94-13509. Improved Schedule for Remediation in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Complex  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 106 (Friday, June 3, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
    [Page 0]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-13509]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: June 3, 1994]
    
    
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    DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
    
    [Recommendation 94-1]
    
     
    
    Improved Schedule for Remediation in the Defense Nuclear 
    Facilities Complex
    
    agency: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
    
    action: Notice; recommendation.
    
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    summary: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a 
    recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a 
    concerning improved schedule for remediation in the defense nuclear 
    facilities complex. The Board requests public comments on this 
    recommendation.
    
    dates: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
    recommendation are due on or before July 5, 1994.
    
    addresses: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this 
    recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana 
    Avenue, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.
    
    for further information contact: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Carole C. 
    Morgan, at the address above or telephone (202) 208-6400.
    
        Dated: May 31, 1994.
    John T. Conway,
    Chairman.
    
    Improved Schedule for Remediation in the Defense Nuclear Facilities 
    Complex
    
        The halt in production of nuclear weapons and materials to be used 
    in nuclear weapons froze the manufacturing pipeline in a state that, 
    for safety reasons, should not be allowed to persist unremediated. The 
    Board has concluded from observations and discussions with others that 
    imminent hazards could arise within two to three years unless certain 
    problems are corrected.
        We are especially concerned about specific liquids and solids 
    containing fissile materials and other radioactive substances in spent 
    fuel storage pools, reactor basins, reprocessing canyons, processing 
    lines, and various buildings once used for processing and weapons 
    manufacture.
        It is not clear at this juncture how fissile materials produced for 
    defense purposes will eventually be dealt with long term. What is clear 
    is that the extant fissile materials and related materials require 
    treatment on an accelerated basis to convert them to forms more 
    suitable for safe interim storage.
        The Board is especially concerned about the following situations:
         Several large tanks in the F-Canyon at the Savannah River 
    Site contain tens of thousands of gallons of solutions of plutonium and 
    trans-plutonium isotopes. The trans-plutonium solutions remain from 
    californium-252 products; they include highly radioactive isotopes of 
    americium and curium. These tanks, their appendages, and vital support 
    systems are old, subject to deterioration, prone to leakage, and are 
    not seismically qualified. If an earthquake or other accident were to 
    breach the tanks, F-Canyon would become so contaminated that cleanup 
    would be practically impossible. Containment of the radioactive 
    material under such circumstances would be highly uncertain.
         The K-East Basin at the Hanford Site contains hundreds of 
    tons of deteriorating irradiated nuclear fuel from the N-Reactor. This 
    fuel has been heavily corroded during its long period of storage under 
    water, and the bottom of the basin is now covered by a thick deposit of 
    sludge containing antinide compounds and fission products. The basin is 
    near the Columbia River. It has leaked on several occasions, is likely 
    to leak again, and has design and construction defects that make it 
    seismically unsafe.
         The 603 Basin at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
    (INEL) contains deteriorating irradiated reactor fuel from a number of 
    sources. This basin also contains sludge from corrosion of the reactor 
    fuel. The seismic competence of the 603 Basin is not established.
         Processing canyons and reactor basins at the Savannah 
    River Site contain large amounts of deteriorating irradiated reactor 
    fuel stored under conditions similar to those at the 603 Basin at INEL.
         There are thousands of containers of plutonium-bearing 
    liquids and solids at the Rocky Flats Plant, the Hanford Site, the 
    Savannah River Site, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. These 
    materials were in the nuclear-weapons-manufacturing pipeline when 
    manufacturing ended. Large quantities of plutonium solutions are stored 
    in deteriorating tanks, piping, and plastic bottles. Thousands of 
    containers at the Rocky Flats Plant hold miscellaneous plutonium-
    bearing materials classed as ``residuals'', some of which are 
    chemically unstable. Many of the containers of plutonium metal also 
    contain plastic and, in some at the Rocky Flats Plant, the plastic is 
    believed to be in intimate contact with the plutonium. It is well known 
    that plutonium in contact with plastic can cause formation of hydrogen 
    gas and pyrophoric plutonium compounds leading to a high probability of 
    plutonium fires.
        We note that removal of fissile materials from the 603 Basin at 
    INEL has begun. We are also following the plans for remedying several 
    of the other situations listed. In general these plans are at an early 
    stage. In addition, we are aware of steps DOE has taken to assess spent 
    fuel inventories and vulnerabilities. We also note that a number of 
    environmental assessments are being conducted in relation to the 
    situations we have listed above. Finally, we note that a draft DOE 
    Standard has been prepared for methods to be used in safe storage of 
    plutonium metal and plutonium oxide.
        These actions notwithstanding, the Board is concerned about the 
    slow pace of remediation. The Board believes that additional delays in 
    stabilizing these materials will be accompanied by further 
    deterioration of safety and unnecessary increased risks to workers and 
    the public.
        Therefore the Board recommends:
        (1) That an integrated program plan be formulated on a high 
    priority basis, to convert within two to three years the materials 
    addressed in the specific recommendations below, to forms or conditions 
    suitable for safe interim storage. This plan should recognize that 
    remediation will require a systems engineering approach, involving 
    integration of facilities and capabilities at a number of sites, and 
    will require attention to limiting worker exposure and minimizing 
    generation of additional waste and emission of effluents to the 
    environment. The plan should include a provision that, within a 
    reasonable period of time (such as eight years), all storage of 
    plutonium metal and oxide should be in conformance with the draft DOE 
    Standard on storage of plutonium now being made final.
        (2) That a research program be established to fill any gaps in the 
    information base needed for choosing among the alternate processes to 
    be used in safe conversion of various types of fissile materials to 
    optimal forms for safe interim storage and the longer term disposition. 
    Development this research program should be addressed in the program 
    plan called for by (1) above.
        (3) That preparations be expedited to process the dissolved 
    plutonium and trans-plutonium isotopes in tanks in the F-Canyon at the 
    Savannah River Site into forms safer for interim storage. The Board 
    considers this problem to be especially urgent.
        (4) That preparations be expedited to repackage the plutonium metal 
    that is in contact with, or in proximity to, plastic and to eliminate 
    the associated existing hazard in any other way that is feasible and 
    reliable. Storage of plutonium materials generated through this 
    remediation process should be such that containers need not be opened 
    again for additional treatment for a reasonably long time.
        (5) That preparations be expedited to process the containers of 
    possibly unstable residues at the Rocky Flats Plant and to convert 
    constituent plutonium to a form suitable for safe interim storage.
        (6) That preparations be expedited to process the deteriorating 
    irradiated reactor fuel stored in basins at the Savannah River Site 
    into a form suitable for safe interim storage until an option for 
    ultimate disposition is selected.
        (7) That the program be accelerated to place the deteriorating 
    reactor fuel in the K-East Basin at the Hanford Site in a stable 
    configuration for interim storage until an option for ultimate 
    disposition is chosen. This program needs to be directed toward storage 
    methods that will minimize further deterioration.
        (8) That those facilities that may be needed for future handling 
    and treatment of the materials in question be maintained in a usable 
    state. Candidate facilities include, among others, the F- and H-Canyon 
    and the FB- and HB-Lines at the Savannah River Site, some plutonium-
    handling glove box lines among those at the Rocky Flats Plant, the Los 
    Alamos National Laboratory, and the Hanford Site, and certain 
    facilities necessary to support a uranium handling capability at the Y-
    12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Site.
        (9) Expedited preparations to accomplish actions in items (3) 
    through (7) above should take into account the need to meet the 
    requirements for operational readiness in accordance with DOE Order 
    5480.31.
    John T. Conway,
    Chairman.
    [FR Doc. 94-13509 Filed 6-2-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 6820-KD-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
06/03/1994
Department:
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Action:
Notice; recommendation.
Document Number:
94-13509
Dates:
Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation are due on or before July 5, 1994.
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: June 3, 1994, Recommendation 94-1