94-13213. Custody of Investment Company Assets with Futures Commission Merchants and Commodity Clearing Organizations  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 104 (Wednesday, June 1, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
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    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-13213]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: June 1, 1994]
    
    
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    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
    
    17 CFR Part 270
    
    [Release No. IC-20313, File No. S7-15-94]
    RIN 3235-AF97
    
     
    
    Custody of Investment Company Assets with Futures Commission 
    Merchants and Commodity Clearing Organizations
    
    AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.
    
    ACTION: Proposed rule and request for comment.
    
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    SUMMARY: The Commission is proposing a new rule under the Investment 
    Company Act of 1940 to permit registered management investment 
    companies to use futures commission merchants and commodity clearing 
    organizations as custodians of their assets in connection with futures 
    contracts and commodity options regulated under the Commodity Exchange 
    Act. Currently, investment companies generally must maintain special 
    accounts with their custodian banks for these transactions. The 
    proposed rule would enable investment companies to effect their 
    commodity trades in the same manner as other market participants under 
    conditions designed to ensure the safekeeping of investment company 
    assets.
    
    DATES: Comments must be received on or before August 1, 1994.
    
    ADDRESSES: Comments should be submitted in triplicate to Jonathan G. 
    Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, 
    NW., Stop 6-9, Washington, DC 20549. All comment letters should refer 
    to File No. S7-15-94. All comments received will be available for 
    public inspection and copying in the Commission's Public Reference 
    Room, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Washington, DC 20549.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elizabeth R. Kentzman, Special 
    Counsel, or Diane C. Blizzard, Assistant Director, at (202) 942-0690, 
    Office of Regulatory Policy, Division of Investment Management, 450 
    Fifth Street, NW., Washington, DC 20549.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission today is requesting public 
    comment on proposed rule 17f-6 [17 CFR 270.17f-6] under the Investment 
    Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a] (the ``Act''). The new rule would 
    permit registered management investment companies to maintain their 
    assets with certain futures commission merchants (``FCMs'') and 
    commodity clearing organizations in connection with futures contracts 
    and commodity options regulated under the Commodity Exchange Act [7 
    U.S.C. 1-25] (``CEA''). The proposed rule would not affect the extent 
    to which investment companies may engage in commodity trading.
    
    Table of Contents
    
    I. Introduction and Executive Summary
    II. Background
        A. Settlement of Futures Contracts and Commodity Options
        1. Futures Contracts
        2. Commodity Options
        3. FCM Insolvency Risks and the Settlement Process
        B. FCM and Clearinghouse Custody under the Act
        C. Problems with Current Custody Arrangements
    III. Discussion
        A. Investment Company Margin
        1. Initial Margin
        2. Margin Gain
        B. FCMs Eligible to Hold Investment Company Assets
        C. Contract Requirements
        D. Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and Delegation
        E. Additional FCMs Used for Clearing Purposes
        F. Foreign-Related Commodity Transactions
    IV. Summary of Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    V. Statutory Authority
    VI. Text of Proposed Rule
    
    I. Introduction and Executive Summary
    
        Over the last several years, investment company participation in 
    the commodity market has increased.\1\ Investment companies, for 
    example, use commodity investments to hedge their portfolios from 
    declines in securities prices, changes in interest rates, or foreign 
    currency fluctuations.\2\ Alternatively, investment companies enter 
    into commodity transactions to adjust the percentage of their 
    portfolios held in cash, long-term debt, and stocks without having to 
    buy or sell the actual assets.\3\
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        \1\Section 18 of the Act significantly restricts how investment 
    companies, particularly open-end funds, may use leverage. 15 U.S.C. 
    80a-18. Although section 18 does not expressly address commodity 
    transactions, the Commission has concluded that section 18 governs 
    trading practices that have the potential for leveraging an 
    investment company's assets. Securities Trading Practices of 
    Registered Investment Companies: General Statement of Policy, 
    Investment Company Act Release No. 10666 (Apr. 18, 1979), 44 FR 
    25128. These transactions have been interpreted to include commodity 
    investments. See, e.g., Dreyfus Strategic Investing and Dreyfus 
    Strategic Income (pub. avail. June 22, 1987). To avoid section 18's 
    reach, investment companies must fully collateralize their commodity 
    obligations by establishing a segregated account consisting of high-
    grade liquid assets. Id. Proposed rule 17f-6 does not address 
    section 18 considerations or related restrictions attending 
    commodity investments, and thus does not affect the extent to which 
    investment companies may engage in these transactions.
        Investment companies and their sponsors also may be subject to 
    regulation as commodity pool operators under the CEA and Commodity 
    Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'') rules, although most seek and 
    qualify for exemption. See CEA section 1a(4), 7 U.S.C. 1a(4) 
    (defining commodity pool operator); CFTC regulation 4.5, 17 CFR 4.5 
    (excluding certain institutional investors, including registered 
    investment companies, and their principals and employees from the 
    definition of commodity pool operator, subject to certain 
    conditions).
        \2\Commodity investments include futures contracts and options 
    on futures contracts and physical commodities. A futures contract 
    generally is a bilateral agreement providing for the purchase or 
    sale of a specified commodity at a stated time in the future for a 
    fixed price. Robert E. Fink & Robert B. Feduniak, Futures Trading 10 
    (1988) [hereinafter Fink & Feduniak]. A commodity option gives its 
    holder the right, for a specified period of time, to either buy (in 
    the case of a call option) or sell (in the case of a put option) the 
    subject of the option at a predetermined price. The writer (seller) 
    of an option is obligated to sell or buy the specified commodity at 
    the election of the option holder. 1 Philip M. Johnson & Thomas L. 
    Hazen, Commodities Regulation Sec. 1.07 (2d ed. Supp. 1991) 
    [hereinafter Johnson & Hazen].
        \3\In this case, the investment would be used as a substitute 
    for paying cash in the stock and bond markets. Taking a position in 
    a futures contract, for example, may be quicker and cheaper than 
    buying and selling the instruments subject to the contract due to 
    lower brokerage and transaction costs.
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        To enter into a futures contract or write a commodity option, 
    investors deposit a specified amount of assets or cash as initial 
    margin.\4\ The FCM then clears the transaction by posting margin either 
    directly with a clearing organization (which matches the opposite side 
    of the trade) or with one or more other FCMs that will effect the 
    transaction through the clearing organization. Once a position is 
    established, it is marked to market at least daily to reflect gains and 
    losses in the position's value. Gains on commodity transactions are 
    available for payment on the next business day.
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        \4\See ``Background--Settlement of Futures Contracts and 
    Commodity Options.''
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        Commodity investors other than investment companies generally 
    initiate trades by posting margin directly with an FCM. Section 17(f) 
    of the Act and related rules, however, currently do not permit FCMs to 
    maintain custody of investment company assets.\5\ FCM custody also 
    presents certain risks because, in FCM bankruptcy proceedings, margin 
    entrusted to an FCM's safekeeping may not be returned in full.\6\
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        \5\15 U.S.C. 80a-17(f), 17 CFR 270.17f-1 to 270.17f-5. See 
    ``Background--FCM and Clearinghouse Custody under the Act.'' See 
    also infra note 28 (regarding the Department of Labor's position, 
    which has not been adopted by the Division of Investment Management, 
    that margin is not an asset for purposes of the custody requirements 
    and certain other fiduciary provisions of the Employee Retirement 
    Income Security Act of 1974 (``ERISA'') [29 U.S.C. 1001-1461]).
        \6\See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. See also 
    ``Background--Settlement of Futures Contracts and Commodity 
    Options--FCM Insolvency Risks and the Settlement Process.'' As 
    indicated infra at note 49, although the potential for loss exists, 
    actual customer losses from FCM insolvencies are rare.
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        Under no-action positions of the Division of Investment Management 
    (the ``Division''), investment companies must maintain their initial 
    margin deposits in special accounts with a third party custodian 
    bank.\7\ Because investment company margin is held by a third party, 
    FCMs must advance their own funds to cover investment company margin 
    obligations with the clearinghouse or other FCM that will be used to 
    effect the transaction.
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        \7\See ``Background--FCM and Clearinghouse Custody under the 
    Act.''
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        Some have suggested that third party custodial accounts create 
    systemic liquidity risks by diverting otherwise available FCM capital 
    from the marketplace.\8\ In addition, the CFTC staff has stated that 
    third party accounts would not provide any special protection for 
    investment company assets in the event of an FCM's bankruptcy.\9\
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        \8\See ``Background--Problems with Current Custody 
    Arrangements.''
        \9\Id.
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        To address potential liquidity risks and the uncertain status of 
    third party accounts in FCM bankruptcy proceedings, the Commission is 
    proposing rule 17f-6. The proposal would permit FCM and clearinghouse 
    custody of investment company margin, subject to conditions designed to 
    ensure the safekeeping of investment company assets.
        Under proposed rule 17f-6, investment companies could deposit 
    initial margin with FCMs in amounts necessary to effect their futures 
    contracts and commodity options.\10\ FCMs also would be permitted to 
    hold de minimis amounts of gain on commodity transactions; gains 
    exceeding this threshold would have to be paid to the fund on the day 
    after receipt by the FCM.\11\
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        \10\See ``Discussion--Investment Company Margin--Initial 
    Margin.''
        \11\See ``Discussion--Investment Company Margin--Margin Gain.''
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        To protect against the risks of FCM insolvency, rule 17f-6 would 
    require FCMs holding investment company assets, including any FCMs used 
    for clearing purposes, to have at least $20 million in adjusted net 
    capital in excess of the minimum capital requirements established by 
    the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC''). As an additional 
    measure of financial strength, the ratio of an FCM's adjusted net 
    capital to the CFTC required minimum would have to equal or exceed 250 
    percent.\12\
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        \12\See ``Discussion--FCMs Eligible to Hold Investment Company 
    Assets'' and ``--Additional FCMs Used for Clearing Purposes.''
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        The proposal also would require a written contract between the 
    investment company and the FCM to contain certain provisions. Among 
    other things, FCMs could transfer investment company assets for 
    clearing purposes only to another FCM that satisfies the requirements 
    of the rule (other than the requirement of a contract with the 
    investment company), a bank, or a clearing organization.\13\
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        \13\See ``Discussion--Contract Requirements.''
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        The board of directors would be responsible for selecting FCMs and 
    monitoring the custodial arrangements. The board could delegate these 
    responsibilities to the company's investment adviser or officers under 
    the board's general oversight and certain procedural requirements.\14\
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        \14\See ``Discussion--Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
    and Delegation.''
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        Finally, FCM custody would be permitted for foreign-related 
    transactions traded on domestic contract markets, even if the margin is 
    held overseas. FCM custody would not be allowed for foreign exchange-
    traded transactions, since margin for these trades does not enjoy the 
    full protections of the CEA and CFTC rules.\15\
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        \15\See ``Discussion--Foreign-Related Commodity Transactions.''
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    II. Background
    
    A. Settlement of Futures Contracts and Commodity Options
    
        Under the CEA and CFTC rules, trading of futures contracts and 
    commodity options generally must take place on a designated contract 
    market (an ``exchange'').\16\ An FCM executing trades on an exchange 
    must be a member of that exchange; nonmembers trade by entering orders 
    through an exchange member.\17\ All transactions are cleared through a 
    clearing organization, which matches trades on behalf of the exchange, 
    and acts as guarantor of the opposite side of each transaction accepted 
    for settlement.\18\ To clear transactions with a clearing organization, 
    an FCM must be both an exchange member and a member of the clearing 
    organization.\19\ Non-clearing member FCMs must execute their 
    transactions through a clearing member.\20\
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        \16\See CFTC regulation 1.3(h), 17 CFR 1.3(h) (defining contract 
    market).
        \17\Fink & Feduniak, supra note 2, at 88.
        \18\See CFTC regulation 1.3(d), 17 CFR 1.3(d) (defining clearing 
    organization). Some clearinghouses are organized as separate 
    entities from the exchange, while others are departments within the 
    exchange. Fink & Feduniak, supra note 2, at 154. See generally 1 
    Thomas A. Russo, Regulation of the Commodities Futures and Options 
    Markets Sec. 2.01 (1983 & Supp. 1992) [hereinafter Russo] (``Upon 
    accepting trades for clearance, commodity exchange clearing houses 
    interpose themselves as principals between the parties, becoming the 
    `seller to every buyer and the buyer to every seller' and thus `a 
    party to every trade.''') (citations omitted).
        \19\See CFTC regulation 1.3(c), 17 CFR 1.3(c) (defining clearing 
    member). Exchange membership is a prerequisite to clearing 
    membership. See 1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 2.49.
        \20\Fink & Feduniak, supra note 2, at 154.
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        Depending on an FCM's qualifications as an exchange or 
    clearinghouse member, settlement of a commodity transaction may involve 
    multiple FCMs. When one FCM acts on behalf of another, its ``customer'' 
    is the FCM on whose behalf the order is effected, not that FCM's 
    underlying customers. Similarly, clearinghouses consider FCM clearing 
    members as their customers for purposes of settling trades.
    1. Futures Contracts
        Investors entering into futures contracts deposit a specified 
    amount of assets or cash as initial margin.\21\ Initial margin is 
    intended to secure the obligations of the contracting parties as well 
    as to protect those involved in the settlement process.\22\ Initial 
    margin is not considered to be part of the contract purchase price, and 
    is returned upon the contract's termination unless it is used to cover 
    a loss in the contract position.\23\ Initial margin in futures 
    transactions thus differs from securities margin, which represents a 
    partial payment for securities purchased by the broker on its 
    customer's behalf.\24\
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        \21\See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the 
    Commodity Futures Industry--History and Theory, 64 Temple L. Rev. 
    59, n.12 (1991) (initial margin for futures contracts often is five 
    to ten percent of the value of the commodity subject to delivery 
    under the contract). See also 1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, 
    Sec. 2.43 (Supp. 1991) (describing recent developments in the 
    computation of margin, including ``cross margining'' involving 
    coordination of margin levels for certain commodity and stock option 
    positions).
        See generally 1 Russo, supra note 18, Sec. 1.20 (``Each of the 
    exchanges has its own rules as to the types of assets, and as to the 
    percentage of the fair market value of those assets (sometimes 
    referred to as a haircut), which may be accepted in satisfaction of 
    margin requirements.'') (emphasis in original).
        \22\See 1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 1.10 (``margins 
    serve not only to protect the parties against default, but the 
    carrying brokers and clearing house as well'').
        \23\Id. Sec. 1.10. See 2 id. Secs. 3.76, 3.79.
        \24\1 Id. Sec. 1.10.
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        Minimum initial margin requirements are set by the exchange on 
    which the contract is designated to trade, although FCMs may impose 
    higher requirements.\25\ Clearing organizations also impose their own 
    margin requirements for clearing members, which typically are less than 
    exchange-established initial margin minimums.\26\ Initial margin levels 
    may be increased or reduced throughout the life of a contract.\27\
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        \25\1 Russo, supra note 18, Sec. 2.03. An FCM, for example, may 
    increase margin requirements based on experience with a customer or 
    the customer's financial resources. Division of Trading and Markets, 
    CFTC, Follow-up Report on Financial Oversight of Stock Index Futures 
    Markets During October 1987 at 28-29 (Jan. 6, 1988) [hereinafter 
    CFTC October 1987 Follow-up Report].
        \26\1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 1.10. Margin deposited 
    to satisfy clearinghouse requirements is known as ``original'' 
    margin. Id. Original margin requirements typically vary for 
    different clearing members depending, for example, on each member's 
    trading volume. 1 Russo, supra note 18, Sec. 2.03. Under net 
    clearing systems in effect at most exchanges, clearing members are 
    not required to post original margin for offsetting customer 
    positions. Id. Sec. 2.06.
        \27\1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 1.10 (``Commodity 
    margins often vary depending on the stage of the transaction, the 
    nature of the trading involved, and the volatility of market 
    prices.''); Markham, supra note 21, at 132 & n.513 (1991) (the 
    Chicago Board of Trade changed margin levels over 200 times in 1987, 
    often on a daily basis).
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        Customers other than investment companies generally post initial 
    margin directly with an FCM when they initiate trades.\28\ If the FCM 
    is a clearing member, it must then satisfy clearinghouse margin 
    requirements. The FCM typically deposits all or a portion of the 
    customer's assets directly in a commingled account established by the 
    clearinghouse for margin deposits and accruals on the FCM's customer 
    positions.\29\ Any funds remaining in the FCM's possession are 
    deposited in a commingled customer bank account maintained by the 
    FCM.\30\ While section 4d(2) of the CEA permits the commingling of 
    customer funds at both the clearinghouse and FCM levels, it requires 
    FCMs to segregate customer assets from the FCM's own funds, including 
    those used for its own trading, and prohibits the use of one customer's 
    funds to carry another's trades.\31\
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        \28\Investment company third party custodial arrangements are 
    discussed below under ``FCM and Clearinghouse Custody Under the 
    Act.'' Some pension accounts also may use third party arrangements 
    for their initial margin deposits, although they are not required to 
    do so under the ERISA. The Department of Labor has held that, for 
    purposes of the custody requirements and certain other fiduciary 
    provisions of ERISA, margin deposited by a pension plan with an FCM 
    does not constitute an asset of the plan; rather, the plan's assets 
    are deemed to be the rights embodied in the futures contract. Op. 
    No. 82-49A (Office of Pension and Welfare Benefits Program, U.S. 
    Dept. of Labor 1982). The Division has not adopted this approach.
        \29\2 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 3.69 Clearing members 
    maintain a proprietary account with the clearinghouse for their own 
    trades, which must be kept separate from customer assets. 1 Russo, 
    supra note 18, Sec. 2.02. Accounts at the clearinghouse level are 
    maintained by banks that have been approved by the clearinghouse as 
    original margin depositories. Id. Sec. 2.03.
        An FCM may use its own assets to satisfy a customer's margin 
    obligations, pending receipt of the required margin from the 
    customer. CFTC regulation 1.23, 17 CFR 1.23. Exchange rules 
    generally require FCMs to receive customer margin within a 
    reasonable time after an order is accepted. See 1 Russo, supra note 
    18, Sec. 1.20. Under CEA section 4d(2) and the special provisions of 
    the Bankruptcy Code and CFTC rules that govern FCM liquidations, 
    margin in the clearinghouse customer account is considered customer 
    property, whether the margin represents actual customer assets or 
    the FCM's own funds. 7 U.S.C. 6d(2); 11 U.S.C. 761-766; 17 CFR 
    190.01 to .10.
        \30\1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 3.69. See also CFTC 
    regulations 1.25, 1.29, 17 CFR 1.25, 1.29 (permitting FCMs to invest 
    customer assets in their possession in certain United States 
    government obligations and retain the interest thereon, unless the 
    customer specifically arranges to receive the interest payments).
        \31\See also CFTC regulations 1.20-.30, 17 CFR 1.20-.30 
    (implementing the requirements of section 4d(2)). The FCM at all 
    times must have sufficient funds in segregation representing 
    customer margin received or required to be paid. Id.
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        If an FCM is not a clearing member, the same procedures and 
    requirements apply, except that the non-member FCM must post margin 
    with the clearing member, which in turn must satisfy clearinghouse 
    requirements.32 FCM custody of customer margin in this case thus 
    involves both the non-member and clearing member FCM.33
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        \3\2See 2 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 3.76 (``customer 
    funds routinely travel from the originating FCM to other FCMs, such 
    as clearing member firms of a contract market, and to the clearing 
    agencies of the contract market''). If the FCM originating the trade 
    effects the transaction through an exchange member that is not a 
    clearing member, the exchange member FCM would be an additional 
    party in the settlement chain.
        \3\3Under CFTC regulation 1.58, clearing member FCMs that carry 
    customer positions on behalf of non-members must collect margin on a 
    gross basis (i.e., based on the individual transactions of the non-
    member FCM's customers without regard to offsetting positions 
    between such customers). 17 CFR 1.58. See Gross Margining of Omnibus 
    Accounts, [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 
    21,296 at 25,507 n.8 (Dec. 29, 1981) (indicating that this approach 
    transfers customer margin from non-member FCMs to the ``stronger 
    hands'' of clearing members). Gross margining between clearing and 
    non-clearing member FCMs contrasts with net margining, discussed 
    supra note 26, between clearing organizations and their members.
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        Once a contract position is established, variation margin is 
    credited or assessed at least daily to reflect changes in the 
    contract's value.34 In contrast to initial margin, variation 
    margin represents the system of marking to market the contract's 
    value.35 Through this system, losses on one side of a contract 
    position are matched with and paid as profits to the other side of the 
    transaction.36
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        \3\4Some exchanges regularly make intraday variation margin 
    calls and others may do so in response to market volatility. See, 
    e.g., CFTC October 1987 Follow-up Report, supra note 25, at 26; 1 
    Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 2.50.
        \3\51 Russo, supra note 18, Sec. 2.04. As a result of its 
    function, variation margin, unlike initial margin, may be satisfied 
    only in cash. Fink & Feduniak, supra note 2, at 146 (``If losing 
    positions were permitted to be marked to market with Treasury 
    securities, letters of credit, and so on, then clearinghouses and 
    FCMs would face the impossible task of converting various and sundry 
    types of collateral into the correct amounts of cash for potential 
    withdrawal by customers with margin excesses.''). See supra note 21.
        \3\6See CFTC October 1987 Follow-up Report, supra note 25, at 19 
    (``The daily settlement of profits and losses through the system of 
    daily variation collections and payments reflects the `zero sum' 
    nature of the futures system in which profits and losses are exactly 
    equivalent.'').
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        At the end of each trading day, the clearing organization credits 
    gains and debits losses on all contract positions in the clearing 
    member's customer account.37 Before the opening of the exchange on 
    the next business day, the clearing member FCM must satisfy any 
    variation margin call reflecting a net loss in contract positions and 
    similarly is entitled to collect any net gain.38
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        \3\71 Russo, supra note 18, Sec. 2.04.
        \3\8Id.; CFTC October 1987 Follow-up Report, supra note 25, at 
    25-26.
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        The member FCM must reconcile its customers' positions by crediting 
    gains and debiting losses on a customer-by-customer basis.39 An 
    FCM will require the customer to post additional funds to cover any 
    losses that reduce the customer's margin below a specified 
    ``maintenance'' level set by the exchange. The customer then will make 
    a margin payment, or meet a ``margin call,'' to restore its account to 
    the initial margin level.40 Whether gains on contract positions 
    are collected by the customer immediately or held by the FCM depends on 
    the customer's arrangements with the FCM.41
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        \3\91 Russo, supra note 18, Sec. 2.04. See CFTC regulation 1.32, 
    17 CFR 1.32 (requiring daily computation of customer accounts).
        \4\01 Russo, supra note 18, Sec. 1.20; 1 Johnson & Hazen, supra 
    note 18, Sec. 1.10.
        \4\1See, e.g., CFTC Financial and Segregation Interpretation No. 
    10, Treatment of Funds Deposited in Safekeeping Accounts, 1 Comm. 
    Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 7120 at 7128 n.15 (CFTC Division of Trading and 
    Markets May 23, 1984) [hereinafter CFTC Interpretation No. 10].
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        If a non-member FCM executes trades through a clearing member, 
    variation margin payments are transferred between the clearing member 
    and the originating FCM. The originating FCM then reconciles the 
    individual contract positions of its customers.42
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        \4\21 Russo, supra note 18, Sec. 2.04. If a non-exchange member 
    FCM executes trades through an exchange member that is not a 
    clearing member, variation margin transfers would occur between 
    these two FCMs as well.
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    2. Commodity Options
        Initial and variation margin for commodity options serve the same 
    function as margin for futures contracts.43 Unlike the parties to 
    a futures contract, however, only the writer (seller) of an option is 
    subject to margin requirements; the option holder (purchaser) pays the 
    writer a one-time premium as compensation in full for its right to 
    compel the writer's performance.44 In addition, the writer's 
    variation margin payments attributable to losses in its position, known 
    as mark-to-market payments in the options context, are not available 
    for collection by the option holder.45 During the life of an 
    option, the writer's mark-to-market payments are transferred to and 
    held by all FCMs in the settlement chain and, ultimately, the clearing 
    organization in the same way as initial margin deposits.
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        \4\3See supra notes 22 & 35 and accompanying text.
        \4\41 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 1.07. Initial margin 
    for commodity options may be based on the premium paid for the 
    option and the initial margin requirements applicable to the 
    underlying futures contract. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs & Co. (pub. 
    avail. May 2, 1986). Initial margin also may be determined by 
    reference to the aggregate risk of the option and underlying futures 
    contract. See, e.g., 1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 2.43 
    (Supp. 1991). The premium collected from the buyer is passed through 
    the clearinghouse to the writer's FCM, which credits the writer's 
    account for the premium received.
        \4\5The writer of an option is responsible for changes in the 
    value of the position only if the option is exercised by the holder 
    or closed out by the writer through an offsetting position. 1 
    Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Secs. 1.31, 1.07. For this reason, 
    unlike margin payments on futures contracts (as discussed supra note 
    35), payments for losses on option positions may be made in cash or 
    other assets. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs & Co., supra note 44 (option 
    mark-to-market payments may be made in securities, such as U.S. 
    Treasury obligations, or letters of credit). In the event of later 
    gains, the writer would be entitled to collect the gain from 
    previously made margin payments. See Markham, supra note 21, at 116.
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    3. FCM Insolvency Risks and the Settlement Process
        FCMs are financially responsible for the trade obligations of their 
    customers.46 If a clearing member FCM becomes insolvent and cannot 
    cover the obligations of a defaulting customer, the FCM's non-
    defaulting customers may be affected.47 The clearinghouse has the 
    right to satisfy an outstanding margin call from the assets securing 
    all of the member's customer trades at the clearinghouse level, which 
    will create a shortfall in the clearinghouse account.48 Exchanges 
    and other parties may contribute additional funds to prevent customer 
    loss.49 Absent this voluntary action, however, a shortfall in the 
    clearinghouse account will be borne by the member's non-defaulting 
    customers.50 Because a member's customers may include other FCMs, 
    losses at the clearinghouse level may affect other FCMs and customer 
    margin in their safekeeping.
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        \4\6See CEA section 4d(2); 1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, 
    Sec. 1.10.
        \4\7An FCM's insolvency may result from its obligation to cover 
    the trades of a defaulting customer or for other unrelated reasons. 
    See, e.g., Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin, Maintenance of 
    Market Strategies in Futures Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position 
    Transfers From Troubled Firms, Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 852-70 (1987) 
    [hereinafter Corcoran & Ervin] (the inability of certain customers 
    to satisfy trade obligations of approximately $14 million caused the 
    1985 Volume Investors Corporation insolvency, which placed other 
    customers at risk); CFTC News Release 3663-93 (May 24, 1993) (CFTC 
    administrative complaints allege that Stotler and Company's 
    insolvency followed improper conduct by its officers, accountants, 
    and the Chicago Board of Trade including, among other things, 
    overstating the firm's net capital).
        \4\8See CFTC Interpretative Statement No. 85-3, Use of 
    Segregated Funds by Clearing Organizations Upon Defaults by Member 
    Firms, [1984-1986 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,703 
    at 30,988 (CFTC Office of the General Counsel Aug. 12, 1985). While 
    the CFTC staff has considered the rights of clearing organizations 
    in these circumstances, an FCM's right to use another FCM's customer 
    margin has not been determined. For example, it has not been 
    established whether a clearing member FCM would be entitled to 
    customer margin deposited by a non-member FCM in the event the non-
    member was unable to satisfy its customers' obligations. See 
    Corcoran & Ervin, supra note 47, at nn.92, 95.
        \4\9See generally National Futures Association, Customer Account 
    Protection Study 13 (Nov. 20, 1986) [hereinafter NFA Account 
    Protection Study] (FCM insolvency losses from 1938 through 1985 
    totalled less than $10 million); Corcoran & Ervin, supra note 47, at 
    873 (``customer losses have been forestalled * * *, in significant 
    measure, by the voluntary contributions of futures exchanges to the 
    compensation of customers of failed clearing members.'').
        \5\0See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text regarding the 
    treatment of customer margin in FCM bankruptcy proceedings.
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    B. FCM and Clearinghouse Custody Under the Act
    
        Section 17(f) of the Act and the rules thereunder govern the 
    safekeeping of investment company assets.51 Under section 17(f), 
    investment companies generally may maintain their assets only in the 
    custody of a bank, a member of a national securities exchange, or a 
    national securities depository.52 FCMs and commodity clearing 
    organizations do not fit within one of the statutory categories.53
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        \5\1The legislative history of section 17(f) indicates that 
    Congress intended the assets of investment companies to be kept by a 
    financially secure entity that has sufficient safeguards against 
    misappropriation. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: 
    Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking 
    and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 264 (1940).
        \5\2See also rule 17f-1 (governing custody of investment company 
    assets by members of a national securities exchange) and rule 17f-4 
    (governing custody by national securities depositories). Under 
    section 17(f) and rule 17f-2, investment companies also may maintain 
    custody of their own assets.
        \5\3While certain FCMs also may be members of a national 
    securities exchange, these FCMs cannot rely on rule 17f-1. This is 
    because, in accepting margin deposits, the FCM would be acting in 
    its capacity as a futures broker, and not as a securities broker as 
    contemplated under rule 17f-1. In any event, rule 17f-1 is rarely 
    used today because of its segregation and earmarking requirements. 
    Thomas P. Lemke, Investment Company Act of 1940, in 4 Securities Law 
    Techniques Transactions Litigation (A.A. Sommer, ed.) Sec. 83.07, at 
    83-181 (Oct. 1993).
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        Under Division no-action positions, investment companies deposit 
    initial margin in special accounts with their custodian banks.54 
    Although a third party account may be maintained in the name of an FCM, 
    the FCM may withdraw funds from the account only if the investment 
    company does not make a variation margin payment.55 As a 
    consequence, FCMs must advance their own funds to cover investment 
    company margin obligations with the clearinghouse or other FCM that is 
    used to effect the transaction.56
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        \5\4See, e.g., Prudential Bache IncomeVertible Plus Fund, Inc. 
    (pub. avail. Nov. 20, 1985). See also VALIC Timed Opportunity Fund, 
    Inc., Investment Company Act Release Nos. 13891 (Apr. 17, 1984), 49 
    FR 17639 (Notice of Application), and 13943 (May 16, 1984), 30 SEC 
    Docket 845 (Order).
        In 1981, the CFTC considered third party arrangements as a way 
    to address customer losses associated with FCM insolvency. Although 
    the CFTC rejected this approach, it noted that to make segregation 
    requirements completely effective, ``access to customer money by the 
    FCM would have to be totally prohibited. A third party trustee would 
    have to accept and hold all customer funds and commingling of any 
    kind would have to be prohibited.'' Gross Margining of Omnibus 
    Accounts, supra note 33, at 25,504.
        \5\5See, e.g., Pension Hedge Fund, Inc. (pub. avail. Jan. 20, 
    1984). See also CFTC Interpretation No. 10, supra note 41, and CFTC 
    Interpretative Letter No. 85-6 (Safekeeping Accounts), [1984-1986 
    Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,579 at 30,495 (CFTC 
    Division of Trading and Markets Apr. 19, 1985) (both concerning CFTC 
    staff requirements attending the use of third party custodial 
    accounts).
        \5\6See, e.g., Letter of William J. Brodsky, President and Chief 
    Executive Officer, Chicago Mercantile Exchange (``CME''), to 
    Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC 4 (Oct. 12, 1990), File No. S7-11-
    90 (responding to the Commission's request for comments on the 
    reform of investment company regulation in connection with the 
    Division's 1992 report, Protecting Investors: A Half Century of 
    Investment Company Regulation) [hereinafter CME Letter]. The CME 
    Letter was resubmitted to the Commission last year in connection 
    with other rule proposals. Letter of Carl A. Royal, Senior Vice 
    President and General Counsel, CME, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, 
    SEC (Mar. 16, 1993), File No. S7-41-92.
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        No-action letters and exemptive orders permit FCMs to retain 
    custody of investment company gains on commodity positions in limited 
    circumstances.57 Under no-action positions, FCMs may hold margin 
    gain overnight or over a weekend in recognition of the fact that, while 
    positions are settled at the close of each day's trading, margin gain 
    is not available to the FCM's customers until the following business 
    day.58 The Division has reasoned that such custody is incidental 
    to the commodity investment and not of sufficient duration to trigger 
    the requirements of section 17(f).59 Exemptive orders permit FCMs 
    to hold de minimis amounts of margin gain (e.g., $50,000) so that funds 
    may avoid having to make daily withdrawals when only small amounts of 
    margin accrue.60
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        \5\7Gains on commodity positions are paid directly by an FCM to 
    the investment company without flowing through or being held in the 
    third party account. Goldman, Sachs & Company, supra note 44. 
    Variation margin payments owed by an investment company due to 
    declines in its position are liabilities of the company, and not 
    fund assets under section 17(f). Montgomery Street Income 
    Securities, Inc. (pub. avail. Apr. 11, 1983). Investment companies 
    satisfy their variation margin obligations by paying the required 
    amounts directly to FCMs. See id.
        \5\8See supra notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text.
        \5\9Montgomery Street Income Securities, supra note 57. See also 
    Putnam Option Income Trust II (pub. avail. Sept. 23, 1985) (futures 
    contracts); Goldman, Sachs & Company, supra note 44 (written 
    options).
        \6\0See, e.g., Drexel Bond-Debenture Trading Fund, Investment 
    Company Act Release Nos. 13861 (Apr. 2, 1984), 49 FR 13934 (Notice 
    of Application), and 13916 (May 1, 1984), 30 SEC Docket 671 (Order). 
    See also Carnegie Government Securities Trust, Investment Company 
    Act Release Nos. 15272 (Aug. 22, 1986), 51 FR 30927 (Notice of 
    Application), and 15317 (Sept. 18, 1986), 36 SEC Docket 1044 (Order) 
    (permitting up to $50,000 in margin gain to be maintained with any 
    one FCM and limiting margin gain held by all FCMs to the greater of 
    $100,000 or 1/8 of one percent of the fund's net assets).
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    C. Problems With Current Custody Arrangements
    
        Commenters have criticized third party custodial accounts on 
    several grounds. Some have asserted that current arrangements create 
    systemic liquidity risks by diverting otherwise available FCM capital 
    from the marketplace.61 These risks may become acute in times of 
    market volatility when liquidity may be most critical. Initial margin 
    requirements typically rise during these periods, resulting in 
    additional drains on FCM resources.62 According to the 1988 Brady 
    Report, third party custodial accounts may have been a source of 
    liquidity stress in the clearing and credit systems during the October 
    1987 market break.63
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        \6\1See, e.g., Letter from Peter Karpen, First Boston 
    Corporation, Steven Keltz, Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc., Anthony J. 
    Leitner, Goldman, Sachs & Co., and John T. Shinkle, Saloman Brothers 
    Inc., to Marianne K. Smythe, Director, Division of Investment 
    Management, SEC 1-4 (Sept. 17, 1991) [hereinafter Joint FCM Letter] 
    (observing that a survey of 12 FCMs revealed that as much as $2 
    billion may be maintained in third party custodial accounts, and 
    suggesting by way of a conservative estimate that FCMs advance as 
    much as 50% of initial margin deposited by investment companies).
        Commenters also point out that FCMs incur financing and 
    potential opportunity costs as a result of using their own assets to 
    meet investment company margin requirements. See, e.g., Letter from 
    Barbara Wierzynski, General Counsel, Futures Industry Association 
    Inc., to Elizabeth Krentzman, Division of Investment Management, SEC 
    (Oct. 11, 1993) (securities deposited by FCMs on behalf of 
    investment companies may not be pledged by the FCM to raise cash for 
    other purposes). See also Letter from Thomas A. Russo, Cadwalader, 
    Wickersham & Taft, to Mary Podesta, Chief Counsel, Division of 
    Investment Management, SEC 13 (Sept. 23, 1988) [hereinafter Russo 
    Letter II] (financing costs may cause FCMs to increase commission 
    rates or limit the number and size of investment company accounts, 
    forcing funds to trade through less well-capitalized FCMs).
        \6\2CFTC October 1987 Follow-up Report, supra note 25, at 65.
        \6\3Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms 
    (1988) VI-73 to -74 (discussing statements of certain CME members).
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        Commenters also have contended that third party arrangements are 
    unnecessary because they are unlikely to provide any special protection 
    to investment company assets in FCM bankruptcy proceedings.64 
    Special provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and related CFTC rules govern 
    FCM liquidations.65 Under these provisions, FCM customers 
    generally have priority over other creditors' claims. All customer 
    assets, even if specifically identifiable to one customer, are subject 
    to disposition based on each customer's pro rata share of the available 
    customer property.66 The CFTC staff has stated that funds in a 
    third party custodial account will be subject to the same pro rata 
    treatment as all other customer assets.67
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        \6\4See, e.g., Joint FCM Letter, supra note, at 4-6.
        \6\511 U.S.C. 761-766; 17 CFR 190.01 to .10. The CFTC bankruptcy 
    regulations were adopted pursuant to CEA section 20, 7 U.S.C. 24.
        \6\6See United States Bankruptcy Code sections 766(d), (h). The 
    claims of customers engaging in certain foreign-related commodity 
    transactions may be subordinated in bankruptcy to the claims of 
    other customers. See infra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
        \6\7CFTC Interpretation No. 10, supra note 41, at 7129. The CFTC 
    staff reasons that the Bankruptcy Code provisions were intended ``to 
    promote equitable treatment of customers and to provide for an 
    across-the-board application of pro rata distribution to all 
    customer commodity accounts whether or not the funds related to such 
    accounts were maintained with separate depositories or otherwise 
    were specifically identifiable.'' Id. See also Interpretative Letter 
    No. 90-1 (Safekeeping and Third-Party Custodial Accounts) [1987-1990 
    Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 24,579 at 36,505 (CFTC 
    Division of Trading and Markets Jan. 19, 1990) (reaffirming this 
    position).
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        No court has examined the status of these accounts in bankruptcy. 
    Commenters maintain that the issue inevitably will be litigated, which 
    may carry its own adverse consequences.68 In addition to freezing 
    investment company assets during the pendency of the action, third 
    party accounts may impede the transfer of investment company accounts 
    to a financially strong FCM, subjecting the fund to possible 
    losses.69
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        \6\8See, e.g., Letter from Thomas A. Russo, Cadwalader, 
    Wickersham & Taft, to Mary Podesta, Chief Counsel, Division of 
    Investment Management, SEC 3-4 (Apr. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Russo 
    Letter I]. See also CFTC Interpretation No. 10, supra note 41, at 
    7129 (if presented with the issue, the CFTC staff intends to 
    strongly recommend that the CFTC take appropriate action ``to ensure 
    that all customers, including institutional customers, are treated 
    equally'' in FCM bankruptcy proceedings).
        \6\9Russo Letter I, supra note 68, at 4; Joint FCM Letter, supra 
    note 61, at 5 (``even if such customers ultimately recover the 
    entire equity in their account following liquidation, they will lose 
    money as the result of prices realized on forced liquidations or 
    they will lose the protection of hedges until they can replace the 
    positions at a new firm.''). See generally Corcoran & Ervin, supra 
    note 47, at 872 (discussing the Bankruptcy Code's strong preference 
    for immediate transfer of customer accounts to ensure daily payment 
    of margin obligations and to minimize the possibility of margin 
    default).
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        The Commission believes liquidity concerns and the absence of clear 
    bankruptcy protection for third party accounts warrant proposing new 
    rule 17f-6. The Commission, however, requests comment on these and any 
    other factors concerning current investment company 
    arrangements.70
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        \7\0Some commenters, for example, have identified certain 
    operational difficulties associated with third party arrangements. 
    See, e.g., CME Letter, supra note 56, at 4 (third party accounts may 
    take up to several weeks to establish and are expensive and complex 
    to maintain). Other commenters have suggested certain benefits 
    associated with their use. See, e.g., Leslie L. Ogg, Remarks at the 
    Meeting of the Financial Products Advisory Committee, CFTC 54 (July 
    23, 1992) (noting that tax-exempt funds avoid earning taxable income 
    (excluding any gains realized on contract positions) by maintaining 
    their tax-exempt securities in third party custodial accounts).
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    III. Discussion
    
        Proposed rule 17f-6 would allow FCM and clearinghouse custody of 
    investment company margin, subject to conditions designed to ensure the 
    safekeeping of investment company assets.71 The proposal would 
    govern initial margin deposits and FCM custody of margin gain, 
    establish certain objective qualifications for FCMs that hold 
    investment company assets, and require a written contract between the 
    FCM and investment company to contain certain provisions. The board of 
    directors would be responsible for selecting FCMs and monitoring the 
    custodial arrangements, although the board could delegate its 
    responsibilities to the investment company's investment adviser or 
    officers. The rule's provisions (other than the requirement of a 
    contract with the investment company) would apply to any FCM used to 
    clear the fund's commodity transactions. FCM custody would be permitted 
    in connection with foreign-related commodity transactions traded on 
    domestic exchanges. It could not be used, however, for foreign-exchange 
    traded transactions since margin for those trades does not enjoy the 
    full protections of the CEA and CFTC rules.
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        \7\1The Commission is not proposing to amend rule 7d-1 with 
    respect to the use of proposed rule 17f-6 by investment companies 
    organized under Canadian law and other foreign jurisdictions. 17 CFR 
    270.7d-1. Rule 7d-1 governs applications by Canadian funds seeking 
    to obtain exemptive orders under section 7(d). 15 U.S.C. 7(d). 
    Although rule 7d-1 by its terms only applies to Canadian investment 
    companies, funds organized in other jurisdictions have agreed to 
    comply with its conditions as a prerequisite to receiving a section 
    7(d) order. See Division of Investment Management, SEC, Protecting 
    Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company Regulation 193 n.23 
    (1992) [hereinafter Protecting Investors report]. Considerable time 
    has passed since rule 7d-1 was last used. Id. Should an investment 
    company seek relief pursuant to rule 7d-1 in the future, the 
    Commission would consider any request to rely on proposed rule 17f-
    6, as it may be adopted, at that time.
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        Proposed rule 17f-6 would not be mandatory, and investment 
    companies could use third party custodial accounts for their margin 
    deposits.72 Because of the uncertain status of third party 
    accounts in FCM bankruptcy proceedings, investment companies using 
    these accounts should satisfy themselves of the financial strength of 
    the FCMs that carry their trades.73 The Commission requests 
    comment on whether investment companies should be permitted to continue 
    to use third party arrangements if the proposed rule is adopted.
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        \7\2Investment companies also could continue to initiate their 
    trades through introducing brokers, which do not take custody of 
    customer margin. See CEA section 1(a)(14), 7 U.S.C. 1(a)(14) 
    (defining introducing broker). When, however, an introducing broker 
    is used and margin is placed in the custody of an FCM, the proposed 
    rule would apply with respect to the FCM holding investment company 
    assets.
        \7\3See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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    A. Investment Company Margin
    
        Rule 17f-6 would permit investment companies to maintain margin 
    with FCMs in connection with futures contracts and commodity options 
    traded on a designated contract market.74 This provision is 
    intended to establish the parameters of fund transactions involving FCM 
    custody and to ensure that margin underlying those transactions has the 
    full protections of the CEA and CFTC rules.75 Because only United 
    States commodity exchanges may be designated contract markets, 
    investment company margin deposits involving FCM custody would be 
    limited to domestically traded transactions.76
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        \7\4See proposed subparagraph (d)(2) (defining exchange-traded 
    futures contracts and commodity options). Fund investments for which 
    FCM custody would be permitted include futures contracts, options on 
    futures contracts, and options on physical commodities. Id. The 
    Commission understands that options on physical commodities 
    currently are not traded on any exchange, although CFTC rules would 
    permit their trading. See CFTC regulation 33.7, 17 CFR 33.7. As 
    discussed supra at note 57, since margin payments resulting from 
    losses on commodity positions are not fund assets subject to section 
    17(f), the proposed rule would not govern these payments.
        \7\5See, e.g., CEA section 4 (requiring the keeping of books and 
    records); CEA section 4b (prohibiting fraudulent transactions); CEA 
    section 4d (requiring segregation of customer funds and other 
    safekeeping measures); CFTC regulation 1.10, 17 CFR 1.10 (financial 
    reporting obligations); CFTC regulations 1.20 to .30 (safekeeping of 
    customer funds); CFTC regulation 3.10, 17 CFR 3.10 (registration of 
    FCMs).
        \7\6See CEA sections 4(a) and (b). Margin deposits in connection 
    with foreign-related investments are discussed under ``Foreign-
    Related Commodity Transactions'' below.
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    1. Initial Margin
        Under proposed paragraph (a), investment companies may place and 
    maintain initial margin with FCMs in amounts necessary to effect their 
    commodity trades.77 This provision is intended to tie FCM custody 
    of investment company assets to margin levels associated with specific 
    transactions. Investment companies would be permitted to use FCM 
    custody for margins established by exchanges as well as any additional 
    requirements imposed by FCMs.
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        \7\7References to initial margin include maintenance margin 
    deposited throughout the life of the transaction. Rule 17f-6 would 
    not limit the types of assets that investment companies may use to 
    satisfy margin requirements. In addition, in accordance with 
    exchange rules, discounts may be applied to investment company 
    securities posted as margin. See supra note 21.
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        The Commission considered limiting FCM custody to exchange-
    established margin requirements.78 While this approach would 
    address concerns that FCMs might hold more investment company assets 
    than are technically necessary to enter into commodity transactions, it 
    also could interfere with normal commodity settlement 
    procedures.79 In addition, investment companies should be able to 
    bargain effectively with FCMs so that custody of fund assets is 
    appropriately circumscribed. The Commission, however, requests comment 
    on the proposed approach and whether any restrictions are necessary to 
    address an FCM's discretion to increase exchange-established margin 
    levels.
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        \7\8See Russo Letter II, supra note 61, at 4 (recommending such 
    a limitation).
        \7\9See supra notes 25 & 27 and accompanying text.
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        In addition, exchange rules and FCMs may restrict the types of 
    assets that may be used to satisfy margin requirements.\80\ When an 
    investor does not have the assets required, the FCM may loan the 
    investor cash or other acceptable assets to meet margin requirements 
    upon taking possession of other assets as collateral for the loan.\81\ 
    The Commission requests comment on whether investment companies should 
    be permitted to engage in these transactions and what, if any, 
    additional protections should apply.\82\
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        \80\1 Russo, supra note 18, Secs. 1.20, 4.28.
        \81\Id. Sec. 4.28. See CFTC regulation 1.30 (regarding FCM 
    loans).
        \82\See, e.g., Inv. Co. Act Rel. 10666, supra note 1, 82 
    (requiring, among other things, the use of segregated accounts to 
    fully collateralize investment company reverse repurchase 
    agreements).
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    2. Margin Gain
        Paragraph (b) of proposed rule 17f-6 would permit FCMs to hold de 
    minimis amounts of investment company margin gain. The Commission 
    generally would expect that margin gain maintained with any one FCM 
    would not exceed $50,000.\83\ Consistent with current no-action 
    positions and the commodity settlement process, margin gain exceeding 
    de minimis amounts could be held by the FCM until the next business day 
    following receipt.
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        \83\The de minimis limitation would apply on a per FCM basis. 
    This contrasts with certain exemptive orders which also limited the 
    amount of margin gain held by all FCMs through which trades are 
    effected. See, e.g., Carnegie Government Securities Trust, supra 
    note 60.
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        The CFTC staff has suggested that margin gain should be collected 
    daily to avoid possible losses resulting from the pro rata treatment 
    accorded customer assets in FCM bankruptcy proceedings.\84\ Exemptive 
    applications, however, suggest funds may benefit from leaving small 
    amounts of margin gain in FCM custody.\85\ The Commission requests 
    comment on whether FCMs should be permitted to hold margin gain beyond 
    the next business day following receipt and, if so, whether the holding 
    of such gain should be subject to a $50,000 or other de minimis 
    limitation.\86\ The Commission also requests comment on whether it 
    would be appropriate for the rule to include, for example, a specific 
    dollar limitation instead of the proposed de minimis standard.
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        \84\CFTC Interpretation No. 10, supra note 41, at 7128 n.15. The 
    risk of loss should be minimized by the proposed de minimis margin 
    gain limitation and FCM capitalization requirements. See 
    subparagraph (a)(1)(i) of the proposed rule (regarding the proposed 
    FCM capitalization requirements), discussed under ``FCMs Eligible to 
    Hold Investment Company Assets'' below.
        \85\See, e.g., Carnegie Government Securities Trust, supra note 
    60 (indicating that the fund's custodian imposed a $25 charge for 
    each transfer of margin gain to the fund's account).
        \86\The Commission, for example, considered whether to interpret 
    the de minimis limitation based on the facts and circumstances of 
    the fund involved. For example, $100,000 in margin gain could be 
    considered de minimis for funds that are more actively engaged in 
    commodity trading. The Commission also considered using a percentage 
    limitation, which would take into account the size of the fund. 
    Given the CFTC staff's position regarding daily collections of 
    margin gain, however, the $50,000 level seems prudent.
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    B. FCMs Eligible to Hold Investment Company Assets\87\
    
        FCMs maintaining custody of investment company margin would have to 
    be registered under the CEA, and thus would be subject to CEA and CFTC 
    regulation.\88\ The proposal would not require FCMs to be members of a 
    commodity exchange or clearing organization.
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        \87\In addition to the objective requirements discussed in this 
    section, the board of directors (or its delegate) would be required 
    to determine that maintaining the fund's assets with a particular 
    FCM is in the best interests of the investment company and its 
    shareholders. See proposed subparagraph (a)(2), discussed under 
    ``Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and Delegation'' below.
        As discussed below under ``Additional FCMs Used for Clearing 
    Purposes,'' where the FCM accepting the investment company's trade 
    orders uses one or more FCMs to clear the fund's transactions, each 
    other FCM would be subject to the rule's requirements (other than 
    the requirement of a contract with the investment company).
        \88\Proposed subparagraph (d)(1) (defining futures commission 
    merchant). See CFTC regulation 1.3(p), 17 CFR 1.3(p) (FCMs include 
    any entity that solicits or accepts trade orders and also accepts 
    customer assets to margin trades); CEA section 4d(1) (requiring FCM 
    registration).
        The CFTC has delegated its responsibility for processing FCM 
    registrations to the National Futures Association (``NFA''). CFTC 
    regulation 3.10. The NFA currently is the only futures association 
    registered under the CEA and has its own rules governing FCM 
    operations. See CFTC regulation 170.15, 17 CFR 170.15 (requiring 
    FCMs to be members of at least one registered futures association); 
    NFA Manual, Registration Rules, Part 400 (providing for FCM training 
    and proficiency testing); NFA Manual, Compliance Rules, Part 3 (FCM 
    disciplinary actions). Subject to the minimum financial requirements 
    established by the CFTC (discussed in the text below), the NFA and 
    the individual exchanges share responsibility for imposing financial 
    standards and auditing FCMs; the NFA is responsible for FCMs that 
    are not members of an exchange, while the exchanges are responsible 
    for their members. CFTC regulation 1.52, 17 CFR 1.52.
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        An exchange or clearing membership requirement might provide 
    additional investor protections.\89\ It also could reduce risks by 
    limiting the number of FCMs involved in the settlement of investment 
    company transactions.\90\ Imposing either requirement, however, might 
    restrict unnecessarily the number of FCMs eligible to hold investment 
    company margin and force investment companies to use different FCMs for 
    the various exchanges on which trading is conducted.\91\ The Commission 
    requests comment on the appropriateness of an exchange or clearing 
    membership requirement.\92\
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        \89\Members of an exchange are subject to the rules of that 
    exchange and clearing members typically are subject to additional 
    clearing organization requirements. 1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, 
    Secs. 2.53, 3.49 (exchange rules); 1 Russo, supra note 18, 
    Secs. 2.08, 4.33 (clearing organization requirements).
        Prior to 1981, a number of failures occurred among non-member 
    FCMs that were not subject to the additional regulation and 
    oversight of an exchange. See Division of Trading and Markets, CFTC, 
    Commodity Account Protection Study 30 (Nov. 20, 1988) [hereinafter 
    CFTC Account Protection Study]. In 1981, the NFA was given 
    additional powers to regulate non-member FCMs to fill this 
    regulatory gap. 1 Johnson & Hazen, supra note 2, Sec. 1.89.
        \90\See ``Background--FCM Insolvency Risks and the Settlement 
    Process'' above.
        \91\Based on information provided by the CFTC staff, of 265 FCMs 
    registered under the CEA as of December 31, 1993, 184 FCMs, or 
    69.4%, are members of at least one exchange; 134 FCMs, or 50.5%, are 
    members of at least one clearing organization. 117 FCMs, or 44.2%, 
    are members of more than one exchange, and 90 FCMs, or 34%, are 
    members of more than one clearing organization.
        \92\As discussed infra at note 144 and accompanying text, a 
    clearing membership requirement would eliminate the need to evaluate 
    additional FCMs in the settlement process, as currently required 
    under the proposed rule.
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        Under CFTC regulations, FCMs generally must maintain adjusted net 
    capital equal to or exceeding the greatest of (i) $50,000,\93\ (ii) 
    four percent of customer funds maintained in safekeeping,\94\ or (iii) 
    for FCMs that are also registered securities broker-dealers, the net 
    capital required by rule 15c3-1(a) under the Securities Exchange Act of 
    1934 [17 CFR 15c3-1(a)].\95\ FCMs generally must notify the CFTC of 
    potential capital impairment if the ratio of their total adjusted net 
    capital to CFTC required minimums falls below 150%.\96\
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        \93\Under NFA rules, FCMs are required to maintain adjusted net 
    capital of at least $250,000. NFA Manual, Financial Requirements, 
    section 1.
        \94\This requirement is based on the amount of customer funds 
    required to be segregated under CEA section 4d(2) and CFTC rules 
    thereunder.
        \95\CFTC regulation 1.17, 17 CFR 1.17. An FCM whose adjusted net 
    capital falls below the required minimum generally must cease doing 
    business as an FCM and transfer all customer accounts to an FCM that 
    meets CFTC requirements. CFTC regulation 1.17(a)(4).
        After the 1985 insolvency of Volume Investors Corporation, the 
    CFTC proposed, but never adopted, a risk-based approach to FCM 
    capital requirements. See, e.g., Minimum Financial and Related 
    Requirements for FCMs, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
    Rep. (CCH) 23,738 at 33,911 (CFTC July 29, 1987).
        \96\CFTC regulation 1.12(b), 17 CFR 1.12(b).
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        Proposed subparagraph (a)(1)(i) would require an FCM to have at 
    least $20 million in adjusted net capital in excess of the applicable 
    CFTC minimum requirement.\97\ In addition, the ratio of the FCM's 
    adjusted net capital to the CFTC required minimum would have to equal 
    or exceed 250%. These provisions seek to address FCM insolvency risks 
    by establishing a cushion between the FCM's actual capital and minimum 
    regulatory requirements.\98\
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        \97\See proposed subparagraph (d)(3) (an FCM's adjusted net 
    capital and required minimum adjusted net capital would be 
    determined under CFTC regulation 1.17, which governs FCM minimum 
    capital requirements). See also rule 17f-5 (generally requiring 
    foreign banks holding investment company assets to have at least 
    $200 million in shareholders' equity). Rule 17f-1, which governs 
    custody of investment company assets by registered securities 
    brokers, does not contain specific minimum capital requirements. As 
    indicated supra at note 53, however, rule 17f-1 is rarely used, 
    because it requires investment company assets to be individually 
    segregated and marked as belonging to the fund.
        \98\See, e.g., Division of Trading and Markets, CFTC, Volume 
    Investors Corporation 10 (July 1985) (Volume Investors Corporation 
    reported excess adjusted net capital of $1.6 million and a ratio of 
    266% prior to its failure in March 1985); CFTC News Release No. 
    3663-93, supra note 47, at 2 (Stotler and Company claimed $9.5 
    million in excess capital on the eve of its failure in August 1990, 
    but the CFTC later charged that its capital had fallen below the 
    150% ratio without the required notification more than six months 
    before).
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        Because FCMs must compute their adjusted net capital to facilitate 
    regulatory oversight, investment companies should be able to evaluate 
    and monitor an FCM's compliance with the proposed requirements.\99\ If 
    the FCM's capital at any time falls below the proposed thresholds, the 
    FCM no longer would be eligible to hold investment company assets, and 
    the fund would be required to withdraw its assets from the FCM's 
    safekeeping.\100\
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        \99\FCMs, for example, must compute their adjusted net capital 
    regularly to ensure compliance with the CFTC's notification 
    requirement discussed supra at the text accompanying note 96. See 
    also CFTC regulation 1.18, 17 CFR 1.18 (requiring FCMs to calculate 
    their adjusted net capital as of the end of each month); CFTC 
    regulation 1.10 (requiring FCMs to prepare and file periodic reports 
    concerning their financial strength and operations). See generally 
    infra note 128 (regarding the monitoring of FCM arrangements).
        \100\See proposed subparagraph (a)(4), discussed under 
    ``Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and Delegation'' below.
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        The Commission requests comment on the proposed approach and the 
    appropriateness of the proposed $20 million and 250% thresholds.\101\ 
    Specific comment is requested on the circumstances under which FCM 
    capital may fluctuate below these levels and whether the proposed rule 
    should incorporate a grace period or other mechanism to address such 
    fluctuations. The Commission also requests comment on whether both 
    requirements are necessary,\102\ and on alternative capital 
    requirements that would promote the safekeeping of investment company 
    assets.\103\
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        \101\Based on information provided by the CFTC staff, of 265 
    FCMs registered under the CEA as of December 31, 1993, 79 FCMs, or 
    29.8%, would satisfy the proposed excess capital and ratio 
    requirements.
        \102\Either requirement, standing alone, may not provide a 
    complete picture of an FCM's financial strength. For example, 
    without the proposed 250% ratio requirement, an FCM's capital may be 
    sufficient to satisfy the proposed $20 million excess capital 
    standard, but may fall below the CFTC 150% ratio signalling 
    potential vulnerability.
        \103\One commenter, for example, recommended a $10 million total 
    (as opposed to excess) adjusted net capital requirement. Russo 
    Letter II, supra note 61, at 2-3. This approach, however, may not 
    reflect an FCM's financial strength. For example, depending of the 
    amount of customer funds in safekeeping or the FCM's status as a 
    registered broker-dealer, an FCM with $10 million in adjusted net 
    capital may not satisfy applicable CFTC requirements.
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        Under proposed subparagraph (a)(2)(ii), FCMs holding investment 
    company margin could not be affiliated persons of the company or 
    affiliated persons of such persons.\104\
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        \104\See section 2(a)(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(3) 
    (defining affiliated person).
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        Although some investment companies may use affiliated FCMs to 
    execute their trades,105 custody by FCM affiliates raises 
    additional investor protection concerns.106 Investment companies 
    wishing to execute their trades through affiliated FCMs may use third 
    party custodial accounts for their margin deposits.
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        \1\05Several no-action letters concern commission payments to 
    affiliated FCMs. See, e.g., Prudential-Bache Government Plus Fund, 
    Inc. (pub. avail. Sept. 3, 1985); Kidder, Peabody Government Income 
    Fund, Inc. (pub. avail. Sept. 15, 1986).
        \1\06To guard against potential abuses resulting from control 
    over fund assets by related persons, in other contexts rule 17f-2 
    has been read to require investment company affiliates to comply 
    with its provisions or establish other appropriate safeguards. See, 
    e.g., Pegasus Income and Capital Fund, Inc. (pub. avail. Dec. 1, 
    1977) (custody by adviser-bank).
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        The Commission requests comment on whether the proposed approach 
    would be unduly restrictive and whether there are alternative 
    safeguards that would address investor protection concerns associated 
    with these arrangements. For example, should the board of directors 
    retain all responsibility for affiliated FCM custody arrangements, 
    without being able to delegate FCM selection and monitoring 
    responsibilities to the fund's adviser or officers?107
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        \1\07See ``Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and 
    Delegation'' below.
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    C. Contract Requirements
    
        Subparagraph (a)(3) would require a written contract between the 
    investment company and the FCM to contain certain provisions.108 
    The contract would require the FCM to comply with the segregation 
    requirements of section 4d(2) of the CEA and CFTC rules 
    thereunder.109 In addition, to facilitate the inspection of 
    investment company assets, the FCM contract would have to provide that 
    the FCM would furnish the Commission or its staff upon request with 
    information concerning the FCM's custody of investment company 
    margin.110 The Commission requests comment on whether investment 
    company contracts also should require FCMs to furnish information at 
    the request of investment company accountants.111
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        \1\08The Commission understands that FCMs use standardized 
    customer agreements, and that proposed subparagraph (a)(3) would 
    require additional contract provisions for investment company 
    clients.
        \1\09Proposed subparagraph (a)(3)(i). This provision is intended 
    to ensure that investment company assets are not commingled with the 
    FCM's own funds, and that the FCM could not assign, hypothecate, 
    pledge or otherwise dispose of investment company margin except in 
    connection with the fund's commodity transactions and as required by 
    the exchanges and clearing organizations. See supra text 
    accompanying note 31. See also Russo Letter II, supra note 61, at 2, 
    5-6.
        Certain exchanges have applied to the CFTC for exemptions from 
    section 4d(2) and other provisions of the CEA with respect to the 
    trading of futures contracts and commodity options among 
    institutional investors, including registered investment companies. 
    Exemptions for Certain Exchange-Traded Futures and Options 
    Contracts, 58 FR 43414 (Aug. 16, 1993). The Commission has urged the 
    CFTC to disapprove these requests. Letter of Jonathan G. Katz, 
    Secretary, SEC, to Jean A. Webb, Secretary, CFTC (Dec. 28, 1993).
        \1\10Proposed subparagraph (a)(3)(ii). See Russo Letter II, 
    supra note 61, at 3 (recommending that the fund's commodity account 
    and related assets be subject to Division inspection).
        \1\11See rule 17f-5(a)(1)(iii)(F) (imposing this requirement in 
    connection with investment company foreign custody arrangements). 
    The proposed rule also would not require the investment company's 
    independent accountants to verify or otherwise examine the fund's 
    margin held by the FCM. See, e.g., rule 17f-2(f) (imposing such a 
    requirement for self-custody arrangements).
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        The FCM would be permitted to transfer the investment company's 
    assets for clearing purposes, consistent with the commodity settlement 
    process.112 The FCM may deposit and maintain investment company 
    margin with another FCM that meets the requirements of the rule (other 
    than the requirement of a contract with the investment 
    company),113 a bank that satisfies section 26(a)(1),114 or a 
    clearing organization.115 This provision is intended to 
    accommodate the legitimate needs of the participants in the commodity 
    settlement process, consistent with the safekeeping of investment 
    company assets.
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        \1\12Proposed subparagraph (a)(3)(iii). As discussed supra at 
    note 29, if an FCM advances its own funds to satisfy margin 
    requirements, those funds are considered under the CEA to be 
    customer property. Proposed subparagraph (a)(3)(iii) thus would 
    apply without regard to whether an FCM advances its own funds or 
    transfers investment company assets to effect the company's 
    commodity transactions.
        \1\13In addition, proposed subparagraph (a)(3)(iii) would 
    require the FCM to obtain the agreement of each FCM used for 
    clearing purposes to comply with the segregation requirements of the 
    CEA. See ``Additional FCMs Used for Clearing Purposes'' below.
        \1\1415 U.S.C. 80a-26(a)(1). Section 26(a)(1) requires a bank to 
    have at all times at least $500,000 in capital, surplus, and 
    undivided profits. See also sections 17(f)(1) (investment company 
    assets may be held by a bank meeting the requirements of section 
    26(a)(1)) and 2(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(5) (defining bank).
        \1\15See proposed subparagraph (d)(4) (defining clearing 
    organization in accordance with CFTC rule 1.3(q)).
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        The proposed contract provisions would not require that FCMs 
    maintain specific records or furnish investment companies with specific 
    reports concerning their commodity accounts. Under CFTC rules, FCMs 
    must maintain daily financial ledger records of all customer 
    transactions.116 In addition, FCMs must supply customers with 
    prompt confirmations of their trades and monthly statements concerning 
    their accounts.117 The Commission requests comment on whether the 
    proposed rule should impose any additional recordkeeping or reporting 
    requirements.118 For example, would the transmission of daily 
    account reports facilitate an investment company's compliance with the 
    proposed limitations on FCM custody of margin gain?119
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        \1\16CFTC regulation 1.35, 17 CFR 1.35.
        \1\17CFTC regulation 1.33, 17 CFR 1.33.
        \1\18See Russo Letter II, supra note 61, at 4 (recommending that 
    FCMs transmit daily transaction reports); rule 17f-5(a)(1)(iii)(D) 
    and (F) (requiring records and periodic reports in connection with 
    investment company foreign custody arrangements).
        \1\19See proposed paragraph (b), discussed under ``Background--
    Investment Company Margin--Margin Gain'' above.
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        Subparagraph (a)(3) also would not require FCMs to indemnify 
    investment companies or insure their assets against non-trading margin 
    losses.120 It appears that indemnification provisions in favor of 
    FCM customers are not included in customary FCM account 
    agreements.121 Private insurance may not be available or may be 
    unduly expensive.122 Comment is requested on the feasibility of an 
    indemnification or insurance requirement and whether such a requirement 
    would be appropriate.123
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        \1\20Indemnification could protect against the loss of 
    investment company assets as a result of negligence or malfeasance. 
    Third party insurance could protect against both impropriety and 
    insolvency risks.
        \1\21The CFTC has established a customer reparations program 
    that generally permits persons to seek redress with the CFTC for 
    alleged violations of the CEA and CFTC regulations by registered 
    FCMs. CEA section 14, 7 U.S.C. 18. Under this program, the CFTC may 
    award damages without dollar limitation if it finds that a violation 
    has occurred involving monetary injury. Damage awards are paid by 
    the FCM against whom reparation is sought. See id.; CFTC regulations 
    12.1 [-.408], 17 CFR 12.1 [-.408].
        \1\22See CFTC Account Protection Study, supra note 89, at 63-66 
    (describing the experience of one commodity insurer organized in 
    1981, sold a year later, and no longer offering commodity coverage).
        Unlike securities accounts of almost all broker-dealers 
    registered with the Commission, FCM commodity accounts are not 
    protected by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation 
    (``SIPC'') or mandatory insurance requirements. See Securities 
    Investor Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aaa-78lll (in the event of a 
    member's financial failure, SIPC protects each securities customer 
    for claims of up to $500,000 for cash and securities losses, with a 
    $100,000 limit for cash losses); National Association of Securities 
    Dealers, Inc. Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, sec. 32 and Appendix 
    C thereto (broker-dealer fidelity bonds). At the request of Congress 
    and the CFTC, the CFTC staff and the NFA have studied these and 
    other insurance mechanisms, and generally have concluded that 
    insurance protection is neither necessary nor cost effective in the 
    commodity context. See, e.g., CFTC Account Protection Study, supra 
    note 89; NFA Account Protection Study, supra note 49. Certain 
    exchanges maintain trusts that could be used in the exchange's 
    discretion to reimburse customer losses. Corcoran & Ervin, supra 
    note 47, at nn.87 & 208.
        \1\23See rule 17f-5(a)(1)(iii)(A) (regarding indemnification and 
    insurance for investment company foreign custody arrangements).
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    D. Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and Delegation124
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        \1\24As discussed below under ``Additional FCMs Used for 
    Clearing Purposes,'' where the FCM originating the trade uses one or 
    more FCMs to clear the transaction, each other FCM would be subject 
    to the rule's requirements (other than the requirement of a contract 
    with the investment company).
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        Under subparagraph (a)(2), the investment company's board of 
    directors would be required to find that maintaining the investment 
    company's assets with the FCM is in the best interests of the company 
    and its shareholders.125 The board would consider the FCM's 
    financial strength and its general reputation and standing in the 
    financial community, the FCM's internal procedures and safeguards 
    regarding custody of the fund's assets, and such other factors as the 
    board deems relevant.126 This requirement is intended to 
    complement the objective criteria set forth in proposed subparagraph 
    (a)(1) to ensure that all considerations pertinent to the safekeeping 
    of investment company assets are evaluated prior to depositing margin 
    with a particular FCM.
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        \1\25The rule would not require the investment company's 
    contract with an FCM to be approved by the board. The board 
    nonetheless may choose to review and approve the FCM contract in 
    light of its fiduciary duties under state law. As discussed above, 
    proposed subparagraph (a)(3) would mandate specific contract 
    requirements.
        \1\26Proposed subparagraphs (a)(2)(i)-(iii). See generally Russo 
    Letter II, supra note 61, at 4 (recommending similar factors to be 
    considered by the board in selecting FCMs); Note 2 to rule 17f-5 
    (enumerating factors investment company boards should consider in 
    selecting foreign custodians).
        Under proposed subparagraph (a)(2)(i), the board would be 
    required to consider the FCM's financial strength apart from the 
    proposed capitalization requirements of subparagraph (a)(1)(i). The 
    board, for example, may consider the FCM's financial history and any 
    other lines of business undertaken by the FCM and its potential 
    impact on the FCM's operations. See also Risk Assessment for Holding 
    Company Systems, 59 FR 9689 (CFTC Mar. 1, 1993) (proposing rules to 
    require FCM recordkeeping and reporting in connection with financial 
    and operational risks presented by FCM affiliates).
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        Factors not enumerated in the proposed rule that the board may deem 
    relevant would depend on the facts and circumstances. The board, for 
    example, may want to consider the FCM's status as an exchange or 
    clearing member.127
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        \1\27See supra ``Background--Settlement of Futures Contracts and 
    Commodity Options--FCM Insolvency Risks and the Settlement Process'' 
    and infra note 144.
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        Subparagraph (a)(4) would require the board to establish a 
    monitoring system to ensure compliance with the requirements of the 
    proposed rule. This provision would require the board to create a means 
    of receiving sufficient and timely information to alert it to any 
    material change in circumstance.128 If the custodial arrangement 
    no longer complies with the proposed rule, the investment company would 
    be required to withdraw its assets promptly. The Commission generally 
    would expect such a withdrawal to be made within five business days. 
    The Commission requests comment on the appropriateness of this time 
    period.129
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        \1\28An investment company, for example, may arrange to receive 
    regular reports of the FCM's financial condition. A fund also could 
    require the FCM to notify it of changes, such as a drop in the FCM's 
    adjusted net capital, that may affect the FCM's continued ability to 
    meet the requirements of the rule. External sources, such as 
    newspaper reports and other publications, may provide additional 
    information.
        \1\29The Commission believes that five business days should be 
    sufficient to withdraw margin deposits either by closing out 
    existing positions or by transferring margin to an FCM that meets 
    the requirements of the proposed rule. Cf. CFTC regulation 190.02(e) 
    (requiring a trustee in FCM bankruptcy proceedings to transfer open 
    customer positions within four business days). Investment companies 
    may wish to maintain alternative FCM arrangements to facilitate 
    transfers of existing positions in the event of changed 
    circumstances.
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        Under paragraph (c), the board could delegate its responsibilities 
    for selecting and monitoring FCM arrangements to the investment 
    company's adviser or officers, subject to the board's general oversight 
    and certain conditions.\130\ This approach is consistent with 
    recommendations of the Division and rule amendments approved by the 
    Commission to eliminate regulatory requirements that involve directors 
    in detailed findings of fact that do not present serious conflicts of 
    interest.\131\
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        \130\The board would not be permitted to delegate certain 
    responsibilities (e.g., FCM selection), while retaining others 
    (e.g., monitoring).
        \131\Protecting Investors report, supra note, 71 at 251-289; 
    Exemption of Acquisitions of Securities Issued by Persons Engaged in 
    Securities Related Businesses, Investment Company Act Release No. 
    19716 (Sept. 16, 1993) (eliminating the requirement in rule 12d3-1 
    [17 CFR 270.12d3-1] that directors determine the credit quality of 
    debt securities of certain issuers involved in securities related 
    activities). See also Letter from Matthew P. Fink, President, 
    Investment Company Institute, to Marianne K. Smythe, Director, 
    Division of Investment Management, SEC (Jan. 18, 1993) (recommending 
    delegation of the board's responsibilities with respect to foreign 
    custodian arrangements under rule 17f-5).
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        Under proposed rule 17f-6, the board would be required to find that 
    the delegation is in the best interests of the investment company and 
    its shareholders.\132\ In addition, the board would be required to 
    adopt written guidelines and procedures governing the delegate's 
    responsibilities, and make and approve changes to the guidelines and 
    procedures as the board deems necessary.\133\ The guidelines and 
    procedures would require the delegate to notify the board of its 
    selection of an FCM at or before the next regularly scheduled board 
    meeting following the selection.\134\ The delegate also would report 
    any material changes in the investment company's custodial arrangements 
    and the actions taken by the delegate with respect thereto.\135\ 
    Reports of material changes would be given to the board as soon as 
    reasonably practicable, but in no event later than the next regularly 
    scheduled meeting after the event triggering the board's 
    involvement.\136\
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        \132\Proposed subparagraph (c)(1).
        \133\Proposed subparagraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3). The proposed 
    approach is consistent with Investment Company Act rules 10f-3, 17a-
    7, and 17e-1. 17 CFR 270.10f-3, 17a-7, 17e-1. See Revision of 
    Certain Annual Review Requirements of Investment Company Boards of 
    Directors, Securities Act Release No. 7013 (Sept. 17, 1993), 58 FR 
    49919.
        \134\The proposed notification of FCM selection also would 
    extend to any other FCMs used for clearing purposes. See 
    ``additional FCMs Used for Clearing Purposes'' below.
        \135\A material change would include, but not be limited to, 
    discontinuing the use of a particular FCM or an FCM's loss of 
    exchange or clearinghouse membership. A material change also would 
    include circumstances that may adversely affect the FCM's financial 
    strength, such as a change in control as a result of the FCM's sale. 
    If appropriate, the delegate would report its reasons for continuing 
    to use the FCM.
        \136\Proposed subparagraph (c)(2)(ii).
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        Delegation would not relieve the board of ultimate responsibility 
    for the fund's custodial arrangements. Notification of an FCM's 
    selection and reports of material changes would keep the board 
    generally apprised of the investment company's custodial arrangements 
    and facilitate the board's oversight of the delegate's performance. 
    Based on this information, the board may determine to make adjustments 
    in the written guidelines and procedures governing the delegate's 
    responsibilities or overrule the delegate's decision to use a 
    particular FCM. In some instances, the board may determine to rescind 
    the delegation.
        The Commission requests comment on the role and responsibilities of 
    investment company boards and their delegates under proposed rule 17f-
    6. The Commission also requests comment on whether the board should be 
    permitted to delegate its responsibilities to any other party, such as 
    the investment company's primary bank custodian or a fund 
    administrator, and what, if any, additional protections would be 
    necessary or appropriate.\137\
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        \137\Because FCM selection also would involve brokerage 
    considerations (e.g., prompt execution and commission rates), 
    investment company officers and advisers may be in a better position 
    to make these determinations. In addition, officers and advisers 
    have fiduciary duties to investment companies under section 36. 15 
    U.S.C. 80a-35.
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    E. Additional FCMs Used for Clearing Purposes
    
        When the FCM that executes the investment company's trades is not 
    an exchange or clearinghouse member, investment company margin will be 
    transferred to one or more FCMs for clearing purposes.\138\ The 
    proposed rule would apply to each subsequent FCM in the settlement 
    chain, although a contract with the investment company would not be 
    required.\139\
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        \138\See supra notes 17-20 and 32-33 and accompanying text. See 
    also supra note .
        \139\Commodity customers enter into contracts only with the FCM 
    with which orders are placed; as discussed above under 
    ``background--Settlement of Futures Contracts and Commodity 
    Options,'' when one FCM acts on behalf of another, its ``customer'' 
    is the FCM on whose behalf the order is effected, not that FCM's 
    underlying customer. Thus, requiring a contract between the 
    investment company and other FCMs in the settlement process would 
    not be consistent with normal FCM/customer relationships.
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        When a non-clearing member FCM, for example, transfers investment 
    company margin to a clearing member, the member FCM also would have to 
    satisfy the objective requirements of proposed subparagraph 
    (a)(1),\140\ and be selected by the board (or its delegate) in 
    accordance with proposed subparagraph (a)(2).\141\ Under its contract 
    with the investment company, the non-member could place and maintain 
    the company's assets only with a clearing member that meets these 
    requirements.\142\ The non-member FCM also would be contractually 
    responsible for securing the clearing member's agreement to comply with 
    the segregation requirements of the CEA. Although the proposed approach 
    would place certain contractual responsibilities on the non-member FCM, 
    the board of directors and its delegate (if any) would remain 
    responsible for the continuing appropriateness of the custodial 
    arrangement.\143\
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        \140\See ``FCMs Eligible to Hold Investment Company Assets'' 
    above.
        \141\See ``Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and 
    Delegation'' above. Under most circumstances, the board or its 
    delegate would evaluate the use of one or more clearing members at 
    the same time it selects the non-member FCM. Under proposed 
    subparagraph (c)(2)(i), if the board has delegated its 
    responsibilities, the delegate would be required to notify the board 
    of the selection of each FCM used for clearing purposes at or before 
    the next regularly scheduled board meeting.
        \142\Proposed subparagraph (a)(3)(iv).
        \143\See ``Responsibilities of the Board of Directors and 
    Delegation'' above, discussing proposed subparagraph (a)(4).
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        The Commission believes the proposed approach is appropriate to 
    protect investment company assets when more than one FCM is involved in 
    the settlement process. The Commission requests comment on the proposed 
    approach and any alternatives that would ensure the safekeeping of 
    investment company margin.\144\ Specific comment is requested on 
    whether an FCM to which assets are transferred should be required to 
    satisfy only the objective requirements of proposed subparagraph 
    (a)(1).\145\
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        \144\For example, the transfer of investment company assets from 
    one FCM to another could be eliminated by restricting FCM custody to 
    FCM clearing members. Such a requirement, however, would limit the 
    number of FCMs eligible to hold investment company assets. See supra 
    note 91 and accompanying text. Under the proposed rule, investment 
    companies would have the option of determining whether to execute 
    their trades directly through a clearing member FCM.
        \145\For example, the rule could require the FCM originating the 
    fund's trades to determine whether an FCM used for clearing purposes 
    satisfies the objective requirements of proposed subparagraph 
    (a)(1). While such an approach would be less burdensome for 
    investment companies, it would eliminate consideration of subjective 
    factors relevant to the safekeeping of investment company margin.
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    F. Foreign-Related Commodity Transactions
    
        Certain futures contracts and options involving foreign commodities 
    or linked to foreign markets are traded on domestic exchanges. These 
    transactions include commodity contracts and options involving foreign 
    currencies and certain commodity investments that are effected through 
    electronic links between United States and foreign exchanges.\146\ 
    Proposed rule 17f-6 would permit FCM custody of investment company 
    margin for these domestically traded transactions, even if the margin 
    is held overseas.\147\ Because the transactions are traded on or linked 
    to United States contract markets, margin underlying the transactions 
    enjoys the full protections of the CEA and CFTC rules.
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        \146\See Laurie Morse, CME to Relaunch Derivatives in French 
    Francs, Financial Times, Sept. 16, 1993, at 23 (CME commodity 
    trading based on the French franc, Deutsche mark, British sterling, 
    Swiss franc, Japanese yen, and Canadian dollar); Futures Exchanges--
    Open all hours, The Economist, Nov. 6, 1993, at 107 (describing the 
    ``Globe'' and ``Access'' computer systems). Additional transactions 
    include those that are cleared on domestic exchanges pursuant to 
    CFTC-approved linkage agreements between United States and foreign 
    exchanges. Current arrangements involve the Singapore Monetary 
    Exchange and the Sidney Futures Exchange Limited, although the 
    Commission understands that no trading presently is conducted under 
    the Australian agreement. See CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 84-19, 
    Mutual Offset System's Customer Funds Treatment, [1984-1986 Transfer 
    Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,389 at 29,795 (CFTC Division of 
    Trading and Markets Aug. 9, 1984); CFTC Interpretative Letter No. 
    86-26, Treatment of Customer Funds Under Linkage Agreement Between 
    Commodity Exchange, Inc. and the Sidney Future Exchange Limited, 
    [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,359 at 
    32,989 (CFTC Division of Trading and Markets Nov. 17, 1986).
        \147\As discussed above under ``Investment Company Margin,'' 
    although FCM custody would be limited to domestically traded 
    transactions, the proposal would not require investment company 
    assets to be held in the United States. By virtue of proposed 
    paragraph (a)(3)(iii), however, margin posted overseas would have to 
    be maintained by a foreign branch of a United States bank to meet 
    the definition of bank in section 2(a)(5). See International 
    Resources Fund, Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 2866 (Apr. 
    17, 1959). The Commission understands that this requirement 
    generally would be consistent with current practices. Margin held by 
    foreign subsidiaries of United States banks or other foreign 
    entities would raise additional issues. See rule 17f-5 (governing 
    custody of investment company assets by foreign entities in 
    connection with foreign securities investments).
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        The CFTC has identified certain risks associated with domestically 
    traded transactions margined in foreign currencies or overseas.\148\ 
    The CFTC requires customers with these accounts to enter into 
    subordination agreements.\149\ For example, customers trading in the 
    currency of one jurisdiction or posting margin in the same jurisdiction 
    must agree that, if their FCM becomes insolvent and there is a margin 
    shortfall, claims to margin securing their trades will be subordinated 
    to the claims of other customers.\150\ The subordination requirement is 
    intended to tie the risks of a particular jurisdiction and currency to 
    investors engaging in commodity transactions relative to that 
    jurisdiction and currency.\151\ Investment companies depositing margin 
    for foreign-related transactions would be subject to this 
    requirement.\152\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \148\See, e.g., CFTC Financial and Segregation Interpretation 
    No. 12, Deposit of Customer Funds in Foreign Depositories, 1 Comm. 
    Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)  7122 at 7129, 7130-31 (Nov. 16, 1988) 
    [hereinafter CFTC Interpretation No. 12]. These risks include 
    various ``location'' risks, such as the freezing and expropriation 
    of margin deposits, and the risk of foreign currency fluctuations 
    pending FCM insolvency proceedings. Id.
        \149\Id. The CFTC currently is reviewing Interpretation No. 12 
    with a view toward possible refinements.
        \150\Id., at 7132-33. See supra notes 65-66--and accompanying 
    text (regarding the treatment of margin funds in FCM bankruptcy 
    proceedings).
        \151\See CFTC Interpretation No. 12, supra note 148, at 1730.
        \152\The fund's investment adviser would be expected to evaluate 
    the risks associated with a particular foreign-related commodity 
    transaction, such as the likelihood of expropriation or difficulties 
    in converting foreign currencies to United States dollars, in 
    connection with the adviser's decision to engage in that transaction 
    on the fund's behalf. But cf. rule 17f-5, Note 1(d) & (e) 
    (suggesting directors consider these risks in selecting foreign 
    custodians). Foreign investment-related risks also would be 
    disclosed, if material, in the fund's prospectus.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The Commission requests comment on the proposed approach and 
    whether any additional safeguards are necessary to address margin 
    underlying foreign-related transactions. For example, should these 
    margin deposits be required to be held in the United States? The 
    Commission also requests specific comment on the appropriateness of 
    investment companies entering into the required subordination 
    agreements.\153\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \153\Subordination would come into play only upon an FCM's 
    insolvency, which other provisions of the proposed rule are intended 
    to address.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Proposed rule 17f-6 would not allow FCM custody in connection with 
    commodity investments effected on foreign exchanges.\154\ These 
    transactions are governed by special regulations, which do not provide 
    customer funds with the full protections of the CEA and CFTC 
    rules.\155\ Although the proposed approach should not affect 
    significantly investment company participation in foreign futures and 
    options transactions,\156\ the Commission requests comment on the 
    proposed approach and alternatives that would address safekeeping 
    considerations. For example, would risks be diminished if FCMs 
    maintained custody of investment company margin in the United States 
    and advanced their own funds for foreign exchange-traded transactions?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \154\Proposed subparagraph (d)(2) (defining exchange-traded 
    futures contracts and commodity options to include investments 
    traded on or subject to the rules of any contract market designated 
    under the CEA and CFTC rules). See supra note 76 and accompanying 
    text (only United States exchanges may be designated as contract 
    markets). Although comment is requested on this approach, investment 
    companies may use third party custodial accounts for foreign 
    exchange-traded investments. See Koenig Tax-Advantaged Liquidity 
    Fund, Inc. (pub. avail. Mar. 21, 1985).
        \155\See Foreign Futures and Foreign Options, 52 FR 28985 (Aug. 
    5, 1987) (recognizing ``inherent limitations on [the CFTC's] ability 
    to provide U.S. residents trading on foreign exchanges the identical 
    protections available to U.S. residents trading on U.S. contract 
    markets''). See also CFTC regulations 30.1 through 30.10, 17 CFR 
    30.1-.10 (governing the sale of foreign exchange-traded futures 
    contracts and commodity options to United States investors).
        \156\See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text. It appears 
    that most investment company foreign transactions are effected in 
    the over-the-counter market where the posting of collateral 
    generally is not required.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    IV. Summary of Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
    
        The Commission has prepared an Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
    Analysis in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603 regarding proposed rule 17f-6. 
    The analysis states that the proposed rule would permit registered 
    management investment companies to use FCMs and commodity clearing 
    organizations as custodians in connection with CEA-regulated commodity 
    transactions under conditions designed to ensure the safekeeping of 
    investment company assets. The analysis explains that the proposed rule 
    would provide flexibility and investor protection in a way that should 
    minimize any impact on, or cost to, small business. To obtain a copy of 
    the Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, write to Elizabeth 
    Krentzman, Division of Investment Management, Mail Stop 10-6, 
    Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW., Washington, 
    DC 20549.
    
    V. Statutory Authority
    
        The Commission is proposing rule 17f-6 pursuant to sections 6(c) 
    and 38(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 6(c), 
    37(a)].
    
    List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 270
    
        Investment companies, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
    Securities.
    
    Text of Proposed Rule
    
        For the reasons set out in the preamble, Title 17, Chapter II of 
    the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended as follows:
    
    PART 270--RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
    
        1. The authority citation for Part 270 continues to read, in part, 
    as follows:
    
        Authority: 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq., 80a-37, 80a-39 unless 
    otherwise noted;
    * * * * *
        2. By adding Sec. 270.17f-6 to read as follows:
    
    
    Sec. 270.17f-6  Custody of investment company assets with futures 
    commission merchants and commodity clearing organizations.
    
        (a) A registered management investment company may place and 
    maintain cash, securities, and similar investments with a futures 
    commission merchant in amounts necessary to effect the company's 
    transactions in exchange-traded futures contracts and commodity 
    options, provided that:
        (1) The futures commission merchant and each other futures 
    commission merchant the futures commission merchant uses for purposes 
    of clearing the company's transactions:
        (i) Has adjusted net capital that is:
        (A) At least $20,000,000 in excess of the futures commission 
    merchant's required minimum adjusted net capital; and
        (B) Equal to at least 250% of such required minimum adjusted net 
    capital; and
        (ii) Is not an affiliated person of the company or an affiliated 
    person of such person.
        (2) The board of directors of the company shall have determined 
    that placing and maintaining the company's assets with the futures 
    commission merchant and each other futures commission merchant used for 
    clearing purposes is consistent with the best interests of the company 
    and its shareholders, after considering:
        (i) The financial strength of the futures commission merchant and 
    its general reputation and standing within the financial community;
        (ii) The futures commission merchant's internal procedures and 
    safeguards regarding custody of the assets; and
        (iii) Such other factors as the board deems relevant.
        (3) The manner in which the futures commission merchant maintains 
    the company's assets shall be governed by a written contract which 
    provides that:
        (i) The futures commission merchant shall comply with the 
    segregation requirements of section 4d(2) of the Commodity Exchange Act 
    (7 U.S.C. 6d(2)) and the rules thereunder (17 CFR chapter I);
        (ii) The futures commission merchant shall promptly furnish copies 
    of or extracts from the futures commission merchant's records or such 
    other information pertaining to the company's assets as the Commission 
    through its employees or agents may request; and
        (iii) The futures commission merchant may place and maintain the 
    company's assets for clearing purposes only with another futures 
    commission merchant that meets the requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) 
    and (2) of this section, a bank that meets the requirements of section 
    26(a)(1) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 26(a)(1)), or a clearing organization. 
    Each futures commission merchant used for clearing purposes shall agree 
    to comply with the segregation requirements of section 4d(2) of the 
    Commodity Exchange Act and rules thereunder.
        (4) The board of directors shall establish a system to monitor the 
    custodial arrangement to ensure it meets the requirements of this 
    section. If the custodial arrangement no longer meets the requirements 
    of this section, the company shall promptly withdraw its assets from 
    the futures commission merchant.
         (b) Subject to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, 
    any gains of the company on exchange-traded futures contracts and 
    commodity options may be maintained with the futures commission 
    merchant in de minimis amounts. Gains in excess of such amounts may be 
    maintained by the futures commission merchant until the next business 
    day following receipt.
        (c) The board of directors may delegate to the company's investment 
    adviser or officers its responsibilities under this section, provided 
    that:
        (1) The board determines that the delegation is consistent with the 
    best interests of the company and its shareholders.
        (2) The board adopts written guidelines and procedures under which 
    the delegate shall act under this section, which shall include:
        (i) Notifying the board of the selection of a futures commission 
    merchant, including each other futures commission merchant used for 
    clearing purposes, no later than the next regularly scheduled board 
    meeting following such action; and
         (ii) Reporting to the board any material change in the custodial 
    arrangement and any action taken by the delegate with respect thereto 
    as soon as is reasonably practicable under the circumstances, but not 
    later than the next regularly scheduled board meeting.
        (3) The board makes and approves such changes to the written 
    guidelines and procedures required by paragraph (c)(2) of this section 
    as the board deems necessary.
        (d) For purposes of this section:
        (1) Futures commission merchant is any person who is registered as 
    a futures commission merchant under the Commodity Exchange Act (7 
    U.S.C. 1-25).
        (2) Exchange-traded futures contracts and commodity options are 
    commodity futures contracts, options on commodity futures contracts, 
    and options on physical commodities conducted on or subject to the 
    rules of any contract market designated for trading such transactions 
    under the Commodity Exchange Act and the rules and regulations 
    thereunder.
        (3) Adjusted net capital and required minimum adjusted net capital 
    shall be determined under rule 1.17 under the Commodity Exchange Act 
    (17 CFR 1.17).
        (4) Clearing organization has the meaning set forth in rule 1.3(d) 
    under the Commodity Exchange Act (17 CFR 1.3(d)).
    
        By the Commission.
    
        Dated: May 24, 1994.
    Margaret H. McFarland,
    Deputy Secretary.
    [FR Doc. 94-13213 Filed 5-31-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 8010-01-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
06/01/1994
Department:
Securities and Exchange Commission
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Action:
Proposed rule and request for comment.
Document Number:
94-13213
Dates:
Comments must be received on or before August 1, 1994.
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: June 1, 1994, Release No. IC-20313, File No. S7-15-94
RINs:
3235-AF97: Custody of Investment Company Assets With Futures Commission Merchants and Commodity Clearing Organizations
RIN Links:
https://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/3235-AF97/custody-of-investment-company-assets-with-futures-commission-merchants-and-commodity-clearing-organi
CFR: (2)
17 CFR 2.43
17 CFR 270.17f-6