98-11958. Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement United States of America, State of New York, and State of Illinois v. Sony Corporation of America, LTM Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Loews Theatres, Cineplex Odeon Corporation, and J.E. ...  

  • [Federal Register Volume 63, Number 87 (Wednesday, May 6, 1998)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 25071-25080]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 98-11958]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
    
    Antitrust Division
    [Civil Action No. 98-CIV-2716]
    
    
    Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement United 
    States of America, State of New York, and State of Illinois v. Sony 
    Corporation of America, LTM Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Loews Theatres, 
    Cineplex Odeon Corporation, and J.E. Seagram Corp.
    
        Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and 
    Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h), that a proposed Final Judgment, 
    Stipulation and Order, and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed 
    with the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
    York, Case No. 98-CIV-2716. The proposed Final Judgment is subject to 
    approval by the Court after the expiration of the statutory 60-day 
    public comment period and compliance with the Antitrust Procedures and 
    Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16(b)-(h).
        The United States, the State of New York, and the State of Illinois 
    filed a civil antitrust Complaint on April 16, 1998, alleging that the 
    proposed merger of LTM Holdings, Inc. (``Loews'') and Cineplex Odeon 
    Corporation (``Cineplex'') would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
    15 U.S.C. 18. The Complaint alleges that the proposed merger would have 
    combined the first and second largest theatre chains in Manhattan and 
    Chicago. In Manhattan and Chicago, the combined chains would have had 
    market shares, by revenue, of 67 percent and 77 percent, respectively. 
    The complaint states that the merger would have reduced competition in 
    both markets, leading to higher ticket prices and reduced theatre 
    quality for first-run movies. It also would have allowed the newly 
    merged firm to reduce competition by lowering film rentals paid to 
    distributors for first-run movies.
        The prayer for relief seeks: (a) Adjudication that the proposed 
    merger would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act; (b) permanent 
    injunctive relief preventing the consummation of the proposed merger; 
    (c) an award to each plaintiff of the costs of the action; and (d) such 
    other relief as is proper.
        A Stipulation and Order and a proposed Final Judgment were filed 
    with the court at the same time the Complaint was filed. The proposed 
    Final Judgment requires Loews and Cineplex to divest 14 theatres in 
    Manhattan and 11 theatres in the Chicago area to a buyer or buyers, 
    acceptable to the United States (after consultation with the State of 
    New York or the State of Illinois as the case may be), that will 
    continue to operate them as movie theatres. Unless the United States 
    grants a time extension, the divestitures must be completed within one-
    hundred and eighty (180) calendar days after the filing of the 
    Complaint in this matter or five (5) days after notice of the entry of 
    the Final Judgment by the Court, whichever is later.
        If the divestitures are not completed within the divestiture 
    period, the Court, upon application of the United States, is to appoint 
    a trustee selected by the United States to sell the assets. The 
    proposed Final Judgment also requires that, until the divestitures 
    mandated by the Final Judgment have been accomplished, Loews and 
    Cineplex must maintain and operate the 25 theatres to be divested as 
    active competitors, maintain the management, staffing, sales, and 
    marketing of the theatres, and maintain the theatres in operable 
    condition at current capacity configurations. Further, the proposed 
    Final Judgment requires defendants to give the United States prior 
    notice regarding future motion picture theatre acquisitions in 
    Manhattan or Cook County, Illinois.
        The plaintiffs and the defendants have stipulated that the proposed 
    Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of 
    the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that 
    the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the 
    provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations 
    thereof.
        A Competitive Impact Statement filed by the United States describes 
    the Complaint, the proposed Final Judgment, and remedies available to 
    private litigants.
        Public comment is invited within the statutory 60-day comment 
    period. Such comments, and the responses thereto, will be published in 
    the Federal Register and filed with the Court. Written comments should 
    be directed to Craig W. Conrath, Chief, Merger Task Force, Antitrust 
    Division, 1401 H Street, NW., Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530 
    (telephone: 202-307-0001).
        Copies of the Complaint, Stipulation and Order, proposed Final 
    Judgment, and Competitive Impact Statement are available for inspection 
    in Room 215 of the Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, 325 7th 
    Street, NW., Washington, DC 20530 (telephone: 202-514-2481) and at the 
    office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the 
    Southern District of New York, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007.
    
    [[Page 25072]]
    
    Copies of any of these materials may be obtained upon request and 
    payment of a copying fee.
    Constance K. Robinson,
    Director of Operations and Merger Enforcement Antitrust Division.
    
    Stipulation and Order
    
        It is stipulated by and between the undersigned parties, by their 
    respective attorneys, as follows:
        1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this 
    action and over each of the parties hereto, and venue of this action is 
    proper in the Southern District of New York;
        2. The parties stipulate that a Final Judgment in the form hereto 
    attached may be filed and entered by the Court, upon the motion of any 
    party or upon the Court's own motion, at any time after compliance with 
    the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (15 
    U.S.C. 16), and without further notice to any party or other 
    proceedings, provided that plaintiff the United States has not 
    withdrawn its consent, which it may do at any time before the entry of 
    the proposed Final Judgment by serving notice thereof on defendants and 
    by filing that notice with the Court;
        3. The defendants (as defined in paragraph II (B)-(F) of the 
    proposed Final Judgment attached hereto) shall abide by and comply with 
    the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment pending entry of the 
    Final Judgment by the Court, and shall, from the date of the filing of 
    this Stipulation by the parties, comply with all the terms and 
    provisions of the proposed Final Judgment as though the same were in 
    full force and effect as an order of the Court;
        4. Defendants shall not consummate their transaction before the 
    Court has signed this Stipulation and Order;
        5. In the event plaintiff United States withdraws its consent, as 
    provided in paragraph 2 above, or if the proposed Final Judgment is not 
    entered pursuant to this Stipulation, the time has expired for all 
    appeals of any Court ruling declining entry of the proposed Final 
    Judgment, and the Court has not otherwise ordered continued compliance 
    with the terms and provisions of the proposed Final Judgment, this 
    Stipulation shall be of no effect whatever, and the making of this 
    Stipulation shall be without prejudice to any party in this or any 
    other proceeding;
        6. Loews and Cineplex represent that the divestitures ordered in 
    the proposed Final Judgment can and will be made, and that Loews and 
    Cineplex will later raise no claims of hardship or difficulty as 
    grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestiture 
    provisions contained therein;
        7. All parties agree that this agreement can be signed in multiple 
    counterparts.
    
        Dated: April 16, 1998.
    
        For Plaintiff United States:
    
    Allen P. Grunes (AG 4775),
    U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Merger Task Force, 
    1401 H Street, NW, Suite 4000, Washington DC 20530, (202) 307-0001.
    
        For Plaintiff State of New York:
    
     Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney General.
    By: Stephen D. Houck (SH 0959),
    Assistant Attorney General in Charge, Antitrust Bureau, Office of 
    the Attorney General, State of New York, 120 Broadway, New York, NY 
    10271, (212) 416-8280.
    
        For Plaintiff State of Illinois:
    
    James E. Ryan, Attorney General.
    By: Christine H. Rosso (CR 3708),
    Chief, Antitrust Bureau, Office of the Attorney General, State of 
    Illinois, 100 West Randolph Street, 13th Floor, Chicago, Illinois 
    60601, (312) 814-5610.
    
        For Defendants Sony Corporation of America and LTM Holdings, 
    Inc.:
    
    Ira S. Sacks (IS 2861),
    Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, One New York Plaza, New 
    York, NY 10004, (212) 859-8000.
    
        For Defendant Cineplex Odeon Corporation:
    
    Alan J. Weinschel (AW 5659),
    Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 767 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10153, 
    (212) 310-8000.
    
        For Defendant J. E. Seagram Corp.:
    
    Kenneth R. Logan (KL 7745),
    Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, 425 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 
    10017, (212) 455-2000.
    So ordered:
    United States District Judge
    
    Final Judgment
    
        Whereas, plaintiffs, the United States of America, the State of New 
    York, and the State of Illinois filed their Complaint in this action on 
    April 16, 1998, and plaintiffs and defendants by their respective 
    attorneys, having consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without 
    trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and without 
    this Final Judgment constituting any evidence against or an admission 
    by any party with respect to any issue of law or fact herein;
        And whereas, defendants have agreed to be bound by the provisions 
    of this Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
        And whereas, plaintiffs intend Loews and Cineplex, as hereinafter 
    defined, to be required to preserve competition by promptly divesting 
    the 14 theatres in Manhattan and 11 theatres in Chicago identified 
    below;
        And whereas, plaintiffs required Loews and Cineplex to make the 
    divestitures for the purpose of establishing one or more viable 
    competitors in both Manhattan and Chicago in the exhibition of first-
    run motion pictures;
        And whereas, Loews and Cineplex have represented to the plaintiffs 
    that the divestitures ordered herein can and will be made and that 
    Loews and Cineplex will later raise no claims of hardship or difficulty 
    as grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the divestitures 
    contained below;
        Now, therefore, before the taking of any testimony, and without 
    trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon 
    consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby Ordered, Adjudged, And 
    Decreed as follows:
    
    I. Jurisdiction
    
        This Court has jurisdiction over each of the parties hereto and 
    over the subject matter of this action. The Complaint states a claim by 
    the plaintiffs upon which relief may be granted against the defendants, 
    as hereinafter defined, under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended 
    (15 U.S.C. 18).
    
    II. Definitions
    
        As used in this Final Judgment:
        A. DoJ means the Antitrust Division of the United States Department 
    of Justice.
        B. Loews means defendant LTM Holdings, Inc. d/b/a/ Loews Theatres, 
    a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in New York, New York, and 
    its successors, assigns, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, 
    partnerships and joint ventures, and directors, officers, managers, 
    agents, and employees.
        C. Cineplex means Cineplex Odeon Corporation, an Ontario 
    corporation with its headquarters in Toronto, Canada, and its 
    successors, assigns, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, 
    partnerships and joint ventures, and directors, officers, managers, 
    agents, and employees.
        D. Sony means defendant Sony Corporation of America, a New York 
    corporation with its headquarters in New York, New York, and its 
    successors, assigns, subsidiaries, divisions, groups, affiliates, 
    partnerships and joint ventures, and directors, officers, managers, 
    agents, and employees.
        E. Seagram means defendant J.E. Seagram Corp., a Delaware 
    corporation with its headquarters in New York, New York, and its 
    successors, assigns, subsidiaries (including but not limited to 
    Universal Studios, Inc.), divisions, groups, affiliates, partnerships 
    and joint
    
    [[Page 25073]]
    
    ventures, and directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees.
        F. Defendants means Loews, Cineplex, Sony and Seagram.
        G. The Manhattan theatre assets means the motion picture theatre 
    businesses operated by Loews and Cineplex under the following names at 
    the following addresses in Manhattan, New York:
    
        i. Chelsea, 260 West 23rd Street.
        ii. Chelsea West, 333 West 23rd Street.
        iii. 62nd & First, 400 East 62nd Street.
        iv. Ziegfeld, 141 West 54th Street.
        v. Park & 86th Street, 125 East 86th Street.
        vi. Waverly Twin, 323 Sixth Avenue.
        vii. Olympia, 2770 Broadway.
        viii. Art Greenwich, 97 Greenwich Avenue.
        ix. Metro Twin, 2626 Broadway.
        x. Beekman, 1254 Second Avenue.
        xi. Regency, 1987 Broadway.
        xii. 62nd Street & Broadway, 1871 Broadway.
        xiii. 59th Street East, 239 East 59th Street.
        xiv. 34th Street Showplace, 238 East 34th Street.
    
        The term Manhattan theatre assets includes all tangible and 
    intangible assets used in the operation of these theatres including: 
    All real property (owned or leased); all personal property, inventory, 
    office furniture, fixed assets and fixtures, materials, supplies, and 
    other tangible property or improvements used in the operation of the 
    theatres; all licenses, permits and authorizations issued by any 
    governmental organization relating to the operation of the theatres; 
    and all contracts, agreements, leases, licenses, commitments and 
    understandings pertaining to the theatres including supply agreements 
    and licenses to exhibit motion pictures.
        H. The Chicago theatre assets means the motion picture theatre 
    businesses operated by Loews and Cineplex under the following names at 
    the following addresses in Cook County, Illinois:
    
        i. 600 North Michigan, 600 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago.
        ii. 900 North Michigan, 900 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago.
        iii. Biograph, 2433 N. Lincoln Ave., Chicago.
        iv. Bricktown, 6420 W. Fullerton, Chicago.
        v. Watertower 1-4, 845 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago.
        vi. Watertower 5-7, 175 East Chestnut, Chicago.
        vii. Burnham Plaza, 826 S. Wabash, Chicago.
        viii. Broadway, 3175 N. Broadway, Chicago.
        ix. Hyde Park Quad, 5238 S. Harper, Chicago.
        x. River Run Eightplex, 16621 Torrence Ave., Lansing.
        xi. Old Orchard Quad, 9400 Skokie Blvd., Skokie.
    
        The term Chicago theatre assets includes all tangible and 
    intangible assets used in the operation of these theatres including: 
    All real property (owned or leased); all personal property, inventory, 
    office furniture, fixed assets and fixtures, materials, supplies, and 
    other tangible property or improvements used in the operation of the 
    theatres; all licenses, permits and authorizations issued by any 
    governmental organization relating to the operation of the theatres; 
    and all contracts, agreements, leases, licenses, commitments and 
    understandings pertaining to the theatres including supply agreements 
    and licenses to exhibit motion pictures.
        I. Acquirer means the entity or entities to whom Loews and Cineplex 
    divest the Manhattan theatre assets or the Chicago theatre assets under 
    this Final Judgment.
    
    III. Applicability
    
        A. The provisions of this Final Judgment apply to the defendants, 
    their successors and assigns, their subsidiaries, directors, officers, 
    managers, agents, and employees, and all other persons in active 
    concert or participation with any of them who shall have received 
    actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise.
        B. Each defendant shall require, as a condition of the sale or 
    other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets used in its 
    business of operating motion picture theatres in either Manhattan or 
    Cook County, Illinois, that the acquiring party or parties agree to be 
    bound by the provisions of this Final Judgment; provided, however, that 
    Loews and Cineplex need not obtain such an agreement from an Acquirer 
    in connection with the divestiture of the Manhattan theatre assets or 
    the Chicago theatre assets.
    
    IV. Divestiture
    
        A. Loews and Cineplex are hereby ordered and directed in accordance 
    with the terms of this Final Judgment, within one-hundred and eighty 
    (180) calendar days after the filing of the Complaint in this matter or 
    five (5) days after notice of the entry of this Final Judgment by the 
    Court, whichever is later, to divest the Manhattan theatre assets to an 
    Acquirer or Acquirers acceptable to DoJ in its sole discretion after 
    consultation with the State of New York and divest the Chicago theatre 
    assets to an Acquirer or Acquirers acceptable to DoJ in its sole 
    discretion after consultation with the State of Illinois.
        B. Loews and Cineplex shall use their best efforts to accomplish 
    the divestitures as expeditiously and timely as possible. DoJ, in its 
    sole discretion, may extend the time period for any divestiture for two 
    (2) additional thirty (30) day periods of time, not to exceed sixty 
    (60) calendar days in total.
        C. In accomplishing the divestitures ordered by this Final 
    Judgment, Loews and Cineplex promptly shall make known, by usual and 
    customary means, the availability of the Manhattan theatre assets and 
    the Chicago theatre assets described in this Final Judgment. Loews and 
    Cineplex shall inform any person making an inquiry regarding a possible 
    purchase that the sale is being made pursuant to this Final Judgment 
    and provide such person with a copy of this Final Judgment. Loews and 
    Cineplex shall also offer to furnish to all prospective Acquirers, 
    subject to customary confidentiality assurances, all information 
    regarding the Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets 
    customarily provided in a due diligence process except such information 
    subject to attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product 
    privilege. Loews and Cineplex shall make available such information to 
    DoJ at the same time that such information is made available to any 
    other person.
        D. Loews and Cineplex shall permit prospective Acquirers of the 
    Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets to have 
    reasonable access to personnel and to make such inspection of the 
    physical facilities of the Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago 
    theatre assets and any and all financial, operational, or other 
    documents and information customarily provided as part of a due 
    diligence process.
        E. The defendants shall not take any action that will impede in any 
    way the operation of the Manhattan theatre assets or the Chicago 
    theatre assets.
        F. Unless DoJ otherwise consents in writing, the divestitures 
    pursuant to Section IV, or by trustee appointed pursuant to Section V 
    of this Final Judgment, shall include the entire Manhattan theatre 
    assets and Chicago theatre assets and be accomplished by selling or 
    otherwise conveying the Manhattan theatre assets and Chicago theatre 
    assets to an Acquirer or Acquirers in such a way as to satisfy DoJ in 
    its sole discretion (after consultation with the State of New York or 
    the State of Illinois as the case may be), that the Manhattan theatre 
    assets and the Chicago theatre assets can and will be used by the 
    Acquirer(s) as part of a viable, ongoing business of exhibition of 
    first-run films. Divestiture of the
    
    [[Page 25074]]
    
    Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets may be made to 
    one or more Acquirers provided that in each instance it is demonstrated 
    to the sole satisfaction of DoJ (after consultation with the State of 
    New York or the State of Illinois as the case may be) that the 
    Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets will remain 
    viable and the divestiture of such assets will remedy the competitive 
    harm alleged in the complaint. The divestitures, whether pursuant to 
    Section IV or Section V of this Final Judgment: (1) Shall be made to an 
    Acquirer or Acquirers who it is demonstrated to DoJ's sole satisfaction 
    (after consultation with the State of New York or the State of Illinois 
    as the case may be) has or have the intent and capability (including 
    the necessary managerial, operational, and financial capability) of 
    competing effectively in the business of exhibition of first-run films; 
    (2) shall be accomplished so as to satisfy DoJ, in its sole discretion 
    (after consultation with the State of New York or the State of Illinois 
    as the case may be), that none of the terms of any agreement between an 
    Acquirer and Loews or Cineplex give Loews or Cineplex the ability 
    unreasonably to raise the Acquirer's costs, to lower the Acquirer's 
    efficiency, or otherwise to interfere in the ability of the Acquirer to 
    compete effectively.
    
    V. Appointment of Trustee
    
        A. In the event that Loews and Cineplex have not divested the 
    Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets within the time 
    specified in Section IV(A) of this Final Judgment, the Court shall 
    appoint, on application of the United States, a trustee selected by DoJ 
    to effect the divestiture of the Manhattan theatre assets and the 
    Chicago theatre assets.
        B. After the appointment of a trustee becomes effective, only the 
    trustee shall have the right to sell the Manhattan theatre assets and 
    the Chicago theatre assets. The trustee shall have the power and 
    authority to accomplish the divestitures at the best price then 
    obtainable upon a reasonable effort by the trustee, subject to the 
    provisions of Sections IV and X of this Final Judgment, and shall have 
    such other powers as the Court shall deem appropriate. Subject to 
    Section V (C) of this Final Judgment, the trustee shall have the power 
    and authority to hire at the cost and expense of Loews and Cineplex any 
    investment bankers, attorneys, or other agents reasonably necessary in 
    the judgment of the trustee to assist in the divestitures, and such 
    professionals and agents shall be accountable solely to the trustee. 
    The trustee shall have the power and authority to accomplish the 
    Manhattan theatre assets divestitures at the earliest possible time to 
    an Acquirer or Acquirers acceptable to DoJ in its sole discretion 
    (after consultation with the State of New York), and the Chicago 
    theatre assets divestitures at the earliest possible time to an Aquirer 
    or Acquirers acceptable to DoJ in its sole discretion (after 
    consultation with the State of Illinois), and shall have such other 
    powers as this Court shall deem appropriate. Loews and Cineplex shall 
    not object to a sale by the trustee on any grounds other than the 
    trustee's malfeasance. Any such objections by Loews and Cineplex must 
    be conveyed in writing to plaintiffs and the trustee within ten (10) 
    calendar days after the trustee has provided the notice required under 
    Section VII of this Final Judgment.
        C. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of Loews and 
    Cineplex, on such terms and conditions as the Court may prescribe, and 
    shall account for all monies derived from the sale of the assets sold 
    by the trustee and all costs and expenses so incurred. After approval 
    by the Court of the trustee's accounting, including fees for its 
    services and those of any professionals and agents retained by the 
    trustee, all remaining money shall be paid to Loews and Cineplex and 
    the trust shall then be terminated. The compensation of such trustee 
    and of any professionals and agents retained by the trustee shall be 
    reasonable in light of the value of the divested business and based on 
    a fee arrangement providing the trustee with an incentive based on the 
    price and terms of the divestitures and the speed with which they are 
    accomplished.
        D. Loews and Cineplex shall use their best efforts to assist the 
    trustee in accomplishing the required divestitures, including best 
    efforts to effect all necessary consents and regulatory approvals. The 
    trustee, and any consultants, accountants, attorneys and other persons 
    retained by the trustee, shall have full and complete access to the 
    personnel, books, records, and facilities of the businesses to be 
    divested, and Loews and Cineplex shall develop financial or other 
    information relevant to the business to be divested customarily 
    provided in a due diligence process as the trustee may reasonably 
    request, subject to customary confidentiality assurances. Loews and 
    Cineplex shall permit prospective Acquirers of the assets to have 
    reasonable access to personnel and to make such inspection of physical 
    facilities and any and all financial, operational or other documents 
    and other information as may be relevant to the divestitures required 
    by this Final Judgment.
        E. After its appointment, the trustee shall file monthly reports 
    with the parties and the Court setting forth the trustee's efforts to 
    accomplish the divestitures ordered pursuant to this Final Judgment; 
    provided, however, that to the extent such reports contain information 
    that the trustee deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in 
    the public docket of the Court. Such reports shall include the name, 
    address and telephone number of each person who, during the preceding 
    month, made an offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, 
    entered into negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an 
    inquiry about acquiring, any interest in the businesses to be divested, 
    and shall describe in detail each contact with any such person during 
    that period. The trustee shall maintain full records of all efforts 
    made to divest the business to be divested.
        F. If the trustee has not accomplished such divestitures within six 
    (6) months after its appointment, the trustee thereupon shall file 
    promptly with the Court a report setting forth (1) the trustee's 
    efforts to accomplish the required divestitures, (2) the reasons, in 
    the trustee's judgment, why the required divestitures have not been 
    accomplished, and (3) the trustee's recommendations; provided, however, 
    that to the extent such reports contain information that the trustee 
    deems confidential, such reports shall not be filed in the public 
    docket of the Court. The trustee shall at the same time furnish such 
    report to the parties, who shall each have the right to be heard and to 
    make additional recommendations consistent with the purpose of the 
    trust. The Court shall enter thereafer such orders as it shall deem 
    appropriate in order to carry out the purpose of the trust which may, 
    if necessary, include extending the trust and the term of the trustee's 
    appointment by a period requested by DoJ.
    
    VI. Notice
    
        Unless such transaction is otherwise subject to the reporting and 
    waiting period requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
    Improvements Act of 1976, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18a (the ``HSR Act''), 
    defendants, without providing advance notification to DoJ, shall not 
    directly or indirectly acquire any assets of or any interest, including 
    any financial, security, loan, equity or management interest, in any 
    then-existing motion picture theatre in either
    
    [[Page 25075]]
    
    Manhattan in the State of New York or in Cook County in the State of 
    Illinois. Such notification shall be provided to the DoJ in the same 
    format as, and per the instructions relating to the Notification and 
    Report Form set forth in the Appendix to Part 803 of Title 16 of the 
    Code of Federal Regulations as amended, except that the information 
    requested in Items 5-9 of the instructions must be provided only with 
    respect to defendants' motion picture theatre operations in Manhattan 
    in the State of New York or in Cook County in the State of Illinois. 
    Notification shall be provided at least thirty (30) days prior to 
    acquiring any such interest, and shall include, beyond what may be 
    required by the applicable instructions, the names of the principal 
    representatives of the parties to the agreement who negotiated the 
    agreement, and any management or strategic plans discussing the 
    proposed transaction. If within the 30-day period after notification, 
    representatives of DoJ make a written request for additional 
    information, defendants shall not consummate the proposed transaction 
    or agreement until twenty (20) days after submitting all such 
    additional information. Early termination of the waiting periods in 
    this paragraph may be requested and, where appropriate, granted in the 
    same manner as is applicable under the requirements and provisions of 
    the HSR Act and rules promulgated thereunder. This Section shall be 
    broadly construed and any ambiguity or uncertainty regarding the filing 
    of notice under this Section shall be resolved in favor of filing 
    notice.
    
    VII. Notification
    
        Within two (2) business days following execution of a definitive 
    agreement, contingent upon compliance with the terms of this Final 
    Judgment, to effect, in whole or in part, any proposed divestitures 
    pursuant to Sections IV or V of this Final Judgment, Loews and Cineplex 
    or the trustee, whichever is then responsible for effecting the 
    divestitures, shall notify DoJ, and, as the case may be, in the State 
    of New York or the State of Illinois of the proposed divestitures. If 
    the trustee is responsible, it shall similarly notify Loews and 
    Cineplex. The notice shall set forth the details of the proposed 
    transaction and list the name, address, and telephone number of each 
    person not previously identified who offered to, or expressed an 
    interest in or a desire to, acquire any ownership interest in the 
    businesses to be divested that are the subject of the binding contract, 
    together with full details of same. Within fifteen (15) calendar days 
    of receipt by DoJ of notice, DoJ may request from Loews or Cineplex, 
    the proposed Acquirer, or any other third party additional information 
    concerning the proposed divestitures and the proposed Acquirer. Loews 
    and Cineplex and the trustee shall furnish any additional information 
    requested from them within fifteen (15) calendar days of the receipt of 
    the request, unless the parties shall otherwise agree. Within thirty 
    (30) calendar days after receipt of the notice or within twenty (20) 
    calendar days after DoJ has been provided the additional information 
    requested from Loews and Cineplex, the proposed Acquirer, and any third 
    party, whichever is later, DoJ shall provide written notice to Loews 
    and Cineplex and the trustee, if there is one, stating whether or not 
    it objects to the proposed divestitures. If DoJ provides written notice 
    to Loews and Cineplex and the trustee that DoJ does not object, then 
    the divestitures may be consummated, subject only to Loews and 
    Cineplex's limited right to object to the sale under Section V(B) of 
    this Final Judgment. Absent written notice that DoJ does not object to 
    the proposed Acquirer or upon objection by DoJ, a divestiture proposed 
    under Section IV or Section V may not be consummated. Upon objection by 
    Loews and Cineplex under the provision in Section V(B), a divestiture 
    proposed under Section V shall not be consummated unless approved by 
    the Court.
    
    VIII. Affidavits
    
        A. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint 
    in this matter and every thirty (30) calendar days thereafter until the 
    divestitures have been completed whether pursuant to Section IV or 
    Section V of this Final Judgment, Loews and Cineplex shall deliver to 
    DoJ an affidavit as to the fact and manner of compliance with Sections 
    IV or V of this Final Judgment. Each such affidavit shall include, 
    inter alia, the name, address, and telephone number of each person who, 
    at any time after the period coverage by the last such report, made an 
    offer to acquire, expressed an interest in acquiring, entered into 
    negotiations to acquire, or was contacted or made an inquiry about 
    acquiring, any interest in the businesses to be divested, and shall 
    describe in detail each contact with any such person during that 
    period. Each such affidavit shall also include a description of the 
    efforts that Loews and Cineplex have taken to solicit a buyer for the 
    relevant assets and to provide required information to prospective 
    Acquirers.
        B. Within twenty (20) calendar days of the filing of the Complaint 
    in this matter, Loews and Cineplex shall deliver to DOJ an affidavit 
    which describes in detail all actions they have taken and all steps 
    they have implemented on an on-going basis to preserve the Manhattan 
    theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets pursuant to Section IX of 
    this Final Judgment. The affidavit also shall describe, but not be 
    limited to, the efforts of Loews and Cineplex to maintain and operate 
    the Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets as active 
    competitors, maintain the management, staffing, sales, and marketing of 
    the Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets, and 
    maintain the Manhattan and the Chicago theatre assets in operable 
    condition at current capacity configurations. Loews and Cineplex shall 
    deliver to DoJ an affidavit describing any changes to the efforts and 
    actions outlined in their earlier affidavit(s) filed pursuant to this 
    Section within fifteen (15) calendar days after the change is 
    implemented.
        C. Until one year after such divestiture has been completed, Loews 
    and Cineplex shall preserve all records of all efforts made to preserve 
    the business to be divested and effect the divestitures.
    
    IX. Preservation of Assets
    
        Until the divestitures required by the Final Judgment have been 
    accomplished, Loews and Cineplex shall take all steps necessary to 
    maintain and operate the Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago 
    theatre assets as active competitors, maintain the management, 
    staffing, sales, and marketing of the Manhattan theatre assets and the 
    Chicago theatre assets, and maintain the Manhattan theatre assets and 
    the Chicago theatre assets in operable condition at current capacity 
    configurations. Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize 
    the divestitures described in this Final Judgment.
    
    X. Financing
    
        The defendants are ordered and directed not to finance all or any 
    part of any purchase by an Acquirer or Acquirers made pursuant to 
    Sections IV or V of this Final Judgment.
    
    XI. Compliance Inspection
    
        For purposes of determining or securing compliance with the Final 
    Judgment and subject to any legally recognized privilege, from time to 
    time:
        A. Duly authorized representatives of the plaintiffs, upon the 
    written request of the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
    Antitrust Division, the New York Attorney General or the Illinois 
    Attorney General, and on
    
    [[Page 25076]]
    
    reasonable notice to the defendants made to their principal offices, 
    shall be permitted:
        1. Access during office hours of the defendants to inspect and copy 
    all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other 
    records and documents in the possession or under the control of the 
    defendants, who may have counsel present, relating to the matters 
    contained in this Final Judgment; and
        2. Subject to the reasonable convenience of the defendants and 
    without restraint or interference from any of them, to interview, 
    either informally or on the record, their officers, employees, and 
    agents, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters.
        B. Upon the written request of the Assistant Attorney General in 
    charge of the Antitrust Division, the New York Attorney General, or the 
    Illinois Attorney General made to the defendants' principal offices, 
    the defendants shall submit such written reports, under oath if 
    requested, with respect to any matter contained in the Final Judgment.
        C. No information or documents obtained by the means provided in 
    Sections VIII or XI of this Final Judgment shall be divulged by a 
    representative of the plaintiffs to any person other than a duly 
    authorized representative of the Executive Branch of the United States, 
    or of each state government, except in the course of legal proceedings 
    to which at least one of the plaintiffs is a party (including grand 
    jury proceedings,), or for the purpose of securing compliance with this 
    Final Judgment, or as otherwise required by law.
        D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by the 
    defendants to the plaintiffs, the defendants represent and identify in 
    writing the material in any such information or documents to which a 
    claim of protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal 
    Rules of Civil Procedure, and the defendants mark each pertinent page 
    of such material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(7) 
    of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then ten (10) calendar days 
    notice shall be given by the plaintiffs to the defendants prior to 
    divulging such material in any legal proceeding (other than a grand 
    jury proceeding) to which the defendants are not a party.
    
    XII. Retention of Jurisdiction
    
        Jurisidiction is retained by this Court for the purpose of enabling 
    any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any 
    time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or 
    appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Final 
    Judgment, for the modification of any of the provisions hereof, for the 
    enforcement of compliance herewith, and for the punishment of any 
    violations hereof.
    
    XIII. Termination
    
        Unless this Court grants an extension, this Final Judgment will 
    expire upon the tenth anniversary of the date of its entry.
    
    XIV. Public Interest
    
        Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.
    
    Dated------------------------------------------------------------------
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    United States District Judge
    
    Competitive Impact Statement
    
        Plaintiff, the United States of America, pursuant to Section 2(b) 
    of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA''), 15 U.S.C. 
    16(b)-(h), files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the 
    proposed Final Judgment submitted for entry in this civil antitrust 
    proceeding.
    
    I. Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
    
        Plaintiffs the United States, the State of New York, and the State 
    of Illinois filed a civil antitrust Complaint on April 16, 1998, 
    alleging that a proposed merger of LTM Holdings, Inc. (``Loews'') and 
    Cineplex Odeon Corp. (``Cineplex'') would violate Section 7 of the 
    Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. The Complaint alleges that Loews and 
    Cineplex both operate motion picture theatres throughout the United 
    States, and that they each operate first-run motion picture theatres in 
    Manhattan and Chicago. The merger would combine the two leading theatre 
    circuits in both Manhattan and Chicago and give the newly merged firm a 
    dominant position in both localities: in Manhattan, the newly merged 
    firm would have a 67% market share (by revenue) and in Chicago, the 
    newly merged firm would have a 77% market share (by revenue). As a 
    result, the combination would substantially lessen competition and tend 
    to create a monopoly in the markets for theatrical exhibition of first-
    run films in both Manhattan and Chicago.
        The prayer for relief seeks: (1) an adjudication that the proposed 
    merger described in the Complaint would violate Section 7 of the 
    Clayton Act; (b) permanent injunctive relief preventing the 
    consummation of the transaction; (c) an award to each plaintiff of the 
    costs of this action; and (d) such other relief as is proper.
        Shortly before this suit was filed, a proposed settlement was 
    reached that permits Loews to complete its merger with Cineplex, yet 
    preserved competition in the markets in which the transactions would 
    raise significant competitive concerns. A Stipulation and proposed 
    Final Judgment embodying the settlement were filed at the same time the 
    Complaint was filed.
        The proposed Final Judgment orders Loews and Cineplex to divest 14 
    theatres in Manhattan and 11 theatres in the Chicago area to an 
    acquirer acceptable to the United States. Unless the United States 
    grants a time extension, the divestitures must be completed within one-
    hundred and eighty (180) calendar days after the filing of the 
    Complaint in this matter or five (5) days after notice of the entry of 
    this Final Judgment by the Court, whichever is later.
        If the divestitures are not completed within the divestiture 
    period, the Court, upon application of the United States, is to appoint 
    a trustee selected by the United States to sell the assets. The 
    proposed Final Judgment also requires that, until the divestitures 
    mandated by the Final Judgment have been accomplished, the defendants 
    must maintain and operate the 25 theatres to be divested as active 
    competitors, maintain the management, staffing, sales, and marketing of 
    the theatres, and maintain the theatres in operable condition at 
    current capacity configurations. Further, the proposed Final Judgment 
    requires defendants to give the United States prior notice regarding 
    future motion picture theatre acquisitions in Manhattan or Cook County, 
    Illinois.
        The plaintiffs and the defendants have stipulated that the proposed 
    Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. Entry of 
    the proposed Final Judgment would terminate this action, except that 
    the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or enforce the 
    provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish violations 
    thereof.
    
    II. The Alleged Violations
    
    A. The Defendants
    
        Sony Corporation of America is a New York corporation with its 
    headquarters in New York, New York.
        LTM Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware corporation which does business 
    under the name Loews Theatres and has its principal executive offices 
    in New York, New York. Loews is an indirect wholly
    
    [[Page 25077]]
    
    owned subsidiary of Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., itself an 
    indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Sony Corporation of America, which 
    in turn is an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Sony Corporation, a 
    Japanese company. Loews currently operates 139 theatres with 1,035 
    screens in 16 states. Its annual revenues for the fiscal year ending 
    February 28, 1997 were approximately $375 million.
        Cinceplex is a Canadian corporation headquartered in Toronto, 
    Ontario. It currently operates a total of 312 theatres with 1,723 
    screens in the United States, Canada and Hungary. Its United States 
    operations consist of 911 screens at 175 locations in 13 states and the 
    District of Columbia. Cineplex had annual revenues of approximately 
    $500 million in 1996.
        J.E. Seagram Corp. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in New 
    York, New York. Its subsidiary, Universal Studios, Inc., is the largest 
    shareholder of Cineplex.
    
    B. Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violations
    
        On September 30, 1997, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., LTM 
    Holdings, Inc. and Cineplex entered into a merger agreement. Pursuant 
    to the agreement, Cineplex will become a wholly owned subsidiary of LTM 
    Holdings, Inc., and Sony Pictures Entertainment will transfer all of 
    its U.S. theatre assets not owned by LTM Holdings, Inc. to LTM 
    Holdings, Inc. or its subsidiaries. LTM Holdings, Inc. will then be 
    renamed Loews Cineplex Entertainment Corporation (``LCE''). Following 
    the merger, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. will own approximately 51% 
    of LCE and Universal Studios, Inc. will own approximately 26% of LCE.
        Loews and Cineplex compete in the theatrical exhibition of first-
    run films in Manhattan and Chicago: They compete to obtain films from 
    film distributors and to attract movie-goers to their theatres. The 
    proposed merger, and the threatened loss of competition that would be 
    caused thereby, precipitated the government's suit.
    
    C. Anticompetitive Consequences of the Proposed Transaction
    
        The Complaint alleges that the theatrical exhibition of first-run 
    films in Manhattan and Chicago each constitutes a line of commerce and 
    section of the country, or relevant market, for antitrust purposes. 
    First-run films differ significantly from other forms of entertainment. 
    The experience of viewing a film in a theatre is an inherently 
    different experience from a live show, a sporting event, or viewing a 
    videotape in the home. Ticket prices for first-run films are also 
    generally very different than for other forms of entertainment. A small 
    but significant increase in the price of tickets for first-run films 
    would not cause a sufficient shift to other forms of entertainment to 
    make the increase unprofitable.
        From a movie-goer's standpoint, theatres outside Manhattan and 
    Chicago are not acceptable substitutes for theatres within those areas. 
    A small but significant increase in the price of tickets for first-run 
    films would not cause a sufficient shift to theatres outside Manhattan 
    or Chicago to make the increase unprofitable.
        From a distributor's standpoint, there is no alternative to 
    screening its first-run films in first-run theatres. Given the high 
    population densities and number of significant critics in both 
    Manhattan and Chicago, ``passing'' (i.e., not playing a film in) 
    Manhattan and Chicago is not a viable option. From the distributor 
    standpoint as well, a small but significant decrease in prices (i.e., a 
    decrease in film rental fees) would not cause a sufficient shift by 
    distributors to other locations to make the decrease unprofitable to 
    exhibitors.
        The Complaint alleges that the merger of Loews and Cineplex would 
    lessen competition substantially and tend to create a monopoly in the 
    markets for exhibition of first-run films in Manhattan and Chicago. The 
    proposed transaction would create further market concentration in 
    already highly concentrated markets, and the merged firm would control 
    a majority of box office revenues in those markets. In Manhattan, the 
    market share possessed by the largest theatre circuit would rise from 
    46% percent to 67% percent of box office revenues after the proposed 
    transaction. According to the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (``HHI''), a 
    widely-used measure of market concentration defined and explained in 
    Appendix A, the merged firm's post-transaction HHI in Manhattan would 
    be 4815, representing an increase of 1911 points. In Chicago, the 
    market share possessed by the largest theatre circuit would rise from 
    47% percent to 77% percent of box office revenues after the proposed 
    transaction. The post-transaction HHI would equal 6438, representing an 
    increase of 2874 points. These substantial increases in concentration 
    would likely lead the merged firm to raise ticket prices.
        Distributors and exhibitors often break the Manhattan and Chicago 
    markets into ``zones'' that reflect various neighborhoods--such as, in 
    Manhattan, the Upper East Side, the East Side, the West Side, Broadway-
    Times Square, Chelsea, and Greenwich Village, and in Chicago, Downtown, 
    Near North, North, Far North, West, South, and Far South. Movies 
    typically will open and play at only one theatre within a zone. The 
    merger would convert a number of film zones in which Loews and Cineplex 
    compete with each other into zones in which there would be no 
    competition. For instance, in the downtown Chicago zone, the combined 
    entity would control all seven theatres. The same is true in the north 
    zone (Old Orchard/Orchard Gardens), the west zone (Bricktown Square/
    Norridge) and the far south zone (River Run/River Oaks).
        By reducing non-price competition, the merger would also likely 
    lead to lower quality theatres by reducing the incentive to maintain, 
    upgrade and renovate theatres in Manhattan and Chicago, thus reducing 
    the quality of the viewing experience for movie-goer. It also may allow 
    the merged entity to reduce the number of shows as there no longer 
    would be competitive pressure to continue early and late shows.
        Finally, the merger would also likely lead to distributors 
    receiving less in revenue for the exhibition of their pictures, either 
    in the form of reduced (or eliminated) guarantees, higher overhead 
    allowances for the exhibitors, or a less favorable percentage of the 
    box office receipts. The reduced revenue remitted to the distributors 
    could lead to fewer films being produced, or less money being expended 
    on high quality films, to the ultimate detriment of movie-goers.
        New entry into the Manhattan and Chicago markets for exhibition of 
    first-run films would be highly unlikely to eliminate the 
    anticompetitive effects of this transaction. Manhattan and Chicago are 
    two of the most difficult markets in the country to enter: Available 
    theatre sites are scarce, real estate and construction costs are among 
    the highest in the nation, and acquiring the necessary permits and 
    approvals can be difficult and time-consuming. Identifying a site, 
    planning the development, and constructing a theatre in Manhattan or 
    Chicago takes several years.
        For all of these reasons, plaintiff has concluded that the proposed 
    transaction would lessen competition substantially in the exhibition of 
    first-run films in Manhattan and Chicago, eliminate actual and 
    potential competition between Loews and Cineplex, and likely result in 
    increased ticket prices and lower quality theatres in both Manhattan 
    and Chicago. The merger would also likely reduce the rental fees paid 
    to distributors for films. The
    
    [[Page 25078]]
    
    proposed merger therefore violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
    
    III. Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment
    
        The proposed Final Judgment would preserve existing competition in 
    the theatrical exhibition of first-run films in both Manhattan and 
    Chicago. It requires the divestiture of 14 theatres in Manhattan: 13 
    Cineplex theatres (Chelsea, Chelsea West, 1st and 62nd, Ziegfeld, Park 
    & 86th Street, Waverly Twin, Olympia, Art Greenwich, Metro Twin, 
    Beekman, Regency, 62nd & Broadway, and 59th Street East) and one Loews 
    theatre (34th Street Showplace); and 11 theatres in the Chicago area: 8 
    Cineplex Odeon theatres (600 North Michigan, 900 North Michigan, 
    Biograph, Bricktown, Watertower 1-4, Watertower 5-7, Burnham Plaza, and 
    Broadway) and 3 Loews theatres (Hyde Park Quad, River Run Eightplex, 
    and Old Orchard Quad). The divested theatres constitute slightly more 
    in box office revenue in Manhattan and in Chicago than the leading firm 
    is acquiring in each market and, as a result, will reduce the leading 
    firm's share back to (or actually slightly less than) pre-merger levels 
    in both markets. The divestitures will preserve choices for 
    distributors and movie-goers and make it less likely that ticket prices 
    will increase, rental fees paid to distributors will decrease, and 
    theatre quality will decline in Manhattan and Chicago as a result of 
    the transaction.
        Two of the divestitures in the Chicago area are outside of the city 
    limits: Old Orchard Quad and the River Run Eightplex. In a case like 
    this, where theatres are geographically differentiated and consumers' 
    willingness to travel is varied, some movie-goers near the border have 
    options outside the city limits. Accordingly, we have negotiated relief 
    that includes two theatres outside of Chicago. Both of these theatres 
    are in close proximity to the city, are near major highways, and are in 
    zones that would be rendered non-competitive by the merger.
        Unless the United States grants an extension of time, the 
    divestitures must be completed within one-hundred and eighty (180) 
    calendar days after the filing of the Complaint in this matter or five 
    (5) days after notice of the entry of this Final Judgment by the Court, 
    whichever is later. Until the divestitures take place, Loews and 
    Cineplex must maintain and operate the 25 theatres to be divested as 
    active competitors, maintain the management, staffing, sales, and 
    marketing of the theatres, and maintain the theatres in operable 
    condition at current capacity configurations.
        The divestitures must be to a purchaser or purchasers acceptable to 
    the United States in its sole discretion, after consultation with the 
    State of New York or the State of Illinois as appropriate. Unless the 
    United States otherwise consents in writing, the divestitures shall 
    include all the assets of the theatres being divested, and shall be 
    accomplished in such a way as to satisfy the United States that such 
    assets can and will be used as viable, ongoing first-run theatres.
        If defendants fail to divest these theatres within the time periods 
    specified in the Final Judgment, the Court, upon application of the 
    United States, is to appoint a trustee nominated by the United States 
    to effect the divestitures. If a trustee is appointed, the proposed 
    Final Judgment provides that Loews and Cineplex will pay all costs and 
    expenses of the trustee and any professionals and agents retained by 
    the trustee. The compensation paid to the trustee and any persons 
    retained by the trustee shall be both reasonable in light of the value 
    of the theatres remaining to be divested, and based on a fee 
    arrangement providing the trustee with an incentive based on the price 
    and terms of the divestitures and the speed with which they are 
    accomplished. After appointment, the trustee will file monthly reports 
    with the parties and the Court, setting for the trustee's efforts to 
    accomplish the divestitures ordered under the proposed Final Judgment. 
    If the trustee has not accomplished the divestitures within six (6) 
    months after its appointment, the trustee shall promptly file with the 
    Court a report setting forth (1) the trustee's efforts to accomplish 
    the required divestitures, (2) the reasons, in the trustee's judgment, 
    why the required divestitures have not been accomplished and (3) the 
    trustee's recommendations. At the same time the trustee will furnish 
    such report to the plaintiff and defendants, who will each have the 
    right to be heard and to make additional recommendations.
        The proposed Final Judgment also prohibits the defendants from 
    acquiring any other threatres in Manhattan or Cook County, Illinois 
    without providing at least thirty (30) days' notice to the U.S. 
    Department of Justice. Such acquisitions could raise competitive 
    concerns but might be too small to be reported otherwise under the 
    Hart-Scott-Rodino (``HSR'') premerger notification statute.
    
    IV. Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants
    
        Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15, provides that any 
    person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the 
    antitrust laws may bring suite in federal court to recover three times 
    the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 
    attorney's fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither 
    impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. 
    Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
    16(a), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any 
    subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against defendants.
    
    V. Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final 
    Judgment
    
        The parties have stipulated that the proposed Final Judgment may be 
    entered by the Court after compliance with the provisions of the APPA, 
    provided that plaintiff United States has not withdrawn its consent. 
    The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's determination that the 
    proposed Final Judgment is in the public interest.
        The APPA provides a period of at least sixty (60) days preceding 
    the effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any 
    person may submit to the plaintiff written comments regarding the 
    proposed Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so 
    within sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive 
    Impact Statement in the Federal Register. The plaintiff will evaluate 
    and respond to the comments. All comments will be given due 
    consideration by the U.S. Department of Justice, which remains free to 
    withdraw its consent to the proposed Final Judgment at any time prior 
    to entry. The comments and the response of the plaintiff will be filed 
    with the Court and published in the Federal Register.
        Written comments should be submitted to: Craig W. Conrath, Chief, 
    Merger Task Force, Antitrust Division, United States Department of 
    Justice, 1401 H Street, NW; Suite 4000, Washington, DC 20530.
        The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains 
    jurisdiction over this action, and that the parties may apply to the 
    Court for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, 
    interpretation or enforcement of the Final Judgment.
    
    VI. Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment
    
        Plaintiff United States considered, as an alternative to the 
    proposed Final
    
    [[Page 25079]]
    
    Judgment, a full trial on the merits of its Complaint against 
    defendants. Plaintiff is satisfied, however, that the divestiture of 
    the Manhattan theatre assets and the Chicago theatre assets and other 
    relief contained in the proposed Final Judgment will preserve viable 
    competition in the first-run exhibition of motion pictures in Manhattan 
    and Chicago. Thus, the proposed Final Judgment would achieve the relief 
    the government might have obtained through litigation, but avoids the 
    time, expense and uncertainty of a full trial on the merits of the 
    Complaint.
    
    VII. Standard of Review Under the APPA for Proposed Final Judgment
    
        The APPA requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust 
    cases brought by the United States be subject to a sixty (60) day 
    comment period, after which the Court shall determine whether entry of 
    the proposed Final Judgment ``is in the public interest.'' In making 
    that determination, the Court may consider--
    
        (1) The competitive impact of such judgment, including 
    termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and 
    modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of 
    alternative remedies actually considered and any other 
    considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;
        (2) The impact of entry of such judgment upon the public 
    generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the 
    violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the 
    public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the 
    issues at trial.
    
        15 U.S.C. 16(e).
        As the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held, 
    this statute permits a court to consider, among other things, the 
    relationship between the remedy secured and the specific allegations 
    set forth in the government's complaint, whether the decree is 
    sufficiently clear, whether enforcement mechanisms are sufficient and 
    whether the decree may positively harm third parties. See United States 
    v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448, 1461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
        In conducting this inquiry, ``[t]he Court is nowhere compelled to 
    go to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the 
    effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement 
    through the consent decree process.''\1\ Rather,
    
        \1\ 119 Cong. Rec. 24598 (1973). See United States v. Gillette 
    Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975). A ``public interest'' 
    determination can be made properly on the basis of the Competitive 
    Impact Statement and Response to Comments filed pursuant to the 
    APPA. Although the APPA authorizes the use of additional procedures, 
    15 U.S.C. 16(f), those procedures are discretionary. A court need 
    not invoke any of them unless it believes that the comments have 
    raised significant issues and that further proceedings would aid the 
    court in resolving those issues. See H.R. Rep. 93-1463, 93rd Cong. 
    2d Sess. 8-9 (1974), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535, 6538.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    [a]bsent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge 
    its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should * 
    * * carefully consider the explanations of the government in the 
    competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order 
    to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the 
    circumstances.
    
        United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 
    para. 61,508. at 71, 980 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
        Accordingly, with respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by 
    the decree, a court may not ``engage in an unrestricted valuation of 
    what relief would best serve the public.'' United States v. BNS, Inc., 
    858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988), Citing United States v. Bechtel 
    Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 
    (1981); see also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1460-62. Precedent requires 
    that,
    
    the balancing of competing social and political interests affected 
    by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first 
    instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's 
    role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the 
    government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to 
    the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a 
    particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but 
    whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public 
    interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the 
    effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.\2\
    
        \2\ Bechtel., 648 F.2d at 666 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
    added); See BNS, 858 F.2d at 463; United States v. National 
    Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1978); 
    Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 716. See also Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1461 
    (whether ``the remedies [obtained in the decree are] so inconsonant 
    with the allegations charged as to fall outside of the `reaches of 
    the public interest' '') (citations omitted).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The proposed Final Judgment, therefore, should not be reviewed 
    under a standard of whether it is certain to eliminate every 
    anticompetitive effect of a particular practice or whether it mandates 
    certainty of free competition in the future. Court approval of a final 
    judgment requires a standard more flexible and less strict than the 
    standard required for a finding of liability. ``[A] proposed decree 
    must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would 
    impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of 
    acceptability or is `within the reaches of public interest.' ''\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \3\ United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 
    131, 151 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 
    460 U.S. 1001 (1983), quoting Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. at 716 
    (citations omitted); United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 605 F. 
    Supp. 619, 622 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        This is strong and effective relief that should fully address the 
    competitive harm posed by the proposed transaction.
    
    VIII. Determinative Documents
    
        There are no determinative materials or documents within the 
    meaning of the APPA that were considered by the plaintiff in 
    formulating the proposed Final Judgment.
    
        Dated: April 16, 1998.
    
        Respectifully submitted,
    
    Allen P. Grunes (AG 4775),
    
    U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H. Street, NW.; 
    Suite 4000, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 307-0001, Attorney for 
    Plaintiff the United States.
    
    Exhibit A Definition of HHI and Calculations for Market
    
        ``HHI'' means the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly accepted 
    measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the 
    market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the 
    resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting of four firms 
    with shares of thirty, thirty, twenty and twenty percent, the HHI is 
    2600 30\2\ + 30\2\ + 20\2\ + 20\2\=2600). The HHI takes into account 
    the relative size and distribution of the firms in a market and 
    approaches zero when a market consists of a large number of firms of 
    relatively equal size. The HHI increases both as the number of firms in 
    the market decreases and as the disparity in size between those firms 
    increases.
        Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 points are 
    considered to be moderately concentrated, and those in which the HHI is 
    in excess of 1800 points are considered to be concentrated. 
    Transactions that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in 
    concentrated markets presumptively raise antitrust concerns under the 
    Merger Guidelines. See Merger Guidelines Sec. 1.51.
    
    Certificate of Service
    
        I, Allen P. Grunes, hereby certify that on April 16, 1998, I caused 
    the foregoing document to be served on defendants by having a copy 
    mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, to:
    
    Ira S. Sacks,
    Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, One New York Plaza, New 
    York, NY 10004, (212) 859-8000.
    
    
    [[Page 25080]]
    
    
        Attorney for defendants Sony Corporation of America and LTM 
    Holdings, Inc.
    
    Alan J. Weinschel,
    Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 767 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10153, 
    (212) 310-8000.
    
        Attorney for defendant Cineplex Odeon Corporation.
    
    Kenneth R. Logan,
    Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, 425 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 
    10017, (212) 455-2000.
    
        Attorney for defendant J.E. Seagram Corp.
    Allen P. Grunes.
    [FR Doc. 98-11958 Filed 5-5-98; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4410-11-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
05/06/1998
Department:
Antitrust Division
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
98-11958
Pages:
25071-25080 (10 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Civil Action No. 98-CIV-2716
PDF File:
98-11958.pdf