[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 118 (Tuesday, June 21, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-15119]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: June 21, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Notice of Intent To Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement for Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile
Materials
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of Intent (NOI) to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (PEIS) for Long-Term Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials.
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SUMMARY: The changes in the aftermath of the Cold War have significant
implications for the management of weapons-usable fissile materials
(primarily plutonium and highly-enriched uranium). The large reductions
in nuclear weapons agreed to by the United States and Russia reduces
our national security requirements for fissile materials and, as a
result, storage and disposition decisions for these materials will be
required.
The national policy outlined by the President in September 1993 is
to seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, and to ensure that where
these materials already exist they are subject to the highest standards
of safety, security and international accountability. In addition, the
President has initiated a comprehensive review of long-term options for
plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation,
environmental, budgetary and economic considerations.
The Department of Energy (DOE), which is the agency responsible for
management, storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials
from United States nuclear weapons dismantlement and weapons production
processes, proposes to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) to evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all weapons-
usable fissile materials, and disposition of weapons-usable fissile
materials declared surplus to national defense needs by the President.
The results of the environmental analysis in the PEIS, information
from technical and economic studies, and national policy objectives
will form the basis for decisions regarding long-term storage of all
weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of surplus
weapons-usable fissile materials. The PEIS may be followed by project-
specific NEPA documents to the extent necessary to implement any
decisions.
The purpose of this NOI, which is the initial step in the NEPA
process, is to inform the public of the PEIS proposal, to solicit
public input, and to announce that a scoping process will be conducted
so that the public may express its opinions and views regarding the
alternatives to be considered and the scope of the issues to be
addressed in the PEIS.
Written comments on the scope of the PEIS for Storage and
Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials are invited from the
public. To ensure consideration in preparation of the PEIS, written
comments must be postmarked by October 17, 1994. Late comments will be
considered to the extent practicable. Public scoping workshops to
provide and discuss information, and receive oral comments on the scope
of the PEIS will be held during August and September 1994, both
regionally and in the vicinity of the sites which may be affected by
potential decisions and their implementation. DOE will announce the
location, date and time for these public scoping workshops in a
subsequent Notice in the Federal Register, and by other appropriate
means as early as practicable. The Department will endeavor to provide
30 days notice prior to any applicable workshops. Following this
scoping period, the Department will issue an Implementation Plan which
will describe, among other things, the scope of the PEIS, the
alternatives that will be analyzed, and the schedule for completing the
PEIS.
Note: A definition of terms is included at the end of this NOI.
ADDRESSES: Written comments on the scope of the PEIS, requests for
copies of Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, a
1994 report prepared by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
requests for copies of the PEIS Implementation Plan (when available),
and requests for copies of the PEIS or PEIS Executive Summary (when
available) should be sent to: U.S. Department of Energy, c/o Oak Ridge
Institute for Science & Education, P.O. Box 117, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-
0117, Attn: Robert Menard, EESD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE
NEPA process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of
NEPA Oversight, EH-25, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
National Policy Objectives
On September 27, 1993, the President outlined a major principle of
U.S. nonproliferation policy:
Our national security requires us to accord higher priority to
nonproliferation, and to make it an integral element of our
relations with other countries.
The policy further states that the U.S. will:
Seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles
of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium, and to ensure that where
these materials already exist they are subject to the highest
standards of safety, security and international accountability.
In addition, the President called upon the Government to:
Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for
plutonium disposition, taking into account technical,
nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic
considerations.
The Department's objectives in furtherance of this policy include:
To strengthen national and international arms control
efforts by providing an exemplary model for storage of all weapons-
usable fissile materials and disposition of surplus weapons-usable
fissile materials;
To ensure that storage and disposition of weapons-usable
fissile materials is carried out in compliance with environmental,
safety and health standards;
To minimize the prospect that surplus United States
weapons-usable fissile materials could be reintroduced into the
arsenals from which they came and therefore increasing the prospect of
reciprocal measures by Russia and other nuclear powers;
To minimize the risk that surplus United States weapons-
usable fissile materials could be obtained by unauthorized parties; and
To accomplish these objectives in a timely and cost-
effective manner.
Purpose of, and Need for, the PEIS
The Department of Energy (DOE), the agency responsible for
management, storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials
from United States nuclear weapons dismantlement and weapons production
processes, proposes to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (PEIS) to evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all
weapons-usable fissile materials, and disposition of weapons-usable
fissile materials declared surplus to national defense needs by the
President.
The results of the environmental analysis in the PEIS, information
from technical and economic studies, and national policy objectives
will form the basis for decisions regarding long-term storage of all
weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of surplus
weapons-usable fissile materials. The PEIS may be followed by project-
specific NEPA documents to the extent necessary to implement any
decisions.
The purpose of this NOI, which is the initial step in the NEPA
process, is to inform the public of the PEIS proposal, to solicit
public input, and to announce that a scoping process will be conducted
so that the public may express its opinions and views regarding the
alternatives to be considered and the scope of the issues to be
addressed.
Background
In early 1994, the National Academy of Sciences published a report,
Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. This study,
commissioned by the President's National Security Council, provides
information regarding management and disposition of surplus nuclear
materials, in particular plutonium. Copies of this National Academy of
Sciences report are available upon request to the address stated above.
In the United States, weapons-usable fissile nuclear materials are
currently stored at several DOE sites, including Pantex (Amarillo,
Texas), Hanford Site (Richland, Washington), Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho), Rocky Flats Plant (Denver, Colorado),
Savannah River Site (Aiken, South Carolina), Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (Livermore, California), Los Alamos National
Laboratory (Los Alamos, New Mexico), and Oak Ridge Reservation (Oak
Ridge, Tennessee).
The Department is currently performing vulnerability studies to
determine the environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) risks associated
with the current storage of plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU),
and other weapons-usable fissile materials. These studies will form the
basis for Departmental actions to ensure safe, secure interim storage
of weapons-usable fissile materials until the long-term storage or
disposition actions are implemented. In addition, plans for bilateral
or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and
verification of the surplus material in storage are being developed and
may require action. If any actions required to establish these interim
conditions are considered major federal actions that might have a
significant impact on the environment, appropriate NEPA analysis will
be prepared and documented prior to proceeding. The results of these
efforts will establish the interim condition of safe, controlled,
inspectable storage.
Recent nuclear arms reduction agreements and pledges, along with
Presidential decisions concerning what stocks of plutonium, HEU, and
other nuclear materials are to be reserved for national defense will
largely determine how much and when material will be declared
``surplus'' and will become available for disposition. Discussions are
ongoing with the Nuclear Weapons Council to determine what materials
are surplus and what must be maintained as a reserve. DOE anticipates
that these amounts will be identified so that the analysis planned for
the PEIS can address the storage and disposition alternatives.
Several kilograms of plutonium, or several times that amount of
HEU, are sufficient to make a nuclear weapon. Although both plutonium
and HEU can be used to make nuclear weapons, they pose different risks
and require different controls. HEU is produced by ``enriching''
natural uranium using one of several technologies, all of which are
complex isotopic separation technologies that require commitment of
significant funds and industrial resources. As stated by the National
Academy of Sciences in its study, HEU can be blended down with
naturally occurring, depleted or low-enriched uranium to make a low-
enriched uranium (LEU) reactor fuel that poses lower proliferation risk
and can return a substantial economic benefit. In fact, LEU is the fuel
for most of the world's nuclear power reactors.
In contrast, blending cannot reduce the proliferation risks of
plutonium because all plutonium isotopes can be used to make a nuclear
weapon. Separating plutonium from other elements with which it might be
mixed or from unirradiated reactor fuel containing plutonium requires
only well-understood chemical processing techniques. Thus, the
management of plutonium in any form is a greater challenge than the
management of HEU.
HEU Long-Term Storage and Disposition Alternatives
DOE has proposed to consolidate HEU into secure interim storage at
Oak Ridge in the Y-12 facility (see 59 FR 11783), and may reduce its
surplus by blending down some of the HEU. The resulting LEU could then
be made available for commercial sale.
The PEIS will consider the following alternatives for HEU
disposition: Blending down surplus HEU with other, more abundant,
naturally occurring uranium, depleted uranium or other LEU, to make LEU
for reactor fuel; and any other reasonable alternatives identified in
the scoping process. Additionally, the no-action alternative of
maintaining surplus HEU in a storage facility indefinitely will be
evaluated.
HEU can be made highly proliferation resistant by blending it down
into a LEU (less than 20 percent U-235), and there may be significant
economic benefits that would offset the costs associated with this
alternative. Consequently, alternatives which do not exploit the
economic value of the surplus HEU, such as blending it down into LEU,
are likely to be considered reasonable for disposition of most of the
surplus HEU. However, some HEU may have impurities that make this
material unacceptable as a reactor fuel when blended down and would
have to be disposed of as waste. For these materials, blending down to
less than 20 percent U-235 to prevent use in nuclear weapons, followed
by disposal as waste, may be the only reasonable alternative.
Plutonium Long-Term Storage and Disposition Alternatives
The Department proposes to use the report prepared by the National
Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons
Plutonium, as the starting point for evaluating alternatives regarding
the long-term storage and disposition of plutonium. The Academy
concluded that the existence of surplus fissile materials worldwide
constitutes a ``clear and present danger to national and international
security.'' The Academy further noted that:
None of the options yet identified for managing this material
can eliminate this danger; all they can do is to reduce the risk.
Moreover, none of the options for long-term disposition of excess
weapons plutonium can be expected to substantially reduce the
inventories of excess plutonium from nuclear weapons for at least a
decade.
As a result, the Academy recommended that:
It is important to begin now to build consensus on a road map
for decisions concerning long-term disposition of excess weapons
plutonium. Because disposition options will take decades to carry
out, it is critical to develop options that can muster a sustainable
consensus.
Standards for Action
In its report, the Academy identified standards for managing the
risks associated with surplus weapons plutonium. These standards
include:
The Stored Weapons Standard
The high standards of security and accounting applied to storage of
nuclear weapons should be maintained for weapons-usable fissile
materials throughout the process of dismantlement, storage and
disposition. The Academy concluded that storage should not be extended
indefinitely because of nonproliferation risks and arms reduction
objectives.
The Spent Fuel Standard
The National Academy of Sciences recommended that options for long-
term disposition of plutonium should seek to meet a ``spent-fuel
standard'' in which the plutonium is as inaccessible for weapons use as
the plutonium in spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.
The Department is seeking public comment on the appropriateness of
these standards as well as others.
Long-term Storage Alternatives
The Department proposes to evaluate alternatives for long-term
storage of plutonium, HEU and other weapons-usable fissile materials:
(1) In the current interim storage facilities (the no-action
alternative); (2) in facilities upgraded as necessary to comply with
current ES&H and design requirements; or (3) in a new consolidated
storage facility. Five candidate sites for a new consolidated long-term
storage were selected from those evaluated during the Reconfiguration
Program in preparation for development of the Reconfiguration PEIS,
addressing the nuclear weapons complex for the post-Cold War era. They
are the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Savannah River Site,
the Oak Ridge Reservation, the Pantex Plant, and the Nevada Test Site.
In addition, ongoing evaluation of interim storage sites may result in
other sites being considered reasonable alternatives for consolidated
long-term storage.
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (Including Other Surplus
Nuclear Materials Except HEU)
Controlled, interim storage will be required until the materials
are either placed into long-term storage or dispositioned into a more
proliferation resistant form. As mentioned previously, the alternatives
for disposition of plutonium and certain other surplus nuclear
materials were evaluated by the Academy. In general, the Academy
identified several broad alternatives for meeting the ``spent fuel
standard.''
Mixed Oxide fuel alternative, in which the surplus
plutonium would be used as fuel in existing, modified, or new nuclear
reactors, that would consume a fraction of the plutonium and embed the
rest in highly radioactive spent fuel similar to that now produced by
commercial power reactors, and which would be stored and ultimately
disposed of in a geologic repository;
Immobilization alternative, in which the surplus plutonium
would be vitrified or embedded in a ceramic or other material, either
alone or mixed with radioactive high-level wastes, to form glass or
ceramic logs for ultimate disposal in a geologic repository; and
Geologic disposition alternative, in which plutonium in
some other acceptable form would be placed directly in suitable
canisters and buried in deep boreholes drilled into the earth, or in a
mined geologic repository.
Beyond the Spent Fuel Standard
Because plutonium disposition alternatives meeting the ``spent fuel
standard'' result in a form that still entails a risk of use in
weapons, and because the barriers to use diminish with time as the
radioactivity decays, it will be prudent to consider further steps to
reduce long-term proliferation risks. Thus, the alternatives that
result in the plutonium becoming essentially inaccessible or destroyed
include:
Accelerator based conversion, in which a large fraction of
plutonium would be fissioned in a sub-critical reactor aided by
neutrons produced by an accelerator; and
``Deep Burn'' Reactors, in which the plutonium is
fissioned so completely in reactors, without spent fuel reprocessing
and recycling, that only a small amount of plutonium would remain in
the spent nuclear fuel.
There may be other alternatives that are reasonable for disposition
of surplus plutonium (and other surplus weapons-usable fissile
materials) into a form which is substantially and inherently
proliferation resistant. The PEIS will include consideration of any
other reasonable alternatives identified in the scoping process.
The purpose of the PEIS is to develop information to support
decision making concerning long-term storage of all plutonium, HEU, and
other weapons-usable material and disposition of the surplus plutonium
and other weapons-usable fissile materials so that the risk of
proliferation is minimized. Some of the alternatives to accomplish
disposition may require substantial research and development, and could
entail subsequent NEPA analysis prior to any decision concerning
implementation.
The Academy study also considered plutonium disposition
alternatives that the Academy judged to be unreasonable. These
alternatives were: sub-seabed disposal; ocean dilution; underground
detonation; and disposal in space. Comments regarding these, and any
other alternatives, are encouraged to aid DOE in establishing the
reasonable PEIS alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium (and
other weapons-usable fissile materials).
The NEPA Process
This PEIS is being prepared pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C.
4321 et seq.) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
regulations (40 CFR parts 1500-1508). The reason for this PEIS is that
there might be significant environmental impacts from implementing
decisions on the long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable
fissile materials. Such decisions would be a major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the
meaning of NEPA and, therefore, requiring the preparation of an
environmental impact statement (EIS).
NEPA requires review of any major Federal action which may
significantly affect the quality of the human environment. The review
is documented through an EIS. The NEPA process is described in the CEQ
regulations implementing NEPA [40 CFR, Parts 1500-1508] and DOE NEPA
regulations at 10 CFR Part 1021. The draft and final PEIS will be
prepared in accordance with these requirements.
A PEIS is a broad-scope environmental analysis of a program or
policy [40 CFR 1500.4(i)]. A PEIS provides an opportunity for NEPA
review to coincide with meaningful points in agency planning and
decisionmaking [40 CFR 1502.4(b)]. A PEIS may be used to support later
NEPA documents of narrower scope (called ``tiering''), such as site-
specific or project-specific NEPA reviews. NEPA documents tiered from
the PEIS would focus on specific actions when they are ripe for review
[40 CFR 1502.20]. Following preparation of an EIS, an agency issues a
Record of Decision (ROD) to document its decision [40 CFR 1505.2]. The
ROD explains how the EIS analysis was balanced against other factors
leading to the agency's decision. DOE has determined that potential
decisions and their implementation regarding the long-term storage and
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials would be a major
Federal action within the meaning of NEPA; and that the several actions
which might be anticipated under this effort are connected [40 CFR
1508.25] and would constitute a broad agency program [40 CFR 1502.4].
Accordingly, DOE has decided that a PEIS is appropriate to analyze the
environmental consequences associated with long-term storage and
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials and to factor
environmental considerations into DOE decisions.
At this point in the NEPA process, all alternatives, especially
those identified for plutonium disposition, are broadly stated. This
has been done intentionally so that public input during scoping can be
optimally utilized to identify which alternatives should be
specifically addressed and which significant issues should be included
within the scope of the PEIS. Based on comments received during the
scoping process, the reasonable alternatives to be included in the
PEIS, a discussion of the methodology and the issues to be addressed
will be identified in a PEIS Implementation Plan.
Environmental Issues
The PEIS will identify and analyze direct, indirect, and cumulative
impacts resulting from the alternatives for potential decisions and
their implementation. The impact analyses will address the following
resources: air, water, land, biota, human health and safety, social and
economic, cultural, energy and minerals, transportation, and any other
issues identified as appropriate during the scoping process. The impact
analyses will be at the programmatic level for the proposed action and
each alternative and will not deal with specific site environmental
resource issues unless an alternative proposes a site-specific
activity. Subsequent to the decisions made upon the completion of this
PEIS, DOE may undertake site-specific actions based upon such decisions
and may also perform separate NEPA analyses on those actions prior to
any site implementation. Such analyses would include a detailed
examination of the site-specific environmental impacts of those
activities. DOE invites public comments specifically on the scope of
the PEIS analysis.
Classified Material
DOE plans to prepare the PEIS in unclassified form; however, DOE
will review classified material while preparing the PEIS. In the event
any classified material is included in the completed PEIS or its
associated Record of Decision (ROD), such material would be in a
classified appendix which would not be available for general public
review. This material would, however, be considered by DOE in reaching
a decision on long-term storage and disposition of fissile nuclear
materials. DOE will provide as much information as possible in
unclassified form to assist public understanding and input.
Other DOE NEPA Documents
There are several other NEPA documents in preparation by DOE that
have a direct bearing on this PEIS. These are:
The Reconfiguration PEIS which will no longer address
long-term storage of plutonium and HEU since the PEIS which is the
subject of this NOI will address alternatives for long-term storage of
all weapons-usable fissile material. The Reconfiguration PEIS will
continue to describe the remaining missions in the nuclear weapons
complex and will evaluate alternatives for tritium supply and recycle.
The Pantex Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
will address alternatives for interim storage of plutonium pits. This
interim storage of plutonium pits is part of the no-action alternative
for long-term storage of all plutonium which includes other forms of
plutonium, along with pits, and which will be addressed in this PEIS.
The Oak Ridge Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium
Environmental Assessment (EA) will address interim storage alternatives
for enriched uranium. This interim storage also forms part of the no-
action alternative for long-term storage of HEU which will be addressed
in this PEIS.
The Environmental Restoration and Waste Management PEIS
will address the programmatic level decisions for treatment, storage
and disposal of waste within the DOE complex. If any actions to dispose
of weapons-usable fissile materials result in a waste form, these waste
forms would be treated, stored and disposed of in accordance with the
decisions resulting from the Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management PEIS.
Other EIS's and EA's involving weapons-usable fissile
materials are or will be in progress for the purpose of establishing
the interim conditions for some of these materials.
Definitions
As used in this Notice of Intent, the following definitions apply:
Disposition is a process of use or disposal of materials
that results in the remaining material being converted to a form that
is substantially and inherently more proliferation-resistant than the
original form.
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is uranium which has an
isotopic content of uranium-235 of 20 percent or more.
Interim Storage refers to the safe, controlled,
inspectable storage facilities and conditions that will be established
in the near term and will remain in effect until the long-term storage
or disposition actions are implemented.
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) is uranium which has an
isotopic content of uranium-235 of less than 20 percent. Most
commercial reactor fuel is enriched to about 4 to 5 percent uranium-
235.
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials is used to refer to a
specific set of nuclear materials that may be utilized in making a
nuclear explosive for a weapon. Weapons-usable fissile materials
include uranium with uranium-235 isotopic content of 20 percent or
more, plutonium of any isotopic composition, and other isotopes such as
uranium-233, americium-241, and neptunium-237 which have been separated
from spent nuclear fuel or irradiated targets. The term weapons-usable
fissile materials does not include the fissile materials present in
spent nuclear fuel or irradiated targets from reactors.
Invitation to Comment
DOE invites comments on the scope of this PEIS from all interested
parties, including affected Federal, State and local agencies and
Indian tribes. DOE solicits comments regarding the scope of the PEIS
analysis, suggestions on significant environmental issues, alternatives
to be included in the PEIS, and other matters of content.
To ensure consideration of comments in preparing the draft PEIS,
written comments must be postmarked by October 17, 1994. Late comments
will be considered to the extent practicable. Agencies, organizations,
and the general public are invited to present oral comments pertinent
to preparation of the PEIS at public scoping workshops. DOE will also
accept written material at the workshops. Written and oral comments
will be given equal weight in the scoping process.
Public scoping workshops to provide information and discuss and
receive comments on the scope of the PEIS will be held during August
and September 1994, both regionally and in the vicinity of the sites
which may be affected by the proposed action. A national public scoping
workshop will also be held in Washington, DC. DOE will announce the
location, date and time for these public workshops in a subsequent
Notice in the Federal Register, and by other appropriate means as early
as practicable. The Department will endeavor to provide 30 days notice
prior to any applicable workshops. Advance registration to provide oral
comments at these workshops will be facilitated using an ``800 number''
that will be provided in the Federal Register notice. On-site
registration to provide oral comments will be accommodated to the
extent possible.
Signed in Washington, DC this 15th day of June 1994, for the
United States Department of Energy.
Tara O'Toole,
Assistant Secretary, Environment, Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 94-15119 Filed 6-20-94; 8:45 am]
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