[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 114 (Wednesday, June 14, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31325-31330]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-14501]
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[[Page 31326]]
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Proposed Generic Communication; 10 CFR 50.54(p) Process for
Changes to Security Plans Without Prior NRC Approval
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public comment.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to issue
a generic letter to clarify the process for changes to security plans
under the provisions of Section 54(p) of Part 50 of Title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.54(p)). The NRC is seeking
comment from interested parties regarding both the technical and
regulatory aspects of the proposed generic letter presented under the
Supplementary Information heading. This proposed generic letter was
endorsed by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) to be
published for comment. The relevant information that was sent to the
CRGR to support their review of the proposed generic letter will be
made available in the NRC Public Document Room. The NRC will consider
comments received from interested parties in the final evaluation of
the proposed generic letter. The NRC's final evaluation will include a
review of the technical position and, when appropriate, an analysis of
the value/impact on licensees. Should this generic letter be issued by
the NRC, it will become available for public inspection in the NRC
Public Document Room.
DATES: Comment period expires on July 14, 1995. Comments submitted
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but
assurance of consideration cannot be given except for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to Chief, Rules Review and
Directives Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555. Written comments may also be delivered to 11545 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays.
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public
Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Skelton at (301) 415-3208.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
NRC Generic Letter 95-XX: 10 CFR 50.54(p) Process for Changes to
Security Plans Without Prior NRC Approval
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses and construction permits for
nuclear power plants.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this
generic letter to notify you of a clarification of the procedures used
by licensees to process 10 CFR 50.54(p) changes to security plans. It
is expected that recipients will review the information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate.
However, suggestions contained in this generic letter are not NRC
requirements; therefore, no specific actions or written response is
required.
Description of Circumstances
On January 4, 1993, the Executive Director for Operations
established a Regulatory Review Group (RRG). The RRG conducted a review
of power reactor regulations and related processes, programs, and
practices. One RRG recommendation was to change the current practice to
enable licensees to make changes to their security plans without prior
NRC approval (i.e., using the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p)). The plan
developed by the staff for implementing RRG recommendations (SECY 94-
003, January 4, 1994) was not to change the regulations, but to clarify
the process by providing a screening criterion that would ensure
consistency of security plan changes without prior NRC approval.
Discussion
Some confusion and inconsistencies have apparently occurred in the
past regarding implementation of 10 CFR 50.54(p) by licensees without
NRC approval. This generic letter restates the original criterion for
judging the acceptability of changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p).
That criterion has allowed that the ``test'' for determining if a
change decreases the effectiveness of the plan has been the
determination that the overall effectiveness of the plan is not
decreased. This generic letter clarifies the language in 10 CFR
50.54(p) that licensees shall ``make no change which would decrease the
effectiveness of a security plan, or guard training and qualification,
* * * or safeguards contingency plan.''
The following is a clarification of this language. Changes that
meet the following screening criteria may be made without prior NRC
approval.
A change in any of the three security plans is deemed not
to decrease the effectiveness of the plan if the change does not
decrease the ability of the onsite physical protection system and
security organization, as described in paragraphs (b) through (h) of 10
CFR 73.55, or equivalent measures approved under 10 CFR 73.55(a), to
protect with high assurance against the design basis threat as stated
in 10 CFR 73.1(a). The change cannot delete or replace any of the
regulatory capabilities, as described in paragraphs (b) through (h) or
in Appendixes B and C to 10 CFR Part 73.
A change that increases the effectiveness of any plan.
Use of these screening criteria would allow licensees to reduce
certain commitments that have exceeded regulatory requirements or
published guidance if the overall effectiveness of the plan is not
reduced. Each issue is reviewed against the overall assurance levels
contained in the plan and not against the specific individual changes.
Latitude has always existed in that improvements in one area of the
program may offset reductions in other areas. Overall assurance levels
of the plans must be maintained, and this clarification is not intended
to reduce plan commitments to levels less than the overall high-
assurance objectives stated in 10 CFR 73.55(a).
NRC has expected that licensees would judiciously make the proper
determination regarding 10 CFR 50.54(p) changes and implement those
changes as permitted by the regulations. This position was the original
intent of the Commission and remains so today. The NRC believes that,
with the use of these screening criteria and expertise of the licensee
staff, licensees should implement changes made pursuant to 10 CFR
50.54(p) without prior NRC approval.
Licensees should note that some of the safeguards-related
regulatory guidance has become dated and superseded in recent years,
and caution should be exercised by licensees when screening changes,
particularly regarding specific guidance issues. The original intent of
10 CFR 50.54(p) has been to screen changes in terms of their overall
impact on the security program. Guidance specified in NRC publications
are not requirements and should not be interpreted as the only possible
method for satisfying regulatory requirements. The screening criteria
contained herein are the fundamental criteria necessary for determining
the acceptability of a change made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p). NUREG-
0908, ``Acceptance
[[Page 31327]]
Criteria for the Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Security Plans,''
is an example of a document that should not be used verbatim to make
individual acceptability determines.
The screening criteria presented herein are not applicable to plan
changes that would eliminate or replace security plan commitments to
specific security measures stated in 10 CFR 73.55 (b) through (h). NRC
approval of such changes may need to be submitted as exemption or
license amendment (i.e., 10 CFR 50.90) requests.
A suggested outline for applying the screening criteria for the
evaluation of a proposed security plan change is presented in
Attachment 1. An evaluation of any proposed security plan change using
the suggested outline should lead to a determination as to whether or
not the change can be made without prior NRC approval.
Changes made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p) and this generic letter
may be made to physical security plans, guard training and
qualification plans, and contingency plans. Licensees that successfully
meet the screening criteria in Attachment 1 should conclude that a
particular change would be acceptable without NRC approval. Use of the
screening criteria format, while strictly voluntary, would document the
licensees determination of no decrease in effectiveness as described in
10 CFR 50.54(p)(2). The burden for the submittal of information
associated with the use of 10 CFR 50.54(p) is included in OMB Clearance
3150-0011. This generic letter does not increase that burden.
Changes must be appropriate for particular site programs, and use
of the screening criteria does not guarantee acceptance by the NRC or
applicability to all sites. The licensee bears the responsibility for
changes made without NRC approval.
The three security plans remain the ``enforceable documents,'' and
inspections will be based upon the commitments contained within those
plans. It is incumbent upon licensees to keep their plans accurate and
meet the timing requirements for updating plans as stated in 10 CFR
50.54(p).
As in the past, the NRC regional staff will continue to screen all
changes and will refer policy-related changes to the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR). In the future the NRC regional staff will
forward all questionable changes to NRR for review and disposition to
ensure staff consistency.
Attachment 2 contains 10 examples of previously accepted changes
made by licensees without NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(p), and
Attachment 3 contains a list of 10 changes that have been found to be
unacceptable for inclusion in security related plans unless approved by
the NRC on a case by case basis pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 or as an
exemption request to 10 CFR 73.55.
Attachment 1--Screening Criteria Outline (Assessment of
Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Section/Title
List the section and title of where the change is proposed.
Proposed Commitment
Specify the relevant existing and revised commitments. Address
any offsetting provisions.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
This section of the outline asks a series of questions. If the
response to each question is ``no'' and the rationale supports a
``no'' response, the change may be processed using the provisions of
10 CFR 50.54(p) without NRC prior approval. The questions are as
follows:
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: Explain the rationale.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Attachment 2--Acceptable 10 CFR 50.54(p) Changes
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example I
Weapons Training
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
Currently, some licensees train each security officer on all
types of weapons maintained at their site. The licensee would now
require individual security officer training only for the specific
weapon types (i.e., shotguns and handguns or rifles and handguns)
that individual security officers would use for assigned duties.
Weapons training would be more specific to weapons used to carry out
the specific assigned duties which would reduce training costs.
Training of security officers on weapons that are not assigned to or
used by them in routine or response duties wastes training resources
and funding that could be used for additional training on assigned
weapons. Response weaponry and training would remain unchanged.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall level
of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: Training security officers in use of weapons not
deployed in routine or response activities provides no benefit to
their responsive capability.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example II
Vehicle Entry and Search
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
Currently, two armed security officers are required by the
security plan to be present when a protected area barrier is opened.
Allow one armed officer to open the protected area barrier for
vehicle access and search of that vehicle. This would be acceptable
if that portal is under observation by closed circuit television
(CCTV) from the central alarm station (CAS) or secondary alarm
station (SAS). If CCTV is not available, two security officers are
required, but only one of the two needs to be armed. This change
would allow more efficient use of security force resources. If the
CAS or SAS were to witness an incident at the vehicle gate, they
would be in the best position to dispatch armed responders.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall level
of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the
[[Page 31328]]
design basis threat of radiological sabotage as stated in 10 CFR
73.1(a)?
Rationale: This change would allow better utilization of
security force resources and would help maintain current levels of
assurance. Having a second armed security officer present during a
vehicle search provides little, if any, additional deterrence to a
potential adversary. CCTV coverage of vehicle access control and
searches has a deterrence similar to the presence of the second
officer.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example III
Safeguards Information
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
Currently, all lists of vital equipment are controlled as
safeguards information (SGI). The following criterion defines what
information needs to be controlled as SGI.
The following three elements must be present before ``documents
or other matter'' are designated SGI in accordance with 10 CFR
73.21(b)(1)(vii):
(1) the safety-related equipment must be designated as vital
equipment or be specified as being located in a vital area in either
the licensee's physical security plan (PSP), the safeguards
contingency plan (SCP) or, if applicable, any licensee-generated
plant-specific safeguards analyses; and
(2) the equipment or area must be specifically designated as
``vital'' in the ``documents or other matter'' being reviewed; and
(3) the physical protection measures (other than any general
regulatory requirement stated in 10 CFR 73.55) afforded the
equipment or area, as described in either a licensee's PSP, a SCP,
or a plant-specific safeguards analysis,* must also be specifically
described in the ``documents or other matter.''
*Plant-specific sabotage scenarios or vulnerabilities in the
physical protection system are considered SGI.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: This change allows the licensee to include a list of
vital areas in training documents for licensee operations personnel
without treating the documents as SGI. This change would also reduce
the amount of SGI generated, handled, and stored. A non-SGI list
does not decrease the effectiveness of the plan due to the absence
of the above criteria and the fact that safety equipment lists are
available from other sources.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example IV
Protected Area Patrols
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
Reduce frequency of protected area (PA) patrols. Patrol
frequency would be reduced to a minimum of two patrols per shift (8
hours) or no less than once every 4 hours. Additional patrols
contribute minimally to security effectiveness. Reduction of number
of patrols would provide for more effective use of personnel
resources. The consideration that all employees, as well as security
force members, are trained to report any suspicious individuals or
materials in the protected area decreases the importance of more
frequent patrols.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: Previously issued guidance states that a patrol at
least every 4 hours meets the performance requirements of the
regulation.
{time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example V
Security Organizational Changes
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
Two levels of management would be eliminated, reducing the
number of vertical layers of security staff organization. The change
provides for more efficient management and possible savings in
manpower resources. The number of guards for each shift directly
involved in implementing the security plan would not be affected.
Historically the NRC staff has not specified organizational or
managerial structures. Published guidance is silent on the number of
managers and the type of organizational structure for the security
operation. Security management is judged by its performance and not
by the number or type of managers.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
{time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall level
of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: With the actual number of on-duty security force
members remaining unchanged, the implementation of the security plan
should remain unchanged.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example VI
Armed Responder Duties
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
Assign duties other than armed response to security officers
designated as members of the response team. Armed responders would
[[Page 31329]]
be assigned additional duties that would not interfere with their
contingency response. Assigned duties would be only ones that could
be immediately abandoned for response purposes. This change allows
for more efficient resource management. This change should not
affect the security officers' ability to perform their duties as
members of the response team. Use of response officers to perform
additional duties has been an acceptable practice under current
guidance. What has not been acceptable, as discussed in IN 86-88, is
assigning responders to routine duties that cannot be abandoned
during a security event when response is necessary.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: Ability to abandon duties and respond will be
demonstrated and documented. The number of armed responders is not
reduced and their ability to respond is not affected.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example VII
Requalification Schedule
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
The current plan specifies that security audits and weapons
training (required by Appendix B to 73.55) be completed 1 year or
less after the audit or training was last accomplished. This results
in the due date of audits and training being adjusted each year and
the audits and training, over a period of years, being completed
more than once each 12 months. This change provides scheduling
latitude in performing annually required security audits and weapons
training. It allows use of a ``tech spec'' formula to provide
flexibility in meeting audit and weapons training commitments. The
revised commitment would allow fixed dates in the plan with a
provision for extending the audit or training interval beyond 1 year
(e.g., a maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the
surveillance interval, but the combined time interval for any 3
consecutive surveillance intervals shall not exceed 3.25 time the
specific surveillance interval).
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: There would be no impact on performance capabilities
of the security program or security officer weapons proficiency.
Audits and security training would still be conducted on an annual
basis with only minor variations.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example VIII
Guard/Watchman Duties
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
Some security plans list numerous positions within the security
organization and specifically identify whether a position is filled
by an armed guard or unarmed watchman. For example, a plan may
specify that operators of search equipment in the gatehouse and SAS/
CAS officers will be armed. This change would allow certain security
officer positions to be filled by unarmed watchmen rather than armed
guards. Watchmen would be allowed to operate search equipment in the
gatehouse, to man the CAS and SAS, and to escort individuals in the
protected and vital areas.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: This change does not involve any of the armed
response force members. Consequently the response to security
contingencies would remain the same.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example IX
Vital Area Door Controls
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
Proposed Commitment
Some licensees have committed to placement of vital areas within
vital areas. This arrangement results in doors, identified as vital
area doors, being located within other vital areas. This change
would allow the number of doors controlled as vital to be reduced.
Vital area doors located within vital areas (with the exception of
the control room and the alarm stations) would no longer be
designated as vital.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: Unless the current response strategy to an external
threat relies on delay or detection at internal vital area doors,
elimination of their vital designation would not affect licensee
response to a design basis external threat.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Screening Criteria Form
(Assessment of Acceptability of 10 CFR 50.54(p) Plan Change)
Example X
Security Vehicles
Section/Title
This is an example. In an actual 50.54(p) determination, this
section would give specific references to the parts of the security
plan the licensee proposes to change.
[[Page 31330]]
Proposed Commitment
Eliminate a requirement that a 4-wheel drive vehicle be used as
a patrol and response vehicle. This reduction would need to be
balanced by a commitment to verify that the response strategy to
address the design basis threat did not rely on the use of a 4-wheel
drive vehicle. This change would eliminate the costs of purchasing
and maintaining 4-wheel drive vehicles that are not required for
protection against the design basis external threat.
Impact on Effectiveness on a Generic Plan
1. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change delete or contradict any
regulatory requirement?
2. {time} Yes {time} No Would the change decrease the overall
level of security system performance as described in paragraphs (b)
through (h) of 10 CFR 73.55 to protect with the objective of high
assurance against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage
as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a)?
Rationale: The demonstration of protective strategies that do
not require the use of a 4-wheel drive vehicle would confirm the
ability of a site's protection strategy to protect the facility
against the design basis threat.
3. {time} Yes {time} No Does this change any unique site-specific
commitments?
Rationale: (Explain why the change does not decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan while taking into consideration existing
unique site-specific security features. Consider historical reasons
why specific commitments were included in the security plans. Were
there specific counterbalancing commitments and has that
counterbalance been changed negatively?)
Attachment 3--Unacceptable 10 CFR 50.54(p) Changes
The following is a listing of 10 CFR 50.54(p) changes that have
been proposed or submitted but were determined to decrease the
effectiveness of their respective plans. Changes would be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis if submitted as noted for amendments or
exemptions.
1. A change was submitted that would allow a ``designated
vehicle'' to be stored outside the protected area in an unsecured
manner. This change is considered to be decrease in overall
effectiveness of the plan and would require an exemption request
since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4).
2. A change was submitted by which any vehicle entering the
protected area that is driven by an individual with unescorted
access would not have to be escorted by an armed member of the
security force. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness
of the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to
the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(4) and specific implementation
guidance provided to the staff in SECY 93-326.
3. A change was submitted that would allow materials destined
for the protected area to be searched and stored in an unsecured,
owner-controlled warehouse. This change is considered a decrease in
overall effectiveness of the plan and would require an exemption
request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR
73.55(d)(3).
4. A change was submitted that requested that security officers
be qualified on other than assigned weapons or ``duty'' ammunition.
The change would be considered a decrease in overall effectiveness
of the plan. This change could be submitted pursuant to 10 CFR
50.90.
5. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that
would eliminate the secondary alarm station. This change would
decrease the overall effectiveness of the plan and require an
exemption request since it is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR
73.55(e)(1).
6. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that
would reduce the number of armed responders below the minimum
required by the regulation. This change would decrease that overall
effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it
is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(h)(3).
7. A change was submitted that did not specify which positions
within the security organization would be armed or unarmed. As
written, the staff had to assume the overall effectiveness of the
plan was decreased. The licensee would need to resubmit this change
to clarify which positions would be armed to confirm that regulatory
requirements were being met.
8. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that
would allow visitor escorting to be determined at the licensee's
discretion. No specifics were provided regarding how this change was
to be implemented. This change would decrease the overall
effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request since it
is contrary to the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(6).
9. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that
would give an alarm station operator the discretion to determine the
need for compensatory measures for failed intrusion detection
equipment. This change would decrease the overall effectiveness of
the plan and require an exemption request since it is contrary to
the provisions of 10 CFR 73.55(g)(1). Compensatory measures for
vital area doors are contained in proposed rulemaking currently
being processed by the staff.
10. A generic change was proposed during public meetings that
would not require compensatory measures for 72 hours on a vital area
door that had only a functional lock. This change would decrease the
overall effectiveness of the plan and require an exemption request
since it is contrary to the provisions of 73.55(g)(1).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of June 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brian K. Grimes,
Director, Division of Project Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-14501 Filed 6-13-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
