98-16960. Special Conditions: Eurocopter France Model AS-365 N3 ``Dauphin'' Helicopters, Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC)  

  • [Federal Register Volume 63, Number 123 (Friday, June 26, 1998)]
    [Rules and Regulations]
    [Pages 34784-34786]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 98-16960]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    
    Federal Aviation Administration
    
    14 CFR Parts 21 and 29
    
    [Docket No. SW002; Special Condition No. 29-002-SC]
    
    
    Special Conditions: Eurocopter France Model AS-365 N3 ``Dauphin'' 
    Helicopters, Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC)
    
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
    
    ACTION: Final special condition; request for comments.
    
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    SUMMARY: This special condition is issued for the Eurocopter France 
    Model AS-365 N3 ``Dauphin'' helicopters. These helicopters will have a 
    novel or unusual design feature associated with the Full Authority 
    Digital Engine Control (FADEC). The applicable airworthiness 
    regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards to 
    protect systems that perform critical functions from the effects of 
    high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF). This special condition contains 
    the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers 
    necessary to ensure that critical functions of systems will be 
    maintained when exposed to HIRF.
    
    DATES: The effective date of this special condition is June 17, 1998. 
    Comments must be received on or before August 25, 1998.
    
    ADDRESSES: Comments on this special condition may be mailed in 
    duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Regional 
    Counsel, Southwest Region, Attention: Rules Docket No. SW002, Fort 
    Worth, Texas 76193-0007 or deliver in duplicate to the Office of the 
    Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, at 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, 
    Texas 76137. Comments must be marked: Rules Docket No. SW002. Comments 
    may be inspected in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, 
    between 8:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carroll Wright, FAA, Rotorcraft 
    Directorate, Regulations Group, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0111; telephone 
    817-222-5120, fax 817-222-5961.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice and 
    opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable because 
    these procedures would significantly delay issuance of the approval 
    design and thus delivery of the affected aircraft. In addition, notice 
    and opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary since the 
    substance of this special condition has been subject to the public 
    comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments 
    received. The FAA therefore finds that good cause exists for making 
    this special condition effective upon issuance.
    
    Comments Invited
    
        Interested persons are invited to submit such written data, views, 
    or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the 
    regulatory docket and be submitted in duplicate to the address 
    specified above. All communications received on or before the closing 
    date for comments will be considered by the Administrator. The special 
    condition may be changed in light of the comments received. All 
    comments received will be available in the Rules Docket for examination 
    by interested persons, both before and after the closing date for 
    comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA 
    personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the docket. 
    Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments 
    submitted in response to this Special Condition must include a self-
    addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: 
    ``Comments to Rules Docket No. SW002'' The postcard will be date 
    stamped and returned to the commenter.
    
    Background
    
        On September 1, 1997, Eurocopter France applied for an amendment to 
    Type Certificate (TC) No. H10EU to include the new Model AS-365 N3 
    ``Dauphin'' helicopter. The Model AS-365 N3 ``Dauphin'' helicopter, 
    which is a derivative of the Model AS-365 N2 helicopter that is 
    currently approved under TC No. H10EU, is a transport category A and B 
    helicopter powered by two Turbomeca Arriel 2C engines with FADEC. The 
    Turbomeca Arriel 1C2 engine has been replaced with the Turbomeca Arriel 
    2C engine, which includes a digital engine control system.
    
    Type Certification Basis
    
        Under the provisions of 14 CFR Sec. 21.101, Eurocopter France must 
    show that the Model AS-365 N3 ``Dauphin'' helicopter meets the 
    applicable provisions of the regulations incorporated by reference in 
    TC No. H10EU or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of 
    application for the change to the Model No. AS-365 N3. The regulations 
    incorporated by reference in the type certificate are commonly referred 
    to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The regulations 
    incorporated by reference in H10EU are as follows: Sec. 21.29 and 14 
    CFR part 29, effective February 1, 1965, plus Amendments 29-1 through 
    29-11. In addition, the applicant elected to comply with 14 CFR part 29 
    amendments 29-12 through 29-16, except for 14 CFR part 29.397 
    concerning the rotorbrake. The certification basis also includes 
    certain special conditions and equivalent safety findings that are not 
    relevant to this special condition.
        If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
    regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for 
    these helicopters because of a novel or unusual design feature, special 
    conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec. 21.16.
        In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
    conditions, the Model AS-365 N3 helicopter must comply with the noise 
    certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36; and the FAA must issue a 
    finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to Sec. 611 of Public Law 92-
    574, the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.''
        Special conditions, as appropriate, are issued in accordance with 
    Sec. 11.49, as required by Secs. 11.28 and 11.29(b), and become part of 
    the type certification basis in accordance with Sec. 21.101(b)(2).
    
    [[Page 34785]]
    
        Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
    they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended 
    later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or 
    unusual design feature, or should any other model already included on 
    the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the same novel or 
    unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the 
    other model under the provisions of Sec. 21.101(a)(1).
    
    Novel or Unusual Design Features
    
        The Eurocopter France Model AS-365 N3 ``Dauphin'' helicopter will 
    incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: Electrical, 
    electronic, or combination of electrical electronic (electrical/
    electronic) systems, such as FADEC, that will be performing functions 
    critical to the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. 
    FADEC is an electronic device that performs the functions of engine 
    control.
    
    Discussion
    
        The Eurocopter France Model AS-365 N3 ``Dauphin'' helicopter, at 
    the time of application, was identified as having modifications that 
    incorporate one and possibly more electrical/electronic systems, such 
    as FADEC. After the design is finalized, Eurocopter France will provide 
    the FAA with a preliminary hazard analysis that will identify any other 
    critical functions required for safe flight and landing that are 
    performed by the electrical/electronic systems.
        Recent advances in technology have given rise to the application in 
    aircraft designs of advanced electrical/electronic systems that perform 
    critical functions. These advanced systems respond to the transient 
    effects of induced electrical current and voltage caused by HIRF 
    incident on the external surface of the helicopter. These induced 
    transient currents and voltages can degrade the performance of the 
    electrical/ electronic systems by damaging the components or by 
    upsetting the systems' functions.
        Furthermore, the electromagnetic environment has undergone a 
    transformation not envisioned by the current application of 14 CFR 
    Sec. 29.1309(a). Higher energy levels radiate from operational 
    transmitters currently used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the 
    number of HIRF transmitters has increased significantly.
        Existing aircraft certification requirements are inappropriate in 
    view of these technological advances. In addition, the FAA has received 
    reports of some significant safety incidents and accidents involving 
    military aircraft equipped with advanced electrical/electronic systems 
    when they were exposed to electromagnetic radiation.
        The combined effects of the technological advances in helicopter 
    design and the changing environment have resulted in an increased level 
    of vulnerability of the electrical/electronic systems required for the 
    continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. Effective measures 
    to protect these helicopters against the adverse effects of exposure to 
    HIRF will be provided by the design and installation of these systems. 
    The following primary factors contributed to the current conditions: 
    (1) increased use of sensitive electronics that perform critical 
    functions; (2) reduced electromagnetic shielding afforded helicopter 
    systems by advanced technology airframe materials; (3) adverse service 
    experience of military aircraft using these technologies; and (4) an 
    increase in the number and power of radio frequency transmitters and 
    the expected increase in the future.
        The FAA recognizes the need for aircraft certification standards to 
    keep pace with the developments in technology and environment and, in 
    1986, initiated a high-priority program to (1) determine and define 
    electromagnetic energy levels; (2) develop and describe guidance 
    material for design, test, and analysis; and (3) prescribe and 
    promulgate regulatory standards.
        The FAA participated with industry and airworthiness authorities of 
    other countries to develop internationally recognized standards for 
    certification.
        The FAA and airworthiness authorities of other countries have 
    identified two levels of the HIRF environment to which a helicopter 
    could be exposed, one environment for VFR operations and a different 
    environment for IFR operations. While the HIRF rulemaking requirements 
    are being finalized, the FAA is adopting a special condition for the 
    certification of aircraft that employ electrical/electronic systems 
    that perform critical functions. The accepted maximum energy levels 
    that civilian helicopter system installations must withstand for safe 
    operation are based on surveys and analysis of existing radio frequency 
    transmitters. This special condition will require the helicopters' 
    electrical/electronic systems and associated wiring to be protected 
    from these energy levels. These external threat levels are believed to 
    represent the worst-case exposure for a helicopter operating under VFR 
    or IFR.
        Compliance with HIRF requirements will be demonstrated by tests, 
    analysis, computer models, similarity with existing systems, or a 
    combination of these methods. Service experience alone will not be 
    acceptable since such experience in normal flight operations may not 
    include an exposure to HIRF. Reliance on a system with similar design 
    features for redundancy, as a means of protection against the effects 
    of external HIRF, is generally insufficient because all elements of a 
    redundant system are likely to be concurrently exposed to the radiated 
    fields.
        This special condition will require the systems that perform 
    critical control functions, or provide critical displays as installed 
    in the aircraft, to meet certain standards based on either a defined 
    HIRF environment or a fixed value using laboratory tests. Control 
    system failures and malfunctions can more directly and abruptly 
    contribute to a catastrophic event than display system failures and 
    malfunctions. Therefore, it is considered appropriate to require more 
    rigorous HIRF verification methods for critical control systems than 
    for critical display systems.
        The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational 
    capabilities of the installed electrical/electronic systems that 
    perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft 
    is exposed to the defined HIRF test environment. The FAA has determined 
    that the test environment defined in Table 1 is acceptable for critical 
    control functions in helicopters. The test environment defined in Table 
    2 is acceptable for critical display systems in helicopters.
        The applicant may also demonstrate by a laboratory test that the 
    electrical/electronic systems that perform critical control, or provide 
    critical displays, can withstand a peak electromagnetic field strength 
    in a frequency range of 10 KHz to 18 GHz. If a 
    laboratory test is used to show compliance with the defined HIRF 
    environment, no credit will be given for signal attenuation due to 
    installation. A level of 100 volts per meter (v/m) is appropriate for 
    critical displays systems. A level of 200 v/m is appropriate for 
    critical control functions. Laboratory test levels are defined 
    according to RTCA/DO-160D Section 20 Category W (100 v/m and 150 mA) 
    and Category Y (200 v/m and 300 mA). As defined in DO-160D Section 20, 
    the test levels are defined as the peak of the root mean square (rms) 
    envelope. As a minimum, the modulations required for RTCA/DO-160D 
    Section 20 Categories W and Y will be used. Other modulations should be 
    selected for the signal most
    
    [[Page 34786]]
    
    likely to disrupt the operation of the system under test, based on its 
    design characteristics. For example, flight control systems may be 
    susceptible to 3 Hz square wave modulation while the video 
    signals for electronic display systems may be susceptible to 400 
    Hz sinusoidal modulation. If the worst-case modulation is 
    unknown or cannot be determined, default modulations may be used. 
    Suggested default values are a 1 KHz sine wave with 80 
    percent depth of modulation in the frequency range from 10 
    KHz to 400 MHz and 1 KHz square wave 
    with greater than 90 percent depth of modulation from 400 
    MHz to 18 GHz. For frequencies where the 
    unmodulated signal would cause deviations from normal operation, 
    several different modulating signals with various waveforms and 
    frequencies should be applied.
        Applicants must perform a preliminary hazard analysis to identify 
    electrical/electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term 
    ``critical'' means those functions whose failure would contribute to or 
    cause an unsafe condition that would prevent the continued safe flight 
    and landing of the helicopter. The systems identified by the hazard 
    analysis as performing critical functions are required to have HIRF 
    protection. A system may perform both critical and noncritical 
    functions. Primary electronic flight display systems and their 
    associated components perform critical functions such as attitude, 
    altitude, and airspeed indications. HIRF requirements would apply only 
    to the systems that perform critical functions.
        Acceptable system performance would be attained by demonstrating 
    that the critical function components of the system under consideration 
    continue to perform their intended function during and after exposure 
    to required electromagnetic fields. Deviations from system 
    specifications may be acceptable but must be independently assessed by 
    the FAA on a case-by-case basis.
    
               Table 1.--VFR Rotorcraft Field Strength Volts/Meter          
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Frequency                         Peak     Average 
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    10-100 KHz........................................        150        150
    100-500...........................................        200        200
    500-2000..........................................        200        200
    2-30 MHz..........................................        200        200
    30-100............................................        200        200
    100-200...........................................        200        200
    200-400...........................................        200        200
    400-700...........................................        730        200
    700-1000..........................................       1400        240
    1-2 GHz...........................................       5000        250
    2-4...............................................       6000        490
    4-6...............................................       7200        400
    6-8...............................................       1100        170
    8-12..............................................       5000        330
    12-18.............................................       2000        330
    18-40.............................................       1000        420
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    
               Table 2.--IFR Rotorcraft Field Strength Volts/Meter          
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         Frequency                         Peak     Average 
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    10-100 KHz........................................         50         50
    100-500...........................................         50         50
    500-2000..........................................         50         50
    2-30 MHz..........................................        100        100
    30-70.............................................         50         50
    70-100............................................         50         50
    100-200...........................................        100        100
    200-400...........................................        100        100
    400-700...........................................        700         50
    700-1000..........................................        700        100
    1-2 GHz...........................................       2000        200
    2-4...............................................       3000        200
    4-6...............................................       3000        200
    6-8...............................................       1000        200
    8-12..............................................       3000        300
    12-18.............................................       2000        200
    18-40.............................................        600        200
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Applicability
    
        As previously discussed, this special condition is applicable to 
    Model AS-365 N3 helicopters. Should Eurocopter France apply at a later 
    date for a change to the type certificate to include another model 
    incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special 
    condition would apply to that model as well under the provisions of 
    Sec. 21.101(a)(1).
    
    Conclusion
    
        This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
    on one model series of helicopters. It is not a rule of general 
    applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for 
    approval of these features on the helicopters.
        The substance of this special condition has been subjected to the 
    notice and comment procedures in several prior instances and has been 
    derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is 
    unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change 
    from the substance contained herein. For this reason and because a 
    delay would significantly affect the certification of the helicopter, 
    which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and 
    comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for 
    adopting this special condition upon issuance. The FAA is requesting 
    comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have 
    been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment 
    described above.
    
    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 21 and 29
    
        Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.
    
        The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: 
    42 USC 7572; 49 USC. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701-44702, 44704, 44709, 
    44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.
    
    The Special Condition
    
        Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
    Administrator, the following special condition is issued as part of the 
    type certification basis for Eurocopter France Model AS 365 N3 
    ``Dauphin'' helicopters.
    
    Protection for Electrical and Electronic Systems From High Intensity 
    Radiated Fields
    
        Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and 
    installed to ensure that the operation and operational capabilities of 
    these critical functions are not adversely affected when the helicopter 
    is exposed to high intensity radiated fields external to the 
    helicopter.
    
        Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on June 17, 1998.
    Eric Bries,
    Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate Aircraft Certification Service, 
    ASW-100.
    [FR Doc. 98-16960 Filed 6-25-98; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-U
    
    
    

Document Information

Effective Date:
6/17/1998
Published:
06/26/1998
Department:
Federal Aviation Administration
Entry Type:
Rule
Action:
Final special condition; request for comments.
Document Number:
98-16960
Dates:
The effective date of this special condition is June 17, 1998. Comments must be received on or before August 25, 1998.
Pages:
34784-34786 (3 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. SW002, Special Condition No. 29-002-SC
PDF File:
98-16960.pdf