[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 114 (Wednesday, June 14, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31290-31296]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-14544]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of intent.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intent to prepare
a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (SSM PEIS). The end of the Cold War has brought about
significant changes in the requirements for the nation's nuclear
deterrent, including substantial reductions in the nuclear weapons
stockpile. To fulfill its responsibilities for ensuring the safety and
reliability of the stockpile without underground nuclear testing, DOE
proposes the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.
Stockpile Stewardship includes activities required to maintain a
high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear
weapons in the absence of underground nuclear testing, and to be
prepared to resume nuclear testing if so directed by the President.
Stockpile Management activities include dismantlement, maintenance,
evaluation, and repair or replacement of weapons and their components
in the existing stockpile.
This Notice of Intent, the initial step in the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, informs the public of the PEIS
proposal, announces the schedule for scoping meetings, and solicits
public input. Following the scoping period, the Department will prepare
and issue an Implementation Plan (IP) to describe the scope of the
PEIS, the alternatives that will be analyzed, and the schedule for
completing the PEIS.
DATES: Comments on the proposed scope of the SSM PEIS are invited from
the public. To ensure consideration in the preparation of the IP,
comments must be postmarked by August 11, 1995. Late comments will be
considered to the extent practicable. DOE will hold interactive public
scoping meetings at sites that may be affected by the proposed action
to discuss issues and receive oral and written comments on the scope of
the PEIS. These meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to
present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns with DOE
officials regarding SSM activities. The locations, dates, and times for
these public meetings are included in the Supplementary Information
section of this notice, and will be announced by additional appropriate
means.
The Department is also requesting federal agencies that desire to
be designated as cooperating agencies on the SSM PEIS to contact the
Office of Reconfiguration at the address listed below by August 11,
1995.
ADDRESSES: General questions concerning the SSM program can be asked by
calling the toll-free telephone number at 1-800-776-2765, or by writing
to: Stephen M. Sohinki, Director, Office of Reconfiguration, U.S.
Department of Energy, P.O. Box 3417, Alexandria, VA 22302.
As an alternative, comments can also be submitted electronically by
using the Federal Information Exchange bulletin board and following the
instructions listed below:
Modem: Dial Toll Free (800) 783-3349. Local (301) 258-0953. (Modem
parameters set at: '8' data bits, '1' stop bit and 'N' parity at 1200,
2400 or 9600 baud.)
InterNet: Telnet or Gopher to: fedix.fie.com or 192.111.228.33
Hours: Available 24 hours a day. A Help Line, (301) 975-0103, is
available weekdays between 8:30 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST, except Federal
holidays.
Costs: Free, no cost to users. No telephone, registration, access, or
downloading fees.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE
NEPA process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-800-
472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
In January 1991, the then-Secretary of Energy announced that the
Department would prepare a PEIS examining alternatives for the
reconfiguration of the Department's nuclear weapons complex (the
Complex). The framework for the Reconfiguration PEIS was described in
the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study
(Reconfiguration Study), a detailed examination of alternatives for the
future Complex. Because of significant changes in the world since
January 1991, especially with regard to projected future requirements
for the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile, the Department
concluded in October 1994 that the framework described in the
Reconfiguration Study no longer fit current circumstances or supported
any realistic proposal for reconfiguration of the Complex (59 FR 54175,
October 28, 1994). Contributing factors to that conclusion included
public comments at the September-October 1993 Reconfiguration PEIS
scoping meetings, the fact that no production of new nuclear weapons
types was required for the foreseeable future, budget constraints, and
the Department's decision to prepare a separate PEIS on Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Nuclear Materials (Notice of
Intent published June 21, 1994, 59 FR 17344).
As a result of these changed circumstances, the Department
separated the previously planned Reconfiguration PEIS into two new
PEISs: (1) a Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS; and (2) a Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS. The Draft PEIS for Tritium Supply and
Recycling was issued in March 1995 (60 FR 14433, March 17, 1995),
public hearings were held in April 1995, and a Final PEIS for Tritium
Supply and Recycling is expected in October 1995.
With regard to the SSM PEIS, during the past six months the
Department has been developing the new framework to support the SSM
program. That resulting framework, described in a DOE report entitled
``The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program'' (May 1995), is
available on the Internet under DOE's Home Page for Defense Programs
(www.dp.doe.gov). That document was mailed to individuals who had
previously requested information on the SSM program. Other individuals
who would like to receive that document can contact the Office of
Reconfiguration at the address listed above or by calling the program's
toll free number at 1-800-776-2765.
On May 19, 1995, the Department held a pre-scoping workshop with
interested members of the public to discuss the framework of the SSM
program and the information contained in ``The Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program''. While a wide range of specific issues were
discussed during that meeting, general concerns centered on: Future
stockpile planning, including the basis for selecting the baseline
stockpile size of the future; whether the Department would evaluate a
range of stockpile sizes in the PEIS; the relationship between the SSM
PEIS and the Department's other Programmatic and Site-Wide EISs; and
whether the Department would evaluate underground nuclear testing in
the PEIS. Comments received from that pre-scoping workshop have been
taken into account in developing this NOI.
Purpose and Need for the SSM Program. Under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2011 et seq.), DOE is charged with
providing
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nuclear weapons to support the United States' nuclear deterrent policy.
The mission of the DOE nuclear weapons complex is to provide the nation
with safe and reliable nuclear weapons and components so that an
effective nuclear deterrent can be maintained into the foreseeable
future, and to accomplish this in a way that protects the environment
and the health and safety of workers and the public.
Recent changes in national security needs have necessitated
corresponding changes in the way the Department must meet its
responsibilities regarding the nation's nuclear weapons. As a result of
international arms-control agreements (the START I treaty and the START
II protocol) and unilateral decisions by the United States, the
nation's stockpile will be significantly reduced by the year 2003.
Consequently, the nation has halted the development of new nuclear
weapons, has begun closing portions of the Complex, and is considering
further consolidation or downsizing of the remaining elements in the
Complex. In addition, the nation is observing a moratorium on nuclear
testing and is pursuing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
However, international dangers remain and, as the President has
emphasized, nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of the
United States' national security policy. Thus, the Department's
responsibilities for ensuring the safety and reliability of the
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile will also continue for the
foreseeable future.
Because of the moratorium on nuclear testing, the termination of
new nuclear weapons development and production, and the closure of
several production facilities, a new approach to ensure confidence in
the stockpile is needed. In announcing the indefinite extension of the
nuclear testing moratorium (July 1993), President Clinton reaffirmed
the importance of maintaining confidence in the enduring United States
nuclear stockpile and the need to ensure that the nation's nuclear
deterrent remains unquestioned during a test ban. By Presidential
Decision Directive and Act of Congress (Pub. L. 103-160), the
Department of Energy was directed to establish a stewardship program to
ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical
competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons in the absence of
nuclear testing.
Without nuclear testing, this new approach must rely on scientific
understanding and expert judgment to predict, identify, and correct
problems affecting the safety and reliability of the stockpile. This
program is essential if the nation is to properly safeguard its nuclear
weapons and maintain an unquestioned nuclear deterrent.
The SSM program is being developed to meet the challenges involved
in ensuring the safety and reliability of the stockpile. Three
particular challenges must be met:
Fully supporting, at all times, the nation's nuclear
deterrent with safe and reliable nuclear weapons, while transforming
the nuclear weapons complex (laboratories and production facilities) to
one that is more appropriate for the smaller stockpile.
Preserving the core intellectual and technical
competencies of the weapons laboratories. Without nuclear testing,
confidence in the nation's nuclear deterrent will depend largely on the
continued competency of the people who must make the scientific and
technical judgments related to the safety and reliability of nuclear
weapons.
Ensuring that the activities needed to maintain the
nation's nuclear deterrent are consistent with the nation's arms-
control and nonproliferation objectives.
DOE Nuclear Weapons Complex: The current DOE nuclear weapons
complex consists of 8 major facilities located in 7 states. Currently,
the Complex maintains a limited capability to design and manufacture
nuclear weapons; provides surveillance of and maintains nuclear weapons
in the stockpile; and retires and disposes of nuclear weapons. Major
facilities and their primary responsibilities within the Complex are
listed below:
Pantex Plant (Amarillo, Texas)--Dismantles retired weapons;
fabricates high explosives components; assembles high explosives,
nuclear components, and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons;
repairs and modifies weapons; evaluates and performs nonnuclear testing
of nuclear weapons.
Savannah River Site (SRS) (Aiken, South Carolina)--Tritium loading/
unloading and surveillance of tritium reservoirs.
Y-12 Plant (Oak Ridge, Tennessee)--Maintains the capability to
produce and assemble uranium and lithium components; recovers uranium
and lithium materials from the component fabrication process and
retired weapons; produces nonnuclear weapon components.
Kansas City Plant (KCP) (Kansas City, Missouri)--Manufactures
nonnuclear weapons components.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) (Livermore,
California)--Conducts research and development of nuclear weapons;
designs and tests advanced technology concepts; maintains a weapons
design program; maintains a limited capability to fabricate plutonium
components; provides safety and reliability assessments of the
stockpile.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (Los Alamos, New Mexico)--
Conducts research and development of nuclear weapons; designs and tests
advanced technology concepts; maintains a weapons design program;
maintains a limited capability to fabricate plutonium components;
provides safety and reliability assessments of the stockpile.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) (Albuquerque, New Mexico)--
Conducts system engineering of nuclear weapons; designs and develops
nonnuclear components; conducts field and laboratory nonnuclear
testing; manufactures nonnuclear weapons components; and provides
safety and reliability assessments of the stockpile.
Nevada Test Site (NTS) (Las Vegas, Nevada)--Maintains capability to
conduct underground nuclear testing and nonnuclear experiments.
SSM Program Foundational Framework. In the SSM program and SSM
PEIS, DOE will:
Emphasize compliance with applicable laws and regulations,
and accepted practices regarding industrial and weapons safety;
safeguarding the health of Complex workers and the general public;
protecting the environment; and ensuring the security of nuclear
materials and weapons components.
Safely and reliably maintain the nuclear weapons stockpile
as directed by the President and mandated by Congress.
Analyze alternatives for configuration of the nuclear
weapons complex that are reflective of, and consistent with, policy
direction from the Nuclear Posture Review.
Maximize efficiency and minimize costs associated with the
maintenance of the weapons stockpile.
Maximize the transfer of nonnuclear materials production
activities to the private sector.
Maintain core intellectual and technical competencies in
nuclear weapons.
Sustain confidence in safety and reliability of the
stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear testing.
Minimize the use of hazardous materials and the number and
volume of waste streams.
PEIS Decisions. In addition to the PEIS, supporting cost,
technical, and schedule studies will be prepared for the SSM program.
The PEIS and these other studies will be balanced with
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policy and strategic objectives to support the Record of Decision
(ROD). The ROD will:
Identify the future missions of the SSM program; and
Determine the configuration (facility locations) of the
nuclear weapons complex to accomplish the SSM program missions.
Project-specific NEPA documents will be prepared as necessary to
implement any programmatic alternatives chosen in the ROD.
An analysis of the sensitivity of the proposed SSM program
configuration to a range of hypothetical stockpile sizes will also be
performed. DOE expects to use the stockpile size consistent with the
START II protocol (approximately 3,500 weapons) as the baseline for the
PEIS analysis since this is the current planning guidance for the
Department and is consistent with the recently completed Nuclear
Posture Review. Upper and lower excursion cases are also expected to be
analyzed.
The SSM Program
Stockpile Management. Stockpile Management activities include
dismantlement, maintenance, evaluation, and repair or replacement of
weapons and weapons components in the existing stockpile. In the past,
a large weapons production complex provided the capability and capacity
to rapidly fix any problems found in the stockpile. However, the
existing production complex may be inefficient and ineffective for a
much smaller stockpile. Therefore, one of the primary goals of the
Stockpile Management proposal will be to downsize and/or consolidate
functions to provide an effective and efficient production capability
for the smaller stockpile. The capabilities needed by the Department to
carry out its Stockpile Management responsibilities are described
below:
Weapons Assembly/Disassembly. Provides the capability to: dismantle
retired weapons; assemble high explosives, nuclear components, and
nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons; repair and modify weapons;
perform weapons surveillance; and store strategic reserves of nuclear
components (pits and secondaries).
Nonnuclear Components. Provides the capability to: fabricate
nonnuclear components and perform nonnuclear component surveillance.
Nuclear Components. Provides the capability to: fabricate nuclear
components; perform nuclear component surveillance; stage and store
nuclear materials and components. Alternatives will be assessed for:
Pit Reuse (minor). Nonintrusive modification and recertification of
existing pits.
Replacement Pit Fabrication and Reuse (major). Fabrication of
replacement pits and/or intrusive modification and recertification of
existing pits.
Secondaries and Cases. Fabrication of replacement secondaries and
cases.
High Explosives. Provides the capability to fabricate high
explosives components and perform high explosives component
surveillance.
Stockpile Stewardship. Stockpile Stewardship includes activities
required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety and
reliability of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground nuclear
testing, and to be prepared to resume testing if so directed by the
President. While the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile is currently
judged to be safe, secure, and reliable, the average age of the
stockpile has never significantly exceeded the current age of 12 to 13
years. Furthermore, very few data exist for weapons older than 25
years. Because the Department cannot predict with certainty when age-
related changes affecting weapon safety or reliability will occur, a
conservative assumption would be that problems will arise more
frequently as the weapons age beyond their original 20- to 25-year
design lifetimes.
Historically, nuclear testing has provided unambiguous confidence
in the safety and performance of weapons in the stockpile. Without
underground nuclear testing, the Department must rely on experimental
and computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to
predict the consequences of the complex problems that are likely to
occur in an aging stockpile.
Enhanced aboveground experimental and computational capabilities
are needed to assess and predict the consequences of these problems. An
improved science-based program with enhanced experimental and
computational capabilities is necessary to maintain confidence in the
safety and reliability of the nation's stockpile without nuclear
testing. This program must be of sufficient technical challenge to
attract the high-quality scientific and technical talent needed for
future stewardship of the stockpile.
Substantial advances in experimental and computational capabilities
are needed to fill in those areas of nuclear weapon science that are
incomplete, particularly gaps in our understanding of physics and gaps
in the data needed for computational simulations of weapons performance
and model-based assessments of safety and reliability. Upgraded or new
experimental capabilities are required to validate improved or new
computational models.
Without these enhanced capabilities, the Department will lack the
ability to evaluate some safety and reliability issues, which could
significantly affect the stockpile. It is also possible that, without
these enhanced capabilities, the Department would not be able to
certify the acceptability of weapons components that had been repaired
or modified to address future safety or reliability issues.
The capabilities needed by the Department to carry out its
Stockpile Stewardship responsibilities are described below, along with
a brief description of proposed facilities for each capability.
Primary Physics Issues. The study of issues related to the safety
and reliability of the primary portion of nuclear weapons. Issues
include physics validation, material behavior, improved understanding
of implosion, and ability to assess age-related defects. The facilities
proposed or under consideration are:
Contained Firing Facility. An addition to the Flash X-Ray
hydrodynamic test facility at LLNL, this facility would provide
hydrodynamic test capabilities and new diagnostics for improved studies
of the behavior of weapons material. The PEIS will contain a full
evaluation for site-specific construction and operational impacts.
Advanced Hydrotest Facility. If proposed, this facility would
provide up to eight radiographic views of the primary's implosion
symmetry. In the longer term, this facility may be essential for
assuring weapon reliability and safety without nuclear testing.
Secondary Physics Issues. The study of issues related to the safety
and reliability of the secondary portion of nuclear weapons. Issues
include physics validation, material behavior, improved understanding
of thermonuclear ignition, and ability to assess age-related defects.
Some of these facilities may also investigate physics phenomena that
relate to primaries. The facilities proposed or under consideration
are:
National Ignition Facility (NIF). This facility would make it
possible in the laboratory, for the first time ever, to study radiation
physics in a regime close to that of nuclear weapon detonations. The
PEIS will contain a full evaluation for site selection, and for site-
specific construction and operational impacts.
High Explosive Pulsed-Power Facility (HEPPF). If proposed, the
HEPPF would provide experimental capabilities for
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studying secondary physics issues at shock pressures and velocities
approaching those of actual weapon conditions.
Atlas Facility. The Atlas Facility at LANL would be used for
hydrodynamic experiments to resolve issues related to boost-gas mixing
and other primary physics, and improving the predictive capabilities
related to the aging, reliability, and performance of secondaries. The
facility builds on special existing equipment at LANL. The PEIS will
contain a full evaluation for site-specific construction and
operational impacts.
X-Ray Hardness. The study of radiation-effects science and
materials certification. The facility under consideration is:
Jupiter Facility. If proposed, Jupiter would provide an x-ray
environment to enhance the ability to certify that critical weapon
components meet military requirements for x-ray hardness.
Computational Capabilities. To handle simulations of weapon
performance and assessments of weapons safety without underground
nuclear testing, improved computational capabilities are needed.
However, because there are not expected to be any environmental impacts
from this activity, the PEIS is not expected to provide any assessment
of these capabilities.
PEIS Alternatives. Preliminary Stockpile Management and Stockpile
Stewardship alternatives have been developed for public comment and are
described below.
Stockpile Management. The PEIS will assess the alternatives for
conducting the Stockpile Management mission. Based upon the
capabilities and facilities that already exist in the Complex, no major
new production facilities are currently proposed. Instead, the PEIS
will evaluate upgrading and/or downsizing facilities at the sites where
the Stockpile Management capabilities are currently located, as well as
transferring the functions to other sites which have existing
facilities that could be modified to perform the capability. Based upon
an evaluation of the existing capabilities and facilities at the sites
in the Complex, the following matrix of proposed alternatives has been
developed for Stockpile Management:
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Site alternatives
Capability ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KCP LANL LLNL NTS Y-12 PX SNL SRS
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Weapons assembly/disassembly............ ............ ............ ............ X ............ X ............ ............
Nonnuclear components................... X X X ............ ............ ............ X ............
Nuclear components:
--Pit reuse (minor)................. ............ X ............ X ............ X ............ X
--Replacement pit fabrication and
reuse (major)...................... ............ X ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ X
--Secondaries and cases............. ............ X X ............ X ............ ............ ............
High explosives components.............. ............ X X ............ ............ X ............ ............
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In addition, the PEIS will also evaluate the no action alternative.
For Stockpile Management, no action is described by the following
matrix:
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Sites
Capability ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KCP LANL LLNL NTS Y-12 PX SNL SRS
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Weapons assembly/disassembly............ ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ X ............ ............
Nonnuclear components................... X X ............ ............ ............ ............ X ............
Nuclear components:
--Replacement pit fabrication and
reuse (major)...................... ............ X X ............ ............ ............ ............ ............
--Secondaries and cases............. ............ ............ ............ ............ X ............ ............ ............
High explosives components.............. ............ ............ ............ ............ ............ X ............ ............
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Stockpile Stewardship. The PEIS will assess the alternatives for
conducting the Stockpile Stewardship mission. New facilities and
upgraded facilities that will enable the Department to maintain
confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the
absence of underground nuclear testing will be assessed in the PEIS.
Because the nuclear weapons testing mission has always been a primary
responsibility of the weapons laboratories and the NTS, the Department
does not believe it is reasonable to expand the stockpile stewardship
mission to other sites. Therefore, only the three weapons laboratories
(LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and the NTS are expected to be considered for new
Stockpile Stewardship facilities. This is also consistent with one of
the Stockpile Stewardship program's main purposes to preserve the core
intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons laboratories.
Because there is currently a moratorium on underground nuclear testing,
and because the nation is pursuing a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the
Department has not made a decision whether it is reasonable to include
underground nuclear testing as an alternative in the SSM PEIS to
fulfill the Stockpile Stewardship mission. Comments on this issue are
specifically invited during the scoping period.
The following matrix of proposed alternatives and facilities under
consideration for proposal has been developed for Stockpile
Stewardship:
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Site alternatives
Capability Facility -------------------------------------------------------
LANL LLNL NTS SNL
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Primary physics issues..... Contained firing facility.. ............ X ............ ............
Primary physics issues..... Advanced hydrotest facility X X X X
Secondary physics issues... National ignition facility. X X X X
Secondary physics issues... High explosive pulsed-power X X X X
facility.
Secondary physics issues... Atlas facility............. X ............ ............ ............
X-Ray hardness............. Jupiter facility........... X X X X
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Of these facilities, the Advanced Hydrotest Facility, the High
Explosive Pulsed-Power Facility, and the Jupiter Facility are under
consideration for proposal in the SSM PEIS. The Department may elect to
proceed with only some of the facilities in this matrix.
The PEIS will also evaluate the no action alternative of not
constructing new facilities or upgrading existing facilities. For
Stockpile Stewardship, no action is described by the following matrix:
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Sites
Capability Facility -------------------------------------------------------
LANL LLNL NTS SNL
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary physics issues..... Hydrotest facilities....... X X X ............
Secondary physics issues... NOVA....................... ............ X ............ ............
Secondary physics issues... Pegasus.................... X ............ ............ ............
Radiation hardness......... Test facilities............ ............ ............ ............ X
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Site-Specific NEPA Reviews. The SSM PEIS will provide a
programmatic assessment of environmental impacts to support
programmatic decisions to: (1) identify the future missions of the SSM
program; and (2) determine the facility locations. More detailed
project-specific and site-specific NEPA analyses for individual
activities and facilities generally would tier from the PEIS as
necessary to implement the PEIS decisions. However, for the NIF, the
Contained Firing Facility (CFF), and the Atlas Facility, the PEIS will
include both a programmatic assessment, and a site-specific assessment
of the construction and operation impacts at the reasonable candidate
sites. The programmatic assessment will consider the cumulative and
synergistic impacts associated with siting these facilities, and will
provide a basis for deciding whether to proceed with the facilities.
For NIF, the programmatic assessment will also provide a basis for
selecting a site for NIF since there are four candidate sites for that
facility. However, for the CFF at LLNL, which is an upgrade to an
existing facility, and for the Atlas Facility at LANL, which builds on
special existing equipment at LANL, there are no alternative sites. If
a decision is made to proceed with the NIF, CFF, or the Atlas Facility,
the site-specific analyses in the SSM PEIS would provide the necessary
NEPA analysis to decide where on the selected site to construct the
facility, if relevant, and how to operate it.
Relationship to Other DOE NEPA Activities. In addition to the SSM
PEIS, the Department is currently conducting NEPA reviews of other
activities. The relationship between the SSM PEIS and other relevant
major NEPA documents is discussed below.
Site-Wide EISs. DOE is currently preparing site-wide EISs for the
Pantex Plant, NTS, and LANL. The site-wide EISs will address continued
operations for current and reasonably foreseeable program missions at
these sites. Programmatic issues such as what long-term capabilities
are required to carry out DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management
program, and the location for these long-term capabilities, will be
addressed in the SSM PEIS.
Waste Management PEIS. This PEIS is analyzing alternatives for the
long-term management and safe treatment, storage, and disposal of
radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes. The SSM PEIS will assure that
all wastes generated as a result of SSM activities are compatible with
treatment, storage, and disposal decisions resulting from the Waste
Management PEIS.
Storage and Disposition of Weapons Usable Fissile Material PEIS.
This PEIS is analyzing alternatives for the long-term storage of all
weapons-usable fissile materials, primarily plutonium and highly
enriched uranium (HEU), and the disposition of excess plutonium. There
is a potential overlap with the SSM PEIS regarding storage of strategic
reserves of plutonium and HEU. Preparation of these PEISs will be
closely coordinated to prevent conflicting analysis and to ensure that
an appropriate decision on strategic reserve storage is reached.
Interim Actions. Two proposals that are within the scope of the SSM
PEIS will proceed to separate Records of Decision, in accordance with
Council on Environmental Quality regulations for interim actions (40
CFR 1506.1). These are the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
(DARHT) Facility EIS, and the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS. In the
case of the DARHT EIS, DOE will continue with its ongoing hydrodynamic
testing program and has proposed to provide an enhanced hydrodynamic
test capability in the near term regardless of the decisions to be made
following this SSM PEIS. In the case of the Tritium Supply and
Recycling PEIS, DOE needs to establish a long-term tritium supply
regardless of the decisions to be made following this SSM PEIS. Thus,
the DOE's decisions regarding these two proposals would not prejudice
the outcome of the SSM PEIS.
Scoping Meetings. Public scoping meetings will be held at each site
that may be affected by the proposed action. The interactive scoping
meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to present
comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns regarding SSM activities
with DOE officials, and for the Department to receive oral and written
comments on the scope of the PEIS. Input from the scoping meetings will
assist DOE in formulating the Implementation Plan for the SSM PEIS and
refining PEIS alternatives. The locations, dates, and starting times
for these public meetings are as follows:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory--June 29, 12:00 noon and 6:00
p.m., Villa
[[Page 31296]]
Tassajara, 6363 Tassajara Road, Pleasanton, CA 94566.
Sandia National Laboratory--July 11, 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.,
Albuquerque Convention Center, 401 Second Street, N.W., Albuquerque,
NM 87102.
Los Alamos National Laboratory--July 13, 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m.,
Fuller Lodge, 2132 Central Avenue, Los Alamos, NM 87544.
Kansas City Plant--July 18, 9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., Rockhurst
College, Massman Hall, 1100 Rockhurst Road, 53rd & Troost, Kansas
City, MO 64110.
Pantex--July 20, 12:00 noon and 7:00 p.m., Sunset Convention Center,
3601 West 15th, Amarillo, TX 79102.
Y-12, Oak Ridge--July 25, 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m., Pollard
Auditorium, Badger Avenue, Oak Ridge, TN 37830.
Savannah River Site--July 27, 12:00 noon and 6:00 p.m., The Aiken
Municipal Center, 214 Park Avenue, S.W., Aiken, SC 29801.
Nevada Test Site--August 3 & 4, August 3: 6:00 p.m. and August 4:
8:30 a.m., Community College of Southern Nevada/Cheyenne Campus,
3200 East Cheyenne Avenue, North Las Vegas, NV 89030.
Scoping Meeting Format. The Department intends to hold a plenary
session at the beginning of each scoping hearing in which DOE officials
will more fully explain the framework for the proposed SSM program,
including preliminary alternatives for Stockpile Management, Stockpile
Stewardship, and the NIF project. Following the plenary session, the
Department intends to discuss relevant issues in more detail. Each
scoping meeting is expected to last approximately three to four hours.
Issued in Washington, D.C. this 9th day of June 1995, for the
United States Department of Energy.
Peter N. Brush,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Environment, Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 95-14544 Filed 6-13-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
