[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 122 (Monday, June 27, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-15482]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: June 27, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-029]
Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station);
Exemption
I
The Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC or the licensee), is the
holder of Facility Operating License (Possession Only) No. DPR-3 which
authorizes possession and maintenance of the Yankee Nuclear Power
Station (YNPS or plant). The license provides, among other things, that
the licensee is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the
Commission now or hereafter in effect.
The facility is a permanently shutdown pressurized water reactor,
currently in the process of being prepared for decommissioning, and is
located at the licensee site in Franklin County, Massachusetts.
II
The licensee, by letter dated February 27,1992, supplemented by
letter dated January 19,1 993, informed the NRC and YAEC had
permanently ceased power operations, removed the fuel from the reactor
to the fuel pool, and had begun to develop detailed plans to
decommission the facility. The reactor was actually shut down on
October 1, 1991; thus, the fuel has now undergone over two years and
seven months of decay. The NRC in a license amendment dated August 5,
1992, modified License No. DPR-3 to possession only status. The license
is conditioned so that YAEC is not authorized to operate the reactor
and fuel may not be placed in the reactor vessel, thus formalizing the
YAEC commitment to permanently cease power operations.
By letter dated September 28, 1992, the licensee requested an
amendment to the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) Indemnity
Agreement No. B-17 which would reduce the primary level of financial
protection maintained at the plant to $4.5 million from the current
level of $200 million and provide relief from participation in the
industry retrospective rating plan (secondary level). This letter was
supplemented by the licensee letter to the Commission dated January 19,
1993.
III
The justification presented by the licensee for amendment of its
indemnity agreement is that because of the permanently shutdown status
of the plant, defueled condition of the reactor, and possession only
license amendment (which prohibits operation), 10 CFR 140.11 no longer
applies to YAEC. Given these considerations, the licensee contends that
10 CFR 140.12, which describes financial protection for reactors not
covered by 10 CFR 140.11, applies to YAEC. The licensee also addressed
past NRC actions with respect to relief granted to the consolidated
Edison facility, Indian Point Unit 1. Consequently, the licensee has
requested that its indemnity agreement be amended such that the
licensee would no longer be required to participate in the secondary
protection program, and that its primary financial protection be
reduced to the minimum required under 10 CFR 140.12, which is $4.5
million.
The staff has determined on its own initiative that an exemption
from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11 is required in order to
implement an amendment to the licensee indemnity agreement. The bases
for providing this exemption to 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) are provided
herein.
The NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and technical
issues associated with the application of the Price-Anderson Act to
permanently shut down reactors in SECY-93-127, ``Financial Protection
Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993. In this evaluation, the staff
concluded that the Commission has discretionary authority to respond to
licensee requests for a reduction in the level of primary financial
protection and withdrawal from participation in the industry
retrospective rating plan. Depending on the plant-specific
configuration and the time since permanent shutdown, the staff also
concluded that potential hazards may exist at permanently shutdown
reactors for which financial protection is warranted. The staff
concluded that accidents and hazards insured against under the Price-
Anderson Act go beyond design basis accidents and beyond those
considered ``credible'' as that term is used in 10 CFR Part 100 and
cases interpreting the application of that regulation. The Commission
issued a SRM in response to SECY-93-127 on July 13, 1993. In this SRM,
the Commission approved a staff recommendation to permit a reduction of
primary level coverage to $100 million through the exemption process
after an appropriate spent fuel cooling period and after allowing
withdrawal from participation in the secondary level of financial
protection.
In the exercise of its discretionary authority, the Commission may,
as long as a potential hazard exists at a permanently shutdown reactor,
require the full amount of primary financial protection and full
participation in the industry retrospective rating plan. At such time
that the hazard is determined to no longer exist or to be significantly
reduced, the Commission may reduce the amount of primary financial
protection and permit the licensee to withdraw from participation in
the industry retrospective rating plan.
Since the legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act does not
explicitly consider the potential hazards that might exist after
termination of operation, the staff generically evaluated the offsite
consequences associated with normal and abnormal operations, design
basis accidents, and beyond design basis accidents for reactors that
have been permanently defueled and shut down. The staff concluded that
where an appropriate cooling time has elapsed since plant shutdown,
aside from the handling, storage, and transportation of spent fuel and
radioactive materials, no reasonably conceivable potential accident
exists that could cause significant offsite damage.
As summarized in SECY-93-127, a severe transportation accident
could potentially result in local contamination requiring cleanup and
offsite liabilities resulting from traffic disruption and consequential
damages. This type of accident would warrant maintaining some level of
liability insurance. The liabilities an indemnification requirements
associated with the transfer of spent fuel from the licensee to the
Department of Energy will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis at a
future time when spent fuel is shipped to a repository.
As further set forth in SECY-93-127, the most significant accident
sequence for a permanently defueled and shutdown reactor involves the
complete loss of water from a light water reactor spent fuel pool. This
beyond-design-basis accident sequence could result in a zirconium fuel
cladding fire that could propagate through the spent fuel storage pool
and result in significant offsite consequences. The potential
consequences of such an accident could involve billions of dollars.
Although such an accident is beyond the design bases, it may be
considered ``reasonably conceivable'' and could warrant requiring
substantial financial protection. Such an accident is possible during
the first year after reactor shutdown for a low density spent fuel
storage configuration and during the first two or three years after
shutdown for spent fuel stored in certain high density configurations.
Accident scenarios involving blockage of coolant channels in
conjunction with loss of spent fuel pool water could hypothetically
extend the time within which a zirconium fuel cladding fire could
occur. However, in addition to being less likely than loss of water,
air flow to react with the zirconium and to disperse fission products
would likely be inhibited by such blockage. The staff believes that
this sequence approaches the strictly hypothetical.
Once the requisite cooling period after reactor shutdown has
elapsed, the zirconium fuel cladding fire sequence after a postulated
loss of spent fuel pool water is no longer a concern since the fuel
would air cool sufficiently to avoid zirconium fuel cladding
combustion. Possible accident scenarios, after these cooling period
have elapsed, have greatly reduced consequences but could still result
in small releases or precautionary evacuations which could result in
offsite liability.
With respect to the Yankee Nuclear Power Station plant-specific
evaluation, the NRC staff independently evaluated the legal and
technical justifications for this exemption. In particular, the NRC
evaluated the current Yankee status, that is, the plant is permanently
shut down and defueled, the license has been amended to authorize
``possession only,'' the possession only license amendment prohibits
fuel movement from the spent fuel pool into the reactor building, and
the fuel is stored in a low density configuration. The staff concludes,
after evaluation of the remaining spectrum of accidents and considering
that the stored fuel has decayed for over two years and seven months
and is stored in a low density configuration, that any such accident
would result in greatly reduced offsite consequences. Thus, the staff
further concludes that the YNPS meets the criterion established in
SECY-93-127 for relief from the full financial protection requirements.
Although the licensee presented legal views and opinions regarding
the applicability of 10 CFR 140.12 versus 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), the
staff did not concur with those legal views and opinions and concludes
that the licensee has not demonstrated the applicability of 10 CFR
140.12 to the YNPS. The staff has also concluded that the Three Mile
Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) claims settlement experience (an accident which
did not result in a significant release of radioactivity) provides a
reasonable basis for establishing the appropriate level of primary
insurance coverage. Because TMI-2 claims have reached $60 million and a
large number of TMI-2 claims are still unsettled, the staff concluded
that a level of $100 million for primary financial protection coverage
is warranted. This level of primary insurance coverage is consistent
with the SRM dated July 13, 1993, based on SECY-93-127, for relief from
financial protection requirements.
IV
The staff, based on its independent evaluation, consistent with the
Commission July 13, 1993 SRM based on SECY-93-127, ``Financial
Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power Plants During
Decommissioning,'' has concluded that sufficient bases exist for
approval of a partial exemption from the financial protection
requirements for the YNPS. The staff has also concluded that granting
the proposed exemption does not increase the probability or
consequences of any accidents or reduce the margin of safety at the
facility.
V
Based on the discussion presented in Sections III and IV above, the
Commission has determined, that pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, this
exemption is authorized by law and is otherwise in the public interest.
Therefore, the Commission grants an exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to the extent that primary financial protection in
the amount of $100 million shall be maintained, and an exemption from
participation in the industry retrospective rating plan (secondary
level financial protection) is granted for the YNPS.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment (59 FR 31651).
This exemption is effective immediately.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 20th day of June 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brian K. Grimes,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Support, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-15482 Filed 6-24-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
