[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 112 (Friday, June 11, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 31533-31536]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-14834]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 571
Denial of Petition for Rulemaking; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of petition for rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: This document denies Mr. W. A. Barr's petition to require
warning systems on all vehicles to alert operators and the immediate
public when a vehicle is not immobilized and may move after the
operator exits the vehicle. Based on our analysis of his petition, we
conclude that the cost of requiring the system requested by Mr. Barr
would far exceed the potential benefits.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Chris Flanigan, Office of Safety
Performance Standards, NHTSA, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC
20590. Mr. Flanigan's telephone number is: (202) 366-4918. His
facsimile number is (202) 366-4329.
Background
1980 Defect Investigation of Ford Vehicles
In 1980, we conducted an extensive investigation (Office of Defects
Investigation (ODI) Case No. C8-02) of alleged safety-related defects
in model year 1970 through 1979 Ford vehicles. On June 6, 1980, we made
an initial determination that a safety-related defect existed in all of
those vehicles. We determined that the park gear may not be securely
engaged after an attempt to shift; that the transmission may shift to
reverse by itself without warning, allowing the vehicle to move while
unattended; and that such uncontrolled vehicle movement may result, and
had resulted, in injury or death to vehicle occupants or pedestrians.
However, the Secretary of Transportation never made a final
determination of the existence of a safety-related defect. Instead,
this investigation was terminated by a settlement agreement entered
into on
[[Page 31534]]
December 30, 1980. The settlement agreement required Ford to send both
warning letters and self-sticking labels to all owners of the subject
vehicles. These letters and labels informed recipients of our
determination and reminded them of proper procedures to follow when
parking and leaving their vehicles. The proper procedure includes
making sure the transmission is in the park position, setting the
parking brake, and shutting off the engine.
Mid-1980's Petitions for Defect Investigation
On March 6, 1985, the Center for Auto Safety (CFAS) petitioned us
to initiate an expedited defect investigation into the failure of
automatic transmissions in 1966 through early 1980 Ford vehicles to
hold or engage in park. CFAS stated that these vehicles have been the
cause of more fatalities and injuries than any other defect since our
1980 settlement with Ford. CFAS believed that, because the terms of
this settlement called for reopening the investigation if the warning
labels failed to decrease park to reverse incidents, we should do so.
CFAS stated that the reason for the supposed ineffectiveness was that
the labels were not being placed in a significant number of vehicles.
We denied this petition based mainly on the fact that there was no new
technical information presented by CFAS which would alter our findings
in the 1980 defect investigation. Also, the data showed that the number
and rate of park to reverse incidents involving the subject Ford
vehicles had declined in every year since the 1980 settlement. ODI
compiled a report discussing the rationale for denying CFAS's petition
that was published on July 3, 1985 (P85-15-30) (hereafter referred to
as ``the 1985 ODI report'').
Mr. Barr petitioned us on December 4, 1986, and again on June 29,
1989, to commence a formal defect investigation to address not only
Ford vehicles, but all vehicles with automatic transmissions. In these
petitions, Mr. Barr asserted that any movement of a vehicle with no
driver and with an automatic transmission which has been placed in the
park position occurred because of an ``illusory park'' unless the shift
lever was removed from the latched position after the driver exited the
vehicle. He further asserted that the possibility of such an illusory
park condition constituted a safety-related defect.
Mr. Barr stated that a vehicle's transmission is in an ``illusory
park'' position when either the vehicle operator does not fully move
the shift lever into the park position or the transmission components
are degraded, broken, or maladjusted. He further states that, if a
transmission is in illusory park, it will appear to the vehicle
operator that the vehicle is immobilized upon exiting the vehicle. Two
modes of park to reverse incidents could result when the vehicle is in
illusory park. If the vehicle's engine is running, internal forces in
the transmission could cause the park system to migrate to the reverse
position. As a result, the vehicle would move rearward in powered
reverse. If the vehicle's engine is not running and the transmission
comes out of park, the vehicle could move forward or backward,
depending on the grade of the roadway. Mr. Barr asserts that, unless
the shift lever is manually removed from the latched park position
after the operator has left the vehicle, any movement of a vehicle with
no operator and an automatic transmission occurs because the vehicle
was in the ``illusory park'' position.
We denied both of these petitions because there was no reason to
expect that any further investigation of this matter would result in a
determination that the vehicles in question contained a safety-related
defect, because we had already conducted a thorough investigation on
this subject for the 1985 ODI report.
The Current Petition for Rulemaking
On June 24, 1998, Mr. Barr petitioned us to conduct rulemaking to
require a warning system on all vehicles that would alert operators and
the immediate public when a vehicle is not immobilized and may move
after the operator exits the vehicle. Mr. Barr states that ``it is
reasonable that every empty vehicle with an automatic transmission
which moves, does so because the selector lever was not in the park
slot or was in the park slot but the park system linkage was broken or
maladjusted so that the system could not properly place the pawl in its
park position.'' He bases this assertion on analysis provided by Ford
in response to our investigation. In Ford's response, it states that,
if the driver shifts into park, it is impossible for the transmission
to ``jump'' or ``slip'' into reverse unless a transmission component is
broken or the control system is grossly maladjusted.
As a result of vehicles being placed into ``illusory park,'' Mr.
Barr believes that there are 64 fatalities and 650 injuries annually.
He derives these numbers first by citing data obtained from the 1985
ODI report. For this report, Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)
data for the period of 1975 through 1984 were searched for all
incidents which involved driver-less vehicles and in which a pedestrian
was killed. This search produced 443 records for an average of 44.3
fatalities per year. Mr. Barr also cites data submitted to us by Ford
regarding the CFAS petition (P85-15) which lists fatalities caused by
non-Ford vehicles with automatic transmissions. From this list, Mr.
Barr extracted only the vehicles that were not contained in the FARS
data used in the 1985 ODI report. From this he found an additional 197
fatalities during the same ten year period for an average of 19.7 per
year. Adding the annual averages of 44.3 fatalities found in the FARS
data to the 19.7 fatalities found in the list Ford submitted gives Mr.
Barr his estimate of 64 fatalities per year.
Mr. Barr estimates the injury rate of 650 per year by using data
contained in the 1985 ODI report. The report shows that ODI received
reports on 4,597 injuries and 412 fatalities as a result of park to
reverse incidents in all model year 1966 through 1979 Ford vehicles.
This yields a ratio of 11.2 injuries per fatality. By assuming that
this Ford vehicle ratio would be similar when comparing injuries to
fatalities in all driver-less vehicle incidents, he estimated that the
number of injuries would be approximately ten times the number of
fatalities, thus coming up with the value of 650 injuries per year.
Because Mr. Barr believes that there is no feasible mechanical fix
that would remedy the perceived problem, he petitioned us to implement
new requirements for vehicles with automatic transmissions to have
warning systems that alert the driver and/or nearby pedestrians when
one of three situations occur. First, when the driver opens the driver
side door and the transmission shift lever is not latched in park, a
warning of this condition would be activated until the driver latches
the shift lever in park or closes the door. Second, when the driver
opens the driver side door and the park system linkage is broken or
maladjusted, another warning annunciating that condition would be
activated until the driver deactivates it by opening a manual switch.
This switch would be automatically closed when the ignition is next
activated. Third, if the driver ignores either of the first two
warnings, a loud, audible, exterior warning would be activated to warn
the driver and nearby pedestrians that the vehicle is not properly
immobilized.
Agency Analysis of Mr. Barr's Petition
Based on our analysis of Mr. Barr's petition, we conclude that he
has made
[[Page 31535]]
a number of assumptions, many of which cause him to substantially
overstate the problem size. For instance, in his petition, Mr. Barr
asserted that ``it is reasonable that every empty vehicle with an
automatic transmission that moves, does so because the selector lever
was not in the park slot or was in the park slot but the park system
linkage was broken or maladjusted so that the system could not properly
place the pawl in its park position.'' The data obtained from the 1985
ODI report that he cites in the petition refer to vehicles in which
there was no driver present and a pedestrian was killed. This does not
necessarily mean that the vehicles were empty. As discussed below, in
many of the cases, while they were driverless, there were other
passengers present in the vehicles. One of these other passengers may
have caused the transmission to move out of the park position by
inadvertently bumping the shift lever. Further, if children are left
unattended and unrestrained, they could play with the shift lever and
take it out of park.
Cases of children moving the shift lever can be avoided by taking a
few simple precautions. First, as required by all States, children
should be restrained in a vehicle at all times. This would make it more
difficult for them to access the shift lever. Also, children should not
be left unattended. Second, most States also require that, when a
vehicle is left unattended, the vehicle's transmission must be placed
in the park position and the parking brake must be engaged. Moreover,
many states require that the key be turned to the position which locks
the ignition and must be removed. Most owners' manuals also contain
these precautions. When these precautions are taken, it is highly
unlikely for a passenger to be able to move the vehicle's shift lever
out of the park position. And, if a vehicle's transmission was somehow
jostled out of park by some means, the parking brake would be set and
the engine would be off which would also make it highly unlikely for
the vehicle to be involved in a park to reverse incident.
As stated above, we believe that Mr. Barr's estimates of fatalities
caused by park to reverse incidents are substantially overstated. He
used FARS data for a time span (1975 through 1984) that includes the
vast majority of the Ford vehicles that were subject to the 1980 defect
investigation. We believe a fair estimate of the current problem should
not include a population of old vehicles that had an unusually high
incidence of transmission problems in an analysis of the entire vehicle
population. The rate of park to reverse incidents in the non-Ford
vehicle population was much lower than that of the Ford vehicles during
that time span. In fact, for model year 1970 through 1979 Ford
vehicles, there were 72 fatalities reported to ODI between 1981 and
1985 that were apparently caused by a park to reverse incident. During
this same period of time, a total of 26 such fatalities was reported to
ODI that involved model year 1970 through 1979 General Motors (GM),
Chrysler, and American Motors Corporation vehicles combined. Thus, the
Ford vehicles apparently were involved in almost three times more park
to reverse incidents than the next three largest manufacturers
combined. For this reason, we believe that using the 1975 through 1984
FARS data will substantially overestimate the average number of
fatalities that could be expected to occur in the late 1990's.
In addition, Mr. Barr's use of the 1975-1984 time period misses the
effects of a significant amendment to Standard No. 114, Theft
Protection. During the 1975-1984 time period examined by Mr. Barr,
Standard No. 114 required that vehicles have a key locking system that
prevents the vehicle's steering or forward self-mobility, or both, when
the ignition key is removed. Significantly, Standard No. 114 at that
time did not prohibit systems in which the transmission lever could be
shifted when the vehicle is parked with the ignition locked.
That changed with our May 30, 1990, rule amending Standard No. 114
(55 FR 21868). Since September 1, 1992, when the changes became
effective, Standard No. 114 has required the key-locking system to
prevent removal of the key unless the transmission or transmission
shift lever is locked in ``park'' or becomes locked in ``park'' as the
direct result of removing the key. This was a significant change that
required many manufacturers to redesign their automatic transmissions.
Mr. Barr's use of 1975-1984 data completely misses the impacts of this
upgrade of the safety standard. We conclude that the failure to
consider this upgrade is another cause of Mr. Barr substantially
overestimating the number of rollaway crashes.
Mr. Barr also used an inaccurate method in determining the number
of annual injuries which occur as a result of park to reverse
incidents. He cites our driverless vehicle injury and fatality reports
for Ford's 1966 through 1979 model year vehicles and applies this ratio
to all other manufacturers' vehicles. As stated above, the Ford
vehicles exhibited an unusually high rate of involvement in park to
reverse incidents and, therefore, should not be used to estimate the
involvement of other non-Ford vehicles. Based on the significantly
lower rate of involvement in park to reverse incidents of the non-Ford
vehicles, we believe Mr. Barr's assumptions that the rate of injury
will be approximately the same in both Ford and non-Ford vehicles and
that data from 1975 through 1984 is still valid in the late 1990's
caused him to substantially overestimate the expected injuries.
We do, however, recognize that some transmissions may contain
defects that have the ability to create unsafe conditions by allowing
vehicles to move after the driver believes that he or she has placed
the transmission in park. However, we believe that Mr. Barr's approach
to remedy these occasional problems is far too costly. His approach
would be expensive as manufacturers would have to redesign
transmissions to accommodate a sensor system to detect the multiple
situations he describes when the transmission is not adequately placed
in the park position. Internal and external annunciators would have to
be installed that could produce a clear audible warning. Because
transmission control systems can be electronically or mechanically-
controlled, it is difficult to estimate an exact cost for the system.
However, we believe it would exceed $20 per vehicle. With approximately
16,000,000 million vehicles produced annually in the U.S., this would
put the annual cost of such a requirement at a minimum of $320,000,000,
which would far exceed the likely anticipated benefits of such a
requirement.
We will continue to investigate particular makes and models of
vehicles on a case-by-case basis where there is information indicating
the existence of a possible safety defect. Using this method, we can
focus on a specific vehicle's specific problem. For instance, we have
conducted defect investigations regarding defective gear selection
indicators that may show that the vehicle is in park when actually it
is not, water leakage into transmissions which could cause
malfunctions, and broken internal components which could also cause
malfunctions. In many cases, these investigations have led
manufacturers to recall the vehicles to provide a remedy for the
problem.
In accordance with 49 CFR part 552, this completes our review of
the petition. We have concluded that there is no reasonable possibility
that the amendment requested by the petitioner would be issued at the
conclusion of a rulemaking proceeding. Accordingly, we deny Mr. Barr's
petition.
[[Page 31536]]
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30103, 30162; delegation of authority at 49
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Issued on: June 7, 1999.
L. Robert Shelton,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 99-14834 Filed 6-10-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
