96-14944. Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 117 (Monday, June 17, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 30672-30724]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-14944]




[[Page 30671]]


_______________________________________________________________________

Part II





Department of Transportation





_______________________________________________________________________



Federal Railroad Administration



_______________________________________________________________________



49 CFR Parts 223, 229, 232, and 238



Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 61, No. 117 / Monday June 17, 1996 / Proposed 
Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 223, 229, 232, and 238

[FRA Docket No. PCSS-1; Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AA95


Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: FRA announces the initiation of rulemaking on rail passenger 
equipment safety standards. FRA requests comment on the need for 
particular safety requirements and the costs, benefits, and 
practicability of such requirements. FRA anticipates this rulemaking 
will address the inspection, testing, and maintenance of passenger 
equipment; equipment design and performance criteria related to 
passenger and crew survivability in the event of a train accident; and 
the safe operation of passenger train service, supplementing existing 
railroad safety standards. FRA also announces the formation of a 
working group to assist FRA in developing this rule. FRA makes 
available preliminary safety concepts that have been placed before the 
working group. This notice is issued in order to comply with the 
Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994, to respond to 
concerns raised by the General Accounting Office and the National 
Transportation Safety Board, to respond to public concerns, to respond 
to petitions for rulemaking, and to consider possible regulations 
derived from experience in application of existing standards.

DATES: (1) Written comments: Written comments must be received on or 
before July 9, 1996. Comments received after that date will be 
considered to the extent possible without incurring additional expense 
or delay.
    (2) Public Hearing: Requests for a public hearing must be made on 
or before July 9, 1996.

ADDRESSES: Address comments to the Docket Clerk, Office of Chief 
Counsel, RCC-30, Federal Railroad Administration, 400 Seventh Street, 
S.W., Room 8201, Washington, D.C. 20590. Comments should identify the 
docket and notice number and be submitted in triplicate. Persons 
wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of their comments should 
include a self-addressed, stamped postcard. The dockets are housed in 
Room 8201 of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, 
D.C. 20590. Public dockets may be reviewed between the hours of 8:30 
a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: Edward W. Pritchard, Acting Staff 
Director, Motive Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety 
Assurance and Compliance, RRS-14, Room 8326, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, 
S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone [phone] or 202-366-9252), 
or Daniel L. Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone [phone]).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Introduction

Mandate

    FRA requests comment on possible regulations governing rail 
passenger equipment. FRA believes such regulations are necessary for 
several reasons. In particular, effective Federal safety standards for 
freight equipment have long been in place, but equivalent standards for 
passenger equipment do not currently exist. The Association of American 
Railroads (AAR) sets industry standards for the design and maintenance 
of freight equipment that add materially to the safe operation of this 
equipment. However, over the years AAR has discontinued the development 
and maintenance of passenger equipment standards.
    Worldwide, passenger equipment operating speeds are increasing. 
Several passenger trainsets designed to European standards have been 
proposed for operation at high speeds in the United States. In general, 
these trainsets do not meet the structural or operating standards that 
are common practice for current North American equipment. The North 
American railroad operating environment requires passenger equipment to 
operate commingled with very heavy and long freight trains, often over 
track with frequent grade crossings used by heavy highway equipment. 
European passenger equipment design standards may therefore not be 
appropriate for the North American operating environment. A clear set 
of safety and design standards for future passenger equipment tailored 
to the North American operating environment is needed to provide for 
the safety of future rail operations and to facilitate sound planning 
for those operations.
    The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994 (the Act), 
Pub. L. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619 (November 2, 1994), requires FRA to 
develop initial rail passenger equipment safety standards within 3 
years of enactment and final regulations within 5 years of enactment. 
The Act also gives FRA an important tool to be used to help develop 
these safety standards: FRA is allowed to consult with the National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), public authorities, passenger 
railroads, passenger organizations, and rail labor organizations 
without being subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. 
App.).

Approach

    FRA established a Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working 
Group (Working Group) comprised of representatives of the types of 
organizations listed in the Act to provide the consultation allowed by 
the Act. The Working Group first met on June 6, 1995, and continues to 
meet to assist FRA in developing passenger equipment safety standards. 
This ANPRM describes the issues before the Working Group, and seeks the 
assistance of other interested persons in providing information and 
views pertinent to this effort. FRA intends to use the Working Group 
throughout this rulemaking. The minutes of the Working Group meetings 
and the materials distributed at these meetings to date have been 
placed in the docket. FRA intends to keep a current record of the 
Working Group's activities and decisions in the docket.

Topics Covered

    Specific topics discussed by this ANPRM include:
    (1) System safety programs and plans;
    (2) Passenger equipment crashworthiness;
    (3) Inspection, testing and maintenance requirements;
    (4) Training and qualification requirements for mechanical 
personnel and train crews;
    (5) Excursion, tourist and private equipment;
    (6) Commuter equipment and operations;
    (7) Train make-up and operating speed;
    (8) Tiered design standards based on a system safety approach;
    (9) Fire safety; and
    (10) Operating practices and procedures.
    FRA solicits suggestions for other matters related to passenger 
train safety standards that should be considered in order to promote 
safe and efficient train operations. FRA also solicits suggestions for 
alternate approaches or ways to structure passenger equipment safety 
standards.

[[Page 30673]]

Purpose of Notice

    Section 215 of the Act (49 U.S.C. 20133) requires the Secretary of 
Transportation to prescribe minimum standards ``for the safety of cars 
used by railroad carriers to transport passengers.'' The Act 
specifically requires the Secretary to consider--
    (1) The crashworthiness of the cars;
    (2) Interior features (including luggage restraints, seat belts, 
and exposed surfaces) that may affect passenger safety;
    (3) Maintenance and inspection of the cars;
    (4) Emergency procedures and equipment; and
    (5) Any operating rules and conditions that directly affect safety 
not otherwise governed by regulations.
    Given the breadth of the specific items listed in the Act, it is 
clear that the Congress intended the agency to consider the safety of 
rail passenger service as a whole, determining the extent to which 
existing regulations should be supplemented or strengthened. Existing 
regulations affecting the safety of rail passenger service include 
standards for signal and train control systems, track safety, power 
brakes, glazing, programs of testing and training for railroad 
operating rules, and hours of service of safety-critical personnel, 
among others. While existing locomotive safety regulations address the 
structural characteristics of multiple-unit powered cars, non-powered 
cars are not subject to the same standards. In addition, FRA has not 
issued regulations addressing interior features of passenger equipment.
    The Act requires issuance of initial passenger safety regulations 
within 3 years and final regulations within 5 years. FRA intends to 
establish a reasonably comprehensive structure of necessary safety 
regulations for rail passenger service in initial standards. Where 
further research is needed to develop a technical foundation for safety 
improvements, rulemaking may be completed over the 5-year period 
referred to in the Act.
    The Act permits FRA to apply new requirements to existing passenger 
cars, but requires FRA to explain why any such ``retrofit'' 
requirements are imposed. FRA believes that passenger equipment 
operating in permanent service in the United States has established a 
good safety record, proving its compatibility with the operating 
environment. Many of the structural design changes identified during 
preliminary analyses are likely to be cost effective only if 
implemented for new equipment. Appropriate analysis should be conducted 
to evaluate whether selected safety measures can be applied to existing 
equipment or to rebuilt equipment on a cost-effective basis.

Collaborative Rulemaking and This Advance Notice

    FRA is committed to the maximum feasible use of collaborative 
processes in the development of safety regulations. As a means to allow 
the industry to collaborate with FRA to develop this rulemaking, FRA 
established the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, as 
described earlier. FRA structured the Working Group to give a balanced 
representation of the types of organizations listed in the Act.
    A list of the private sector members of the Working Group is given 
in Table 1.

               Table 1.--Rail Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Working Group Membership List               
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Organization represented         Representative      Mailing address        Telephone             Fax       
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amtrak..........................  George Binns,        National Railroad       [phone]     [phone]
                                   General Manager      Passenger                                               
                                   for Compliance and   Corporation, 30th                                       
                                   Standards.           Street Station,                                         
                                                        4th Floor South,                                        
                                                        Philadelphia, PA                                        
                                                        19104.                                                  
United Transportation Union.....  David Brooks,        15200 Brooksview,       [phone]  .................
                                   Conductor.           Brandywine, MD                                          
                                                        20613.                                                  
National Association of Railroad  Ross Capon,          900 Second Street,      [phone]     [phone]
 Passengers.                       Executive Director.  N.E., Washington,                                       
                                                        DC 20002-3557.                                          
American Public Transit           Frank Cihak, Chief   1201 New York           [phone]     [phone]
 Association.                      Engineer.            Avenue, N.W.,                                           
                                                        Washington, DC                                          
                                                        20005.                                                  
Federal Railroad Administration.  Grady Cothen,        400 Seventh Street,     [phone]     [phone]
                                   Deputy Associate     S.W., Washington,                                       
                                   Administrator for    DC 20590-0002.                                          
                                   Safety Standards.                                                            
Electro-Motive Division, General  Harvey Boyd, Senior  9301 West 55th          [phone]     [phone]
 Motors Corporation.               Research Engineer.   Street, La Grange,                                      
                                                        IL 60525.                                               
Federal Transit Administration..  Jeffrey Mora,        400 Seventh Street,     [phone]     [phone]
                                   Office of            S.W., Washington,                                       
                                   Technology.          DC 20590-0002.                                          
American Association of State     William Green,       New York State Dept     [phone]     [phone]
 Highway and Transportation        Senior Railroad      of Transportation,                                      
 Officials.                        Inspector.           120 Washington                                          
                                                        Avenue, Albany,                                         
                                                        New York 12232.                                         
Safe Travel America.............  Arthur Johnson,      10600 Red Barn          [phone]  .................
                                   Chairman.            Lane, Potomac, MD                                       
                                                        20854.                                                  
Brotherhood of Locomotive         Leroy Jones,         400 North Capitol       [phone]     [phone]
 Engineers.                        International Vice   Street, N.W.,                                           
                                   President.           Suite 850,                                              
                                                        Washington, DC                                          
                                                        20001.                                                  
Brotherhood Railway Carmen......  Hank Lewin, Vice     AFL/CIO Building,       [phone]     [phone]
                                   President.           Suite 511, 815                                          
                                                        16th Street, N.W.,                                      
                                                        Washington, DC                                          
                                                        20006.                                                  
Siemens Transportation Systems,   Frank Guzzo,         700 South Ewing,        [phone]  .................
 Inc..                             Director Rolling     St. Louis, MO                                           
                                   Stock.               63103.                                                  
Bombardier Corporation,           Larry Kelterborn,    1084 Botanical          [phone]     [phone]
 Transportation Equipment Group.   Consultant.          Drive, Burlington,                                      
                                                        Ontario, Canada                                         
                                                        L7T 1V2.                                                
National Transportation Safety    Russ Quimby,         490 L'Enfant Plaza,     [phone]     [phone]
 Board.                            Investigator.        S.W., Washington,                                       
                                                        DC 20594.                                               
American Public Transit           Dennis Ramm, Chief   547 W. Jackson          [phone]     [phone]
 Association.                      Mechanical           Blvd., Chicago, IL                                      
                                   Officer, Metra.      60661.                                                  

[[Page 30674]]

                                                                                                                
Federal Railroad Administration.  Brenda Moscoso,      400 Seventh Street,     [phone]  .................
                                   Economist, Office    S.W., Washington,                                       
                                   of Safety Analysis.  DC 20590-0002.                                          
Federal Railroad Administration.  Thomas, Tsai,        400 Seventh Street,     [phone]  .................
                                   Program Manager,     SW., Washington,                                        
                                   Office of Research.  DC 20590-0002.                                          
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                        Table 2.--Passenger Train Occupant Casualties; Ten Year Period 1985-1994                                        
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                                                                     Train accidents       Grade crossing         Non-accident         Total passenger  
                                                                 ----------------------       accidents          passenger train       train occupants  
                                                                                       ----------------------       incidents      ---------------------
                                                                    Killed    Injured                        ----------------------                     
                                                                                          Killed    Injured     Killed    Injured     Killed    Injured 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985............................................................          0        287          0         30          3        424          3        741
1986............................................................          1        409          0         72          4        269          5        750
1987............................................................         17        258          0         20          1        261         18        539
1988............................................................          2        160          0         39          2        246          4        445
1989............................................................          1        103          2        123          8        253         11        479
1990............................................................          0        238          1         41          3        280          4        559
1991............................................................          9         61          0         29          0        333          9        423
1992............................................................          0         48          1        114          3        299          4        461
1993............................................................         54        171          1         86          9        402         64        659
1994............................................................          3        129          0         96          3        343          6        568
                                                                 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Totals........................................................         87       1864          5        650         36       3110        128       5624
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    An FRA representative chairs the Working Group, and a 
representative of the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) serves as 
associate member. Staff members from the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) also attend and assist the Working Group. In addition, the 
Working Group is supported by FRA program, legal and research staff, 
including technical personnel from the Volpe National Transportation 
System Center (Volpe Center). Vendors of equipment to passenger 
railroads constitute another essential source of information about rail 
passenger equipment safety. Accordingly, FRA has included vendor 
representatives designated by the Railway Progress Institute (RPI) as 
associate members of the Working Group. As one of its first tasks, the 
Working Group developed a statement of its charter and scope of effort.
    The Working Group is broadly representative of interests involved 
in intercity and commuter service nationwide. This service is regularly 
scheduled, employs contemporary electric multiple-unit (MU) equipment, 
electric or diesel electric power, is often intermingled on common 
rights-of-way with freight movements, and often involves maximum speeds 
in the range of 79 to 125 miles per hour (mph) with speeds up to 150 
mph projected in the near future.
    FRA also regulates approximately 100 additional railroads that 
provide service often characterized as historic, excursion, or scenic. 
These ``tourist'' or ``museum'' railroads often employ steam 
locomotives or older generation diesel power, and historic coaches or 
freight equipment modified for passenger use. Tourist and museum 
railroads vary widely in the nature of their operating environment, 
personnel, train speeds, and other characteristics. FRA intends to form 
a small, separate working group comprised of tourist and museum 
operators and freight or passenger railroads that host or provide this 
type of service. FRA will request that the Tourist Railway Association, 
the Association of Railway Museums, and AAR provide representation for 
this effort.
    Regulations governing emergency preparedness and emergency response 
procedures for rail passenger service will be covered by a separate 
rulemaking and are being addressed by a separate working group. Persons 
wishing to receive more information regarding this separate effort 
should contact Mr. Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices Division, 
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, RRS-11, Room 8314, FRA, 400 
Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone [phone]) 
or David H. Kasminoff, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 
400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-366-
0628).
    FRA's commitment to developing a proposed rule through the Working 
Group necessarily influences the role and purpose of this ANPRM. FRA 
sets forth in this ANPRM numerous preliminary ideas regarding 
approaches to safety issues affecting passenger service. These are 
ideas that have already been placed before the Working Group as 
concrete, illustrative approaches to possible improvements in the 
safety of passenger service. They are provided in this ANPRM as 
information to any interested person not involved in the Working 
Group's deliberations. FRA wishes to emphasize, however, that these 
concepts do not constitute specific proposals of the agency in this 
proceeding, nor do they represent the position of the Working Group. In 
addition, issuance of this ANPRM should not be considered a diminution 
of FRA's intent to prescribe passenger equipment safety regulations 
within the 5-year period required by the Act.
    FRA expects that the Working Group will develop proposed rules 
based on a consensus process. The proposals will be based on facts and 
analysis flowing from the Working Group's deliberations. Accordingly, 
FRA has requested that the Working Group's members and the 
organizations that they represent refrain from responding formally to 
this ANPRM.
    Just as FRA will not prejudge the outcome of the Working Group 
deliberations, FRA asks organizations represented on the Working Group 
to avoid adopting fixed positions that could polarize the discussion 
within the Working Group. Rather, the deliberations of the Working 
Group should be permitted to mature through a careful, fact-based 
dialogue that leads to appropriate recommendations for cost-effective 
standards. The evolving positions of the Working Group members--as 
reflected in the minutes of the group meetings and associated 
documentation, together with data provided by the membership during 
their deliberations--will be placed in the docket of this rulemaking.
    FRA invites other interested parties to respond to the questions 
posed in this ANPRM, submitting information and views that may be of 
assistance in developing a proposed rule. All comments provided in 
response to this ANPRM will be provided to the Working Group for 
consideration in preparation of the proposed rule.

Working Group's Scope of Effort

    The Working Group will focus on developing safety standards for 
rail passenger equipment by applying a system safety approach--where 
practical--to:
    (1) Determine and prioritize safety risks;
    (2) Determine steps or corrective actions to reduce risks; and
    (3) Optimize safety benefits.
    The Working Group will recommend future research or test programs 
when a technology appears to have the potential for a safety benefit, 
but is not yet mature enough to be applied with confidence.
    The Working Group will provide advice to FRA on all phases of the 
rulemaking process, to include:
    (1) Recommending what issues or requirements must be covered by 
Federal regulations, and what issues or requirements can be effectively 
handled outside the body of Federal regulations by industry standards 
or some other means;
    (2) Reviewing the written comments in response to the ANPRM, and 
recommending those comments that should affect a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM);
    (3) Providing cost information to support FRA's economic analysis 
of the proposed rule;
    (4) Providing information and advice on the potential benefits of 
the proposed rule and its individual elements;
    (5) Providing advice regarding critical assumptions required for 
the economic analysis;
    (6) Reviewing and critiquing a draft NPRM prepared by FRA based on 
Working Group guidance;
    (7) Reviewing the oral and written comments to the NPRM and 
recommending those comments that should affect a final rule;
    (8) Reviewing and critiquing a draft final rule prepared by FRA 
based on Working Group guidance; and
    (9) If requested by FRA, recommending actions to take to respond to 
any petitions for reconsideration received as a result of the final 
rule.
    The Working Group will also assist FRA in drafting a second NPRM 
for passenger equipment power brake standards.
    To ensure full development of the issues, the Working Group will 
attempt to draw on all sources within the industry to collect 
information necessary to conduct comparative analyses and reach 
decisions.
    The Working Group will establish a procedure for considering ideas, 
approaches, and performance standards

[[Page 30677]]

for use as part of the safety standards. This procedure should be based 
on the concept of reaching an overall consensus. Overall consensus 
means represented organizations may object--even strongly--to 
individual ideas, approaches, or standards, but the organization can 
accept and ``live with'' the evolving set of standards as a whole. FRA 
believes the success of this entire innovative approach to rulemaking 
depends on the ability of the group to reach overall consensus.
    The Working Group will consider whether to continue to meet on a 
periodic basis after final rulemaking to consider changes necessary to 
keep any rules or other standards current and responsive to the needs 
of the industry.

Background

Need for Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

    Rail passenger service is currently operated with a high level of 
safety. However, accidents continue to occur, often as a result of 
factors beyond the control of the passenger railroad. Further, the rail 
passenger operating environment in the United States is rapidly 
changing--technology is advancing; equipment is being designed for 
ever-higher speeds; and many potential new operators of passenger 
equipment are appearing. With this more complex operating environment, 
FRA must become more active to ensure that passenger trains continue to 
be designed, built, and operated with public safety foremost.
    The General Accounting Office (GAO) recognizes this need in Report 
GAO/RCED-93-196, entitled ``AMTRAK Should Implement Minimum Safety 
Standards for Passenger Cars.'' In addition, NTSB has issued several 
recommendations to FRA and to the railroad industry concerning the 
crashworthiness of locomotives. Although the recommendations directly 
apply to freight locomotives, the same concerns exist for passenger 
train locomotives or power cars.

NTSB's Crashworthiness Concerns

    NTSB's interest in locomotive crashworthiness dates to 1970, and 
NTSB has made several safety recommendations to FRA and the industry 
concerning increased protection for crew members in the cab based on 
the following accidents:
     On September 8, 1970, a collision between an Illinois 
Central (IC) and an Indiana Harbor Belt (IHB) train occurred at 
Riverdale, Illinois. The collision caused the IC caboose to override 
the heavy under frame of the IHB locomotive demolishing the control cab 
of the locomotive. Two following cars continued in the path established 
by the caboose, completing the destruction of the locomotive cab. The 
IHB engineer was found dead in the wreckage. NTSB recommended that FRA 
and the industry expand their cooperative effort to improve the 
crashworthiness of railroad equipment (NTSB Safety Recommendation R-71-
44).
     An accident on October 8, 1970, involving a Penn Central 
Transportation Company freight train and a passenger train near Sound 
View, Connecticut, again demonstrated the weakness of the locomotive 
crew compartment. This collision caused NTSB to reiterate its 
recommendation to improve the crash resistance of locomotive cabs (NTSB 
Safety Recommendation R-72-005). This recommendation was ultimately 
classified as ``Closed-No Longer Applicable'' following the issuance of 
Safety Recommendation R-78-27 which addressed the same issue.
     The investigation of the collision of three freight trains 
near Leetonia, Ohio, on June 6, 1975, again prompted NTSB to recommend 
increased cab crashworthiness, including consideration of a readily 
accessible crash refuge (NTSB Safety Recommendation R-76-009). This 
recommendation was classified as ``Closed-Acceptable Action'' on August 
6, 1978, following FRA's assurance that studies were continuing in this 
area.
     On September 18, 1978, a Louisville and Nashville freight 
train collided head-on with a yard train inside yard limits at 
Florence, Alabama. The lead unit of the yard train overrode the lead 
unit of the freight train. The cab provided no protection for the head 
brakeman and engineer, who jumped but were run over by their train.
     On August 11, 1981, a Boston and Maine Corporation freight 
train and a Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority commuter train 
collided head-on near Prides Crossing, Beverly, Massachusetts. The lead 
car of the commuter train overrode the freight locomotive, pushing 
components of the locomotive into the cab killing three people.
    NTSB's investigations of the above accidents resulted in 
recommendations to FRA regarding crashworthiness protection to the 
locomotive operating compartments (NTSB Recommendations R-77-37, R-78-
27, R-79-11, and R-82-34). As a result of the FRA-sponsored report 
``Analysis of Locomotive Cabs,''1 NTSB classified these four 
recommendations ``Closed-Acceptable Action'' on November 24, 1982.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ ``Analysis of Locomotive Cabs.'' (Report No. DOT/FRA/ORD-81/
84, National Space Technology Laboratories, September 1982.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     A rear-end collision of two Burlington Northern (BN) 
freight trains occurred near Pacific Junction, Iowa, on April 13, 1983. 
The operating compartment of the lead locomotive on the striking train, 
BN train 64T85, was overridden by the caboose of train 43J05 when the 
trains collided. The locomotive operating compartment was crushed. (In 
general, when a locomotive strikes a caboose or a light freight car, 
the lighter vehicle overrides the locomotive, frequently with 
devastating results.) As a result of this accident, NTSB issued a 
recommendation that FRA initiate and/or support a design study to 
provide a protected area in the locomotive operating compartment for 
the crew when a collision is unavoidable (NTSB Recommendation R-83-
102). This recommendation was subsequently classified as ``Closed-
Unacceptable Action/Superseded'' based on a future investigation that 
reiterated similar concerns regarding locomotive crashworthiness.
     On July 10, 1986, Union Pacific (UP) freight train CLSA-09 
struck a standing UP freight train near North Platte, Nebraska, at a 
speed of approximately 32 mph. Three locomotives and eleven cars from 
both trains derailed, and the accident resulted in one fatality and 
three injuries. This accident, in which the locomotive cab section of 
train CLSA-09 was destroyed on impact, probably would have resulted in 
fatal injuries to the engineer and head brakeman of train CLSA-09 had 
they not jumped from the cab prior to the collision. As a result, NTSB 
issued Safety Recommendation R-87-23, which recommends that FRA:

    Promptly require locomotive operating compartments to be 
designed to provide crash protection for occupants of locomotive 
cabs.

    NTSB believes that locomotive collision investigations continue to 
demonstrate that improvements are needed in the crashworthiness design 
standards of locomotives.
    As a result of investigations of numerous accidents involving 
passenger trains over the past 20 years, NTSB has recommended that FRA 
or the passenger railroad industry:
    (1) Prescribe regulations requiring emergency means of escape from 
railroad passenger cars;
    (2) Prescribe regulations requiring emergency lighting for railroad 
passenger cars;
    (3) Initiate studies to determine the relationship between 
passenger car design and passenger injuries;

[[Page 30678]]

    (4) Prescribe regulations requiring passenger cars with secured 
seats and luggage retention devices;
    (5) Apply system safety principles to the acquisition, design, 
construction and renovation of passenger cars;
    (6) Prescribe regulations to require back-up power for emergency 
lights and doors that can be opened in the event of loss of power;
    (7) Require that rail passenger equipment be fitted with roof 
escape hatches;
    (8) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum standards for the 
interior of commuter cars so that adequate crash injury protection and 
emergency equipment will be provided;
    (9) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum standards for the 
design and construction of interiors of passenger cars so adequate 
crash injury protection will be provided;
    (10) Promulgate regulations to establish minimum safety standards 
for the inspection and maintenance of railroad passenger cars; and
    (11) Amend the power brake regulations to provide appropriate 
guidelines for inspecting power brake equipment on modern passenger 
cars.

Accident/Incident Data

    FRA has compiled a 10-year history of passenger equipment 
accidents/incidents that railroads have reported to FRA. FRA supplied 
this information to the Working Group and placed it in the docket. 
Table 2 summarizes the deaths and injuries reported to FRA by railroads 
for occupants of passenger trains during this 10-year period. The 
``train accidents'' column of Table 2 includes all collisions, 
derailments, or fires involving passenger trains that resulted in more 
than $6,300 damage to on-track equipment, signals, track, track 
structure, or road bed. The ``grade crossing accidents'' column of 
Table 2 includes all reported impacts of a passenger train with cars, 
trucks, busses, farm equipment, or pedestrians at grade crossings. The 
``non-accident passenger train incidents'' column of Table 2 includes 
all reports of injuries or deaths of passenger train occupants not 
caused by a train accident or grade crossing accident.
    Figure 1 is a pie chart depicting the percentages of deaths to 
passenger train occupants caused by train accidents, grade crossing 
accidents, and non-accident incidents. Figure 2 shows the 10-year trend 
for each of these causes of deaths.

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    Figure 3 is a pie chart depicting the percentages of injuries to 
passenger train occupants caused by train accidents, grade crossing 
accidents, and non-accident incidents. Figure 4 shows the 10-year trend 
for each of these causes of injuries to occupants of passenger trains. 
(Amtrak has noted that the showing of only 10 years of accident data is 
somewhat distorted in that two accidents account for over 80 percent of 
the deaths, and one of the accidents had substantial intermodal 
implications.)
    Comment is requested regarding the significance of this data, 
elements of societal and railroad cost not included in the reported 
data, and factors to be considered in evaluating the risk of future 
catastrophic passenger train accidents.

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Approach/Structure for Safety Standards

Scope and Context

    FRA recognizes that safety standards that apply only to passenger 
equipment provide only a partial solution to improving rail passenger 
safety, and the best way to increase rail passenger safety is to keep 
trains on the track and spaced apart.
    Keeping trains on the track and apart requires a systems approach 
to safety that includes railroad track, right-of-way, signals and 
controls, operating procedures, station- and platform-to-train 
interface design, as well as equipment. FRA has active rulemaking and 
research projects ongoing in a variety of contexts that address non-
equipment aspects of passenger railroad system safety.
    While reflecting the other aspects of passenger railroad system 
safety, this rulemaking will focus on:
    (1) Equipment inspection, testing, and maintenance standards;
    (2) Equipment design and performance standards;
    (3) Platform- and station-to-train interface design and procedures 
to promote safe ingress and egress of passengers; and
    (4) Other issues specifically related to safe operation of rail 
passenger service not addressed in other FRA regulations, proceedings, 
or program development efforts.

Existing Rail Passenger Operations

    FRA intends to structure any proposed actions to cause a minimum of 
disruption to existing safe operations of passenger equipment. This 
notice is designed to bring to FRA's attention the special situations 
and problems confronting tourist and excursion railroads, private 
passenger car owners, commuter railroads, and the existing operations 
of Amtrak, which all have a long history of safe operation. FRA 
believes the first objective of this rulemaking should be to construct 
common sense minimum safety floors under these existing operations. To 
the extent new technology or innovative approaches might offer 
opportunities for improving safety performance on a cost- effective 
basis, FRA seeks the appropriate means to exploit these opportunities.
    A common sense safety floor under existing safe operations includes 
a complete pre-departure (or daily) safety inspection of each departing 
train conducted by skilled inspectors, and a well-planned test and 
preventive maintenance program for safety-critical components of the 
system triggered by time, mileage, or some other reliability-driven 
parameter. (A ``safety critical component'' is a component whose 
failure to function as intended results in a greater risk to passengers 
and crew.) One of the main purposes of this ANPRM is to solicit 
information concerning:
    (1) The steps necessary to conduct a complete pre-departure or 
daily safety inspection of the equipment;
    (2) A means to demonstrate (e.g., training, testing, supervision, 
certification) that safety inspectors have the knowledge and skills 
necessary to perform effective inspections or tests;
    (3) The minimum planned or periodic maintenance program required to 
keep the equipment in safe operating condition;
    (4) The frequency of required planned or periodic maintenance; and
    (5) The costs and benefits associated with the requirements under 
consideration.

Special Consideration for Tourist and Excursion Railroads

    Tourist and excursion railroads generally provide passenger rail 
service as entertainment or recreation, often at low speed on track 
dedicated to that service alone. FRA recognizes the extensive service 
provided by this growing sector of the railroad industry, and the need 
to tailor appropriate safety requirements to the level of risk 
involved. Accordingly, FRA will work to identify appropriate criteria 
for creating relatively simple system safety plans and programs for 
tourist and excursion railroads that recognize the special needs of 
this sector of the industry.
    Speed and distance limits may be helpful to define tourist and 
excursion railroads excepted from many of the effects of any proposed 
passenger equipment safety standards. For instance, less stringent 
requirements might be applied to a railroad with a maximum operating 
speed of 30 mph and a maximum trip distance of 250 miles. In addition, 
operations segregated from the general railroad system may warrant 
consideration for less stringent requirements. FRA seeks comment on 
these proposed limits and, as noted earlier, will request assistance of 
an appropriately representative working group to develop these issues.

Special Consideration for Private Passenger Cars

    FRA recognizes private passenger cars as another segment of the 
industry that may need special consideration. However, some important 
differences between the two types of operations exist that need to be 
taken into account. Private passenger cars often operate as part of 
freight, Amtrak, and commuter trains at track speeds over long 
distances. Providing regulatory relief to private passenger car owners 
through speed and/or distance limitations could severely restrict 
current operations. The host railroads often impose their own safety 
requirements on the private passenger cars and have a strong interest 
in any Federal safety standards that apply to private passenger cars. 
FRA intends to fully involve Amtrak, the American Association of 
Private Railcar Owners, and the American Public Transit Association 
(APTA) as standards for private passenger cars are developed.
    Does the simple system safety program proposed for tourist and 
excursion railroads make sense for private passenger cars? If not, why? 
Do alternate means exist to provide regulatory relief to private 
passenger car owners without imposing restrictive speed and distance 
limits? How should railroad business or observation cars be treated?

New Rail Passenger Service or Systems

    FRA intends the main thrust of any proposed safety standards for 
equipment design to be focused on new equipment and new rail passenger 
service. New equipment and new service present the opportunity to 
analyze the proposed equipment and its intended use to ensure that a 
systematic approach is taken to design safety into the operation. 
However, some of the safety enhancements that the final rule resulting 
from this ANPRM deem necessary for new equipment may have the potential 
to be applied to existing or to rebuilt equipment. Without such 
consideration, opportunities to increase safety that stand up to a 
cost/benefit analysis could be lost. In addition, not requiring rebuilt 
equipment to meet the latest standards provides an incentive to rebuild 
equipment rather than purchase new equipment, thus delaying the full 
benefit of the new standards.

Passenger Equipment Power Brakes

    On September 16, 1994, FRA published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking on power brakes. 59 FR 47676. Much of the public testimony 
received in response to the NPRM emphasized the differences between 
freight operations and passenger operations, and the differences 
between freight equipment brake systems and passenger equipment brake 
systems. In light of this testimony, and because passenger equipment 
power brake standards are a logical subset of passenger equipment 
safety standards,

[[Page 30684]]

FRA will separate passenger equipment power brake standards from 
freight equipment power brake standards. The Working Group will assist 
FRA to develop a second NPRM that covers passenger equipment power 
brake standards. Since power brakes have already been the subject of a 
recent ANPRM, NPRM, and supplementary notice, FRA is not seeking 
additional information on passenger equipment power brakes, and they 
will not be addressed in this ANPRM.

Regulatory Flexibility

    FRA conducts this proceeding to determine how best to meet the need 
to assure the public of continued safe operation of passenger trains in 
a more complex operating environment. Although FRA is required by law 
to issue minimum standards for passenger equipment safety, FRA 
recognizes that the level of detail properly embodied in regulations 
can and should be powerfully influenced by the presence of voluntary 
standards adhered to by those participating in their development. FRA 
encourages the formation of a rail passenger industry forum (similar to 
AAR in some functions, but more representative of all segments of the 
rail passenger industry) to establish supplementary safety standards 
developed through industry consensus. Such an organization could reduce 
the need for detailed Federal regulations beyond such basic 
requirements as may be appropriate to provide for safety.
    FRA desires to structure regulations to provide the flexibility 
necessary for introduction of new technology or new operating concepts 
that could improve service and safety. Use of performance standards--
where feasible--can best achieve this objective.
    FRA desires this ANPRM to stimulate discussion focused on how FRA 
can meet its responsibility to the public while imposing a minimum 
regulatory burden on the rail passenger industry. Does the industry 
have plans to establish a forum with the charter and authority to 
develop safety standards by consensus for the industry, or can an 
existing organization serve this function? If such a group can be 
established, what safety concerns have a high potential of being 
resolved through industry consensus and voluntary action? What time 
frame would be required to develop industry safety standards by 
consensus? What role could/should rail labor organizations, equipment 
builders, component suppliers, and state agencies play in developing 
these safety standards? What assurances could be provided that the 
industry would adhere to these safety standards? What role could/should 
FRA play to assist the industry in developing these standards? When 
consensus cannot be reached or is not adequate, and Federal regulations 
are required, how can the flexibility/adaptability of the regulations 
to meet a dynamic operating environment and changing technology be 
maximized? To what extent might development of voluntary industry 
guidelines limit the need for highly detailed or prescriptive Federal 
standards?

Discussion of Issues

    An introductory discussion of several concepts--crucial to rail 
equipment safety--may convey a better understanding of the approach FRA 
is considering to develop safety standards for new passenger equipment. 
These concepts are:
    (1) system safety plan and program;
    (2) rail vehicle crashworthiness;
    (3) crash energy management;
    (4) suspension system performance; and
    (5) wheel thermal stress.

System Safety Plan and Program

    The heart of the approach to new passenger equipment safety 
standards will be a system safety program. A system safety plan is a 
document developed by the operator--with a large input from the builder 
of new equipment--to describe the system safety program. The plan 
should lay out a top-down approach to how the system--including the 
equipment, the inspection, the testing and maintenance program, the 
routes over which the equipment will operate, and the operating rules 
that will be applied to it--will be designed, tested, and verified to 
meet all safety requirements and provide a safe operation.
    A true and complete system safety approach begins at the top level 
of the system--in this case, the ``system'' is the entire railroad 
operation. For the purpose of risk analysis, the railroad system must 
be broken down into its component systems. No one--or right--way exists 
to perform this breakdown. It can be done many ways. Figure 5 is just 
one logical example.

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    Many passenger railroads operate at least partially as a tenant on 
the right-of-way and property of another railroad. In this case, the 
passenger railroad may have little or no control under the contractual 
terms of the tenancy arrangement, and little or no prospect of gaining 
future control over some of the major risk components of the risk 
analysis. The actions of the passenger railroad cannot change these 
risk components, and for the purpose of performing a system safety 
analysis, they must remain fixed and be accepted as a given unless 
subject to separate changes in Federal standards.
    For example, a passenger railroad that operates largely as a tenant 
would have little or no control over the Interfaces (RC1) and Right-of-
Way (RC2) risk components. By holding these risk components fixed, the 
system safety approach degrades to a systems approach applied to the 
remaining two subsystems rather than to the railroad as a whole. The 
``systems'' methodology still has considerable merit when applied to 
the remaining subsystems, but a true system safety approach cannot be 
applied to a system that has major risk components that are 
constrained. This analysis could help define the equipment 
crashworthiness features required for its intended purpose, or the 
operational limitations needed to improve or retain safety levels.
    What practical constraints must be taken into account when applying 
a system safety approach to passenger railroads? When all practical 
constraints are taken into account, how should the system safety 
approach be applied to help develop passenger equipment safety 
standards?
    The system safety plan can range from a relatively simple 
document--for conventional equipment being procured to continue an 
existing service--to a detailed document laying out a comprehensive 
approach for designing, testing, and operating state-of-the-art high-
speed passenger rail systems. The outline of the system safety plan 
given in Appendix A applies to the procurements of new high-speed 
trainsets. For the less complex procurements of replacement equipment 
for existing service, the plan should be simplified and tailored to fit 
the particular need. It should be emphasized that the purpose of the 
system safety plan is to force a thorough thought process to ensure 
safety is optimized.
    The purpose of a formal system safety program, among other things, 
is to ensure safety is adequately addressed during the design of 
passenger trainsets and during the development of the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance program that supports these trainsets. The 
system safety program also permits other high risk components in the 
system to be identified, including operational aspects and the 
signaling and grade crossing technology employed. The system safety 
program requires:
    (1) Analysis of the trainset design for identification of safety 
hazards (risk assessment) and systematic elimination or reduction of 
the risk associated with these hazards (mitigating actions);
    (2) Analysis of operational aspects for safety hazards and, where 
feasible, systematic elimination or reduction of the associated risk of 
these hazards; and
    (3) Development of the inspection, testing, and maintenance concept 
in a step-by-step process to determine the procedures and maintenance 
intervals necessary to keep the trainset operating safely.
    MIL-STD-882C defines the approach taken for system safety programs 
used by the United States military. A copy has been placed in the 
docket. This document is an excellent reference for how to plan and 
conduct a system safety program.
    FRA solicits comments from all segments of the rail passenger 
industry on formal system safety programs. FRA is particularly 
interested in ways to tailor the program to meet the multitude of 
individual situations that exist in the industry. The purpose of the 
program is to ensure that safety is planned into new systems. FRA is 
searching for ways to ensure the system safety program is good 
business--not a regulatory burden. FRA seeks to determine the process 
necessary to ensure system safety is good business and allows 
flexibility in tailoring the planning to the level of the safety need.
    Are any system safety plans currently in use? How much would it 
cost (in terms of time and effort) to update existing or develop new 
system safety plans? On average, approximately how often would system 
safety plans have to be updated? How would system safety plans improve 
safety? Specifically, what areas of safety would be improved, by how 
much, and why? Please provide copies of any studies, data, arguments, 
or opinions which support your answer.

Rail Passenger Equipment Crashworthiness

    Since vehicle crashworthiness is one of the means to reduce safety 
risks, it is therefore a major subset of the system safety program. 
``Rail passenger equipment crashworthiness'' means a system of 
interrelated vehicle design features intended to maximize passenger and 
crew survivability of collisions and derailments. Vehicle 
crashworthiness is the last line of defense or protection in the event 
all other precautions fail, and a serious accident occurs.
    A risk assessment done by Arthur D. Little, Inc., (ADL) for Amtrak 
regarding operation of high-speed trainsets in the Northeast Corridor 
points to the need for attention to passenger equipment crashworthiness 
by showing that the following types of collisions could occur on the 
Northeast Corridor:
    (1) Loaded freight equipment or locomotives might derail on 
adjacent track, overturning and fouling a high- speed main line. (The 
derailment could be caused by defective freight equipment or 
vandalism.)
    (2) The braking system on a freight train or light locomotives 
could fail to operate properly, causing that consist to split a switch 
and occupy a high-speed main line immediately ahead of an oncoming 
high-speed passenger train.
    (3) A high-speed passenger train could derail on a curve due to a 
track defect (e.g., a broken rail initiated by the last freight 
movement) and strike a fixed object such as an abutment or pier.
    Scenarios with substantially similar consequences are possible even 
after the installation of an enhanced train control system. These are 
the types of scenarios feared by freight railroads that allow passenger 
trains to operate on their systems, and have led the freight railroads 
to demand insulation from excessive tort liability.
    To ensure crashworthiness, passenger equipment must:
    (1) Maintain an envelope or minimum volume of survivability for 
passengers and crew which resists extreme structural deformation and 
separation of main structural members;
    (2) Protect against penetration of the occupied compartments;
    (3) Protect the occupants from being ejected from occupied 
compartments; and
    (4) Protect the occupants from secondary impacts with the interior 
of the occupied compartments.
    To make a passenger train accident survivable (1) the spaces 
occupied by people must be strong enough not to collapse, crushing the 
people; and (2) the initial deceleration of the people must be limited 
so they are not thrown against the interior of the train with 
unsurvivable force. Achieving these general objectives can be the most 
difficult challenge facing equipment designers.

[[Page 30687]]

Crash Energy Management

    Crash energy management is a design technique to help equipment 
designers meet this challenge. The basic concept embodied by crash 
energy management is that designated sections in unoccupied spaces or 
lightly occupied spaces are intentionally designed to be weaker than 
heavily occupied spaces. This is done so that during a collision, 
portions of the unoccupied spaces will deform before the occupied 
spaces, allowing the occupied spaces of the trainset initially to 
decelerate more slowly and minimize the uncontrolled deformation of 
occupied space.
    The docket contains two technical papers 2 by the Volpe Center 
that analyze the merits of crash energy management design techniques. 
These studies evaluate the effectiveness of alternative strategies for 
providing crashworthiness of passenger rail vehicle structures and 
interiors at increased collision speeds by comparing them to a design 
permitted by current standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ ``Evaluation of Selected Crashworthiness Strategies for 
Passenger Trains.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green & B. Marquis, U.S. 
Department of Transportation Volpe National Transportation System 
Center, January 20, 1995; ``Train Crashworthiness Design for 
Occupant Survivability.'' D. Tyrell, K. Severson-Green & B. Marquis, 
U.S. Department of Transportation Volpe National Transportation 
System Center, April 7, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current regulations permit cars of essentially uniform longitudinal 
strength. Simplified analysis done using a lumped-mass computer model 
and an idealized load-crush curve predicts this type of design to be 
effective in maintaining survivable volumes in coaches for train-to-
train collision speeds up to 70 mph. Further analysis needs to be done 
using a more complex distributed-mass computer model and a widely 
accepted load-crush curve to refine this prediction.
    Using a simplified lumped-mass computer model, the assumed uniform 
longitudinal strength causes the predicted structural crushing of the 
train to proceed uniformly from the front to the rear of the train, 
through both the unoccupied and occupied areas of the train. Using a 
distributed-mass computer model, structural crushing of uniform 
strength equipment tends to be predicted to occur at both ends of the 
car, more in agreement with observations from actual accidents.
    The crash energy management design approach results in varying 
longitudinal strength, with high strength in the occupied areas and 
lower strength in the unoccupied areas. This approach attempts to 
distribute the structural crushing throughout the train to the 
unoccupied areas to preserve the occupant volumes and to control and 
limit the decelerations of the cars. The crash energy management 
approach has been found to offer significant benefits. (Amtrak has 
noted that while this concept seems to work well for single-level 
equipment with vestibules at each end, its application to a bi-level 
design--which is now Amtrak's long distance standard--was not 
considered in these publications.)
    The interior crashworthiness study evaluates the influence of 
interior configurations and occupant restraints on injuries resulting 
from occupant motions during a collision. For a sufficiently gentle 
train deceleration, compartmentalization (a strategy for providing a 
``friendly'' interior) can provide sufficient occupant protection to 
keep widely accepted injury criteria below the threshold values applied 
by the automotive industry.
    The Volpe Center reports show that, if installed properly and used, 
the combination of lapbelts and shoulder restraints can reduce the 
likelihood of fatality due to deceleration to near-certain survival for 
even the most severe collision conditions considered. However, 
individual restraints may have limited practical value on a train, 
where mobility within the vehicle is an important attribute of service 
quality, and times of most significant risk cannot be predicted. The 
most likely application of personal restraints could be in a control 
compartment located at the front of the train.
    The value of a crash energy management design is not in the energy 
absorbed--only a few percent of the kinetic energy of a high-speed 
collision can be absorbed in a reasonable crush distance. The real 
safety benefit comes from allowing the occupied spaces to decelerate 
more slowly, while decreasing the likelihood that occupied spaces will 
fail in an uncontrolled fashion. If the occupied spaces are initially 
decelerated more slowly, people will be pinned to an interior surface 
of the trainset with less force, resulting in fewer and less severe 
injuries. Once pinned against an interior surface, occupants can then 
sustain much higher subsequent decelerations without sustaining serious 
injuries. Also, since unoccupied space is intentionally sacrificed, 
less occupied space will be crushed during the collision.
    Crash energy management design involves a system of interrelated 
safety features, in addition to controlled crushable space, that could 
include: (1) design techniques to keep the trainset in line and on the 
track for as long as possible during the initial impact;
    (2) Interior design that eliminates sharp corners and that pads, 
with shock absorbing material, surfaces that are likely to be struck by 
people thrown about by a collision;
    (3) Attachment of interior fittings and seats with sufficient 
strength not to fail and thereby cause additional injuries; and
    (4) A crash refuge for the vulnerable crew members in the cab.
    To help maintain survivable volumes in passenger equipment, 
particularly during collisions at higher closing speeds, minimum 
standards for the following structural design parameters would be 
needed:
    (1) Anti-buckling to keep the train in line and on the track for as 
long as possible after impact. (Prevention of buckling is not always 
possible, but it can be delayed);
    (2) End structures and anticlimbers to prevent override and 
telescoping;
    (3) Corner posts to deflect glancing collisions;
    (4) Rollover strength;
    (5) Truck to car body attachment; and
    (6) A control cab crash refuge.
    ``Anti-buckling'' refers to trainset design techniques intended to 
prevent to a certain force level or delay both vertical (override) and/
or lateral buckling. The current state-of-the-art in passenger rail 
equipment design will impose limitations on the extent to which anti-
buckling can be achieved. (Devices that meet the anti-buckling 
requirements have not been developed or tested. Those devices that have 
been evaluated by the French National Railroad in actual crash testing 
of their latest TGV bi-level design are intended to prevent override 
similar to those devices currently required on North American 
equipment.)
    Standards would be necessary to address the general design 
parameters to limit decelerations of passengers and crew, as well as 
flying objects striking passengers and crew. One possible approach is 
to define, under the dynamic conditions created by a specific collision 
scenario:
    (1) Limits on the maximum and average deceleration of the crew in 
the control cab for the first 250 milliseconds after impact (assuming 
the crew had anticipated the collision and placed themselves in the 
crash refuge);
    (2) Limits on the maximum and average deceleration of passengers in 
passenger cars for the first 250 milliseconds after impact;
    (3) Minimum longitudinal, lateral, and vertical seat attachment 
strength;
    (4) Minimum longitudinal, lateral, and vertical fitting attachment 
and

[[Page 30688]]

luggage stowage compartment strengths; and
    (5) Minimum padding requirements for seat backs and interior 
surfaces. Achieving the second item requires careful design to create a 
differential in structural strength between passenger seating areas 
(``occupied volume'') and certain other areas that would be allowed to 
fail before the occupied volume. By contrast, permitting uniform 
rigidity throughout the trainset could result in unacceptably high 
initial accelerations of the passenger compartments and possibly make 
the accident non-survivable.

Suspension System Performance

    A passenger train suspension system's purpose is to follow the 
track at all speeds of operation and to minimize the vibrations and 
motions transmitted to the passengers. An unsafe condition occurs 
whenever the suspension system:
    (1) Allows a wheel to lift from a rail;
    (2) Allows a wheel to climb over a rail;
    (3) Transmits excessive vibration or motion to the passengers;
    (4) Exerts excessive force on a rail causing it to shift or roll; 
or
    (5) Allows unstable lateral hunting oscillations of a truck or 
wheelset.

The vehicle no longer safely follows the track when a wheel either 
climbs the rail or lifts from the rail. Wheel climb may occur in curves 
where large lateral forces are generated as the truck negotiates the 
curve. These lateral forces, particularly in combination with changes 
in vertical wheel load caused by track surface variations, can cause 
the wheel to climb the rail.
    The ratio of lateral to vertical forces acting on a wheel (L/V 
ratio) is generally taken as a measure of the proximity of the wheel to 
derailment. If L/V remains less than Nadal's limit, which is 0.8 on 
clean, dry, tangent track, then wheel derailment is remote.
    Whenever insufficient vertical force exists to support the lateral 
force acting on the rail, wheel climb can potentially occur under a 
broad range of track alignment and surface geometry combinations. If a 
wheel lifts due to excessive rolling, twisting, or other motions of the 
car body or truck, it will likely return to the rail as long as no 
excessive lateral forces exist to push it out of line with the rail. 
However, wheel lift represents a potentially unsafe condition, because 
there is no certainty of the absence of a strong lateral force that 
prevents the wheel's return to the rail. To assure that the wheel 
remains in contact with the rail, each wheel must maintain a minimum 
vertical load of 10 percent of the nominal static wheel vertical load 
on straight, level track.
    Excessive lateral forces acting on a rail can cause the rail to 
rollover and/or shift outward, allowing a wheelset to drop between the 
rails. For this to happen, all wheels on one side of a truck must be 
pushing outward on a rail. The railroad industry generally accepts that 
if the ratio of the sum of the lateral forces to the sum of the 
vertical forces exerted by all the wheels on one side of a truck on the 
rail is less than 0.5, there is little danger of rail rollover or 
shift.
    Excessive lateral forces, induced by a car traversing the track, 
can also cause the track as a unit to shift laterally on its ballast. 
To assure that the track does not get pushed out of alignment by a 
train, the ratio of the net lateral load exerted by each axle to the 
net vertical load exerted by that axle must remain less than 0.5.
    Passenger ride quality is generally a comfort rather than a safety 
concern, unless ride quality deteriorates so that passengers are 
injured by a rough ride. To provide minimum protection for passengers 
from injuries due to being thrown about by excessive car body motions, 
FRA believes that equipment should be designed such that car body 
lateral accelerations are less than 0.30g peak-to-peak and the car body 
vertical accelerations are less than 0.55g peak-to-peak, while the 
square root of the sum of lateral accelerations squared plus the 
vertical accelerations squared (the vector sum) is less than 0.604g 
peak-to-peak. Compliance with this design standard would typically be 
established as part of an equipment qualification program.
    Sustained lateral oscillations of the truck (``truck hunting'') can 
lead to derailment. Sensor technology allows the lateral accelerations 
of the truck to be constantly monitored under service operating 
conditions. FRA proposes that trucks be equipped with accelerometers to 
monitor for hunting so that corrective action can be taken when hunting 
is detected. FRA proposes to define ``hunting'' as a lateral 
acceleration of the truck frame in excess of 0.8g peak-to-peak repeated 
for six or more cycles.
    Recent experience with the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority's 
new bi-level commuter cars demonstrated the close relationship between 
suspension system performance and track geometry. The suspension system 
must be able to perform at low speed over track with relatively large 
surface variations, such as 3-inch cross level deviation, while 
maintaining stability and smooth ride quality at maximum service 
speeds. FRA is concerned that suspension systems of all new passenger 
equipment maintain passenger safety over their entire range of intended 
operating conditions. The suspension system requirements, such as wheel 
equalization, must therefore be established for all equipment and 
service based on analysis from the system safety program. Compliance 
with this requirement would typically be established as part of an 
equipment qualification program.

Wheel Thermal Stress

    FRA is concerned that frequent, repeated braking from high speeds 
could induce thermal damage in wheels that can result in cracking and 
potential wheel failure in service. New high-speed passenger equipment 
may include blended brakes which combine dynamic and friction braking 
(either on tread, disk, or both). Such blended systems typically 
maximize the available dynamic brake portion at all speeds to minimize 
wear and thermal input to the wheels, discs, and friction brake 
components. Wheel slide detection and prevention is typically available 
to minimize loss of wheel to track adhesion of individual wheelsets 
during deceleration.
    Thermal demand on wheels due to frictional heating by tread brakes 
can be substantial when loaded cars are operated at high braking 
ratios. This scenario may apply to blended systems which use tread 
brakes more extensively to make up for the loss of failed dynamic 
brakes. Recent research has shown that for wheels on some types of 
passenger equipment operated at weights of 60 to 80 tons per car, at 
speeds from 80 to 100 mph and retardation rates of 2 to 3 mph/second, 
the brake horsepower which the wheel must absorb can flash-heat a 
shallow layer of the rim to a temperature high enough to damage the 
metal and possibly cause a change in its mechanical properties.
    An operational test under simulated service conditions was 
conducted in October 1992 using wheels instrumented with thermocouples 
to measure temperatures in the rim. The test train was operated at 
near-empty weight (61 tons per car) and at speeds up to 100 mph. Wheel 
temperatures were measured during speed reductions and stops, at 
retardation rates from 1.3 to 1.9 mph/second, with tread braking only. 
Temperatures as high as 1000  deg.F. (538  deg.C.) were measured by the 
thermocouple closest to the tread surface (approximately 0.1 inch below 
the tread surface). The S-plate wheel

[[Page 30689]]

design common in commuter service was used to obtain these results.
    Current Federal safety standards for locomotives, under which MU 
cars are covered, define a defective wheel due to cracking as any wheel 
with ``[a] crack or break in the flange, tread, rim, plate, or hub.'' 
49 CFR 229.75(k). Although the AAR Manual of Interchange Rules (1980) 
applies only to interchange freight service, it is often applied to 
equipment in passenger service and defines a wheel to be ``condemnable 
at any time'' if it contains ``thermal cracks: transverse cracks in 
tread, flange or plate * * *'' (Rule 41--Section A). The 1984 edition 
of the same manual adds a qualification as follows: ``Thermal or heat 
checks: Brake shoe heating frequently produces a fine network of 
superficial lines or checks running in all directions on the surface of 
the wheel tread. This is sometimes associated with skid burns. It 
should not be confused with thermal cracking and is not a cause for 
wheel removal.''
    Heat checking is recognized by experienced failure analysts as a 
phenomenon distinct from thermal cracking. In the absence of other 
effects, heat checks are believed--at worst--to progress to minor 
shelling or spalling which can be detected and corrected well before 
they cause a risk to operational safety. However, recent research has 
shown that heat checks are unsafe if the affected wheel has also been 
subjected to rim stress reversal.
    Wrought wheels used in commuter service are rim-quenched after 
forming to create a layer of residual compressive stress in the rim 
extending inward from the tread. Depths of penetration of the 
compressive layer are estimated at 1.2 inches (30 mm) by finite element 
simulations of the quenching process. This residual compressive stress 
is beneficial since compression tends to force cracks closed and retard 
crack growth.
    Repeated wheel excursions to high temperatures can result in stress 
reversal in the wheel rim, especially in shallow layers near the tread 
surface where cracks are likely to originate. Estimates of residual 
stresses in new (as manufactured) wheels were obtained by application 
of an advanced finite element-based technique which uses stresses due 
to quenching as an input state and then calculates the final residual 
stress state after repeated simulated stop-braking from 80 mph at 2 
mph/second. The results of this simulation predict stress reversal 
(reversal from circumferential compression due to quenching to residual 
tension) in a layer approximately \5/8\-inch (16 mm) deep from the 
surface of the wheel tread.
    This research causes FRA concern regarding the possibility of wheel 
failures due to cracking initiated in overbraked wheels. A visual 
estimation of thermal damage is difficult in the absence of cracks. 
Conventional practices based on wheel discoloration have been 
discredited as being unreliable indicators of wheel thermal damage. 
Within the limits of current sensor technology, the best means 
available to prevent wheel failure resulting from thermal damage is 
careful brake system design to limit the frictional heating of wheels 
to within safe limits.
    Ad hoc recommendations identify the onset of thermal damage at 
wheel tread near surface temperatures of 600 to 700  deg.F. In order to 
better quantify the effect of temperature on wheel integrity, several 
metallurgical experiments of wheel material were done. The base 
material condition of a non-thermally abused wheel rim is normally a 
pearlitic microstructure hardened to approximately RC 35. Metallurgical 
examination near the treads of thermally cracked wheels shows a 
spheroidized microstructure with an increased hardness for a layer 
approximately \1/2\-inch deep.
    This microstructure form is usually associated with formation by a 
sequence of heating to extremely high temperatures (above 1400  deg.F.) 
followed by rapid quenching to produce martensite (an undesirable steel 
microstructure), followed by tempering at high temperature (800 to 900 
deg.F.) to transform martensite to spheroidite.
    Since field data indicated that wheel temperatures were not 
reaching the elevated levels necessary to produce the laboratory 
material transformation, more work was done to try to explain this 
inconsistency. This laboratory work involved testing of wheel steel 
samples that were exposed to combined rapid heating and high 
compression. The combination of heat and compression was used to 
simulate the environment of material near a wheel tread surface that is 
subjected to combined stop-braking (heat) and rail contact 
(compression). The results of these laboratory tests showed that the 
microstructure of the material can transform at temperatures below 1200 
 deg.F if the material is also compressed, and the transformed 
microstructure can have an appearance similar to that of spheroidite.
    Based on this research, FRA is concerned that passenger equipment 
in service with frequent stops from high speeds can over brake wheels. 
Of particular concern is equipment that utilizes a high percentage of 
tread braking and blended brake systems that require a wheel tread 
friction brake to carry a greater portion of the braking load when the 
dynamic portion of the brake fails.
    Disc brakes are commonly used on high speed passenger trainsets as 
a companion to the dynamic brake system to avoid some of the thermal 
problems that can be caused by tread brakes. Disc air brakes provide 
fail-safe braking and high levels of retardation. Disc brakes offer 
several advantages as opposed to tread brakes. Disc brakes are less 
sensitive to moisture and have more uniform coefficients of friction at 
high speeds. Disc brakes can also improve ride quality due to reduced 
jerk and less noise. In addition, disc brakes require lower brake 
forces than tread brakes, thus permitting smaller cylinders and lighter 
rigging. But the main advantage of disc brakes is that they allow 
braking heat to be dissipated using a heat sink other than the wheel.
    Brake discs can be mounted directly to the wheel with bolts or can 
be axle mounted. Axle mounted discs are installed on the axle between 
the wheels. The disc consists of two friction rings interconnected by 
cooling fins, which exist in several forms, including a vane design and 
a ventilated design. The vanes and fins increase the convective cooling 
of the disc as it rotates. Retarding force is provided by means of a 
caliper--actuated by a pneumatic cylinder--that clamps brake pads 
against the rotating disc.
    Substantial research and development effort has gone into the 
design of disc brakes, especially for European high-speed trains. While 
disc brakes are well suited for high-energy dissipation and high-
temperature events, disc pad wear and thermally damaged discs are two 
of the cost drivers in maintaining high-speed passenger trainsets.
    One manufacturer of disc brakes has recommended limiting disc pad 
temperatures to 750  deg.F. to prevent thermal damage to the wheels or 
brake pads during stop distance tests of a European trainset to be 
tested in the Northeast Corridor.
    Based on these concerns and research, FRA wishes to explore 
requiring each railroad establish the maximum safe speed that each type 
of its equipment can be operated over a specific route, when the 
dynamic portion of the brake has failed or is disabled. These speed 
limits should be established as part of the system safety program.
    Another possible concern involving disc brakes is wheel slide. Due 
to the high retardation rate that can be achieved with disc brakes, 
failure of the

[[Page 30690]]

wheel slide protection system can cause the formation of martensite in 
the vicinity of the wheel/rail contact region. This can lead to wheel 
mechanical damage similar to that caused by excessive tread braking.
    What steps have the passenger rail industry taken to prevent wheel 
damage due to over braking? What wheel thermal problems continue to 
occur in the field? How should thermal limits on wheels and discs be 
handled in safety regulations?

Tiered Equipment Design Standards Based on Risk Analysis

    FRA believes there may be merit in a tiered approach to equipment 
safety standards based on a risk analysis of the operating environment 
in which the equipment will operate. (Tiers are levels of design 
requirements determined by system safety considerations.) The advantage 
of such an approach is that it takes into account system safety factors 
other than equipment design that reduce safety risks. The tiered 
approach also readily lends itself to amending the safety standards for 
a new type of service--a new tier could be added without changing the 
existing standards. The disadvantage is that such an approach can 
rapidly become very complex. Further, when applied to design 
performance criteria for new equipment, an excessively tiered approach 
could result in purchases of equipment that might be severely limited 
with respect to its future uses and marketability.
    For simplicity, FRA had initially envisioned tiered safety 
standards based on operating speed alone. FRA suggested the following 
logical break points to the Working Group for tiered equipment 
standards:
     Level 1--up to 30 mph--Tourist and Excursion Railroads.
     Level 2--up to 79 mph--Conventional Passenger Operations.
     Level 3--up to 125 mph--Intermediate Speed Operations.
     Level 4--up to 150 mph--High Speed Operations.

However, discussions with the Working Group highlighted several 
objections to this approach based on tiering by maximum operating speed 
alone. Conventional intercity passenger trains operated by Amtrak, 
powered by diesel- electric locomotives, frequently operate at speeds 
up to 90 mph, and commuter railroads provide ``conventional'' service 
at speeds up to 110 mph. Both Amtrak and commuter railroads expressed a 
strong opinion that their ``conventional'' equipment had proven itself 
capable of operating safely at ``intermediate'' speeds.
    The majority of the Working Group has expressed a preference for 
only two tiers of equipment standards for intercity and commuter 
service, and for basing the criteria for distinguishing between the 
tiers on a system safety approach rather than solely on operating 
speed. As a result, the discussion of tiered safety standards that 
follows centers around a two-tiered approach. FRA recognizes that 
approaches containing more than two tiers may be desirable. 
Accordingly, FRA will carefully consider alternate approaches received 
in response to this ANPRM that contain more than two tiers of safety 
standards. Such alternate approaches should attempt to explain the 
safety/economic advantages of safety standards based on more than two 
tiers, and should attempt to define and state the logic behind the 
criteria used to distinguish between these tiers. (A formal vote by the 
Working Group on the number of tiers to use has not been taken. Amtrak 
can envision the need for at least three tiers, as specified in the 
introduction of Appendix B.)
    The basic concept behind a system safety approach for tiering is 
that safety risks can be reduced by controlling any number of operating 
environment factors in addition to equipment design, inspection, 
testing, and maintenance. Factors that should be considered when 
performing a risk analysis to determine the correct tier of equipment 
requirements include:
    (1) Maximum operating speed;
    (2) Presence of at-grade rail crossings;
    (3) Type of protection at highway grade crossings;
    (4) Number of at-grade rail crossings;
    (5) Current and projected train traffic densities;
    (6) Capabilities of current and planned signal systems;
    (7) Tracks shared with freight trains;
    (8) Shared rights-of-way with freight or light rail type 
operations;
    (9) Wayside structures; and
    (10) Special right-of-way safety features such as track separation 
distance, barriers or track obstruction detection systems.
    If the risk analysis shows that the type of operation or non-
equipment safety features result in a very low risk operation, less 
restrictive--or Tier I--equipment safety standards would be 
appropriate. If the risk analysis shows a higher risk of operation due 
to higher operating speeds, traffic densities, or some other factor, 
Tier II equipment safety standards--which reduce risk more than Tier I 
standards--would be used. A good example of a risk analysis of a 
passenger railroad operating environment is provided in a report 
prepared by ADL under contract to Amtrak, entitled ``Northeast Corridor 
Risk Assessment'' (August 26, 1994). A copy of this report is included 
in the docket.
    One of the factors that will make an approach to equipment safety 
standards based on risk assessment difficult to implement is that the 
industry must quantify and make public the degree of risk that is 
considered acceptable. Is the level of risk per billion highway 
passenger miles the criterion? Is the level of risk per billion 
passenger miles in scheduled air carrier service the criterion?
    FRA seeks industry comments on a tiered approach or alternate 
approaches to passenger equipment safety standards. Does the initial 
approach of speed break points suggested by FRA make sense? What would 
be the impact of imposing this set of break points? What existing 
commuter operations would be caught between conventional and 
intermediate speed standards? Should FRA grandfather the current 
equipment providing this service and apply the more stringent standards 
only to the new or refurbished equipment procured to provide service in 
this speed range? Should FRA also grandfather all of Amtrak's equipment 
providing service at speeds greater than 79 mph? Should other sets of 
break points be considered? If so, which and why? What should be the 
major change in equipment safety standards at each break point? What 
problems could be caused by the approach to grandfathering current 
equipment operating in each speed range?
    Rather than the initial FRA approach, does the concept of tiered 
standards based on the outcome of a risk analysis make sense? Would 
such an approach be too complex? Is the industry willing to undertake 
the thorough risk analysis process necessary to make such an approach 
effective? What would the industry use as an acceptable level of risk 
to determine break points between tiers of requirements?
    The discussion of possible safety standards that follows is based 
on a two-tiered approach. The question of exactly how to draw the line 
between the two tiers of requirements is not answered. For purposes of 
discussion, Tier I requirements are broadly applied to operations with 
a known low risk or record of proven safe operation, e.g., passenger 
equipment operating at speeds of 110 mph or less. Tier II requirements 
are broadly applied to higher risk operating environments, e.g., 
Amtrak's planned operation at 150 mph in the Northeast Corridor or 
perhaps

[[Page 30691]]

cab-car-forward operations under some sets of higher risk operating 
conditions.
    Although the discussion of possible safety standards that follows 
is based on a two-tiered approach, this does not mean FRA assumes a 
proposed rule will be based on two tiers. A discussion of a two-tiered 
approach serves only as the simplest means to present the concept of 
tiering. FRA remains open to alternate concepts based on more than two 
tiers, or concepts that define the break point between two tiers 
differently.
    FRA recognizes the need to handle special equipment such as that 
operated by tourist and excursion railroads and private passengers cars 
outside this two-tiered system.
    FRA also recognizes the possible future need for a third tier for 
equipment intended to operate at very high speeds--in excess of 150 
mph. However, operations at such speeds would be considered only on 
dedicated rights-of-way with no at-grade highway or rail crossings. In 
such instances, FRA will review equipment safety criteria as an 
integral part of an overall system safety program, issuing a rule of 
particular applicability.

Discussion of Possible Safety Standards

Basis for Safety Parameters Under Consideration

    In preparation for rulemaking, FRA considered the service history 
of general system railroads in the United States, research and 
technical advice from the Volpe Center (incorporating learning from 
human trauma studies in other modes of transportation), staff analysis, 
and learning gleaned from extensive consultations with knowledgeable 
persons (both within the United States and abroad) over several years 
of study. In addition, FRA has worked with Amtrak to develop safety 
features incorporated into Amtrak's specification for high-speed 
trainsets.
    Safety features suggested by FRA to Amtrak for high-speed 
trainsets--intended for use in the mixed passenger/freight 
environment--serve as the basis for sample safety parameters used by 
FRA to evoke a discussion of Tier II equipment safety standards. 
Current North American passenger rail safety practice, recent NTSB 
recommendations, and selective use of requirements gleaned from 
recommendations made to Amtrak for high-speed trainsets serve as the 
basis for the sample safety parameters used to evoke a discussion of 
safety standards appropriate for a less challenging operating 
environment (Tier I equipment standards).
    FRA made both Tier I and Tier II equipment safety concepts 
available to the Working Group for discussion and consideration. The 
safety parameters contained in these concepts draw upon AAR 
Specification S-580 for locomotive crashworthiness, existing 
regulations (49 CFR Part 229), NTSB recommendations, and an analysis of 
the forces produced as a result of realistic collision scenarios.
    Appendix B outlines safety parameters provided for consideration 
for Tier I and Tier II equipment. Given that Tier II equipment is 
intended to operate in an environment that can create a greater safety 
risk than Tier I equipment, most Tier I parameters outlined in Appendix 
B also become Tier II parameters. To simplify the task of responding to 
this ANPRM, Appendix B contains only those Tier II requirements that 
are in addition to, or different from, Tier I requirements.
    It is emphasized that neither FRA nor the Working Group has 
endorsed these safety parameters, except to the extent that they mirror 
existing regulations. FRA is not proposing their adoption; rather, FRA 
makes available for discussion the results of efforts by the technical 
staff to identify safety risks and to suggest possible means to address 
these risks.
    While the basis for many of the safety parameters suggested for 
discussion will be self evident, certain of the more novel concepts 
warrant explanation. The following discussion addresses that need.
    Limiting initial decelerations of passengers to 6g maximum and 4g 
average--as suggested in Appendix B--is based on automobile 
crashworthiness research. These decelerations are identified as levels 
that unrestrained people are likely to survive if the interior of the 
vehicle is designed to mitigate secondary impacts (i.e., the 
compartmentalization design strategy). Analysis shows peak longitudinal 
deceleration of the occupied spaces of coach cars protected by a 
leading or trailing locomotive or power car is expected to be 
approximately 8g for a train-to-train collision at a speed in excess of 
30 mph. Greater collision speed does not significantly increase the 
peak deceleration of the occupied coach volume, but it does increase 
the time over which the occupied volume is decelerated.
    During the collision, unrestrained occupants of such a coach will 
be thrown into interior fixtures, such as seatbacks, with a force 
substantially greater than that associated solely with the deceleration 
of the train. This increase in force is due to the occupant striking 
the interior at a relative speed of up to 25 mph. If the seat is to 
remain attached during a train-to-train collision in excess of 35 mph, 
simulation analysis indicates that coach seat attachment strength must 
be able to resist the inertial force of 8g acting on the mass of the 
seat plus the impact force of the mass of the passenger(s) being 
decelerated from a relative speed of 25 mph.
    FRA believes that sufficient potential crush distance is available 
in single-level equipment with end vestibules such that good crash 
energy management design can achieve the 6g-maximum and 4g-average 
limits for passengers (other than those riding in a leading control 
cab) even for a high- speed crash scenario. Other equipment types (bi-
level, gallery, and food service with no vestibules) need to be studied 
to determine the limits of potential crush distance.
    On the other hand, FRA recognizes the difficulty in limiting the 
initial deceleration of the crew in the cab to a survivable level 
during a high-speed collision because little unoccupied crush space is 
available forward of the control cab. As a result, Appendix B contains 
a design goal of limiting decelerations on the crew in the cab to 24g 
maximum and 16g average for the first 250 milliseconds of the crash 
pulse. (The 250-millisecond duration was selected as the time required 
for people to make their initial impact with an interior surface and be 
pinned by inertia against that surface. After this time, the peak 
deceleration can be greatly increased without causing extensive 
injuries.) Based on analysis results, the peak deceleration of a 
leading control cab is approximately 12g. Analysis indicates that this 
peak deceleration does not increase as collision speed increases, but 
it does increase the time over which this peak deceleration is exerted 
on the cab. During the collision, unrestrained crew members may be 
thrown against the interior of the cab with a force substantially 
greater than that associated solely with the deceleration of the train. 
This increase in force is due to the crew member striking an interior 
surface or object at a relative speed of up to 25 mph. Decelerations of 
this magnitude require restraint systems or a crash refuge to protect 
the crew in the cab.
    FRA believes that many crash survivability issues can be resolved 
without great difficulty. However, protecting persons from secondary 
impacts is a considerable challenge. To limit the decelerations of 
people to survivable levels, high-speed trainsets

[[Page 30692]]

must be designed with a crash energy management feature.
    The greater the crush distance that can intentionally be designed 
into the trainset before reaching an occupied volume, the more 
survivable a collision will be. In equipment operated with a cab car 
forward, the control cab is necessarily near the leading surface of the 
trainset, so very little crush distance is available to protect people 
in the cab. As a result, the decelerations of people will be large, 
resulting in more numerous and more severe injuries.
    An argument presented against increases in structural strength 
requirements for new passenger equipment is that the new equipment 
would be a hazard to existing passenger equipment operating in the same 
corridor. This argument is based, in part, on a 1972 rear-end collision 
between two passenger trains in Chicago. In this collision, an older, 
heavier car climbed over a newer car of lighter construction, 
telescoping into the passenger compartment of the lighter car, 
resulting in the deaths of many people.
    Some have contended that increased structural strength for new 
passenger equipment would create an equivalent incompatible situation 
between new equipment and existing equipment. However, several 
differences between the situation in 1972 and today refute this 
argument. Today's passenger equipment has collision posts, 
anticlimbers, and strong truck-to-car body attachments--all intended to 
prevent climbing and telescoping. In addition, both existing equipment 
and new equipment will have the same basic static end strength 
(backbone). While new equipment may have a more substantial end 
structure, the crash energy management system will cause this end 
structure to be pushed back into the unoccupied space of the new 
equipment rather than forward into the existing equipment. 
Alternatively, some of the end structure strength characteristics might 
be placed inboard of the crush zones.
    Once the crash energy management system crush distance is consumed, 
the full height of the collision posts and corner posts recommended for 
the new equipment will likely deflect the older equipment up over the 
new equipment rather than creating a telescoping situation. The fears 
expressed are therefore unlikely to materialize.
    The basis of the concern for side impact strength and the point of 
application of side impact forces stems from two facts:
    (1) Approximately 25 percent of all highway-rail crossing accidents 
involve a highway vehicle striking the side of a train; and
    (2) Designs of some passenger equipment have floor levels low to 
the rail, creating the tendency for a heavy highway vehicle striking 
the side of the train to climb into the occupied passenger volume 
rather than being driven under the underframe of the passenger rail 
car.
    Analysis shows that current single-level intercity passenger coach 
equipment is sufficiently strong, and will derail in collision 
scenarios similar to that described above before a significant amount 
of crushing of the occupied passenger volume occurs. FRA believes that 
future equipment should perform at least as well as current equipment 
in such collisions, and that a need exists to specify minimum side 
impact protection for rail cars with low floor levels such as bi-level 
equipment.
    Other scenarios where reasonable side strength may be of value 
include side impacts at switches and at railroad crossing diamonds 
(when e.g., a single freight car rolls free during switching).
    A proposed concept for a side impact strength design requirement 
involves the ability of a car body to withstand--with limited 
deformation of the car body structure--the load applied by a loaded 
tractor trailer travelling at a selected speed which collides with the 
side of the car over an area and at a height typical of tractor trailer 
bumpers. What specific parameters should be used to implement this 
concept, or what alternate concepts can be proposed for a side impact 
strength design requirement?
    FRA's concern for a minimum rollover strength requirement is based 
on accidents such as that which occurred to Amtrak's Lakeshore Limited 
in January 1994. The train derailed while travelling from Albany, New 
York, to Chicago, and several cars rolled down an embankment. Very 
little crushing of the occupied volumes of any of the cars involved 
occurred. The current design of single-level intercity passenger cars 
generally performs well when subjected to the impact loads associated 
with tipping on a side or rolling onto its roof from an upright 
position. While these loads may vary significantly depending upon the 
nature of the wayside where the rolling occurs, FRA believes that 
passenger cars should have minimum side strength and roof strength to 
help minimize the loss of occupied volume should a rollover occur. FRA 
also believes that locomotives and power cars should have sufficient 
side and roof structural strength to minimize loss of volume in the 
operator's cab under such conditions.
    The sections of this ANPRM addressing design standards seek input 
from the industry on how to take advantage of the safety improvements 
offered by a crash energy management design approach for future 
passenger equipment.

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements

Pre-Departure or Daily Safety Inspections

    A pre-departure or daily safety inspection is an essential element 
of a system safety program for all trains that carry passengers. The 
pre-departure or daily inspection should include the steps necessary to 
ensure the train departs without mechanical, electrical, or electronic 
defects that could degrade the safe operation of the train.
    Amtrak has voluntarily implemented a pre-departure safety 
inspection of all passenger trains. Amtrak developed the inspection 
procedures in close cooperation with FRA. The procedures combine a 
power brake inspection and test, a mechanical inspection similar to 
that required for freight cars, a safety appliance inspection, and spot 
checks by supervisors. Amtrak has been using these procedures since 
April 1994, and they do not appear to have an adverse impact on train 
schedule. Appendix C contains a copy of the inspection procedures used 
by Amtrak. These inspection procedures are offered as an example only. 
They are not a general solution to how to conduct pre-departure safety 
inspections of passenger trains.
    Using the Amtrak procedures as a starting point, FRA solicits 
comments on how these procedures need to be tailored to fit the needs 
of each segment of the industry. What train schedule impacts will 
result from implementing a pre-departure or daily safety inspection 
program? Does FRA need to be made aware of any circumstances or reasons 
for not performing a pre-departure or daily safety inspection? What 
range of options should an operating railroad have when the safety 
inspection uncovers a defect? How should any proposed safety standards 
take into account and encourage the potential that technology provides 
to automate pre-departure or daily inspections of future equipment? As 
automated features are added to passenger trains, does a train 
information system that records and logs inspection and test results 
and maintenance status make sense?

[[Page 30693]]

    In terms of labor, materials, etc., what additional resources would 
each operator need to perform a pre-departure inspection equivalent to 
Amtrak's? How many pre-departure or daily inspections are performed 
annually by each operator? What potential safety benefits could result 
from performing inspections equivalent to Amtrak's? Please explain or 
document estimates. For those currently performing inspections, what 
additional benefits could be realized by modifying those inspection 
procedures to meet Amtrak's? Please explain or document.

Tourist, Museum, and Other Special or Unusual Equipment

    FRA recognizes that most tourist railroads are small businesses 
operating older equipment on a limited budget. As a basis for 
discussion, FRA postulates a simple system safety program for excursion 
and tourist railroads based on:
    (1) A pre-departure safety inspection that takes into account the 
type of equipment being used;
    (2) A periodic testing and maintenance program based on the type of 
equipment and the extent of its use; and
    (3) Minimum qualifications for inspectors and maintenance personnel 
to ensure that they have the knowledge necessary to perform safety-
critical tasks.
    FRA needs the tourist and excursion railroad industry to address 
the following questions: What are the effects of such a simple system 
safety program on tourist and excursion railroad operations? How can 
the requirements for a pre-departure safety inspection be written so 
they are enforceable but provide necessary flexibility?
    Information available to FRA indicates that there are approximately 
100 excursion railroads subject to FRA jurisdiction, operating about 
250 locomotives and 1,000 passenger cars. Is this information correct? 
What size crews operate excursion and tourist trains? What is the 
average annual passenger car mileage for tourist and excursion 
railroads? What human and physical resources are available to these 
railroads for inspection and maintenance of equipment?
    What potential safety benefits are available from the proposed 
standards for tourist and excursion railroads? To what extent will they 
be realized under the proposal? Please explain.
    FRA also solicits comments from the tourist and excursion railroad 
industry on how passenger equipment safety standards may impact them in 
unintended ways.

Private Passenger Cars

    FRA believes a private passenger car should be held to the same 
basic inspection standards as the other equipment being hauled in the 
train hauling the private car. However, FRA intends to take into 
account the financial burden imposed by requiring private passenger car 
owners to modify their equipment to meet any new design standards 
included as part of proposed passenger equipment safety standards.
    FRA needs private passenger car owners to address the following 
questions as part of their response to this ANPRM: What minimum set of 
inspection requirements should host operators impose on private 
passenger cars? How should these minimum standards be incorporated into 
Federal regulations? What effects are foreseen from the proposed 
passenger equipment safety regulations on the ability to operate this 
equipment? Take care to point out all potential unintended impacts.
    How many private passenger cars are in operation? On average, how 
many miles do private passenger cars travel annually? What potential 
safety benefits are available from the proposed standards for private 
passenger cars operators? To what extent will they be realized under 
the proposal? Please explain.

Tier I Equipment

    FRA believes standards for pre-departure and daily inspections of 
Tier I equipment should take into account the type of equipment being 
used and the type of service. Pre-departure safety inspection and test 
criteria implemented by Amtrak should be considered as a guide for 
developing a set of core inspection criteria for incorporation into 
Federal safety standards for Tier I equipment. These inspection 
criteria are given as Appendix C.
    FRA recommends that each operator of passenger equipment use these 
criteria as a guide, and comment on how similar criteria could be--or 
have been--implemented as part of its operation. Members of APTA are 
encouraged to comment through the APTA members on the Working Group.
    FRA recognizes that the pre-departure inspection need not be a 
complete safety inspection. The combination of the daily and the pre-
departure inspections should be considered the complete safety 
inspection of the train.
    To what extent would daily and pre-departure inspections vary from 
current practice? To what extent would these requirements impact 
passenger operations? How can the requirements for pre-departure and 
daily safety inspections be written so they are enforceable but provide 
the flexibility required to meet service requirements, hold down costs, 
and encourage innovation?

Tier II Equipment

    Since Tier II equipment will be designed for operation in higher 
risk and/or consequence operating environments, FRA believes the safety 
inspection program to be used with the equipment should be developed 
from a thorough risk analysis done as part of the system safety 
program. This risk analysis should result in a set of inspection 
criteria, tasks, intervals, and skills required to develop a safety 
inspection program that reduces the overall risk of operation to an 
acceptable level.

Planned Testing, Preventive Maintenance, and Personnel Qualification 
Requirements

    FRA believes planned testing and preventive maintenance 
requirements of safety-critical systems or components-- triggered by 
time, mileage, or some other key reliability/safety parameter--are also 
an essential feature of a system safety program. A key step in the 
system safety program is to perform a reliability analysis or use 
accumulated reliability data to determine the planned tests and 
preventive maintenance tasks--as well as what should trigger them--that 
are required to maintain a safe operation. The system safety plan 
should also include an approach to accumulate the data necessary to 
justify changes in maintenance approaches or intervals for safety-
critical systems and components.
    Most passenger equipment operators already have testing and 
maintenance requirements for their equipment, though the extent to 
which they are based on formalized risk analysis is not clear. FRA 
searches for a means to ensure that all industry system safety programs 
include preventive maintenance and planned testing requirements while 
allowing the industry the flexibility needed to cope with various 
operating environments. FRA also recognizes the desirability of 
allowing maintenance or testing intervals to be changed based on 
accumulated operating experience with the equipment.
    Currently, what equipment is tested and maintained periodically? 
How often (in terms of miles, time, or other parameters) is this 
equipment tested and maintained? How can standards be structured to 
allow testing or maintenance intervals to be changed based on either 
good or bad operating

[[Page 30694]]

experience while maintaining adequate safety margins? What do periodic 
tests and maintenance currently entail--labor, materials, etc.? What 
benefit(s) would be associated with a periodic testing and maintenance 
requirement? Please explain.
    FRA views the skills and knowledge of the people responsible for 
inspections, testing, and maintenance as one of the most important 
requisites of an effective system safety program. FRA seeks a means for 
passenger equipment operators to demonstrate that the people performing 
crucial safety inspections and maintenance tasks--whether they be 
mechanical forces or train crews--have the current knowledge and skills 
necessary for their jobs. As equipment incorporating new technology--to 
include remote sensing and automated testing--comes into widespread 
use, a better trained inspection and maintenance workforce will be 
required and minimum qualification standards will become more 
important.
    GAO Report RCED-93-68 ``Improvements Needed for Employees Who 
Inspect and Maintain Rail Equipment'' highlights some of the concerns 
regarding the knowledge and training of personnel performing safety-
critical tasks. GAO concludes that training programs for mechanical 
employees and foremen have weaknesses that leave passenger railroads 
vulnerable to skill shortfalls in the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance workforce. GAO points out that the personnel who inspect, 
test, and maintain European high-speed passenger trains receive much 
more training and generally are more skilled than their American 
counterparts. European railroads require mechanical employees either to 
pass an examination or to demonstrate their proficiency. An internal 
FRA assessment confirms the findings of this GAO report. Copies of both 
the GAO report and the internal FRA report documenting this assessment 
have been placed in the docket.
    FRA seeks comment from all segments of the industry on how to 
require passenger equipment operators to demonstrate that the people 
(whether employees or contractors) performing safety-critical tasks 
have the knowledge and skills to do so. FRA does not wish to mandate 
specific training programs or experience requirements; FRA believes 
that these details are the purview of each individual operator and that 
each railroad should establish the minimum training and qualification 
requirements based on the equipment being operated. However, an 
important feature of proposed passenger equipment safety standards will 
be a means to measure or to demonstrate the effectiveness of individual 
training programs. Unless people with the necessary knowledge and skill 
perform safety-critical tasks, passenger equipment operators cannot 
have an effective system safety program.
    How should the proposed safety standards be structured to ensure 
that each operator meets this important responsibility to demonstrate 
the skills and knowledge of personnel that perform safety-critical 
tasks on passenger equipment? Currently, how many employees/contractors 
are involved in inspecting, testing, and maintaining a passenger car or 
locomotive? How many of these people are mechanical personnel? Are 
there established minimum training and qualification requirements for 
employees and contractors performing inspections, tests, and 
maintenance? Approximately how many labor hours does each passenger 
service operator spend each year on these activities?
    What are the potential benefits of increased training in periodic 
testing and maintenance? To what extent are expenditures on such 
training cost effective? Historically, does this type of training 
produce identifiable safety benefits? Please explain.

Tourist, Museum, and Other Special or Unusual Equipment

    FRA believes that tourist and excursion railroads, museums, and 
other operators of special or unusual equipment that carry passengers 
should have:
    (1) A planned testing program;
    (2) A preventive maintenance program keyed to mileage, time, or 
some other triggering parameter; and
    (3) A means to demonstrate that the people carrying out these 
programs have the knowledge and skills necessary to correctly perform 
the safety-critical tasks identified as part of these programs.
    FRA seeks to establish a minimum program for operators of special 
or unusual equipment that takes into account the resource constraints 
placed on these operators, and yet recognizes that even equipment 
operated for short distances and at low speeds requires periodic 
maintenance attention by skilled individuals to maintain safety.
    What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and 
preventive maintenance, and what crucial tasks need to be performed? 
How should tourist and excursion railroads demonstrate to FRA that 
personnel performing safety-critical tasks have the knowledge necessary 
to do the job?

Private Passenger Cars

    FRA believes that a private passenger car should be held to the 
same basic planned testing and preventive maintenance standards as the 
other equipment being hauled in the train hauling the private car. 
However, FRA anticipates that since private passenger cars tend not to 
be highly used equipment, the events that trigger planned tests or 
preventive maintenance (mileage, time, etc.) will occur less frequently 
than for equipment in regularly scheduled passenger or commuter 
service.
    Since private passenger cars tend to be vintage equipment with 
parts, and testing and maintenance procedures that are no longer common 
in the rail passenger industry, the knowledge and skills necessary to 
conduct an effective planned testing and preventive maintenance program 
are likely to be possessed by only a few individuals.
    What minimum set of planned testing and preventive maintenance 
requirements should host operators impose on private passenger cars? 
How should these minimum standards be incorporated into Federal 
regulations? What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and 
preventive maintenance for private passenger cars, and what critical 
tasks need to be performed? How should owners of private passenger cars 
demonstrate to FRA that personnel performing safety-critical tasks have 
the knowledge necessary to do the job? To what extent does any third 
party monitor the quality of work performed on passenger cars by 
contract shops? (Amtrak currently operates a certification process for 
private passenger cars that desire to operate in Amtrak trains.)

Tier I Equipment

    Since Tier I equipment will very likely be traditionally designed 
equipment that operates in environments with which railroads have a 
wealth of experience, planned testing and preventive maintenance 
programs should be based on that experience with the type of equipment 
and its extent of use. Operators of Tier I equipment should have a 
planned testing and maintenance program based on operating experience 
with the equipment. Changes to the program would also be based on 
operating experience.
    As part of the operating experience on Tier I equipment, railroads 
need to identify the safety-critical maintenance tasks and the skills 
required to perform them. Railroads must use this knowledge to develop 
a training

[[Page 30695]]

program to ensure inspection and maintenance personnel have these 
skills and are able to demonstrate them.
    What should be the basis for scheduling planned tests and 
preventive maintenance for Tier I equipment? What critical tasks need 
to be performed? How should railroads demonstrate to FRA that personnel 
performing safety-critical tasks on Tier I equipment have the knowledge 
necessary to do the job?

Tier II Equipment

    Because Tier II equipment will be new equipment designed for 
operation in higher risk operating environments, FRA believes the 
planned testing and preventive maintenance program for safety-critical 
systems and components should be developed from a thorough risk 
analysis done as part of the system safety program. This risk analysis 
should result in a set of planned testing and preventive maintenance 
criteria, tasks, intervals, and skills required to develop a program 
that reduces the overall risk of operation to an acceptable level. What 
is an acceptable level of risk in developing risk-based performance 
standards for this type of equipment?

Equipment Design Standards

Standards for Tier I Equipment

    Current passenger equipment has certainly demonstrated its ability 
to operate safely at speeds up to 125 mph. However, the design of this 
equipment is largely based on loose industry standards that are no 
longer actively maintained or enforced. The design of new Tier I 
passenger equipment should not be left to a collection of similarly 
loose standards. A practical approach to establish minimum safety 
standards for new Tier I equipment would be to consolidate current 
safety related design standards or industry practices directly into the 
new regulation.
    FRA believes train operation has significantly changed since the 
design requirements in 49 CFR 229.141 for trains of total empty weight 
of less than 600,000 pounds and AAR Specification S-034,``Specification 
for the Construction of New Passenger Cars,'' were first promulgated. 
Have these requirements outlived their usefulness, and should they be 
eliminated? Would a regulation based on the compilation of current 
North American industry structural design standards and practices 
provide the ``minimum floor'' crashworthiness requirements for Tier I 
equipment?
    Initial analysis and computer modeling by the Volpe Center, using a 
lumped-mass model and idealized force-crush characteristics, predicts 
the conventional uniform longitudinal structural strength design 
approach to be as effective as a crash energy management design 
approach in providing protection for passengers and crew at speeds up 
to approximately 70 mph. Although crash energy management design can 
benefit passengers of equipment involved in lower speed collisions, 
this analysis suggests that the additional expense of a crash energy 
management design may not be justified for some new Tier I passenger 
equipment, depending upon the upper speed limit in this tier.
    The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act (RSERA), Pub. L. No. 
102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (September 3, 1992), requires FRA to report to 
the Congress on the crashworthiness of locomotives and the 
effectiveness of AAR Specification S-580, which is the current industry 
standard regarding crashworthiness of locomotives. Much of the research 
and analysis done to comply with this law can be applied to head-on 
and, potentially, rear-end collisions of passenger trains.
    This analysis shows AAR Specification S-580 provides a significant 
increase in crashworthiness over locomotives built prior to 
implementation of this specification. However, the locomotive collision 
computer model developed to support the RSERA shows a weakness in the 
way locomotive builders implement the S-580 anticlimber requirement. 
The model shows--at all but very low collision speeds--that at the 
onset of override, the anticlimber of the locomotive being overridden 
is crushed and sheared or bypassed rather than loaded vertically by the 
anticlimber of the opposing locomotive. Evidence from several collision 
investigations tends to confirm this prediction. Examination of 
locomotives and cars equipped with anticlimbers that have been involved 
in collisions where override occurred shows evidence of bending of the 
anticlimber shelf due to high coupler loads. This bending appears to 
prevent the shelf from being capable of resisting a vertical load. 
Couplers designed to break away or load some part of the structure so 
that the anticlimber shelf is not deformed before being required to 
resist a vertical load appear to be necessary to allow the anticlimbers 
to function as intended.
    FRA believes that if passenger equipment can be designed to fully 
involve (bend but not collapse) the underframe to resist collision 
forces before collision posts or end structures are loaded, the ability 
to maintain uncrushed, survivable volumes will be maximized. Properly 
designed anticlimbers can play an important role by allowing the 
significant structural strength of the underframe to resist the full 
collision forces during the initial phase of an impact. Bending the 
underframe before the collision posts or end structures take over the 
role of protecting the cab occupants can dissipate a large amount of 
the collision's energy that might otherwise cause crushing of occupied 
space.
    Does other evidence exist to support or refute this computer model 
prediction of anticlimber effectiveness? What design analysis has been 
done on existing anticlimber designs under dynamic conditions 
simulating a collision? Are anticlimber design changes necessary to 
ensure that anticlimbers are loaded vertically as intended during 
collisions? Are practical design concepts available that may improve 
anticlimber performance during collisions? Can anticlimbers be designed 
that make bending (but not collapse) of the underframe likely before 
collision posts or end structures are required to bear significant 
loads? What would be the likely costs associated with alternative 
designs to ensure that anticlimbers are loaded vertically during 
collisions?
    The computer model also predicts collision post designs currently 
used by North American manufacturers exceed the requirements of AAR S-
580 by a factor of two for freight locomotives--weight restrictions can 
prevent such a large factor of safety in passenger locomotives--and 
that this additional strength provides significant additional 
protection to the crew in the cab. Should a modified version of AAR S-
580 specifying a more effective anticlimber, stronger and full-height 
collision posts, and full-height corner posts be considered as part of 
the safety standards for new conventional passenger locomotives? What 
would be the likely impacts of such a standard on locomotive weight and 
performance? What costs would be associated with specifying full-height 
collision posts and full-height corner posts on conventional 
locomotives?
    Rather than a standard similar to AAR S-580, should a unitized type 
of end structure with integral collision and corner posts that extend 
to the roof line be considered for a design standard for conventional 
passenger locomotives? Would it be feasible to develop a purer 
performance specification for train end structural strength that allows 
full flexibility in the design of structures? What collision scenarios 
and forces should be considered in such an approach? Such an approach 
could

[[Page 30696]]

provide weight and performance advantages.
    Fuel spills are both an environmental and a safety problem. Fires 
resulting from fuel spills can turn a minor accident into a major 
event. What is the experience of passenger railroads with fuel spills? 
What clean-up costs have been incurred? Should all diesel passenger 
locomotives--including self-propelled diesel cars--be equipped with the 
type of strengthened fuel tanks that meet the requirements in Appendix 
B proposed for Tier II equipment? If not, what performance standard 
should be used for Tier I diesel passenger locomotive fuel tanks?
    How much would it cost to equip conventional passenger service 
locomotives with the type of strengthened fuel tanks discussed in 
Appendix B? What levels of safety benefits can be realized from 
strengthened fuel tanks? Please explain.
    Based on the findings of recent investigations of accidents 
involving passenger trains, several factors have contributed to the 
number and the extent of the injuries suffered. Among these factors 
are:
    (1) A lack of reliable backup emergency lighting for coaches;
    (2) A lack of means to exit coaches and locomotives more easily--
from both ends and all compartments--especially when they are resting 
on their sides;
    (3) Seats that break loose from attachment points or that rotate; 
and
    (4) Luggage and other objects thrown about the interior of coaches.
    Amtrak believes that existing industry standards for emergency 
lighting are adequate and should become the Federal standard. NTSB 
would like a requirement for securing the batteries that provide power 
to emergency lights so connections to the emergency lights are not 
knocked loose during a collision.
    During Working Group meetings, Amtrak pointed out several potential 
disadvantages of roof hatches in passenger equipment because they are 
difficult to maintain and are often a source of leaks. The hatches 
allow passengers or trespassers access to the roof which can be 
particularly dangerous in electrified territory. Amtrak has suggested 
inclusion of a clearly marked structural weak spot where properly 
equipped emergency personnel can quickly gain access to the interior of 
the coach or locomotive through the roof as preferable to roof hatches.
    Should Tier I equipment safety standards include provisions for:
    (1) Emergency lighting?
    (2) Roof hatches or a clearly identified structural weak point 
where properly equipped emergency personnel can quickly gain access 
through the roof?
    (3) Minimum strength of seat attachment?
    (4) Minimum strength and enclosed luggage compartments?
    To what extent does passenger equipment currently have backup power 
systems in place? What would it cost to install a backup power system? 
What safety benefits would result from backup power systems?
    How many coach units have backup emergency lighting? What would it 
cost to install a backup emergency lighting system? What rationale is 
used to determine whether a unit will have backup emergency lighting? 
To what extent would potential safety benefits be realized? Please 
explain.
    What would it cost to install roof hatches or access areas on cars?
    What options exist for enclosing existing luggage compartments? At 
what cost? To what extent would potential safety benefits be realized 
from enclosing luggage compartments? Please explain.

Safety Glazing

    One of the issues addressed by existing regulations that bears on 
the safety of passenger train occupants is exterior glazing. Because of 
the complexity of the issues in this proceeding, satisfaction with 
existing standards, and the need for coordination with freight 
interests not represented on the Working Group, the Working Group has 
expressed a reluctance to address glazing in this proceeding. In order 
to determine whether to renew its request to the Working Group or 
another advisory body to examine this issue, FRA seeks information on 
incidents of glazing shattering or spalling that caused injuries to 
occupants of passenger trains. Some perceived problems with current 49 
CFR Part 223 requirements that have come to FRA's attention include the 
following:
    (1) The witness plate used for testing is too thick, allowing 
spalling of pieces of glass large enough to cause injury;
    (2) The impact test using a 24-pound cinder block is not 
repeatable;
    (3) Vendors need to be periodically recertified by an independent 
testing laboratory; and
    (4) The strength of the framing arrangement securing the glazing is 
neither specified nor tested. (Amtrak has noted that it currently 
requires glazing to be tested in its intended framing.)
    Should FRA revise the glazing standards for conventional passenger 
equipment to:
    (1) Require testing with a thinner witness plate?
    (2) Require a more repeatable impact test? If so, what should the 
impact test requirement be?
    (3) Require periodic recertification of vendors by an independent 
testing laboratory?
    (4) Address the strength of the glazing frame? If so, how could 
this be practically done?
    (5) Require increased strength, impact resistance, or bullet 
penetration resistance?
    What would the impact on glazing thickness and weight be if FRA 
were to modify Part 223 as suggested above? To what extent should 
interior glazing be considered in this proceeding? Are appropriate 
reference standards already available? What benefits could be derived 
from modifying Part 223 as suggested? What would be the cost to realize 
these benefits?

Fire Safety

    FRA does not have regulations covering fire safety of passenger 
equipment. Current industry practice is to follow FRA guidelines 
published in the Federal Register on January 17, 1989. (See 54 FR 1837, 
``Rail Passenger Equipment; Reissuance of Guidelines for Selecting 
Materials to Improve Their Fire Safety Characteristics.'') Fire 
resistance, detection, and suppression technologies have all advanced 
since these guidelines were published. Amtrak follows more stringent 
specifications for fire safety than found in FRA's guidelines. A trend 
toward a systems approach to fire safety is evident in most countries 
with modern rail systems. Are Federal regulations or more in-depth 
guidelines needed to:
    (1) Prevent fire or retard its growth?
    (2) Detect and suppress fire?
    (3) Protect occupants from the effects of fire?

Appendix B

    To stimulate thought and generate discussion on passenger equipment 
design standards, FRA is providing for consideration the detailed set 
of equipment design provisions contained in Appendix B. From experience 
with past ANPRM's, FRA learned that such a strategy results in more and 
higher quality comments on the specific issues in the proceeding. FRA 
does not intend to implement the requirements given in Appendix B 
without significant change based on the deliberations of the Working 
Group, supplemented by information and views received in response to 
this notice. FRA strongly encourages comments on these

[[Page 30697]]

provisions and proposals for alternative standards.

Standards for Tier II Equipment

    For the past several years, FRA has held discussions with 
manufacturers of foreign high-speed rail equipment seeking a market for 
their equipment in the United States. These manufacturers sought a 
clear definition of the requirements that their equipment must meet to 
be allowed to operate in the United States. Because FRA recognizes 
existing North American passenger equipment standards were not intended 
to apply to equipment operating at speeds significantly over 100 mph, 
and because current Federal regulations do not cover such operations, 
FRA could not provide clear guidance. This has caused confusion, and 
has led to the perception that competition for the American market is 
risky.
    Amtrak has hosted test and revenue service demonstrations of two 
foreign, high-speed trainsets in the United States. Operating 
experience gained in Europe and in the United States with these 
trainsets helped place Amtrak in a position to develop a system 
specification to procure trainsets to operate at speeds up to 150 mph 
in the Northeast Corridor. FRA reviewed drafts of the procurement 
specification for these trainsets and made safety-related 
recommendations. The resulting discussions between Amtrak and FRA 
highlighted the technical issues that must be resolved as part of the 
process for developing safety standards for high-speed trainsets.
    Sample high-speed passenger trainset design requirements are 
outlined in Appendix B. FRA compiled this set of design requirements to 
prepare for the review of Amtrak's system specification for high-speed 
trainsets. FRA developed this set of proposed requirements based on 
discussions with manufacturers and operators of European equipment, 
research done or sponsored by the Volpe Center, experience gained in 
developing a concept for a proposed rule specifically applicable to the 
Texas TGV System, and the results of tests conducted jointly with 
Amtrak on high-speed trainsets in the Northeast Corridor. FRA 
recognizes that some of the requirements push the state of the art. Of 
particular interest to FRA are comments on the technical limits of 
crash energy management systems and on how best to define or specify 
crash energy management in a set of performance requirements. FRA 
attempted to specify a crash energy management system by placing limits 
on the acceleration experienced by passengers during the initial phase 
of a collision. To design to such a requirement requires a reference 
collision scenario with defined collision parameters. The advantage of 
such an approach is that it is tied directly to the parameter most 
responsible for injuries due to secondary impacts. Can an approach to 
designate crash energy management requirements tied to a specific 
design collision scenario be adequately defined to serve as the basis 
for trainset design?
    An alternate approach, advocated as less complex, is to specify the 
minimum energy to be absorbed at each location in the trainset designed 
to crush before occupied space crushes. Such an approach has the 
advantage of not being tied to a design based on a collision scenario. 
However, FRA believes that the main value of a crash energy management 
design is to increase the duration of the collision, allowing train 
occupants to decelerate more slowly, and minimize the uncontrolled 
collapse of occupied space. The amount of energy absorbed is of 
secondary importance.
    FRA also believes that using ability to absorb energy as a crash 
energy management design parameter does not focus on the real purpose 
of the crash energy management system. FRA invites comments in this 
area. Is the amount of energy that can be absorbed in a collision 
actually a secondary issue to slower decelerations and more controlled 
collapse?
    If ability to absorb energy is used as the crash energy management 
system performance parameter, what are the limits on controlled crush 
distance and energy absorbed that can reasonably be expected to be 
achieved? What causes these limitations? How can a performance standard 
based on an ability to absorb energy be tied to an ability to decrease 
the initial acceleration of train occupants which is the key parameter 
for a crash energy management design? What flexibility is needed in 
end-strength requirements of occupied versus unoccupied volume to allow 
effective crash energy management system design?
    A second safety-critical design feature of key interest to FRA is 
the strength and construction of the end frame (or end structure) of 
both power cars and coaches. As noted above, a unitized or monocoque 
end structure with vertical members (collision post(s) and corner 
posts) that extend to the roofline, with significant structural 
strength where they are tied into the roofline, may be capable of 
protecting crew space more effectively and with less weight penalty 
than more traditional designs. FRA believes such an end structure may 
play a significant role when override occurs to prevent crushing or 
penetration of the occupied volume that it protects. When combined with 
an effective crash energy management design, such an end structure 
would be pushed back as a unit (similar to being mounted on a spring) 
through the volume designed to crush.
    Through the Working Group, FRA will pursue a thoughtful technical 
discussion of such an approach including suggestions on how best to set 
performance requirements and reasonable limits for design strengths. 
Should a monocoque end structure--or equivalent structure--that ties 
together the floor, collision posts, corner posts and roof into a 
single structure be required or authorized for high speed passenger 
trains? FRA welcomes proposed alternative approaches designed to 
provide equivalent protection. What costs would be associated with 
alternative approaches designed to prevent crushing or penetration of 
the occupied volume in power and coach cars? Please be specific in 
defining the alternative approach and its cost elements.
    A third safety feature that needs a thorough technical review is 
how to design the trainset to stay in line and on the track during the 
initial phase of a collision to give the crash energy management system 
an opportunity to perform its intended function. If the trainset 
buckles laterally and leaves the track too soon, volumes designed to 
crush will not be crushed, resulting in higher decelerations of 
occupants, and possibly negating the significant structural protection 
provided by end structures. If the trainset buckles vertically causing 
early override, the protection provided by the underframe may be 
bypassed. A discussion of the design innovations necessary to delay 
buckling of the trainset as long as possible is needed.
    What practical design techniques exist to delay either lateral or 
vertical buckling of passenger trainsets involved in collisions? How 
much would installation of alternative buckling delay systems cost in 
terms of labor hours and materials?
    As train speed increases, the human decision and reaction time 
necessary to avoid potential calamity decreases. Automatic control 
techniques that briefly take the operator out of the control loop are a 
means to eliminate the human decision and reaction delays in situations 
where taking quick and positive action can be crucial. FRA believes 
technology can allow safety-critical parameters pertaining to the 
following high-speed trainset

[[Page 30698]]

subsystems or events to be monitored by remote sensors:
    (1) Truck hunting;
    (2) Dynamic brake status;
    (3) Friction brake status;
    (4) Fire detection;
    (5) Head-end power status;
    (6) Alerter;
    (7) Horn and bell;
    (8) Wheel slip and wheel slide control; and
    (9) Tilt control system, if equipped.
    FRA intends to require monitoring of dynamic brake status. If the 
friction brake of the trainset is designed to be able to safely handle 
the entire braking load without assistance from the dynamic brake, the 
dynamic brake may not be considered a primary safety-critical system.
    FRA considered including bearing overheat in the above list. 
However, the Working Group cautioned FRA that on-board bearing sensors 
have proven to be unreliable. In the Working Group's view, until on-
board bearing sensor technology matures, the industry will continue to 
rely on wayside bearing overheat detection.
    Should automatic monitoring for each of the above events/subsystems 
be required? Do other safety-critical subsystems/events lend themselves 
to monitoring by remote sensors? Could safety be enhanced by requiring 
an automatic response from the train control system--such as slowing 
the train--when a monitored parameter falls outside pre-determined safe 
limits? Which events/subsystems are prime candidates for some form of 
initial automatic response followed by a return to operator or manual 
control?
    Seat arrangement design and passenger restraint systems have a 
potential to reduce the number and the extent of injuries in the event 
of a passenger train collision. This potential is present at all 
speeds, but becomes greater as speed increases. A copy of a technical 
paper 3 published by the Volpe Center describes a study of the 
occupant dynamics and predicted fatalities due to secondary impact for 
passengers involved in train collisions with impact speeds up to 140 
mph. The principal focus of the paper is on the effectiveness of 
alternative strategies for protecting occupants in train collisions, 
including ``friendly'' interior arrangements and occupant restraints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ ``Train Crashworthiness Design for Occupant Survivability.'' 
See note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Three different interior configurations were analyzed: forward-
facing seats in rows, facing rows of seats, and facing rows of seats 
with a table. Two of these three configurations--the forward-facing 
consecutive rows of seats and the facing rows of seats--were evaluated 
with the occupant unrestrained, restrained with a seat belt alone, and 
restrained with a seat belt and shoulder harness.
    The injury criteria used to evaluate interior performance included 
Head Injury Criteria (HIC), chest deceleration, and axial neck load. 
Based upon these criteria, the probability of fatality resulting from 
secondary impacts was evaluated for each of the interior configurations 
and restraint systems modeled.
    In some configurations, such as seats in rows, compartmentalization 
is shown to be as effective as a restraint system for the 50th 
percentile male occupant simulated. (As noted earlier, 
``compartmentalization'' is an occupant protection strategy that 
requires seats or restraining barriers to be positioned in a manner 
that provides a compact, cushioned protection zone surrounding each 
occupant.) FRA intends to work closely with the Working Group to 
structure requirements for the interior of new passenger equipment that 
take advantage of the compartmentalization concept.
    In cases where occupants are allowed to travel relatively long 
distances before impacting the interior, such as the facing-seats 
interior, restrained occupants have a much greater chance of survival. 
Fatalities from secondary impacts are not expected in any of the 
scenarios modeled if the occupant is restrained with a lap belt and 
shoulder harness.
    Design approaches for passenger coaches that exploit this potential 
are needed. FRA briefed the Working Group on this research, and the 
Working Group has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of 
passenger restraint systems (primarily lap belts) and coach interior 
arrangement design to mitigate injuries. Effectiveness of restraint 
systems can be dependent on the strength of the seat attachment to the 
car body. A possible worst case scenario exists when a seat containing 
a belted passenger is struck from behind by an unbelted passenger. Such 
a situation can require the seat attachment design to carry a double 
load.
    If the seat is to remain attached under the above conditions during 
a train-to-train collision in excess of 35 mph, analysis indicates that 
coach-seat attachment strength must be able to resist the inertial 
force of 8g acting on the mass of the seat, plus the mass of the belted 
passenger(s), plus the impact force of the mass of the passenger(s) in 
the following seat being decelerated from a relative speed of 25 mph 
against the seat back.
    Should lap belts be required? Should all seating be rear facing? 
Should facing seating be allowed? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of placing tables between facing seats? What are 
reasonable performance requirements for padding materials? Where should 
padding materials be located? What shock-absorbing characteristics 
should be required of padding material? What padding thicknesses are 
practical? What seat attachment strength can reasonably be expected to 
be achieved?
    What seat configurations do passenger cars operating at speeds 
greater than 80 mph have? If configurations vary, please explain the 
differences and the reasons for the variations. How many seats does the 
average passenger car have? If there is no such thing as an average 
passenger car, how many seats do the different types of passenger cars 
have? How many cars of different types are there?
    What costs would be involved with installing lap belts, shoulder 
harnesses, and other safety restraints on passenger cars? To what 
extent would safety benefits be realized from installing safety 
restraints? Please explain. A review of the technical papers placed in 
the docket may help with responses to some of these questions.
    Due to the forward location of the operator of a high-speed 
passenger train, he or she is often the person closest to the point of 
impact and at most risk during a collision. Special provisions are 
required to protect the operator. How much crushable space can 
practically be located forward of the operator? Should a lap belt/
shoulder harness combination be provided for each crew member in the 
cab? If lap belts/shoulder harnesses are provided for crew members, 
will they wear them?
    NTSB has long advocated special protective crash refuges (protected 
areas) for locomotive crew members. ADL has done computer modeling to 
predict the effectiveness of two types of crash refuge concepts under 
dynamic conditions simulating locomotive collisions. One of these 
concepts is a padded trench in the floor of the locomotive in front of 
the electrical cabinets. Such a trench could be equipped with restraint 
systems. The other concept is a seat equipped with a lap belt and 
shoulder harness that rotates and locks in a reverse position allowing 
the operator to ride out the collision in a rear-facing position. (A 
report by ADL describing these concepts is part of the docket.4) 
Advanced versions of some European trains

[[Page 30699]]

employ a concept where the operator's position is designed to be pushed 
to the rear, relative to the rest of the cab, to provide the operator 
additional protection during a collision. Could any of these concepts 
be implemented into the design of new passenger equipment? Would they 
be effective? Would they be used?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     4 ``Locomotive Crashworthiness Research,'' Volumes 1-4, 
DOT-VNTSC-FRA-95-4.1, Final Report July, 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    What are some alternative concepts for the design of such 
protective refuges? Are they likely to be effective? Are they likely to 
be used? What impact would they have on locomotive or power car design? 
Should FRA require them as part of high-speed trainset design 
requirements? What other, perhaps more practical means exist to reduce 
the vulnerability of the cab crew to collisions? In terms of time, 
materials, and labor, what would installation of refuges in locomotives 
cost?
    Lack of an accepted, recognized design tool (computer model) to 
predict changes in trainset performance as well as changes in the 
ability to protect people as trainset design parameters are changed 
inhibits exploiting new design techniques that could result in safer 
trainsets. Research by the Volpe Center on the structural response of 
portions of the vehicle to the extremely high loads associated with a 
collision, and research by AAR to accurately predict the performance of 
suspension systems to changing track conditions, have contributed 
greatly toward the goal of developing accepted analytical tools. 
However, efforts need to be increased and focused on a common goal.
    Because full-scale crash testing of passenger equipment is 
prohibitively expensive, the development of a design tool that is 
widely accepted by the industry is essential. Such a tool could 
accelerate investigations of composite materials that hold promise for 
increased strength at less weight than current materials. A tool of 
this type could aid research into utilizing high-strength, light-weight 
composite materials and other technologies to provide operational and 
safety benefits.
    FRA seeks comment from the industry on what the current state of 
the art is regarding modeling techniques for trainset collisions. Up to 
what trainset speeds are current models capable of predicting the 
collision mechanics of a trainset collision? What confidence levels can 
be expected with these models to predict the onset of override and 
train set buckling? Are these models capable of accurately predicting 
the acceleration levels in the trainset throughout the collision, 
particularly for the first 250 milliseconds?
    FRA also seeks input from the industry on the potential for such 
models to replace full-scale crash testing. Have the current models 
that are being used been validated by full-scale, partial-scale or 
component impact testing? Will it be necessary to validate new models 
by test? Are there limitations as to what type of accident scenarios 
existing models are capable of analyzing?
    The accuracy of the modeling techniques employed is dependent on 
the individual vehicle and trainset crush characteristics used as input 
to the models. What means should be used to quantify large deformation 
and dynamic crush characteristics of the various parts of a trainset? 
Can this be achieved through simulation alone? Has the industry 
developed dynamic force-deflection characteristics for existing North 
American rolling stock that could be used as a reference in FRA 
crashworthiness studies? If these characteristics are available, for 
what speeds of collision would they be valid?
    What are the essential features of such a modeling tool? How can it 
be developed so it will receive wide acceptance, be credible and be 
used within the industry?
    FRA outlines a sample set of detailed design requirements for high-
speed passenger trainsets in Appendix B to provoke thought and 
discussion on these and other technical issues that need to be resolved 
to develop high- speed trainset safety standards. As with the 
conventional equipment design standards, FRA is pursuing an intentional 
strategy by providing this level of detail. From experience with past 
ANPRM's, FRA learned that such a strategy results in more and higher 
quality comments. FRA does not intend to implement the requirements 
given in Appendix B without significant change based on the 
recommendations of the Working Group, supplemented by the information 
and views obtained in response to this ANPRM. FRA strongly encourages 
comments on these provisions and proposals for alternative standards. 
Again, comments from interests represented on the Working Group should, 
to the maximum extent possible, be expressed through those 
representatives during the Working Group's deliberations.
    FRA seeks comment from technically knowledgeable individuals on the 
initial set of design standards for high-speed passenger trainsets 
outlined in Appendix B. FRA recognizes that these standards would 
preclude operation of several existing high-speed trainsets in the 
United States without structural design changes. FRA believes that 
because these trainsets were designed for a much less severe operating 
environment, and because the American public demands and deserves the 
safest possible transportation system, attention is warranted for 
further development of North American standards. Do alternative 
approaches exist to safety standards for high-speed trainsets that 
could provide an equivalent level of safety at less cost?

Possibility of Design Standards for Other Tiers of Equipment

    Amtrak and some commuter railroads have a long operating experience 
safely running trains of existing equipment at speeds between 80 and 
125 mph. Much of this equipment is the same equipment--designed to the 
same standards--used for conventional service (herein defined as 
service at speeds less than 80 mph.) This practice supports the notion 
that the same set of design requirements used for conventional 
equipment is adequate for intermediate-speed equipment (i.e., equipment 
designed for service at speeds up to 125 mph). However, components wear 
faster and are subject to higher dynamic, mechanical, and thermal 
stresses at higher speeds. Perhaps more steps need to be added to the 
pre-departure safety inspection for intermediate-speed equipment. 
Perhaps maintenance intervals need to be more frequent and/or have more 
tasks performed as part of the preventive maintenance program. FRA 
seeks information on how inspection, testing, and maintenance programs 
for intermediate-speed equipment should differ from those used for 
conventional equipment.
    If the designation between tiers were based solely on operating 
speed, design or performance requirements for intermediate speed 
equipment should logically fall between the requirements for 
conventional equipment and the requirements for high-speed equipment 
(i.e., equipment designed for service at speeds up to 150 mph). 
Analysis by the Volpe Center shows a crash energy management design 
provides significant benefits in terms of passenger and crew protection 
over conventional designs as collision speeds increase to over 70 mph. 
This suggests new intermediate- speed equipment would benefit from a 
crash energy management design approach.
    If standards based on more than two tiers are developed, FRA 
currently believes design requirements for new intermediate-speed 
equipment should include the requirements for conventional equipment 
and some of the (possibly modified) requirements for high-speed 
equipment. The following criteria suggested for consideration for

[[Page 30700]]

high-speed equipment may have applicability to intermediate-speed 
equipment:
    (1) Glazing requirements;
    (2) Crash refuge for cab crew;
    (3) Crash energy management system--perhaps to modified performance 
standards;
    (4) Interior arrangement or restraint systems to mitigate secondary 
impacts; and
    (5) Emergency systems.
    FRA seeks comment from builders and operators of intermediate-speed 
equipment as to where the design requirements for such equipment should 
be placed on the spectrum between the design requirements for 
conventional equipment and the design requirements for high-speed 
equipment.

Design Standards for Systems with Dedicated Rights-of-Way and No At-
Grade Crossings

    FRA recognizes that a system safety program that places emphasis on 
the prevention of collisions is highly desirable. However, fundamental 
changes are necessary in the North American railroad operating 
environment before accident prevention provisions allow equipment 
structural design standards to be relaxed. The main problem is North 
American passenger trains generally share, or operate adjacent to, the 
rights-of-way with an ever-increasing number of very heavy freight 
trains, and most passenger rail routes include at-grade crossings used 
by heavy highway vehicles. The risk to passengers and crew members in 
this operating environment increases as passenger train speed 
increases.
    FRA encourages passenger systems to operate over dedicated rights-
of-way with no at-grade crossings. FRA believes such systems can 
potentially provide the safest means of high-speed passenger 
transportation. Should proposed vehicle crashworthiness standards be 
modified for such operations? If so, to what degree? Should 
consideration of equipment used exclusively on dedicated rights-of-way 
be undertaken as part of this proceeding or through a system safety 
approach in individual proceedings for rules of specific applicability?

Discussion of Operating Issues

Commuter Equipment and Operations

    FRA is aware that unique features of some commuter equipment and 
the unique operating cycle of commuter railroads may require specific 
attention. Some commuter equipment is stored at outlying locations 
overnight to be in position for the first morning trip into the major 
city being served. Mechanical employees are generally not available at 
these outlying locations to do pre-departure safety inspections. At 
those outlying points where mechanical employees are not available, an 
abbreviated initial daily safety inspection is generally performed by 
train crew members.
    During the middle of the day, the pace of commuter operations 
generally slows, and the equipment is brought to a central location for 
a more comprehensive inspection by mechanical personnel prior to being 
dispatched for the evening rush hour. This reality of the commuter 
operating cycle must be taken into account for any proposed rules 
governing pre-departure safety inspections of commuter equipment. 
However, where mechanical employees and facilities are available to 
perform the pre-departure inspection, it must be performed by 
mechanical employees. Equipment that receives an abbreviated inspection 
by the train crew at outlying points at the beginning of the day must 
receive a complete pre-departure inspection by mechanical employees at 
the earliest opportunity during the day.
    Some of the MU equipment operated by commuter railroads is very 
different from intercity rail passenger equipment. FRA needs the help 
of the operators of such equipment to identify the differences that may 
require special regulatory treatment to avoid unintended impacts on 
commuter operations. Through participation of APTA on the Working 
Group, FRA anticipates that commuter railroads will make a special 
effort to point out unique operating or equipment features that should 
be taken into account to develop safety standards for commuter 
equipment.
    Information available to FRA suggests that nationwide there are 
about 20 commuter railroads operating roughly 5,400 passenger cars, 400 
cab cars, 2,000 multiple unit locomotive pairs, and 400 conventional 
locomotives. Are these estimates accurate? What size crews operate 
commuter trains? Approximately how many people stand on each train? As 
a result of implementing the proposed standards, would commuter 
operators realize different levels of safety benefits than intercity 
operators? Please explain.

Cab Car Forward and Risk

    FRA is concerned regarding operation of passenger trains with cab 
cars or MU locomotives positioned at the head of the train at high 
speeds. Such operations place the train operator and the passengers in 
the lead vehicle at inherently greater risk than operating the trainset 
with a locomotive or power car leading. Current designs of cab cars and 
MU locomotives provide little structural protection to the operator and 
forward-most passengers in the event of a head-on or side-swipe 
collision. Cab car locomotives and passenger MU locomotives are 
structurally equivalent from a crashworthiness standpoint. (Amtrak has 
noted that not all cab car locomotives should be considered equivalent 
to MU locomotives when the cab cars are not equipped with stairway 
traps in the leading end, such as in the X2000 train).
    Computer modeling of passenger train collisions at high speeds by 
the Volpe Center predicts a dramatic increase in casualties in head-on 
collisions of trainsets operated with a cab car forward when compared 
to the same collision with a power car or locomotive leading. This 
prediction is based on a limited number of hypothetical accident 
scenarios. The prediction is not based on accident statistics. The 
technical papers 5 documenting these predictions are part of the 
docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     5 ``Evaluation of Selected Crashworthiness Strategies for 
Passenger Trains''; ``Train Crashworthiness Design for Occupant 
Survivability.'' See note 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Recent accidents involving trains operating with cab cars in the 
forward position have heightened FRA's concern. On February 9, 1996, a 
near-head-on collision occurred between New Jersey Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc., (NJTR) trains 1254 and 1107 on the borderline of 
Secaucus and Jersey City, New Jersey. Two crewmembers and one passenger 
were fatally injured, and an additional 162 passengers reported minor 
injuries. The passenger fatality and most of the injuries occurred on 
train 1254, which was operating with the cab control car forward and 
the locomotive pushing. In addition, the engineer on train 1254 was 
fatally injured.
    On February 16, 1996, a near-head-on collision occurred between 
Maryland Mass Transit Administration (MARC) train 286 and Amtrak train 
29 on CSX Transportation, Inc., at Silver Spring, Maryland. The MARC 
train consisted of a cab control car in the lead, followed by two 
passenger coaches and a locomotive pushing the consist. The accident 
resulted in 11 fatalities, consisting of 3 crewmembers and 8 passengers 
who were located in the MARC cab car, and at least 13 non-fatal 
injuries to other passengers of the MARC train.
    Following these accidents, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 20, 
Notice

[[Page 30701]]

No. 1, on February 20, 1996, requiring prompt action to immediately 
enhance passenger train operating rules and emergency egress, and to 
develop a more comprehensive interim system safety plan addressing cab 
car forward and MU operations that do not have either cab signal, 
automatic train stop, or automatic train control systems. 61 FR 6876, 
Feb. 22, 1996. FRA subsequently issued Notice No. 2 to Emergency Order 
No. 20 on February 29, 1996, to refine three aspects of the original 
order. 61 FR 8703, Mar. 5, 1996.
    NTSB recommends that MU cars and control cab locomotives be 
equipped with corner posts to provide greater structural protection 
from a side-swipe collision. NTSB makes this recommendation based on 
the findings of the investigation of a passenger train collision that 
occurred on January 18, 1993, in which Northern Indiana Commuter 
Transportation District (NICTD) eastbound commuter train 7 and NICTD 
westbound commuter train 12 collided in a corner-to-corner impact in 
Gary, Indiana, resulting in 7 passenger fatalities and 95 injuries. The 
presence of a gauntlet bridge and absence of automatic train control 
contributed to the cause of this accident. The damage that both trains 
sustained after the initial impact resulted from the action of dynamic 
forces that caused the left front corner and sidewall of the passenger 
compartment of each car to experience a complete structural failure and 
intrude inward. Because little structure was available in the corner 
post areas to absorb the forces of the collision, the substantial car 
body intrusion into each car left no survivable space in the left front 
areas of either car. Consequently, NTSB issued Safety Recommendation R-
93-24, which recommends that:

    In cooperation with the Federal Transit Administration and the 
American Public Transit Association, [FRA] study the feasibility of 
providing car body corner post structures on all self-propelled 
passenger cars and control cab locomotives to afford occupant 
protection during corner collisions.

    The RSERA requires FRA to analyze the crashworthiness of 
locomotives. As part of this analysis, the Volpe Center tasked ADL to 
do computer modeling of collisions involving cab cars to predict the 
benefit of substantial corner posts. The docket contains copies of this 
report.6 ADL used the following general approach to evaluate cab 
car crashworthiness: Finite element models for the major structural 
elements of a typical cab car were developed and utilized to compute 
the load versus deformation characteristic curves for major structural 
elements involved in collisions. These characteristics were used as 
input to the train collision dynamics model developed previously for 
freight locomotives. The collision dynamics model was modified as 
needed to represent a typical passenger train with a cab car at the 
head end and a locomotive at the rear pushing, instead of a freight 
train with locomotives at the head end. The modified models were then 
validated by comparison of predicted results with the actual damage in 
documented collisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     6 ``Cab Car Crashworthiness Study Final Report,'' April 
1995, Reference 63065.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This modeling predicts, for control cab/MU locomotives of current 
design, that when the underframe resists the forces of collision, a cab 
car will sustain substantial loss of survivable volume in both operator 
and passenger compartments in head-on collisions at closing speeds 
above 30 mph. The result of such crush would cause severe injury or 
fatality to some of the cab car occupants.
    When the underframe is bypassed and collision or corner posts 
resist the forces of the collision, the cab car will sustain 
substantial loss of survivable volume at collision closing speeds in 
the 10 to 15 mph range. These predictions emphasize the importance of 
designs that increase the probability that the underframe will be fully 
involved in resisting the forces resulting from a collision.
    ADL took the modeling one step further by repeating the 
calculations for a conceptual cab car with a 50 percent underframe 
strength increase and a 400 percent corner post strength increase over 
current cab car design practice. These structural changes increased the 
closing speed required to result in a significant loss of survivable 
space by approximately 10 mph. These results suggest that only a small 
improvement in protection is possible through structural changes for a 
cab car leading, train-to-train collision. However, these structural 
changes may provide a much more significant increase in protection for 
the less severe scenarios of a grade crossing collision, a collision 
with debris including lading that falls from freight trains, or a 
collision with an object overhanging the track.
    Several system characteristics determine the degree of risk 
involved in cab-car-forward or MU equipment operations. These 
characteristics include operating speed, traffic density, signal 
system, grade crossings and grade crossing warning systems (including 
barriers to prevent entry onto the crossing), and right-of-way 
features. In addition, the operator of a cab car or MU equipment often 
has an opportunity to exit the control stand area and move through the 
passenger compartment toward the rear of the car when a collision is 
impending.
    FRA seeks comment focusing on what is practical and what is 
economical to reduce the risk associated with operating cab cars in the 
forward position and operating MU equipment. FRA poses the following 
set of questions to operators and builders of cab car type equipment: 
What can be done to increase the protection provided to the operator 
and forwardmost passengers in a head-on collision with a cab car 
leading? Advanced versions of some European trains employ a concept 
where the operator's position is designed to be pushed to the rear 
relative to the rest of the cab to provide the operator additional 
protection during a collision. Could such a technique be employed to 
protect operators in future North American equipment? What design 
changes can be made to increase the probability that the underframe 
will be fully involved in resisting the collision forces? Recognizing 
that structural changes will have only limited benefit, should speed 
restrictions be placed on cab-forward operations? Should passengers be 
prohibited from occupying cab cars operating above a certain speed when 
in a leading position? What would be the impact of placing speed 
restrictions on cab car forward operations? What mitigating factors may 
exist that would alleviate FRA's concern for the increased risk 
associated with cab-car-forward operations as speeds increase? If speed 
restrictions are placed on cab car forward operations, what speed 
restrictions should be imposed?
    What costs and benefits would be associated with alternatives for 
increasing crew and passenger protection in a head-on collision with a 
cab car leading?
    Data indicate that at least 400 cab cars operate as lead units. Is 
this estimate accurate? Approximately how many trips are made each year 
with cab cars operating as lead units? At what maximum speeds do trains 
operate with the cab car forward?
    FRA estimates that 2,000 MU locomotive pairs operate as lead units. 
Is this estimate accurate? Approximately how many trips per year 
involve multiple unit locomotive pairs?

Combined Passenger and Freight Trains

    FRA recognizes that circumstances exist where freight trains haul 
passenger cars and where passenger trains haul freight cars. For 
example, freight trains on occasion include private or business

[[Page 30702]]

cars, Amtrak trains can include mail cars, and Amtrak has experimented 
with roadrailer-type equipment in passenger trains. Passenger safety 
standards should cover these special situations as well.
    How frequent are such operations? Are any special safety 
considerations necessary for passenger cars hauled by freight trains or 
is normal passenger equipment safety practice adequate for this special 
situation? Are any special safety considerations necessary for freight-
type equipment hauled by passenger trains or for passenger trains that 
haul freight-type equipment.

Station/Platform Boarding and Exiting Passenger Trains

    FRA requests comment on the safety of persons in station areas, 
issues regarding boarding and exiting from trains, and other issues 
affecting the safety of passenger operations. The following specific 
issues have come to FRA's attention in recent years, and are 
illustrative of the concerns that may warrant examination in this 
proceeding:

Door Securement

    The manner and extent to which end and side doors are secured 
varies among passenger operators. When doors may be opened with 
excessive ease, a risk exists that passengers will unwittingly fall 
from moving trains. Of particular concern is the need to secure 
passenger train end doors against casual operation.
    However, full, interlocked securement may greatly complicate 
evacuation in emergency situations. In some situations when a train is 
departing, the train doors must be open as it leaves the station for 
the crew to observe the platform area. In some situations when a train 
is arriving, the train doors must also be open to allow trap doors to 
be raised to minimize dwell time in stations not equipped with floor-
level platforms. A signal light that displays the status of the doors 
to the crew in the control cab may have value for departing trains. 
Many railroads currently employ such a display light. Should passenger 
car doors be secured while the train is in motion during normal 
operations? What provision should be made for operation of doors by 
passengers in emergency situations? To what extent does the railroad's 
operating environment (elevated structures, tunnels, etc.) bear on 
resolving this question?

Ground-Level Stations

    Ground-level stations are economical responses to light-density 
boarding in both commuter and intercity service. However, particularly 
where multiple tracks are present, the environment presents the 
possibility that passengers may be struck by moving trains. Attention 
needs to be directed toward the design of the interface of the ground-
level station to the train to ensure passengers can safely board and 
leave the train. What station-to-train interface design features are 
desirable to minimize the possibility of injuries resulting from 
boarding or departing the train? What warning is appropriate for the 
arrival of passenger trains? Should movement of freight trains through 
stations be announced? What measures are appropriate to safeguard 
passenger movements in stations? What alternatives have been 
implemented in the United States? Internationally? With what success? 
What costs are associated with alternative measures to safeguard 
passenger movements in ground level stations? When is construction of 
pedestrian overpasses and fencing warranted?

Floor-Level Platforms

    Station platforms that are elevated to the level of the passenger 
car floor permit prompt boarding and can be arranged to provide better 
access for persons with disabilities. However, concern has been 
expressed with regard to movement of trains through stations on tracks 
that are adjacent to platforms. Attention needs to be directed toward 
the design of the interface of the floor-level platform to the train to 
ensure passengers can safely board and leave the train. What platform-
to-train interface design features are desirable to minimize the 
possibility of injuries resulting from boarding or departing the train? 
What warning is appropriate for the arrival of trains?

High-Speed Movements through Stations

    Express trains often move through passenger stations without 
stopping, sometimes on tracks immediately adjacent to areas where 
passengers are waiting to board local trains. Could movement of high-
speed express trains through stations present an unreasonable risk? If 
so, how could that risk be mitigated? What measures are utilized by 
passenger railroads currently facing this situation? At what costs can 
alternative measures be implemented to mitigate risks of high-speed 
express trains through stations?

Additional Economic Impact Information

    Information available to FRA suggests that there are about 8,200 
passenger cars and 970 conventional locomotives dedicated to rail 
passenger service in the United States. Is this information accurate? 
What ridership levels are experienced through the year? Would meeting 
the new higher standards described in Appendix B result in higher 
fares? If so, how much higher? Would a decrease in ridership be 
anticipated? If so, to what extent? Please explain the method of 
estimation. To which alternative forms of travel would lost ridership 
be expected to switch? How has this conclusion been reached? What 
assumptions have been made? FRA is interested in obtaining copies of 
studies or other documentation addressing the issue of passenger 
diversion from rail to other modes of travel as a result of new rail 
safety standards. What factors have the greatest effect on ridership 
levels: price, seat availability, trip time, variability in trip time, 
etc.?
    Appendix D lists the economic questions posed by this ANPRM.

Regulatory Impact

    FRA will evaluate any proposed action and its potential impacts to 
determine whether it would be considered significant under Executive 
Order 12866 or DOT policies and procedures (44 FR 11034, Feb. 26, 
1979). Due to the substantial impact this rulemaking may have on a 
major transportation safety problem, this rulemaking is expected to be 
classified as significant pursuant to DOT Order 2100.5. FRA will also 
examine any proposed action and its potential impacts to determine 
whether it will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities under the provisions of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.).
    FRA will further evaluate any proposed rule pursuant to DOT 
regulations implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (42 
U.S.C. 432 et seq.).
    Any proposed action will be further evaluated to determine 
information collection burdens pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act. 
Any proposed action will be evaluated pursuant to Executive Order 12612 
to determine whether it would have substantial effects on the states, 
on the relationship between the national government and the states, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    The economic impact of any rule that may be proposed on the subject 
of passenger equipment safety standards cannot be accurately quantified 
with the information currently available to FRA. An analysis of the 
economic impact will be made after evaluating the data

[[Page 30703]]

submitted in response to this ANPRM, and the findings of that analysis 
will be published as part of any further notices of rulemaking issued 
in this matter. In addition, without fully evaluating the comments 
solicited by this ANPRM, it is impossible to determine what action FRA 
will take with regard to the other areas addressed by this ANPRM, and 
thus it is impossible to determine the economic impact of those changes 
at this time. Furthermore, any action taken by FRA is expected to 
result in the prevention or mitigation of accidents, personal injuries 
and property damage. However, until FRA fully considers the comments 
requested by this ANPRM and determines what action it will take, these 
benefits cannot be quantified.

Comments and Hearing

    FRA solicits the submission of written comments, which should be 
filed in triplicate with the Docket Clerk at the address provided 
above. Specific responses to the questions set forth in this notice 
would be appreciated. The comment period will close on July 9, 1996, so 
that all comments can be presented to the Working Group before its next 
scheduled meeting in July 1996. When responding, reference to the topic 
or question number in the ANPRM will ensure full consideration of the 
comments submitted.
    FRA has not currently scheduled a public hearing in connection with 
this ANPRM. Any interested party desiring an opportunity for oral 
comment should submit a written request to the Docket Clerk before the 
end of the comment period.

    Issued in Washington, DC on June 5, 1996.
Jolene M. Molitoris,
Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration.

Appendix A--Sample System Safety Plan Elements

    The outline that follows describes the elements of a system 
safety plan for a safety program for the development of a new high-
speed passenger trainset. Safety programs for less complex 
procurements of new equipment might be greatly simplified versions 
of this plan.

General Description

    1. The system safety plan shall describe the system safety 
program to be conducted as part of the trainset design process to 
ensure all safety-critical issues and Federal safety requirements 
are identified and addressed.
    2. The system safety program shall ensure safety issues are 
treated equal to cost and performance issues when design trade-offs 
are made. The basis for making safety-related design trade-offs 
shall be documented.
    3. The system safety plan shall be the top level document--
completed as one of the first design process deliverables--used as 
guidance for the development of the following lower level safety 
planning and design guidance documents:
    a. Fire Protection Engineering Plan.
    b. Software Safety Plan.
    c. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Plan.
    d. Training Plan.
    e. Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Test Plan
    4. The system safety plan shall describe the approaches to be 
taken to accomplish the following tasks or objectives:
    a. Identification of all safety requirements including Federal 
requirements governing the design of the trainset and its supporting 
systems.
    b. Evaluation of the total system--including hardware, software, 
testing and support activities--to identify known or potential 
safety hazards over the entire life cycle of the equipment.
    c. The process to be used to raise safety issues during design 
reviews.
    d. The process to be used to eliminate or reduce the risk of the 
hazards identified.
    e. The monitoring and tracking system to be used to track the 
progress made toward resolving safety issues, reducing hazards, and 
meeting safety requirements.
    f. The development of the testing program to demonstrate that 
safety requirements have been met.
    5. The system safety program shall include periodic safety 
reviews that result in safety action items being assigned and 
tracked.
    6. The system safety program shall include adequate 
documentation to audit how the design meets safety requirements and 
to track how safety issues were raised and resolved.
    7. The system safety plan shall address how operational 
limitations may be imposed if the design cannot meet certain safety 
requirements.

Fire Protection Engineering Plan

    1. Develop a Fire Protection Engineering Plan to be used to 
design adequate fire safety into the trainset.
    2. The Fire Protection Engineering Plan shall:
    a. Require the system developer to complete a thorough analysis 
of the fire protection problem.
    b. Require the system developer to use good fire protection 
engineering practice as part of the design of the trainset design 
process.
    c. Describe and analyze the effectiveness of the steps to be 
taken to design the train to be sufficiently fire resistant to 
ensure the detection of a fire and the evacuation of the train 
before the fire, smoke or toxic fumes cause injury to the passengers 
or crew.
    d. Identify, analyze and prioritize the fire hazards inherent in 
the design of the trainset.
    e. Describe the design approach taken and justify the design 
trade-offs made to minimize the risk of each fire hazard.
    f. Present an analysis and propose tests to demonstrate how the 
fire protection engineering approach taken will lead to a train 
which meets these fire protection standards.
    g. Be a major subset of the overall System Safety Plan, and 
dovetail with the railroad's Emergency Preparedness Plan.
    h. Present the analysis required to select materials which 
provide sufficient fire resistance to ensure adequate time to detect 
the fire and safely evacuate the train. The system developer shall 
also propose the tests to be conducted to demonstrate this analysis 
has basis in fact.
    i. Present the analysis done to ensure the ventilation system 
does not contribute to the lethality of a fire.
    j. Include the analysis performed to determine which train 
components require overheat protection. If overheat protection is 
not provided for a component at risk of being a source of fire, a 
solid rationale and justification for the decision shall be included 
in the plan.
    k. Identify all unoccupied train compartments which contain 
equipment or material which poses a fire hazard, and analyze the 
benefit provided from including a fire or smoke detection system in 
each compartment identified. Fire or smoke detectors shall be 
installed in compartments where the analysis determines that they 
are necessary to ensure time for safe evacuation of the train. The 
analysis shall provide the reasoning why a fire or smoke detector is 
not necessary if the decision is made not to install one in any of 
the unoccupied compartments identified in the plan.
    l. Include an analysis of the occupied and unoccupied spaces 
which require portable fire extinguishers. The analysis will include 
the proper type and size of fire extinguisher for each location.
    m. Identify all unoccupied train compartments that contain 
equipment or material which poses a fire hazard risk. On a case-by-
case basis, the plan shall analyze the benefit provided by including 
a fixed, automatic fire-suppression system in each compartment 
identified. The type and size of the automatic fire-suppression 
system for each necessary application shall be determined. A fixed, 
automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in compartments 
where the analysis determines they are necessary and practical to 
ensure time for safe evacuation of the train. The analysis shall 
provide the reasoning why a fixed, automatic fire suppression system 
is not necessary or practical if the decision is made not to install 
one in any of the unoccupied compartments identified in the plan.
    n. Describe the procedures to be used for inspection, 
maintenance, and testing of all fire safety systems and equipment.
    3. The system developer shall follow the design criteria, 
perform the tests, and follow the operating procedures called for in 
the plan.

Software Safety Plan

    1. Trainset system software that controls or monitors safety 
functions shall be treated as safety-critical.
    2. The system operator shall require the system developer to 
develop a software safety plan to guide the design, development, 
testing, integration and verification of computer programs used to 
control and/or monitor trainset functions.

[[Page 30704]]

    3. The software safety plan shall include a description of how 
the following tasks will be accomplished or objectives achieved to 
ensure reliable, fail-safe system software:
    a. Software design process used.
    b. Software design documentation to be produced.
    c. Software hazard analysis.
    d. Software safety reviews.
    e. Software hazard monitoring and tracking.
    f. Software module level safety tests.
    g. Safety tests of multiple modules combined to function as a 
software system.
    h. Hardware/software integration safety tests.
    i. Demonstration of overall software safety as part of the pre-
revenue service tests of the trainset.

Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Plan

    1. The plan shall:
    a. Provide adequate technical detail on the procedures to be 
followed by the system operator to ensure trainset safety does not 
deteriorate over time.
    b. Be used as the basis for the trainset inspection, testing, 
and maintenance safety standards.
    c. Contain the specific, detailed inspection, testing, and 
maintenance procedures and intervals required to ensure safe, 
reliable long-term operation of all train systems.
    d. Focus on, and give priority to, those inspections, preventive 
maintenance procedures, and tests required to prevent any 
deterioration in train safety.
    e. Include an inspection and maintenance program that ensures 
all systems and components of the train are free of general 
conditions that endanger the safety of the crew, passengers, or 
equipment. These conditions include but are not limited to:
    i. Insecure attachment of components.
    ii. Continuous accumulations of oil or grease.
    iii. Improper functioning of components.
    iv. Cracks, breaks, excessive wear, structural defects or 
weakness of components.
    v. Leaks.
    vi. Use of components or systems under conditions that exceed 
those for which the component or system is designed to operate.
    2. The plan shall include a description of the process to be 
used to develop detailed information on the inspection, testing and 
maintenance procedures necessary for long-term safe operation of the 
trainset. This information shall include:
    a. Safety Inspection Criteria and Procedures.
    b. Testing Procedures/Intervals.
    c. Predetermined corrective action to take upon failure of an 
inspection or test.
    d. Scheduled Preventive Maintenance.
    e. Maintenance Procedures.
    f. Special Testing Equipment.
    3. The plan shall set initial scheduled maintenance intervals 
conservatively. The intervals shall be extended only when thoroughly 
justified by accumulated operating data.

Training Plan

    1. Develop a training plan to provide employees and contract 
personnel including supervisors with the knowledge and skills 
necessary to effectively implement the inspection, maintenance and 
testing program, and to safely do his/her job.
    2. The training plan shall include the knowledge and skills 
necessary for electronic, computer software, and mechanical 
personnel.
    3. The plan shall contain detailed descriptions of the 
training--crucial to the safe operation of the trainset-- which will 
be required for each craft.
    4. The plan shall contain the certification process to be used 
to be sure each employee in a safety sensitive position is fit and 
well qualified to do his/her job.
    5. The training plan shall include the training necessary for 
supervisors to be able to adequately spot check the work of the 
inspection, maintenance and testing personnel that they supervise.
    6. The training plan shall include:
    a. Identification of all the knowledge and skills necessary to 
accomplish the tasks described in the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance plan.
    b. Design of a training program including classroom instruction 
and hands-on experience to ensure that employees and supervisors are 
given the necessary knowledge and skills.
    c. A means to measure that employees--including supervisors--
have the necessary knowledge and skills.
    d. Modules that specifically address technology used as part of 
the trainset that is new to the railroad industry.
    e. A program of periodic refresher training to recertify 
employees and contract personnel.
    f. A schedule to have the work force adequately trained prior to 
the start of revenue service.

Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan

    1. Develop a pre-revenue service testing plan and fully execute 
the plan prior to introducing new equipment into revenue service.
    2. The plan shall include:
    a. Identification of any waivers of Federal safety regulations 
required for the tests or for revenue service operation of the 
trainset.
    b. A clear statement of the test objectives. One of the major 
objectives shall be to demonstrate that the trainset meets safety 
design requirements when operated in the environment in which it is 
to be used.
    c. A planned schedule for conducting the tests.
    d. A description of the railroad property or facilities to be 
used to conduct the tests.
    e. A detailed description of how the tests are to be conducted 
including:
    i. Which components are to be tested;
    ii. How they are to be tested;
    iii. How frequently they are to be tested;
    iv. What criteria are to be used to judge their performance; and
    v. How the test results are to be reported.
    f. A description of any special instrumentation to be used 
during the tests.
    g. A description of the information or data to be obtained.
    h. A description of how the information or data obtained is to 
be analyzed or used.
    i. A clear description of any criteria to be used as safety 
limits during testing.
    j. A description of the criteria to be used to measure or 
determine the success or failure of the tests. If acceptance is to 
be based on extrapolation of less than full level testing results, 
the analysis to be done to justify the validity of the extrapolation 
shall be described.
    k. A description of any special safety precautions to be 
observed during the testing.
    l. A written set of standard operating procedures to be used to 
ensure that the testing is done safely.
    m. A verification of the inspection, maintenance, and testing 
procedures and criteria to be used for the revenue service operation 
of the trainset.
    3. The system operator shall report the results of the pre-
revenue service tests and correct any safety deficiencies in the 
design of the trainset or in the inspection, testing, and 
maintenance procedures.
    4. If safety deficiencies cannot be corrected by design changes, 
operational limitations may be imposed on the revenue service 
operation of the trainset.

Standard Operating Procedures

    1. Develop step-by-step standard operating procedures for 
performing all safety-critical or potentially hazardous trainset 
inspection, testing, maintenance or repair tasks.
    2. Standard operating procedures shall:
    a. Describe in detail each step required to safely perform the 
task;
    b. Describe the qualifications necessary to safely perform the 
task;
    c. Describe any precautions that must be taken to safely perform 
the task;
    d. Describe the use of any safety equipment necessary to perform 
the task;
    e. Be approved by the chief mechanical officer of the system 
operator;
    f. Be approved by the responsible official for safety of the 
system operator;
    g. Be read and understood by the employees and contractors 
performing the tasks;
    h. Be enforced by supervisors with responsibility for 
accomplishing the tasks; and
    i. Be updated and approved annually.
    3. Knowledge of standard operating procedures shall be required 
to qualify an employee or contractor to perform a task.

Appendix B--Sample Design Standards Based on a Tiered Approach

Introduction

    FRA offers this sample outline of tiered design requirements to 
help generate discussion on how to set safety standards for 
equipment. As discussed in the body of the ANPRM, it is not clear 
whether the distinction between various tiers would be based solely 
on operating speed, a risk analysis of the envisioned operating 
environment, or another method. For purposes of discussion, this 
appendix is based on two tiers determined solely by operating speed:
    Tier I: Existing and future equipment designed for operation in 
an environment

[[Page 30705]]

with known risk or proven safe operation, e.g., existing passenger 
equipment operating at speeds of 110 mph or less or up to 125 mph 
under specific waiver conditions.
    Tier II: Equipment that is envisioned to operate in higher risk 
operating environments, e.g., Amtrak's planned operation at 150 mph 
in the Northeast Corridor, or perhaps cab car forward operations 
under some sets of higher risk operating conditions.
    (APTA takes exception to the possibility of including cab car 
forward operations in the Tier II category.)
    FRA recognizes the need to address special equipment outside 
this two-tiered system, such as that operated by tourist and 
excursion railroads and private passenger cars. FRA also recognizes 
the possible need to identify additional tiers in the future, 
whether it be for an intermediate tier between Tiers I and II 
described above or for equipment intended to operate at very high 
speeds, i.e., in excess of 150 mph.
    (Amtrak agrees with the logic behind the tiered safety standard 
based on speed. The logical breaks for Amtrak are 0 to 90 mph, 90 to 
125 mph, and 125 mph and above, thus creating a three-tiered 
standard.)
    It is important to emphasize that neither FRA nor the Working 
Group has endorsed the parameters provided, except to the extent 
that they mirror existing rail safety laws. FRA intends that the 
parameters suggested in this appendix serve only as the starting 
point for discussion to help determine the parameters to be included 
in a subsequent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).

A. Crash Energy Management System Design Requirements

    Tier I: (Note: Existing equipment designs do not typically 
incorporate crash energy management principles in an effort to 
mitigate the consequences of a collision. However, future designs of 
Tier I equipment should embrace the following guidelines.)
    (APTA believes crash energy management design requirements 
should be applied only to Tier II equipment.)
    1. Both the power vehicle and the passenger vehicle shall be 
designed with a crash energy management system to dissipate kinetic 
energy during a collision. The crash energy management system shall 
cause a controlled deformation and collapse of designated sections 
within the unoccupied volumes to absorb collision energy and reduce 
the decelerations on passengers and crew resulting from dynamic 
forces transmitted to occupied volumes.
    2. The design of the power vehicle and each unit of the 
passenger vehicle shall consist of an occupied volume located 
between two normally unoccupied volumes. Where practical, sections 
within the unoccupied volumes shall be designed to be structurally 
weaker than the occupied volume. During a collision or derailment, 
the designated sections within the unoccupied volumes shall start to 
deform and eventually collapse in a controlled fashion to dissipate 
energy before any structural damage occurs to the occupied volume. 
Alternately, a crash energy management strategy shall be implemented 
by trainset.
    3. The crash energy management system shall keep the train in 
line and on the track long enough to maximize the energy absorbed by 
controlled crushing of designated sections within unoccupied volumes 
of the train. The train shall be designed for controlled collapse of 
the designated sections within unoccupied volumes of the train, 
starting from the ends of the train and working toward the center of 
the train as the energy to be dissipated increases.
    4. The trainset shall be designed for a crush distance and crush 
force that result in survivable volumes in all occupied areas of the 
trainset under the conditions of the collision scenario. A collision 
scenario needs to be defined to serve as a basis for design analysis 
of Tier I equipment's crash energy management system and structure. 
What parameters should be used to define this collision scenario?
    5. The locomotive or power car cab shall be designed to limit 
the secondary impact deceleration of crew members to a maximum of 
24g and an average of 16g for 250 milliseconds after initial impact 
under the conditions of the collision scenario.
    6. The trainset shall be designed to limit the secondary impact 
deceleration acting on passengers in the leading passenger 
compartment to a maximum of 6g and an average of 4g for 250 
milliseconds after initial impact under the conditions of the 
collision scenario.
    7. The occupied volume of the power vehicle and the occupied 
volumes of the passenger vehicle shall be designed and constructed 
in a manner to preclude telescoping of the crushed unoccupied volume 
structure into the occupied volume.
    8. The unoccupied volume of the power vehicle shall have a 
static end yield strength of no less than 50 percent of the required 
static end strength of the power vehicle occupied volume. The 
unoccupied volume of each unit of the passenger vehicle shall have a 
static end yield strength of no less than 50 percent of the required 
static end strength yield of the passenger unit occupied volume. Any 
deviation form this requirement must be fully justified by analysis 
or test.
    9. The crash energy management system shall start to function at 
a static end load of no less than 50 percent of the required static 
end strength of the occupied volume, but no more than 90 percent of 
the actual static end strength of the occupied volume.
    10. An analysis based on the collision scenario shall be 
performed to verify that the trainset crash energy management system 
meets the requirements of this section. Assumptions made as part of 
the analysis to calculate how the kinetic energy of the colliding 
passenger train is dissipated shall be fully justified. The analysis 
must clearly show that the designated energy absorbing sections 
within the unoccupied volumes of the trainset crush before collapse 
of the occupied volumes start and that the deceleration of people in 
the occupied volumes is limited to the levels required by paragraphs 
5 and 6 above. This analysis shall be made available to FRA upon 
request.
    (APTA points out that crash energy management design concepts 
have not been validated by tests or analysis for equipment operating 
in the speed range envisioned for Tier I equipment. APTA points to 
the need for a major research and physical testing program to 
demonstrate and validate crash energy management design benefits.)
    (Amtrak is in full agreement with the concept of crash energy 
management, but similarly feels that some form of full-scale testing 
may be required to validate the computer simulations. Further, 
Amtrak warns that this type of testing is expensive by nature, and 
an effort to identify a funding source needs to be initiated now in 
order not to delay the rulemaking process.)
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

B. Structural Design Requirements

1. Static End Strength

    Tier I: The current U.S. practice is to require both locomotives 
and coaches to have a minimum static end strength of 800,000 pounds 
without deformation. If a crash energy management design approach is 
taken, this requirement applies only to the occupied volume of the 
equipment. Unoccupied volumes may have a lesser static end yield 
strength.
    Tier II: The longitudinal static yield strength of the trainset 
occupied volumes shall be no less than 1,000,000 pounds ultimate 
strength.
    (APTA suggests that the static end strength requirements for 
both Tier I and Tier II equipment should be the same. APTA believes 
the occupants of the weaker car may suffer unduly in a collision of 
cars of differing strength.)

2. Anticlimbing Mechanism

    Tier I: The current U.S. practice is to require locomotives 
(power cars) to have an anticlimbing mechanism capable of resisting 
an upward or downward vertical force of 200,000 pounds. This 
requirement is given in Association of American Railroads (AAR) 
Specification S-580, that became effective in August, 1990. 
Passenger coaches and MU locomotives (49 CFR 229.141(a)(2)) are 
required to have an anticlimbing mechanism capable of resisting an 
upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 pounds. How should the 
anticlimber requirements for Tier I equipment be specified to ensure 
maximum advantage is taken of the strength of the underframe to 
resist collision forces?
    Tier II: a. Anticlimber engagements of each end of each interior 
trainset unit shall be designed to keep the trainset in line and on 
the track until the energy-absorbing capability of the crash energy 
management system has been exceeded and the strength of occupied 
volumes of the train start to be overcome.
    b. Anticlimber engagements shall be capable of resisting both 
vertical and lateral buckling forces between units due to an 
acceleration of 1g acting on the total loaded mass including trucks 
of the heavier of the two coupled units.

3. Link Between Coupling Mechanism and Carbody

    Tier I: The mechanical link which attaches the front coupling 
mechanism to the car body shall be designed to resist a vertical

[[Page 30706]]

downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000 pounds for any 
horizontal position of the coupler, without exceeding the yield 
points of the materials used.
    Does this requirement provide protection to passengers and crew? 
If not, how should this parameter be specified?
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

4. Short Hood Structure (Non-MU Locomotives Only)

    Tier I: The skin covering the short hood or forward-facing end 
of the locomotive shall be equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate 
with a 25,000 pounds-per-square-inch yield strength. Higher yield 
strength material may be used to decrease the thickness of the 
material as long as an equivalent strength is maintained. This skin 
shall be securely attached to the forward collision posts and shall 
be sealed to prevent the entry of flammable fluids into the occupied 
cab area. Does this requirement inhibit the application of crash 
energy management technology to Tier I equipment?
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

5. Collision Posts

    Tier I: a. Locomotive Forward Collision Posts--Two collision 
posts are required, each capable of withstanding a shear load of 
500,000 pounds at the joint of the collision post to the underframe 
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the joint. Each post must 
also be capable of withstanding, without exceeding the ultimate 
strength, a 200,000 pound shear force exerted 30 inches above the 
joint of the post to the underframe (AAR Specification S-580). This 
requirement is independent of train weight. Alternately, an 
equivalent end structure may be used in place of the two collision 
posts. The single end structure must withstand the sum of the forces 
required for each collision post.
    b. MU Locomotive Rear Collision Posts--Two collision posts are 
required, each having an ultimate shear value of not less than 
300,000 pounds at a point even with the top of the underframe member 
to which it is attached. If reinforcement is used to provide the 
shear value, the reinforcement shall have full value for a distance 
of 18 inches up from the underframe connection and then taper to a 
point approximately 30 inches above the underframe connection (49 
CFR 229.141(a)(4)). FRA believes this requirement needs to be 
improved. The collision posts can easily be strengthened and 
lengthened (preferably full height to the roofline). An equivalent 
single end structure may be used in place of the two collision 
posts. The single end structure must be designed to withstand the 
sum of the forces required for the end posts. For analysis purposes, 
the required forces can be assumed to be evenly distributed at the 
end structure at the underframe joint.
    c. Passenger Coach Collision Posts--Current U.S. practice is to 
require a pair of collision posts at each end of a passenger coach. 
If a passenger coach consists of articulated or otherwise 
permanently joined units, collision posts are required only at the 
ends of the permanently coupled assembly of units, not at the ends 
of each unit of the assembly. In other words, collision posts are 
required at ends of passenger equipment where coupling and 
uncoupling are expected. The requirements for passenger coach 
collision posts are identical to the requirements for locomotive 
rear collision posts. FRA believes this requirement needs to be 
improved. The collision posts can easily be strengthened and 
lengthened (preferably full height to the roofline). An equivalent 
end structure may be used in place of the two collision posts.
    FRA believes a unified collision post requirement should apply 
to all Tier I passenger vehicles, to include coaches and power/cab 
cars. The collision posts should be stronger and preferably extend 
to the roofline. How should collision posts for Tier I passenger 
vehicles be specified?
    Tier II: As discussed in the body of the ANPRM, FRA believes 
that a unitized type of end structure with integral collision and 
corner posts that extend to the roof line should be considered for a 
design standard for passenger equipment.
    a. Strength of the Leading and Trailing Ends of a Trainset.
    i. The leading and trailing ends of the trainset shall be 
equipped with an end structure capable of transmitting to the frame 
of the leading or trailing unit a horizontally applied longitudinal 
load of 1,000,000 pounds uniformly applied at floor level decreasing 
uniformly with height to no less than 400,000 pounds uniformly 
applied at the roof line without exceeding the ultimate strength of 
the end structure.
    (APTA points out that the need for and basis of the high 
roofline strength requirement has not been established.)
    ii. A leading/trailing end structure may be used to meet 
requirements for corner posts and collision posts.
    b. Strength of Collision Posts or End Structures. (Ends of 
trainset other than leading or trailing ends.)
    i. Each end of a trainset unit designed for automatic coupling 
that is not a leading or trailing end of the trainset shall be 
equipped with collision posts or an end structure capable of 
transmitting to the frame of that unit a horizontal, longitudinal 
load of 600,000 pounds applied at floor level decreasing uniformly 
with height to no less than 240,000 pounds applied at the roof line 
without exceeding the ultimate strength of the collision posts or 
end structure.
    (APTA points out that the need for and basis of the high 
roofline strength requirement has not been established.)
    ii. A unitized end structure may be used to meet requirements 
for corner posts and collision posts.

6. Corner Posts

    Tier I: Corner posts shall be full height (extending from 
underframe structure to roof structure) and capable of resisting a 
horizontal load of 150,000 pounds at the point of attachment to the 
underframe and a load of 80,000 pounds at the point of attachment to 
the roof structure without failure. The orientation of the applied 
horizontal load shall range from longitudinal inward to transverse 
inward. The corner posts may be positioned to provide protection or 
structural strength to the occupied volume.
    Tier II: As discussed in the body of the ANPRM, FRA believes 
that a unitized type of end structure with integral collision and 
corner posts that extend to the roof line should be considered for a 
design standard for passenger equipment.
    a. Strength of Corner Posts at the Leading or Trailing End of a 
Trainset:
    i. The leading and trailing ends of the trainset shall be 
equipped with a corner post at the intersection of the end with each 
side.
    ii. Each corner post shall be capable of resisting--without 
failure or deformation--a horizontal load applied at any point in a 
90 degree arc from lateral to longitudinal of 333,000 pounds applied 
at floor level decreasing uniformly to no less than 133,000 pounds 
at the roof line.
    iii. The corner posts may be part of the end structure.
    b. Strength of Corner Posts Not at the Leading or Trailing End 
of a Trainset:
    i. Each end of a trainset unit that is not a leading or trailing 
end of the trainset and that is equipped with automatic couplers 
shall be equipped with a corner post at the intersection of the end 
with each side.
    ii. Each corner post shall be capable of resisting--without 
failure or deformation--a horizontal load applied at any point in a 
90-degree arc from lateral to longitudinal of 200,000 pounds applied 
at floor level decreasing uniformly to no less than 80,000 pounds at 
the roof line.
    iii. The corner posts may be part of the end structure.
    (APTA does not believe that the corner post requirements 
proposed by FRA are realistic. APTA believes these proposed corner 
post requirements should be replaced with a requirement that the 
post be able to resist a load of 65,000 pounds applied at a point 
30'' above the floor without permanent deformation.)

7. Crash Refuge

    Tier I: (Note: Existing equipment designs do not typically 
incorporate crash energy management principles in an effort to 
mitigate the consequences of a collision. However, future designs of 
Tier I equipment should embrace the following guidelines.)
    (APTA does not believe that crash refuge requirements should be 
applied to future designs of Tier I equipment.)
    a. A refuge or survivable area to which the crew can retreat in 
the event of an impending collision shall be provided. This refuge 
or survivable area shall take maximum advantage of the structural 
strength of the power vehicle or control cab and include shock-
mitigating material.
    b. This refuge shall have the structural integrity and shock 
mitigation necessary to allow the crew to survive the accelerations 
and forces resulting from the collision scenario described as part 
of the recommended crash energy management system requirements.
    c. The crash refuge shall be readily accessible for quick entry 
by the crew.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

[[Page 30707]]

8. Rollover Strength

    Tier I: There are no current industry or Federal specifications 
for rollover protection in locomotives or passenger equipment. The 
following are proposed examples of such requirements to protect crew 
and passengers in the event of a rollover scenario:
    a. Locomotives should be able to withstand a uniformly applied 
load equal to 2g acting on the mass of the locomotive without 
failure of the cab side structure or the cab roof structure. (Local 
deformation of the side sheathing or roof sheathing in the cab area 
is permitted as long as a survivable volume is preserved in the crew 
compartment.)
    (APTA believes that this specific requirement should be replaced 
with a more general requirement stating that locomotives shall be 
designed to provide a survivable volume in the crew compartment in 
the event of a rollover.)
    b. Passenger coach and MU locomotive sides and roofs shall have 
sufficient structural strength to withstand the dynamic rollover 
force exerted by an acceleration of 2g acting on the mass of an 
individual vehicle or unit without collapse of the occupied volume. 
The occupied volume may deform to the extent that no more than 10 
percent of initial volume is lost due to crush caused by the 
rollover. FRA believes existing North American designs will likely 
meet this requirement.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

9. Side Impact Strength

    Tier I:
    a. A side impact design requirement would, among other things, 
protect passengers and crew from side collisions by heavy highway 
vehicles at grade crossings. Such a requirement may be particularly 
important for equipment with a floor height less than 36 inches 
above the top of the rail. A concept for the requirement is an 
ability to withstand the load applied by a loaded tractor trailer 
travelling at a selected speed colliding with the side of the car 
over an area and at a height typical of tractor trailer bumpers with 
a limited deformation of the car body structure. What specific 
parameters should be used to implement this concept or what 
alternate concepts can be proposed for a side impact strength design 
requirement?
    b. If the highway vehicle is likely to override the trainset 
unit floor structure, the trainset unit side structures shall be 
designed to resist the resulting forces without penetration of the 
highway vehicle into the occupied volume of the trainset unit.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
    (APTA believes the advanced bus design side penetration 
requirements should be considered as an option to the requirements 
proposed by FRA.)

10. Truck-to-Car-Body Attachment

    Tier I: The intent of the requirement in 49 CFR 229.141(a)(5) 
and (b)(5) is to keep the truck attached to the car body in the 
event of a derailment or rollover. In place of this requirement, new 
designs might be required to resist without failure a minimum force 
applied in any horizontal direction for the link which attaches the 
truck to the car body. The requirement under consideration is as 
follows:
    a. For all trainset units, ultimate strength of the truck-to-
car-body attachment shall be sufficient to resist without failure a 
force of 250,000 pounds or the force due to an acceleration of 4g 
acting in any direction on the mass of the truck, whichever is 
greater.
    b. The mass of the truck includes axles, wheels, bearings, 
truck-mounted brake system, suspension system components, and any 
other components attached to the truck.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

11. Strength of Attachment of Interior Fittings

    a. Seat Strength:
    Tier I:
    i. All seat components shall be designed to withstand loads due 
to the impact of passengers at a relative speed of 25 mph.
    ii. The seat back shall include shock-absorbent material to 
cushion the impact of passengers with the seat ahead of them.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
    b. Seat Attachment Strength:
    Tier I:
    i. Passenger and crew seats shall be securely fastened to the 
car structure in a manner so as to withstand an acceleration of 4g 
acting in the vertical direction on the deadweight of the seat or 
seats, if a tandem unit.
    ii. The ultimate strength of a seat attachment must be such that 
the seat attachment is able to resist the longitudinal inertial 
force of 8g acting on the mass of the seat plus the impact force of 
the mass of the passenger(s) being decelerated from a relative speed 
of 25 mph.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
    (APTA questions the basis for the seat strength and seat 
attachment strength requirements. APTA also believes the 
requirements should apply only to passenger seats, not to crew 
seats.)
    c. Other Interior Fittings:
    Tier I: Other interior fittings shall be attached to the car 
body with sufficient strength to withstand accelerations of 8g/4g/4g 
acting longitudinally/laterally/vertically on the mass of the 
fitting.
    Tier II: In addition to the Tier I requirement provided above, 
the following is required:
    The ultimate strength of a locomotive cab interior fitting and 
equipment attachment shall be sufficient to resist without failure 
loads due to accelerations of 12g/4g/4g longitudinally/laterally/
vertically acting on the mass of the fitting or equipment.
    (APTA recommends a 3g/3g/3g requirement for the strength of 
attachment of interior fittings for both Tier I and Tier II 
equipment.)
    d. Luggage Stowage Compartment Strength:
    Tier I:
    i. Luggage stowage compartments shall be of enclosed aircraft 
type.
    ii. Ultimate strength shall be sufficient to resist loads due to 
accelerations acting longitudinally/laterally/vertically of 8g/4g/4g 
on the mass of the luggage stowed.
    (APTA recommends the following requirement for Tier I equipment: 
Passenger luggage stowage racks shall provide longitudinal restraint 
for stowed articles.)
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.
    (APTA recommends 3g/3g/3g for Tier II equipment luggage stowage 
compartments)
    e. Interior Surface Fittings:
    Tier I:
    i. To the extent possible, interior fittings shall be recessed 
or flush-mounted.
    ii. Corners and sharp edges shall be avoided.
    iii. Energy-absorbent material shall be used to pad surfaces 
likely to be impacted by passengers or crew members during 
collisions or derailments. (APTA recommends deleting this 
requirement.)
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

C. Glazing

    Tier I: As addressed in the body of the ANPRM, FRA believes that 
portions of the current glazing requirements in 49 CFR Part 223 may 
need to be revised to adequately protect crew members and 
passengers. In this proceeding or a separate future proceeding, FRA 
may ask for consideration of modifications to 49 CFR Part 223 to 
address the concerns listed below:
    1. The witness plate used for testing is too thick, allowing 
spalling of pieces of glass large enough to cause injury;
    2. The impact test using a 24-pound cinder block is not 
repeatable;
    3. Vendors or materials should be periodically recertified by an 
independent testing laboratory;
    4. The strength of the framing arrangement securing the glazing 
is neither specified nor tested; and
    5. Interior glass breakage in the event of a collision poses a 
significant hazard to passengers.
    Tier II: FRA believes that the following requirements address 
the concerns listed above, and also address additional issues 
necessary to provide adequate protection to crew and passengers in 
the higher risk environments in which Tier II equipment will be 
operating.
    1. Anti-Spalling Performance--.001 aluminum witness plate, 12 
inches from glazing surface, no marks in witness plate after any 
test.
    2. Bullet Impact Performance--Able to stop without spall or 
bullet penetration a single impact of a 9-mm, 147-grain bullet 
traveling at an impact velocity of 900 feet/second with no bullet 
penetration or spall.
    3. Large Object Impact Performance.
    a. End Facing--Impact of a 12-pound solid steel sphere at the 
maximum speed at which the vehicle will operate, at an angle equal 
to the angle between the glazing surface as installed and the 
direction of travel, with no penetration or spall.
    b. Side Facing--Impact of a 12-pound solid steel sphere at 15 
mph, at an angle of 90 degrees to the surface of the glazing, with 
no penetration.
    4. Small Object Impact Performance.
    a. Side Facing--Impact of a granite ballast stone with major and 
minor axes of no

[[Page 30708]]

greater than 10 percent difference in length, weighing a minimum of 
0.5 pounds, travelling at 75 mph, impacting at a 90-degree angle to 
the glazing surface, with no penetration or spall.
    5. Frame Strength--Frame holds glazing in place against all 
forces that do not cause glazing penetration.
    6. Passing Trains--Glazing and frame shall resist the forces due 
to air pressure differences caused by trains passing with the 
minimum separation for two adjacent tracks while traveling in 
opposite directions, each traveling at maximum speed.
    7. Interior Glazing--Interior trainset glazing shall meet the 
minimum requirements of AS1 type laminated glass as defined in 
American National Standard ``Safety Code for Glazing Materials for 
Glazing Motor Vehicles Operating on Land Highways,'' ASA Standard 
Z26.1-1966.

D. Emergency Systems--Each Unit and Each Level of Bi-Level Units

    Tier I:
    1. Emergency Lighting.
    a. Illumination level shall be a minimum of 5 foot-candles at 
floor level for all potential trainset evacuation routes.
    b. A back-up power system capable of operating all emergency 
lighting for a period of at least two hours shall be provided.
    c. The back-up power system shall be capable of operation in all 
trainset unit orientations. (APTA recommends adding ``within 45 
degrees of vertical'' to the end of this requirement.)
    d. The back-up power system shall be capable of operation after 
the initial shock of a collision or derailment. (APTA proposes a 3g 
shock load.)
    2. Emergency Communication.
    a. Both interior and exterior locations of emergency 
communications equipment shall be specified. Exterior locations must 
be compatible with communication equipment normally carried by 
emergency response personnel. Interior locations must be provided at 
both ends of every level of passenger units, for passengers to 
communicate emergency conditions to the trainset operator.
    b. Back-up power--Emergency communication system back-up power 
shall be provided for a minimum time period of two hours.
    c. Clear, concise instructions for emergency use shall be posted 
at all potential evacuation locations.
    (APTA recommends that these requirements be deferred to the 
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group.)
    3. Emergency Equipment.
    a. Locations of emergency equipment shall be clearly marked.
    b. Clear, concise instructions for use of emergency equipment 
shall be posted at each location.
    (APTA recommends that these requirements be deferred to the 
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness Working Group.)
    4. Emergency Exits.
    a. Locations of emergency exits shall be clearly marked and 
lighted.
    (APTA recommends eliminating lighted)
    b. Clear, concise instructions for use of the emergency exits 
shall be posted at each location.
    c. Number of exits required:
    i. Four windows--one located at each end of each side--of a 
passenger coach shall operate as emergency exits.
    ii. If the coach is bi-level, four windows--one located at each 
end of each side--on each level shall operate as emergency exits.
    iii. For special design cars, such as sleepers, each compartment 
shall have at least one emergency exit.
    d. Size--Passenger coach sealed window emergency exits shall 
have a minimum free opening of 30 inches wide by 30 inches high. 
(APTA recommends 18 inches wide by 24 inches high.)
    e. Each locomotive or power cab shall have a minimum of one roof 
hatch emergency exit with either a minimum opening of 18 inches by 
24 inches or a clearly marked structural weak point in the roof to 
provide quick access for properly equipped emergency personnel. 
(APTA recommends eliminating this requirement.)
    f. Each passenger coach or passenger service car shall be 
equipped with either a minimum of two roof hatch emergency exits 
with a minimum opening of 18 inches by 24 inches (APTA recommends 
eliminating the size requirement) or a clearly marked structural 
weak point in the roof to provide quick access for properly equipped 
emergency personnel.
    g. Each emergency exit shall be easily operable by passengers 
and crew members without requiring the use of any special tools.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

E. Doors (APTA recommends this section apply only to exterior 
powered side doors.)

    Tier I:
    1. The status of exterior doors shall be displayed to the crew. 
If door interlocks are used, the sensors used to detect train motion 
shall be accurate to within 2 mph.
    2. Doors shall be powered by the emergency back-up power system.
    3. Doors shall be equipped with a manual override that can be 
used to open doors without power both from outside and inside the 
trainset. Instructions for manual override shall be clearly posted 
in the car interior at door locations.
    4. Doors shall be easily operable by passengers and crew members 
following a derailment or collision without requiring the use of any 
special tools to accomplish the manual override in the event of 
head-end power loss.
    5. Doors shall open outward to facilitate timely egress in the 
event of a collision or derailment.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

F. Fuel Tanks

    Tier I:
    1. External Fuel Tanks.
    a. Height off rail--With all locomotive wheels resting on the 
ties beside the rail, the lowest point of the fuel tank shall clear 
an 8.5-inch combined tie plate/rail height by a minimum of 1.5 
inches. This requirement results in a minimum 10-inch vertical 
distance from the lowest point on the wheel tread to the lowest 
point on the fuel tank.
    b. Bulkhead and skin--material, thickness, and strength.
    i. Bulkheads--1-inch steel plate with 25,000 psi yield strength. 
Higher yield-strength steel may be used to decrease the thickness 
required as long as equivalent strength is maintained.
    ii. Skin--1/2-inch steel plate with 25,000 psi yield strength or 
equivalent. Higher yield-strength steel may be used to decrease the 
thickness required as long as equivalent strength is maintained.
    iii. The material used for construction of fuel tank exterior 
surfaces shall not exhibit a decrease in yield strength or 
penetration resistance in the temperature range of 0 to 160  deg.F.
    c. Compartmentalization--The interior of fuel tanks shall be 
divided into a minimum of four separate compartments designed so 
that a penetration in the exterior skin of any one compartment shall 
result in loss of fuel only from that compartment.
    d. Vent system spill protection--Fuel tank vent systems shall be 
designed to prevent them from becoming a path of fuel loss in the 
event the tank is placed in any orientation due to a locomotive 
overturning.
    e. The bottom surface of the fuel tank shall be equipped with 
skid surfaces to prevent sliding contact with the rail or the ground 
from easily wearing through the tank.
    f. Structural Strength--The structural strength of the tank 
shall be adequate to support 1.5 times the dead weight of the 
locomotive without deformation of the tank.
    2. Internal Fuel Tanks.
    a. ``Internal fuel tank'' is defined as a tank whose lowest 
point is at least 18 inches above the lowest point on the locomotive 
wheel tread and that is enclosed by, or is part of, the locomotive 
structure.
    b. Compartmentalization--The interior of fuel tanks shall be 
divided into a minimum of four separate compartments designed so 
that a penetration in the exterior skin of any one compartment shall 
result in loss of fuel only from that compartment.
    c. Vent system spill protection--Fuel tank vent systems shall be 
designed to prevent them from becoming a path of fuel loss in the 
event the tank is placed in any orientation due to a locomotive 
overturning.
    d. Internal fuel tank bulkheads and skin shall be 3/8-inch steel 
plate with 25,000-lb yield strength or material with equivalent 
strength. Skid plates are not required.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

G. Cab Controls, Interior and Safety Features

    Tier I:
    1. Slip/Slide Alarms (49 CFR 229.115).
    a. Each power vehicle/control cab shall be equipped with an 
adhesion control system designed to automatically detect a loss of 
adhesion during power application and then reduce power to limit 
wheel slip. (APTA recommends eliminating this requirement.)
    b. The adhesion control system shall also automatically adjust 
the braking force on

[[Page 30709]]

each wheel to prevent sliding during braking. In the event of a 
failure of this system to prevent wheel slip/slide within preset 
parameters, a visual and/or audible wheel slip/slide alarm shall 
alert the train operator. The slip/slide alarm shall alert the 
operator in the cab of the controlling power vehicle/control car to 
slip/slide conditions on any powered axle of the train. (APTA 
recommends eliminating this requirement.)
    c. Each powered axle shall be monitored for slip/slide. (APTA 
recommends moving this requirement to passenger equipment power 
brake rules.)
    2. Operator controls in the power vehicle/control cab shall be 
arranged to be comfortably within view and within easy reach when 
the operator is seated in the normal train control position.
    3. The control panels shall be laid out to minimize the chance 
of human error.
    4. Control panel buttons, switches, levers, knobs, etc., shall 
be distinguishable by sight and by touch.
    5. An alerter shall be provided. The alerter may allow the 
operator freedom of movement in the control cab but shall not allow 
the operator to move outside the area in which control of the train 
is exercised while the train is in motion.
    6. Cab Information Displays.
    a. Simplicity and standardization shall be the driving criteria 
for design of formats for the display of information in the cab.
    b. Essential, safety-critical information shall be displayed as 
a default condition.
    c. Operator selection shall be required to display other than 
default information.
    d. Cab/train control signals shall be available as a display 
option for the operator.
    e. Displays shall be easy to read from the operator's normal 
position under all lighting conditions.
    7. Pilots, Snowplows, Endplates.
    a. The power vehicle/control cab car shall be equipped with a 
structurally substantial endplate, pilot or snowplow which extends 
across both rails of the track.
    b. The height of the endplate, pilot, or snowplow shall be 
greater than 3 inches and less than 6 inches off the rails.
    8. Headlights (49 CFR 229.125)
    a. The power vehicle/control cab shall be equipped with more 
than one headlight producing no less than 200,000 candela.
    b. The headlights shall be focused to illuminate a person 
standing between the rails at 800 feet (1000 feet for Tier II) under 
clear weather conditions.
    9. Crew's Field of View.
    a. The cab layout shall be arranged so the crew has an effective 
field of view in the forward direction and to the right and left of 
the direction of travel.
    b. Field-of-view obstructions due to required structural members 
shall be minimized.
    c. The crew's position in the cab shall be located to permit the 
crew to be able to directly observe traffic approaching the train 
from either side of the train. (APTA recommends this requirement be 
revised to be measurable or be eliminated.)
    10. Seat Placement/Features.
    Seats provided for crew members shall:
    a. Be equipped with quick-release lap belts and shoulder 
harnesses.
    b. Be secured to the car body with an attachment having an 
ultimate strength capable of withstanding the loads due to 
accelerations of 12g/4g/4g acting longitudinally/laterally/
vertically on the mass of the seat and the crew member occupying it. 
(APTA recommends a 3g/3g/3g requirement that applies only to the 
mass of the seat.)
    c. Be designed so all adjustments have the range necessary to 
accommodate a 5th-percentile female to a 95th-percentile male.
    d. Be equipped with lumbar support that is adjustable from the 
seated position.
    e. Be equipped with force-assisted, vertical-height adjustment, 
operated from the seated position.
    f. Have manually reclining seat backs, adjustable from the 
seated position.
    g. Have adjustable headrests.
    h. Have folding, padded armrests.
    (APTA recommends that these requirements only apply to floor 
mounted seats.)
    11. Impact Mitigation.
    a. Sharp edges and corners shall be eliminated from the interior 
of the cab.
    b. Interior surfaces of the cab likely to be impacted by crew 
members during a collision or derailment shall be padded with shock-
absorbent material.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

H. Fire Safety

    Tier I:
    1. A Fire Protection Engineering Plan shall be developed as part 
of the system planning process.
    a. The fire protection engineering plan shall identify and 
evaluate the major sources of fire risk. (APTA recommends that this 
requirement be deleted.)
    b. The plan shall describe the design steps taken to delay the 
onset of lethal conditions until the fire can be detected, the train 
stopped and all personnel safely evacuated. (APTA recommends that 
this requirement be deleted.)
    2. The trainset ventilation system shall be designed so as not 
to contribute to the spread of flames or products of combustion.
    3. Trainset roof design shall prevent high-voltage arcs from 
overhead catenaries from penetrating the skin or shell of the 
occupied spaces in the trainset. The roof shall not be susceptible 
to ignition due to high-voltage arcing. (APTA recommends that this 
requirement be deleted.)
    4. Where possible, components that are potential sources of fire 
ignition shall be located outside occupied volumes and shall be 
separated from occupied volumes by a structural fire-resistant 
barrier. (APTA recommends that this requirement be deleted.)
    5. Portions of the trainset structure separating major sources 
of ignition, of energy storage, or of fuel loading from the occupied 
volumes of the trainset shall have sufficient resistance to fire, 
smoke and fume penetration to allow time for fire detection and safe 
evacuation of the trainset. (APTA recommends that this requirement 
be deleted.)
    6. All materials and finishes used or installed in the 
construction of the trainset shall have sufficient resistance to 
fire, smoke and fume production to allow sufficient time for fire 
detection, for the trainset to stop, and for safe evacuation of 
passengers before lethal conditions develop. (APTA recommends that 
this requirement be deleted.)
    7. At a minimum, the materials used for the construction of cab 
interiors including but not limited to walls, floors, ceilings, 
seats, doors, windows, electrical conduits, air ducts and any other 
internal equipment shall meet FRA guidelines published in the 
Federal Register on January 17, 1989. (See 54 FR 1837, ``Rail 
Passenger Equipment; Reissuance of Guidelines for Selecting 
Materials to Improve Their Fire Safety Characteristics''; see also 
the latest National Fire Protection Association ``NFPA 130, Standard 
for Fixed Guideway Transit Systems.'')
    8. Detection and Suppression.
    a. Fire extinguishers shall be placed in each unit.
    b. All trainset components with a potential to overheat in the 
event of a malfunction to the extent they could be the source of an 
on-board fire shall be equipped with overheat warning devices. These 
components shall include, but not be limited to:
    i. Diesel Engines;
    ii. Traction Motors;
    iii. Dynamic Brake Energy Dissipation System Components;
    iv. Transformers;
    v. Inverters; and
    vi. Head-End Power Generation Systems.
    (APTA recommends that the system safety plan determine how to 
handle components that could overheat rather than requiring 
detection devices.)
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

I. Electrical System Design

    No one specific, industry electrical standard adequately 
addresses all of the electrical safety issues relating to the 
operation of a trainset. As safe operation of trains becomes more 
dependent on electronic technology, reliable electrical and 
electronic systems become crucial. The industry standard most 
appropriate for each major component of the trainset electrical 
system needs to be carefully selected.
    The requirements provided below are intended for Tier I and Tier 
II equipment, as applicable.
    1. Conductor Sizes--Conductor sizes shall be selected on the 
basis of current-carrying capacity, mechanical strength, 
temperature, flexibility requirements and maximum allowable voltage 
drop. Current-carrying capacity shall be derated for grouping and 
for operating temperature in accordance with nationally recognized 
standards.
    2. Circuit Protection.
    a. The main propulsion power line shall be protected with a 
lightning arrestor, automatic circuit breaker and overload relay. 
The lightning arrestor shall be run by the most direct path possible 
to ground with a connection to ground of not less than No. 6 AWG. 
These overload protection devices shall be housed in an enclosure 
designed specifically for that purpose with arc chute vented 
directly to outside air.

[[Page 30710]]

    b. Head end power including trainline power distribution shall 
be provided with both overload and ground fault protection.
    c. Circuits used for purposes other than propelling the trainset 
shall be connected to their power source through correctly sized 
circuit breakers or circuit breaking contactors.
    d. Each auxiliary circuit shall be provided with a circuit 
breaker located as near as practical to the point of connection to 
the source of power for that circuit. Such protection may be omitted 
from circuits controlling crucial safety devices.
    3. Battery System.
    a. The battery compartment shall be isolated from the cab by a 
non-combustible barrier.
    b. Battery chargers shall be designed to protect against 
overcharging.
    c. Battery circuits shall include an emergency battery cut-off 
switch to completely disconnect the energy stored in the batteries 
from the load.
    d. If batteries are of the type to potentially vent explosive 
gases, the battery compartment shall be adequately ventilated to 
prevent accumulation of explosive concentrations of these gases.
    4. Power Dissipation Resistors.
    a. Power dissipating resistors shall be adequately ventilated to 
prevent overheating under worst-case operating conditions.
    b. Power dissipation grids shall be designed and installed with 
adequate air space between resistor elements and combustible 
material.
    c. Power dissipation resistor circuits shall incorporate warning 
or protective devices for low ventilation air flow, over-temperature 
and short circuit failures.
    d. Resistor elements shall be electrically insulated from 
resistor frames, and the frames shall be electrically insulated from 
the supports that hold them.
    e. The current value used to determine the size of resistor 
leads shall not be less than 120 percent of the RMS load current 
under the most severe operating conditions.
    5. Electromagnetic Interference/Compatibility.
    a. No trainset system shall produce electrical noise that 
interferes with trainline control and communications or with wayside 
signaling systems.
    b. To contain electromagnetic interference emissions, 
suppression of transients shall be at the source wherever possible.
    c. Trainset electrical/electronic systems shall be capable of 
operation in the presence of external electromagnetic noise sources.
    d. All electronic equipment shall be self-protected from damage 
and/or improper operation due to high voltage transients and long-
term over-voltage or under-voltage conditions.

J. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

    Tier I: The operating railroad shall provide detailed 
information on the inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures 
necessary for long-term safe operation of the trainset. This 
information should include:
    1. Testing Procedures/Intervals;
    2. Scheduled Preventive Maintenance;
    3. Maintenance Procedures;
    4. Special Testing Equipment; and
    5. Training of Mechanical Forces.
    Tier II: Same requirements as above for Tier I equipment.

K. Brake System

    Existing brake system equipment must meet the applicable 
requirements of 49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232, and 49 U.S.C. 
Chapters 203 and 207 as they relate to the specific equipment and 
operation.
    FRA has recognized that the current regulations fail to 
adequately delineate between requirements for conventional freight 
braking systems and the more diverse systems for various categories 
of passenger service. FRA also recognizes that the regulations 
should be updated to recognize the contemporary electronic systems 
that are used to control elements of power brake systems.
    In response to the above concerns, FRA published a NPRM for 
power brake regulations in September 1994. Four public hearings were 
held to discuss particular issues regarding the proposed rules, and 
FRA is in the process of reviewing comments received for inclusion 
in a revision to the original proposed rule.
    Proposed brake system design requirements for Tier I and II 
equipment will be determined by the Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards Working Group using the information on passenger equipment 
brakes accumulated in docket PB-9 in response to the NPRM on power 
brakes.

L. Automated Monitoring and Diagnostics

    As train speed increases, the human decision and reaction time 
necessary to avoid potential calamity decreases. Automatic control 
techniques that briefly take the operator out of the control loop 
are a means to eliminate the delays associated with human decision 
and reaction in situations where taking quick and positive action 
can be crucial. (APTA recommends that this paragraph be deleted.)
    Tier I: There are no current requirements for Tier I equipment 
to incorporate automatic monitoring and control measures as 
described above. Specific functions are identified below for Tier II 
equipment, as increased train speeds and higher risk operating 
environments make reactions to these functions more time-sensitive 
with respect to safety. If the functions identified below can be 
shown to be practically and economically feasible in Tier I 
equipment, implementation should be considered. (APTA recommends no 
such requirements for Tier I equipment.)
    Tier II:
    1. The trainset shall be equipped with a system that monitors 
the performance of the following safety-critical items:
    a. Reception of Cab Signals/Train Control Signals;
    b. Truck Hunting;
    c. Dynamic Brake Status;
    d. Friction Brake Status;
    e. Fire Detection Systems;
    f. Head End Power Status;
    g. Alerter;
    h. Horn and Bell;
    i. Wheel Slip/Slide; and
    j. Tilt System, if so equipped.
    2. The monitoring system shall alert the operator when any of 
the monitored parameters are out of predetermined limits. In 
situations where the system safety analysis indicates that operator 
reaction time is crucial to safety, the monitoring system shall take 
immediate, automatic corrective action such as limiting the speed of 
the train.
    3. The self-monitoring system shall be designed with an 
automatic self-test feature that notifies the operator that the 
system is functioning correctly.

M. Trainset System Software

    The requirements provided below are intended for Tier I and Tier 
II equipment, as applicable.
    1. Software used to monitor and control trainset safety features 
or functions shall be treated as safety-critical.
    2. A formal system software safety program shall be used to 
develop the system software. This program shall include a software 
hazard analysis and thorough software design walk-through and 
verification tests to ensure software is reliable and designed to be 
fail-safe.
    (APTA recommends that Section M be eliminated.)

N. Trainset Hardware/Software Integration

    The requirement provided below is intended for Tier I and Tier 
II equipment, as applicable.
    1. A comprehensive hardware/software integration program shall 
be planned and conducted to demonstrate that the software functions 
as intended when installed in a hardware system identical to that to 
be used in service.

O. Suspension System Design Requirements

    Tier I: FRA does not currently address suspension system 
requirements for passenger equipment.
    Tier II:
    1. The suspension system shall be designed so no single wheel 
lateral to vertical force
(L/V) ratio is greater than 0.8 for a duration required to travel 3 
feet at any operating speed or over any class of track used by the 
trainset unless the axle sum ratio is less than 1.0. The L/V should 
be measured with an instrument with a band pass of 0 to 25 Hz.
    2. Net axle lateral force may not exceed 0.5 times the static 
vertical axle load.
    3. The minimum vertical wheel/rail force shall be a minimum of 
10 percent of the static vertical wheel load.
    4. The maximum truck side L/V ratio shall not exceed 0.5.
    5. When positioned on track with a uniform 6-inch 
superelevation, trainsets shall have no wheel unload to a value less 
than 60 percent of its static value on perfectly level track.
    6. When the equipment is positioned on level, tangent track, and 
any one wheel is raised by three inches, no other wheel of the 
equipment shall unload to a value of less than 0.65 times the weight 
of the unit divided by the number of wheels supporting the unit. 
(Builders of passenger equipment take exception to this proposed 
requirement as too stringent. They prefer a more flexible 
requirement allowing individual railroads to

[[Page 30711]]

define wheel unloading requirements for safe operation under worst 
case track conditions for the intended use of the equipment. 
Compliance with this requirement must be demonstrated as part of the 
vehicle qualification tests.)
    7. All Tier II equipment shall be equipped with lateral 
accelerometers mounted above an axle of each truck. The 
accelerometer output signals shall be accurately calibrated and 
shall be passed through signal conditioning circuitry designed to 
determine if hunting oscillations of the truck are occurring. 
Hunting oscillations are defined as six or more consecutive 
oscillations having a peak acceleration in excess of 0.8g peak-to-
peak at a frequency of between 1 and 10 Hz. If hunting oscillations 
are detected, the train monitoring system shall provide an alarm to 
the operator and automatically slow the train to a speed where 
hunting oscillations no longer occur before returning total control 
of the trainset to the operator.
    8. Ride Vibration (Quality)--While traveling at the maximum 
operating speed over the intended route, the train suspension system 
shall be designed to:
    a. Limit the vertical acceleration as measured by a vertical 
accelerometer mounted over the leading truck of each trainset unit 
to no greater than 0.55g single event, peak-to-peak.
    b. Limit the lateral acceleration as measured by a lateral 
accelerometer mounted over the leading truck of each trainset unit 
to no greater than 0.3g single event, peak-to- peak.
    c. Limit the combination of lateral and vertical events 
occurring within any time period of 2 consecutive seconds to the 
square root of (V2+L2) to no greater than 0.604--where L 
may not exceed 0.3g and V may not exceed 0.55g.
    9. If hunting oscillations are detected on any equipment in the 
train, the maximum speed of that train shall be limited to 10 mph 
less than the speed at which hunting stops as the train speed is 
decreased from the initial hunting speed.
    10. If the ride quality limitations of paragraph 8 of this 
section are exceeded, the operating speed shall be restricted to 
that which would result in a peak-to-peak lateral acceleration no 
greater than 0.25g and a peak-to- peak vertical acceleration no 
greater than 0.5g.
    11. Passenger cars of a non-tilting design shall not operate 
under conditions resulting in a cant deficiency of greater than 6 
inches or that corresponds to a steady-state lateral acceleration of 
0.1g, whichever is less.
    12. Trainsets of a tilting design shall not operate under 
conditions resulting in a cant deficiency greater than 9 inches or 
that corresponds to a steady-state lateral acceleration of 0.1g 
(measured parallel to the car floor), which ever is less.
    13. All wheels shall be heat treated, curved-plate type or a 
design with equivalent resistance to thermal abuse.
    14. Bearing overheat sensors are required. These are not 
required to be on board, and may be placed at reasonable wayside 
intervals. Periodic bearing inspection required at 50 percent of the 
L10 life at a load factor of 2.

P. General Locomotive/Power Car Design Requirements

    Tier I: 1. All moving parts, high voltage equipment, electrical 
conductors and switches, and pipes carrying hot fluids or gases 
shall be installed in non-exposed locations or shall be 
appropriately equipped with interlocks or guards to minimize the 
chance of personal injury. (APTA recommends eliminating this 
requirement for Tier I equipment.)
    Tier II: Same requirement as above for Tier I equipment.

Q. Power Vehicle/Control Cab Health and Comfort Design Features

    Issues under this heading may be added to this proceeding 
following submission of FRA's Report to Congress on Locomotive 
Crashworthiness and Working Conditions.

R. Coupler/Draft System Performance (Only Leading and Trailing 
Couplers of Integral Trainsets)

    Note: This requirement is applicable only for use in integral 
trainsets, envisioned to be prevalent in the higher speed operating 
environments of Tier II equipment. Otherwise, guidance regarding 
coupler/draft system performance requirements remain as specified.
    Tier II: 1. Leading and trailing automatic couplers of the 
trainset shall be compatible with standard AAR couplers with no 
special adapters used. These couplers shall include automatic 
uncoupling devices that comply with the Safety Appliance Standards 
(49 CFR Part 231) and 49 U.S.C. 20302(a)(1)(A).
    2. The leading and trailing trainset unit's coupler/draft system 
design shall include an anti-climbing feature capable of resisting 
without failure a minimum vertical force between the coupled units 
in either the up or the down direction resulting from an 
acceleration of 1g acting on the total mass including trucks of the 
leading or trailing unit of the trainset. The coupler/draft system 
itself may fail (shear back type coupler) to allow the anti-climbing 
feature to engage.

S. Safety Appliance Design Requirements

    Tier I: Current safety appliance requirements are found at 49 
CFR Parts 229, 231 and 232, and 49 U.S.C. Chapters 203 and 207. 
(Existing requirements which are statutorily based cannot be changed 
by this rulemaking.)
    Tier II: 1. The leading and the trailing ends of the trainset 
shall be equipped with automatic couplers that:
    a. Couple on impact and allow uncoupling without necessitating a 
person going between cars; and
    b. Shall be activated either by a traditional uncoupling lever 
or some other means of automatic uncoupling mechanism that does not 
require a person to go between equipment units.
    2. Leading and trailing end automatic couplers and uncoupling 
devices may be stored within a shrouded housing, but shall be easily 
removed when required for emergency use.
    3. If the units of the trainset are semi-permanently coupled, 
with uncoupling done only at maintenance facilities, the trainset 
units need not be equipped with sill steps, end or side handholds.
    4. If the units of the trainset are coupled with automatic 
couplers, the units shall be equipped with sill steps, end handholds 
and side handholds that meet the requirements of 49 CFR 231.14.
    5. Passenger handrails or handholds shall be provided on both 
sides of steps used to board or depart the train.
    6. Power vehicle and control cab exits shall be equipped with 
handholds and sill steps.
    7. Safety appliance mechanical strength.
    a. All handrails and sill steps shall be made of 1-inch diameter 
steel pipe or \5/8\-inch thickness steel or a material of equal or 
greater mechanical strength.
    b. All safety appliances shall be securely fastened to the 
carbody structure with mechanical fasteners that have mechanical 
strength greater than or equal to that of a \1/2\-inch diameter SAE 
steel bolt mechanical fastener.
    8. Handrails.
    a. Throughout their entire length, handrails shall be a 
contrasting color to the surrounding vehicle body.
    b. Vertical handrails shall be installed so as:
    i. The maximum distance above the top of the rail to the bottom 
of the handrail shall be 51 inches and the minimum distance shall be 
21 inches.
    ii. To continue to a point at least equal to the height of the 
top edge of the control cab door.
    iii. Minimum hand clearance distance between the handrail and 
the vehicle body shall be 2\1/2\ inches for the entire length.
    iv. All vertical handrails shall be securely fastened to the 
vehicle body.
    v. If the length of the handrail exceeds 60 inches, it shall be 
securely fastened to the power vehicle body with two fasteners at 
each end.
    9. Sill steps.
    a. Each power vehicle or control cab shall be equipped with sill 
steps below each door.
    b. Power vehicle or control cab sill steps shall be a minimum 
cross-sectional area \1/2\ by 3 inches, of steel or a material of 
equal or greater strength and fatigue resistance.
    c. Sill steps shall be designed and installed so:
    i. The minimum tread length of the sill step shall be 10 inches.
    ii. The minimum clear depth shall be 8 inches.
    iii. The outside edge of the tread of the sill step shall be 
flush with the side of the power vehicle or cab car body structure.
    iv. Sill steps shall not have a vertical rise between treads 
exceeding 18 inches. The lowest sill step tread shall be not more 
than 20 inches above the top of the track rail.
    v. The sill step shall be a color which contrasts with the 
surrounding power vehicle body color.
    vi. All sill steps shall be securely fastened.
    vii. As a minimum, 50 percent of the tread surface area shall be 
open space.
    viii. The portion of the tread surface area which is not open 
space and is normally contacted by the foot shall be treated with an 
anti-skid material.
    10. Safety appliance mechanical fasteners.

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    a. Safety appliance mechanical fasteners shall have mechanical 
strength and fatigue resistance equal to or greater than a \1/2\-
inch diameter SAE steel bolt.
    b. Fasteners shall be installed with a positive means to prevent 
unauthorized removal.
    c. Fasteners shall be installed to facilitate inspection.
    11. Safety appliances installed at the option of the system 
operator shall be firmly attached with mechanical fasteners and 
shall meet the design and installation requirements given herein.
    12. If two trainsets are coupled to form a single train by an 
automatic coupler, the coupled ends must be equipped with end 
handholds, side handholds and sill steps. If the trainsets are semi-
permanently coupled, these safety appliances are not required.

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Appendix C.--AMTRAK Passenger Train Safety Inspection Criteria 
(Serves as a Sample Only)
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Appendix D--Economic Questions for Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards

    Economic questions which appear in the body of this document are 
posed to help FRA gain a clear understanding of what costs the 
industry would incur to meet possible passenger equipment safety 
standards. To estimate the total costs that the industry would incur 
as a result of complying with possible passenger equipment safety 
standards, we need to understand how performance of existing 
structures, equipment, programs, and procedures compare with what 
would be required to meet the standards. FRA also needs to gain a 
better understanding of both the qualitative and quantitative 
benefits associated with the requirements under consideration.
    FRA would appreciate receiving economic information from all 
concerned parties including individual passenger service operators 
and equipment manufacturers. Information regarding only one 
particular sector or operator is useful. Use of this information 
will result in a more accurate analysis of costs and benefits.

1. Questions on System Safety Plans

    Are any system safety plans or similar plans currently in use? 
How much would it cost (in terms of time and effort) to update 
existing or develop new system safety plans? On average, 
approximately how often would system safety plans have to be 
updated?
    How would system safety plans improve safety? Specifically, what 
areas of safety would be improved, by how much, and why? Please 
provide copies of any studies, data, or arguments which support your 
answer.

2. Questions on Pre-Departure or Daily Safety Inspections

    In terms of labor, materials, etc., what additional resources 
would each operator need to perform a pre departure inspection 
equivalent to Amtrak's? How many pre-departure or daily inspections 
are performed annually by each operator?
    What potential safety benefits would result from performing 
inspections equivalent to Amtrak's? Please explain/document 
estimates. For those currently performing inspections, what 
additional benefits could be realized by modifying those inspection 
procedures to meet Amtrak's? Please explain/document. What 
additional costs would result from performing inspections equivalent 
to Amtrak's, or for those operators currently performing 
inspections, what additional costs would be incurred by modifying 
inspection procedures to be equivalent to Amtrak's? Please explain/
document.

3. Questions on Periodic Testing and Maintenance

    Currently, what equipment is tested and maintained periodically? 
How often (in terms of miles or time) is this equipment tested and 
maintained? What do periodic tests and maintenance currently 
entail--labor, materials, etc.? What benefit(s)/costs would be 
associated with a periodic testing and maintenance requirement? 
Please explain.

4. Questions on Personnel Qualifications

    Currently, how many employees/contractors are involved in 
inspecting, testing, and maintaining a passenger car or locomotive? 
How many of these people are mechanical personnel? Are there 
established minimum training and qualification requirements for 
employees and contractors performing inspections, testing, and 
maintenance? Approximately how many labor hours does each passenger 
service operator spend each year on these activities?
    What are the potential benefits of increased training in 
periodic testing and maintenance? To what extent are expenditures on 
such training cost effective? Historically, does this type of 
training produce identifiable safety benefits? Please explain.

5. Questions on Tourist and Excursion Railroads

    Information available to FRA indicates that there are 
approximately 100 excursion railroads operating about 250 
locomotives and 1,000 passenger cars. Is this information correct? 
What size crews operate excursion and tourist trains? What is the 
average annual passenger car mileage for tourist and excursion 
railroads?
    What potential safety benefits are available from possible 
passenger equipment standards for tourist and excursion railroads? 
To what extent can these safety benefits be realized, and what will 
they cost? Please explain.

6. Questions on Private Passenger Cars

    How many private passenger cars are in operation? On average, 
how many miles do private passenger cars travel annually?
    What potential safety benefits are available from possible 
passenger equipment standards for private passenger car operators? 
To what extent can these safety benefits be realized, and what will 
they cost? Please explain.

7. Questions on Commuter Equipment and Operations

    Information available to FRA suggests that there are about 20 
commuter railroads nationwide operating roughly 5,400 passenger 
cars, 400 cab cars, 2,000 multiple unit locomotive pairs, and 400 
conventional locomotives. Are these estimates accurate? What size 
crews operate commuter trains? Approximately how many people stand 
on each train?
    As a result of implementing possible passenger equipment 
standards, would commuter operators realize different safety 
benefits and costs than intercity operators? Please explain.

8. Questions on Operations With Cab Car Forward and MUs

    What costs and benefits would be associated with alternatives 
for increasing crew and passenger protection in a head-on collision 
with a cab car leading?
    Data indicate that at least 400 cab cars operate as lead units. 
Is this estimate accurate? Approximately, how many trips are made 
each year with cab cars operating as lead units? At what maximum 
speeds do trains operate cab car forward?
    Information available to FRA suggests approximately 2,000 
multiple unit locomotive pairs operate as lead units. Is this 
estimate accurate? Approximately how many trips per year involve 
multiple unit locomotive pairs?

9. Questions on Operating Practices and Procedures

    a. What costs and potential benefits are associated with 
alternative measures to safeguard passenger movements in ground 
level stations?
    b. At what costs can alternative measures to mitigate risks of 
high-speed express trains through stations be implemented?

10. Questions on Equipment Design Standards

    a. What would be the likely costs associated with different 
alternatives available for ensuring that anticlimbers are loaded 
vertically during collisions?
    b. What costs would be associated with specifying a more 
effective anticlimber, stronger and full height collision posts, and 
full height corner posts on conventional passenger locomotives?
    c. How much would it cost to equip conventional passenger 
service locomotives with the type of strengthened fuel tanks 
discussed in Appendix B? What levels of safety benefits can be 
realized from strengthened/ruggedized fuel tanks?
    d. How many units have backup power systems currently in place? 
What would it cost to install a backup power system? What levels of 
safety benefits would result from backup power systems?
    How many coach units have backup emergency lighting? What would 
it cost to install a backup emergency lighting system? What 
rationale is used to determine whether a unit will have backup 
emergency lighting? To what extent would potential safety benefits 
be realized? Please explain.
    What would it cost to install roof hatches on cars?
    What options exist for enclosing existing luggage compartments? 
At what cost? To what extent would potential safety benefits from 
enclosing luggage compartments be realized? Please explain.
    e. What levels of benefits would be realized from modifying 49 
CFR Part 223 as suggested? At what cost would these benefits be 
realized?

11. Questions on Design Standards for High-Speed Equipment

    a. What costs would be associated with alternative approaches 
designed to prevent crushing or penetration of the occupied volume 
in power and coach cars? Please be specific in defining the 
alternative approach and its cost elements.
    b. How much would installation of alternative buckling delay 
systems cost in terms of labor hours and materials?
    c. What seat configurations do passenger cars operating at 
speeds greater than 80 mph have? If configurations vary, please 
explain the differences and why they vary. How many seats does the 
average passenger car have? If there is no such thing as an average 
passenger car, how many seats do the different types of passenger 
cars have? How many cars are there of each different type?

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    What costs would be involved with installation of lap belts, 
shoulder harnesses, and other safety restraints on passenger cars? 
To what extent would safety benefits be realized from installing 
safety restraints? Please explain.
    d. In terms of time, materials, and labor, what would 
installation of crash refuges (protected areas for the crew when a 
collision is unavoidable) in locomotives cost?

12. Question Regarding Size of Fleet Affected

    Information available to FRA suggests that there are about 8,200 
passenger cars and 970 conventional locomotives dedicated to rail 
passenger service in the United States. Is this information 
accurate?

13. Questions Regarding Ridership and Ticket Prices

    What ridership levels are experienced through the year? Would 
meeting the new higher standards described in Appendix B result in 
higher fares? If so, how much higher? Would a decrease in ridership 
be expected? If so, to what extent? Please explain the method of 
estimation. To which alternative forms of travel would any lost 
ridership be expected to switch? How has this conclusion been 
reached? What assumptions are made? FRA is interested in obtaining 
copies of studies or other documentation addressing the issue of 
passenger diversion from rail to other modes of travel as a result 
of new rail safety standards. What factors have the greatest effect 
on ridership levels: price, seat availability, trip time, 
variability in trip time, etc.?
[FR Doc. 96-14944 Filed 6-14-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P