99-15384. Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site  

  • [Federal Register Volume 64, Number 122 (Friday, June 25, 1999)]
    [Proposed Rules]
    [Pages 34316-34396]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 99-15384]
    
    
    
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    Part II
    
    
    
    
    
    Department of Transportation
    
    
    
    
    
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    Federal Aviation Administration
    
    
    
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    14 CFR Parts 417 and 420
    
    
    
    Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site; 
    Proposed Rule
    
    Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 122 / Friday, June 25, 1999 / 
    Proposed Rules
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    
    Federal Aviation Administration
    
    14 CFR Parts 417, 420
    
    [Docket No. FAA-1999-5833; Notice No. 99-07]
    RIN 2120-AG15
    
    
    Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site
    
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
    
    ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
    
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    SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation's (DOT or the Department) 
    Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing to amend its 
    commercial space transportation licensing regulations to add licensing 
    and safety requirements for the operation of a launch site. To date, 
    commercial launches have occurred principally at federal launch ranges 
    under safety procedures developed by federal launch range operators. To 
    enable the development and use of launch sites that are not operated by 
    a federal launch range, rules are needed to establish specific 
    licensing and safety requirements for operating a launch site, whether 
    that site located on or off of a federal launch range. These proposed 
    rules would provide licensed launch site operators with licensing and 
    safety requirements to protect the public from the risks associated 
    with activities at a launch site.
        A separate rulemaking will address licensing and safety 
    requirements for operation of a reentry site.
    
    DATES: Comments on the proposed regulations must be submitted on or 
    before September 23, 1999.
    
    ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposed rulemaking should be mailed or 
    delivered, in duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets, 
    Docket No. FAA-1999-5833, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Room Plaza 401, 
    Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also be sent electronically to the 
    following Internet address: [email protected] Comments may be filed 
    and/or examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays 
    except Federal holidays.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: J. Randall Repcheck, Licensing and 
    Safety Division (AST-200), Commercial Space Transportation, Federal 
    Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591; 
    telephone (202) 267-8602; or Laura Montgomery, Office of the Chief 
    Counsel (AGC-250), FAA, 800 Independence Avenue, Washington, DC 20591; 
    telephone (202) 267-3150.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
    
    Comments Invited
    
        Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by 
    submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. 
    Comments relating to the environmental, energy, federalism, or economic 
    impact that might result from adopting the proposals in this notice are 
    also invited. Substantive comments should be accompanied by cost 
    estimates. Comments must identify the regulatory docket or notice 
    number and be submitted in triplicate to the Rules Docket address 
    specified above.
        All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each 
    substantive public contact with FAA personnel on this rulemaking, will 
    be filed in the docket. The docket is available for public inspection 
    before and after the comment closing date.
        All comments received on or before the closing date will be 
    considered by the FAA before taking action on this proposed rulemaking. 
    Late-filed comments will be considered to the extent practicable, and 
    consistent with statutory deadlines. The proposals contained in this 
    Notice may be changed in light of the comments received.
        Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
    submitted in response to this notice must include a pre-addressed, 
    stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement 
    is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-5833.'' The postcard will be 
    date stamped and mailed to the commenter.
    
    Availability of NPRMs
    
        An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem 
    and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section 
    of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: 703-321-
    3339), the Government Printing Office's electronic bulletin board 
    service (telephone: 202-512-1661), or the FAA's Aviation Rulemaking 
    Advisory Committee Bulletin Board service (telephone: (800) 322-2722 or 
    (202) 267-5948). Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://
    www.faa.gov/avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm or the Government Printing Office's 
    webpage at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently 
    published rulemaking documents.
        Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request 
    to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 
    800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 
    267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number or docket 
    number of this NPRM.
        Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future 
    NPRM's should request from the above office a copy of Advisory Circular 
    No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution System, that 
    describes the application procedure.
    
    Outline of Notice of Proposed Rulemaking:
    
    I. Background
        A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role
        B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry
        C. Current Practices
    II. Discussion of Proposed Regulations
        A. License and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch 
    Site
        B. Explosive Site Plan Review
        C. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures
        D. Launch Site Location Review
        E. License Conditions
        F. Operational Responsibilities
    III. Part Analysis
    IV. Required Analyses
    
    I. Background
    
        The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified at 49 U.S.C. 
    Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701, Commercial Space 
    Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), authorizes the 
    Secretary of Transportation to license a launch or the operation of a 
    lunch site carried out by a U.S. citizen or within the United States. 
    49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the Secretary to exercise this 
    responsibility in the interests of public health and safety, safety of 
    property, and the national security and foreign policy interests of the 
    United States 49 U.S.C. 70105. On August 4, 1994, a National Space 
    Transportation Policy reaffirmed the government's commitment to the 
    commercial space transportation industry and the critical role of the 
    Department of Transportation (DOT) in encouraging and facilitating 
    private sector launch activities. A National Space Policy released on 
    September 19, 1996, notes and reaffirms that DOT is responsible as the 
    lead agency for regulatory guidance pertaining to commercial space 
    transportation activities.
    
    A. The FAA's Commercial Space Transportation Licensing Role
    
        On November 15, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation delegated 
    commercial space licensing authority to the Federal
    
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    Aviation Administration. The FAA licenses commercial launches and the 
    operation of launch sites pursuant to the Act and implementing 
    regulations at 14 CFR Ch. III. The commercial launch licensing 
    regulations were issued in April 1988, when no commercial launches had 
    yet taken place. Accordingly, DOT established a flexible licensing 
    process intended to be responsive to an emerging industry while 
    ensuring public safety. The Department noted that it would ``continue 
    to evaluate and, when necessary, reshape its program in response to 
    growth, innovation, and diversity in this critically important 
    industry.'' ``Commercial Space Transportation; Licensing Regulations,'' 
    53 FR 11,004, 11,006 (Apr. 4, 1988).
        Under the 1988 regulations, DOT implemented a case-by-case approach 
    to evaluating launch and launch site operator license applications. At 
    the time, it was envisioned that most commercial launches would take 
    place from federal launch ranges, which imposed extensive ground and 
    flight safety requirements on launch operators, pending the development 
    of commercial launch sites. The Federal launch ranges provided 
    commercial launch operators with facilities and launch support, 
    including flight safety services.
        Since 1988, DOT and now the FAA have taken steps designed to 
    simplify further the licensing process for launch operators. The 
    regulatory and licensing emphasis during the past decade has been on 
    launch operators. The emergence of a commercial launch site sector has 
    only become a reality during the past few years.
    
    B. Growth and Current Status of Launch Site Industry
    
        The commercial space transportation industry continues to grow and 
    diversify. Between the first licensed commercial launch in August 1989, 
    and June 1999, 113 licensed launches have taken place from five 
    different federal launch ranges, one from a launch site operated by a 
    licensed launch site operator and one has taken place from Spain. The 
    vehicles have included traditional orbital expendable launch vehicles, 
    such as the Atlas, Titan, and Delta, sub-orbital launch vehicles such 
    as the Starfire, new expendable launch vehicles using traditional 
    launch techniques, such as Athena and Conestoga, and unique vehicles, 
    such as the air-borne Pegasus. In a notice of proposed rulemaking 
    issued on March 19, 1997, 62 FR 13216, the FAA discussed how the 
    commercial launch industry has evolved from one relying on traditional 
    orbital and suborbital launch vehicles to one with a diverse mix of 
    vehicles using new technology and new concepts. A number of 
    international ventures involving U.S. companies have also formed, 
    further adding to this diversity.
        Development in cost savings and innovation are not confined to the 
    launch industry. The launch site industry, the focus of this NPRM, has 
    also made progress. Commercial launch site operations are coming on 
    line with the stated goal of providing flexible and cost-effective 
    facilities both for existing launch vehicles and for new vehicles. When 
    the commercial launch industry began, commercial launch companies based 
    their launch operations chiefly at federal launch ranges operated by 
    the Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space 
    Administration (NASA). Federal launch ranges that have supported 
    licensed launches include the Eastern Range, located at Cape Canaveral 
    Air Station in Florida (CCAS), and the Western Range located at 
    Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB), in California, both operated by the 
    U.S. Air Force; Wallops Flight Facility in Virginia, operated by NASA; 
    White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico, operated by the U.S. 
    Army; and the Kauai Test Facility in Hawaii, operated by the U.S. Navy. 
    Federal launch ranges provide the advantage of existing launch 
    infrastructure and range safety services. Launch companies are able to 
    obtain a number of services from a federal launch range, including 
    radar, tracking and telemetry, flight termination and other launch 
    services.
        Today, most commercial launches still take place from federal 
    launch ranges; however, this pattern may change as other launch sites 
    become more prevalent. On September 19, 1996, the FAA granted the first 
    license to operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International to 
    operate California Spaceport. That launch site is located within VAFB. 
    Three other launch site operators have received licenses. Spaceport 
    Florida Authority (SEA) received an FAA license to operate Launch 
    Complex 46 at CCAS as a launch site. Virginia Commercial Space Flight 
    Authority (VCSFA) received a license to operate Virginia Spaceflight 
    Center (VSC) within NASA's Wallops Flight Facility. Most recently, 
    Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) received a license to 
    operate Kodiak Launch Complex (KLC) as a launch site on Kodiak Island, 
    Alaska. The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC) 
    proposes to operate Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) adjacent to the 
    White Sands Missile Range as a site for reusable launch vehicles. It is 
    evident from this list that federal launch ranges still play a role in 
    the licensed operation of a number of launch sites. California 
    Spaceport, Spaceport Florida and VSC are located on federal launch 
    range property.
        Whether launching from a federal launch range, a launch site 
    located on a federal launch range, or a non-federal launch site, a 
    launch operator is responsible for ground and flight safety under its 
    FAA license. At a federal launch range a launch operator must comply 
    with the rules and procedures of the federal launch range. The safety 
    rules, procedures and practice, in concert with the safety functions of 
    the federal launch ranges, have been assessed by the FAA, and found to 
    satisfy the majority of the FAA's safety concerns. In contrast, when 
    launching from a non-federal launch site, a launch operator's 
    responsibility for ground and flight safety takes on added importance. 
    In the absence of federal launch range oversight, it will be incumbent 
    upon each launch operator to demonstrate the adequacy of its ground and 
    flight safety to the FAA.
    
    C. Current Practices
    
        Because of the time and investment involved in bringing a 
    commercial launch facility into being, several entities that have been 
    planning to establish these facilities asked the DOT for guidance 
    concerning the information that might be requested as part of an 
    application for a license to operate a launch site. In response to 
    these requests. DOT's then Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
    (Office) published ``Site Operators License, Guidelines for 
    Applicants,'' on August 8, 1995, as guidance for potential launch site 
    operators. The guidelines describe the information that DOT, and now 
    the FAA, expects from an applicant for a license to operate a 
    commercial launch site. This information includes launch site location 
    information, a hazard analysis, and a launch site safety operations 
    document that governs how the facility should be operated to ensure 
    public safety and the safety of property. The Office intended that the 
    guidelines would assist an applicant with the parts of the application 
    that are critical to assuring the suitability of the launch site 
    location, the applicant's organization, and the facility for providing 
    safe operations.
        The Office issued the guidelines as an interim measure for 
    potential developers of launch sites pending this
    
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    rulemaking, and the guidelines describe the information that the FAA 
    requests of an applicant as part of its application for a license to 
    operate a launch site. The pace of development of the launch site 
    industry has resulted in the FAA describing the process and 
    requirements for applications for launch site operator licenses under 
    the guidelines. As noted above, the FAA issued its first license to 
    operate a launch site to Spaceport Systems International for the 
    operation of California Spaceport. The FAA issued this license under 
    its general authority under 49 U.S.C. 70104 and 70105 and 14 CFR Ch. 
    III to license the operation of a launch site. Because the operation of 
    California Spaceport as a launch site occurs at a federal launch range, 
    the U.S. Air Force is expected to play a significant role in California 
    Spaceports's safety process. In fact, the FAA was able to review the 
    Spaceport Systems International application expeditiously because the 
    applicant certified its intention to observe the safety requirements 
    currently applied by the Western Range and contained in ``Eastern and 
    Western Range 127-1. Range Safety Requirements (EWR 127-1),'' (Mar. 
    1995).\1\ The FAA determined that applicant compliance with EWR 127-1, 
    together with Air Force approval of other important elements of the 
    operation of a launch site protected public health and safety and the 
    safety of property. In general, the FAA deems the compliance by a 
    licensed launch site operator with these requirements in combination 
    with other safety practices imposed by a federal launch range as 
    acceptable for purposes of protecting the public and property from 
    hazards associated with launch site activities at a licensed launch 
    site operator's facilities. In 1997, the FAA entered into a Memorandum 
    of Agreement with Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and 
    Space Administration regarding safety oversight of licensed launch site 
    operators located on federal launch ranges.
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        \1\ EWR 127-1 is updated on an ongoing basis. The latest version 
    of these requirements may be found at http://www.pafb.af.mil/45SW/.
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        Until these proposed rules become final, the guidelines provide the 
    only published criteria for guiding a prospective license applicant and 
    in identifying the criteria that the FAA uses in determining whether a 
    proposed commercial launch site is acceptable.
    Comparison of the Guidelines and the Proposed Regulations
        The existing guidelines will no longer be in effect once the 
    proposed regulations are issued as final rules. A comparison of some of 
    the similarities and differences may therefore prove of assistance. The 
    FAA will issue a license to operate a launch site under either the 
    guidelines or the proposed rules only if the operation of the launch 
    site will not jeopardize the public health and safety, the safety of 
    property, or national security or foreign policy interests of the 
    United States. The guidelines are flexible and are intended to identify 
    the major elements of an application and lead the applicant through the 
    application process with the FAA. The proposed rules would codify the 
    requirements that must be met before a license will be issued.
        The guidelines and the proposed rules share some common elements, 
    namely, the need for the applicant to supply information to support the 
    FAA's environmental determination under the National Environmental 
    Policy Act (NEPA) and the FAA's policy review that addresses national 
    security and foreign policy issues. These requirements are discussed in 
    detail below, in the description of the proposed regulations. Under the 
    proposed regulations, the information requirements for these reviews 
    remain for the most part unchanged from the guidelines.
        A review of the suitability of the proposed location of the launch 
    site is an important component of both the guidelines and the proposed 
    regulations. Although both approaches call for a site location review, 
    the reviews differ in breadth and specificity. The guidelines request 
    an applicant to provide information regarding geographic 
    characteristics, flight paths and impact areas and the meteorological 
    environment. To describe a launch site's geographic characteristics, an 
    applicant is requested to provide information regarding the launch site 
    location, size, and shape, its topographic and geological 
    characteristics, its proximity to populated areas, and any local 
    commercial and recreational activities that may be affected by launches 
    such as air traffic, shipping, hunting, and offshore fishing. An 
    applicant also provides planned possible flight paths and general 
    impact areas designated for launch. If planned flight corridors overfly 
    land, the guidelines request that an applicant provide flight safety 
    analyses for generic sets of launch vehicles and describe, where 
    applicable, any arrangements made to clear the land of people prior to 
    launch vehicle flight. With respect to the meteorological environment, 
    the guidelines request an applicant to provide data regarding 
    temperature, surface and upper wind direction and velocity, temperature 
    inversions, and extreme conditions that may affect the safety of launch 
    site operations. Under the guidelines, an application should include 
    the frequency (average number of days for each month) of extremes in 
    wind or temperature inversion that could have an impact on launch.
        In contrast, the proposed rules would require an applicant to use 
    specified methods to demonstrate the suitability of the launch site 
    location for launching at least one type of launch vehicle, including 
    orbital, guided sub-orbital, or unguided sub-orbital expendable launch 
    vehicles, and reusable launch vehicles. Each proposed launch point on 
    the launch site must be evaluated for each type of launch vehicle that 
    the applicant wishes to have launched from the launch point. An 
    applicant would be provided with a choice of methods to develop a 
    flight corridor for a representative launch of an orbital or guided 
    sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, or to develop a set of impact 
    dispersion areas for a representative launch of an unguided sub-orbital 
    expendable launch vehicle. If a flight corridor or set of impact 
    dispersion areas exists that does not encompass populated areas, no 
    additional analysis would be required. Otherwise, an applicant would be 
    required to conduct a risk analysis to demonstrate that the risk to the 
    public from a representative launch would not exceed a casualty 
    expectation (Ec) of 30  x  10-6. The FAA would 
    review the applicant's analyses to ensure the applicant's process was 
    correct, and would approve the launch site location if the 
    Ec risk criteria were met.
        Under either the guidelines or the proposed regulations, little or 
    no launch site location review would be needed if the applicant 
    proposed to locate a launch site at a federal launch range. The 
    fundamental purpose of the FAA's proposed launch site location review--
    to assure that a launch may potentially take place safely from the 
    proposed launch site--has been amply demonstrated at each of the 
    ranges. Exceptions may occur if a prospective launch site operator 
    plans to use a launch site at a federal launch range for launches 
    markedly different from past federal launch range launches, or if an 
    applicant proposes a new launch point from which no launch has taken 
    place.
        The guidelines and proposed regulations differ markedly in their 
    approach to ground and flight safety. For ground safety under the 
    guidelines, applicants perform a hazard analysis and develop a 
    comprehensive ground safety plan and a safety organization. Explosive 
    safety is part of the analysis
    
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    and safety plan. In contrast, the proposed regulations require the 
    submission of an explosive site plan, but impose fewer operational 
    ground safety responsibilities on a launch site operator. For flight 
    safety, under the guidelines and proposed rules, a launch site operator 
    license contains minimal flight safety responsibilities. The FAA 
    assigns almost all responsibility for flight safety and significant 
    ground safety responsibility to a licensed launch operator. Extensive 
    ground and flight safety requirements will accompany a launch license. 
    This does not mean a launch site operator cannot offer flight safety 
    services or equipment to its customers. However, the adequacy of such 
    service and equipment typically will be assessed in the FAA's review of 
    a launch license application.
    
    II. Discussion of Proposed Regulations
    
        The proposed regulations specify who must obtain a license to 
    operate a launch site, application requirements and licensee 
    responsibilities. Because a launch licensee's license covers ground 
    operations as well as the flight of a launch vehicle, a launch operator 
    is not required to obtain a license to operate a launch site. The FAA 
    is aware that a launch operator may select a launch site for its own 
    launches. In that event, a launch operator requires a license to 
    launch. Only if a prospective launch site operator proposes to offer 
    its launch site to others, need that person obtain a license to operate 
    a launch site.
        By means of operational, location, and site layout constraints, the 
    FAA intends its regulations to ensure that the public is not harmed by 
    launches that take place from a launch site whose operation the FAA has 
    licensed. Additionally, in the course of a license review, the FAA will 
    ensure that environmental and international obligations are addressed, 
    and that national security interests are reviewed by the appropriate 
    agencies. To further these objectives, the FAA proposes to create in 14 
    CFR Chapter III a new part 420 to contain the requirements for 
    obtaining and possessing a license to operate a launch site. The FAA's 
    proposed part 420 would require an applicant to obtain certain FAA 
    approvals in order to receive a license to operate a launch site. These 
    required approvals consist of policy, explosive site plan, and location 
    approvals. Environmental review may precede or be concurrent with the 
    licensing process.
        The grant of a license to operate a launch site will not guarantee 
    that a launch license will be granted for any particular launch 
    proposed for the site. All launches will be subject to separate FAA 
    review and licensing.
    
    A. Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site
    
        The FAA's proposed approach to licensing the operation of a launch 
    site would focus on four areas of concern critical to ensuring that 
    operation of a launch site would not jeopardize public health and 
    safety, the safety of property or foreign policy and other U.S. 
    interests. These reviews would encompass the environment, policy, 
    siting of explosives, and site location. Under the proposed 
    regulations, an applicant would be required to provide the FAA with 
    information sufficient to conduct environmental and policy reviews and 
    determinations. An applicant would also be required to submit an 
    explosive site plan that shows the location of all explosive hazard 
    facilities and distances between them, and the distances to public 
    areas.
        In the case of launch site location approval, the proposed 
    regulations would provide an applicant options for proving to the FAA 
    that a launch could be conducted from the site without jeopardizing 
    public health and safety. The requirement for a launch site location 
    approval would not normally apply to an applicant who proposes to 
    operate an existing launch point at a federal launch range, unless the 
    applicant plans to use a launch point different than used previously by 
    the federal launch range, or to use an existing launch point for a 
    different type or larger launch vehicle than used in the past. The fact 
    that launches have taken place safely from any particular launch point 
    at a federal launch range may provide the same demonstration that would 
    be accomplished by the FAA's proposed location review: Namely, a 
    showing that launch may occur safely from the site.
        The FAA is proposing to impose specific ground safety 
    responsibilities on a licensed launch site operator, and will require 
    that an applicant demonstrate how those requirements will be met. A 
    launch site operator licensee's responsibilities would include: 
    Preventing unauthorized public access to the site; properly preparing 
    the public and customers to visit the site; informing customers of 
    limitations on use of the site; scheduling and coordinating hazardous 
    activities conducted by customers; and arranging for the clearing of 
    air and sea routes and notifying adjacent property owners and local 
    jurisdictions of the pending flight of a launch vehicle. Part 420 would 
    also contain launch site operator responsibilities with regard to 
    recordkeeping, license transfer, compliance monitoring, accident 
    investigation and explosives. Other federal government agencies have 
    jurisdiction over a number of ground safety issues, and the FAA does 
    not intend to duplicate their efforts.\2\ \3\ The FAA will revisit 
    ground safety issues in its development of rules for launches from non-
    federal launch sites.
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        \2\ The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
    (OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) play a 
    role in regulating ground activities at a launch site. OSHA 
    regulations cover worker safety issues, and may, as a by-product, 
    help protect public safety as well. One provision of particular note 
    is 29 CFR 1910.119, process safety management of highly hazardous 
    chemicals (PSM). The requirements of the PSM standard are intended 
    to eliminate or mitigate the consequences of releases of highly 
    hazardous chemicals that may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or 
    explosive. Management controls are emphasized to address the risks 
    associated with handling or working near hazardous chemicals. These 
    requirements may apply to some launch site and launch operators. EPA 
    regulations are designed to protect the public health and safety 
    from releases of chemicals. One regulation of note is 40 CFR part 
    68, Accidental release prevention provisions. It applies to an owner 
    or operator of a stationary source that has more than a threshold 
    quantity of a regulated substance in a process, and requires the 
    owner or operator to develop and implement a risk management program 
    to prevent accidents and limit the severity of any accidents that 
    occur. The EPA rule further requires sources to conduct an offsite 
    consequence analysis to define the potential impacts of worst-case 
    releases and other release scenarios. For any process whose worst-
    case release would reach the public, the source must develop and 
    implement a prevention program and an emergency response program. 
    Both the EPA and OSHA prevention rules require regulated entities to 
    conduct formal analyses of the risks involved in the use and storage 
    of covered substances and consider all possible ways in which 
    existing systems could fail and result in accidental release.
        \3\ ATF regulations cover the long-term storage of explosives.
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    Environmental
        Licensing the operation of a launch site is a major federal action 
    for purposes of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 
    et seq. As a result, the FAA is required to assess the environmental 
    impacts of constructing and operating a proposed launch site to 
    determine whether these activities will significantly affect the 
    quality of the environment. Although the FAA is responsible under NEPA 
    regulations for preparing an environmental assessment or environmental 
    impact statement, the proposed rules continue to require a license 
    applicant to provide the FAA with sufficient information to conduct an 
    analysis in accordance with the requirements of the Council on 
    Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations Implementing the Procedural 
    Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's Procedures 
    for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order
    
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    1050.1D. An applicant will typically engage a contractor with 
    specialized experience in the NEPA process to conduct the study 
    underpinning the FAA's environmental analysis. This rulemaking marks no 
    change in the environmental requirements attendant to obtaining a 
    license to operate a launch site.
        The FAA encourages an applicant to begin the environmental review, 
    including the gathering of pertinent information to perform the 
    assessment, early in the planning process, but after the applicant has 
    defined its proposed action and considered feasible alternatives. The 
    FAA will determine whether a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) 
    may be issued after an environmental assessment, or whether an 
    environmental impact statement followed by a record of decision is 
    necessary. An applicant may be subject to restrictions on activities at 
    a proposed launch site. An applicant may acquire property for future 
    use as a launch site; however, absent a FONSI, the FAA must prepare an 
    environmental review that includes consideration of reasonable 
    alternatives to the site. According to the CEQ regulations as 
    interpreted by the courts, an applicant may not use the purchase of a 
    site or construction at the site to limit the array of reasonable 
    alternatives. As a result, an applicant must complete the environmental 
    process before construction or improvement of the site. The FAA will 
    not issue a license if an environmental review in accordance with all 
    applicable regulations and guidelines is not concluded.
    Policy
        Under current practice, the FAA conducts a policy review of an 
    application for a license to operate a launch site to determine whether 
    operation of the proposed launch site would jeopardize national 
    security, foreign policy interests, or international obligations of the 
    United States. The FAA conducts the policy review in coordination with 
    other federal agencies that have responsibility for national and 
    international interests. The Department of Defense is consulted to 
    determine whether a license application presents any issues affecting 
    national security. The Department of State reviews an application for 
    issues affecting foreign policy or international obligations. Other 
    agencies, such as NASA, are consulted as appropriate. By this 
    rulemaking, the regulations would require an applicant to supply 
    information relevant to the FAA's policy approval, including, for 
    example, identification of foreign ownership of the applicant. The FAA 
    will obtain other information required for a policy review from 
    information submitted by an applicant in other parts of the 
    application. During a policy review, the FAA would consult with an 
    applicant regarding any question or issues before making a final 
    determination. An applicant would have the opportunity to address any 
    questions before completion of the review.
    
    B. Explosive Site Plan Review
    
        Proposed subpart B would establish criteria and procedures for the 
    siting of facilities at a launch site where solid and liquid 
    propellants are to be located to prepare launch vehicles and payloads 
    for flight. Subpart B also would establish application procedures for 
    an applicant to demonstrate compliance with the siting criteria. The 
    requirements in subpart B are commonly referred to as quantity-distance 
    (Q-D) requirements because they provide minimum separation distances 
    between explosive hazard facilities, surrounding facilities and 
    locations where the public may be present on the basis of the type and 
    quantity of explosive material to be located within the area. Minimum 
    prescribed separation distances are necessary to protect the public 
    from explosive hazards on a launch site so that the effects of an 
    explosion does not reach the public.
        An applicant would provide the FAA an explosive site plan that 
    demonstrates compliance with the proposed Q-D requirements. the FAA 
    must approve this plan, so applicants are cautioned not to begin 
    construction of facilities requiring an explosives site plan until 
    obtaining FAA approval. Note also that the proposed Q-D requirements do 
    not address any toxic hazards. Toxic hazards may be mitigated through 
    procedural means, and the FAA will address toxic hazards in a separate 
    rulemaking. If a toxic hazard is a controlling factor in siting, it 
    should be considered along with the explosives hazards when the site 
    plan is prepared.
        The FAA proposes to adopt the explosive safety practice in use at 
    federal launch ranges today, namely, the application of quantity-
    distance criteria. Prescribed distances provide for a separation of an 
    explosive source from people and property that may otherwise be exposed 
    to explosive events. These criteria have long been used to mitigate 
    explosive hazards to an acceptable level. Q-D criteria address only the 
    consequences. The underlying assumption of quantity-distance criteria 
    is that an accidental explosion will occur for any explosive material 
    operation.
        The quantity-distance criteria in the proposed regulations are a 
    critical mitigation measure required in a launch site operator 
    application to provide the public protection from ground operations at 
    a launch site. The proposed rules have other mitigation measures, 
    including launch site operator responsibilities that address accident 
    prevention measures, and procedural requirements to protect visitors 
    and other launch site customers on the launch site. Any other 
    procedural requirements necessary to protect the public from explosive 
    hazards will be the responsibility of a launch operator under a launch 
    license. The scope of a launch license encompasses ground activities, 
    including the explosive operations involved with the handling and 
    assembly of launch vehicles at a launch site.
        The requirement to submit an explosive site plan to the FAA would 
    not apply to an applicant applying for a license to operate a launch 
    site at a federal launch range. Federal launch ranges have separate 
    rules which are either identical or similar to the rules proposed, or 
    permit mitigation measures which otherwise ensure safety.
        What follows is a discussion of launch site explosive hazards, the 
    reason the FAA is proposing explosive siting criteria, current Q-D 
    standards, the FAA's proposed use of NASA and DOD Q-D standards, other 
    approaches to explosive safety, application of ATF, DOD or NASA 
    standards, future changes in liquid propellant requirements, and solid 
    and liquid bi-propellants at launch pads.
    Explosive Hazards on a Launch Site
        The hazards associated with launch vehicle pre-flight operations 
    involving large quantities of propellants may typically be broken down 
    into phases, including storage, handling, assembly, checkout, ordnance 
    installation, propellant loading, and final launch preparations. Each 
    of these are covered below, for liquid and solid propellants.
        During storage, liquid propellant hazards include leaking or 
    ruptured propellant tanks causes by loss of pressure or mechanical 
    failure. If fuels and oxidizers are stored separately any potentially 
    harmful event would be limited to fire or tank pressure rupture. Solid 
    propellant hazards include accidental ordnance initiation caused by 
    stray electrical energy or dropping a motor with sufficient impact 
    force to initiate the propellant. Long term storage of solid rocket 
    motors, although not within the scope of this
    
    [[Page 34321]]
    
    rulemaking,\3\ presents its own unique hazards. As solid rocket motors 
    age, chemical changes in the binder within the motor cause ammonium 
    perchlorate to form on the outside of the motor. This is a hazardous 
    condition. The shelf life of solid rocket motors can be extended by a 
    carefully controlled environment in the storage facility.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \3\ ATF regulations cover the long-term storage of explosives.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The handling phase may include the transfer of liquid propellants 
    from one holding tank to another. Explosive reactions may occur if 
    fuels and oxidizers mix due to under or overpressurization, or if 
    improper connections cause propellant tanks, transfer lines, or 
    fittings to leak or rupture. If fuels and oxidizers are handled 
    separately no explosive reactions should occur. Hazardous handling 
    operations of solid rocket motors includes transporting and lifting 
    with cranes at the launch pad or other facility. Any impact during 
    these activities could cause propellant ignition.
        During assembly, liquid propellant operations include the assembly 
    and encapsulation of spacecraft and upper stages. Assembly and 
    encapsulation may involve loading hypergolic propellants such as 
    nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) and hydrazine. Tank 
    punctures, impacts caused by lifting, and over- or under-pressurization 
    could cause fuels and oxidizers to come in contact with one another, 
    causing fire and fragmentation hazards. This phase includes the final 
    assembly of solid rocket motors at a launch pad or other facility. Any 
    motor impact on the ground during these activities could cause 
    propellant ignition.
        Checkout at a launch pad may involve a number of hazards due to the 
    presence of solid propellant and hypergolic propellant stages. Any 
    accident causing interaction between hypergolic and solid propellants 
    can result in fires, pressure ruptures, and propulsive flight.
        During ordnance installation, inadvertent initiation of electro-
    explosive devices (EEDs) is possible. This does not pose a threat to 
    the public (although it does to the vehicle and personnel) because EEDs 
    have a small quantity of explosive and are not, by design, capable of 
    detonating propellants.
        The main hazard during propellant loading is over or under-
    pressurization of liquid propellant tanks, which may cause major spills 
    of fuels and oxidizers. These events could lead to significant 
    explosive yield, which is the energy released by an explosion.
        Final launch preparations, which begin just prior to flight, 
    involve a fully fueled launch vehicle. Systems are switched to internal 
    power, and liquid propellant systems are brought to flight pressure. A 
    mishap here could lead to significant explosive yield. The explosive 
    yield of a launch vehicle exploding on a launch pad is based on shock 
    impact for solid propellants, and non-dynamic mixing of liquid 
    propellants by, for example, the failure or interior bulkheads in the 
    launch vehicle.
    Reason for Proposing Explosive Siting Criteria
        After careful consideration, the FAA decided it had to propose 
    explosive siting criteria to protect the public from explosive hazards 
    associated with the operation of a launch site. Although the FAA places 
    much of the responsibility for safety of hazardous ground operations on 
    the launch operator, the FAA believes that the siting requirements 
    would be better addressed by a launch site operator. This is because 
    the siting requirements will more efficiently be satisfied prior to 
    construction of launch site facilities rather than afterwards. The FAA 
    does not intend to duplicate or supercede existing regulatory 
    frameworks. Although both the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
    (ATF) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have 
    regulations on explosives, neither provides all the quantity-distance 
    criteria applicable to launch site necessary to protect the public.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \4\ Another agency, the Research and Special Programs 
    Administration (RSPA), DOT, has regulations for the commercial 
    shipment of explosives (and other hazardous material) by rail, motor 
    vehicle, cargo aircraft and ship within the United States. The 
    regulations are found in Title 49 of the Code of Federal 
    Regulations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        ATF has jurisdiction over the storage of commercial explosives in 
    order to provide for public safety. The storage requirements in 27 CFR 
    part 55, Commerce in Explosives, include construction, separation 
    distances, and some storage compatibility provisions. They also cover 
    items such as licensing, records, and other administrative procedures.
        Two gaps in coverage require FAA involvement, namely, the handling 
    of explosives and the treatment of liquid bi-propellants. In the first 
    instance, ATF regulations are limited to storage, not the use or 
    handling of an explosive. Many of the activities that occur on a launch 
    site will not constitute storage. These activities include moving or 
    handling solid rocket motors and other ordnance for the purpose of 
    preparing a launch vehicle for flight, and the build-up and checkout of 
    a launch vehicle on a launch pad. The FAA's proposed regulations are 
    required to ensure the safety of the public from these activities. 
    Additionally, ATF regulations only address solid explosives and liquid 
    mono-propellants. Large quantities of liquid by-propellants are often 
    used on existing launch sites, and many of these bi-propellants pose an 
    explosive hazard to the public. The FAA is proposing rules to ensure 
    the safe use and storage of liquid bi-propellants.
        OSHA explosives requirements are contained in 29 CFR 1910.109, 
    Explosives and Blasting Agents. These requirements apply to the 
    manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale, transportation, and use of 
    explosives, blasting agents and pyrotechnics. OSHA regulations do not 
    address public safety. For example, 29 CFR 1910.109 only includes Q-D 
    requirements for the separation of magazines from each other. OSHA 
    requirements do not address public areas such as inhabited buildings, 
    passenger railways, and public highways. The FAA believes Q-D 
    requirements that adequately separate the public from the effects of an 
    explosion are necessary to protect the public.
        The FAA recognizes that procedural measures may also be employed to 
    achieve explosive safety. For example, if two customers of a launch 
    site operator intend to conduct explosive handling operations in 
    adjacent facilities that are not sited for public area distances, a 
    launch site operator may schedule their operations at different times 
    and keep one facility vacant to maintain safety. A licensee who 
    proposed such measures as a substitute for the siting criteria proposed 
    in this rulemaking would have to anticipate license terms and 
    conditions that achieve an equivalent level for safety.
    Current Q-D Standards
        Current standards effectively mitigate explosive hazards on federal 
    launch ranges. The FAA, therefore, studied these standards in order to 
    adopt the most relevant parts in its proposed Q-D standards. DOD, NASA, 
    and, for storage, AFT, have explosive standards designed to protect the 
    public.
        The DOD standard, ``DOD STD 6055.9, DOD Ammunition and Explosives 
    Safety Standards,'' (Aug. 1997), is the standard used for explosive 
    siting on DOD launch sites and for commercial launch sites located on 
    DOD property. DOD 6055.9-STD defines general explosive safety criteria 
    for use throughout the DOD, and
    
    [[Page 34322]]
    
    establishes protection criteria for personnel and assets such as 
    facilities, equipment, and munitions. The DOD standard provides 
    quantity-distance criteria to protect against overpressure and 
    fragments, and permissible exposure levels to protect against thermal 
    hazards.
        The Q-D criteria in DOD STD 6055.90 constitute a refinement of the 
    American Table of Distances (ATD), originally published in 1910 by the 
    Institute of Makers of Explosives. Authors of the ATD criteria 
    acknowledged very early that listed separation distances do not provide 
    absolute safety. The magnitude of the hazard is simply mitigated to a 
    level the ATD authors deemed to be acceptable. Because of this, the FAA 
    encourages license applicants to use greater distances where 
    practicable.
        DOD STD 6055.9 also provides information relating to the 
    construction and siting of facilities that are potential explosive 
    sites or that may be exposed to the damaging effects of explosions. The 
    effects of potential explosions may be altered significantly by 
    construction features that limit the amount of explosives involved, 
    attenuate resultant blast overpressure or thermal radiation, and reduce 
    the quantity and range of hazardous fragments and debris. DOD also 
    includes additional criteria for electrical safety and lightning.
        ATF also adopted the ATD in its approach to facility siting. ATF 
    regulations provide procedural and substantive requirements regarding, 
    in relevant part, the issuance of user permits and the storage of 
    explosive materials. AFT specifies tables of distances for high 
    explosives, low explosives, and blasting agents. The tables governing 
    high explosives and low explosives are very pertinent to launch site 
    operations.
        As noted, the scope of operations within a launch site goes beyond 
    the on-site receipt, transfer and storage of explosives within ATF 
    jurisdiction. A launch site may have a number of launch vehicle and 
    payload customers on site who posses liquid and solid propellants that 
    are being used for incorporation into a launch vehicle or payload.
        NASA's safety standards and policy for operations involving 
    explosives are contained in ``Safety Standard for Explosives, 
    Propellants, and Pyrotechnics,'' NSS 1740.12 (Aug. 12, 1993) (NASA 
    Standard). This document contains a uniform set of standards for all 
    NASA facilities engaged in the development, manufacture, handling, 
    storage, transportation, processing, or testing of explosives. Like the 
    DOD standard, the NASA standard contains guidelines and standards for 
    explosives operations in order to safeguard not only the public, but 
    personnel and property. It covers not only Q-D criteria, but personnel 
    training, operating procedures, and other policies such as the use of 
    all available advances in protective construction to provide the safety 
    work environment to prevent or minimize the exposure of personnel and 
    facilities to explosives hazards when performing NASA program 
    activities.
    FAA's Proposed Use of NASA and DOD Q-D Standards for Licensed Operation 
    of a Launch Site
        Because the NASA and DOD standards are similar, and because both 
    the NASA and DOD standards comprehensively cover explosive hazards at a 
    launch site, the FAA has used both as a guide in proposing the rules in 
    subpart B. However, the FAA proposes to employ the tables and many of 
    the definitions of the NASA standard specifically.
        The relevant differences for solid explosives between NASA, DOD, 
    and ATF are not significant. The NASA and ATF table for division 1.3 
    explosives (discussed below) are identical except that ATF requirements 
    stop at 300,000 pounds. The NASA division 1.3 table is also the same as 
    the DOD standard except that the DOD standard has more increments.
        The relevant differences for liquid propellants between the NASA 
    and DOD standards are also minor.\5\ The hazard groups that liquid 
    propellants fall into, discussed below, are identical in the two 
    standards. The values in the table used for explosive equivalents are 
    also identical for quantities greater than 35,000 pounds. A discrepancy 
    exists under 35,000 pounds because the DOD requirement is based on a 
    table used for division 1.1 solid explosives.\6\ The distance specified 
    below 35,000 pounds in the DOD table is based on the ranges of 
    hazardous fragments and firebrands from an explosion. This is 
    appropriate for solid explosives but is not necessary for liquid 
    propellant explosive equivalents. The NASA standard, on the other hand, 
    has separate tables for division 1.1 solid explosives and liquid 
    propellant explosive equivalents. The NASA table for division 1.1 solid 
    explosives takes fragments and firebrands into account, as appropriate. 
    NASA's table for liquid propellants does not take fragmentation into 
    account.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \5\ ATF does not regulate liquid propellants, other than mono-
    propellants.
        \6\ Solid explosives, like liquid explosives, may be measured in 
    terms of explosive equivalency. The explosive equivalency of a 
    certain weight of solid explosive is the weight of trinitrotoluene 
    that would provide an equivalent blast effect.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Other Approaches to Explosive Safety
        The FAA has taken a number of measures in order to simplify the 
    proposed Q-D standards. The proposed requirements do not account for 
    the use of hardening or barricades, or for any other solid propellant 
    other than division 1.3. The proposed rules also reflect that only two 
    liquid propellant compatibility groups are necessary. These are 
    discussed below.
        The proposed requirements do not account for hardening. Both NASA 
    and DOD have standards for using protective construction to harden an 
    explosive hazard facility to suppress explosion effects, and to harden 
    an area potentially exposed to explosive hazards. In the NASA and DOD 
    standards, the use of hardening may reduce the required distance 
    between an explosive hazard facility and a public area. The proposed 
    rules do not explicitly address hardening. The distances required 
    between explosive hazard facilities and public areas assume that 
    neither the explosive hazard facilities nor the public areas are 
    hardened. Because of the complexity of hardening standards, the FAA 
    believes hardening is better left to case-by-case approval. If an 
    applicant plans to use hardening, the applicant should plan on 
    demonstrating an equivalent level of safety to justify a reduction in 
    applicable Q-D requirements.
        Similarly, the proposed requirements do not account for the use of 
    barricades and other protective measures to mitigate the effect of an 
    explosion on exposed areas. An applicant proposing to use such measures 
    in order to deviate from the proposed siting rules may apply for a 
    waiver to the FAA, accompanied with a demonstration that the applicant 
    achieves an equivalent level of safety.
        The proposed requirements govern only one type of solid explosive, 
    division 1.3. To classify solid propellants, the FAA is proposing to 
    adopt the United Nations Organization (UNO) classification system for 
    transport of dangerous goods. This classification system is reflected 
    in DOD and NASA standards, and standards of the Department of 
    Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration. 
    Propellants will be assigned the appropriate DOT class in accordance 
    with 49 CFR part 173. The hazard classification system used by all 
    three agencies consists of nine classes for dangerous goods with 
    ammunition and explosives included in UNO ``Class 1, Explosives.'' 
    Class 1 explosives are
    
    [[Page 34323]]
    
    further subdivided into ``divisions'' based on the character and 
    predominance of the associated hazards and on the potential for causing 
    casualties or property damage. As defined in 49 CFR 173.50:
          Division 1.1--consists of explosives that have a mass 
    explosion hazard. A mass explosion is one which affects almost the 
    entire load instantaneously.
          Division 1.2--consists of explosives that have a 
    projection hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
          Division 1.3--consists of explosives that have a fire 
    hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or 
    both, but not a mass explosion hazard.
          Division 1.4--consists of explosives that present a minor 
    explosion hazard.
          Division 1.5--consists of very insensitive explosives.
         Division 1.6--consists of extremely insensitive articles 
    which do not have a mass explosion hazard.
        The FAA proposes criteria only for division 1.3. The only solid 
    explosives for commercial launches that will likely affect separation 
    distances on a launch site are division 1.3 propellants. Although 
    launch vehicles frequently have components incorporating division 1.1 
    explosives, such as those used to initiate flight termination systems, 
    the quantity is small. Division 1.1 explosives will not likely be 
    present in sufficient quantities to affect the application of Q-D 
    criteria. The only division 1.1 solid rocket motors existing today are 
    from old military missiles which are not likely to be used at a 
    commercial launch site. When liquid fuels and oxidizers are located 
    together, as they would be during a fueling test, the combination has 
    an explosive potential equal to a percentage of division 1.1 
    explosives. The proposed rules take such activities into account, but 
    address liquid propellants separately from solid propellants.
        The proposed regulations would not assign compatibility groups for 
    solid propellants. The NASA and DOD standards assign solid explosives 
    to compatibility groups. Explosives are assigned to the same group when 
    they can be stored together without significantly increasing either the 
    probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of 
    the effects of such an accident. Because division 1.3 solid propellants 
    are all compatible, the proposed regulations do not incorporate 
    compatibility groups for solid propellants.
        Like the DOD and NASA standards, the proposed rules classify each 
    liquid propellant into one hazard group and one compatibility group. 
    Classifying each liquid propellant into a hazard group is necessary 
    because the hazards associated with different liquid propellants vary 
    widely, and the quantity-distance relationship varies accordingly. 
    Hazard group 1 individually represents a fire hazard, hazard group 2 
    individually represents a more serious fire hazard, and hazard group 3 
    individually represents a fragmentation hazard because propellants in 
    this category can cause rupture of a storage container.
        The proposed rules classify current launch vehicle liquid 
    propellants, namely, liquid hydrogen (LH2), RP-1, hydrazine (N2H4) and 
    its variants (e.g. UDMH and Aerozine-50), hydrogen peroxide, liquid 
    oxygen (LO2), and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4). RP-1 and N2O4 fall into 
    hazard group 1, hydrogen peroxide and LO2 fall into hazard group 2, and 
    LH2 and N2H4 fall into hazard group 3. Other propellants will be 
    classified on a case-by-case basis.
        Like the NASA and DOD standards, the proposed rules also assign 
    each liquid propellant into a compatibility group. However, unlike 
    those standards which cover many different types of propellants, only 
    two compatibility groups are represented in the proposed rules, group A 
    and group C. Group A represents oxidizers, such as LO2, N2O4, and 
    hydrogen peroxide, and group C represents fuels. Whenever propellants 
    of different compatibility groups are not separated by the minimum 
    distance requirements, that is, when fuels and oxidizers are close 
    enough to each other to potentially mix and explode, the explosive 
    equivalency of the explosive mixture must be calculated.
    Application of ATF, DOD, or NASA Standards
        The storage of solid propellant and liquid mono-propellant on a 
    launch site is covered by ATF regulations, and therefore not addressed 
    in the FAA's proposed requirements. ATF has a permit process for the 
    storage of solid propellants and liquid mono-propellants. The FAA's 
    proposed rules, therefore, do not cover the separation distance between 
    magazines, or between magazines and public areas. However, an applicant 
    must show any magazines in its explosive site plan and their location 
    in relation to other explosive hazard facilities. Applicants should 
    note that on federal launch ranges DOD or NASA standards apply. These 
    launch sites may have Q-D requirements that are different than the 
    FAA's proposed rules.
    Future Change in Liquid Propellant Requirements
        The DOD Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) has initiated a DOD 
    Explosive Safety Standard for Energetic Liquids Program, and has 
    established an interagency advisory board called the Liquid Propellants 
    Working Group (LPWG). The FAA is a member of this group. A number of 
    possible inconsistencies and irregularities have been identified in the 
    current approach to siting liquid propellants. These include Q-D 
    criteria for most liquid propellants, possible inconsistencies in 
    hazard group and compatibility group definitions, and possible 
    inaccurate characterization of blast over pressure hazards of liquid 
    propellant explosions. The purpose of the LPWG is to address issues of 
    explosive equivalence, compatibility mixing, and quantity-distance 
    criteria, and to develop recommended revisions to DOD STD 6055.9 
    addressing liquid propellants and other liquid energetic materials. The 
    LPWG is currently consolidating all available test and accident data, 
    and non-DOD regulatory information to provide a basis for the 
    revisions.
        Because the DDESB is possibly the best equipped group in the 
    country to address these issues, the FAA will carefully consider its 
    recommendations. The basic approach outlined in the proposed rule 
    should not change. However, the DDESB is likely to specify new hazard 
    and compatibility groups, distance values, and equivalency values, and 
    the public may anticipate their eventual consideration and possible 
    adoption by the FAA.
    Solid and Liquid Bi-propellants at Launch Pads
        The FAA is proposing a special requirement at launch pads for 
    launch vehicles that use liquid bi-propellant and solid propellant 
    components. The required separation distance shall be the greater of 
    the distance determined by the explosive equivalent of the liquid 
    propellant alone or the solid propellant alone. An applicant does not 
    have to add the separation distances of both. This notice assumes that 
    generally, no credible scenario exists that could produce a 
    simultaneous explosion reaction of both liquid propellant tanks and 
    solid propellant motors. Although not reflected in the published DOD 
    and NASA standards, the proposed requirement constitutes current 
    practice at federal launch ranges. The FAA is interested in the 
    public's view on this approach.
    
    [[Page 34324]]
    
    C. Explosive Mishap Prevention Measures
    
        Application of the proposed quantity-distance rules alone will not 
    prevent mishaps from occurring on a launch site. The proposed Q-D rules 
    merely reduce the risk to the public to an acceptable level if a mishap 
    occurs, and if the public is kept away from the mishap by a distance 
    that is at least as great as the public area distance. Safe facility 
    design and prudent procedural measure are critical to preventing a 
    mishap from occurring in the first place. Because visitors to a launch 
    site cannot be protected by prudent site planning alone, the FAA has 
    proposed launch site operator responsibilities to prevent mishaps 
    involving propellants.
        The FAA considered measures taken at federal launch ranges to 
    prevent inadvertent initiation of propellants. For this notice the FAA 
    focused on those measures that are appropriate to be taken by a launch 
    site operator. For the most part, the FAA considers it prudent to place 
    the responsibility on a launch site operator for those measures that 
    must be built into facilities. Requirements of a more operational 
    nature will be covered in another rulemaking.
        The FAA focused on construction measures intended to prevent 
    inadvertent initiation of propellant from electricity. These are 
    particularly important for electro-explosive devices. Electric hazards 
    include electrostatic discharge such as lightning, static electricity, 
    electric supply systems, and electromagnetic radiation. As discussed 
    below, the FAA is proposing launch site operator requirements for two 
    of these electric hazards: Lightning and electric supply systems. Other 
    measures were considered but rejected because the FAA's planned 
    rulemaking on launches from non-federal launch sites will cover other 
    procedural measures to guard against inadvertent initiation of 
    propellants from electricity. Moreover, the FAA believes launch and 
    launch site operators will implement prudent design and construction 
    measures to comply with local, state, and other federal law, such as 
    OSHA requirements. The FAA is interested in public views on this 
    approach and any need to address other facility requirements.
    Lighting Protection
        Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by lightning. 
    The primary method of protecting against damage from lightning is to 
    provide a means to direct a lightning discharge directly to the earth 
    without causing harm to people or property. A lightning protection 
    system consists of a system of air terminals such as lightning rods, a 
    system of ground terminals, and a conductor system connecting the air 
    terminals to the ground terminals. These systems are typically 
    installed during construction.
        The FAA proposes to impose certain requirements on launch site 
    operators involving lightning protection. The requirements are based on 
    current industry practice, namely, DOD STD 6055.9, chapter 7, and the 
    NASA standard's chapter 5. Each of those standards define, in detail, 
    minimum explosives safety criteria for the design, maintenance, testing 
    and inspection of lightning protection systems. The FAA's proposed 
    rules are not as detailed as those standards so that an applicant may 
    have more flexibility in meeting performance standards. The FAA expects 
    applicants to achieve the level of safety represented by the DOD and 
    NASA standard.
        The FAA's proposed rules were derived from the DOD and NASA 
    standards, which are similar to each other. Like NASA and DOD, the 
    proposed rules require lightning protection for all explosives hazard 
    facilities. The design of lightning protection systems includes air 
    terminals, low impedance paths to the ground, referred to as down 
    conductors, and earth electrode systems. An air terminal is a component 
    of a lightning protection system that is able to safely intercept 
    lightning strikes. Air terminals may include overhead wires or grids, 
    vertical spikes, or a building's grounded structural elements. Air 
    terminals must be capable of safely conducting a lighting strike. Down 
    conductors, such as wires or structural elements having high current 
    capacity, provide low impedance paths from the air terminals described 
    above to an earth ground system. Earth electrode systems dissipate the 
    current from a lightning strike to ground.
        Bonding and surge protection are other important considerations for 
    lightning protection systems. Metallic bodies, such as fences and 
    railroad tracks near an explosive hazard facility, should be bonded to 
    ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal everywhere in 
    the explosive hazard facility. Lightning protection systems should also 
    include surge protection for all incoming conductors, such as metallic 
    power, communication, and instrumentation lines coming into an 
    explosive hazard facility, so as to reduce transient voltages due to 
    lightning to a harmless level.
        The FAA proposes to adopt a provision of DOD STD 6055.9 that 
    exempts the need for a lightning protection system when a local 
    lightning warning system is used to permit operations to be terminated 
    before the incidence of an electrical storm, if all personnel can and 
    will be provided with protection equivalent to a public traffic route 
    distance, which is equivalent to the FAA's proposed public area 
    distance. The FAA is interested in views on this exception, and whether 
    it is sensible in light of the small chance that lightning may cause 
    inadvertent solid rocket motor flight. The FAA is also interested in 
    views on whether other exceptions should be added.
        The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Batterymarch Park, 
    Quincy, Massachusetts, has published a Lightning Protection Code, NFPA 
    780 (1995). The FAA is interested in the public's views on the use and 
    applicability of this code.
    Static Electricity
        Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by extraneous 
    electricity such as static electricity, fields around electric supply 
    lines, and radio frequency emissions from radio, radar, and television 
    transmitters.
        Static electricity is generally created by a transfer of electrons 
    from one substance to another caused by friction or rubbing. The 
    generation of static electricity is not in itself a hazard. The hazard 
    arises when static electricity is allowed to accumulate, subsequently 
    discharging as a spark across an air gap in the presence of highly 
    flammable materials or energetic materials such as propellants. The 
    NASA standard states that:
    
        In order for static to be a source of ignition, five conditions 
    must be fulfilled: (1) A mechanism for generating static electricity 
    must be present, (2) a means of accumulating or storing the charge 
    so generated must exist, (3) a suitable gap across which the spark 
    can develop must be present, (4) a voltage difference sufficient to 
    cause electrical breakdown or dielectric breakdown must develop 
    across the gap, and (5) a sufficient amount of energy must be 
    present in the spark to exceed the minimum ignition energy 
    requirements of the flammable mixture.\7\
    
        \7\ NASA Standard at 5-29.
    
        Electro-explosive devices are particularly susceptible to static 
    discharge. The primary method used to neutralize static potential is to 
    create an electrical path between the objects so that the potential 
    charges will be equalized. This path can be generated by bonding 
    potential charged objects to each other and humidifying or ionizing
    
    [[Page 34325]]
    
    the air to create a path for the charge to bleed off.
        Both NASA and DOD have standards to control static electricity. For 
    example, they have standards \8\ to prevent static electricity 
    accumulations that are capable of initiating combustible dusts, gases, 
    flammable vapors, or exposed electroexplosive devices. The standards 
    build on the National Electrical Code, published by the National Fire 
    Protection Association as NFPA 70, which establishes standards for the 
    design and installation of electrical equipment and wiring in hazardous 
    locations containing combustible dusts, flammable vapors and gases.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \8\ DOD Standard, chapter 6, NASA Standard, chapter 5.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        These standards require personnel and equipment in hazardous 
    locations and locations where static sensitive EEDs are exposed to be 
    grounded in a manner to effectively discharge static electricity. For 
    example, the NASA standard requires personnel to wear static 
    dissipation devices such as legstats and wriststats. Conductive shoes 
    are required when handling, installing, or connecting or disconnecting 
    EEDs.
        Solid rocket motors may also be initiated by static electricity. 
    Material contact, specifically, the rubbing or removing of one material 
    from another, such as removing tooling from a motor, can produce a 
    static charge buildup in solid rocket motors. This energy, when 
    released under appropriate conditions, may lead to a cascade discharge 
    and propellant ignition. A number of incidents have occurred due to 
    static electricity, including a Pershing II missile burn in West 
    Germany, a Stage I Peacekeeper missile initiation at a manufacturing 
    facility (due to the pulling of a tool), and a Minuteman State II 
    missile ignition on the rapid pulling of the core.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \9\ ``JANNAF Propulsion Systems Hazards Subcommittee 
    Electrostatic Discharge Panel Report,'' CPIA Publication 510 (Mar. 
    1989).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Although the control of static electricity is important for public 
    safety, the FAA is not proposing any requirements in this rulemaking. 
    The FAA believes that the control of static electricity in launch 
    operations is primarily procedural in nature, and is best covered by 
    the FAA in a future rulemaking on launches. The FAA is interested in 
    the public's view on whether requirements should be placed on launch 
    site operators.
    Electric Supply Systems
        As noted above, rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels 
    by extraneous electricity such as fields around high tension wires. 
    Both the NASA standard, chapter 5, and DOD STD 6055.9, chapter 6, have 
    similar standards to address the hazards from fields around high 
    tension wires.
        The FAA proposes rules that are similar to both the NASA and DOD 
    standard. As in those standards, the proposed rules require electric 
    power lines to be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the 
    length of the lines between the poles or towers that support the lines, 
    unless effective means is provided to ensure that energized lines 
    cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive hazard 
    facility. The proposed rules also require towers or poles supporting 
    electric distribution lines that carry between 15 and 69 KV, or 
    electrical transmission lines that carry 69 KV or more, to be no closer 
    to an explosive hazard facility than the public area distance for that 
    explosive hazard facility.
    Electromagnetic Radiation
        Rocket motors may be energized to dangerous levels by extraneous 
    electricity such as radio frequency emissions from radio, radar, and 
    television transmitters. Radio frequency (RF) emitters may present a 
    hazard to the public by direct exposure to high levels of RF energy. 
    The levels of RF energy that are hazardous are dependent on frequency. 
    For instance, ``ANSI C95.1-1991 Electromagnetic Fields, Safety Levels 
    With Respect to Human Exposure to Radio Frequency'' defines the maximum 
    safe level for personnel for frequencies between 0.003 and 0.1 MHz at 
    100mWcm \2\, and a level of 180 mW/Cm \2\ for frequencies between 1.34 
    and 3.0 MHz. More importantly for this proposal, RF emitters may 
    present hazard to ordnance. At launch sites today, design and 
    procedural methods are used to mitigate risks to personnel and 
    ordnance. Separation distances are also used to ensure personnel and 
    ordancne are not exposed to hazardous levels.
        One hazard of particular importance on a launch site is the 
    accidental firing of electroexplosvie devices by stray electromagnetic 
    energy. A large number of these devices are initiated by low levels of 
    electrical energy and are susceptible to unintentional ignition by many 
    forms of direct or induced stray electrical energy, such as from 
    lightning discharges, static electricity, and radio frequency due to 
    ground and airborne emitters.
        One federal launch site operator, the U.S. Air Force, defines its 
    RF requirements in ``Air Force Manual (AFM) 91-201, Explosives Safety 
    Standards,'' (Jan. 1998). Safe separation distance criteria are 
    contained in section 2.58. A table is provided that gives minimum 
    separation distances between EEDs (within explosive hazard facilities) 
    and the transmitting antenna of all RF emitters. The distances are 
    based on the frequency, transmitter power, and power ratio of the 
    transmitting antenna. For worst-case situations, safe separation 
    distances are based on frequency and effective radiated power. ``Worst-
    case'' is defined as EEDs that are the most sensitive in the Air Force 
    inventory, unshielded, having leads or circuitry which could 
    inadvertently be formed into a resonant dipole, loop or other antenna. 
    Where EEDs are in less hazardous configurations, the standard allows 
    for shorter distances. The standard also allows for the conduct of 
    power density surveys to ensure safety, in lieu of using the minimum 
    safe separation distances defined from the table and figure. Power 
    density surveys measure the actual conditions in an area here EEDs may 
    be located, and are appropriate when the minimum distances cannot be 
    complied with, for whatever reason, and when more than one transmitter 
    is operating in a certain area at different frequencies.
        The FAA has not chosen to specifically address RF hazards in this 
    proposal. OSHA covers direct exposure of personnel to RF.\10\ Although 
    the FAA is not aware of any other federal regulations that specifically 
    protect the public from the accidental firing of electroexplosive 
    devices by stray electromagnetic energy, the FAA with this proposal is 
    focussing on those measures that a launch site operator must build into 
    its facilities. The distance requirements discussed above were 
    considered by the FAA but other procedural means exist to mitigate RF 
    hazards, including the FAA's proposed scheduling and coordination 
    requirement for launch site operators. The procedural requirements of 
    launch operators, covered in a separate rulemaking, in conjunction with 
    the requirement in proposed Sec. 420.5 for a licensee to develop and 
    implement procedures to coordinate operations carried out by launch 
    site customers and their contractors, should prove adequate to address 
    RF hazards. The FAA is interested in the public's view on whether other 
    requirements, such as distance requirements, should be placed on launch 
    site operators.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \10\ 29 CFR 1910.97.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    D. Launch Site Location Review
    
        The FAA intends a launch site location review to determine whether 
    the location of a proposed launch site
    
    [[Page 34326]]
    
    would jeopardize public health and safety. To that end, the FAA 
    proposes to determine whether at least one hypothetical launch could 
    take place safely from a launch point at the proposed site. The FAA 
    does not intend to license the operation of a launch site from which a 
    launch could never safely take place. An applicant should, however, 
    bear in mind that an FAA license to operate a launch site does not 
    guarantee that a launch license would be issued for any particular 
    launch proposed from that site. Accordingly, much of the decision 
    making with respect to whether a particular site will be economically 
    successful will rest, as it should, with a launch site operator, who 
    will have to determine whether the site possesses sufficient flight 
    corridors for economic viability. The FAA seeks through a location 
    review only to ensure that at least one flight corridor exists that may 
    be used safely for a hypothetical launch.
        Accordingly, prior to issuing a license to operate a launch site at 
    the proposed location, the FAA will ascertain whether it is possible to 
    launch at least one type of launch vehicle on at least one trajectory 
    from each launch point at the proposed site while meeting the FAA's 
    collective risk criteria. The FAA wants to ensure that there exists at 
    least one flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas from a 
    proposed launch site that would contain debris away from population. 
    Launch is a dangerous activity that the FAA will allow to occur only 
    when the risk to people is below an expected casualty (Ec) 
    of 30  x  10-6. In other words, if there are too many people 
    around a launch site or in a flight corridor the FAA will not license 
    the site. The FAA's proposed methods for determining flight corridors 
    and impact dispersion areas and estimating Ec are designed 
    to ascertain whether a hypothetical flight corridor would avoid 
    creating too much risk.
        All this is not to say that the FAA proposed to require an 
    applicant for a license to operate a launch site to perform a complete 
    flight safety analysis for a particular launch. The FAA recognizes that 
    an applicant may or may not yet have customers or a particular launch 
    vehicle in mind. Accordingly, the FAA's proposed launch site location 
    review methods only approximate, on the basis of certain assumptions 
    and recognizing that not all factors need to be taken into account, a 
    full flight safety analysis that would be normally be performed for an 
    actual launch. Of course, if an applicant does have a customer who 
    satisfies the FAA's flight safety criteria for launch and obtains a 
    license for launch from the site, that showing would also demonstrate 
    to the FAA that a launch may occur safely from the proposed site, and 
    the FAA could issue a license to operate the launch site on the basis 
    of the actual launch proposed.
        Bear in mind also that the focus of FAA's proposed launch site 
    location review methods is on expendable launch vehicles with a flight 
    history. The reusable launch vehicles (RLV) currently proposed by 
    industry vary quite a bit. Accordingly, the FAA considered it unwise to 
    define a detailed analytical method for determining the suitability of 
    a launch site location for RLVs. An applicant proposed a launch site 
    limited to the launch of reusable launch vehicles would still need to 
    define a flight corridor and conduct a risk analysis if population were 
    present within the flight corridor, but the FAA will review such an 
    analysis on a case-by-case basis consistent with the principles 
    discussed in this rulemaking.
        Similarly, the FAA has chosen not to define a detailed analytical 
    method for determining the suitability of a launch site location for 
    unproven launch vehicles. An applicant proposing a launch site limited 
    to the launch of unproven launch vehicles would have to demonstrate to 
    the FAA that the launch site is safe for the activity planned.
        A launch site location review would provide an applicant with 
    alternative methods for demonstrating that a proposed launch site 
    satisfies FAA safety requirements. Specifically, the applicant must 
    demonstrate that a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas 
    exist that do not encompass populated areas or that do not give rise to 
    an Ec risk of greater than 30  x  10-6. Each 
    proposed launch point must be evaluated for each type of launch 
    vehicle, whether expendable orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided 
    sub-orbital, or reusable, that an applicant proposes would be launched 
    from each point.
        Each of the three methods the FAA proposes for evaluating the 
    acceptability of a launch site's location require an applicant to 
    identify an area, whether a flight corridor or a set of impact 
    dispersion areas, emanating from a proposed launch site. That area 
    identifies the public that the applicant must analyze for risk of 
    impact and harm. The FAA proposes to have an applicant who anticipates 
    customers who use guided orbital launch vehicles define a flight 
    corridor for a class of vehicles launched from a specific point along a 
    specified trajectory, that extends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch 
    point or until the launch vehicle's instantaneous impact point leaves 
    the earth's surface, whichever is sooner. For guided sub-orbital launch 
    vehicles, the flight corridor would end at an impact dispersion area of 
    a final stage. An applicant would have to demonstrate either that there 
    are no populated areas within the flight corridor or that the risk to 
    any population in the corridor does not exceed the FAA's risk criteria. 
    Similarly, for the sub-orbital launch of an unguided vehicle, an 
    applicant would analyze the risks associated with a series of impact 
    dispersion areas around the impact points for spent stages. If there 
    are people in the dispersion areas, the applicant must demonstrate that 
    the expected casualties from stage impacts do not exceed the FAA's risk 
    criteria.
        Ec, or casualty expectancy, represents the FAA's measure 
    of the collective risk to a population exposed to the launch of a 
    launch vehicle. The measure represents the expected average number of 
    casualties for a specific launch mission. In other words, if there were 
    thousands of the same mission conducted and all the casualties were 
    added up and the sum divided by the number of missions, the answer and 
    the mission's expected casualty should statistically be the same. This 
    Ec value defines the acceptable collective risk associated 
    with a hypothetical launch from a launch point at a launch site, and, 
    as prescribed by the proposed regulations, shall not exceed an expected 
    average number of casualties of 0.00003 (30  x  10-6) for 
    each launch point at an applicant's proposed launch site. This 
    Ec value defines acceptable collective risk. In contrast to 
    individual risk, which describes the probability of serious injury or 
    death to a single person, the launch industry's common measure of risk 
    is collective risk. The Ec value proposed originated with 
    the Air Force's measure of acceptable risk. ``EWR 127-1,'' Sec. 1.4, 1-
    12. Relying on the Air Force measure, the FAA proposed the adoption of 
    collective risk and a risk level of 30  x  10-6 for licensed 
    launches in an earlier proceeding. ``Commercial Space Transportation 
    Licensing Regulations,'' (62 FR 13216, 13229-30 (Mar. 19, 1997). The 
    FAA now proposes to use the same measure for evaluating the suitability 
    of a proposed launch site location.
        Collective risk reflects the probability of injury or death to all 
    members of a defined population set--in this case, those located within 
    the flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas being analyzed--
    placed at risk by a launch event. Collective risk constitutes the sum 
    total launch related risk, that is, the
    
    [[Page 34327]]
    
    probability of injury or death, to that part of the public exposed to a 
    launch. Collective risk is analogous to an estimate of the average 
    number of people hit by lightning each year, while individual annual 
    risk would be an individual's likelihood of being hit by lightning in 
    any given year. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual 
    risk if certain factors associated with any given launch are taken into 
    account. Collective risk may be expressed in terms of individual risk 
    when the exposed population consists of one person. Also, individual 
    risk may be--and will be, in most instances--less than collective risk, 
    depending on the size of the population exposed. For example, a 
    collective Ec risk of 30  x  10-6 for a defined 
    population of one hundred thousand people exposed to a particular 
    launch results (assuming the risk is spread equally throughout the 
    defined population) in a probability of injury or death to any one 
    exposed individual of 3  x  10-10 (three per ten billion).
        The FAA's proposed methods for identifying a flight corridor or 
    impact dispersion areas distinguish between guided orbital launch 
    vehicles with a flight termination system (FTS), guided sub-orbital 
    launch vehicles with an FTS, and unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles 
    without an FTS.\11\ For purposes of this proposal, references to a 
    guided launch vehicle, whether orbital or sub-orbital, may be taken to 
    mean that the vehicle has an FTS. References to an unguided sub-orbital 
    may be understood to mean that the vehicle does not possess an FTS.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \11\ This proposal does not propose a means for analyzing risks 
    posed by a launch site for the launch of unguided suborbital launch 
    vehicles that employ FTS. Historically, few of these vehicles have 
    been launched. In the event an applicant for a license to operate a 
    launch site wishes to operate a launch site only for such vehicles, 
    the FAA will handle the request on a case by case basis. The FAA 
    does note, however, that unguided suborbital launch vehicles that in 
    the past have been launched with an FTS were usually launched with 
    the FTS because the launch was otherwise too close to populated 
    areas for the type of vehicle and trajectory flown.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The FAA's proposed regulations divide guided orbital launch 
    vehicles into four classes, with each class defined by its payload 
    weight capability, as shown in table 1. Sub-orbital launch vehicles are 
    not divided into classes by payload weight, but are categorized as 
    either guided or unguided. Table 2 shows the payload weight and 
    corresponding classes of existing orbital launch vehicles. For a launch 
    site intended for the use of orbital launch vehicles, an applicant 
    would define a hypothetical flight corridor from a launch point at the 
    proposed launch site for the largest launch vehicle class anticipated--
    which the FAA anticipates would be based on expected customers.
    
                                                      Table 1.--Class of Launch Vehicles by Payload Weight
                                                                              [LBS]
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Orbital launch vehicles
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              100 nm orbit                       Small                             Medium                            Medium large                  Large
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    28 deg. inc.\1\................  4,400               >4,400 to 11,100          >11,100 to <18,500>18,500
    90 deg. inc.\2\................  3,300               >3,330 to 8,400           >8,400 to 15,000                 >15,000
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 28 deg. inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 deg. latitude.
    \1\ 90 deg. inclination orbit.
    
    
                      Table 2.--Classification of Common Guided Orbital Expendable Launch Vehicles
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Payload weight  Payload weight
                                                      (lbs)           (lbs)
                      Vehicle                   --------------------------------                Class
                                                  100 nm Orbit    100 nm Orbit
                                                  29 deg. inc.    90 deg. inc.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Conestoga 1229.............................             600             450  Small.
    Conestoga 1620.............................           2,250           1,750  Small.
    LML V-1....................................           1,755           1,140  Small.
    LML V-2....................................           4,390           3,290  Small.
    Pegasus....................................             700             N/A  Small.
    Pegasus XL.................................           1,015             769  Small.
    Scout......................................             560             460  Small.
    Taurus.....................................           3,100           2,340  Small.
    Atlas II...................................          14,500          12,150  Medium.
    Atlas 2A...................................          16,050          13,600  Medium.
    Delta 6920.................................           8,780           6,490  Medium.
    Delta 7920.................................          11,220           8,575  Medium.
    Titan II...................................             N/A           4,200  Medium.
    Atlas 2AS..................................          19,050          16,100  Medium/Large.
    Titan III..................................          31,200             N/A  Medium/Large.
    Titan IV...................................          47,400          41,000  Large.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Methods for estimating the risk posed by the operation of a launch 
    site for guided orbital and sub-orbital launch vehicles are presented 
    in proposed appendices A, B and C. Appendix A contains instructions for 
    creating a flight corridor for guided orbital and sub-orbital launch 
    vehicles. Appendix B provides an alternative method to appendix A. 
    Appendix B also instructs an applicant how to create a flight corridor 
    for guided launch vehicles, but provides more detailed calculations to 
    employ so that, although an appendix B flight corridor is typically 
    less conservative than that of appendix A, it should provide more 
    representative of actual vehicle behavior. Appendix C
    
    [[Page 34328]]
    
    contains the FAA's proposed method for applicants to analyze the risk 
    posed by guided launch vehicles within a flight corridor created under 
    appendix A or B. Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles are presented in 
    appendix D, which describes how an applicant should estimate impact 
    dispersion areas and analyze the risk in those areas.
        Appendix A is less complex, but generates a larger flight corridor, 
    than the methodology of appendix B. No local meteorological or vehicle 
    trajectory data are required to estimate a flight corridor under 
    appendix A. Because it is a simpler methodology, an applicant may want 
    to use it as a screening tool. If an applicant can define a flight 
    corridor for a single trajectory, using appendix A, that does not 
    overfly populated areas, the applicant may satisfy the launch site 
    location review requirements with the least effort. If, however, the 
    corridor includes populated areas, the applicant has the choice of 
    creating an appendix B flight corridor, which may be more narrow, or 
    conducting a casualty expectancy analysis. An applicant is not required 
    to try appendix A before employing appendix B.
        The FAA's proposed location review reflects a number of assumptions 
    designed to keep the review general rather than oriented toward or 
    addressing a particular launch. These assumptions are discussed more 
    fully below, but may be summarized briefly. The location reviews for 
    appendices A and B flight corridors reflect an attempt to ensure that 
    launch failure debris would be contained within a safe area. Successful 
    containment must assume a perfectly functioning flight termination 
    system. A perfectly functioning flight termination system would ensure 
    that any debris created by a launch failure would be contained within a 
    flight corridor. When the high risk event is not launch failure but 
    launch success, as tends to be the case with an unguided sub-orbital 
    launch vehicle that does not employ an FTS, the FAA still proposes a 
    location review based on an assumption of containment.
        The approaches provided in the four proposed location review 
    appendices are based on some comment assumptions that reflect 
    limitations of the launch site location review analysis. The FAA is not 
    requiring an application to analyze the risks posed to the public by 
    toxic materials that might be handled at the proposed site, nor the 
    risk to ships or aircraft from launch debris or planned jettisoning of 
    stages. The FAA recognizes that these assumptions represent a 
    limitation in the launch site location review. The FAA intends that 
    these three risks will be dealt with through pre-launch operational 
    controls and launch commit criteria which will be better identified as 
    part of a launch license review. All launches that take place from an 
    approved U.S. launch site will either be regulated by the FAA through a 
    launch license or will be U.S. government launches that the government 
    carries out for the government.
        The two methods for creating guided launch vehicle flight corridors 
    are intended to account for launch vehicle failure rate, malfunction 
    turn capability, and the launch vehicle guidance accuracy as defined by 
    the impact dispersions of these vehicles. The premise undergirding each 
    of these proposed methods is that debris would be contained within the 
    defined flight corridor or impact dispersion areas. Accordingly, for 
    purposes of a launch site location review, only the populations within 
    the defined areas need to be analyzed for risk. The FAA recognizes that 
    were a flight termination system fail to destroy a vehicle as intended, 
    a launch vehicle could stray outside its planned flight corridor. That 
    concern will be better accommodated through another forum, namely, the 
    licensing of a launch operator and the review of that launch operator's 
    flight safety system. Because a containment analysis only looks at how 
    far debris would travel in the event an errant vehicle were destroyed, 
    the containment analysis has to assume a perfectly functioning flight 
    termination system. In other words, for purposes of analyzing the 
    acceptability of a launch site's location for launching guided 
    expendable launch vehicles, the FAA will assume that a malfunctioning 
    vehicle will be destroyed and debris will always impact within 
    acceptable boundaries. Accordingly, the FAA does not propose to 
    explore, for purposes of determining the acceptability of a launch 
    site's location, the possibility that a vehicle's flight termination 
    system may fail and that the vehicle could continue to travel toward 
    populated areas. Any proposed site may present such risks--indeed, any 
    proposed launch presents such risks--but they are best addressed in the 
    context of individual launch systems. This working assumption of a 
    perfectly reliable flight termination system will not, of course, apply 
    to the licensing of a launch of a launch vehicle. The FAA will consider 
    the reliability of any particular launch vehicle's FTS in the course of 
    a launch license review. From a practical standpoint, this means that 
    for the launch site location review, both nominal and failure-produced 
    debris would be contained within a flight corridor, obviating the need 
    for risk analyses that address risk outside of a defined flight 
    corridor or set of impact dispersion areas.
        Additionally, the FAA does not propose to require an applicant to 
    analyze separately the risks posed by the planned impact of normally 
    jettisoned stages from a guided expendable launch vehicle, except for 
    the final stage of a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle. The FAA does 
    not consider intermediate stage impact analysis necessary to assess the 
    general suitability of a launch point for guided expendable launch 
    vehicles because the impact location of stages is inherently launch 
    vehicle-specific, and the trajectory and timing for a guided launch 
    vehicle can normally be designed so that the risks from nominally 
    jettisoned stages will be kept to acceptable levels. A launch license 
    review will have to ensure that vehicle stages are not going to impact 
    in densely populated areas. Risk calculations performed for launches 
    from federal launch ranges demonstrate a relatively low risk posed by 
    controlled disposition of stages in comparison to the risk posed by 
    wide-spread dispersion of debris due to vehicle failure.
        Each of the FAA's proposed approaches to defining flight corridors 
    or impact dispersion areas is designed to analyze the highest risk 
    launch event associated with a particular vehicle technology. This is 
    not meant to imply that lower risk launch events are necessarily 
    acceptable; only that they will not be considered in the course of this 
    review. For a guided orbital launch vehicle, that event is vehicle 
    failure. For an unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle, the launch event 
    of highest risk is vehicle success, namely, the predicted impact of 
    stages. For a guided launch vehicle the overflight risk, which results 
    from a vehicle failure followed by its destruction (assuming no FTS 
    failure), is the dominant risk. Risks from nominally jettisoned debris 
    are subsumed in the overflight risk assessment. For an unguided sub-
    orbital launch vehicle, the FAA proposes that risk due to stage impact 
    be analyzed instead of the overflight risk. This distinction is 
    necessitated by the fact that the failure rate during thrust is 
    historically significantly lower for unguided vehicles than for guided 
    vehicles. Current unguided launch vehicles with many years of use are 
    highly reliable. They do not employ an FTS; therefore, debris pieces 
    usually consist of vehicle components that are not broken up. Another 
    reason for the
    
    [[Page 34329]]
    
    difference between analyses is that unguided vehicle stage impact 
    dispersions are significantly larger than guided vehicle impact 
    dispersions. These differences add up to greater risk within an 
    unguided launch vehicle stage impact dispersion area than the areas 
    outside the dispersion areas. Therefore, a risk assessment is only 
    performed on those populations within an unguided launch vehicle stage 
    impact dispersion area.
        An applicant must define an area called an overflight exclusion 
    zone (OEZ) around each launch point, and the applicant must demonstrate 
    that the OEZ can be clear of the public during a launch. An OEZ defines 
    the area where the public risk criteria of 30 x 10-6 would 
    be exceeded if one person were present in the open. The overflight 
    exclusion zone was estimated from risk computations for each launch 
    vehicle type and class. An applicant must define an OEZ because launch 
    vehicle range rates are slow in the launch area, launch vehicle 
    effective casualty areas, the area within which all casualties are 
    assumed to occur through exposure to debris, are large, and impact 
    dispersion areas are dense with debris so that the presence of one 
    person inside this hazardous area is expected to produce Ec 
    values exceeding the public risk criteria. Accordingly, an applicant 
    would either have to own the property, demonstrate to the FAA that 
    there are times when people are not present, or that it could clear the 
    public from the overflight exclusion zone prior to a launch. Evacuating 
    an overflight exclusion zone for an inland site, might, for example, 
    require an applicant to demonstrate that agreements have been reached 
    with local officials to close any public roads during a launch. The FAA 
    seeks comments on the feasibility of evacuating areas inland and on the 
    impact of the OEZ requirement on the ability to gain a license for an 
    inland site.
    
    E. License Conditions
    
        A license may contain conditions flowing from the various reviews 
    conducted during the application process. For example, a license 
    granted following approval of a launch site location would be limited 
    to the launch points analyzed, and the type and class of vehicle used 
    in the demonstration of site location safety. An applicant may choose 
    to analyze all three types of launch vehicles in its application. An 
    FAA launch site operator license authorizing the operation of a launch 
    site for launch of an orbital expendable launch vehicle would allow the 
    launch of vehicles from the site that were less than or equal to the 
    class of launch vehicle, based on payload weight, used to demonstrate 
    the safety of the site location. If a licensee later wanted to offer 
    the launch site for the launch of a larger class of vehicles or a 
    different type of launch vehicle, such as an unguided sub-orbital 
    launch vehicle, the licensee would be required to request a license 
    modification and demonstrate that the larger vehicle or different type 
    of vehicle could be safely launched from the launch site. Likewise, the 
    addition of a new launch point would require a license modification. 
    The demonstration would be based on the same kinds of analyses used for 
    the original license. In some cases, a licensee might be able to use 
    the safety analyses performed by a launch operator to meet location 
    review requirements.
        Although the authority granted by the launch site operator license 
    would be limited to certain types or classes of vehicles, the license 
    would not represent a guarantee that the FAA would necessarily license 
    any particular launch from an approved launch site. The demonstration 
    is intended to ensure that the location of the launch site can safely 
    support at least some type of vehicle, launched on a specific 
    trajectory. The planned launch of an actual vehicle may differ from the 
    hypothetical trajectory or vehicle characteristics used for the launch 
    site location demonstration, potentially posing different risks to the 
    public than those used in the site location demonstration. In addition 
    to the protection provided by a safe launch site location, the safety 
    of any actual flight of a launch vehicle will be dependent on the 
    safety procedures, personnel qualifications, safety systems, and other 
    elements of the proposed launch. Consequently, each launch operator, 
    other than the U.S. Government, must obtain a launch license for its 
    specific operations.
    
    F. Operational Responsibilities
    
        The FAA is proposing to impose certain operational responsibilities 
    on an operator of a launch site. In addition, the FAA proposes to 
    distinguish between activities covered by a license to operate a launch 
    site and those covered by a launch license. Any activity that will be 
    approved as part of a launch license will not be covered in a launch 
    site operator license even if the launch site operator provides the 
    service. For example, because a launch licensee will need to assure the 
    adequacy of ground tracking, approval of ground tracking systems will 
    be handled in the launch license process even if a launch site operator 
    provides the service. Similarly, in the case of ground safety, a launch 
    site operator may provide fueling for a launch licensee, but safe 
    procedures for fueling will be addressed in the launch license.
        The operational requirements being proposed for the operator of a 
    launch site addresses control of public access, scheduling of 
    operations at the site, notifications, recordkeeping, launch site 
    accident response and investigation, and explosive safety. A launch 
    site operator licensee would be required to control access to the site. 
    Security guards, fences, or other physical barriers may be used. Anyone 
    entering the site must, on first entry, be informed of the site's 
    safety and emergency response procedures. Alarms or other warning 
    signals would be required to alert persons on the launch site of any 
    emergency that might occur when they are on site. If a launch site 
    licensee has multiple launch customers on site at one time, the 
    licensee must have procedures for scheduling their operations so that 
    the activities of one customer do not create hazards for others.
        Because it is more efficient to have a single point of contact for 
    launches conducted at a site, the FAA is proposing that the launch site 
    operator be responsible for all initial coordination with the 
    appropriate FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the airspace 
    where launches will take place and the U.S. Coast Guard (where 
    applicable) through a written agreement. The FAA's Air Traffic Service 
    and the Coast Guard issues Notice to Airmen and Mariners, respectively, 
    to ensure that they avoid hazardous areas. An FAA Air Route Traffic 
    Control Center also closes airways during a launch window, if 
    necessary. A launch site operator would be required to obtain an 
    agreement regarding procedures for coordinating contacts with these 
    agencies for launches from the site. The requirement for coordinating 
    with the Coast Guard might not, of course, always be applicable, for 
    example, for an inland launch site. A launch site operator licensee 
    would also have to notify local officials with an interest in the 
    launch. These would include officials with responsibilities that might 
    be called into play by a launch mishap, such as fire and emergency 
    response personnel.
        Another operational requirement being proposed is for the operator 
    of a launch site to develop and implement a launch site accident 
    investigation plan containing procedures for investigating and 
    reporting a launch site accident. This would extend similar reporting, 
    investigation and response procedures
    
    [[Page 34330]]
    
    currently applicable to launch related accidents and incidents to 
    accidents occurring during ground activities at a launch site. Lastly, 
    an operator of a launch site would have responsibilities regarding 
    explosives, specifically, those dealing with lightning and electric 
    power lines. This has been discussed above.
    
    III. Part Analysis
    
    Part 417--License to Operate a Launch Site
    
        The FAA removes and reserves part 417 and creates part 420 to 
    address licensing and operation of a launch site.
    
    Part 420--License to Operate a Launch Site
    
        Proposed Sec. 420.1 would describe the scope of proposed part 420. 
    Part 420 would encompass the requirements for obtaining a license to 
    operate a launch site and with which a licensee must comply.
        Proposed Sec. 420.3 would specify the person who must apply for a 
    license to operate a launch site, and the person who must comply with 
    regulations that apply to a licensed launch site operator. Because a 
    launch site operator is someone who offers a launch site to others for 
    launch, only someone proposing such an offer need obtain a license to 
    operate a launch site. A launch operator proposing to launch from its 
    own launch site need only obtain a launch license because a launch 
    license will address safety issues related to a specific launch and 
    because a launch license encompasses ground operations.
        Proposed Sec. 420.5 would add terms that have not been previously 
    defined by the FAA. These definitions would apply in the context of 
    part 420, which governs the licensing and safety requirements for 
    operation of a launch site. These terms do not apply outside part 420. 
    Specifically, the following terms would be defined:
        Ballistic Coefficient () means the weight (W) of an object 
    divided by the quantity product of the coefficient of drag 
    (Cd) of the object and the area (A) of the object.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.000
    
    A ballistic coefficient is a parameter used to describe flight 
    characteristics of an object.
        Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be 
    located together without adverse reaction. Compatibility in storage 
    exists when storing materials together does not increase the 
    probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of 
    the effects of such an accident. Compatibility determines whether 
    materials require segregation. The FAA derived this definition from a 
    NASA definition, which states that compatibility is ``the chemical 
    property of materials to coexist without adverse reaction for an 
    acceptable period of time. Compatibility in storage exists when storing 
    materials together does not increase the probability of an accident or, 
    for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident. 
    Storage compatibility groups are assigned to provide for segregated 
    storage.'' \12\ The FAA proposes to adapt the NASA definition in order 
    to describe coexistence with greater specificity.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \12\ NASA Standard at A-2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated 
    maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
    case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into 
    flight. If a launch vehicle failure occurs shortly after ignition, and 
    a flight termination system is employed, the FAA expects the debris to 
    be contained within an area described by Dmax.
        Division 1.3 explosive means an explosive as defined in 49 CFR 
    173.50. That provision is part of the hazardous materials regulations 
    of the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) of the 
    Department of Transportation. Section 173.50 defines a division 1.3 
    explosive as ``. . . consist(ing) of explosives that have a fire hazard 
    and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or both, 
    but not a mass explosion hazard.'' This classification is identical to 
    the United Nations Organization classification, and is also used by 
    NASA and the Department of Defense.
        Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where 
    a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch 
    point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact 
    dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
        E,F,G coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
    geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is 
    at the center of an ellipsoidal Earth model. The E-axis is positive 
    directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive 
    directed through 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident 
    with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is 
    normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
        E,N,U coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
    topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
    is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis 
    is positive directed north. The En-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal 
    Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic 
    vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed 
    away from the Earth.
        Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate 
    casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle 
    failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty 
    area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of 
    the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty, 
    and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to 
    be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris 
    piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact 
    explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce.
        Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that, 
    when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable 
    initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large 
    volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding 
    medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or 
    deflagrate. With the exception of a minor editorial change, this 
    proposed definition is identical to that of NASA.\13\ For comparison, 
    49 CFR 173.50 of RSPA's regulations defines an explosive as, ``. . . 
    any substance or article . . . which is designed to function by 
    explosion . . . or which, by chemical reaction within itself, is able 
    to function in a similar manner even if not designed to function by 
    explosion. . . .'' Both definitions are consistent with each other, and 
    the FAA proposes to use the NASA definition because it is more 
    descriptive.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \13\ NASA Standard at A-4.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from 
    explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the 
    weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast 
    effects when detonated. This proposed definition is identical to the 
    NASA definition for ``TNT equivalent,'' and similar to the DOD 
    definition of ``explosive equivalent'' which defines the term, in 
    relevant part, as ``(t)he amount of a standard explosive that, when 
    detonated, will produce a blast effect comparable to that which results 
    at the same distances from the
    
    [[Page 34331]]
    
    detonation or explosion of a given amount of the material for which 
    performance is being evaluated.'' \14\ DOD uses TNT as the standard 
    explosive, thus rendering the NASA and DOD terms interchangeable. FAA 
    proposes to use the more general term ``explosive equivalent'' instead 
    of ``TNT equivalent.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \14\ DOD Standard at A-4.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where 
    solid or liquid propellant is stored or handled. The FAA proposes to 
    define this term for the purpose of identifying specific hazard 
    facilities on a launch site that present potential explosive hazards. 
    NASA and DOD use the more general term ``potential explosive site,'' 
    which is defined, in part, as ``the location of a quantity of 
    explosives that will create a blast fragment, thermal, or debris hazard 
    in the event of an accidental explosion of its contents. . . .'' \15\ 
    As proposed, an explosive hazard facility may include a location where 
    explosives are either handled or stored.
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        \15\ DOD Standard at A-7; NASA Standard at A-9.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch 
    vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
    degrees. For example, due east is 90 degrees.
        Flight corridor means an area on the earth's surface estimated to 
    contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal 
    flight of an orbital or guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
        Guided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub: orbital rocket that 
    employs an active guidance system.
        Impact dispersion area means an area representing an estimated five 
    standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an 
    intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle. The 
    definition is confined to proposed part 420, and should not be confused 
    with other impact dispersion areas that may be defined by the federal 
    launch ranges for their particular launch safety programs.
        Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a 
    stage apogee, a five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal 
    impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch 
    vehicle. Intermediate stages include all stages up to the final stage.
        Impact dispersion radius (R) means a radius that defines an impact 
    dispersion area. It applies to all launch vehicle stages.
        Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the 
    impact point of a sub-orbital launch vehicle stage.
        Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, with the use 
    of a launch vehicle stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an 
    intermediate or final stage of a sub-orbital launch vehicle.
        Instantaneous impact point (IIP) means an impact point, following 
    thrust termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of 
    atmospheric drag effects, that is, a vacuum. This shows the point at 
    which launch vehicle debris would land in the event thrust was 
    terminated. In this proposal, the IIP calculations would assume a 
    vacuum.
        Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch 
    vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface. It is 
    typically abbreviated as R, or R-dot.
        Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any 
    two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control 
    of one launch site customer. Intraline distance prevents the 
    propagation of an explosion. In other words, with an appropriate 
    intraline distance, an explosive mishap at one explosive hazard 
    facility would not cause an explosive event at another explosive hazard 
    facility. The FAA anticipates that worker safety requirements will 
    dictate protection of employees and anticipates that all licensees will 
    familiarize themselves with those requirements and conform to them in 
    accordance with the law. Unlike distances used to protect the public, 
    intraline distance will not protect workers with the same level of 
    protection as the public. NASA defines intraline distance as ``(t)he 
    distance to be maintained between any two operating buildings and sites 
    within an operating line, of which at least one contains or is designed 
    to contain explosives, . . .''.\16\ Thus, for NASA, the criteria for 
    using intraline distance is whether the areas are within an operating 
    line. An operating line is a ``group of buildings used to perform the 
    consecutive steps in the loading, assembling, modification, normal 
    maintenance, renovation, or salvaging of an item or in the manufacture 
    of an explosive or explosive device.'' \17\ The FAA's proposed 
    definition is more suitable to its statutory obligation to protect 
    public safety because public safety dictates only that explosive hazard 
    facilities of one launch operator be sited in a manner to prevent the 
    propagation of an explosion. If intraline distances are not maintained 
    between two explosive hazard facilities, then the larger area 
    encompassing both quantities must be used for Q-D purposes when 
    determining prescribed distances to the public.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \16\ NASA Standard at A-7.
        \17\ NASA Standard at A-8.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined using appendix A, 
    the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to a point 100 
    nm in the direction of the flight azimuth. For a flight corridor 
    defined using appendix B, a launch site is the portion of a flight 
    corridor from the launch point to the enveloping line enclosing the 
    outer boundary of the last Di dispersion circle.
        Launch point means a point on the earth from which the flight of a 
    launch vehicle begins, and is defined by the point's geodetic latitude, 
    longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
        Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a 
    ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious 
    injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated 
    with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to 
    property not associated with the activity. The FAA considers any 
    licensee or its employees, or any licensee customer, contractor, or 
    subcontractor or the employees of any of these persons to be associated 
    with a ground activity. Property not associated with the activity will 
    typically include any property belonging to members of the public or 
    personal property of employees. Property associated with the activity 
    includes the property of a launch site operator or launch licensee, or 
    either licensee's customers, contractors or subcontractors.
        Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in 
    pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an 
    item. This term is used for applying Q-D criteria to solid propellants, 
    and for liquid propellants when explosive equivalency applies. 
    Explosive equivalency applies to liquid propellants when a liquid fuel 
    and a liquid oxidizer are close enough together that their explosive 
    potential combined must be used when determining prescribed distances 
    to the public.
        Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance, 
    trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all 
    launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle 
    internal and external systems perform exactly as planned, and there are 
    no external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric 
    drag and gravity.
        Nominal trajectory means the position and velocity components of a 
    nominally
    
    [[Page 34332]]
    
    performing launch vehicle relative to an x,y,z, coordinate system, 
    expressed in x,y,z,x,y,z. The x,y,z coordinates describe the position 
    of the vehicle both for projecting the proposed flight path and during 
    actual flight. The x,y,z variables describe the velocity of the 
    vehicle.
        Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a 
    launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given 
    populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measure 
    along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose 
    normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the 
    populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory 
    intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
        Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor 
    which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch 
    vehicle.
        Populated area means a land area with population. For a part 420 
    site location risk analysis of a populated area within the first 100 nm 
    of a launch point, a populated area is no greater than a census block 
    group in the U.S., and an equivalent size outside the U.S. For analysis 
    of a part 420 flight corridor more than 100 nm downrange from the 
    launch point, a populated area is no greater than a 1 deg. X 1 deg. 
    latitude/longitude grid, whether in the United States or not.
        Population density means the number of people per unit area in a 
    populated area.
        Position data means data referring to the current position of a 
    launch vehicle with respect to time using the X, Y, Z coordinate 
    system.
        Public area means any area outside an explosive hazard facility and 
    is an area that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of 
    a launch site operator or of a launch site customer who possesses, owns 
    or otherwise controls that explosive hazard facility. For purposes of 
    Q-D criteria, the proposed rules treat any location outside a launch 
    site boundary as a public area for any activity at a launch site. 
    Certain areas within a launch site are also considered public areas for 
    purposes of applying Q-D criteria. With respect to any given launch 
    operator, areas where other launch operators are located, or where the 
    launch site operator Commission is located, are public areas.
        Public area distance means the minimum separation distance 
    permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility. 
    Although NASA and DoD differentiate between areas that contain 
    inhabited buildings and areas that contain public traffic routes, with 
    inhabited buildings requiring greater separation distances, the FAA's 
    proposed requirements does not make the same differentiation.\18\ The 
    FAA proposes to use NASA's and DoD's more conservative inhabited 
    building distance as the required distance between an explosive hazard 
    facility and all public areas. This is because a public area is not in 
    the control of the applicant, and can, therefore, contain anything from 
    open land to groups of office buildings. This is consistent with the 
    approach taken by NASA and DoD for areas outside a launch site. For 
    example, NASA defines inhabited building distance as ``(t)he minimum 
    allowable distance between an inhabited building and an explosive area. 
    Inhabited building distances are used between explosives areas and 
    administrative areas, also between operating lines with dissimilar 
    hazards and between explosive locations and other exposures. Inhabited 
    building distances will also be provided between explosive areas and 
    Center boundaries.''\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \18\ Nor does the FAA attempt to protect inhabited buildings 
    that are not considered property of the public.
        \19\ NASA Standard at A-7.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that 
    does not have a guidance system.
        X,Y,Z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
    topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
    is at a launch point. The X-axis coincides with the initial launch 
    azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The Y-axis is 
    positive to the left looking downrange. The XY-plane is tangent to the 
    ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to 
    the geodetic vertical. The Z-axis is normal to the XY-plane and 
    positive directed away from the earth.
        0, 0, 0 
    means a latitude, longitude, height system where 0 
    is the geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is 
    the east longitude of the launch point, and h is the height of the 
    launch point above a reference ellipsoid. 0 and 
    0 are expressed in degrees decimal degrees, which 
    is abbreviated as DDD.
        Proposed subpart B would contain the criteria and information 
    requirements for obtaining a license to operate a launch site. Section 
    420.15 would specify the information that an applicant for a launch 
    site license would have to submit as part of its license application. 
    The FAA requires this information to evaluate environmental impacts, 
    whether the launch site location could safely be used to conduct 
    launches, issues affecting national security and foreign policy, 
    explosive site safety, and whether the applicant will operate safely.
        Proposed Sec. 420.15(a) contains the environmental review 
    requirements currently located at Sec. 417.105-107.
        Proposed Sec. 420.15(b) would provide the information necessary for 
    a location review. It would also require foreign ownership information 
    and an explosive site plan.
        Proposed Sec. 420.15(c) requires an applicant to demonstrate how it 
    will satisfy its subpart D responsibilities. Specifically, a license 
    applicant must show how the applicant proposes to control public access 
    pursuant to Sec. 420.53, how it proposes to comply with the scheduling 
    requirements of Sec. 420.55, and how it proposes to satisfy the 
    notification obligations of Sec. 420.57. The FAA requires this 
    information to ascertain whether an applicant will be able to satisfy 
    the subpart D performance requirements and for compliance monitoring 
    purposes. With regard to the notification obligations of Sec. 420.57, 
    an applicant must submit its agreements with the U.S. Coast Guard 
    district and the FAA regional office for air traffic services to 
    demonstrate satisfaction of the requirements of Sec. 420.57(b) and (c). 
    A license applicant must also show how it proposes to comply with the 
    accident investigation requirements in Sec. 420.59 and requirements on 
    explosives in Sec. 420.63.
        Proposed Sec. 420.15(d) provides that an applicant who is proposing 
    to locate a launch site at an existing launch point at a federal launch 
    range is not required to perform a location review if a launch vehicle 
    of the same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been 
    safely launched from the launch point. An applicant who is proposing to 
    locate at a federal launch range is not required to submit an explosive 
    site plan.
        Section 420.17 would establish the bases upon which the FAA will 
    make its license determination. This includes the FAA's determination 
    of the adequacy of information provided by the applicant, the 
    conclusions of the environmental and policy reviews, the adequacy of 
    the explosive site plan, and satisfaction of site location 
    requirements. The FAA will notify the applicant of, and allow the 
    applicant to address, any deficiencies in the application.
        Section 420.19 would require an applicant to demonstrate that its 
    proposed launch site location will allow for the safe launch of at 
    least one type of launch vehicle by defining flight corridors or impact 
    dispersion areas and estimating casualty expectancy.
    
    [[Page 34333]]
    
        Section 420.21 would require an applicant to specify which launch 
    vehicle type and class would be launched from each launch point at the 
    proposed launch site. This section also proposes to define the minimum 
    distance from each launch point to a launch site boundary.\20\ The 
    three types of expendable launch vehicle proposed account for the 
    critical distinctions between launch vehicles designed for orbital or 
    sub-orbital flight, and between those with and without guidance 
    systems. Guided orbital expendable launch vehicles typically require an 
    FTS, which means that the greatest risk to the public stems from debris 
    caused by destruction of a vehicle. Guided sub-orbital launch vehicles 
    will be treated similarly to orbital launch vehicles, except for the 
    nominal impact of the final stage. In contrast, unguided sub-orbital 
    launch vehicles generally have high reliability levels, and therefore 
    crate the greatest public risk through nominal stage impact. The 
    methods proposed in the appendices are designed to account for these 
    differences in public risk. Orbital expendable launch vehicles are also 
    sorted by class, which is determined by payload weight capacity. 
    Minimum distances are based on actual computations for each of the 
    launch vehicle types and classes. The safety of launch points for 
    reusable launch vehicles will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in a 
    manner consistent with the principles expressed here.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \20\ The FAA also proposed minimum distances between a launch 
    point and a launch site boundary in its explosive site plan 
    requirements in subpart B. Because both requirements apply, an 
    applicant must apply the greater of the Dmax or Q-D 
    distance to accommodate the greater of the hazards.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Section 420.23 would state that the FAA will evaluate the adequacy 
    of a launch site location for unproven launch vehicles on a case-by-
    case basis.
        Subpart B also contains the FAA's proposed explosive facility 
    siting standards for the protection of the public from launch site 
    explosive hazards created by liquid and solid propellants. These 
    standards would be used by an applicant to site facilities that support 
    activities involving liquid and solid propellants, or facilities 
    potentially exposed to such activities, and to document the layout of 
    these facilities.\21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \21\ An analysis may include evaluations of blast hazards; 
    fragment hazards; protective construction; grounding, bounding and 
    lighting protection systems; electrical installations; natural or 
    man-made terrain features; or other mission or local requirements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        In order to comply with proposed subpart B, an applicant would 
    first determine those areas at its proposed launch site where solid or 
    liquid propellant would be stored or handled, and which the FAA 
    proposes to designate as explosive hazard facilities. They may include 
    payload processing facilities, launch pads, propellant storage or 
    transfer tanks, and solid rocket motor assembly buildings. An applicant 
    must then determine the types and maximum quantity of propellants to be 
    located at each explosive hazard facility. For solid propellants, the 
    applicant would determine the total weight, expressed in pounds, of 
    division 1.3 explosive material to be contained in the items that will 
    be located at each explosive hazard facility. For liquid propellants, 
    the applicant would determine either the explosive equivalency of a 
    fuel and oxidizer combination if fuels and oxidizers would be located 
    together at, what is referred to as, incompatible distances; or, if 
    fuels and oxidizers would not be located together, an applicant would 
    determine the net weight in pounds of liquid propellant in each 
    explosive hazard facility.
        The next step for an applicant would be to determine the minimum 
    allowable separation distance between each explosive hazard facility 
    and all other explosive hazard facilities, the launch site boundary, 
    and other public areas such as the launch complex of another launch 
    operator, public railways and highways running through the launch site, 
    and any visitor centers. The distances between explosive hazard 
    facilities are important to ensure that an explosive event in one 
    explosive hazard facility would not cause an explosive event in another 
    explosive hazard facility. The distances between explosive hazard 
    facilities and public areas are important to ensure that the public is 
    protected from blast, debris, and thermal hazards. Exact distances must 
    be given between the wall or corner of the facility closest to the 
    closest wall or corner of other explosive hazard facilities and public 
    areas. Minimum allowable distances based on the type and quantity of 
    propellant to be located within an explosive hazard facility. 
    Determining the minimum allowable distance between two explosive hazard 
    facilities is accomplished by applying the applicable criteria to each 
    and then separating them by at least the greater distance prescribed 
    for each explosive hazard facility. For example, if a certain amount of 
    division 1.3 solid propellant would be located at explosive hazard 
    facility A, and twice as much division 1.3 solid propellant would be 
    located at explosive hazard facility B, the prescribed distance 
    generated by explosive hazard facility B would serve as the minimum 
    distance permitted between explosive hazard facility A and explosive 
    hazard facility B.
        Proposed Sec. 420.31(a) would require an applicant to provide the 
    FAA an explosive site plan that establishes that the applicant's 
    proposed distances satisfy the explosive siting criteria. The explosive 
    site plan must include a scaled map or maps that show the location of 
    all proposed explosive hazard facilities where solid and liquid 
    propellants would be stored or handled.\22\ An applicant must include 
    the class and division for each solid propellant and the hazard and 
    compatibility group for each liquid propellant.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \22\ Areas where solid propellants would be stored would be 
    included in the plan even though ATF requirements apply. Applicants 
    with magazines where solid propellants are to be stored must obtain 
    an ATF permit and meet ATF quantity-distance requirements. The FAA 
    will use the information to ensure that those of its requirements 
    unrelated to storage are satisfied and to coordinate with ATF when 
    necessary.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        In addition to the location of explosive hazard facilities, the map 
    or maps would indicate actual and minimum allowable distances between 
    each explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities 
    and each public area, including the launch site boundary. One means by 
    which an applicant could show that the distances are at least the 
    minimum required in the proposed rules would be by drawing a circle or 
    arc with a radius equal to the minimum allowed distance centered on 
    each explosive hazard facility.
        Unlike the DOD and NASA standards, which both define numerous 
    separation distances, the proposed rules define only two distances for 
    solid propellants, namely, a public area distance and an intraline 
    distance. Public area distance would serve as the minimum distance 
    permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard facility. 
    Facilities and other infrastructure such as roads, railways, and 
    inhabited buildings may or may not be public areas, depending on 
    whether the public has access at the time explosives are present in the 
    explosive hazard facility. Examples include a public road or railroad 
    running through a launch site, and a visitor center where members of 
    the public would be located.\23\ Likewise,
    
    [[Page 34334]]
    
    different launch site customers are also considered the public with 
    respect to each other. Intraline distance would provide the minimum 
    distance permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by 
    one launch site customer. In this regard, for planning purposes, an 
    applicant should bear in mind that using the greater public area 
    distance would avoid later operational constraints when different 
    customers wanted to use facilities sited at intraline distances.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \23\ A launch site operator who does not wish to employ the 
    appropriate public area distance between an explosive hazard 
    facility and public areas such as, for example, a visitor center, 
    must propose operational limitations in its application. These would 
    consist of such strictures as not allowing members of the public in 
    the visitor center while explosives are present in the explosive 
    hazard facility not sited according to the proposed requirements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        In addition to containing maps, an explosive site plan would also 
    describe, through tables or lists, the maximum quantities of liquid and 
    solid propellants to be located at each explosive hazard facility, and 
    the activities to be conducted within each explosive hazard facility.
        Pursuant to proposed Sec. 420.31(b), the requirement to submit an 
    explosive site plan to the FAA would not apply to an applicant applying 
    for a license to operate a launch site at a federal launch range. 
    Federal launch ranges have separate rules which are either identical or 
    similar to the rules proposed, or require mitigation measures which 
    otherwise ensure safety.
        The criteria for determining the minimum required distances between 
    each explosive hazard facility and all other explosive hazard 
    facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary, 
    are proposed in Sec. 420.33 for solid propellants and Sec. 420.35 for 
    liquid propellants. Proposed Sec. 420.37 includes rules for when liquid 
    and solid propellants are located together.
        Proposed Sec. 420.33 covers quantity determinations and minimum 
    required distances for explosive hazard facilities where solid 
    propellants would be handled. Under proposed Sec. 420.33(a), an 
    applicant would first determine the maximum total quantity of explosive 
    in each explosive hazard facility where solid propellants would be 
    handled. The total quantity of explosives in an explosive hazard 
    facility shall be the maximum total weight, expressed in pounds, of 
    division 1.3 explosive material in the contents of the explosive hazard 
    facility. For example, if a facility could hold up to ten solid rocket 
    motors of a particular type, even though it might only rarely hold that 
    many motors, the applicant would calculate the total weight of division 
    1.3 explosive material in the ten motors.
        The proposed rules are based on an assumption that only division 
    1.3 solid propellant will be located at a launch site in sufficient 
    quantities to affect facility location. The FAA is aware that the 
    launch vehicle used for the first launch from Kodiak Launch Complex, a 
    launch site operated by the recently licensed Alaska Aerospace 
    Development Corporation (AADC), had a second stage motor with division 
    1.1 propellant. The FAA believes this will be a rare occurrence in the 
    future. The FAA realizes that 1.1 explosives, such as those used in 
    launch operator's flight termination system, will also likely be 
    located at a launch site. However, current practice is to design such 
    components so as not to be able to initiate division 1.3 components 
    when installed on a vehicle. The FAA anticipates that it will require 
    any licensed launch operator to demonstrate that its 1.1 devices do not 
    initiate 1.3 components as is the current practice at federal launch 
    ranges. Therefore, the amount of such ordnance used with division 1.3 
    explosives may be disregarded for Q-D purposes. The total quantity of 
    explosives shall be the NEW of the division 1.3 components.
        Once an applicant has determined the total quantity of solid 
    propellants in each explosive hazard facility, proposed Sec. 420.33(b) 
    would require an applicant to separate each explosive hazard facility 
    where solid propellants will be handled from all other explosive hazard 
    facilities and each public area, including the launch site boundary, in 
    accordance with the minimum separation distances contained in proposed 
    table E-1 in appendix E. Table E-1 provides two distances for each 
    quantity level. The first, a public area distance, is the minimum 
    distance permitted between a public area and an explosive hazard 
    facility. The second, an intraline distance, is the minimum distance 
    permitted between any two explosive hazard facilities used by one 
    launch site customer. Other explosive hazard facilities may constitute 
    public areas, because the definition of public area includes any area 
    in the possession or ownership, or otherwise under the control of a 
    launch site operator's other customers. Distance calculations would be 
    made accordingly. Table E-1 contains the same distances as the NASA and 
    DOD standards, except that the DOD standard has more increments. An 
    applicant may use linear interpolation for quantity values between 
    those provided in the table. Additionally, because table E-1 does not 
    include quantities greater than 1,000,000 pounds, an applicant with an 
    explosive hazard facility where solid propellants in quantities greater 
    than 1,000,000 pounds would be handled would use the equations proposed 
    in Sec. 420.33(b) to obtain separation distances.
        An applicant would measure a separation distance from the closest 
    source of debris or hazard under proposed Sec. 420.33(c). For example, 
    for a building, an applicant would use for measurement the wall or 
    corner of the facility closet to the closest wall or corner of other 
    explosive hazard facilities and public areas. When solid rocket motors 
    or motor segments are freestanding, an applicant would measure from the 
    closest motor or motor segment. An acceptable way to demonstrate that 
    minimum distance requirements are met is to draw a circle or arc 
    centered on the closest source of debris or hazard showing that no 
    other explosive hazard facility or public area is within the distance 
    permitted.
        Note that Q-D requirements address siting of facilities, not 
    operational control of hazard areas. During actual operations, the 
    existence and size of a hazard area is dependent on the actual amount 
    of explosive material in an explosive hazard facility.
        Proposed Sec. 420.35 covers quantity determinations and distance 
    requirements for explosive hazard facilities that support the storage 
    or handling of liquid propellants. In addition to applying to distances 
    between an explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard 
    facilities and public areas, distance requirements may apply within an 
    explosive hazard facility as well.
        Liquid propellants are classified and separated differently than 
    solid propellants. Where solid propellants are classified by class and 
    division, each liquid propellant is assigned to one of three hazard 
    groups and one of two compatibility groups. A hazard group categorizes 
    liquid propellants according to the hazards they cause. Hazard group 1 
    represents a fire hazard, hazard group 2 represents a more serious fire 
    hazard, and, because a liquid propellant in hazard group 3 can rupture 
    a storage container, it represents a fragmentation hazard. Each liquid 
    propellant also falls into one of two compatibility groups. Liquid 
    propellants are compatible when storing them together does not increase 
    the probability of an accident or, for a given quantity of propellant, 
    the magnitude of the effects of such an accident. Propellants in the 
    same compatibility group do not increase the probability or magnitude 
    of an accident. The two proposed compatibility groups consist of fuels 
    and oxidizers, and are what the NASA and DOD standards label A and C. 
    The FAA proposes to use the same labeling to provide continuity. 
    Proposed group A represents oxidizers
    
    [[Page 34335]]
    
    such as LO2 and N2O4, and proposed group C represents fuels such as RP-
    1 and LH2. Proposed appendix E provides the hazard and compatibility 
    groups for current launch vehicle liquid propellants in table E-3.
        Explosive equivalency serves as another source of difference 
    between the treatment of solid and liquid propellants. Only if fuels 
    and oxidizers are to be located within certain distances of each other 
    would the separation requirements designed to account for the hazardous 
    consequences of their potential combination apply. That combination is 
    measured in terms of explosive equivalency. Explosive equivalency for 
    liquid propellants is a measure of the blast effects from explosion of 
    a given quantity of fuel and oxidizer mixture expressed in terms of the 
    weight of TNT that would produce the same blast effects when detonated. 
    Fuels should not be located near oxidizers if possible. The 
    significance of the hazard groups and compatibility groups is that if 
    fuels are located far enough from oxidizers, the minimum distance 
    requirements to public areas and other explosive hazard facilities 
    depend only on the quantity and hazard group of the individual liquid 
    propellants. If operational requirements require fuels and oxidizers to 
    be located near each other, that is, at less than the minimum public 
    area and incompatible distances proposed in tables E-4, E-5 and E-6, 
    the explosive equivalency of the incompatible propellants must be 
    calculated and used to determine the distances proposed in table E-7 to 
    other explosive hazard facilities and public areas.
        Appendix E contains four distance tables with separation 
    requirements for liquid propellants. Tables E-4, E-5 and E-6 contain 
    separation distances for hazard group 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Table 
    E-7 contains separation distances for when fuels and oxidizers are 
    located less than prescribed distances apart so that explosive 
    equivalency applies. Table E-7 contains distances similar to those for 
    1.1 solid explosives. This is because the ``explosive equivalency'' of 
    a fuel and oxidizer mixture is measured in terms of its equivalent 
    explosive blast effect to TNT, which is a class 1.1 explosive. Table E-
    7 also prescribes public area and intraline distances.
        Tables E-4, E-5, and E-6 have two distances listed for each 
    quantity of liquid propellant by hazard group. The first, a ``public 
    area and incompatible'' distance, is the minimum distance permitted 
    between a given quantity of liquid propellant and a public area. The 
    distance is also the same distance by which incompatible propellants 
    must be separated (e.g. the minimum distance between a fuel and an 
    oxidizer) for explosive equivalency and Table E-7 not to apply to the 
    distance calculations. The second, an ``intragroup and compatible'' 
    distance, is the distance by which propellants in the same hazard 
    group, or propellants in the same compatibility group must be separated 
    (e.g. the minimum distance between two fuels) to avoid adding the 
    quantity of each propellant container being separated in calculating 
    distances. This is simply because if two propellant tanks are far 
    enough apart, they cannot react with one another, even were a mishap to 
    occur. This introduces the third difference between liquid propellant 
    separation requirements and the requirements for solid propellants.
        The third area where liquid propellant separation requirements are 
    different than those for solid propellants may be found in calculations 
    of the quantity of liquid propellant that determines the distance 
    relationship with other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. 
    Quantity calculations may depend on distance. As an example, suppose 
    one was determining the minimum distance required between a tank farm 
    having many containers of fuel, and a launch site boundary. If the 
    containers were all close together the applicant would simply take the 
    total amount of fuel, look up the ``public area and incompatible'' 
    distance in the table that corresponded to the hazard group of the 
    fuel, and ensure that the distance between the closest wall or corner 
    of the explosive hazard facility and the launch site boundary was at 
    least the distance listed in the table. However, if the containers were 
    separated from each other so that the distance between each container 
    met the minimum ``intragroup and compatible'' \24\ distance in the 
    table, the total quantity of propellant to be used for the ``public 
    area'' distance determination is only the quantity in each container. 
    Therefore, as discussed below, although quantity determination 
    requirements may be found in proposed Sec. 420.35(a) and proposed 
    Sec. 420.35(b) contains distance determination requirements, quantity 
    determinations for liquid propellants may depend on distances between 
    containers.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \24\ The category is called ``intragroup and compatible'' to 
    cover propellants that are in different hazard groups but are still 
    compatible.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Like the procedure for solid propellant quantity and distance 
    determinations, an applicant's first step in siting liquid propellants 
    would be to determine the quantity of liquid propellant or, if 
    applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellant to be 
    located in each explosive hazard facility. An applicant determines this 
    through three steps specified in proposed Sec. 420.35(a). First, 
    proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(1) states that the quantity of propellant in a 
    tank, drum, cylinder, or other container is the net weight in pounds of 
    the propellant in that container. The weight of liquid propellant in 
    associated piping must be included in the determination of quantity to 
    any point where positive means, such as shutoff valves, are provided 
    for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or for interrupting a 
    reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.
        Next, proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(2) applies when two or more 
    containers of compatible propellants are stored together in an 
    explosive hazard facility. When liquid propellants are compatible, the 
    quantity of propellant used to determine the minimum separation 
    distance between the explosive hazard facility and other explosive 
    hazard facilities and public areas shall be the total quantity of 
    liquid propellant in all containers unless either the containers are 
    separated one from the other by the ``intragroup and compatible'' 
    distance contained in appendix E, table E-4, E-5 or E-6, depending on 
    the hazard group, or the containers are subdivided by intervening 
    barriers to prevent their mixing. In those two cases, the quantity of 
    propellant in the explosive hazard facility requiring the greatest 
    separation distance must be used to determine the minimum separation 
    distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
    hazard facilities and public areas.
        Finally, proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(3) applies to quantity 
    determinations when two or more containers of incompatible liquid 
    propellants are stored together in an explosive hazard facility. If 
    each container is not separated from every other container by the 
    ``public area and incompatible'' distances identified in appendix E, 
    tables E-4, E-5 and E-6, an applicant must determine the total quantity 
    of explosives by calculating the explosive equivalent in pounds of the 
    combined liquids, using NASA formulas contained in table E-2, to 
    determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard 
    facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. If the 
    containers are, in fact, to be separated one from the other by the 
    appropriate ``incompatible'' distance, an applicant would determine the 
    minimum separation distance to another explosive hazard facility or 
    public area using the quantity of propellant within the explosive 
    hazard facility requiring the greatest separation distance. For
    
    [[Page 34336]]
    
    example, if 50 pounds of hazard group 1 fuel were 31 feet from 150 
    pounds of hazard group 1 fuel, the minimum required distance to a 
    public area would be 35 feet, reflecting the public area distance 
    required by the greater quantity of fuel.
        Proposed Sec. 420.35(a)(4) requires an applicant to convert liquid 
    propellant quantities from gallons to pounds using conversion factors 
    in table E-3, and the equation provided. The proposed requirement 
    reflects a NASA standard.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \25\ NASA Standard at 7-7.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        After an applicant has determined the quantity of liquid propellant 
    or, if applicable, the explosive equivalent of the liquid propellants 
    to be located in each explosive hazard facility, an applicant must then 
    determine the separation distances between each explosive hazard 
    facility and public areas. Proposed Sec. 420.35(b) specifies the rules 
    by which an applicant determines the separation distances between 
    propellants within explosive hazard facilities, and between explosive 
    hazard facilities and public areas. An applicant would first use table 
    E-3 to determine hazard and compatibility groups. An applicant would 
    then separate propellants from each other and from each public area 
    using at least the distances provided in tables E-4 through E-7. With 
    one exception, as discussed below, tables E-1 and E-7 reflect the NASA 
    standard.
        Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(1) would require that an applicant measure 
    minimum separation distances from the container, building, or positive 
    cutoff point in piping which is closet to each public area or explosive 
    hazard facility requiring separation.
        Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(2) would impose a minimum separation 
    distance between compatible propellants. An applicant would measure the 
    separation distance between compatible propellants using the 
    ``intragroup and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and 
    group that requires the greater distance prescribed in tables E-4, E-5, 
    and E-6. The distance between any two propellants is computed by first 
    determining what the minimum required distances is for each propellant 
    based on the quantity and hazard group of that propellant. The one 
    requiring the greater distance is controlling for the pair.
        Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(3) would apply to the minimum separation 
    distance between incompatible propellants. An applicant would have to 
    measure the separation distance between propellants of different 
    compatibility groups using the ``public area and incompatible'' 
    distance from the propellant quantity and group that requires the 
    greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the 
    propellants of different compatibility groups are subdivided by 
    intervening barriers to prevent their mixing. If intervening barriers 
    are to be present, the minimum separation distance shall then be the 
    ``intragroup and compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and 
    group that requires the greater distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, 
    and E-6.
        Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(4) would apply to the separation of liquid 
    propellants from public areas. An applicant shall separate these 
    propellants from public areas using no less than the ``public area'' 
    distance prescribed by tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
        Proposed Sec. 420.35(b)(5) would apply to propellants where 
    explosive equivalents apply prescribed by subparagraph (a)(3). An 
    applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility that will 
    contain propellants where explosive equivalents apply from all other 
    explosive hazard facilities that are under the control of the same 
    customer public areas is the public area distance in table E-7. Table 
    E-7 is a revised form of the NASA standard.
        Proposed Sec. 420.37 would specify the rules to be used when solid 
    and liquid propellants are located together, such as at launch pads and 
    test stands. For applicants proposing an explosive hazard facility 
    where solid and liquid propellants are to be located together, 
    Sec. 420.37 provides three steps that an applicant should use to 
    determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard 
    facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas. An 
    applicant would first determine the minimum separation distances 
    between the explosive hazard facility and other explosive hazard 
    facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants alone, 
    in accordance with proposed Sec. 420.33. An applicant would then 
    determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard 
    facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas 
    required for the liquid propellants alone, in accordance with 
    Sec. 420.35. If explosive equivalents apply, an applicant would 
    determine the minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard 
    facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas 
    required for the liquid propellants using appendix E, table E-7F, in 
    accordance with Sec. 420.35. An applicant would then apply the greater 
    of the distances determined by the liquid propellant alone or the solid 
    propellant alone.
        Subpart C contains license term and conditions. Section 420.41 
    would specify the authority granted to a launch site operator by a 
    license and the licensee's obligation to comply with representations 
    contained in the license application as well as the FAA's license terms 
    and conditions. The provision limits a licensee's authority to the 
    launch points on the launch site and to the types of launch vehicles 
    used to demonstrate the safety of the launch site location, and, for 
    orbital launch vehicles, to vehicles no larger than the class analyzed. 
    The provision would also clarify the licensee's obligation to comply 
    with any other laws or regulations applicable to its licensed 
    activities and identifies certain rights that are not conveyed by a 
    launch site operator license.
        Section 420.43 would specify the duration of a license to operate a 
    launch site, the grounds for shortening the term, and that a license 
    may be renewed.
        Section 420.45 would provide the procedures that an applicant must 
    follow to obtain FAA approval for the transfer of an existing license 
    to operate a launch site.
        Section 420.47 would specify the procedures that the FAA would 
    allow to modify a license through a license order or written approval, 
    and the procedures that a launch site operator licensee must follow to 
    obtain an FAA license modification. A licensee must obtain a license 
    modification if the licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a 
    manner not authorized by its license. This means, among other things, 
    that if a representation in the license application regarding an issue 
    material to public safety is no longer accurate or does not describe 
    the licensee's operation or intended operation of the site, a licensee 
    must obtain a license modification. This is because the representations 
    a licensee makes in its application become part of the terms and 
    conditions of its license.
        A licensee must obtain FAA approval prior to modifying its 
    operations. For example, a licensee whose application stated that it 
    would prevent unauthorized access to its launch site through the use of 
    security personnel might decide, in the course of its operation, that 
    physical barriers might better serve to accomplish this goal. The FAA 
    considered that, on the one hand, the ability to immediately institute 
    a change might best control public access because if a licensee has to 
    wait for its license to be modified prior to instituting a change, 
    needed safety improvements might be unnecessarily delayed. On the other 
    hand, the FAA's
    
    [[Page 34337]]
    
    mandate requires that it first ascertain whether the proposed change is 
    indeed acceptable. Accordingly, the FAA decided that it must first be 
    advised of a proposed change and must approve its implementation. In 
    the event of special circumstances and where safety warrants, the FAA 
    will work with a licensee to accommodate any timing problems.
        Proposed Sec. 420.47 also specifies the procedures for a licensee 
    to obtain and the FAA to issue a license modification. The FAA could 
    modify a license using a written approval rather than a license order 
    in cases where the change addresses an activity or condition that was 
    represented in the license application but not spelled out in a license 
    order.
        Section 420.49 would impose an obligation on a launch site operator 
    licensee, its customers, and its contractors to cooperate with the FAA 
    in compliance monitoring of licensed activities. This requirement 
    recognizes an FAA compliance monitor's need to observe operations 
    conducted by all parties at the site and to have access to records and 
    personnel if the FAA is to be assured that public safety is being 
    protected.
        Subpart D contains the responsibilities of a licensee. Section 
    420.51 would describe a licensee's obligation to operate its launch 
    site in accordance with the representations in its license application, 
    49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and the FAA's regulations.
        Section 420.53 would require a launch site operator licensee to 
    control public access to the launch site and to protect the public 
    present at the launch site. The proposed regulation seeks to protect 
    the public from the consequences of flight and pre-flight activities by 
    separating the public from hazardous launch procedures. The public 
    could also be at risk if allowed to enter the launch site or move about 
    without adequate safeguards. This provision would require the licensee 
    to prevent the public from gaining unauthorized access to the launch 
    site. The applicant would be given broad discretion in selecting the 
    method for controlling access. The provision would also hold the 
    licensee responsible for informing members of the public of safety 
    precautions before entry and for warning of emergencies on-site. A 
    licensee would also be responsible for escorting the public between 
    harzard areas not otherwise controlled by a launch operator at the 
    launch site, and employing warning signals or alarms to notify persons 
    on the launch site of any emergency.
        Section 420.55 would require a licensee to develop and implement 
    procedures to coordinate operations carried out by launch site 
    customers, including launch operators, and their contractors. This 
    requirement is necessary to ensure that the operations of one launch 
    site customer do not interact with the operations of another customer 
    to create a public safety hazard at the launch site or beyond. For 
    example, the testing of equipment using radio frequency transmissions 
    could trigger ordnance used by someone elsewhere on the site, if the 
    two launch preparation activities are not coordinated or warnings 
    issued. Likewise, hazardous operations by one customer with the 
    potential to reach another customer must be coordinated by the launch 
    site operator. A launch site licensee would be required to ensure that 
    all customers at the site are informed of procedures and adhere to 
    scheduling requirements before commencing operations at the launch 
    site.
        Section 420.57 would establish notification requirements for a 
    licensee. The licensee would be responsible for notifying customers of 
    any limitations on use of the site. This provision would ensure that 
    customer activities re compatible with other activities at the launch 
    site. It would also ensure that limitations on the use of facilities 
    provided to customers by a launch site operator are communicated to the 
    customer. The licensee will be responsible for possessing agreements 
    with the Coast Guard to arrange for issuance of Notices to Mariners 
    during launches and with the regional FAA office for Notice to Airmen 
    and closure of air routes. In addition, the licensee will notify local 
    officials and landowners adjacent to the launch site of the flight 
    schedule. This provision places an on-going responsibility on the site 
    operator licensee for establishing notification procedures, rather than 
    on the numerous launch licensees whose involvement with the launch site 
    may be more sporadic and temporary. The proposed requirement would, 
    however, leave open the option of a launch licensee implementing the 
    procedures established by the launch site operator.
        Section 420.59 would require a licensee to development and 
    implement a launch site accident investigation plan containing 
    procedures for reporting, investigating and responding to a launch site 
    accident. The provision would extend reporting, investigation and 
    response procedures currently applicable to launch related accidents 
    and incidents to accidents occurring during round activities at a 
    launch site. The proposed rule allows launch site operators to satisfy 
    the requirements of Sec. 420.59 by using accident investigation 
    procedures developed in accordance with the requirements of the U.S. 
    Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) at 29 CFR 1910.119 
    and 120, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at 40 CFR 
    part 68, to the extent that the procedures include the elements 
    provided Sec. 420.59.\26\ The FAA wishes to ease the regulatory burden 
    here and in other parts of the proposed rules where other federal 
    regulatory agencies impose requirements on launch site operators.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \26\ The EPA's requirements in 40 CFR part 68 apply to 
    ``incidents which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in 
    a catastrophic release.'' 40 CFR 68.60(a). OSHA's requirements in 29 
    CFR 1910.119 are similar, applying to ``each incident which resulted 
    in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release of a 
    highly hazardous chemical in the workplace.'' 29 CFR 1910.119(m)(l).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        OSHA's standard at 29 CFR 1910.119 includes provisions for 
    investigating incidents and emergency response. See 29 CFR 1910.119(m) 
    and (n). In addition, 29 CFR 1910.120, hazardous waste operations and 
    emergency response (HAZWOPER), provides for emergency response planning 
    for operations involving hazardous materials, including those listed by 
    the Department of Transportation under 49 CFR 172.101.\27\ Launch 
    operators and launch site operator in compliance with these 
    requirements will be taking steps to protect the public as well as 
    their workers.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \27\ Hazardous materials in AST regulations, Sec. 401.5, are 
    defined as hazardous materials as defined in 49 CFR 172.101.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        EPA's requirements at 40 CFR part 68 also include standards for 
    incident investigation and emergency response. See 40 CFR 68.60, 68.81, 
    68.90, and 68.180. for both the OSHA and EPA requirements, compliance 
    with 42 U.S.C. 11003, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know, 
    satisfies many of the emergency response provisions.
        The FAA is interested in the public's view of proposed Sec. 420.59, 
    particularly the extent to which other regulatory agency requirements 
    such as OSHA and EPA help to ensure launch site operators respond to an 
    investigate launch site accidents.
        Section 420.61 would provide the requirements for launch site 
    operator retention or records, data, and other material needed to 
    verify that launch site operator operations are conducted in accordance 
    with representations contained in the licensee, and for recorded 
    production in the event of
    
    [[Page 34338]]
    
    launch site accident investigation, or compliance monitoring.
        Section 420.63 would provide responsibilities of a launch site 
    operator regarding explosives. Section 420.63(a) would require a launch 
    site operator to ensure that the configuration of the launch site is in 
    accordance with the licensee's explosive site plan, and that its 
    explosive site plan is in compliance with the requirements in 
    Secs. 420.31-420.37.
        Section 420.63(b) would require a launch site operator to ensure 
    that the public is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of 
    explosives by lightning. Unless an explosive hazard facility has a 
    lightning warning system to permit termination of operations and 
    withdrawal of the public to public area distance prior to the incidence 
    of an electrical storm, or the explosive hazard facility is to contain 
    explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning, it must have a 
    lightning protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by 
    lightning. A lightning protection system shall include an air terminal 
    to intentionally attract a lightning strike, a low impedance path--
    called a down conductor--connecting an air terminal to an earth 
    electrode system, and an earth electrode system to dissipate the 
    current from a lightning strike to ground.
        Because no lightning protection system is necessary if a launch 
    site operator has a lightning warning system to permit termination of 
    operations and withdrawal of the public to public area distance prior 
    to the incidence of an electrical storm, proposed Sec. 420.63 does not 
    explicitly protect the public from the inadvertent flight of a solid 
    rocket motor. The FAA is interested in public views on this point.
        A lightning protection system shall also include measures for 
    bonding and surge protection. For bonding, all metallic bodies shall be 
    bonded to ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are equal 
    everywhere in the explosive hazard facility. Fences within six feet of 
    the lightning protection system shall have bonds across gates and other 
    discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning protection 
    system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the lightning 
    protection system shall be bonded to the lightning protection system. 
    For surge protection, a lightning protection system shall include surge 
    protection for all metallic power, communication, and instrumentation 
    lines coming into an explosive hazard facility to reduce transient 
    voltages due to lightning to a harmless level.
        Lightning protection systems shall be visually inspected 
    semiannually and shall be tested once each year for electrical 
    continuity and adequacy of grounding. A record of results obtained from 
    the tests, including action taken to correct deficiencies noted, must 
    be maintained at the explosive hazard facility.
        Section 420.63(c) would require a launch site operator to ensure 
    that electric power lines on the launch site meet the distance 
    requirements provided. A full discussion of explosive hazard mitigation 
    measures is provided in the general preamble above.
    
    Appendix A
    
        Of the two methods the FAA proposes for allowing an applicant to 
    demonstrate the existence of a guided launch vehicle flight corridor 
    that satisfies the FAA's risk criteria, appendix A typically offers the 
    more conservative approach in that it produces a larger area as well as 
    the more simple of the options available for guided orbital and 
    suborbital launch vehicles. In order to achieve the simplicity this 
    approach offers, the FAA based certain decisions regarding the 
    methodology on a series of what it intends as conservative assumptions 
    and on hazard areas previously developed by the federal launch ranges 
    for the guided launch vehicles listed in table 1 of Sec. 420.21.
        The greater simplicity of the approach derives from the fact that, 
    unlike the method of appendix B, an applicant need obtain no 
    meteorological data and need not plot the trajectory of a particular 
    launch vehicle. Instead, recognizing that a typical flight corridor 
    consists of a series of fans of decreasing angle extending out from a 
    launch point, the FAA proposes, with certain modifications, to employ a 
    variation on that typical corridor for its proposed appendix A 
    analysis.
        The FAA's proposed appendix A flight corridor estimation contains a 
    number of elements, each of which an applicant must define for each of 
    its proposed launch points. An appendix A flight corridor consists of a 
    circular area around a selected launch point, an overflight exclusion 
    zone, a launch area and a downrange area. A flight corridor for a 
    guided orbital launch vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch 
    point, and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the flight corridor 
    ends with the impact dispersion area of the launch vehicle's final 
    stage.
        Once an applicant has produced an appendix A flight corridor, the 
    applicant must ascertain whether the flight corridor contains 
    population, and, if so, whether the use of the corridor would present 
    unacceptable risk to that population. If so, whether the use of the 
    corridor would present unacceptable risk to that population. If no 
    members of the public reside within the corridor, the FAA would approve 
    the proposed location of the site.\28\ If the flight corridor is 
    populated, the FAA proposes to require an applicant to perform a risk 
    analysis as set forth in appendix C. If the proposed corridor satisfies 
    the FAA's risk criteria, the FAA will approve the location of the site. 
    If, however, the proposed corridor fails to satisfy the FAA's risk 
    criteria, an applicant has certain options. The applicant may attempt 
    another appendix A flight corridor by selecting a different flight 
    azimuth or by selecting a different launch point at the proposed launch 
    site, or by selecting a different launch vehicle type or class. Or, the 
    applicant may, using the more accurate but more complicated 
    calculations of appendix B, narrow its flight corridor and determine 
    whether that flight corridor satisfies the FAA's risk criteria.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \28\ An applicant must still obtain written agreements with the 
    FAA regional office having jurisdiction over the airspace where 
    launches will take place and, if appropriate, with the U.S. Coast 
    guard regarding procedures for coordinating launches from the launch 
    site.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        To create a hypothetical flight corridor under proposed appendix A 
    an applicant must first determine from where on the launch site a 
    guided launch vehicle would take flight. That position is defined as a 
    launch point. An applicant must determine the geodetic latitude and 
    longitude of each launch point that it proposes to offer for launch, 
    and select a flight azimuth for each launch point. An applicant should 
    know whether it plans to offer the site for the launch of guided 
    orbital or sub-orbital launch vehicles. If planning for the launch of 
    guided orbital launch vehicles, the applicant must decide what launch 
    vehicle class, as described by payload weight in proposed Sec. 420.21, 
    table 1, best represents the largest launch vehicle class the launch 
    site would support.
        Once an applicant has made the necessary decisions regarding 
    location and vehicle class, the next step in creating an appendix A 
    flight corridor is to look up the maximum distance (Dmax) 
    that debris is expected to travel from a launch point if a worst-case 
    launch vehicle failure were to occur and flight termination action 
    destroyed the launch vehicle at 10 seconds into flight. Dmax 
    serves as a radius that defines a circular area around the launch 
    point. The FAA has estimated, on the basis of federal launch range 
    experience, the Dmax for a guided suborbital launch vehicle 
    and for
    
    [[Page 34339]]
    
    each guided orbital launch vehicle class and provided the results that 
    an applicant should employ in table A-1, appendix A.
        The circular area, defined by Dmax, is part of an 
    overflight exclusion zone. An overflight exclusion zone in an appendix 
    A flight corridor consists of a rectangular area of the length 
    prescribed by table A-2, capped up-range by a semi-circle with radius 
    Dmax, centered on the launch point. Its downrange boundary 
    is defined by an identical semi-circular arc with a radium 
    Dmax, centered on the endpoint prescribed by table A-2. The 
    cross-range boundaries consist of two lines parallel to and to either 
    side of the flight azimuth. Each line is tangent to the upgrade and 
    downgrade Dmax, circles as shown in appendix A, figure A-1.
        An appendix A flight corridor also contains a launch area. The 
    launch area extends from the uprange boundary, which is coextensive 
    with the circle created by the radius Dmax, to a line drawn 
    perpendicular to the flight azimuth one hundred nautical miles down 
    range of the launch point. The launch area's cross-range boundaries are 
    a function of the lengths of two lines perpendicular to the flight 
    azimuth: one drawn ten nautical miles down range from the launch point 
    and the other line drawn one hundred nautical miles down range from the 
    launch point. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the line segments.
        Adjacent to the launch area is the downrange area. For purposes of 
    appendix A, a corridor's downrange area extends from the one hundred 
    nautical miles line to a line, perpendicular to the flight azimuth, 
    that is 5,000 nautical miles downrange from the launch point for the 
    guided orbital launch vehicle classes, and to an impact dispersion area 
    for a guided suborbital launch vehicle corridor. The down range area's 
    cross-range boundaries connect the prescribed endpoints of the 
    perpendicular lines at one hundred nautical miles and 5,000 nautical 
    miles. Table A-3 provides the lengths of the line segments.
        All applicants must determine whether the public resides within 
    this flight corridor. If no populated areas exist, an applicant may 
    submit its analysis for the FAA's launch site location review. If there 
    is population located within the flight corridor, the applicant must 
    calculate the risk to the public following the criteria provided in 
    appendix C. The expected casualty (Ec) result for the flight 
    corridor must not exceed 30  x  10-6 for the applicant to 
    satisfy the proposed location requirements.
    
    Map Requirements and Plotting Methods
    
        To describe a flight corridor and any populated areas within that 
    corridor, an applicant must observe data and methodology requirements 
    for mapping a flight corridor and analyzing populations. These 
    requirements apply to all appendices.
        The FAA proposes to require certain geographical data for use in 
    describing flight corridors for each appendix. The geographical data 
    must include the latitude and longitude of each proposed launch point 
    at a launch site, and all populated areas in a flight corridor. The 
    accuracy requirement for the launch area portion of the analyses calls 
    for map scales of no smaller than 1:250,000 inches per inch. The actual 
    map scale will depend on the smallest census block group size in a 
    launch area. The FAA bases its proposed scale requirement on average 
    range rates in the launch area, because range rates have a direct 
    impact on dwell times over populated areas. While in the launch area of 
    a flight corridor, the instantaneous impact point (IIP) ground trace 
    would tend to linger over any populated areas, which increases the 
    Ec for an individual populated area. The map scale required 
    by the FAA is large enough to allow an applicant to determine the dwell 
    time and size for each applicable populated area.
        Using a similar approach, the FAA proposes to establish an accuracy 
    requirement for the downrange area of a flight corridor. A map scale 
    may be no smaller than 1:20,000,000 inches per inch. The scale would be 
    smaller than that required for the launch area because the dwell times 
    over downrange populated areas is small and the map scale must only be 
    large enough to allow an applicant to determine the dwell time and the 
    size of each populated area downrange. Maps satisfying these accuracy 
    requirements are readily available. For example, civil aeronautical 
    charts are published and distributed by the U.S. Department of 
    Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and 
    are also published by the Defense Mapping Agency and distributed by 
    NOAA.
        Besides scale, the FAA has proposed requirements for projections, 
    depending on the plotting method used. Proposed appendices A, B, C and 
    D would require an applicant to use cylindrical, conic, and plane map 
    projections. The FAA proposes these map projections for the analyses 
    because they produce only small error with straight line measurements. 
    Maps may be produced using several different map projections depending 
    on the map scale, geographic region being depicted, and the 
    application. A map projection, according to the U.S. Geological 
    Survey,\29\ is a device for producing all or part of a round body on a 
    flat sheet. All map projections have inherent distortions. The 
    distortions are virtually unavoidable and are directly, related to the 
    techniques for displaying latitude and longitude lines on a flat 
    surface area. Therefore, many maps are developed for specific 
    applications requiring that some map characteristics be shown more 
    accurately at the expense of others. The flight corridor methods are 
    primarily sensitive to azimuthal direction and geodetic length of the 
    flight corridor line segments. Therefore, it is important to use map 
    projections that preserve scale and direction accuracy. Cylindrical, 
    conic, and plane map projections have been reviewed by the FAA and are 
    most appropriate types for the launch site application analyses.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \29\ Map Projections used by the ``U.S. Geological Survey,'' 
    U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 1532, 1982.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The regular cylindrical projections consist of meridians, which are 
    equidistant parallel straight lines, crossed at right angles by 
    straight parallel lines of latitude, generally not equidistant. 
    Geometrically, cylindrical projections can be partially developed by 
    unrolling a cylinder which has been wrapped around a globe representing 
    the Earth, with the inside of the cylinder touching at the equator, and 
    on which meridians have been projected from the center of the globe. 
    When the cylinder is wrapped around the globe in a different direction, 
    so that it is no longer tangent along the equator, an oblique or 
    transverse projection results, and neither the meridians nor the 
    parallels will generally be straight lines.
        Normal conic projections are distinguished by the use of arcs of 
    concentric circles for parallels of latitude and equally spaced 
    straight radii of those circles for meridians. The angles between the 
    meridians on the map are smaller than the actual differences in 
    longitude. The circular arcs may or may not be equally spaced, 
    depending on the projection. The name ``conic'' originatd from the fact 
    that the more elementary conic projections may be derived by placing a 
    cone on the top of a globe representing the Earth, the apex or tip in 
    line with the axis of the globe, and the sides of the cone touching or 
    tangent to the globe along a specified ``standard'' latitude which is 
    true to scale and without distortion.
    
    [[Page 34340]]
    
    Meridians are drawn on the cone from the apex to the points at which 
    the corresponding meridians on the globe cross the standard parallel. 
    Other parallels are then drawn as arcs centered on the apex in a manner 
    depending on the projection. If the cone is cut along one meridian and 
    unrolled, a conic projection results.
        The azimuthal projections are formed onto a plane which is usually 
    tangent to the globe at either pole, the equator, or any intermediate 
    point. These variations are called the polar, equatorial (or meridian 
    or meridional), and oblique (or horizon) aspects, respectively. Some 
    azimuthals are true perspective projections. Azimuthal projections are 
    characterized by the fact that the direction, or azimuth, from the 
    center of the projection to every other point on the map is shown 
    correctly. The simplest forms of the azimuthal projections are the 
    polar aspects, in which all meridians are shown as straight lines 
    radiating at their true angles from the center, while parallels of 
    latitude are circles concentric about the pole. Most azimuthal maps do 
    not have standard parallels or standard meridians. Each map has only 
    one standard point, the center. Thus, the azimuthals are suitable for 
    minimizing distortion in a somewhat circular region such as Antarctica, 
    but not for an era with predominant length in one direction.
        Scale requirements, geographic location of the launch site, and 
    plotting method are the main considerations for choosing a map 
    projection. Of these considerations, the plotting method selected for 
    development and depiction of the flight corridor line segments is the 
    most important. Three plotting methods are provided in appendix A.
        The ``mechanical method'' is the least complex, least costly, but 
    also the least accurate of the methods suggested here. Selecting an 
    appropriate map scale and using a map projection that minimizes 
    inherent scale and direction distortions can minimize coordinate 
    plotting errors. The ``Lambert-Conformal'' conic projection is 
    acceptable because it has characteristics that preserve angles and 
    scales from any point on the map.\30\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \30\ The projections suggested below for the semi-automated 
    method are accurate in scale and direction only from a point of 
    tangency or the standard parallels. These limitations would produce 
    additional errors when the using mechanical method.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The ``semi-automated method'' provides more accurate techniques for 
    determining the endpoint coordinates of each flight corridor line 
    segment. Errors associated with measuring devices and the mapping 
    medium tend to be the same as those associated with the mechanical 
    method. Engineering judgment and some map errors are reduced through 
    the use of range and bearing equations. These equations also allow the 
    applicant to choose from a wider variety of map projections. The 
    ``Mercator'' and ``Oblique Mercator'' are adequate cylindrical 
    projections. ``Lambert-Conformal'' and ``Albers Equal-Area'' are 
    adequate conic projections. The ``Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and 
    ``Azimuthal Equidistant'' are adequate plane projections. An applicant 
    may use other maps in support of its application, but the applicant 
    would be required to demonstrate an equivalent level of accuracy over 
    the required distances, and would have to describe the consequences of 
    any mapping errors associated with the proposed map projection.
        Each of these projections possesses a number of attributes, which 
    make some better suited for some parts of the global than others. 
    Typically, most projections preserve scale and direction when measured 
    from a point of tangency or along a standard parallel or meridian. A 
    Mercator projection is cylindrical and conformal, that is, all angles 
    presented correctly , and for small areas, true shape of features is 
    maintained. In a Mercator projection, meridians are equally spaced 
    straight lines and parallels are unequally spaced straight lines, 
    closest near the equator, cutting meridians at right angles. Scale is 
    true along the equator, or along two parallels equidistant from the 
    equator. The Mercator projection may produce great distortion of area 
    in polar regions.
        The Oblique Mercator is cylindrical (oblique) and conformal. It 
    contains two meridians, 180 deg. apart, which are straight lines. Other 
    meridians and parallels are complex curves. Scale on the spherical form 
    is true along a chosen central line, a great circle at an oblique 
    angle, or along two straight lines parallel to central line. The scale 
    on the ellipsoidal form is similar, but varies slightly from this 
    pattern. Scale becomes infinite 90 deg. from the central line.
        The Lambert Conformal is conic and conformal. Its parallels are 
    unequally spaced arcs of concentric circles, more closely spaced near 
    the center of the map. Meridians are equally spaced radii of the same 
    circles, and consequently cut parallels at right angles. Scale is true 
    along two standard parallels normally, or along just one. A pole in the 
    same hemisphere as standard parallels is a point. The other pole is at 
    infinity.
        The Albers Equal-Area is conic. Parallels are unequally spaced arcs 
    of concentric circles, more closely spaced at the north and south edges 
    of the map. Meridians are equally spaced radii of the same circles, 
    cutting parallels at right angles. There is no distortion in scale or 
    shape along two standard parallels normally, or along just one. Poles 
    are arcs of circles.
        The Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area is azimuthal. All meridian in the 
    polar aspect, the central meridian in other aspects, and the equator in 
    the equatorial aspect are straight lines. The outer meridian of the 
    hemisphere in the equatorial aspect, for the sphere, and the parallels 
    in the polar aspect for sphere or ellipsoid are circles. All other 
    meridians and parallels are complex curves. Scale decreases radially as 
    the distance increases from the center, the only point without 
    distortion.
        The Azimuthal Equidistant is azimuthal. Distances measured from the 
    center are true. Distances not measured along radii from the center are 
    not correct. The center of projection is the only point without 
    distortion. Directions from the center are true except on some oblique 
    and equatorial ellipsoidal forms. All meridians on the polar aspect, 
    the central meridian on the other aspects, and the equator on the 
    equatorial aspect are straight lines. Parallels on the polar projection 
    are circles spaced at true intervals equidistant for the sphere. The 
    outer meridian of the hemisphere on the equatorial aspect for the 
    sphere is a circle. All other meridians and parallels are complex 
    curves.
        All of these map projections, with the exception of the ``Lambert-
    Conformal'' conic, preserve scale and direction when measured along a 
    standard parallel or meridian. Because range and bearing computations 
    are relative to a particular ellipsoid of revolution--a geoid, not the 
    projection of the geoid, the computed latitude and longitude placement 
    will be correct for any projection assuming the map datum and the range 
    and bearing datum are the same.
        The FAA will not accept straight lines of long distances that 
    result in significant distortions of the flight corridor. Attempting to 
    draw straight lines for distances greater than 7.5 times the map scale 
    on map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 will result in 
    unacceptable errors. The distance factor of 7.5 was determined by 
    plotting several hundred trajectory IIP points and finding equi-distant 
    straight line segments that adequately represent the trajectory curve 
    over a 5,000 nm range.
        Appendix A provides an applicant with the equations the FAA 
    proposes to require to perform range and bearing computations for the 
    purpose of plotting
    
    [[Page 34341]]
    
    a flight corridor on a map. The range and bearing from a launch point 
    are used to determine the latitude and longitude coordinates of a point 
    on the flight corridor. Range and bearing equations are standard 
    geodesic computations which can be found in most geodesy text books. A 
    geodesic is a curve describing the minimum length between two points on 
    the surface of an ellipsoid such as the WGS-84 ellipsoid discussed 
    below. The range and bearing computations are sometimes referred to as 
    great circle math routines. Sodano's direct geodetic method is proposed 
    here. The algorithm was developed in 1963 by Emanuel M. Sodano for the 
    U.S. Army. The computations provide accuracy to less than a foot for 
    ranges up to 6,000 nm and less than 1/100th of a second (0.000002778 
    degrees) for all azimuth angles.\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \31\ The FAA developed a software tool to perform the appendix A 
    calculations for guided orbital launch vehicles. This software tool 
    has been developed in the FORTRAN computer language using 
    Microsoft's Fortran Powerstation. All of the assumptions and 
    equations explained here and contained in appendix A are implemented 
    in the program. The applicant must provide the geodetic latitude, 
    longitude, launch azimuth, and Dmax from table A-1 as 
    input to the program. The software outputs an ASCII text file of 
    geodetic latitude and longitudes that describe the fight corridor 
    boundary. The FORTRAN code listing and example intput/output may be 
    obtained from the FAA.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        An applicant may create line segments to describe a flight corridor 
    by using range and bearings from the launch point along various 
    azimuths. Appendix A provides equations to calculate geodetic latitude 
    (+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch point geodetic latitude (+N), 
    longitude (+E), range (nm), and bearing (degrees, positive clockwise 
    from North). The same equations may also be used to calculate an impact 
    dispersion area by substituting a final stage impact point for the 
    launch point. Appendix A also provides equations to calculate the 
    distance of a geodesic between two points.
        An alternative to range and bearing computations is to use 
    geographic information system (GIS) software with global mapping data. 
    GIS software is an effective tool for constructing and evaluating a 
    flight corridor, and has the advantage of allowing an applicant to 
    create maps of varying scales in the launch and downrange areas. 
    Commercially available GIS products are acceptable to the FAA for use 
    in Appendices A, B, C and D if they meet the map and plotting method 
    requirements in paragraph (b) of appendix A. An applicant should note, 
    however, that maps of different scales in GIS software may not match 
    each other. For instance, the coastline of Florida on a U.S. map may 
    not match the coastline on a world map. Applicants shall resolve such 
    contradictions by referring to more accurate maps such as NOAA maps.
        Once an applicant has selected a map for displaying a flight 
    corridor's launch area, the line segment lengths may be scaled to the 
    chosen map. Map scale units are actual distance units measured along 
    the Earth's surface per unit of map distance. Most map scale units are 
    given in terms of inches per inch (in/in). An applicant converts 
    appendix A flight corridor line segment distances to the map scale 
    distance by dividing the launch area flight corridor line segment 
    length (inches) by the map scale (in/in). If, for example, an applicant 
    selected a map scale of 250,000 in/in and the line segment for the 
    launch area flight corridor was 1677008 inches, the equivalent scaled 
    length of the line segment for constructing an appendix A launch area 
    is (1677008/250,000)=6.7 inches of map distance. An applicant would 
    then plot the line segment on the map for display purposes using the 
    scaled line segment length of 6.7 inches. If an applicant were to 
    choose a map with scale units other than inches per inch, the FAA would 
    require a description of the conversion algorithm to inches per inch 
    and sample computations. Also note that the FAA proposes to accept 
    straight lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map 
    scale on map scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per 
    inch; or straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales less 
    than 1:1,000,000in/in.
    
    Weight Classes for Guided Orbital Launch Vehicles
    
        Proposed appendix A distinguishes between the guided orbital launch 
    vehicles represented in the appendix on the basis of weight class. The 
    FAA does not propose to distinguish among guided suborbital launch 
    vehicles on the basis of weight class for purposes of appendix A. For 
    guided orbital launch vehicles, the FAA proposes to create four 
    separate weight classes. These are used to determine the size of the 
    debris dispersion radius around a launch point, and the size of an 
    Appendix A flight corridor. The FAA selected the four launch vehicle 
    classes based on the size and characteristics of launch vehicles that 
    currently exist in the U.S. commercial inventory and that should 
    approximate any proposed new launch vehicle as well. An applicant 
    planning to support the launch of guided orbital launch vehicles should 
    choose the largest launch vehicle class anticipated for launch from the 
    chosen launch point. This maximizes the area of the flight corridor. 
    Also, selection of the largest class anticipated lessens the 
    possibility of having to obtain a license modification to accommodate a 
    larger customer than an application may have originally encompassed.
        The FAA proposes to rely on a 100-nm orbit as the standard for 
    inter-class launch vehicle comparison purposes. It is a standard 
    reference orbit used by launch vehicle manufacturers for descriptive 
    purposes and allows the uniform comparison of launch vehicle throw 
    weight capability. The FAA obtained the payload weights for the 28 deg. 
    and 90 deg. orbital inclinations from the ``International Reference 
    Guide to Space Launch Systems,'' S.J. Isakowitz, 2d Ed. (1995). They 
    represent capabilities from CCAS and VAFB, respectively.
    
    Dmax Circle
    
        A radius, maximum distance (Dmax), is employed to define 
    a circular area about a launch point. The circular area indicates the 
    limits for both flight control and explosive containment following a 
    worst-case launch vehicle failure and flight termination system 
    activation at 10 seconds into flight. The worst-case failure represents 
    a failure response, immediately following first motion, which causes 
    the launch vehicle to fly in the up-range direction on a trajectory 
    that maximizes the impact range. The ten second flight time represents 
    a conservative estimate of the earliest elapsed time after launch that 
    a flight safety officer would be able to detect the malfunction, 
    initiate flight termination action, and actuate the flight termination 
    system on the launch vehicle. The radius is the estimate Dmax 
    from the launch point that inert debris is expected to travel and 
    beyond which the overpressure from explosive debris is not expected to 
    exceed 0.5 pounds per square inch (psi). Dmax accounts for 
    the public risk posed by the greater of the wind-induced impact 
    distance of a hazardous piece of inert debris, or the sum of the wind-
    induced impact distance of an explosive piece of debris and the debris 
    0.5 psi overpressure radius from the explosion. The values for 
    DGmax in table A-1 appendix A, were derived from guided 
    suborbital launch vehicles and guided orbital launch vehicles of the 
    classes identified in table 1, Sec. 420.21.
    
    Overflight Exclusion Zone
    
        Table A-2 and figure A-1 define an overflight exclusion zone. 
    Because of the risks the early stages of flight create, the FAA 
    proposes to require an applicant to demonstrate that the public
    
    [[Page 34342]]
    
    will not be present in this area during a launch. An overflight 
    exclusion zone is an area in close promimity to a launch point where 
    the mission risk is greater than an Ec of 
    30 x 10-6 if one member of the public is present in the 
    open. The FAA derived the data for table A-2 using high fidelity risk 
    assessment computer models to estimate the Ec for the 
    different vehicle classes in table 1, Sec. 420.21.
        Early in the flight phase launch vehicles have large explosive 
    potential, a low IIP range rate, and an historically higher probability 
    of failure relative to the rest of preorbital flight. The relatively 
    simple risk estimation analysis defined in appendix C does not 
    adequately model the true risk during this stage of flight, and does 
    not serve as the basis for determining that the overflight exclusion 
    zone represents an area where the FAA's risk threshold is not 
    satisfied. Instead, the FAA derived the overflight exclusion zone using 
    a high fidelity risk assessment computer program is use by the national 
    ranges. The program is a launch area risk analysis program called DAMP 
    (facility DAMage and Personal injury). DAMP relies on information about 
    a launch vehicle, its trajectory and failure responses, and facilities 
    and populations in the launch area to estimate hit probabilities and 
    casualty expectation. The hazards analyzed by DAMP include impacting 
    inert debris, and blast overpressures and debris projected from impact 
    explosions.
        For the purpose of the FAA's site location assessment, the proposed 
    overflight exclusion zone downrange distances (DOEZ) in 
    table A-2 were derived by computing the downrange drag impact point 
    distance for a ballisitic coefficient of 3 lbs/ft2 at the 
    first major staging event time for each of the expendable launch 
    vehicle classes in table 1, Sec. 420.21. The effective casually area 
    used in the analysis was the average effective casualty area for the 
    period of flight up to the first major staging event time. See table C-
    3. The DAMP risk assessment results showed that Ec values 
    exceeded 30 x 10-6 for the time up to the first major 
    staging event for each of the launch vehicle classes in table 1, 
    Sec. 420.21.
        Risk assessments were also conducted for the time of flight 
    immediately after the first major staging event. The results showed a 
    significant decrease in the Ec estimates, and those 
    estimates were within the Ec criteria of 
    30 x 10-6. The decrease results from a combination of 
    decreasing dwell times and a signficant reduction in the size of an 
    effective casualty area following a major staging event.
        The FAA compared the results obtained using the high fidelity risk 
    models to the estimated casualty expectancy calculated using the risk 
    analysis method from appendix C. The results from the appendix C method 
    also show unacceptable risk inside the overflight exclusion zone, as 
    shown in table ``3'' and ``4'' below. An appendix A flight corridor was 
    applied to an appendix C risk analysis and the following variables were 
    input as constants for the guided launch vehicle classes:
    
    Pf=0.10
    C=643 seconds
    R-dot=.91 nm/s (from table C-2)
    Nk=0.5 persons
    
        As described in appendix C, when a populated area is split by a 
    trajectory ground trace, each part of the populated area is evaluated 
    separately and the Ec results of each part are summed to 
    estimate the total Ec for the whole populated area. Hence, 
    for this comparison a value of Nk=0.5 was used in each of 
    the OEZ sections so the total Ec after summation would 
    represent the risk for one person. Tables 3 and 4 show that the 
    Ec inside the OEZ does not meet FAA criteria and does meet 
    those criteria outside the OEZ.
    
                                                          Table 3.--Prior to First Major Staging Event
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Sigma
                              Class                            X1 (mi)   X2(nm)    Y1(nm)    Y2(nm)     (nm)     Ac(nm2)   Ak(nm2)       Pi           Ec
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Small...................................................      0.00      3.70      0.00      1.20      1.62      0.32      6.70     1.71E-04     40.9E-06
    Medium..................................................      0.00      4.58      0.00      1.53      1.82      0.40      8.98     2.35E-04     52.3E-06
    Med-Lrg.................................................      0.00      9.67      0.00      1.83      3.56      0.54     12.23     3.25E-04     71.7E-06
    Large...................................................      0.00     14.76      0.00      2.14      5.31      1.46     34.66     3.95E-04     83.2E-06
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                             Med-Lrg values for table ``3'' and ``4'' were interpolated from the bounding
                                                                                                              classes.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Ac=average value up to first major staging
                                                                                             event.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
                                                            Table 4.--After First Major Staging Event
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                         Sigma
                            Class                           X1 (mi)    X2 (nm)    Y1 (nm)    Y2 (nm)      (nm)     Ac (nm2)   Ak (nm2)      Pi         Ec
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Small................................................       0.00       3.70       0.00       1.20       1.62     0.0982       6.70   1.71E-04   12.5E-06
    Medium...............................................       0.00       4.58       0.00       1.53       1.82     0.0017       8.98   2.35E-04   22.2E-06
    Med-Lrg..............................................       0.00       9.67       0.00       1.83       3.56     0.0831      12.23   3.25E-04   11.0E-06
    Large................................................       0.00      14.76       0.00       2.14       5.31     0.4682      34.66   3.95E-04   26.7E-06
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                           Med-Lrg values for tables ``3'' and ``4'' were interpolated from the bounding
                                                                                                             classes.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Ac = value after first major staging event.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The FAA believes that it is efficient to address keeping an 
    overflight exclusion zone clear of the public through a license to 
    operate a launch site so that the licensee better able to address the 
    issue does so. Moreover, although the FAA is willing to license the 
    operation of a launch site from which a limited number or kind of 
    launches may take place, the FAA does not want to license the operation 
    of a launch site from which launch may never occur. The FAA proposes, 
    therefore, to require that an applicant demonstrate either that the 
    overflight exclusion zone is
    
    [[Page 34343]]
    
    unpopulated, that there are times when no one is present, or that the 
    public can be excluded from this area during launch. Although a 
    determination of this nature encompasses issues that will be addressed 
    in a launch license, a launch site cannot support safe launches unless 
    overflight of the highest risk area in close proximity to a launch 
    point takes place without the public present. The FAA considered as an 
    alternative permitting a prospective launch site operator to show that 
    it would be able to clear resident population for one launch. For 
    example, a prospective launch site operator might have a potential 
    customer who has made arrangements for evacuation for a single launch. 
    The FAA, however, wants to be assured that an OEZ would be clear for 
    any launch that takes place from that site, and would, accordingly, 
    require that, if the public does reside in an OEZ, or have other means 
    of access to the OEZ, an applicant show that it has made arrangements 
    for their absence during a launch.\32\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \32\ The FAA recognizes that this requirement would protect 
    persons within an OEZ during a launch but not their property. For 
    the time being, the FAA would not address risks to the property of 
    the public in an OEZ but leave the matter to be accommodated through 
    private financial arrangements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        An applicant must display an overflight exclusion zone on maps 
    using the requirements described in paragraph (b) of appendix A.
    
    Launch Area
    
        As noted at the beginning of this discussion, the FAA proposes to 
    employ a series of fans as the shape of the foundation of its appendix 
    A flight corridor. The FAA proposes the flight corridor fans to account 
    for the turning capabilities and wind dispersed debris of a guided 
    launch vehicle. The launch area fans have been divided into two 
    regions, of 60 and 30 degrees, representing the malfunction turn 
    capability of the launch vehicle relative to its velocity in the 
    downtown direction. Each region is represented by the estimated maximum 
    turning capability over a ground-range interval. These angles are the 
    FAA's estimates for the maximum angles that the launch vehicle velocity 
    vector may turn within a five second time period. The initial fan area 
    is described by a 60 deg. half angle extending ten nautical miles 
    downrange from a launch point. The ten nautical mile threshold 
    represents the FAA's estimate of where a vehicle's maximum turning rate 
    capability is reduced to approximately 30 degrees due to increasing 
    velocity in the downrange direction. The FAA obtained these estimates 
    on the basis of a Delta II launch vehicle trajectory, and by employing 
    an annualized wind speed within one standard deviation\33\ and a debris 
    ballistic coefficient of three. The FAA employed a Delta in its 
    analysis because its thrust profile fell between Atlas and Titan and 
    thus provided a representation of the mean performance parameters of 
    launch vehicles at Cape Canaveral Air Station. This data and use of the 
    appendix B methodology corroborated the selection of 60 and 30 degree 
    half angles.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \33\ The FAA employed the wind speeds from the Global Gridded 
    Upper Air Statistics database for grid point 27.5 North geodetic 
    latitude and 280.0 East longitude. The database covers the period 
    1980 through 1995.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        In the early stages of flight, but past the 100 nautical mile 
    range, a guided launch vehicle is capable of malfunction turns up to 
    30 deg.. Therefore, a 30 deg. half angle was used to define the 
    secondary fan area beginning 10 nautical mile downrange and ending 100 
    nautical mile downrange. Once a launch vehicle has reached the 100 
    nautical mile downrange point, the increasing velocity in the downrange 
    direction continues to reduce the launch vehicle's ability to maneuver 
    through a large malfunction turn.
        The FAA proposes a 100 nautical mile distance as a delimiter 
    between the launch area and the downrange area. From the launch point 
    out to approximately the point where the IIP is 100 nautical miles 
    downrange, most launch vehicles will be subjected to the aerodynamic 
    forces of wind and drag. Once a launch vehicle's IIP has cleared the 
    100 nm limit, the FAA is willing to assume for purposes of appendix A 
    that most launch vehicles are outside the atmosphere.
        Figure 1 in appendix A depicts the launch area of a flight 
    corridor. Figure 1 shows the relative placement of the line segments 
    comprising the launch area of a flight corridor. The left and right 
    sides of the flight corridor are mirror images, with the flight azimuth 
    serving as the line between the two sides. Table A-3 in appendix A 
    tabulates the lengths of the perpendicular line segments comprising the 
    launch area. 
    
    [[Page 34344]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.066
    
    
    
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-C
    
    [[Page 34345]]
    
    Downrange Area
    
        The FAA derived the proposed appendix A flight corridor's downrange 
    area from hazard areas previously developed by federal launch ranges 
    for the classes of launch vehicles defined in table 1 of Sec. 420.21. 
    The downrange fan area of the flight corridor, as shown in figure 2, is 
    based on turning capabilities and impact dispersions of guided 
    expendable launch vehicles. The size of the fan area is necessary for 
    containing launch vehicle debris in the event that a launch vehicle 
    failure initiates a maximum-rate malfunction turn and the flight 
    termination system must be activated. In the later stages of flight a 
    guided launch vehicle's capability to turn is reduced due to increasing 
    velocities in the downrange direction. Therefore, a 10 deg. half angle 
    was used to define the downrange area, which reflects a combination of 
    normal vehicle dispersions and malfunction turns.
        The downrange area of a flight corridor begins 100 nm from a launch 
    point and, for the guided orbital launch vehicle classes, extends 5,000 
    nm downrange from the launch point. The FAA proposes 5,000 nm as the 
    end of an appendix A flight corridor because overflight dwell times for 
    the remaining flight time result in an insignificant risk to the 
    public. In general, after an orbital launch vehicle IIP has passed the 
    5,000 nm point its IIP range rates increase very rapidly as the launch 
    vehicle approaches orbital insertion. As a result, the dwell times 
    decrease significantly, reducing the overflight risk to insignificant 
    levels. For an applicant employing a guided suborbital launch vehicle, 
    a flight corridor would end with the impact dispersion area of a final 
    stage.
        Figure 2 depicts the downrange area of a flight corridor. The 
    figure depicts the relative placement of the line segments comprising 
    the downrange area of a flight corridor. The left and right sides of a 
    flight corridor are mirror images, with the flight azimuth serving as 
    the line between the two sides. Table A-3 in appendix A provides the 
    lengths of the line segments comprising the downrange area. The scaling 
    information discussed above with respect to the launch area applies to 
    the downrange area as well. If an applicant chooses a map with scale 
    units other than inches per inch the FAA will require the applicant to 
    describe the conversion algorithm to inches per inch and to provide 
    example computations.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.067
    
    Appendix B
    
        Appendix B provides another means for creating a hypothetical 
    flight corridor from an applicant's proposed launch site. As with a 
    flight corridor created pursuant to appendix A, an appendix B corridor 
    would identify the populations, those within the defined flight 
    corridor, that must be analyzed for risk. An appendix B analysis offers 
    an applicant a means to demonstrate whether a flight corridor from its 
    launch site satisfies the FAA's risk criteria for a guided orbital or 
    suborbital launch vehicle. Appendix B allows an applicant to perform a 
    more individualized containment analysis rather than relying on the 
    more conservative estimates the FAA derived for appendix A. Because an 
    appendix B analysis uses actual meteorological data and a trajectory, 
    whether actual or computer simulated, of a real launch vehicle, it 
    produces a flight corridor of greater accuracy than one created under 
    appendix A. The FAA derived the methodology from techniques developed 
    for federal launch ranges to calculate the distance that debris would 
    travel as a function of perturbing forces. The FAA's derived the 
    assumptions and simplifications in the appendix B analysis from launch 
    vehicle data
    
    [[Page 34346]]
    
    representing historical launch vehicle malfunction behavior.
        A flight corridor created using appendix B contains, on its face, 
    the same elements as an appendix A flight corridor, including a 
    circular area around a launch point with a radius of Dmax, 
    an overflight exclusion zone, a launch area and a downrange area. 
    Appendix B, however, produces and configures the last two elements 
    differently than appendix A. The launch area of an appendix B flight 
    corridor shows where launch vehicle debris would impact in the event of 
    a vehicle failure, and takes into account local meteorological 
    conditions. The downrange area of a flight corridor also shows where 
    launch vehicle debris would impact given a vehicle failure, but takes 
    into account vehicle imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle 
    guidance and performance dispersions. Also, like an appendix A flight 
    corridor, the uprange portion of the flight corridor is described by a 
    semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most uprange dispersion 
    circle, or the overflight exclusion zone, whichever is further uprange.
        The FAA's proposed appendix B launch area analysis assumes a 
    vehicle failure and destruction at one second intervals along a 
    trajectory z value, which denotes height as measured from the launch 
    point, up to 50,000 feet. An applicant must determine the maximum 
    distance a hazardous piece of debris would travel under local 
    meteorological conditions. The distances that the debris travels 
    provide the boundaries of an appendix B flight corridor's launch area. 
    After a height of 50,000 feet, which is where the FAA estimates, for 
    purposes of this analysis, that debris created by a launch vehicle's 
    destruction has less exposure to atmospheric forces, an applicant shall 
    determine how far harmful debris created by destruction of a launch 
    vehicle would travel based only on malfunction imparted velocity and 
    vehicle dispersion in order to create a downrange area. Although the 
    effects of wind above 50,000 feet are not, in reality, non-existent, 
    they are sufficiently diminished when compared to the effects of 
    malfunction imparted velocity and launch vehicle dispersion for 
    purposes of this estimation.
    
    Dmax Circle
    
        As with an appendix A flight corridor, an applicant must select 
    each launch point at its proposed launch site from which it expects a 
    guided expendable launch vehicle to take flight. An applicant must 
    obtain the latitude and longitude of the launch point to four decimal 
    places. If relying on a guided orbital launch vehicle, the applicant 
    must also select a launch vehicle class from Sec. 420.21, table 1, that 
    best represents the largest class each proposed launch point would 
    support. With the information, the applicant then ascertains the 
    Dmax that debris is expected to travel from a launch point 
    if a mishap were to occur in the first 10 seconds of flight by 
    employing table A-1, appendix A. Table A-1 also provides a maximum 
    distance for sub-orbital launch vehicles. The Dmax distance 
    provided by table A-1 defines a circular area around the launch point.
    
    Overflight Exclusion Zone
    
        That circular area is part of an overflight exclusion zone. Again, 
    an applicant uses information from appendix A to create an overflight 
    exclusion zone, although an appendix B flight corridor's uprange 
    boundary may extend further than its overflight exclusion zone. An 
    overflight exclusion zone consists of the circular area defined by the 
    radius Dmax at the launch point and a corridor of the length 
    prescribed by table A-2. Its downrange boundary is defined by an arc 
    with a radius Dmax centered on the endpoint prescribed by 
    table A-2. The cross-range boundaries consist of two lines parallel to 
    and to either side of the flight azimuth. Each line is tangent to the 
    upgrade and downrange Dmax circles as shown in appendix A, 
    figure A-1. Creation of an overflight exclusion zone is predetermined 
    by the requirements of appendix A and does not require a trajectory for 
    an actual launch vehicle. As with an appendix A overflight exclusion 
    zone, and for the reasons described in this notice's discussion of 
    appendix A, the FAA proposes to require that the public be excluded 
    from this area during launch.
    
    Launch Vehicle Trajectory
    
        An applicant must also obtain or generate a launch vehicle 
    trajectory. The applicant may use either commercially available 
    software or a trajectory provided by the launch vehicle's manufacturer. 
    Because appendix B is based on equations of motion in three dimensions, 
    the appendix B analysis requires that the trajectory be described using 
    a three axis coordinate system. The FAA recommends that an applicant 
    used a WGS-84 ellipsoidal earth model \34\ as the trajectory coordinate 
    system reference ellipsoid in the appendices, because of its general 
    applicability to the analyses that the FAA proposes in appendices B, C 
    and D, the model's wide availability and its development in accordance 
    with military standards and requirements. The WGS-84 model reflects the 
    most current and the most accurate Department of Defense standards for 
    earth models. WGS-84 provides a basic reference frame and geometric 
    figure for the Earth and provides a means for relating positions on 
    various local geodetic coordinate systems, including XYZ, to an Earth-
    centered, Earth-fixed coordinate system such as the EFG system employed 
    in the appendix B analysis.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \34\ Department of Defense World Geodetic System, Military 
    Standard 2401 (Jan. 11, 1994).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The FAA proposes to require time intervals used in the trajectory 
    analysis of no greater than one second for both launch and downrange 
    areas. Data frequency of one second is a compromise a between the low 
    data frequency requirements of the launch area, where dwell times are 
    relatively long, and the high frequency requirements of the downrange 
    area, where dwell times are correspondingly shorter. Accordingly, one 
    second time intervals are sufficient to accommodate linear 
    interpolation between trajectory time points, in the launch and 
    downrange areas, and not degrade the accuracy requirements of the 
    analysis.
        In the launch area, an applicant's trajectory must include position 
    data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed XYZ coordinates 
    centered on the proposed launch point, with the X-axis aligned with the 
    flight azimuth. In the downrange area, the applicant's trajectory must 
    show state vector data in terms of time after liftoff in right-handed 
    x, y, z, x, y, z coordinates, centered on the proposed launch point, 
    with the X-axis aligned with the flight azimuth.
        The FAA proposes to require certain technical information to be 
    used to compute an appendix B trajectory. The proposed appendix B 
    parameters comprise the minimum information needed to create a three 
    axis trajectory with 3-degrees-of-freedom (DOF). The 3-DOF are the 
    trajectory positions in each of the three axes of the XYZ coordinate 
    system and it is impossible to adequately describe the launch vehicle 
    position with less than 3-DOF. Any software used to compute a 
    trajectory must incorporate the data required by appendix B, paragraph 
    (b)(1)(ii)(A)-(I).\35\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \35\ Software for creating a 3-DOF trajectory with the accuracy 
    required for an appendix B analysis is commercially available.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Launch Area
    
        A launch area contains a launch point and an overflight exclusion 
    zone, and constitutes the part of the flight corridor calculated using 
    the effects of
    
    [[Page 34347]]
    
    atmospheric drag forces on debris produced by a series of hypothetical 
    destructions of a launch vehicle at one second intervals along that 
    trajectory. For purposes of an appendix B analysis, a launch area 
    extends from the further uprange of an OEZ arc or dispersion circle arc 
    downrange to a point on the surface of the earth that corresponds to 
    the debris impact locations, assuming a failure of the vehicle in 
    flight at a height of 50,000 feet. Typically, federal launch ranges 
    account for five major parameters to estimate the size of a flight 
    corridor. These include the effects of vehicle-imparted velocity on 
    debris, the change in launch vehicle position and velocity due to a 
    malfunction turn, guidance errors, the ballistic coefficient of debris, 
    and wind. However, imparted velocity, malfunction turn, and trajectory 
    dispersion, although not insignificant, do not play as great a role 
    early in flight as the wind effects on debris. The wind effect on 
    debris, in turn, depends on the ballistic coefficient of the debris. 
    The FAA determined that for purposes of the launch area, of these 
    parameters, launch vehicle debris and meteorological conditions 
    constitute the most significant, and the FAA therefore proposes to 
    focus on these two factors in the launch area.\36\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \36\ Note that the determination of the size of Dmax 
    included considerations of malfunction turns as well.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The FAA proposes to require an applicant to calculate circles that 
    approximate the debris dispersion for each one second time point on a 
    launch vehicle trajectory. The cross-range lines tangent to those 
    circles provide the borders of a launch area. Calculating the circles 
    consists, in general terms, of a two step process. An applicant must 
    first define 15 mean geometric height intervals along the proposed 
    trajectory in order to obtain data, in accordance with subparagraph 
    (c)(4) of appendix B, regarding the mean atmospheric density, maximum 
    wind speed, fall times and debris dispersions in each of those height 
    intervals. An applicant must then use that data in the calculations 
    proposed in subparagraphs (c)(5) to derive the radius applicable to 
    each height interval (Zi). Having obtained that radius, an 
    applicant uses it to describe, pursuant to subparagraph (c)(6), a 
    circle referred to as a debris dispersion circle (Di), 
    around each one second time interval along the vehicle's trajectory, 
    starting at the launch point. An applicant will then ascertain the 
    cross-range boundaries of a flight corridor's launch area by drawing 
    lines that are tangent to all dispersion circles. The final 
    Di dispersion circle forms the downrange boundary of a 
    flight corridor's launch area.
        The launch area represents the effects of meteorological conditions 
    on how far inert debris with a ballistic coefficient of 3 lb/ft.\2\ 
    would travel. Debris comes in many sizes and shapes, but the FAA does 
    not propose to require an applicant's location review analysis to take 
    all such possibilities into account. A complete analysis for an actual 
    launch would entail the determination of the type and size of debris 
    created by each credible failure mode, and the velocity imparted to 
    each piece of debris due to the failure. Instead, for purposes of the 
    appendix B analysis, the FAA proposes to categorize launch vehicle 
    debris by a ballistic coefficient that accounts for the smallest inert 
    debris that may cause harm and that also accounts for the debris most 
    sensitive to wind. A ballistic coefficient reflects the sensitivity of 
    weight and area ratios to drag forces, such as wind dispersion effect. 
    The FAA evaluated wind drift effects on a piece of debris with the 
    smallest hazardous ballistic coefficient. A debris piece with the 
    smallest hazardous ballistic coefficient will play the largest role in 
    ascertaining the total debris dispersion in a launch area. Low beta 
    debris, namely, debris with a ballistic coefficient less than or equal 
    to three pounds per square foot, will have a lower terminal velocity 
    than high ballistic coefficient debris and will spend more time being 
    dispersed by wind forces on descent. Therefore, low ballistic 
    coefficient debris will disperse farther than high ballistic 
    coefficient debris. The FAA proposes a debris piece with a ballistic 
    coefficient of three pounds per square foot for launch area 
    calculations because it is the most wind sensitive debris piece with a 
    potential for harm of reasonable significance. Experience at federal 
    launch ranges has shown that, on average, a debris piece that has a 
    ballistic coefficient of less than three pounds per square foot is not 
    significant in terms of its potential to harm a person in the open.
        Although the FAA proposes to assume a ballistic coefficient of 
    three as the smallest piece of wind sensitive debris hazardous to the 
    public, ballistic coefficient is not directly related to fatality 
    criteria based on the kinetic energy of debris. The ballistic 
    coefficient of three is related to a kinetic energy of 58 ft/lbs which 
    represents a probability of fatality of 50 percent for a standing 
    person. It is therefore possible that fatalities could occur for a 
    lower ballistic coefficient and that no fatalities may occur for a 
    higher ballistic coefficient. The FAA proposes to incorporate neither 
    of these conditions into this analysis, and invites comment.
        In addition to knowing what debris is of concern, an applicant must 
    know the local meteorological conditions. The FAA proposes that an 
    applicant obtain meteorological data for 15 height intervals in a 
    launch area up to 50,000 feet. The FAA proposes an upper limit of 
    50,000 feet in the launch area containment analysis of debris because 
    winds above this altitude contribute little to drift distance. Also, 
    once a launch vehicle reaches an altitude of 50,000 feet its velocity 
    vector has pitched down range so that a malfunction turn and explosion 
    velocity, rather than atmospheric drag and wind effects, play the 
    dominant role in determining the dispersion of debris as the debris 
    falls to the surface. The combination of these two factors 
    significantly reduces the effect of winds on uprange and crossrange 
    dispersion after a launch vehicle reaches 50,000 feet. For altitudes 
    less than 50,000 feet, at the same time as low ballistic coefficient 
    debris pieces are highly sensitive to drag forces, the velocity of an 
    explosion caused by destroying a launch vehicle contributes relatively 
    little to the dispersion effect because the drag produced on these 
    light weight pieces results in a high deceleration so they achieve 
    terminal velocity almost instantaneously and drift with the wind. 
    Therefore, launch vehicle induced explosion-velocities are not 
    considered for the launch area of an appendix B containment analysis. 
    Instead, the FAA proposes to require an applicant to use local 
    statistical wind data by altitude for fifteen height intervals. The 
    data must include altitude, atmospheric density, mean East/West 
    meridianal (u) and North/South zonal wind (v), the standard deviation 
    of u and v wind, a correlation coefficient, the number of observations 
    and the wind percentile.
        Data acceptable to the FAA is available from NOAA's National 
    Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NOAA Data Centers, of which the NCDC is 
    the largest, provide long-term preservation of, management, and ready 
    accessibility to environmental data. The Centers are part of the 
    National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service. The 
    NCDC data set acceptable to the FAA is the ``Global Gridded Upper Air 
    Statistics, 1980-1995, CV1.1, March 1996 (CD-ROM).'' The Global Gridded 
    Upper Air Statistics (GGUAS) CD-ROM data set describes the atmosphere 
    for each month of the represented year on a 2.5 degree global grid at 
    15 standard pressure levels. NCDC provides compiled mean and standard 
    deviation values for sea level pressure, wind
    
    [[Page 34348]]
    
    speed, air temperature, dew point, height and density. GGUAS also 
    complies eight-point wind roses. The spatial resolution is a 73 x 144 
    grid spaced at 2.5 degrees and the temporal resolution is one month. 
    Monthly data have been statistically combined for the period of record 
    1980-1995.
        To simplify the containment analysis, the FAA proposes to allow an 
    applicant to use a mean wind (50%). The FAA proposes to further 
    simplify the analysis by assuming that an applicant's launch pad height 
    is equal to the surface level of the wind measurements provided by the 
    NCDC data base. The actual pad height could be lower or higher than the 
    surface level wind measurement height. The difference between the 
    actual pad height and the surface level measurement height is 
    considered insignificant in terms of its effect on the impact 
    dispersion radius.
        The FAA notes that the NCDC database will not necessarily contain 
    measurements of winds for any particular launch site proposed. If a 
    launch point is located in the center of a 2.5 degree NCDC weather grid 
    cell, the farthest distance to a grid cell corner would be along a 
    diagonal from the center of the grid cell to a corner of the grid cell. 
    The wind measurements will be no more than approximately 106 nm from 
    the launch point. This distance is close enough for purposes of a 
    location review containment analysis, and occurs only for a grid 
    located on the equator. In general, the topography within approximately 
    106 nm of a launch point is assumed to be relatively similar with 
    respect to height above mean-sea-level. As the launch point latitude 
    increases the distance from the wind measurement grid point will 
    decrease, which will reduce errors introduced by this assumption.
        Having obtained the necessary meteorological data, an applicant 
    would use data from the GGUAS CD-ROM to estimate the mean atmospheric 
    density, maximum wind speed, height interval fall times, and height 
    interval debris dispersions for 15 mean geometric height intervals. 
    Altitude intervals are denoted by the subscript ``j''. An applicant 
    would then calculate the debris dispersion radius (Di) for 
    each trajectory position whose ``Z'' values, are less than 50,000 ft. 
    Each trajectory time considered is denoted by the variable subscript 
    ``i''. The initial value of ``i'' is one and the value is increased by 
    increments of one for each subsequent ``Z'' value evaluated. The major 
    dispersion factors are a combination of wind velocity and debris fall 
    time. Because the atmospheric density is a function of altitude and 
    effects the resultant fall time, Di is estimated by summing 
    the radial dispersions computed for each altitude interval the debris 
    intersects on its descent trajectory. Once all the debris dispersion 
    radii have been calculated, the flight corridor's launch area is 
    produced by plotting each debris dispersion circle on a map, and 
    drawing enveloping lines that enclose the outer boundary of the debris 
    dispersion circles. The uprange portion of the flight corridor is 
    described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most 
    uprange Di dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion 
    zone, whichever is further uprange. The enveloping lines that enclose 
    the final Di dispersion circle forms the downrange boundary 
    of a flight corridor's launch area.
    
    Downrange Area Containment Analysis
    
        A containment analysis also describes the dimensions of a flight 
    corridor's downrange area. The FAA designed the downrange area analysis 
    to accommodate launch vehicle imparted velocity, malfunction turns, and 
    vehicle guidance and performance dispersions. The analysis to obtain 
    the downrange area of a flight corridor for guided orbital and 
    suborbital launch vehicle trajectories starts with trajectory positions 
    with heights greater than 50,000 feet, that is, the point where the 
    launch area analysis ends. A downrange area for a guided orbital launch 
    vehicle ends 5,000 nautical miles from the launch point. If an 
    applicant has chosen a guided suborbital launch vehicle for the 
    analysis, the analysis must define the impact dispersion area for the 
    final stage, and that impact dispersion area marks the end of a 
    downrange area.
        An applicant computes the cross-range boundaries of the downrange 
    area of a flight corridor by calculating the launch vehicle position 
    after a simulated worst-case four second turn, rotating the launch 
    vehicle state vector to account for vehicle guidance and performance 
    dispersions, and then computing an instantaneous impact point. The 
    locus of IIPs describes the impact boundary.
        As a first step, an applicant computes a reduction ratio factor 
    that decreases with increasing launch vehicle range. Secondly, an 
    applicant computes the launch vehicle position after a simulated worst-
    case four-second malfunction turn for each altitude interval along a 
    trajectory. For purposes of the launch site location review, the FAA 
    proposes to rely on a velocity vector malfunction turn angle set at 
    45 deg. and to decrease this turn angle using the reduction ratio 
    factor, as a function of downrange distance to simulate the 
    constraining effects of increasing velocity in the downrange direction 
    on malfunction turn capability. See figure B-2. The FAA assumes this 
    worst-case delay result in order to account for the maximum dispersion 
    of the vehicle during the time necessary for a person in charge of 
    destroying a launch vehicle to detect a vehicle failure and cause the 
    vehicle's destruction. Figure B-2 in appendix B depicts the velocity 
    vector movement in the yaw plane of the vehicle body axis coordinate 
    system. The figure below depicts the state vector axes and impact 
    locations for a malfunction turn failure and for an on-trajectory 
    failure.
    
    [[Page 34349]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.068
    
    
        The second step described above assumes perfect performance of the 
    launch vehicle up until the beginning of the malfunction turn. In 
    order, however, to account for normal five sigma (5) 
    performance and guidance dispersions of the launch vehicle prior to the 
    malfunction turn, the applicant next rotates the trajectory state 
    vector. The trajectory state-vector rotation is accomplished in 
    conjunction with a XYZ to ENU coordinate system transformation. This 
    transformation rotates the X and Y axes about the Z axis. The Z and U 
    axes are coincident. Both position and velocity components are rotated. 
    The FAA intends the trajectory azimuth rotation to account for the 
    normal 5-sigma launch vehicle performance and guidance dispersions that 
    may exist at the beginning of a malfunction turn. The rotation angle 
    decreases from three degrees to one degree as the vehicle proceeds 
    downrange, and the rate of decrease is a function of distance from the 
    launch point. This is done because the trajectory azimuth of a launch 
    vehicle with 5-sigma performance and guidance dispersions early in 
    flight could be approximately 3 degrees from the nominal 
    flight azimuth. Since this azimuth offset is not considered a failure 
    response, the guidance, navigation, and control system is expected to 
    achieve steering corrections. These corrections will eventually reduce 
    the angular offset later in flight as the launch vehicle targets the 
    mission objectives for orbital insertion. If a launch vehicle has 5-
    sigma performance and guidance dispersions later in flight, the effects 
    of increasing velocity in the downrange direction limits a launch 
    vehicle's capability to alter the trajectory's azimuth. Launch vehicles 
    in the four launch vehicle classes were reviewed to determine the 
    typical range of malfunction-turning rates in the downrange area. The 
    FAA found these rates to be relatively small compared to launch area 
    rates. The FAA proposes the three and one degree turn rates because 
    they encompass the turn rates found during the review process.
        Before initiating the IIP computations, an applicant must transform 
    the ENU coordinate system to an EFG coordinate system. This EFG 
    coordinate transformation is employed to simplify the IIP computation.
        The IIP computation proposed in appendix B are used for demanding 
    the IIPs to either side of a trajectory by creating latitude and 
    longitude pairs for the left and right flight corridor boundaries. 
    Connecting the latitude and longitude pairs describes the boundary of 
    the downrange area of a flight corridor. The launch site location 
    review IIP calculations assume the absence of atmospheric drag effects. 
    Equations B46-B69 implement an iterative solution to the problem of 
    determining an impact point. This iterative technique includes checks 
    for conditions that will not result in impact point solutions. The 
    conditions prohibiting impact solutions are: (1) An initial launch 
    vehicle position below the earth's surface, (2) a trajectory orbit that 
    is not elliptical, but, parabolic or hyperbolic, (3) a positive perigee 
    height, where the trajectory orbit does not intersect the earth, and 
    (4) the iterative solution does not converge. Any one of the conditions 
    given above will prohibit the computation of an impact point. The 
    iterative approach in equations B46-B69 solves these problems.
    
    Software
    
        The FAA has developed a software tool that performs the flight 
    corridor calculations required by appendix B for a guided orbital 
    launch vehicle. The
    
    [[Page 34350]]
    
    software was developed in FORTRAN. All of the assumptions and equations 
    contained in appendix B are implemented in the program. An applicant 
    must provide the geodetic latitude, longitude, launch azimuth, desired 
    wind percentile, Dmax from table A-1 and Doez 
    from table A-2 as input to the program. The software outputs an ASCII 
    text file of geodetic latitudes and longitudes that describe a flight 
    corridor boundary.
    
    Estimating Public Risk
    
        Upon completing a flight corridor, an applicant must estimate the 
    risk to the public within the flight corridor to determine whether that 
    risk falls within acceptable levels. If an applicant demonstrates that 
    no part of the flight corridor is over a populated area, the flight 
    corridor satisfies the FAA's risk thresholds, and an applicant's 
    application may rely on its appendix B analysis. If a flight corridor 
    includes a populated area, an applicant has the option of rotating an 
    appendix B flight corridor using a different launch point or azimuth to 
    avoid population, or of conducting an overflight risk analysis as 
    provided in appendix C.
    
    Appendix C
    
        Under a launch site location review, once an applicant has created 
    a flight corridor employing either appendix A or B, the applicant must 
    ascertain whether there is population within the flight corridor. If 
    there is no population, the FAA will approve the location of the 
    proposed launch point for the type and class of launch vehicle 
    analyzed. If there is population, an applicant must employ appendix C 
    to perform an overflight risk analysis for the corridor. An appendix C 
    risk analysis determines whether or not the risk to the public from a 
    hypothetical launch exceeds the FAA's risk threshold of an estimated 
    expected casualty (Ec) of no more than 30 x 10-6 
    per launch. An appendix C risk analysis estimates the Ec 
    overflight contribution from a single hypothetical launch whose flight 
    termination system is assumed to work perfectly. The analysis takes 
    into account the probability of a vehicle failing throughout its 
    trajectory, dwell times \37\ over individual populated areas, and the 
    probability of impact within those areas. The analysis also takes into 
    account the effective casualty area of a vehicle class, the size of the 
    populated area, and the population density of the exposed population.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \37\ Although an applicant who calculates an appendix B flight 
    corridor will know actual dwell times for its Ec 
    analysis, the FAA proposes to supply a constant to approximate dwell 
    time for an applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Estimating Ec for an actual launch takes a large number 
    of variables and considerations into account. The risk analysis 
    provided in appendix C provides a somewhat simpler approach to 
    estimating Ec within the boundaries of a flight corridor 
    than might be necessary in performing a risk analysis for an actual 
    launch. The FAA proposes, for purposes of determining the acceptability 
    of a launch site's location, to rely only on variables relevant to 
    ensuring that the site itself offers at least one flight corridor 
    sufficiently isolated from population for safety. Accordingly, many of 
    the factors that a launch operator will take into account will not be 
    reflected here.
        In brief, in order for an applicant to perform an appendix C risk 
    analysis, the applicant must first determine whether any populated 
    areas are present within an appendix A or B flight corridor. If so, the 
    applicant must obtain area and population data. At this point an 
    applicant has a choice. Appendix C requires that an applicant calculate 
    the probability of impact for each populated area, and then determine 
    an Ec value for each populated area. To obtain the estimated 
    Ec for an entire flight corridor, the applicant adds--or 
    sums--the Ec results for each populated area. If the 
    population within the flight corridor is relatively small, an applicant 
    may wish to conduct a less rigorous analysis by making conservative 
    assumptions. Appendix C also offers the option of analyzing a worst-
    case flight corridor for those flight corridors where such an approach 
    might save time and analysis. Examples of such simplifications are 
    provided.
    
    Identification and Location of Population
    
        In order to perform an Ec analysis, an applicant must 
    first identify the populated areas within a flight corridor. For the 
    first 100 nautical miles from a launch point downrange a U.S. census 
    block group serves as the maximum size of an individual populated areas 
    permitted under an appendix C analysis. The proposed maximum permitted 
    size of an individual populated area beyond 100 nautical mile downrange 
    is a 1 degree latitude x 1 degree longitude grid. The size of that area 
    analyzed will play out differently depending on the location of the 
    proposed launch site. For example, if an applicant proposed a coastal 
    site, the applicant would presumably present the FAA with a flight 
    corridor mostly over water. Population may be limited to that of a few 
    islands, minimizing the amount of data and analysis necessary. If an 
    applicant proposes a launch site located further inland, the applicant 
    would need to obtain the area and population of each census block group 
    in the first 100 nm of the flight corridor. This may prove time 
    consuming, although the FAA has proposed alternative approach that may 
    simplify the process for such applicants. An applicant may also propose 
    to operate a launch site on foreign territory, where U.S. census data 
    would not apply. In that event, the FAA would apply the principles 
    underlying a launch site location review to the available data on a 
    case-by-case basis.
        The proposed regulations require the analysis of populations at the 
    census block group level for the first 100 nm from the launch point in 
    the flight corridor. An applicant shall employ data from the latest 
    census.\38\ An applicant must also include population that may not be 
    included in the U.S. census, such as military base personnel. The FAA 
    recognizes a census block group to be a reasonable populated area for 
    analysis because the risk early in flight is greatest due to long dwell 
    times. IIP range rates in a launch area are relatively show, which 
    exposes the launch area populations to launch vehicle risks for a 
    longer period of time when compared to similar populations in the 
    downrange area. Depending on the launch site and launch vehicle, a 
    census block group could be exposed to launch vehicle risks for tens of 
    seconds. In contrast to the size of a populated area in the downrange 
    area, the increased risk due to longer dwell times requires a more 
    detailed evaluation of the launch area for Ec purposes. A 
    census block group is an appropriate size for analysis because it is 
    small enough to accommodate the assumption that a populated area 
    contains homogeneously distributed population without grossly 
    distorting the outcome of the Ec estimates, and because the 
    data is readily available for populations in the United States. 
    Although a census block is smaller and therefore even more accurate, 
    only census block centroids, rather than the more useful geographic 
    area, are available from the U.S. Census Bureau. The FAA also proposes 
    to allow the census block group to serve as the smallest unit addressed 
    because electronic data is available at the census block group level, 
    which will allow for more efficient execution of the computations. 
    Although not as accurate as a census block, a census block group is 
    also sufficiently accurate to serve as
    
    [[Page 34351]]
    
    the smallest populated area for a launch site location review because 
    the launch licensing process will mandate the more thorough risk 
    analysis necessary for a particular launch. An applicant may find the 
    need to use only a portion of a census block group, such as when a 
    populated area is divided by a flight corridor boundary. In that case 
    an applicant should use the population density of the block group to 
    reflect the population in that portion of the census block group.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \38\ Some geographic information software has the capacity to 
    import U.S. Census Bureau demographic and geographic data.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        FAA proposes to allow an applicant to evaluate the presence of 
    people in larger increments of area in the downrange area of a flight 
    corridor than in the launch area of a flight corridor. Populations in 
    the downrange area of a flight corridor must be analyzed in area no 
    greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates. 
    Because dwell times downrange are shorter, the risk to the individual 
    populated areas is less and, therefore, the FAA is willing to accept a 
    different degree of accuracy. IIP range rates in the downrange area can 
    achieve speeds of 500 nm/second. Because the longest distance in a grid 
    space would be approximately 85 nm for a grid on the equator, which is 
    where the largest grid area will be found, the launch vehicle IIP dwell 
    time would be less than 0.20 seconds over the grid. This reduces the 
    risk to population in that grid significantly compared with population 
    in the launch area.
        The data needed for a downrange area analysis is also readily 
    available. One source for population data in an area no greater than 
    1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude and longitude grid coordinates in a database 
    of the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge 
    National Laboratory. The CDIAC database is ``Global Population 
    Distribution (1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name Information on a 
    One by One Degree Grid Cell Basis.'' This database contains one degree 
    by one degree grid information on the world-wide distribution of 
    population for 1990 and country specific information on the percentage 
    of a country's population present to each grid cell.
        The CDIAC obtained its population estimates from the United Nations 
    FAO Yearbook,\39\ the Guinness World Data Book,\40\ and the Rand 
    McNally World Atlas \41\ for approximately 6,000 cities with 
    populations greater than 50,000 inhabitants. The population data was 
    updated by CDIAC to 1990 values with available census data. For the 
    rural population allocation, the CDIAC developed global rural 
    population distribution factors based on national population data, data 
    on approximately 90,000 cities and towns, and the assumption that rural 
    population is proportional to the number of cities and towns within 
    each grid cell for each country.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \39\ United Nations FAO Yearbook, Vol. 47, Rome, 1993.
        \40\ The Guinness World Data Book, Guinness Pub. Ltd., 
    Middlesex, England, 1993.
        \41\ Rand McNally World Atlas, Rand McNally, New York, 1991.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Probability of Impact
    
        The next step in the process would be to ascertain the probability 
    of impact for each populated area. In other words, an applicant must 
    find the probability that debris will land in each populated area 
    within the flight corridor under analysis. For this, the applicant must 
    find the probability of impact in both the cross-range and downrange 
    directions, by employing equation C1 for an appendix A flight corridor 
    for an orbital launch or equations C2 through C4 for an appendix A 
    corridor that describes a suborbital launch. For an analysis based on 
    an appendix B flight corridor, an applicant will employ equation C5 for 
    an orbital launch or equations C6 and C8 for a suborbital launch. For 
    both appendix A and B corridors, the probability of impact 
    (Pi) within a particular populated area is equal to the 
    product of the probability of impact in the downrange (Px) 
    and cross range (Py) directions, and the probability of 
    vehicle failure (Pr).
    
    Pi = Py * Px * Pf
    
    The analysis applicable to both appendix A and B flight corridors is 
    the same for the cross-range direction,\42\ but employs a different 
    equation to determine the probability of impact in the downrange 
    direction. For an appendix A corridor, the FAA proposes to specify a 
    constant in equation C1 to approximate dwell time for the downrange 
    direction. In equation C5 an applicant will employ actual dwell times 
    obtained from the trajectory generated pursuant to appendix B.
    
        \42\ See above text for footnote 42
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \42\ For Equations C-1, C-3, C-5 and C-7 the FAA approximated 
    the probability of impact in the cross-range direction 
    (Py) by applying Simpson's Normal Probability Function. 
    The FAA employed Simpson's rule to derive the following equation:
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.013
    
    Simpson's approximation of the Elliptical Normal Probability 
    Function is described in General Motors Corporation Defense System 
    Division's Elliptical Normal Probability Function, (Apr. 6, 1960).
        An applicant who relies on an appendix A flight corridor will use 
    equation C1 to determine the probability of impact for a particular 
    populated area in the downrange direction by finding the range rate and 
    assuming a total thrusting time of 643 seconds. Equation C1 reflects 
    the fact that appendix A does not employ trajectory data, and 
    therefore, employs a technique for estimating dwell times as a function 
    of range and range rate to determine the probability of impact in the 
    downrange direction. Proposed table C-2 provides the appendix A flight 
    corridor IIP range intervals and corresponding IIP range rates for use 
    in Equation C1.
        To create proposed table C-2, the FAA employed actual trajectory 
    data to determine individual range rates for Atlas, Delta and Titan 
    launch vehicles. The FAA computed the IIP for each trajectory time 
    point, and the range rates were determined by subtracting IIP ranges 
    (RIIP) over one-second intervals. This provided a per second range 
    rate, referred to below at R-dot. The average range rates over the 
    range intervals, shown in the table below, were estimated by dividing 
    the difference of
    
    [[Page 34352]]
    
    the upper value of adjacent IIP ranges by the elapsed trajectory time 
    over the range interval. For example, the following Delta launch 
    vehicle data was used to determine the IIP range rate from 101 through 
    500 nm:
    
    RIIP1 = 100 nm
    TALO1 (time after lift-off 1) = 97 sec
    RIIP2 = 500 nm
    TALO2 = 217 sec
    (RIIP2-RIIP1) (TALO2-TALO1) = 3.33 nm/s
    
        The FAA derived the total average thrusting time of 643 seconds 
    from the data in table 5 by dividing the difference of the upper value 
    of adjacent IIP ranges by the average IIP range rate corresponding to 
    the largest IIP range and summing the results over the set of IIP 
    ranges. The following computations are given as examples of how the FAA 
    reached this determination.
    
    Let:
        RIIP1 = 100 nm
        RIIP2 = 500 nm
        R-dot = 3.00 nm/s
    (RIIP2-RIIP1)/R-dot = 133.33 sec
    
                                      Table 5.--Data To Derive Total Thrusting Time
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           IIP range rate (nm/s)
             IIP range (nm)          ----------------------------------------------------------------  t(s)
                                           Delta           Atlas           Titan           Avg.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    0-100...........................            1.03             085            0.96            0.91          110.50
    100-500.........................            3.33            3.77            2.23            3.00          133.33
    500-1500........................            4.27            3.66            2.73            3.20          312.99
    1500-2500.......................            9.01           21.74           12.99           17.37           57.59
    2501-3000.......................           33.33           50.00           41.67           45.84           10.91
    3001-4000.......................           66.67           90.91           83.33           87.12           11.48
    4001-5000.......................          166.67          142.86          166.67          154.77            6.46
                                     -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total-t............  ..............  ..............  ..............  ..............          643.26
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The ``X'' distances were measured directly off the mapping 
    information source.
        An applicant who relies on an appendix B flight corridor will 
    employ proposed equation C5 or equations C6 through C8 depending on 
    whether the flight corridor culminates in an impact dispersion area or 
    not. Equation C5 reflects the fact that, unlike an appendix A flight 
    corridor, the trajectory data used to create an appendix B flight 
    corridor provides downrange instantaneous impact points (IIPs). 
    Accordingly, the dwell time associated with a populated area may be 
    ascertained for the difference between the closest and furthest 
    downrange distances of the populated area. See figure C-2.
        An applicant may find the following six step procedure helpful in 
    determining the dwell time for individual populated areas that equation 
    C5 calls for. The subscripts to not correspond to subscripts in the 
    appendix.
        Step 1: Determine the trajectory time (t1) associated 
    with the trajectory IIP position (x1), that immediately 
    precedes the uprange point on the populated area boundary. This is a 
    accomplished by locating the IIP points in the vicinity of the 
    populated area, drawing lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
    trace, and choosing the trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal 
    is closest to the uprange boundary of the populated area but does not 
    intersect it. The distance from the launch point to x1 may 
    be determined using the range and bearing equations in appendix A, 
    paragraph (b).
        Step 2: Determine the trajectory time (t2) associated 
    with the trajectory IIP position (x2) that just exceeds the 
    downrange point on the populated area boundary. This is accomplished by 
    locating the IIP point in the vicinity of the populated area, drawing 
    lines normal to the trajectory IIP ground trace, and choosing the 
    trajectory time for the IIP point whose normal is closest to the 
    downrange boundary of the populated area but does not intersect it. The 
    distance from the launch point to x2 may be determined using 
    the range and bearing equations in Appendix A, section (b).
        Step 3: Determines the average IIP range rate (R) for the flight 
    period determined in Steps 1 and 2 above.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.014
    
        Step 4: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the 
    uprange point (x3) on the populated area boundary. This is 
    accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
    trace and tangent to the uprange boundary of the populated area, and 
    determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace 
    from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground 
    trace.
        Step 5: Determine the distance along the nominal trajectory to the 
    downrange point (x4) on the populated area boundary. This is 
    accomplished by drawing a line normal to the trajectory IIP ground 
    trace and tangent to the downrange boundary of the populated area, and 
    determining the distance along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace 
    from the launch point to the intersection of the normal and the ground 
    trace.
        Step 6: The dwell time (td) is estimated by the 
    following equation.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.015
    
        For either type of flight corridor, an applicant determines the 
    probability of impact in the cross range direction, (Py), 
    through a series of steps, of which the first is measuring the distance 
    from the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace to the closest and 
    furthest points in the cross range direction of the area that contains 
    population. The populated area may consist of a census block group or a 
    1 degree latitude by 1 degree longitude grid. See figure C-1. To 
    determine the distribution of the debris pattern in that populated 
    area, the applicant needs to estimate the standard deviation of debris 
    impacts. The FAA proposes that, for purposes of an appendix C analysis, 
    that the cross-range boundaries of a flight corridor represent five 
    standard deviations 5 of all debris impacts form normal and 
    malfunction trajectories.\43\ To apply this to a populated area, an 
    applicant must first find the distance
    
    [[Page 34353]]
    
    from the nominal trajectory to the cross-range boundary, measured on a 
    line normal to the trajectory through the geographic center of the 
    populated area, and then divide that distance by five.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \43\ Five sigma should represent 99.9999426% of all debris 
    impacts from normal and malfunction trajectories assuming a 
    functioning FTS. The one-sided-tail percentage area under the 
    Gaussian Normal Probability curve beyond five-sigma is approximately 
    0.000000287%. Since the normal curve is symmetric this value can be 
    doubled and subtracted from one (1) to determine the percentage area 
    between the plus-and-minus five sigma limits. This results in the 
    99.9999426% value. See, Frederick E. Croxton, Elementary Statistics 
    with Applications in Medicine, 323 (1953).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        Finally, the probability of failure is also an element in 
    calculating the probability of impact. The FAA proposes for the launch 
    site location analysis to assign a failure probability (Pf) 
    constant of Pf=0.10 for guided launch vehicles. This 
    represents a conservative estimate of the failure percentage of current 
    launch vehicles, since many current launch vehicles are more reliable. 
    The appendix C process assumes that the probability of impacting within 
    the corridor is one, and the probability of impacting outside the 
    corridor is zero. The flight termination system is assumed to function 
    perfectly in all failure scenarios.
        A final variation on computing the probability of impact for a 
    particular populated area is used when computing the probability of 
    impact (Pi) within the impact dispersion area of a guided 
    suborbital launch vehicle. In this case, the probability of success 
    (Ps) is substituted for the probability of failure 
    (Pf), and an applicant shall employ a method similar to that 
    used in appendix D to calculate the probability of impact for any 
    populated areas inside the impact dispersion area. This divergence, the 
    use of probability of success rather than probability of failure, from 
    the variable used for an orbital launch vehicle arises out of the 
    relative risk associated with an impact dispersion area of a guided 
    suborbital launch vehicle. The same risks associated with a guided 
    orbital launch are also associated with a guided sub-orbital launch 
    except for the final stage of the guided suborbital mission, which is 
    intended to return to earth rather than to enter orbit. On the basis of 
    past history, the FAA has concluded that the final stage has a high 
    reliability and will impact in the designated impact dispersion area, 
    as intended from a successful mission. The FAA intends through its 
    proposed launch site location review to analyze high risk events, and 
    because the risk due to a planned impact in the dispersion area would 
    be much higher than an unplanned impact, the FAA proposes to use 
    Ps inside the impact dispersion area rather the 
    Pf for determining the probability of impact in a guided 
    suborbital launch vehicle's impact dispersion area.\44\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \44\ The actual probability used in the analysis is 0.98.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Totaling Risk of All Populated Areas in Flight Corridor
    
        The Ec estimate for a flight corridor is a summation of 
    the risk to each populated area and results in an estimate of 
    Ec inside the corridor, Ec (Corridor). This means 
    that an applicant would estimate Ec for each individual 
    populated area within a flight corridor, using the following equation:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.016
    
    Pi is the probability of hitting the populated area. 
    AC is the effective casualty area of the vehicle and may be 
    obtained from table C-3. Ak is the area of the populated 
    area. Nk is the population in Ak, and is obtained 
    from census data. The label ``k'' is used to identify the individual 
    populated area. The summed Ec for all populated areas added 
    together is the Ec (Corridor).
        The FAA proposes to require an applicant to use an effective 
    casualty area specific to a launch vehicle class and range when 
    performing the Ec calculation. An effective casualty area 
    (Ac) means the aggregate casualty area of each piece of 
    debris created by a launch vehicle failure at a particular points on 
    its trajectory. The casualty area for each piece of debris is the area 
    within which 100 percent of the unprotected population on the ground is 
    assumed to be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of 
    the debris piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, 
    impact explosions, and debris skip, splatter, and bounce. In each of 
    the vehicle classes, the Ac decreases, resulting in a 
    smaller casualty area, as a function of distance downrange because 
    vehicle size and explosive potential decreases as explosive propellant 
    is consumed and expended stages are ejected during vehicle flight.
        An effective casualty area is a function of time-after-liftoff is 
    proposed in table C-3 for launch vehicle classes listed in table 1 of 
    Sec. 420.21. The FAA derived the effective casualty areas in table C-3 
    from DAMP, a series of risk estimation computer programs used at 
    federal launch ranges, to evaluate the vehicle classes described in 
    table 1, Sec. 420.21. DAMP considers other factors besides debris 
    characteristics, such as the size of a standing person, which increases 
    the casualty area, and sheltering, which would tend to decrease the 
    casualty area. Because considering sheltering has a greater effect than 
    considering the size of a standing person, and was not assumed in table 
    C-3, the effective casualty areas in table C-3 are conservative.
        An applicant calculates casualty expectancy for each populated area 
    within a flight corridor. After the casualty expectancies have been 
    estimated for all populated areas, the Ec values are summed 
    to obtain the total corridor risk. The total is multiplied by two to 
    estimate the final value for Ec(Corridor). The FAA is 
    proposing this multiplier to account for the error introduced by the 
    risk estimation approach of the launch site location review. Both the 
    method used to construct a flight corridor and the method used to 
    analyze risk contributes error. For example, an appendix A flight 
    corridor is not based on actual wind data, and even though its size is 
    conservative in nature, this size alone can cause the risk to be 
    underestimated in appendix C. In other words, what the analysis gains 
    in conservatism with the greater size of an appendix A corridor it may, 
    on occasion, lose in conservatism due to the corresponding decrease in 
    population density relative to an appendix B corridor. Conversely, an 
    appendix B corridor, which may result in a higher Ec total 
    due to the greater density attributable to the smaller corridor, may 
    not encompass a populated area that would otherwise be analyzed for 
    risk as part of an appendix A corridor. In addition, these calculations 
    do not account for any secondary effects such as fire and collapsing 
    structures that may result from impacting debris. Accordingly, to 
    compensate for these inherent discrepancies, a safety factor is 
    advisable in order to guard against licensing the operation of a launch 
    site which may never be able to support a licensed launch. Also, an 
    appendix B flight corridor is based on a number of approximations, 
    including the descent rate of a piece of debris, the variability of a 
    nominal launch vehicle trajectory prior to a failure, and a malfunction 
    turn. Both the appendix A and B flight corridors for orbital launch 
    vehicles end at 5,000 am, leaving out a large area of overflight, 
    albeit with an IIP with very high velocity and extremely small dwell 
    times. Additionally, the Ec analysis in appendix C itself 
    can underestimate risk to the population within a flight corridor due 
    to certain approximations, including the probability of impact in the 
    cross-range direction (Py), which uses Simpson's 
    approximation of the Elliptical Normal Probability Function, and the 
    determination that the width of a flight corridor is assumed to 
    represent a 5-sigma normal distribution. Cities present in a flight 
    corridor can also cause the risk to be underestimated because the 
    appendix C method
    
    [[Page 34354]]
    
    averages population over areas that may be as large as a 1 deg.  x  
    1 deg. grid. Perhaps the most important factor in contributing to 
    possible error is the fact that the proposed location review assumes a 
    perfectly functioning flight termination system. Accordingly, the FAA 
    has chosen a multiplier of two to balance its intent to only approve 
    launch sites that are safe for the launches intended to be launched 
    from the launch site, and to minimize the burden on applicants.
        The FAA will not approve the proposed launch site location if the 
    estimated expected casualty exceeds 30  x  10-6. An 
    applicant may either modify its proposal, or if the flight corridor 
    used was generated by the method proposed in appendix A, use the 
    typically less conservative but more accurate method proposed in 
    appendix B to narrow the flight corridor and perform another appendix C 
    overflight risk analysis. An applicant may employ specified variations 
    to the analysis described above. Six variations are identified in 
    appendix C. The first four variations permit an application to make 
    conservative assumptions that would lead to an overestimation of the 
    corridor Ec compared with the more detailed process 
    described. Although appendix C's approach simplifies a typical launch 
    safety analysis somewhat by providing conservative default parameters 
    to use, it may also prove unnecessarily complex for applicants 
    proposing launch sites with launch corridors encompassing extremely few 
    people. For those situations, appendix C provides the option for an 
    applicant to further simplify the estimation of casualty expectancy by 
    making worst-case assumptions that would produce a higher value of the 
    corridor Ec compared with the analysis defined in appendix 
    C, subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). This may be particularly useful when an 
    applicant believes Ec is well below the acceptable 
    value.\45\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \45\ The purpose of the Ec analysis as part of the 
    launch site location review is not to determine a value of 
    Ec but rather to confidently demonstrate that 
    Ec is less than the acceptable threshold value.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        These variations would allow an applicant to assume that 
    Px and Py have a value of 1.0 for all populated 
    areas, or combine populated areas into one or more larger populated 
    areas and use the greatest population density of the component 
    populated areas for the combined area or areas. An applicant may also 
    assume Py has a value of one for any given populated area, 
    or, for any given Px sector, assume Py has a 
    value of one and use a worst case population density for the sector. A 
    Px sector is an area spanning the width of a flight corridor 
    and bounded by two time points on the trajectory IIP ground trace. All 
    four of these reduce the number of calculations required for applicants 
    with little population within a flight corridor.
        Another option, permitted in appendix C, is for an applicant who 
    would otherwise fail the baseline analysis to perform a more refined 
    Ec analysis by negating the baseline approach's 
    overestimation of the probability of impact in each populated area. If 
    the flight corridor includes populated areas that are irregular in 
    shape, the equations for probability of impact in appendix C may cause 
    Ec to be overestimated. This is because the result of the 
    Pi computation for each populated area represents the 
    probability of impacting within a rectangular area that bounds the 
    populated area. As shown in figure C-1 in appendix C, the length of two 
    sides of the rectangle would be x2-x1, and the 
    length of the other two sides would be y2-y1. 
    Populated areas used to support the appendix C analysis must be no 
    bigger than a U.S. census block group for the first 100 nautical miles 
    from a launch point and no bigger than a 1 degree latitude  x  1 degree 
    longitude grid (1 deg.  x  1 deg. grid) beyond 100 nautical miles 
    downrange. Whether the populated area is a census block group, a 1 deg. 
     x  1 deg. grid, or a land mass such as a small island, it will not 
    likely be a rectangle. Even a 1 deg.  x  1 deg. grid near the equator, 
    which approximates a rectangle, will not line up with the trajectory 
    ground trace. Thus, a portion of the Pi rectangle includes 
    area outside the populated area being evaluated. The probability of 
    impacting in the rectangle is higher than impacting just in the 
    populated area being evaluated. The value of the probability of impact 
    calculated in accordance with appendix C will thus likely be 
    overestimated.
        One approach permitted in appendix C is to divide any given 
    populated area into smaller rectangles, determine Pi for 
    each individual rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities 
    to determine Pi for the entire populated area. A second 
    approach permitted in appendix C is, for a given populated area, to use 
    the ratio of the populated area to the area of the original 
    Pi rectangle.
        If the estimated expected casualty still exceeds 
    30 x 10-6, the FAA will not approve the proposed launch site 
    location. In that event, the only remaining options for an applicant 
    would be to rely on one of its potential customers obtaining a launch 
    license for launch from the proposed site.
        The FAA considered the option of increasing the accuracy of 
    appendix C by employing a procedure that ensures individual populated 
    areas have homogeneous population densities. The FAA considered this 
    because the probability of impact equations in appendix C can cause the 
    Ec for an individual populated area to be underestimated 
    when unequal population densities occur within the area. This can 
    occur, for example, when a populated area contains one or more densely 
    populated cities interspersed with large land mass areas with rural 
    population. The proposed Ec equation distributes the 
    population evenly throughout the populated area. Accordingly, the 
    Ec may be somewhat underestimated or over-estimated for 
    portions of the populated area. The FAA considered requiring applicants 
    to use smaller areas with homogeneous population densities in order to 
    more accurately estimate the Ec, but chose not to because 
    any error should be accounted for with the multiplier of two discussed 
    above.
    
    Appendix D
    
        Appendix D contains the FAA's proposed method for determining the 
    acceptability of the location of a launch site for launching unguided 
    suborbital launch vehicles. Appendix D describes how to define an 
    overflight exclusion zone and each impact dispersion area to be 
    analyzed for risk for a representative launch vehicle. Proposed 
    appendix D also describes how to estimate whether risk to the public, 
    measured by expected casualty, falls within the FAA's threshold of 
    acceptable risk. In short, the proposed approach requires an applicant 
    to define an overflight exclusion zone around a launch point, determine 
    the impact point for each spent stage and then define an impact 
    dispersion area around each impact point. If populated areas are 
    located in the impact dispersion areas and cannot be excluded by 
    altering the launch azimuth, the FAA would require a risk analysis that 
    demonstrates that risk to the public remains within acceptable levels.
        As a first step, an applicant would select which launch points at 
    the proposed launch site would be used for the launch of unguided 
    suborbital launch vehicles. An applicant must also then select an 
    existing launch vehicle, for which apogee data is available, whose 
    final stage apogee represents the maximum altitude of any intended 
    unguided suborbital launch vehicle intended for launch from that launch 
    point. The applicant would then plot the distance, which is referred to 
    as the
    
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    impact range, from the launch point to the nominal impact point on the 
    azimuth for each stage. Employing the impact dispersion radius of each 
    stage, the applicant would define an impact dispersion area around each 
    nominal impact point.
        The FAA's proposed methodology for its proposed impact dispersion 
    area requirements is grounded in three assumptions which reflect 
    current practice. For purposes of this location review, the FAA assumes 
    that unguided suborbital launch vehicles are not equipped with a flight 
    termination system, and that public risk criteria are accordingly met 
    through the implementation of a wind weighting system, launch 
    procedures and restrictions, and the proper selection of a launch 
    azimuth and elevation angles.\46\ These aspects are currently reflected 
    in FAA guidelines and will be addressed in its regulations for launches 
    from non-federal launch sites. The cumulative launch experience in 
    unguided suborbital launch vehicles demonstrates that risk to the 
    public from launches of these vehicles is attributable to planned stage 
    impact during a successful flight. Controlling these risks solely 
    through measures implemented prior to flight rather than relying on 
    active measures during flight, as is the case for a vehicle equipped 
    with an FTS, has proved historically an acceptable approach to assuring 
    protection of the public. Accordingly, the appendix D analysis should 
    adequately address the general suitability of each launch point for 
    unguided suborbital launch vehicle launches up to the altitude 
    proposed. Operational requirements imposed on a launch licensee through 
    license conditions should adequately address risks posed by the actual 
    launch of unguided suborbital launch vehicles.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \46\ The flight safety program of an unguided suborbital launch 
    vehicle without a flight termination system typically takes place 
    and is concluded prior to flight. A launch operator achieves flight 
    safety by implementing a flight based on launch vehicle performance 
    parameters, launch vehicle dispersion parameters and other sources 
    of error, such as wind measurement errors. A launch operator will 
    offset the effects of winds measured on the day of launch by 
    adjusting the azimuth and elevation of the launch vehicle's launcher 
    accordingly. The methodology for correcting for actual wind 
    conditions on the day of launch is called wind weighting. The 
    products of a wind weighting analysis determine launcher azimuth and 
    elevation settings that correct for wind effects on an unguided 
    launch vehicle.
        During preflight planning a launch operator determines launch 
    vehicle dispersion, which is the potential change in the location of 
    impact, by modeling the known causes of systematic errors. 
    Variations in thrust, stage weight, payload weight and stage 
    ignition time may produce errors, and will typically be included in 
    any error model. Thrust misalignment, and the misalignment of 
    nozzles or fins must also be modeled because of their capacity to 
    contribute to error. A model also incorporates the error created by 
    separation of the launch vehicle from the launcher, and accounts for 
    any errors in motor impulse, drag estimate and launcher setting. 
    Most significantly, a model analyzes wind error. Wind error modeling 
    accounts for the measurement errors in the measuring system employed 
    and the time elapsed between the time of measurement and the time of 
    launch. Once these elements have been determined, wind error will be 
    incorporated into the model to obtain the predicted impact points 
    and total launch vehicle dispersion.
        Historically, one of three methods have been used to correct for 
    actual wind conditions on the day of launch. Both NASA at Wallops 
    Flight Facility and the US Army at White Sands Missile Range have 
    developed and improved methods of predicting the wind effects over 
    the years. The three wind weighting methods that have evolved 
    include: (1) The manual method, (2) the Lewis method, and (3) the 5-
    Degree-Of-Freedom (DOF) method. The difference between the methods 
    is one of complexity and accuracy. The manual method is the least 
    complex, but produces the largest error. The 5-DOF method is the 
    most complex, produces the least error, and is currently employed by 
    safety offices at Wallops Flight Facility and White Sands Missile 
    Range.
        Each of the wind weighting methods produce launch vehicle 
    elevation and azimuth settings. Other launch factors that play a 
    role, however, may be necessary to ensure the wind weighting 
    solutions are within the assumptions made in the pre-flight 
    dispersion analysis. These factors may include the required height 
    and period of wind measurements, limitations on the maximum 
    ballistic wind and wind variability at which launch would be 
    permitted, and a determination regarding maximum launcher setting 
    angles.
        The FAA derived the methods for defining an impact dispersion 
    area proposed in appendix D by assuming that a launch operator would 
    use a 5-DOF method of wind weighting. This does not preclude an 
    applicant for a launch license from using another wind weighting 
    method to develop impact dispersion areas, but the FAA proposes to 
    address such issues in a rulemaking concerning launch licensing 
    requirements.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        The proposed location review for a launch point that will support 
    unguided suborbital launch vehicles also assume that intermediate and 
    final stages impact the earth within five standard deviations 
    5 of each nominal, no wind, impact point. This means that an 
    appendix D analysis does not account for failures outside of five 
    standard deviations from each intended impact point.
        It also means that an appendix D analysis does not simulate an 
    actual launch in actual wind conditions. For actual launches, wind 
    weighting can be used to obtain the nominal, no wind, impact point for 
    the final stage only. In order to ensure that the launch meets 
    Ec, ship hit, and aircraft hit probabilities, launch 
    operators compute the wind drifted impact points of all stages using 
    the launcher settings determined through wind weighting so that 
    intermediate stage impacts are determined prior to launch. Although 
    appendix D does not address this fact directly, it does show that at 
    least some launches can be conducted depending on the wind conditions.
    
    Defining an Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion Areas
    
        The areas an applicant will analyze for risk to the public posed by 
    the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle consist of an 
    overflight exclusion zone and state impact dispersion areas. Having 
    selected a launch point and a launch vehicle for which empirical data 
    is available, an applicant defines each zone and area using the 
    methodology provided. An overflight exclusion zone shall consist of a 
    circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on a launch point. An 
    overflight exclusion zone is the area which must be free of the public 
    during a launch. Creation of each impact dispersion area involves 
    several more steps. For each stage of the analyzed vehicle an applicant 
    must identify the nominal stage impact point on the azimuth where the 
    stage is supposed to land, and draw a circle around that point, using 
    the range and bearing equations of appendix A or GIS software. That 
    circle describes the impact dispersion area, and an applicant defines 
    an impact dispersion area for each stage.
        An applicant must at the outset provide the geodetic latitude and 
    longitude of a launch point that is proposes to offer for launch, and 
    select a flight azimuth. Once an applicant has selected a launch point 
    location and azimuth, the next step is to determine a 1600 foot radius 
    overflight exclusion zone for that launch point. As with an overflight 
    exclusion zone created pursuant to appendices A and B, an applicant 
    must show that the public would be cleared from its overflight 
    exclusion zone prior to launch. Although suborbital vehicles have a 
    very low likelihood of failure, failure is more likely to occur in the 
    early stages of the launch. Consequently, the FAA proposes to guard 
    against that risk through requiring an applicant to show the ability to 
    evacuate an overflight exclusion zone. As with the flight corridors of 
    appendices A and B, the FAA proposes to base the size of the overflight 
    exclusion zone on the maximum distance that debris is expected to 
    travel from a launch point if a mishap were to occur very early in 
    flight. The FAA has estimated the Dmax for an unguided 
    suborbital launch vehicle, and the result is 1600 feet. Accordingly, an 
    applicant would define an appendix D overflight exclusion zone as a 
    circle with a radius of 1600 feet.
        Because an applicant must choose the maximum latitude anticipated 
    of a
    
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    suborbital launch vehicle for launch from its site, an applicant needs 
    to acquire the apogee of each stage of a representative vehicle. An 
    applicant need not possess full information regarding a specific 
    representative launch vehicle. All that is necessary is the apogee of 
    each stage. The apogee height must be obtained from an actual launch 
    conducted at an 84 deg. elevation angle. If needed, data is available 
    from the FAA. The FAA has compiled apogee data from past launches from 
    Wallops Flight Facility for a range of launch vehicles and payloads. 
    This data will be provided to an applicant upon request and may be used 
    to perform the analysis.
        An applicant then defines impact dispersion areas for each stage's 
    nominal impact point. Having selected a launch vehicle most 
    representative of what the applicant intends for launch from the 
    proposed launch point, an applicant will use either its own empirical 
    apogee data or data from one of the vehicles in the FAA's data base. 
    Whether an applicant uses vehicle apogee data obtained from the FAA or 
    from elsewhere, the applicant must employ the FAA's proposed range and 
    dispersion factors to determine the location of each nominal impact 
    point and the size of each impact dispersion area.
        The FAA proposes a means of estimating the distances of both an 
    impact range and an impact dispersion radius. Under proposed appendix 
    D, an applicant would estimate the impact range and dispersion 
    parameters by multiplying the apogee of a launch vehicle intended for 
    the prospective launch site by the FAA's proposed factors. The FAA 
    proposes impact range and impact dispersion factors, which it derived 
    from launch vehicle pedigrees of sounding rockets used by NASA Wallops 
    Flight Facility in its sounding rocket program.\47\ The proposed 
    factors provide estimators of staging data for an unguided vehicle 
    launched at a standard launcher elevation, which is the angle between 
    the launch vehicle's major axis (x) and the ground, of 84 deg.. the 
    appendix defines the relationship between the apogee of a launch 
    vehicle stage, an impact range and a 5 dispersion radius of a 
    stage. This relationship is expressed as two constants, which vary with 
    the altitude of the apogee, an impact range factor and an impact 
    dispersion factor.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \47\ These vehicles include Nike Orion, Black Brant IX, Black 
    Brant XI, and Black Brant XII. They are representative of the 
    current launch vehicle inventory and should approximate any proposed 
    new launch vehicle.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        To locate each nominal impact point, an applicant will calculate 
    the impact range for the final stage and each intermediate state. An 
    impact range describes the distance between an applicant's proposed 
    launch point and the nominal impact point of a stage, or, in other 
    words, its estimated landing spot along the azimuth selected for 
    analysis. For this estimation, an applicant would employ the FAA's 
    proposed impact range factors of 0.4 or 0.7 as multipliers for the 
    apogee of the stage. If an apogee is less than 100 kilometers, the 
    applicant shall employ 0.4 as the impact range factor for that stage. 
    If the apogee of a stage is 100 kilometers or more, the applicant shall 
    use 0.7 as a multiplier. In plotting the impact points on a map, an 
    applicant shall employ the methods provided in appendix A.
        An impact dispersion radius descries the impact dispersion area of 
    a stage. The FAA proposes to rely on an estimated impact dispersion 
    radius of five standard deviations 5 because significant 
    population, such as a densely populated city, in areas within distances 
    up to 5 of the impact point could cause significant public 
    risk. An applicant shall obtain the radius of the impact dispersion 
    area by multiplying the stage apogee by the FAA's proposed impact 
    dispersion factor of 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 kilometers and of 
    0.7 for an apogee of 100 kilometers or more. The final stage would 
    typically produce the largest impact dispersion area.
        Once an applicant determines the impact dispersion radii, the 
    applicant must plot each impact dispersion area on a map in accordance 
    with the requirements of paragraph (b). This is shown in figure D-1. An 
    applicant may then determine if flight azimuths exist which do not 
    affect populated areas. If all potential flight azimuths contain impact 
    dispersion areas which encompass populated areas, then the FAA would 
    require an Ec estimation of risk.
    
    Public Risk Ec Estimation
    
        The FAA will approve a launch point for suborbital launch vehicles 
    if there exists a set of impact dispersion areas for a representative 
    launch vehicle in which the sum of risk to the public does not exceed 
    the FAA's acceptable risk threshold. An overflight exclusion zone must 
    contain no people. If a populated area is present within the impact 
    dispersion areas, the proposed rules require an applicant to estimate 
    the risk to the public posed by possible stage impact. An applicant 
    must then determine whether its estimated risk satisfies the FAA 
    requirement of an Ec of no more than 30  x  10-6. 
    The Ec estimation is performed by computing the sum of the 
    risk for the impact of each stage and accounting for each populated 
    area located within a 5 dispersion of an impact point. The 
    equation used to accomplish this is the same as that used in the impact 
    probability computation in appendix C. Unlike, however, the method in 
    appendix C, which accounts for an impact due to a failure, the 
    probability of a stage impact occurring is Ps = 1-
    Pf, where Ps is the probability of success, and 
    Pf is the probability of failure. The FAA proposes, for the 
    purposes of the launch site location review, a constant of 0.98 for the 
    probability of success for unguided suborbital launch vehicles. The 
    probability of success is used in place of Pf in calculating 
    both the cross-range and downrange probability of impact.
        The proposed location review for launch points intended for the 
    launch of unguided suborbital launch vehicles differs from the approach 
    proposed for reviewing the location of launch points intended for the 
    launch of guided orbital and suborbital launch vehicles. In analyzing 
    whether risk remains at acceptable levels, Ec equations in 
    appendix D rely on the probability of success rather than the 
    probability of failure. The use of stage impact probability, typified 
    as the probability of success (Ps), for suborbital launch 
    vehicles is necessary because stage impacts are high probability events 
    which occur near the launch point with dispersions which may overlap or 
    be adjacent to the launch point. The difference between the methods of 
    appendices A, B and C and that proposed in appendix D reflects the 
    fundamental differences between the likely dominant source of risk to 
    the public guided and unguided vehicles and the methods that have been 
    developed for guarding public safety against the risks created by each 
    type of vehicle. In other words, the methods for defining impact 
    dispersion areas and for conducting an impact risk assessment for an 
    unguided vehicle are premised on the risks posed by a successful 
    flight, that is, the planned deposition of stages and debris. In 
    contrast, the methodology for developing a flight corridor and 
    associated risk methodology for guided vehicles assumes that the likely 
    major source of risk to the public arises out of a failure of a mission 
    and the ensuing destruction of the vehicle. Failures are less probable 
    and debris impacts are spread throughout a flight trajectory.
        The high degree of success recorded for unguided launch vehicles 
    renders
    
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    the probability of success the greater source of risk. Because of their 
    relative simplicity of operation, the failure rate, over time, for 
    unguided launch vehicles is between one and two percent. At this level 
    of reliability, the FAA believes that its primary focus of concern for 
    assessing the safety of a launch site should be the more likely event, 
    namely, the public's exposure to the planned impact of vehicle stages 
    and other vehicle components, such as fairings, rather than the risk 
    posed by exposure to debris resulting from a failure. Success is the 
    high risk event. Although failure rates are low for unguided launch 
    vehicles, their spent stages have large impact dispersions. Moreover, 
    the FAA's proposed impact dispersion area estimations generally produce 
    impact dispersion areas large enough to encompass most of the 
    populations exposed to a possible failure as well as to a nominal 
    flight, thus ensuring the inclusion of any large, densely populated 
    area in the analysis. Thus, all but a small percentage of populated 
    area will be analyzed to some extent, albeit using impact probabilities 
    based on success. This fact plus a multiplier of five should provide a 
    reasonable, conservative estimation of the risks associated with the 
    launch point.
        This is true of unguided sub-orbital launch vehicles because their 
    impact dispersions are much larger than those for guided vehicles and 
    they occur closer to the launch point.
        In appendix D, the FAA assumes that the stage impact dispersion in 
    both the downrange and cross range directions are equal. This is a 
    valid assumption for suborbital launch vehicle rockets because their 
    trajectories produce near circular dispersions. NASA data on sounding 
    rocket impact dispersion supports this conclusion.
        The impact dispersion area is based on a 5  dispersion. 
    Appendix D uses the effective casualty area data, the table D-1, which 
    contains information similar to appendix C, table C-3. This data 
    represents the estimation of the area produced by both suborbital 
    launch vehicle inert pieces. The baseline risk estimation approach in 
    appendix D has the applicant calculate the probability of impact for 
    each populated area, and then determining an Ec value for 
    each populated area. To obtain the estimated Ec for an 
    entire impact dispersion area, the applicant adds the Ec 
    results for each populated area. If the population within the impact 
    dispersion area is relatively small, an applicant may wish to conduct a 
    less rigorous analysis by making conservative assumptions. Appendix D 
    offers the option of analyzing a worst-case impact dispersion area for 
    those where such an approach might save time and analysis, similar to 
    the approach in appendix C.
    
    Paperwork Reduction Act
    
        This proposal contains information collection requirements. As 
    required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. section 
    3507(d)), the Department of Transportation has submitted the 
    information collection requirements associated with this proposal to 
    the Office of Management and Budget for its review.
        Title: Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch 
    Site.
        The FAA is proposing to amend its commercial space transportation 
    licensing regulations to add licensing and safety requirements for the 
    operation of a launch site. In the past, commercial launches have 
    occurred principally at federal launch ranges under safety procedures 
    developed by federal launch range operators. To enable the development 
    and use of launch sites that are not operated by a federal launch 
    ranges, rules are needed to establish specific licensing and safety 
    requirements for operating a launch site, whether that site is located 
    on or off of a federal launch range. These proposed rules would provide 
    licensed launch site operators with licensing and safety requirements 
    to protect the public from the risks associated with activities at 
    launch site.
        The required information will be used to determine whether 
    applicants satisfy requirements for obtaining a license to protect the 
    public from risks associated with operations at a launch site. The 
    information to be collected includes data required for performing 
    launch site location analyses. A launch site license is valid for a 
    period of five years, and it is assumed that all licenses would be 
    renewed after five years. The frequency of required submissions, 
    therefore, will depend upon the number of prospective launch site 
    operators seeking a license and the renewal of site licenses.
        The respondents are all licensees authorized to conduct licensed 
    launch site activities. It is estimated that there will be two 
    respondents annually at 796 hours per respondent for an estimated 
    annual burden hours of 1592 hours.
        The agency is soliciting comments to (1) evaluate whether the 
    proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper 
    performance of the functions of the agency, including whether the 
    information will be practical utility; (2) evaluate the accuracy of the 
    agency's estimate of the burden; (3) enhance the quality, utility, and, 
    clarity of the information to be collected; and (4) minimize the burden 
    of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including 
    through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or 
    other technological collection techniques or other forms of information 
    technology (for example, permitting electronic submission of 
    responses).
        Individuals and organizations may submit comments on the 
    information collection requirement by August 24, 1999, and should 
    direct them to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this 
    document.
        According to the regulations implementing the Paperwork Reduction 
    Act of 1995, (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not conduct or 
    sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of 
    informaiton unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. 
    The OMB control number for this information collection will be 
    published in the Federal Register after it is approved by the Office of 
    Management and Budget.
    
    Regulatory Evaluation Summary
    
        This section summarizes the full regulatory evaluation prepared by 
    the FAA that provides more detailed estimates of the economic 
    consequences of this regulatory action. This summary and the full 
    evaluation quantify, to the extent practicable, estimated costs to the 
    private sector, consumers, Federal, State and local governments, as 
    well as anticipated benefits. This evaluation was conducted in 
    accordance with Executive Order 12866, which directs that each Federal 
    agency can propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned 
    determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the 
    costs. This document also includes an initial regulatory flexibility 
    determination required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, and 
    an international trade impact assessment, required by the Office of 
    Management and Budget. This proposal is not considered a significant 
    regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866. In 
    addition, under Regulatory Policies and Procedures of the Department of 
    Transportation (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979), this proposal is 
    considered significant because there is substantial public interest in 
    the rulemaking.
        The Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend its 
    commercial space licensing regulations to add licensing requirements 
    for the operation of a launch site. The proposal would provide launch 
    site operators with licensing and operating requirements to protect the 
    public from the risks
    
    [[Page 34358]]
    
    associated with operations at a launch site. The FAA currently issues 
    licenses to launch site operators on a case-by case-approach. Elements 
    of that approach are reflected in the guidelines, ``Site Operators 
    License Guidelines for Applicants,'' which describe the information 
    that applicants provide the FAA for a license to operate a launch site. 
    The FAA's interpretation and implementation of the guidelines 
    constitute another element of the case-by-case approach and additional 
    elements, such as policy review, not reflected in the guidelines.
        The proposal represents quantifiable changes in costs compared to 
    the guidelines (current practice) in the following two areas. They are 
    the launch site location review and approval and the launch site 
    operations review and approval. The FAA has estimated the costs and 
    cost savings of these changes under two different cost scenarios over a 
    10-year period discounted at 7 percent in 1997 dollars. The total 10-
    year undiscounted cost savings is estimated to be between $84,000 and 
    $160,000 (or between $53,000 and $105,000, discounted). The most 
    burdensome cost scenario (where net cost savings is the least) to the 
    industry would result in the costs to the launch site operators of 
    $3,000 (or $2,000, discounted) for the launch site location reviews and 
    approval provisions and a cost savings of $11,000 (or $8,000, 
    discounted) for the launch site operations review and approval 
    provisions. Although there would be no cost impact to the FAA, there 
    would be a cost savings to the FAA from the most burdensome cost 
    scenario of $104,000 or $70,000 discounted.
        There are significant nonquantifiable benefits in two areas. First, 
    the proposal eliminates overlapping responsibilities. Second, the 
    proposal provides increased details and specificity, which are not 
    present in the guidelines.
    
    Regulatory Flexibility Determination
    
        The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 establishes ``as a principle 
    of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, consistent with 
    the objective of the rule and of applicable statues, to fit regulatory 
    and informational requirements to the scale of the business, 
    organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to regulation.'' 
    To achieve that principal, the Act requires agencies to solicit and 
    consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rational for 
    their actions. The Act covers a wide-range of small entities, including 
    small businesses, not-for-profit organizations and small governmental 
    jurisdictions.
        Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
    final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
    number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
    agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis (RFA) as 
    described in the Act. However, if an agency determines that a proposed 
    or final rule is not expected to have a significant economic impact on 
    a substantial number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 act 
    provides that the head of the agency must so certify and an RFA is not 
    required. The certification must include a statement providing the 
    factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
    clear.
        The FAA conducted the required review of this proposal and 
    determined that it would not have a significant economic impact on a 
    substantial number of small entities. Accordingly, pursuant to the 
    regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Federal Aviation 
    Administration certifies that this rule will not have a significant 
    economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    
    Potentially Affected Entities
    
        Entities who are licensed, or have begun the licensing process, 
    were contacted to determine their size and to gain insight into the 
    impacts of the proposed regulations on the licensing process. Spaceport 
    Florida Authority (SFA), Spaceport Systems International, L.P. (SSI), 
    the Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) and the Alaska 
    Aerospace Development Corporation (AADC) are all licensed to operate 
    launch sites. The New Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC) 
    is mentioned briefly below although it is only in the pre-application 
    consultation phase.
        The Virginia Commonwealth Space Flight Authority (VCSFA) is a not-
    for-profit subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia, responsible for 
    oversight of the activities of the Virginia Commercial Space Flight 
    Center (VCSFC). The VCSFC is located within the boundaries of the 
    Wallops Flight Facility (WFF). As a subdivision of the Commonwealth of 
    Virginia, the VCSFA is empowered by the Acts of the General Assembly to 
    do all things necessary to carry out its mission of stimulating 
    economic growth and education through commercial aerospace activities.
        The Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA) was created by Florida's 
    Governor and Legislature as the nation's first state government space 
    agency. The authority was established to develop space-related 
    enterprise, including launch activities, industrial development and 
    education-related projects. SFA operate Spaceport Florida (SPF), 
    located on Cape Canaveral Air Station.
        Launch site operator California Spaceport is located on Vandenberg 
    Air Force Base. The launch site is operated and managed by Spaceport 
    Systems International, L.P. who is in partnership with ITT Federal 
    Services Corporation (ITT FSC). ITT FSC is one of the largest U.S.-
    based technical and support services contractors in the world.
        The Kodiak Launch Complex is being built by the Alaska Aerospace 
    Development Corporation. AADC is a public corporation created by the 
    State of Alaska to develop aerospace related economic and technical 
    opportunities for the state.
        The Southwest Regional Spaceport (SRS) is to be operated by the New 
    Mexico Office of Space Commercialization (NMOSC). The NMOSC is a 
    division of the State's New Mexico Economic Development Department. 
    Commencement of space flight operations is not expected until early the 
    next decade.
    
    Definition of Small Entities
    
        The Small Business Administration has defined small business 
    entities relating to space vehicles (SIC codes 3761, 3764 and 3769) as 
    entities comprising fewer than 1000 employees. Although the above 
    mentioned entities have fewer than 1000 employees in their immediate 
    segment of the business, they are affiliated with/or funded by state 
    governments and large parent companies. The VCSFA is a not-for-profit 
    subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia; the SFA is a government 
    space agency; the SSI is affiliated with ITT FSC; and AADC is a 
    government sponsored corporation.
        Under 5 U.S.C. 605, the FAA concludes that this proposal would 
    impose little or no additional cost on this industry and certifies that 
    it will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
    of small entities. The FAA nevertheless requests comments on any 
    potential impacts associated with this proposal.
    
    International Trade Impact Assessment
    
        Licensing and Safety Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site 
    (14 CFR part 420) would not constitute a barrier to international 
    trade, including the export of U.S. goods and services out of the 
    United States. The proposal affects operation of launch sites that are 
    currently located or being proposed within the United States or 
    operated by U.S. citizens.
    
    [[Page 34359]]
    
        The proposal is not expected to affect the trade opportunities for 
    U.S. firms doing business overseas or for foreign firms doing business 
    in the United States. The FAA requests information on the effect that 
    this proposal would have on international trade.
    
    Federalism Implications
    
        The regulations proposed herein will not have substantial direct 
    effects on the states, on the relationship between the national 
    government and the states, or on the distribution of power and 
    responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in 
    accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this 
    proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant 
    the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
    
    Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment
    
        Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 
    enacted as Pub. L. 104-4 on March 22, 1995, requires each Federal 
    agency, to the extent permitted by law, to prepare a written assessment 
    of the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency 
    rule that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
    governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
    million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year. 
    Section 204(a) of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal 
    agency to develop an effective process to permit timely input by 
    elected officers (or their designees) of State, local, and tribal 
    governments on a proposed ``significant intergovernmental mandate.'' A 
    ``significant intergovernmental mandate'' under the UMRA is any 
    provision in a Federal agency regulation that will impose an 
    enforceable duty upon State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
    aggregate, of $100 million (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one 
    year. Section 203 of the UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which supplements section 
    204(a), provides that before establishing any regulatory requirements 
    that might significantly or uniquely affect small governments, the 
    agency shall have developed a plan that, among other things, provides 
    for notice to potentially affected small governments, if any, and for a 
    meaningful and timely opportunity to provide input in the development 
    of regulatory proposals.
        This proposed does not meet the cost thresholds described above. 
    Furthermore, this proposal would not impose a significant cost or 
    uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, the requirements of Title 
    II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.
    
    Environmental Assessment
    
        FAA Order 1050.1D defines FAA actions that may be categorically 
    excluded from preparation of a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
    environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 
    In accordance with FAA Order 1050.1D, appendix 4, paragraph 4(i), 
    regulatory documents which cover administrative or procedural 
    requirements qualify for a categorical exclusion. Proposed sections in 
    subpart B of part 420 would require an applicant to submit sufficient 
    environmental information for the FAA to comply with NEPA and other 
    applicable environmental laws and regulations during the processing of 
    each license application. Accordingly, the FAA proposes that this rule 
    qualifies for a categorical exclusion because no significant impacts to 
    the environment are expected to result from the finalization or 
    implementation of its administrative provisions for licensing.
    
    Energy Impact
    
        The energy impact of the rulemaking action has been assessed in 
    accordance with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) and Pub. 
    L. 94-163, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). It has been determined that it 
    is not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the EPCA.
    
    List of Subjects in 14 CFR 417 and 420
    
        Confidential business information. Environmental protection, 
    Organization and functions, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, 
    Rockets, Space transportation and exploration.
    
    The Amendment
    
        In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation 
    Administration amends Chapter III of Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
    Regulations to read as follows:
    
    PART 417--[REMOVED AND RESERVED]
    
        1. Part 417 is removed and reserved.
        2. Subchapter C of Chapter III, title 14, Code of Federal 
    Regulations, is amended by adding a new part 420 to read as follows:
    
    PART 420--LICENSE TO OPERATE A LAUNCH SITE
    
    Subpart A--General
    
    Sec.
    420.1  Scope.
    420.3  Applicability.
    420.5  Definitions.
    420.6-420.14  [Reserved]
    
    Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a 
    License
    
    420.15  Information requirements.
    420.17  Bases for issuance of a license.
    420.19  Launch site location review.
    420.21  Launch site criteria for expendable launch vehicles.
    420.23  Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.
    420.31  Explosive site plan.
    420.33  Handling of solid propellants.
    420.35  Storage or handling of liquid propellants.
    420.37  Solid and liquid propellants located together.
    420.38-420.40  [Reserved]
    
    Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions
    
    420.41  License to operate a launch site-general.
    420.43  Duration.
    420.45  Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.
    420.47  License modification.
    420.49  Compliance monitoring.
    
    Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee
    
    420.51  Responsibilities--general.
    420.53  Control of public access.
    420.55  Scheduling of launch site operations.
    420.57  Notifications.
    420.59  Launch site accident investigation plan.
    420.61  Records.
    420.63  Explosives.
    Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
    Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
    Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis
    Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Areas and Casualty 
    Expectancy Estimate for Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicles
    Appendix E to Part 420--Tables for Explosive Site Plan
    
        Authority: 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121.
    
    Subpart A--General
    
    
    Sec. 420.1  Scope.
    
        This part prescribes the information and demonstrations that must 
    be submitted as part of a license application, the bases for license 
    approval, license terms and conditions, and post-licensing requirements 
    with which a licensee shall comply to remain licensed. Requirements for 
    preparing a license application are also contained in part 413 of this 
    subchapter.
    
    
    Sec. 420.3  Applicability.
    
        This part applies to any person seeking a license to operate a 
    launch site or to a person licensed under this part.
    
    
    Sec. 420.5  Definitions.
    
        For the purpose of this part,
        Ballistic coefficient means the weight of an object divided by the 
    quantity product of the coefficient of drag of the object and the area 
    of the object.
    
    [[Page 34360]]
    
        Compatibility means the chemical property of materials that may be 
    located together without increasing the probability of an accident or, 
    for a given quantity, the magnitude of the effects of such an accident.
        Debris dispersion radius (Dmax) means the estimated 
    maximum distance from a launch point that debris travels given a worst-
    case launch vehicle failure and flight termination at 10 seconds into 
    flight.
        Divison 1.3 explosive means an explosive as defined in 49 CFR 
    173.50.
        Downrange area means a portion of a flight corridor beginning where 
    a launch area ends and ending 5,000 nautical miles from the launch 
    point for an orbital launch vehicle, and ending with an impact 
    dispersion area for a guided sub-orbital launch vehicle.
        E,F,G coordinate system means an orthgonal, Earth-fixed, 
    geocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system is 
    at the center of an ellipsoidal earth model. The E-axis is positive 
    directed through the Greenwich meridian. The F-axis is positive 
    directed through 90 degrees east longitude. The EF-plane is coincident 
    with the ellipsoidal Earth model's equatorial plane. The G-axis is 
    normal to the EF-plane and positive directed through the north pole.
        E,N,U. coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
    topocentric, right-handed system. The origin of the coordinate system 
    is at a launch point. The E-axis is positive directed east. The N-axis 
    is positive directed north. The EN-plane is tangent to an ellipsoidal 
    Earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to the geodetic 
    vertical. The U-axis is normal to the EN-plane and positive directed 
    away from the Earth.
        Effective casualty area (Ac) means the aggregate 
    casualty area of each piece of debris created by a launch vehicle 
    failure at a particular point on its trajectory. The effective casualty 
    area for each piece of debris is the area within which 100 percent of 
    the unprotected population on the ground are assumed to be a casualty, 
    and outside of which 100 percent of the population are assumed not to 
    be a casualty. This area is based on the characteristics of the debris 
    piece including its size, the path angle of its trajectory, impact 
    explosions, the size of a person, and debris skip, splatter, and 
    bounce.
        Explosive means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture that, 
    when subjected to heat, impact, friction, detonation or other suitable 
    initiation, undergoes a rapid chemical change that releases large 
    volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressure in the surrounding 
    medium. The term applies to materials that either detonate or 
    deflagrate.
        Explosive equivalent means a measure of the blast effects from 
    explosion of a given quantity of material expressed in terms of the 
    weight of trinitrotoluene (TNT) that would produce the same blast 
    effects when detonated.
        Explosive hazard facility means a facility at a launch site where 
    solid or liquid propellant is stored or handled.
        Flight azimuth means the initial direction in which a launch 
    vehicle flies relative to true north expressed in degrees-decimal-
    degrees.
        Flight corridor means an area on the earth's surface estimated to 
    contain the majority of hazardous debris from nominal and non-nominal 
    flight of an orbital or guided suborbital launch vehicle.
        Guided suborbital launch vehicle means a suborbital rocket that 
    employs an active guidance system.
        Impact dispersion area means an area representing and estimated 
    five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal impact point of an 
    intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
        Impact dispersion factor means a constant used to estimate, using a 
    stage apogee, a five standard deviation dispersion about a nominal 
    impact point of an intermediate or final stage of a suborbital launch 
    vehicle.
        Impact dispersion radius (Ri) means a radius that 
    defines an impact dispersion area.
        Impact range means the distance between a launch point and the 
    impact point of a suborbital launch vehicle stage.
        Impact range factor means a constant used to estimate, using the 
    stage apogee, the nominal impact point of an intermediate or final 
    stage of a suborbital launch vehicle.
        Instantaneous impact point (IIP means an impact point, following 
    thrust termination of a launch vehicle, calculated in the absence of 
    atmospheric drag effects.
        Instantaneous impact point (IIP) range rate means a launch 
    vehicle's estimated IIP velocity along the Earth's surface.
        Intraline distance means the minimum distance permitted between any 
    two explosive hazard facilities in the ownership, possession or control 
    of one launch site customer.
        Launch area means, for a flight corridor defined using appendix A 
    to this part, the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to 
    a point 100 nautical miles in the direction of the flight azimuth. For 
    a flight corridor defined using appendix B to this part, a launch area 
    is the portion of a flight corridor from the launch point to the 
    enveloping line enclosing the outer boundary of he last debris 
    dispersion circle.
        Launch point means a point on the Earth from which the flight of a 
    launch vehicle begins, and is defined by its geodetic latitude, 
    longitude and height on an ellipsoidal Earth model.
        Launch site accident means an unplanned event occurring during a 
    ground activity at a launch site resulting in a fatality or serious 
    injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) to any person who is not associated 
    with the activity, or any damage estimated to exceed $25,000 to 
    property not associated with the activity.
        Net explosive weight (NEW) means the total weight, expressed in 
    pounds, of explosive material or explosive equivalency contained in an 
    item.
        Nominal means, in reference to launch vehicle performance, 
    trajectory, or stage impact point, a launch vehicle flight where all 
    launch vehicle aerodynamic parameters are as expected, all vehicle 
    internal and external systems perform as planned, and there are no 
    external perturbing influences (e.g., winds) other than atmospheric 
    drag and gravity.
        Nominal trajectory means the position and velocity components of a 
    nominally performing launch vehicle relative to an x, y, z coordinate 
    system, expressed in x, y, z, xo, yo, zo.
        Overflight dwell time means the period of time it takes for a 
    launch vehicle's IIP to move past a populated area. For a given 
    populated area, the overflight dwell time is the time period measured 
    along the nominal trajectory IIP ground trace from the time point whose 
    normal with the trajectory intersects the most uprange part of the 
    populated area to the time point whose normal with the trajectory 
    intersects the most downrange part of the populated area.
        Overflight exclusion zone means a portion of a flight corridor 
    which must remain clear of the public during the flight of a launch 
    vehicle.
        Populated area means a land area with population.
        Population density means the number of people per unit area in a 
    populated area.
        Position data means data referring to the current position of a 
    launch vehicle with respect to flight time expressed through the x, y, 
    z coordinate system.
        Public area means any area outside a hazard area and is an area 
    that is not in the possession, ownership or other control of a launch 
    site operator or of a
    
    [[Page 34361]]
    
    launch site customer who possess, owns or otherwise controls that 
    hazard area.
        Public area distance means the minimum distance permitted between a 
    public area and an explosive hazard facility.
        Unguided sub-orbital launch vehicle means a sub-orbital rocket that 
    does not have a guidance system.
        x,y,z coordinate system means an orthogonal, Earth-fixed, 
    topocentric, right-handed system. This origin of the coordinate system 
    is at a launch point. The x-axis coincides with the initial launch 
    azimuth and is positive in the downrange direction. The y-axis is 
    positive to the left looking downrange. The xy-plane is tangent to the 
    ellipsoidal earth model's surface at the origin and perpendicular to 
    the geodetic vertical. The z-axis is normal to the xy-plane and 
    positive directed away from the earth.
        0,0,h0 means a 
    latitude, longitude, height system where 0 is the 
    geodetic latitude of a launch point, 0 is the east 
    longitude of the launch point, and h0 is the height of the 
    launch point above the reference ellipsoid. 0 and 
    0 are expressed in degrees-decimal-degrees.
    
    
    Secs. 420.6-420.14  [Reserved]
    
    Subpart B--Criteria and Information Requirements for Obtaining a 
    License
    
    
    Sec. 420.15  Information requirements.
    
        (a) An applicant shall provide the FAA with information for the FAA 
    to analyze the environmental impacts associated with operation of a 
    proposed launch site. The information provided by an applicant must be 
    sufficient to enable the FAA to comply with the requirements of the 
    National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (NEPA), the 
    Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for Implementing the 
    Procedural Provisions of NEPA, 40 CFR parts 1500-1508, and the FAA's 
    Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts, FAA Order 1050.1D. An 
    applicant shall submit environmental information concerning a proposed 
    launch site not covered by existing environmental documentation and 
    other factors as determined by the FAA.
        (b) An applicant shall:
        (1) Provide the information necessary to demonstrate compliance 
    with Secs. 420.19, 420.21, and 420.23. For launch sites analyzed for 
    expendable launch vehicles, an applicant shall provide the following 
    information:
        (i) A map or maps showing the location of each launch point 
    proposed, and the flight azimuth, overflight exclusion zone, flight 
    corridor, and each impact dispersion area for each launch point;
        (ii) Each launch vehicle type and any launch vehicle class proposed 
    for each launch point;
        (iii) Each month and any percent wind data used in the analysis;
        (iv) Any launch vehicle apogee used in the analysis;
        (v) If populated areas are located within an overflight exclusion 
    zone, a demonstration that there are times when the public is not 
    present or that the applicant has an agreement in place to evacuate the 
    public from the overflight exclusion zone during a launch;
        (vi) Each populated area located within a flight corridor or impact 
    dispersion area;
        (vii) The estimated casualty expectancy calculated for each 
    populated area within a flight corridor or impact dispersion area; and
        (vii) The estimated casualty expectancy for each flight corridor or 
    set of impact dispersion areas.
        (2) Identify foreign ownership of the applicant, as follows:
        (i) For a sole proprietorship or partnership, all foreign owners or 
    partners;
        (ii) For a corporation, any foreign ownership interest of 10 
    percent or more; and
        (iii) For a joint venture, association, or other entity, any 
    foreign entities participating in the entity.
        (3) Provide an explosive site plan in accordance with Secs. 420.31, 
    420.33, 420.35 and 420.37.
        (c) An applicant shall provide the information necessary to 
    demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Secs. 420.53, 420.55, 
    420.57, 420.59 and 420.63.
        (d) An applicant who is proposing to locate a launch site at an 
    existing launch point at a federal launch range is not required to 
    comply with paragraph (b)(1) of this section if a launch vehicle of the 
    same type and class as proposed for the launch point has been safely 
    launched from the launch point. An applicant who is proposing to locate 
    a launch site at a federal launch range is not required to comply with 
    paragraph (b)(3) of this section.
    
    
    Sec. 420.17  Bases for issuance of a license.
    
        (a) The FAA will issue a license under this part when the FAA 
    determines that:
        (1) The application provides the information required under 
    Sec. 420.15;
        (2) The National Environmental Policy Act review is completed;
        (3) The launch site location meets the criteria provided in 
    Secs. 420.19, 420.21, and 420.23;
        (4) The explosive site plan meets the criteria provided in 
    Secs. 420.31, 420.33, 420.35 and 420.37;
        (5) The application demonstrates that the applicant shall satisfy 
    the requirements of subpart D of this part; and
        (6) Issuing a license would not jeopardize foreign policy or 
    national security interests of the United States.
        (b) The FAA advises an applicant, in writing, of any issue arising 
    during an application review that would lead to denial. The applicant 
    may respond in writing, submit additional information, or revise its 
    license application.
    
    
    Sec. 420.19  Launch site location review.
    
        (a) To gain approval for a launch site location, an applicant shall 
    demonstrate that for at least one type of expendable launch vehicle--
    orbital, guided sub-orbital or unguided sub-orbital--or a reusable 
    launch vehicle, a flight corridor or set of impact dispersion areas 
    exists that does not exceed an estimated expected average number of 
    0.00003 casualties (Ec) to the collective member of the 
    public exposed to hazards from any one flight 
    (Ec:30 x 10-6). For an orbital 
    expendable launch vehicle, an applicant shall choose a weight class as 
    defined in table 1.
        (b) For a guided orbital or guided sub-orbital expendable launch 
    vehicle, an applicant shall define a flight corridor using one of the 
    methodologies provided in appendices A or B to this part. If a defined 
    flight corridor contains a populated area, the applicant shall use 
    appendix C to this part to estimate the casualty expectation associated 
    with the flight corridor.
        (c) For an unguided sub-orbital expendable launch vehicle, an 
    applicant shall define impact dispersion areas as provided by appendix 
    D to this part. If a defined impact dispersion area contains any 
    populated areas, the applicant shall use appendix D to this part to 
    estimate the casualty expectation associated with the set of impact 
    dispersion areas.
        (d) For a reusable launch vehicle, an applicant shall define a 
    flight corridor that the applicant estimates to contain the hazardous 
    debris from nominal and non-nominal flight of a reusable launch 
    vehicle. If the defined flight corridor contains a populated area, the 
    applicant shall estimate the casualty expectation associated with a 
    reusable launch vehicle mission. An applicant shall demonstrate that 
    the estimated expected average number of casualties (Ec) to 
    the collective member of the public exposed to hazards from any one 
    mission is less than 0.00003. The FAA will evaluate the adequacy of the 
    flight corridor and
    
    [[Page 34362]]
    
    casualty expectancy analysis on a case-by-case basis.
    
    
    Sec. 420.21  Launch site criteria for expendable launch vehicles.
    
        (a) For each launch point proposed for expendable launch vehicles, 
    an applicant shall use each type of expendable launch vehicle proposed 
    to be launched from that launch point as the basis of its demonstration 
    of compliance with the criteria provided in paragraph (b) of this 
    section and for the analyses provided in appendices A through D to this 
    part.
        (b) For each type of expendable launch vehicle selected under 
    paragraph (a) of this section, the distance from the proposed launch 
    point to the launch site boundary must be at least as great as the 
    minimum distance listed in table 2 for that type and any class of 
    launch vehicle.
    
    
    Sec. 420.23  Launch site location review for unproven launch vehicles.
    
        The FA will evaluate the adequacy of a launch site location for 
    unproven launch vehicles including all new launch vehicles, whether 
    expendable or reusable, on a case-by-case basis.
    
                                        Table 1 to Sec.  420.21.--Orbital Launch Vehicle Classes by Payload Weight (lbs)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                     Orbital Launch Vehicles
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              100 nm orbit                      Small                           Medium                             Medium large                   Large
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    28 degrees inclination \1\......  440            >4400 to 11100              >11100 to 18500            >18500
    90 degrees inclination \2\......  3300           >3300 to 8400               >8400 to 15000             >15000
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 28 degrees inclination orbit from a launch point at 28 degrees latitude.
    \2\ 90 degrees inclination orbit.
    
    
               Table 2 to Sec.  420.21.--Minimum Distance From Launch Point to Launch Site Boundary (Feet)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              Orbital launch vehicles                                Suborbital launch vehicles
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        Unguided
          Small              Medium          Medium large          Large        Guided suborbital  suborbital launch
                                                                                  launch vehicle        vehicle
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               7300               9300              10600              13000               8000               1600
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Sec. 420.13  Explosvie site plan.
    
        (a) An applicant shall submit an explosive site plan that 
    establishes compliance with Secs. 420.33, 420.35, and 420.37. The 
    explosive site plan shall include:
        (1) A scaled map that shows the location of all proposed explosive 
    hazard facilities at the proposed launch site and that shows actual and 
    minimal allowable distances between each explosive hazard facility and 
    all other explosive hazard facilities and each public area, including 
    the launch site boundary.
        (2) A listing of the maximum quantities of liquid and solid 
    propellants to be located at each explosive hazard facility, including 
    the class and division for each solid propellant and the hazard and 
    compatibility group for each liquid propellant; and
        (3) A description of each activity to be conducted in each 
    explosive hazard facility.
        (b) An applicant applying for a license to operate a launch site at 
    a federal launch range need not submit an explosive site plan to the 
    FAA.
    
    
    Sec. 420.33  Handling of solid propellants.
    
        (a) An applicant shall determine the total quantity of solid 
    propellant explosives by class and division in each explosive hazard 
    facility where solid propellants will be handled. The total quantity of 
    explosives in an explosive hazard facility shall be measured as the net 
    explosive weight (NEW) of the solid propellants. When division 1.1 
    explosives, designed to be installed on launch vehicles and designed 
    not to detonate division 1.3 components, are located with division 1.3 
    explosives, that total quantity of explosives shall be the NEW of the 
    division 1.3 components.
        (b) An applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility 
    where solid propellants will be handled from all other explosive hazard 
    facilities, each public area and the launch site boundary by a distance 
    no less than those provided for each quantity in appendix E, table E-1. 
    An applicant shall employ no less than the applicable public area 
    distance to separate an explosive hazard facility from each public area 
    and from the launch site boundary. An applicant shall employ no less 
    than an intraline distance to separate an explosive hazard facility 
    from all other explosive hazard facilities that will be used by a 
    single customer. An applicant may use linear interpolation for NEW 
    quantities between table entries. For every explosive hazard facility 
    where solid propellants in quantities greater than 1,000,000 pounds 
    will be handled, an applicant shall separate the explosive hazard 
    facility from all other explosive hazard facilities, each public area 
    and the launch site boundary in accordance with the minimum separation 
    distances derived from the following relationships:
        (1) For a public area distance:
    
    D = 8W1/3
    where ``D'' equals the minimum separation distance in feet and ``W'' 
    equals the NEW of propellant.
    
        (2) For an intraline distance:
    
    D = 5W1/3
    where ``D'' equals the minimum separation distance in feet and ``W'' 
    equals the NEW of propellant.
    
        (c) An applicant shall measure separation distance from the closest 
    debris or explosive hazard source in an explosive hazard facility.
    
    
    Sec. 420.35  Storage or handling of liquid propellants.
    
        (a) For an explosive hazard facility where liquid propellants are 
    handled or stored, an applicant shall determine the total quantity of 
    liquid propellant and, if applicable pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of 
    this section, the explosive equivalent of liquid propellant in each 
    explosive hazard facility in accordance with the following:
        (1) The quantity of liquid propellant in a tank, drum, cylinder, or 
    other container is the net weight in pounds of the propellant in the 
    container. The determination of quantity shall include any liquid 
    propellant in associated piping to any point where positive
    
    [[Page 34363]]
    
    means are provided for interrupting the flow through the pipe, or 
    interrupting a reaction in the pipe in the event of a mishap.
        (2) Where two or more containers of compatible liquid propellants 
    will be handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, the 
    total quantity of propellant to determine the minimum separation 
    distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
    hazard facilities and each public area shall be the total quantity of 
    liquid propellant in all containers, unless:
        (i) The containers are separated one from the other by the 
    appropriate distance as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section; 
    or
        (ii) The containers are subdivided by intervening barriers, such as 
    diking, that prevent mixing.
        (iii) If paragraph (a)(2) (i) or (ii) of this section apply, an 
    applicant shall use the quantity of propellant requiring the greatest 
    separation distance pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section to 
    determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive hazard 
    facility and all other explosive hazard facilities and each public 
    area.
        (3) Where two or more containers of incompatible liquid propellants 
    will be handled or stored together in an explosive hazard facility, an 
    applicant shall determine the explosive equivalent in pounds of the 
    combined liquids, using the formulas provided in appendix E, table E-2, 
    to determine the minimum separation distance between the explosive 
    hazard facility and other explosive hazard facilities and public areas 
    unless the containers are separated one from the other by the 
    appropriate distance as determined in paragraph (b)(3) of this section. 
    An applicant shall then use the quantity of liquid propellant requiring 
    the greatest separation distance to determine the minimum separation 
    distance between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
    hazard facilities and each public area.
        (4) An applicant shall convert quantities of liquid propellants 
    from gallons to pounds using the conversion factors provided in 
    appendix E, table E-3 and the following equation:
    
    Pounds of propellant = gallons  x  density of propellant (pounds per 
    gallon).
    
        (b) An applicant shall use appendix E, table E-3 to determine 
    hazard and compatibility groups and shall separate liquid propellants 
    from each other and from each public area using distances no less than 
    those provided in appendix E, tables E-4 through E-7 in accordance with 
    the following:
        (1) An applicant shall measure minimum separation distances from 
    the hazard source in an explosive hazard facility, such as a container, 
    building, segment, or positive cutoff point in piping, closest to each 
    explosive hazard facility.
        (2) An applicant shall measure the minimum separation distance 
    between compatible liquid propellants using the ``intragroup and 
    compatible'' distance for the propellant quantity and hazard group that 
    requires the greater distance prescribed by appendix E, tables E-4, E-
    5, and E-6.
        (3) An applicant shall measure the minimum separation distance 
    between liquid propellants of different compatibility groups using the 
    ``public area and incompatible'' distance for the propellant quantity 
    and hazard group that requires the greater distance provided in 
    appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6, unless the propellants of 
    different compatibility groups are subdivided by intervening barriers 
    that prevent mixing. If such barriers are present, the minimum 
    separation distance shall be the ``intragroup and compatible'' distance 
    for the propellant quantity and group that requires the greater 
    distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
        (4) An applicant shall separate liquid propellants from each public 
    area using a distance no less than the ``public area and incompatible'' 
    distance provided in appendix E, tables E-4, E-5, and E-6.
        (5) An applicant shall separate each explosive hazard facility that 
    will contain liquid propellants where explosive equivalents apply 
    pursuant to paragraph (a)(3) of this section from all other explosive 
    hazard facilities of a single customer using the intraline distance 
    provided in appendix E, table E-7, and from each public area using the 
    public area distance provided in appendix E, table E-7.
    
    
    Sec. 420.37  Solid and liquid propellants located together.
    
        An applicant proposing an explosive hazard facility where solid and 
    liquid propellants are to be located together shall determine the 
    minimum separation distances between the explosive hazard facility and 
    other explosive hazard facilities and public areas in accordance with 
    the following. An applicant shall determine the minimum separation 
    distances between the explosive hazard facility and all other explosive 
    hazard facilities and public areas required for the solid propellants 
    in accordnace with Sec. 420.33. An applicant shall then apply the 
    greater of the separation distances determined by the liquid propellant 
    alone or the solid propellant alone.
    
    
    Secs. 420.38-420.40  [Reserved]
    
    Subpart C--License Terms and Conditions
    
    
     Sec. 420.41  License to operate a launch site--general.
    
        (a) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to 
    operate a launch site in accordance with the representations contained 
    in the licensee's application, with terms and conditions contained in 
    any license order accompanying the license, subject to the licensee's 
    compliance with 49 U.S.C. subtitle IX, ch. 701 and this chapter.
        (b) A license to operate a launch site authorizes a licensee to 
    offer its launch site to a launch operator for each launch point for 
    the type and any class of launch vehicle identified in the license 
    application and upon which the licensing determination is based.
        (c) Issuance of a license to operate a launch site does not relieve 
    a licensee of its obligation to compy with any other laws or 
    regulations, nor does it confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive 
    right in the use of airspace or outer space.
    
    
     Sec. 420.43  Duration.
    
        A license to operate a launch site remains in effect for five years 
    from the date of issuance unless surrendered, suspended, or revoked 
    before the expiration of the term and is renewable upon application by 
    the licensee.
    
    
     Sec. 420.45  Transfer of a license to operate a launch site.
    
        (a) Only the FAA may transfer a license to operate a launch site.
        (b) The FAA will transfer a license to an applicant who has 
    submitted an application in accordance with 14 CFR part 413, satisfied 
    the requirements of Sec. 420.15, and obtained each approval required 
    under Sec. 420.17 for a license.
        (c) The FAA may incorporate by reference any findings made part of 
    the record to support a prior related licensing determination.
    
    
    Sec. 420.47  License modification.
    
        (a) Upon application or upon its own initiative, the FAA may modify 
    a license to operate a launch site at any time by issuing a license 
    order that adds, removes, or modifies a license term or condition to 
    ensure compliance with the Act and the requirements of this chapter.
        (b) After a license to operate a launch site has been issued, a 
    licensee shall apply to the FAA for modification of its license if:
    
    [[Page 34364]]
    
        (1) The licensee proposes to operate the launch site in a manner 
    that is not authorized by the license; or
        (2) Any representation contained in the license application that is 
    material to public health and safety or safety of property is no longer 
    accurate and complete or does not reflect the licensee's actual 
    operation of the launch site.
        (c) An application to modify a license must meet the requirements 
    of part 413 of this chapter. The licensee shall indicate any part of 
    its license or license application that would be changed or affected by 
    the proposed modification.
        (d) The FAA will approve a request for modification that satisfies 
    the requirements set forth in this part.
        (e) Upon approval of a request for modification, the FAA will issue 
    either a written approval to the licensee or a license order modifying 
    the license if a term or condition of the license is changed, added, or 
    deleted. A written approval has the full force and effect of a license 
    order and is part of the licensing record.
    
    
    Sec. 420.49  Compliance monitoring.
    
        A licensee shall allow access by and cooperate with federal 
    officers or employees or other individuals authorized by the FAA to 
    observe any activities of the licensee, its customers, its contractors, 
    or subcontractors, associated with licensed operation of the licensee's 
    launch site.
    
    Subpart D--Responsibilities of a Licensee
    
    
    Sec. 420.51  Responsibilities--general.
    
        (a) A licensee shall operate its launch site in accordance with the 
    representations in the application upon which the licensing 
    determination is based.
        (b) A licensee is responsible for compliance with 49 U.S.C. 
    Subtitle IX, ch. 701 and for meeting the requirements of this chapter.
    
    
    Sec. 420.53  Control of public access.
    
        (a) A licensee shall prevent unauthorized access to the launch 
    site, and unauthorized, unescorted access to explosive hazard 
    facilities or other hazard areas not otherwise controlled by a launch 
    operator, through the use of security personnel, surveillance systems, 
    physical barriers, or other means approved as part of the licensing 
    process.
        (b) A licensee shall notify anyone entering the launch site of 
    safety rules and emergency and evacuation procedures prior to that 
    person's entry unless that person has received a briefing on those 
    rules and procedures within the previous year.
        (c) A licensee shall employ warning signals or alarms to notify any 
    persons at the launch site of any emergency.
    
    
    Sec. 420.55  Scheduling of launch site operations.
    
        (a) A licensee shall develop and implement procedures to schedule 
    operations to ensure that each operation carried out by a customer, 
    including a launch operator, at the launch site does not create the 
    potential for a mishap that could result in harm to the public because 
    of the proximity of the operations, in time or place, to operations of 
    any other customer at the launch site.
        (b) A licensee shall provide its launch site scheduling 
    requirements to each customer before the customer begins operations at 
    the launch site.
    
    
    Sec. 420.57  Notifications.
    
        (a) A licensee shall notify a launch operator of any limitations on 
    the operations conducted at the launch site that arise out of its 
    license to operate a launch site.
        (b) A licensee shall complete an agreement with the local U.S. 
    Coast Guard district to establish procedures for the issuance of a 
    Notice to Mariners prior to launch and other such measures as the Coast 
    Guard deems necessary to protect public health and safety.
        (c) A licensee shall complete an agreement with the FAA regional 
    office having jurisdiction over the airspace through which launches 
    will take place, to establish procedures for the issuance of a Notice 
    to Airmen prior to a launch and for closing of air routes during the 
    launch window and other such measures as the FAA regional office deems 
    necessary to protect public health and safety.
        (d) At least two days prior to flight of a launch vehicle, the 
    licensee shall notify local officials and all owners of land adjacent 
    to the launch site of the schedule.
    
    
    Sec. 420.59  Launch site accident investigation plan.
    
        (a) General. A licensee shall develop and implement a launch site 
    accident investigation plan that contains the licensee's procedures for 
    reporting, responding to, and investigating launch site accidents, as 
    defined in Sec. 420.5. The launch site accident investigation plan must 
    be signed by an individual authorized to sign and certify the 
    application in accordance with Sec. 413.7(c) of this chapter.
        (b) Reporting requirements. A launch site accident investigation 
    plan shall provide for--
        (1) Immediate notification to the Federal Aviation Administration 
    (FAA) Washington Operations Center in the event of a launch site 
    accident.
        (2) Submission of a written preliminary report to the FAA, 
    Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation, within 
    five days of any launch site accident. The report must include the 
    following information:
        (i) Date and time of occurrence;
        (ii) Location of the event;
        (iii) Description of the event;
        (iv) Number of injuries, if any, and general description of types 
    of injury suffered;
        (v) Property damage, if any, and an estimate of its value;
        (vi) Identification of hazardous materials, as defined in 
    Sec. 401.5 of this chapter, involved in the event;
        (vii) Any action taken to contain the consequences of the event; 
    and
        (viii) Weather conditions at the time of the event.
        (c) Response plan. A launch site accident investigation plan shall 
    contain procedures that--
        (1) Ensure the consequences of a launch site accident are contained 
    and minimized;
        (2) Ensure data and physical evidence are preserved;
        ((3) Require the licensee to report to and cooperate with FAA or 
    National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigations and 
    designate one or more points of contact for the FAA or NTSB; and
        (4) Require the licensee to identify and adopt preventive measures 
    for avoiding recurrence of the event.
        (d) Investigation plan. A launch site accident investigation plan 
    shall contain--
        (1) Procedures for investigating the cause of a launch site 
    accident, and participating in an investigation of a launch accident 
    for launches launched from the launch site;
        (2) Procedures for reporting launch site accident investigation 
    results to the FAA; and
        (3) Delineated responsibilities, including responsibilities for 
    personnel assigned to conduct investigations and for any one retained 
    by the licensee to conduct or participate in investigations.
        (e) Applicability of other accident investigation procedures. 
    Accident investigation procedures developed under 29 CFR 1910.119 and 
    40 CFR part 68 will satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d) 
    of this section to the extent that they include the elements provided 
    in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section.
    
    [[Page 34365]]
    
    Sec. 420.61  Records.
    
        (a) A licensee shall maintain all records, data, and other material 
    needed to verify that its operations are conducted in accordance with 
    representation contained in the licensee's application. A licensee 
    shall retain records for three years.
        (b) In the event of a launch site accident, a licensee shall 
    preserve all records related to the event. Records shall be retained 
    until completion of any federal investigation and the FAA advises the 
    licensee that the records need not be retained.
        (c) A licensee shall make available to federal officials for 
    inspection and copying all records required to be maintained under the 
    regulations.
    
    
    Sec. 420.63  Explosives.
    
        (a) Explosive siting. A licensee shall ensure that the 
    configuration of the launch-site is in acccordance with the licensee's 
    explosive site plan, and that the licensee's explosive site plan is in 
    compliance with the requirements in Secs. 420.31-420.37.
        (b) Lightning protection. A licensee shall ensure that the public 
    is not exposed to hazards due to the initiation of explosives by 
    lightning.
        (1) Elements of a lighting protection system. Unless an explosive 
    hazard facility meets the conditions of paragraph (b)(3) of this 
    section, all explosive hazard facilities shall have a lightning 
    protection system to ensure explosives are not initiated by lightning. 
    A lightning protection system shall meet the requirements of paragraph 
    (b)(2) of this section and include the following:
        (i) Air terminal. An air terminal to intentionally attract a 
    lightning strike.
        (ii) Down conductor. A low impedance path connecting an air 
    terminal to an earth electrode system.
        (ii) Earth electrode system. An earth electrode system to dissipate 
    the current from a lightning strike to ground.
        (2) Bonding and surge protection.--(i) Bonding. All metallic bodies 
    shall be bonded to ensure that voltage potentials due to lightning are 
    equal everywhere in the explosive hazard facility. Any fence within six 
    feet of a lightning protection system shall have a bond across each 
    gate and other discontinuations and shall be bonded to the lightning 
    protection system. Railroad tracks that run within six feet of the 
    lightning protection system shall be bonded to the lighting protection 
    system.
        (ii) Surge protection. A lightning protection system shall include 
    surge protection to reduce transient voltages due to lightning to a 
    harmless level for all metallic power, communication, and 
    instrumentation lines coming into an explosive hazard facility.
        (3) Circumtances where no lightning protection system is required. 
    No lightning protection system is required for an explosive hazard 
    facility when a lightning warning system is available to permit 
    termination of operations and withdrawal of the public to public area 
    distance prior to an electrical storm, or for an explosive hazard 
    facility containing explosives that cannot be initiated by lightning. 
    If no lightning protection system is required, a licensee must ensure 
    the withdrawal of the public to a public area distance prior to an 
    electrical storm.
        (4) Testing and inspection. Lightning protection systems shall be 
    visually inspected semiannually and shall be tested once each year for 
    electrical continuity and adequacy of grounding. A licensee shall 
    maintain at the explosive hazard facility a record of results obtained 
    from the tests, including any action taken to correct deficiencies 
    noted.
        (c) Electrical Power Lines. A licensee shall ensure that electric 
    power lines at its launch site meet the following requirements:
        (1) Electric power lines shall be no closer to an explosive hazard 
    facility than the length of the lines between the poles or towers than 
    support the lines unless an effective means is provided to ensure that 
    energized lines cannot, on breaking, come in contact with the explosive 
    hazard facility.
        (2) Towers or poles supporting electrical distribution lines that 
    carry between 15 and 69 KV, and unmanned electrical substations shall 
    be no closer to an explosive hazard facility than the public area 
    distance for that explosive hazard facility.
        (3) Towers or poles supporting electrical transmission lines that 
    carry 69 KV or more, shall be no closer to an explosive hazard facility 
    than the public area distance for that explosive hazard facility.
    
        Issued in Washington, DC on June 10, 1999.
    Patricia G. Smith,
    Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
    
    Appendix A to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
    
    (a) Introduction
    
        (1) This appendix provides a method to construct a flight 
    corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle 
    or any one of the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles 
    from table 1, Sec. 420.21, without the use of local meteorological 
    data or a launch vehicle trajectory.
        (2) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in a 
    launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an impact 
    dispersion area in a downrange area. A flight corridor for a guided 
    suborbital launch vehicle ends with the impact dispersion area, and, 
    for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles, 5,000 
    nautical miles from the launch point.
    
    (b) Data Requirements
    
        (1) Maps. An applicant shall use any map for the launch site 
    region with a scale not less than 1:250,000 inches per inch in the 
    launch area and 1:20,000,000 inches per inch in the downrange area. 
    As described in paragraph (b)(2), an applicant shall use a 
    mechanical method, a semi-automated method, or a fully-automated 
    method to plot a flight corridor on maps. A source for paper maps 
    acceptable to the FAA is the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National 
    Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Ocean Service.
        (i) Projections for mechanical plotting method. An applicant 
    shall use a conic projection. The FAA will accept a ``Lambert-
    Conformal'' conic projection. A polar aspect of a plane-azimuthal 
    projection may also be used for far northern launch sites.
        (ii) Projections for semi-automated plotting method. An 
    applicant shall use cylindrical, conic, or plane projections for 
    semi-automated plotting. The FAA will accept ``Mercator'' and 
    ``Oblique Mercator'' cylindrical projections. The FAA will accept 
    ``Lambert-Conformal'' and ``Albers Equal-Area'' conic projections. 
    The FAA will accept ``Lambert Azimuthal Equal-Area'' and ``Azimuthal 
    Equidistant'' plane projections.
        (iii) Projections for fully-automated plotting method. The FAA 
    will accept map projections used by geographical information system 
    software scaleable pursuant to the requirements of paragraph (b)(1).
        (2) Plotting Methods.
        (i) Mechanical method. An applicant may use mechanical drafting 
    equipment such as pencil, straight edge, ruler, protractor, and 
    compass to plot the location of a flight corridor on a map. The FAA 
    will accept straight lines for distances less than or equal to 7.5 
    times the map scale on map scales greater than or equal to 
    1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in); or straight lines representing 
    100 nm or less on map scales less than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
        (ii) Semi-Automated method. An applicant may employ the range 
    and bearing techniques in paragraph (b)(3) to create latitude and 
    longitude points on a map. The FAA will accept straight lines for 
    distances less than or equal to 7.5 times the map scale on map 
    scales greater than or equal to 1:1,000,000 inches per inch (in/in); 
    or straight lines representing 100 nm or less on map scales less 
    than 1:1,000,000 in/in.
        (iii) Fully-Automated method. An applicant may use geographical 
    information system software with global mapping data scaleable in 
    accordance with paragraph (b)(1).
        (3) Range and bearing computations on an ellipsoidal earth 
    model.
        (i) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal 
    earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to 
    calculate geodetic latitude (+N) and longitude (+E) given the launch 
    point geodetic latitude (+N),
    
    [[Page 34366]]
    
    longitude (+E) range (nm), and bearing (degrees, positive clockwise 
    from North).
        (A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input in making 
    range and bearing computations:
    
    1 = Geodetic latitude of launch point (DDD)
    1 = Longitude of launch point (DDD)
    S = Range from launch point (nm)
    12 = Azimuth bearing from launch point (deg)
    
        (B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations 
    to determine the latitude (2) and longitude 
    (2) of a target point situated ``S'' nm from the 
    launch point on an azimuth bearing 12 degrees.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.017
    
    Where:
    
    a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
    b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)
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        (ii) To create latitude and longitude pairs on an ellipsoidal 
    earth model, an applicant shall use the following equations to 
    calculate the distance (S) of the geodesic between two points 
    P1 and P2), the forward azimuth 
    (12) of the geodesic at P1, and the 
    back azimuth (21) of the geodesic at 
    P2, given the geodetic latitude (+N), longitude (+E) of 
    P1 and P2. Azimuth is measured positively 
    clockwise form the North.
        (A) Input. An applicant shall use the following input:
    
    1 = Geodetic latitude of point P1 
    (DDD)
    1 = Longitude of point P1 (DDD)
    2 = Geodetic latitude of point P2 
    (DDD)
    2 = Longitude of point P2 (DDD)
    
        (B) Computations. An applicant shall use the following equations 
    to determine the distance (S), the forward azimuth 
    (12) of the geodesic at P1, and the 
    back azimuth (21) of the geodesic at 
    P2,
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.039
    
    Where:
    
    a = WGS-84 semi-major axis (3443.91846652 nmi)
    b = WGS-84 semi-minor axis (3432.37165994 nmi)
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    (c) Creation of a Flight Corridor
    
        (1) To define a flight corridor, an applicant shall:
        (i) Select a guided suborbital or orbital launch vehicle, and, 
    for an orbital launch vehicle, select from table 1 in Sec. 420.21 a 
    launch vehicle class that best represents the type of launch vehicle 
    the applicant plans to support at its launch point:
        (ii) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from 
    table A-1 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch vehicle or 
    orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph (c)(1)(i);
        (iii) Select a launch point geodetic latitude and longitude; and
        (iv) Select a flight azimuth.
        (2) An applicant shall define and map an overflight exclusion 
    zone using the following method:
        (i) Select a debris dispersion radius (Dmax) from 
    table A-1 and a downrange distance (Doez) from table A-2 
    to define an overflight exclusion zone for the guided suborbital 
    launch vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
    (c)(1)(i).
        (ii) An overflight exclusion zone is described by the 
    intersection of the following boundaries, which are depicted in 
    figure A1:
        (A) An applicant shall define an uprange boundary with a half-
    circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length twice 
    Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. the 
    uprange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint 
    positioned on the launch point with the chord oriented along an 
    azimuth 90 deg. from the launch azimuth and the half-
    circle arc located uprange from the launch point.
        (B) An applicant shall define the downrange boundary with a 
    half-circle arc of radius Dmax and a chord of length 
    twice Dmax connecting the half-circle arc endpoints. The 
    downrange boundary placement on a map has the chord midpoint 
    intersecting the nominal flight azimuth line at a distance DOEZ 
    inches downrange with the chord oriented along an azimuth 
    90 deg. from the launch azimuth and the half-circle arc 
    located downrange from the intersection of the chord and the flight 
    azimuth line.
        (C) Crossrange boundaries of an overflight exclusion zone are 
    defined by two lines segments. Each is parallel to the flight 
    azimuth with one to the left side and one to the right side of the 
    flight azimuth line. Each line connects an uprange half-circle arc 
    endpoint to a downrange half-circle arc endpoint as shown in figure 
    A-1.
        (iii) An applicant shall identify the overflight exclusion zone 
    on a map meeting the requirements specified in paragraph (b).
        (3) An applicant shall define and map a flight corridor using 
    the following method:
        (i) In accordance with paragraph (b), an applicant shall draw a 
    flight corridor on a map(s) with the Dmax origin centered 
    on the intended launch point and the flight corridor centerline (in 
    the downrange direction) aligned with the initial flight azimuth. 
    The flight corridor is depicted in figure A-2 and its line segment 
    lengths are tabulated in table A-3.
        (ii) An applicant shall define the flight corridor using the 
    following boundary definitions:
        (A) An applicant shall draw an uprange boundary, which is 
    defined by an arc-line GB (figure A-2), directly uprange from and 
    centered on the intended launch point with radius Dmax.
        (B) An applicant shall draw line CF perpendicular to and 
    centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 10 nm downrange 
    from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line CF 
    provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch 
    vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
    (d)(1)(i).
        (C) An applicant shall draw line DE perpendicular to and 
    centered on the flight azimuth line, and positioned 100 nm downrange 
    from the launch point. The applicant shall use the length of line DE 
    provided in table A-3 corresponding to the guided suborbital launch 
    vehicle or orbital launch vehicle class selected in paragraph 
    (c)(1)(i).
        (D) Except for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant 
    shall draw a downrange boundary, which is defined by line HI and is 
    drawn perpendicular to and centered on the flight azimuth line, and 
    positioned 5,000 nm downrange from the launch point. The
    
    [[Page 34369]]
    
    applicant shall use the length of line HI provided in table A-3 
    corresponding to the orbital launch vehicle class selected in 
    paragraph (c)(1)(i).
        (E) An applicant shall draw crossrange boundaries, which are 
    defined by three lines on the left side and three lines on the right 
    side of the flight azimuth. An applicant shall construct the left 
    flight corridor boundary according to the following, and as depicted 
    in figure A-3:
        (1) The first line (line BC in figure A-3) is tangent to the 
    uprange boundary arc, and ends at endpoint C of line CF, as depicted 
    in figure A-3;
        (2) The second line (line CD in figure A-3) begins at endpoint C 
    of line BC and ends at endpoint D of line DH, as depicted in figure 
    A-3;
        (3) For all orbital launch vehicles, the third line (line DH in 
    figure A-3) begins at endpoint D of line CD and ends at endpoint H 
    of line HI, as depicted in figure A-3; and
        (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the line DH begins 
    at endpoint D of line CD and ends at a point tangent to the impact 
    dispersion area drawn in accordance with paragraph (c)(4) and as 
    depicted in figure A-4.
        (F) An applicant shall repeat the procedure in paragraph 
    (c)(3)(ii)(E) for the right side boundary.
        (iii) An applicant shall identify the flight corridor on a map 
    meeting the requirements specified in paragraph (b).
        (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
    define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight 
    corridor and show the impact dispersion area on a map, as depicted 
    in figure A-3, in accordance with the following:
        (i) An applicant shall select an apogee altitude 
    (Hap) for the launch vehicle final stage. The apogee 
    altitude should equal the highest altitude intended to be reached by 
    a guided suborbital launch vehicle launched from the launch point.
        (ii) An applicant shall define the impact dispersion area by 
    using an impact range factor [IP(Hap)] and a dispersion 
    factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown below:
        (A) An applicant shall calculate the impact range (D) for the 
    final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set D equal to the 
    maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the impact 
    range factor as shown below:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.056
    
    Where:
    
    IP(Hap) = 0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km; and
    ip(Hap) = 0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater.
    
        (B) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius 
    (R) for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R 
    equal to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by 
    the dispersion factor as shown below:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.057
    
    Where:
    
    DISPH(Hap) = 0.05
    
        (iii) An applicant shall draw the impact dispersion area on a 
    map with its center on the predicted impact point. An applicant 
    shall then draw line DH in accordance with paragraph 
    (c)(3)(ii)(E)(4).
    
    (d) Evaluate the Flight Corridor
    
        (1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the 
    presence of any populated areas. If an applicant determines that no 
    populated area is located within the flight corridor, then no 
    additional steps are necessary.
        (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
    zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
    are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
    agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
    exclusion zone during a launch.
        (3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor, 
    an applicant may modify its proposal and create another flight 
    corridor pursuant to appendix A, use appendix B to narrow the flight 
    corridor, or complete a risk analysis as provided in appendix C.
    
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
    
    [[Page 34370]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.069
    
    
    
    [[Page 34371]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.070
    
    
    
    [[Page 34372]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.071
    
    
    
    [[Page 34373]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.072
    
    
    
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-C
    
    [[Page 34374]]
    
    Appendix B to Part 420--Method for Defining a Flight Corridor
    
    (a) Introduction
    
        (1) This appendix provides a method to construct a flight 
    corridor from a launch point for a guided suborbital launch vehicle 
    or any one of the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles 
    from table 1, Sec. 420.21, using local meteorological data and a 
    launch vehicle trajectory.
        (2) A flight corridor is constructed in two sections--one 
    section comprising a launch area and one section comprising a 
    downrange area. The launch area of a flight corridor reflects the 
    extent of launch vehicle debris impacts in the event of a launch 
    vehicle failure and applying local meteorological conditions. The 
    downrange area reflects the extent of launch vehicle debris impacts 
    in the event of a launch vehicle failure and applying vehicle 
    imparted velocity, malfunctions turns, and vehicle guidance and 
    performance dispersions.
        (3) A flight corridor includes an overflight exclusion zone in 
    the launch area and, for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an 
    impact dispersion area in the downrange area. A flight corridor for 
    a guided suborbital launch vehicle ends with an impact dispersion 
    area and, for the four classes of guided orbital launch vehicles, 
    5,000 nautical miles (nm) from the launch point.
    
    (b) Data Requirements
    
        (1) Launch area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy 
    the following data requirements to perform the launch area analysis 
    of this appendix. The data requirements are identified in table B-1 
    along with sources where data acceptable to the FAA may be obtained.
        (i) An applicant must select meteorological data for the 
    proposed launch site that meet the specifications in table B-1.
    
                                        Table B-1.--Launch Area Data Requirements
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Data category                         Data item                                Data source
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Meteorological Data.........  Local statistical wind data versus        These data may be obtained from: Global
                                   altitude up to 50,000 feet. Required      Gridded Upper Air Statistics, Climate
                                   data are: altitude (ft), atmospheric      Applications Branch, National Climatic
                                   density (slugs/ft3), mean East/West       Data Center.
                                   meridianal (u) and North/South zonal
                                   (v) wind (ft/sec), standard deviation
                                   of u and v wind (ft/sec), correlation
                                   coefficient, number of observations and
                                   wind percentile (%)
    Nominal Trajectory Data.....  State vector data versus time after       Actual launch vehicle trajectory data;
                                   liftoff in topocentric launch point       or trajectory generation software
                                   centered X,Y,Z,X,Y,Z coordinates with     meeting requirements in paragraph
                                   the X-axis aligned with the flight        (b)(1)(ii).
                                   azimuth. Trajectory time intervals
                                   shall not be greater than one second.
                                   XYZ units are in feet and X,Y,Z units
                                   are in ft/sec
    Debris Data.................  A fixed ballistic coefficient equal to 3  N/A.
                                   lbs/ft2 is used for the launch area
    Geographical Data...........  Launch point geodetic latitude on the     Geographical surveys or Global
                                   WGS-84 ellipsoidal earth model            Positioning System.
                                  Launch point longitude on an ellipsoidal
                                   earth model
                                  Maps using scales of not less than        Map types with scale and projection
                                   1:250,000 inches per inch within 100 nm   information are listed in the Defense
                                   of a launch point and 1:20,000,000        Mapping Agency, Public Sale,
                                   inches per inch for distances greater     Aeronautical Charts and Publications
                                   than 100 nm from a launch point           Catalog. The catalog and maps may be
                                                                             ordered through the U.S. Dept. of
                                                                             Commerce, National Oceanic and
                                                                             Atmospheric Administration, National
                                                                             Ocean Service.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        (ii) For a guided orbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
    obtain or create a launch vehicle nominal trajectory. An applicant 
    may use trajectory data from a launch vehicle manufacturer or 
    generate a trajectory using trajectory simulation software. 
    Trajectory time intervals shall be no greater than one second. If an 
    applicant uses a trajectory computed with commercially available 
    software products, the software must calculate the trajectory using 
    the following parameters, or demonstrated equivalents:
        (A) Launch location:
        (1) Launch point, using geodetic latitude and longitude to four 
    decimal places; and
        (2) Launch point height above sea level.
        (B) Ellipsoidal earth:
        (1) Mass of earth;
        (2) Radius of earth;
        (3) Earth flattening factor; and
        (4) Gravitational harmonic constants (J2, J3, J4).
        (C) Vehicle characteristics:
        (1) Mass, as a function of time;
        (2) Thrust, as a function of time;
        (3) Specific impulse (ISP), as a function of time; 
    and
        (4) Stage dimensions.
        (D) Launch events:
        (1) Stage burn times; and
        (2) Stage drop-off times.
        (E) Atmosphere:
        (1) Density vs. altitude;
        (2) Pressure vs. altitude;
        (3) Speed of sound vs. altitude; and
        (4) Temperature vs. altitude.
        (F) Winds:
        (1) Wind direction vs. altitude; and
        (2) Wind magnitude vs. altitude.
        (I) Aerodynamics; drag coefficient vs. mach number for each 
    stage of flight showing subsonic, transonic and supersonic mach 
    regions for each stage.
        (iii) An applicant shall use a ballistic coefficient () 
    of 3 lbs/ft2 for debris impact computations.
        (iv) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting 
    requirements for a launch area in appendix A, paragraph (b).
        (2) Downrange area data requirements. An applicant shall satisfy 
    the following data requirements to perform the downrange area 
    analysis of this appendix.
        (i) The launch vehicle class and method of generating a 
    trajectory used in the launch area shall be used by an applicant in 
    the downrange area as well. Trajectory time intervals must not be 
    greater than one second.
        (ii) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data 
    requirements for a downrange area in appendix A, paragraph (b).
    
    (c) Construction of a Launch Area of a Flight Corridor
    
        (1) An applicant shall construct a launch area of a flight 
    corridor using the processes and equations of this paragraph for a 
    single trajectory position. An applicant shall repeat these 
    processes at time points on the launch vehicle trajectory in time 
    intervals no greater than one second. When choosing wind data, an 
    applicant shall select a time period between one and 12 months.
        (2) A launch area analysis must include all trajectory positions 
    whose Z-values are less than or equal to 50,000 ft.
        (3) Each trajectory time is denoted by the subscript ``i''. 
    Height intervals for a given atmospheric pressure level are denoted 
    by the subscript ``j''.
        (4) Using data from the GGUAS CD-ROM, an applicant shall 
    estimate the mean atmospheric density, maximum wind speed, height 
    interval fall times and height interval debris dispersions for 15 
    mean geometric height intervals.
        (i) The height intervals in the GGUAS source data vary as a 
    function of the following 15 atmospheric pressure levels (milibars): 
    Surface, 1000, 850, 700, 500, 400, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 70, 50, 
    30, 10. The actual geometric height associated with each pressure 
    level varies depending on the time
    
    [[Page 34375]]
    
    of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean geometric height over 
    the period of months selected in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph 
    for each of the 15 pressure levels as shown in equation B1.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.058
    
    Where:
    
    Hj=mean geometric height
    hm=geometric height for a given month
    nm=number of observations for a given month
    k=number of wind months of interest
    
        (ii) The atmospheric densities in the source data also vary as a 
    function of the 15 atmospheric pressure levels. The actual 
    atmospheric density associated with each pressure level varies 
    depending on the time of year. An applicant shall estimate the mean 
    atmospheric density over the period of months selected in 
    subparagraph (1) of this paragraph for each of the 15 pressure 
    levels as shown in equation B2.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.059
    
    Where:
    
    pj=mean atmospheric density
    m=atmospheric density for a given month
    nm=number of observation for a given month
    k=number of wind months of interest
    
        (iii) An applicant shall estimate the algebraic maximum wind 
    speed at a given pressure level as follows and shall repeat the 
    process for each pressure level.
        (A) For each month, an applicant shall calculate the monthly 
    mean wind speed (Waz) for 360 azimuths using equation B3;
        (B) An applicant shall select the maximum monthly mean wind 
    speed from the 360 azimuths;
        (C) An applicant shall repeat subparagraphs (c)(4)(iii)(A) and 
    (B) for each month of interest; and
        (D) An applicant shall select the maximum mean wind speed from 
    the range of months. The absolute value of this wind is designated 
    Wmax for the current pressure level.
        (iv) An applicant shall calculate speed using the means for 
    winds from the West (u) and winds from the North (v). An applicant 
    shall use equation B3 to resolve the winds to a specific azimuth 
    bearing.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.135
    
    Where:
    
    az=wind azimuth
    u=West zonal wind component
    v=North zonal wind component
    Waz=mean wind speed at azimuth for each month
    
        (v) An applicant shall estimate the interval fall time over a 
    height interval assuming the initial descent velocity is equal to 
    the terminal velocity (VT). An applicant shall use 
    equations B4 through B6 to estimate the fall time over a given 
    height interval.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.060
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.061
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.062
    
    Where:
    
    =height difference between 
    two mean geometric heights
    =ballistic coefficient
    px=mean atmospheric density for the corresponding mean 
    geometric heights
    vTj=terminal velocity
    
        (vi) An applicant shall estimate the interval debris dispersion 
    (Dj) by multiplying the interval fall time by the 
    algebraic maximum mean wind speed (Wmax) as shown in 
    equation B7.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.063
    
        (5) Once the Dj are estimated for each height 
    interval, an applicant shall determine the total debris dispersion 
    (Di) for each Zi using a linear interpolation 
    and summation exercise. An applicant shall use a launch point height 
    of zero equal to the surface level of the nearest GGUAS grid 
    location and is shown below in equation B8.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.064
    
    Where:
    
    n=number of height intervals below jth height interval
    
        (6) Once all the Di radii have been calculated, an 
    applicant shall produce a launch area flight corridor according to 
    instructions in subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(iv).
        (i) On a map meeting the requirements of appendix A, paragraph 
    (b), an applicant shall plot the Xi position location on 
    the flight azimuth for the corresponding Zi position;
        (ii) An applicant shall draw a circle of radius Di 
    centered on the corresponding Xi position; and
        (iii) An applicant shall repeat the instructions in 
    subparagraphs (c)(6)(i)-(ii) for each Di radius.
        (iv) The launch area of a flight corridor is the enveloping line 
    that encloses the outer boundary of the Di circles as 
    shown in Fig. B-1. The uprange portion of a flight corridor is 
    described by a semi-circle arc that is a portion of either the most 
    uprange Di dispersion circle, or the overflight exclusion 
    zone (defined in subparagraph (c)(7)), whichever is further uprange.
        (7) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone in 
    the launch area pursuant to the instructions provided in appendix A, 
    subparagraph (c)(2).
        (8) An applicant shall draw the launch area flight corridor and 
    overflight exclusion zone on a map(s) meeting the requirements of 
    table B-1.
    
    [[Page 34376]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.073
    
    
        (1) The downrange area analysis estimates the debris dispersion 
    for the downrange time points on a launch vehicle trajectory. An 
    applicant shall perform the downrange area analysis using the 
    processes and equations of this paragraph.
        (2) The downrange area analysis shall include trajectory 
    positions at a height (the Zi-values) greater than 50,000 
    feet and nominal trajectory IIP values less than or equal to 5,000 
    nm. For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, the final IIP value that 
    an applicant must consider is the launch vehicle final stage impact 
    point. Each trajectory time shall be one second or less and is 
    denoted by the subscript ``i''.
        (3) An applicant shall compute the downrange area of a flight 
    corridor boundary in four steps, from each trajectory time 
    increment: Determine a reduction ratio factor; calculate the launch 
    vehicle position after simulating a malfunction turn; rotate the 
    state vector after the malfunction turn in the range of three 
    degrees to one degree as a function of Xi distance 
    downrange; and compute the IIP of the resulting trajectory. The 
    locus of IIPs describes the boundary of the downrange area of a 
    flight corridor. An applicant shall use the following subparagraphs, 
    (d)(3)(i)-(v), to compute the downrange area of the flight corridor 
    boundary:
        (i) Compute the downrange distance to the final IIP position for 
    a nominal trajectory as follows:
        (A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP 
    coordinates (max, max) for 
    the nominal state vector before the launch vehicle enters orbit 
    where  in equation B30 is the nominal flight azimuth angle 
    measured from True North.
        (B) Using the range and bearing equations in appendix A, 
    paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Smax) from the 
    launch point coordinates (lp 
    lp) to the IIP coordinates 
    (max, max) computed in 
    (3)(i)(A) of this paragraph.
        (C) The distance for Smax may not exceed 5000 mm. In 
    cases when the actual value exceeds 5000 nm the applicant shall use 
    5000 nm for Smax.
        (ii) Compute the reduction ratio factor (Fri) for 
    each trajectory time increment as follows:
        (A) Using equations B30 through B69, determine the IIP 
    coordinates (i, i) for the 
    nominal state vector where  in equation B30 is the nominal 
    flight azimuth angle measured from True North.
        (B) Using the range and bearing equations in appendix A, 
    paragraph (b)(3), determine the distance (Si) from the 
    launch point coordinates (lp 
    lp) to the IIP coordinates 
    (i, i) computed in 
    (3)(ii)(A) of this paragraph.
        (C) The reduction ratio factor is:
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.065
        
        (iii) An applicant shall compute the launch vehicle position and 
    velocity components after a simulated malfunction turn for each 
    i, using the following method.
        (A) Turn duration (t)= 4 sec.
        (B) Turn angle ().
    
    =(Fri) * 45 degrees.
    
        The turn angle equations perform a turn in the launch vehicle's 
    yaw plane, as depicted in figure B-2.
    
    [[Page 34377]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.074
    
    
        (C) Launch vehicle velocity magnitude at the beginning of the 
    turn (Vb) and velocity magnitude at the end of the turn 
    (Ve).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.081
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.082
    
        (D) Average velocity magnitude over the turn duration (V).
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.084
        
        (E) Velocity vector path angle (i) at turn 
    epoch.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.085
    
        (F) Launch vehicle position components at the end of turn 
    duration.
    
    [[Page 34378]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.086
    
    
    Where:
    
    gi=32.17405 ft/sec.2
    
        (G) Launch vehicle velocity components at the end of turn 
    duration.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.087
    
        (iv) An applicant shall rotate the trajectory state vector at 
    the end of the turn duration to the right and left to define the 
    right-lateral flight corridor boundary and the left-lateral flight 
    corridor boundary, respectively. An applicant shall perform perform 
    the trajectory rotation in conjunction with a trajectory 
    transformation from the X90, Y90, 
    Z90, X90, Y90, Z90 
    components to E,N,U,E,N,U. The trajectory subscripts ``R'' and ``L'' 
    from equations B15 and B26 have been discarded to reduce the number 
    of equations. An applicant shall transform from E,N,U,E,N,U to 
    E,F,G,E,F,G. An applicant shall use the equations of paragraph 
    (d)(3)(iv)(A)-(F) to produce the EFG components necessary to 
    estimate each instantaneous impact point.
        (A) An applicant must calculate the flight angle ().
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.088
        
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.089
        
            or
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.090
        
        (B) An applicant shall transform X90, Y90, 
    Z90 to E,N,U.
    
    [[Page 34379]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.091
    
    
        (C) An applicant shall transform X90, Y90, 
    Z90 to E90 to E,N,U.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.092
    
        (D) An applicant shall transform the launch point coordinates 
    (o, o, ho) to 
    Eo, Fo, Go.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.093
    
        (E) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to E90, 
    F90, G90.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.094
    
        (F) An applicant shall transform E,N,U to E,F,G.
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.095
        
        (v) The IIP computation implements an iterative solution to the 
    impact point problem. An applicant shall solve Equations B46 to B69, 
    with the appropriate substitutions, up to a maximum of five times. 
    Each repetition of the equations provides a more accurate prediction 
    of the IIP. The required IIP computations are shown in subsection 
    (d)(3)(v)(A)-(W) below. An applicant shall use this computation for 
    both the left- and right-lateral offsets. The IIP computations will 
    result in latitude and longitude pairs for the left-lateral flight 
    corridor boundary and the right-lateral flight corridor boundary. An 
    applicant shall use the lines connecting the latitude and longitude 
    pairs to describe the entire downrange area boundary of the flight 
    corridor up to 5000 nm or a final stage impact dispersion area.
        (A) An applicant shall approximate the radial distance 
    (k,l) from the geocenter to the IIP. The 
    distance from the center of the earth ellipsoid to the launch point 
    shall be used for the initial approximation of rk,l as 
    shown in equation B46.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.096
    
        (B) An applicant shall compute the radial distance (r) from the 
    geocenter to the launch vehicle position.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.097
    
        If r<>k,l then the launch vehicle position is below 
    the Earth's surface and an impact point cannot be computed. An 
    applicant
    
    [[Page 34380]]
    
    must restart the calcuations with the next trajectory state vector.
        (C) An applicant shall compute the inertial velocity components.
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.098
        
    
    Where:
    
     = 4.178074 x 10-3 deg/sec
    
        (D) An applicant shall compute the magnitude of the inertial 
    velocity vector.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.099
    
        (E) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
    trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly 
    at epoch. (c).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.100
    
    Where:
    
    K=1.407644 x 1016 ft3/sec2
    
        (F) An applicant shall compute the semi-major axis of the 
    trajectory ellipse (at).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.101
    
        If at <0 or="">t>  then the 
    trajectory orbit is not elliptical, but is hyperbolic or parabolic, 
    and an impact point cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has 
    achieved escape velocity and the applicant may terminate 
    computations.
        (G) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
    trajectory ellipse multipled by the sine of the eccentric anomaly at 
    epoch (s).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.102
    
        (H) An applicant shall compute the eccentricity of the 
    trajectory ellipse squared (\2\).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.103
    
        If [a(1-)-a]>0 and 
    0 then the trajectory perigee height is positive 
    and an impact point cannot be computed. The launch vehicle has 
    achieved earth orbit and the applicant may terminate computations.
        (I) An applicant shall computer the eccentricity of the 
    trajectory ellipse multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly 
    at impact (ck).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.104
    
        (J) An applicant shall compute the eccentrity of the trajectory 
    ellipse multiplied by the sine of the eccentric anomaly at impact 
    (sk).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.105
    
        If sk <0 then="" the="" trajectory="" orbit="" does="" not="" intersect="" the="" earth's="" surface="" and="" an="" impact="" point="" cannot="" be="" computed.="" the="" launch="" vehicle="" has="" achieved="" earth="" orbit="" and="" the="" applicant="" may="" terminate="" computations.="" (k)="" an="" applicant="" shall="" compute="" the="" cosine="" of="" the="" difference="" between="" the="" eccentric="" anomaly="" at="" impact="" and="" the="" eccentric="" anomaly="" at="" epoch="">ck).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.106
    
        (L) An applicant shall compute the sine of the difference 
    between the eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at 
    epoch sk).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.107
    
        (M) An applicant shall compute the f-series expansion of 
    Kepler's equations.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.108
    
        (N) An applicant shall compute the g-series expansion of 
    Kepler's equations.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.109
    
        (O) An applicant shall compute the E,F,G coordinates at impact 
    (Ei,Fi,Gi).
    
    [[Page 34381]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.110
    
    
        (P) An applicant shall approximate the distance from the 
    geocenter to the launch vehicle position at impact 
    (rk,2).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.111
    
    Where:
    
    aE=20925646.3255 ft
    e2=0.00669437999013
    
        (Q) An applicant shall let rk+1,1=rk,2, 
    substitute rk+1,1 for rk,1in equation B55 and 
    repeat equations B55-B64 up to four more times incrementing ``k'' by 
    one on each loop (e.g. {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}). If 
    |r5,1-r5,2|>1 then the iterative solution does 
    not converge and an impact point does not meet the accuracy 
    tolerance of plus or minus one foot. An applicant must try more 
    iterations, or restart the calculations with the next trajectory 
    state vector.
        (R) An applicant shall compute the difference between the 
    eccentric anomaly at impact and the eccentric anomaly at epoch 
    ().
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.112
    
        (S) An applicant shall compute the time of flight from epoch to 
    impact (t).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.113
    
        (T) An applicant shall compute the geocentric latitude at impact 
    (').
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.114
    
    Where:
    
    +90 deg. 'oi  
    -90 deg.
    
        (U) An applicant shall compute the deodetic latitude at impact ( 
     ).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.115
    
    Where:
    
    +90 deg. 'oi  
    -90 deg.
    
        (V) An applicant shall compute the East longitude at impact 
    ().
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.116
    
        (W) If the range from the launch point to the impact point is 
    equal to or greater than 5000nm, an applicant shall terminate IIP 
    computations.
        (4) For a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an applicant shall 
    define a final stage impact dispersion area as part of the flight 
    corridor and show the area on a map using the following procedure:
        (i) For equation B70 below, an applicant shall use an apogee 
    altitude (Hap) corresponding to the highest altitude 
    reached by the launch vehicle final stage in the applicant's launch 
    vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance with paragraph 
    (b)(1)(ii).
        (ii) An applicant shall define the final stage impact dispersion 
    area by using a dispersion factor [DISP(Hap)] as shown 
    below. An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius (R) 
    for the final launch vehicle stage. An applicant shall set R equal 
    to the maximum apogee altitude (Hap) multiplied by the 
    dispersion factor as shown below:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.117
    
    Where:
    
    DISP(Hap) =0.05
    
        (5) An applicant shall combine the launch area and downrange 
    area flight corridor and any final stage impact dispersion area for 
    a guided suborbital launch vehicle.
        (i) On the same map with the launch area flight corridor, an 
    applicant shall plot the latitude and longitude positions of the 
    left and right sides of the downrange area of the flight corridor 
    calculated in subparagraph (d)(3).
        (ii) An applicant shall connect the latitude and longitude 
    positions of the left side of the downrange area of the flight 
    corridor sequentially starting with the last IIP calculated on the 
    left side and ending with the first IIP calculated on the left side. 
    An applicant shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
        (iii) An applicant shall connect the left sides of the launch 
    area and downrange portions of the flight corridor. An applicant 
    shall repeat this procedure for the right side.
        (iv) An applicant shall plot the overflight exclusion zone 
    defined in subparagraph (c)(7).
        (v) An applicant shall draw any impact dispersion area on the 
    downrange map with the center of the impact dispersion area on the 
    launch vehicle final stage point obtained from the applicant's 
    launch vehicle trajectory analysis done in accordance with 
    subparagraph (b)(1)(ii).
    
    (e) Evaluate the Launch Site
    
        (1) An applicant shall evaluate the flight corridor for the 
    presence of populated areas. If no populated area is located within 
    the flight corridor, then no additional steps are necessary.
        (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
    zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
    are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
    agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
    exclusion zone during a launch.
        (3) If a populated area is located within the flight corridor, 
    an applicant may modify its proposal or complete an overflight risk 
    analysis as provided in appendix C.
    
    Appendix C to Part 420--Risk Analysis
    
    (a) Introduction
    
        (1) This appendix provides a method for an applicant to estimate 
    the expected casualty (Ec) for a launch of a guided 
    launch vehicle using a flight corridor generated either by appendix 
    A or appendix B. This appendix also provides an applicant options to 
    simplify the method where population at risk is minimal.
        (2) An applicant shall perform a risk analysis when a populated 
    area is located within a flight corridor defined by either
    
    [[Page 34382]]
    
    appendix A or appendix B. If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 
    30 x 10-6, an applicant may either modify its proposal, 
    or if the flight corridor used was generated by the appendix A 
    method, use the appendix B method to narrow the flight corridor and 
    then redo the overflight risk analysis pursuant to this appendix C. 
    If the estimated expected casualty still exceeds 
    30 x 10-6, the FAA will not approve the location of the 
    proposed launch point.
    
    (b) Data Requirements
    
        (1) An applicant shall obtain the data specified in 
    subparagraphs (b)(2) and (3) and summarized in table C-1, Table C-1 
    provides sources where an applicant may obtain data acceptable to 
    the FAA. An applicant will also employ the flight corridor 
    information from appendix A or B, including flight azimuth and, for 
    an appendix B flight corridor, trajectory information.
        (2) Population Data. Total population (N) and the total landmass 
    area within a populated area (A) are required. Population data up to 
    and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the U.S. 
    census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm are 
    required at no greater than 1 deg. x 1 deg. latitude/longitude grid 
    coordinates.
        (3) Launch Vehicle Data. These data consist of the launch 
    vehicle failure probability (Pf), the launch vehicle 
    effective casualty area (Ac), trajectory position data, 
    and the overflight dwell time (td). The failure 
    probability is a constant (Pf=0.10) for a guided orbital 
    or suborbital launch vehicle. Table C-3 provides effective casualty 
    area data based on IIP range. Trajectory position information is 
    provided from distance computations given in this appendix for an 
    appendix A flight corridor, or trajectory data used in appendix B 
    for an appendix B flight corridor. The dwell time (td) 
    may be determined from trajectory data produced when creating an 
    appendix B flight corridor.
    
                                    Table C-1.--Overflight Analysis Data Requirements
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Data category                      Data item                             Data source
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Population Data....................  Total population within a    Within 100 nm of the launch point: U.S. census
                                          populated area (N).          data at the census block-group level.
                                                                       Downrange from 100 nm beyond the launch
                                                                       point, world population data are available
                                                                       from:
                                         Total landmass area within   Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center
                                          the populated area (A).      (CDIAC).
                                                                      Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
                                                                      Database--Global Population Distribution
                                                                       (1990), Terrestrial Area and Country Name
                                                                       Information on a One by One Degree Grid Cell
                                                                       Basis (DB1016 (8-1996)).
    Launch Vehicle Data................  Failure probability--        N/A.
                                          Pf=0.10.
                                         Effective casualty area      See table C-3.
                                          (Ac).
                                         Overflight dwell time......  Determined by range from the launch point or
                                                                       trajectory used by applicant.
                                         Nominal Trajectory Data      See appendix B, table B-1.
                                          (for an appendix B flight
                                          corridor only).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    (c) Estimating Corridor Casualty Expectation
    
        (1) A corridor casualty expectation [E(Corridor)] 
    estimate is the sum of the expected casualty measurement of each 
    populated area inside a flight corridor.
        (2) An applicant shall identify and locate each populated area 
    in the proposed flight corridor.
        (3) An applicant shall determine the probability of impact in 
    each populated area using the procedures in subparagraphs (5) or (6) 
    of this paragraph. Figures C-1 and C-2 show an area considered for 
    probability of impact (Pi) computations by the dashed-
    lined box around the populated area within a flight corridor, and 
    figure C-3 shows a populated area in a final stage impact dispersion 
    area. An applicant shall then estimate the Ec for each 
    populated area using the procedures in subparagraphs (7) and (8) of 
    this paragraph.
        (4) The Pi computations do not directly account for 
    populated areas whose areas are bisected by an appendix A flight 
    corridor centerline or an appendix B nominal trajectory ground 
    trace. Accordingly, an applicant must evaluate Pi for 
    each of the bi-sections as two separate populated area, as shown in 
    figure C-4, which shows one bi-section to the left of an appendix A 
    flight corridor's centerline and one on its right.
        (5) Probability of Impact (Pi) Computations for a 
    Populated Area in an appendix A Flight Corridor. An applicant shall 
    computer Pi. for each populated area using the following 
    method:
        (i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not a final stage 
    impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an 
    applicant shall compute Pi, for each populated area using 
    the following equation:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.118
    
    Where:
    
    x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
    distance (nm) along the flight corridor centerline to the populated 
    area (see figure C-1)
    y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
    distance (nm) to the populated area measured from the flight 
    corridor centerline (see figure C-1)
     = one-fifth of the cross range 
    distance from the centerline to the flight corridor boundary (see 
    figure C-1)
    exp = exponential function (ex)
    Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
    R = IIP range rate (nm/sec) (see table C-2)
    C = 643 seconds (constant)
    
                    Table C-2.--IIP Range Rate vs. IIP Range
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  IIP range
                           IIP range (nm)                        rate (nm/s)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    0-75.......................................................         0.75
    76-300.....................................................         1.73
    301-900....................................................         4.25
    901-1700...................................................         8.85
    1701-2600..................................................        19.75
    
    [[Page 34383]]
    
     
    2601-3500..................................................        42.45
    3500-4500..................................................        84.85
    4501-5250..................................................       154.95
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        (ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact 
    dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the 
    following method:
        (A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage 
    impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the 
    final stage impact dispersion area using equations C2 and C3:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.119
    
    Where:
    
    x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
    distance, measured along the flight corridor centerline, measured 
    from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see figure C-3)
     = one-fifth of the impact dispersion 
    radius (see figure C-3)
    exp = exponential function (ex)
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.120
    
    Where:
    
    y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
    distance to the populated area measured from the flight corridor 
    centerline (see figure C-3)
    y = one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius 
    (see figure C-3)
    exp = exponential function (ex)
    
        (B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
    boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
    otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the 
    x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the 
    impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for 
    populated area A in figure C-3 is an example, If a populated area 
    intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C3 
    by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall 
    determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and 
    y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1 
    = 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C-4. The 
    probability Py is then equal to the sum of the 
    probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area interests the 
    line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an 
    applicant shall solve equation C2 by obtaining the solution in two 
    parts in a similar manner with the values of x.
        (C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for 
    each populated area using equation C4 below:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.121
    
    Where:
    
    Ps = 1 - Pf = 0.90
    
    [[Page 34384]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.075
    
    
        (6) Probability of Impact Computations for a Populated Area in 
    an appendix B Flight Corridor. An applicant shall compute 
    Pi using the following method:
        (i) For the launch and downrange areas, but not a final stage 
    impact dispersion area for a guided suborbital launch vehicle, an 
    applicant shall compute Pi for each populated area using 
    the following equation:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.122
    
    Where:
    
    y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
    distance (nm) to a populated area measured from the nominal 
    trajectory IIP ground trace (see figure C-2)
     = one-fifth of the cross range 
    distance (nm) from nominal trajectory to the flight corridor 
    boundary (see figure C-2)
    exp = exponential function (ex)
    Pf = probability of failure = 0.10
    t  = flight time from lift-off to orbital insertion (seconds)
    td = overflight dwell time (seconds)
    
        (ii) For each populated area within a final stage impact 
    dispersion area, an applicant shall compute Pi using the 
    following method:
        (A) An applicant shall estimate the probability of final stage 
    impact in the x and y sectors of each populated area within the 
    final stage impact dispersion area using equations C6 and C7:
    
    [[Page 34385]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.123
    
    
    Where:
    
    x1, x2 = closest and farthest downrange 
    distance, measured along nominal trajectory IIP ground trace, 
    measured from the nominal impact point to the populated area (see 
    figure C-3)
     = one-fifth of the impact dispersion 
    radius (see figure C-3)
    exp  = exponential function (ex)
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.124
    
    Where:
    
    y1, y2 = closest and farthest cross range 
    distance to the populated area measured form the nominal trajectory 
    IIP ground trace (see figure C-3)
     = one-fifth of the impact dispersion 
    radius (see figure C-3)
    exp = exponential function (ex)
    
        (B) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
    boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
    otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the 
    x2  or y2 distance should be set equal to the 
    impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for 
    populated area A in figure C-3 is an example. If a populated area 
    intersects the flight azimuth, an applicant shall solve equation C7 
    by obtaining the solution in two parts. An applicant shall 
    determine, first, the probability between y1 = 0 and 
    y2 = a and, second, the probability between y1 
    = 0 and y2 = b, as depicted in figure C-4. The 
    probability Py is then equal to the sum of the 
    probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area interests the 
    line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an 
    applicant shall solve equation C6 by obtaining the solution in two 
    parts in a similar manner with the values of x.
        (C) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact for 
    each populated area using equation C8 below:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.125
    
    Where:
    
    Ps = 1 - Pf = 0.90
    
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
    
    [[Page 34386]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.076
    
    
    
    [[Page 34387]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.077
    
    
    
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-C
    
    [[Page 34388]]
    
        (7) Using the Pi calculated in either subparagraph 
    (c)(5) or (6) of this paragraph, an applicant shall calculate the 
    casualty expectancy for each populated area within the flight 
    corridor. Eck is the casualty expectancy for a given 
    populated area as shown in equation C9, where individual populated 
    areas are designated with the subscript ``k''.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.126
    
    Where:
    Ac = casualty area (from table C-3)
    Ak = populated area
    Nk = population in Ak
    
                                                 Table C-3--Effective Casualty Area (miles2) vs. IIP Range (nm)
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Orbital launch vehicles                                                         Suborbital launch
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------        vehicles
                                                                                                                                     -----------------------
            IIP Range (nmi)                   Small                   Medium               Medium  large               Large                  Guided
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    0-49...........................  0.43...................  0.53..................  0.71..................  1.94..................  0.43
    50-1749........................  0.13...................  0.0022................  0.11..................  0.62..................  0.13
    1750-5000......................  3.59  x  10-6..........  8.3  x  10-4..........  1.08  x  10-1.........  7.17  x  10-1.........  3.59  x  10-6
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        (8) An applicant shall estimate the total corridor risk using 
    the following summation of risk, including a multiplier of two, as 
    shown in equation C10.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.127
    
        (9) Alternative Casualty Expectancy (Ec) Analyses. An 
    applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined in 
    subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8). Those variations are identified in 
    subparagraphs (9)(i) through (vi) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs 
    (i) through (iv) permits an applicant to make conservative 
    assumptions that would lead to an overestimation of the corridor 
    Ec compared with the analysis defined in subparagraphs 
    (c)(1)-(8). In subparagraphs (v) and (vi), an applicant that would 
    otherwise fail the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (c)(1)-(8) 
    may avoid (c)(1)-(8)'s overestimation of the probability of impact 
    in each populated area. An applicant employing a variation shall 
    identify the variation used, show and discuss the specific 
    assumptions made to a modify the analysis defined in subparagraphs 
    (c)(1)-(8), and demonstrate how each assumption leads to 
    overestimation of the corridor Ec compared with the 
    analysis defined in subparagraphs (c)(1)-(c)(8).
        (i) Assume that Px and Py have a value of 
    1.0 for all populated areas.
        (ii) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated 
    areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas 
    equal to the most dense populated area.
        (iii) for any given populated area, assume Py has a 
    value of one.
        (iv) For any given Px sector (an area spanning the 
    width of a flight corridor and bounded by two time points on the 
    trajectory IIP ground trace) Py has a value of one and 
    use a population density for the sector equal to the most dense 
    populated area.
        (v) For a given populated area, divided the populated area into 
    smaller rectangles, determined Pi for each individual 
    rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine 
    Pi for thee entire populated area.
        (vi) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated 
    area to the area of the Pi rectangle from the 
    subparagraph (c)(1)-(8) analysis.
    
    (d) Evaluation of Results
    
        (1) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 30  
    x 10-6, the FAA will approve the launch site location.
        (2) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30  
    x 10-6, then an applicant may either modify its proposal, 
    or, if the flight corridor used was generated by the appendix A 
    method, use the appendix B method to narrow the flight corridor and 
    then perform another appendix C risk analysis.
    
    Appendix D to Part 420--Impact Dispersion Area and Casualty Expectancy 
    Estimate for an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle
    
    (a) Introduction
    
        (1) This appendix provides an method for determining the 
    acceptability of the location of a launch point from which an 
    unguided suborbital launch vehicle would be launched. The appendix 
    describes how to define an overflight exclusion zone and impact 
    dispersion areas, and how to evaluate whether the public risk 
    presented by the launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle 
    remains at acceptable levels.
        (2) An applicant shall base its analysis on an unguided 
    suborbital launch vehicle whose final launch vehicle stage apogee 
    represents the intended use of the launch point.
        (3) An applicant shall use the apogee of each stage of an 
    existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle with a final launch 
    vehicle stage apogee equal to the one proposed, and calculate each 
    impact range and dispersion area using the equations provided.
        (4) This appendix also provides a method of performing an impact 
    risk analysis that estimates the expected casualty (Ec) 
    within each impact dispersion area. This appendix provides an 
    applicant options to simplify the method where population at risk is 
    minimal.
        (5) If the Ec is less than or equal to 30  
    x 10-6, the FAA will approve the launch point for 
    unguided suborbital launch vehicles. If the Ec exceeds 30 
     x 10-6, the proposed launch point will fail the launch 
    site location review.
    
    (b) Data Requirements
    
        (1) An applicant shall employ the apogee of each stage of an 
    existing unguided suborbital launch vehicle whose final stage apogee 
    represents the maximum altitude to be reached by unguided suborbital 
    launch vehicles launched from the launch point. The apogee shall be 
    obtained from one or more actual flights of an unguided suborbital 
    launch vehicle launched at an 84 degree elevation.
        (2) An applicant shall satisfy the map and plotting data 
    requirements in appendix A, paragraph (b).
        (3) Population Data. An applicant shall use total population (N) 
    and the total landmass are within a populated area (A) for all 
    populated areas within an impact dispersion area. Population data up 
    to and including 100 nm from the launch point are required at the 
    U.S. census block group level. Population data downrange from 100 nm 
    are required at no greater than 1 deg.  x  1 deg. latitude/longitude 
    grid coordinates.
    
    (c) Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion Area
    
        (1) An applicant shall choose a flight azimuth from a launch 
    point.
        (2) An applicant shall define an overflight exclusion zone as a 
    circle with a radius of 1600 feet centered on the launch point.
        (3) An applicant shall define an impact dispersion area for each 
    stage of the suborbital launch vehicle chosen in subparagraph (b)(1) 
    as provided below:
        (i) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for the final 
    launch vehicle stage (Dn). An applicant shall set 
    Dn equal to the last
    
    [[Page 34389]]
    
    stage apogee altitude (Hn) multiplied by an impact range 
    factor [IP(Hn)] as shown below:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.128
    
    Where:
    
    IP(Hn)=0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
    IP(Hn)=0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater.
        (ii) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for each 
    intermediate stage (Di), where i{1, 2, 3, . . . 
    (n-1)}, and where n is the total number of launch vehicle stages. 
    Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate 
    stage, an applicant shall used equation D1 to compute the impact 
    range of each stage by substituting Hi for Hn. 
    An applicant shall use the impact range factors provided in equation 
    D1.
        (iii) An applicant shall calculate the impact dispersion radius 
    for the final launch vehicle stage (Rn). An applicant 
    shall set Rn equal to the last stage apogee altitude 
    (Hn) multiplied by an impact dispersion factor 
    [DISP(Hn)] as shown below:
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.129
    
    Where:
    
    DISP(Hn)=0.4 for an apogee less than 100 km, and
    DISP(Hn)=0.7 for an apogee 100 km or greater
        (iv) An applicant shall calculate the impact range for each 
    intermediate stage (Ri), where i{1,2,3, . . . 
    (n-1)}. and where n is the total number of launch vehicle stages. 
    Using the apogee altitude (Hi) of each intermediate 
    stage, an applicant shall used equation D2 to compute impact 
    dispression radius of each stage by substituting Hi for 
    Hn. An applicant shall use the dispersion factors 
    provided in equation D2.
        (4) An applicant shall display an oversflight exclusion zone, 
    each intermediate and final stage impact point (Di 
    through Dn), and each impact dispersion area for the 
    intermediate and final launch vehicle stages on maps in accordance 
    with paragraph (b)(2).
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.078
    
    (d) Evaluate the Overflight Exclusion Zone and Impact Dispersion 
    Areas
    
        (1) An applicant shall evaluate the overflight exclusion zone 
    and each impact dispersion area for the presence of any populated 
    areas. If an applicant determines that no populated area is located 
    within the overflight exclusion zone or any impact dispersion area, 
    then no additional steps are necessary.
        (2) If a populated area is located in an overflight exclusion 
    zone, an applicant may modify its proposal or demonstrate that there 
    are times when no people are present or that the applicant has an 
    agreement in place to evacuate the public from the overflight 
    exclusion zone during a launch.
        (3) If a populated area is located within any impact dispersion 
    area, an applicant may modify its proposal and defined a new 
    exclusion zone and new impact dispersion areas, or perform an impact 
    risk analysis as provided in paragraph (e).
    
    (e) Impact Risk Analysis
    
        (1) An applicant shall estimate the expected average number of 
    casualties, EC, within the impact dispersion areas 
    according to the following method:
        (i) An applicant shall calculate the Ec by summing 
    the impact risk for the impact dispersion areas of the final launch 
    vehicle stage and all intermediate stages. An applicant shall 
    estimate Ec for the impact dispersion area of each stage 
    by using equation D3 through D7 for each of the populated areas 
    located within the impact dispersion areas.
        (ii) An applicant shall estimate the probability of impacting 
    inside the X and Y sectors of each populated area within each impact 
    dispersion area using equations D3 and D4 below:
    
    [[Page 34390]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.130
    
    
    Where:
    
    x1, x2=closest and farthest downrange distance 
    to populated area (see figure D-2)
    x=one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius (see 
    figure D-2)
    exp=exponential function (ex)
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.131
    
    Where:
    
    y1, y2=closest and farthest cross range 
    distance to the populated area (see figure D-2)
    y=one-fifth of the impact dispersion radius (see 
    figure D-2)
    exp=exponential function (ex)
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.079
    
        (iii) If a populated area intersects the impact dispersion area 
    boundary so that the x2 or y2 distance would 
    otherwise extend outside the impact dispersion area, the 
    x2 or y2 distance should be set equal to the 
    impact dispersion area radius. The x2 distance for 
    populated area A in figure D-2 is an example.
        (iv) If a populated area intersects the flight azimuth, an 
    applicant shall solve equation D4 by obtaining the solution in two 
    parts. An applicant shall determine, first, the probability between 
    y1=0 and y2=a and, second, the probability 
    between y1=0 and y2=b, as depicted in figure 
    D-3. The probability Py is then equal to the sum of the 
    probabilities of the two parts. If a populated area intersects the 
    line that is normal to the flight azimuth on the impact point, an 
    applicant shall solve equation D3 by obtaining the solution in two 
    parts in the same manner as with the values of x.
    
    [[Page 34391]]
    
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.080
    
    
        (v) An applicant shall calculate the probability of impact 
    (Pi) for each populated area using the following 
    equation;
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.132
    
    Where:
    
    Ps=probability of success=0.98
    
        (vi) An applicant shall calculate the casualty expectancy for 
    each populated area. Eck is the casualty expectancy for a 
    given populated area as shown in equation D6, where individual 
    populated areas are designated with the subscript ``k''.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.133
    
    Where   {1, 2, 3, . . . n}
    Ac=casualty area (from table D-1)
    Ak=populated area
    Nk=population in Ak
    
            Table D-1.--Effective Casualty Area (Ac) vs. Impact Range
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Effective casualty area
                 Impact range (nm)                        (miles2)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    0-4.......................................  9 x 10-3
    5-49......................................  9 x 10-3
    50-1,749..................................  1.1 x 10-3
    1,750-4,999...............................  3.6 x 10-6
    5,000-more................................  3.6 x 10-6
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        (vii) An applicant shall estimate the total risk using the 
    following summation of risk, including a multiplier of five, as 
    shown in equation D7.
    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP25JN99.134
    
        (viii) Alternative Casualty Expectancy (EC) Analysis. 
    An applicant may employ specified variations to the analysis defined 
    in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). Those variations are identified in 
    subparagraphs (viii)(A) through (F) of this paragraph. Subparagraphs 
    (A) through (D) permit an applicant to make conservative assumptions 
    that would lead to an overestimation of Ec compared with 
    the analysis defined in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii). In 
    subparagraphs (E) and (F), an applicant that would otherwise fail 
    the analysis prescribed by subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii) may avoid 
    (d)(1)(i)-(vii)'s overestimation of the probability of impact on 
    each populated area. An applicant employing a variation shall 
    identify the variation used, show an discuss
    
    [[Page 34392]]
    
    the specific assumptions made to modify the analysis defined in 
    subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii), and justify how each assumption leads 
    to overestimation of the corridor Ec compared with the 
    analysis defined in subparagraphs (d)(1)(i)-(vii).
        (A) Assume that Px and Py have a valve of 
    1.0 for all populated areas.
        (B) Combine populated areas into one or more larger populated 
    areas, and use a population density for the combined area or areas 
    equal to the most dense populated area.
        (C) For any given populated area, assume Px has a 
    value of one.
        (D) For any given populated area, assume Py has a 
    value of one.
        (E) For a given populated area, divide the populated area into 
    small rectangles, determine Pi for each individual 
    rectangle, and sum the individual impact probabilities to determine 
    Pi for the entire populated area.
        (F) For a given populated area, use the ratio of the populated 
    area to the area of the Pi rectangle from the 
    subparagraph (d)(1)(i)-(vii) analysis.
        (2) If the estimated expected casualty does not exceed 30  x  
    10-6, then no additional steps are necessary.
        (3) If the estimated expected casualty exceeds 30  x  
    10-6, then an applicant may modify its proposal and then 
    repeat the impact risk analysis per this appendix D. If no set of 
    impact dispersion areas exist which satisfy the FAA's risk 
    threshold, the applicant's proposed launch site will fail the launch 
    site location review.
    
    Appendix E to Part 420.--Tables for Explosive Site Plan
    
                       Table E-1 Quantity Distance Requirements for Division 1.3 Solid Propellants
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Quantity (lbs.) (over)     Qhantity (lbs.) (not over)  Public area distance (ft.)   Intraline distance (ft.)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            0                        1,000                           75                          50
                        1,000                        5,000                          115                          75
                        5,000                       10,000                          150                         100
                       10,000                       20,000                          190                         125
                       20,000                       30,000                          215                         145
                       30,000                       40,000                          235                         155
                       40,000                       50,000                          250                         165
                       50,000                       60,000                          260                         175
                       60,000                       70,000                          270                         185
                       70,000                       80,000                          280                         190
                       80,000                       90,000                          195                         195
                       90,000                      100,000                          300                         200
                      100,000                      200,000                          375                         250
                      200,000                      300,000                          450                         300
                      300,000                      400,000                          525                         350
                      400,000                      500,000                          600                         400
                      500,000                    1,000,000                          800                         500
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
               Table E-2: Liquid Propellant Explosive Equivalents
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Propelland combinations                Explosive equivalent
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    LO2/LH2............................  The larger of: 8W2/3 where W is the
                                          weight of LO2/LH2, or 14% of W.
    LO2/LH2+LO2/RP-1...................  Sum of (20% for LO2/RP-1)+the
                                          larger of: 8W2/3 where W is the
                                          weight of LO2/LH2, or 14% of W.
    LO2/RP-1...........................  20% of W up to 500,000 pounds plus
                                          10% of W over 500,000 pounds,
                                          where W is the weight of LO2/RP-1.
    N2O4N2H4 (or UDMH OR UDMH/N2H4       10% of W, where W is the weight of
     Mixture).                            the propellant.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
                Table E-3: Propellant Hazard and Compatibility Groupings and Factors To Be Used When Converting Gallons of Propellant Into Pounds
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                                             At temperature
                   Propellant                            Hazard group                     Compatibility group             Pounds/gallon          deg.F
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hydrogen Perioxide.....................  II                                   A                                                 11.6                  68
    Hydrazine..............................  III                                  C                                                  8.4                  68
    Liquid Hydrogen........................  III                                  C                                                  0.59               -423
    Liquid Oxygen..........................  II                                   A                                                  9.5                -297
    Nitrogen Tetroxide.....................  I                                    A                                                 12.1                  68
    RP-1...................................  I                                    C                                                  6.8                  68
    UDMH...................................  III                                  C                                                  6.6                  68
    UDHM/Hydrazine.........................  III                                  C                                                  7.5                  68
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
                           Table E-4:--Hazard Group I
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Pounds of propellant          Public area and    Intragroup and
    ------------------------------------    incompatible       compatible
           Over            Not over     ------------------------------------
    ------------------------------------  Distance in feet  Distance in feet
                                        ------------------------------------
         Column 1          Column 2           Column 3          Column 4
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 0                100                30                 25
               100                200                35                 30
               200                300                40                 35
               300                400                45                 35
    
    [[Page 34393]]
    
     
               400                500                50                 40
               500                600                50                 40
               600                700                55                 40
               700                800                55                 45
               800                900                60                 45
               900              1,000                60                 45
             1,000              2,000                65                 50
             2,000              3,000                70                 55
             3,000              4,000                75                 55
             4,000              5,000                80                 60
             5,000              6,000                80                 60
             6,000              7,000                85                 65
             7,000              8,000                85                 65
             8,000              9,000                90                 70
             9,000             10,000                90                 70
            10,000             15,000                95                 75
            15,000             20,000               100                 80
            20,000             25,000               105                 80
            25,000             30,000               110                 85
            30,000             35,000               110                 85
            35,000             40,000               115                 85
            40,000             45,000               120                 90
            45,000             50,000               120                 90
            50,000             60,000               125                 95
            60,000             70,000               130                 95
            70,000             80,000               130                100
            80,000             90,000               135                100
            90,000            100,000               135                105
           100,000            125,000               140                110
           125,000            150,000               145                110
           150,000            175,000               150                115
           175,000            200,000               155                115
           200,000            250,000               160                120
           250,000            300,000               165                125
           300,000            350,000               170                130
           350,000            400,000               175                130
           400,000            450,000               180                135
           450,000            500,000               180                135
           500,000            600,000               185                140
           600,000            700,000               190                145
           700,000            800,000               195                150
           800,000            900,000               200                150
           900,000          1,000,000               205                155
         1,000,000          2,000,000               235                175
         2,000,000          3,000,000               255                190
         3,000,000          4,000,000               265                200
         4,000,000          5,000,000               275                210
         5,000,000          6,000,000               285                215
         6,000,000          7,000,000               295                220
         7,000,000          8,000,000               300                225
         8,000,000          9,000,000               305                230
         9,000,000         10,000,000               310                235
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
                                               Table E-5: Hazard Group II
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      Pounds of propellant                          Public area and        Intragroup and compatible
    ---------------------------------------------------------        incompatible        ---------------------------
                Over                       Not over          ----------------------------      Distance in feet
    ---------------------------------------------------------      Distance in feet      ---------------------------
                                                             ----------------------------
              Column 1                     Column 2                    Column 3                    Column 4
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            0                          100                           60                          30
                          100                          200                           75                          35
                          200                          300                           85                          40
                          300                          400                           90                          45
                          400                          500                          100                          50
                          500                          600                          100                          50
                          600                          700                          105                          55
    
    [[Page 34394]]
    
     
                          700                          800                          110                          55
                          800                          900                          115                          60
                          900                        1,000                          120                          60
                        1,000                        2,000                          130                          65
                        2,000                        3,000                          145                          70
                        3,000                        4,000                          150                          75
                        4,000                        5,000                          160                          80
                        5,000                        6,000                          165                          80
                        6,000                        7,000                          170                          85
                        7,000                        8,000                          175                          85
                        8,000                        9,000                          175                          90
                        9,000                       10,000                          180                          90
                       10,000                       15,000                          195                          95
                       15,000                       20,000                          205                         100
                       20,000                       25,000                          215                         105
                       25,000                       30,000                          220                         110
                       30,000                       35,000                          225                         110
                       35,000                       40,000                          230                         115
                       40,000                       45,000                          235                         120
                       45,000                       50,000                          240                         120
                       50,000                       60,000                          250                         125
                       60,000                       70,000                          255                         130
                       70,000                       80,000                          260                         130
                       80,000                       90,000                          265                         135
                       90,000                      100,000                          270                         135
                      100,000                      125,000                          285                         140
                      125,000                      150,000                          295                         145
                      150,000                      175,000                          305                         150
                      175,000                      200,000                          310                         155
                      200,000                      250,000                          320                         160
                      250,000                      300,000                          330                         165
                      300,000                      350,000                          340                         170
                      350,000                      400,000                          350                         175
                      400,000                      450,000                          355                         180
                      450,000                      500,000                          360                         180
                      500,000                      600,000                          375                         185
                      600,000                      700,000                          385                         190
                      700,000                      800,000                          395                         195
                      800,000                      900,000                          405                         200
                      900,000                    1,000,000                          410                         205
                    1,000,000                    2,000,000                          470                         235
                    2,000,000                    3,000,000                          505                         255
                    3,000,000                    4,000,000                          535                         265
                    4,000,000                    5,000,000                          555                         275
                    5,000,000                    6,000,000                          570                         285
                    6,000,000                    7,000,000                          585                         295
                    7,000,000                    8,000,000                          600                         300
                    8,000,000                    9,000,000                          610                         305
                    9,000,000                   10,000,000                          620                         310
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
                          Table E-6:--Hazard Group III
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Pounds of propellant          Public area and    Intragroup and
    ------------------------------------    incompatible       compatible
           Over            Not over     ------------------------------------
    ------------------------------------  Distance in feet  Distance in feet
                                        ------------------------------------
         Column 1          Column 2           Column 3          Column 4
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 0                100               600                 30
               100                200               600                 35
               200                300               600                 40
               300                400               600                 45
               400                500               600                 50
               500                600               600                 50
               600                700               600                 55
               700                800               600                 55
               800                900               600                 60
               900              1,000               600                 60
    
    [[Page 34395]]
    
     
             1,000              2,000               600                 65
             2,000              3,000               600                 70
             3,000              4,000               600                 75
             4,000              5,000               600                 80
             5,000              6,000               600                 80
             6,000              7,000               600                 85
             7,000              8,000               600                 85
             8,000              9,000               600                 90
             9,000             10,000               600                 90
            10,000             15,000             1,200                 95
            15,000             20,000             1,200                100
            20,000             25,000             1,200                105
            25,000             30,000             1,200                110
            30,000             35,000             1,200                110
            35,000             40,000             1,200                115
            40,000             45,000             1,200                120
            45,000             50,000             1,200                120
            50,000             60,000             1,200                125
            60,000             70,000             1,200                130
            70,000             80,000             1,200                130
            80,000             90,000             1,200                135
            90,000            100,000             1,200                135
           100,000            125,000             1,800                140
           125,000            150,000             1,800                145
           150,000            175,000             1,800                150
           175,000            200,000             1,800                155
           200,000            250,000             1,800                160
           250,000            300,000             1,800                165
           300,000            350,000             1,800                170
           350,000            400,000             1,800                175
           400,000            450,000             1,800                180
           450,000            500,000             1,800                180
           500,000            600,000             1,800                185
           600,000            700,000             1,800                190
           700,000            800,000             1,800                195
           800,000            900,000             1,800                200
           900,000          1,000,000             1,800                205
         1,000,000          2,000,000             1,800                235
         2,000,000          3,000,000             1,800                255
         3,000,000          4,000,000             1,800                265
         4,000,000          5,000,000             1,800                275
         5,000,000          6,000,000             1,800                285
         6,000,000          7,000,000             1,800                295
         7,000,000          8,000,000             1,800                300
         8,000,000          9,000,000             1,800                300
         9,000,000         10,000,000             1,800                310
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
             Table E-7:--Distances When Explosive Equivalents Apply
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                  Distance in feet
         TNT equivalent weight of      -------------------------------------
                propellants               To public area       Intraline
    Column 1                                     Column 2           Column 3
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not Over:                                                Unbarricaded
        100...........................              1,250                 80
        200...........................              1,250                100
        300...........................              1,250                120
        400...........................              1,250                130
        500...........................              1,250                140
        600...........................              1,250                150
        700...........................              1,250                160
        800...........................              1,250                170
        900...........................              1,250                180
        1,000.........................              1,250                190
        1,500.........................              1,250                210
        2,000.........................              1,250                230
    
    [[Page 34396]]
    
     
        3,000.........................              1,250                260
        4,000.........................              1,250                280
        5,000.........................              1,250                300
        6,000.........................              1,250                320
        7,000.........................              1,250                340
        8,000.........................              1,250                360
        9,000.........................              1,250                380
        10,000........................              1,250                400
        15,000........................              1,250                450
        20,000........................              1,250                490
        25,000........................              1,250                530
        30,000........................              1,250                560
        35,000........................              1,310                590
        40,000........................              1,370                620
        45,000........................              1,425                640
        50,000........................              1,475                660
        55,000........................              1,520                680
        60,000........................              1,565                700
        65,000........................              1,610                720
        70,000........................              1,650                740
        75,000........................              1,685                770
        80,000........................              1,725                780
        85,000........................              1,760                790
        90,000........................              1,795                800
        95,000........................              1,825                820
        100,000.......................              1,855                830
        125,000.......................              2,115                900
        150,000.......................              2,350                950
        175,000.......................              2,565              1,000
        200,000.......................              2,770              1,050
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    [FR Doc. 99-15384 Filed 6-24-99; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
06/25/1999
Department:
Federal Aviation Administration
Entry Type:
Proposed Rule
Action:
Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
Document Number:
99-15384
Dates:
Comments on the proposed regulations must be submitted on or before September 23, 1999.
Pages:
34316-34396 (81 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. FAA-1999-5833, Notice No. 99-07
RINs:
2120-AG15: License Requirements for Operation of a Launch Site
RIN Links:
https://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/2120-AG15/license-requirements-for-operation-of-a-launch-site
PDF File:
99-15384.pdf
CFR: (33)
14 CFR 0.00003
14 CFR 173.50
14 CFR 401.5
14 CFR 420.1
14 CFR 420.3
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