[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 125 (Monday, June 30, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35330-35331]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-17132]
[[Page 35329]]
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Part V
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Federal Railroad Administration
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Notice of Safety Directive; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 125 / Monday, June 30, 1997 /
Notices
[[Page 35330]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Notice of Safety Directive
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety directive.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Directive 97-1 addressing safety
practices to evaluate the integrity of all railroads' programs of
operational tests and inspections and to ensure that safety-critical
information is accurately conveyed and acknowledged for operations in
Direct Train Control 1 (DTC) territory.
\1\ This is an umbrella term and refers to methods of operation
known variously as Direct Traffic Control, Track Warrant Control
(TWC), Track Permit Control Systems (TPCS), Form D control system
(DCS), and similar methods of authorizing train movements.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas H. Taylor, Staff Director,
Operating Practices Division, Office of Safety Assurance and
Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., RRS-11, Mail Stop 25,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3346) or David H. Kasminoff,
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., RCC-
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12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3191).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA has determined that the safety of
railroad employees and the general public compels the issuance of this
safety directive. A review of FRA's accident/incident data demonstrates
that the safety of rail transportation has continued to improve;
however, two recent train accidents, one on CSX Transportation (CSX) in
St. Albans, West Virginia, on June 7, 1997, and the other on the Union
Pacific Railroad (UP) in Devine, Texas, on June 22, 1997, have claimed
a total of five lives, and have caused FRA serious concern about the
safety of certain aspects of rail transportation. Specifically, FRA is
concerned about possible gaps in existing train control systems that,
due to inadequate operational testing or deficient operational
procedures, can lead to train collisions. In response, FRA has
initiated an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the operational
tests and inspections programs and dispatching procedures employed by
CSX and UP. FRA inspection teams are on those properties to conduct
safety assurance reviews on all aspects of these issues.
Operational Tests and Inspections
Subsequent to the CSX train accident, an initial analysis of CSX's
operational tests and inspections program raised questions about the
adequacy of the quality controls necessary to accomplish the objectives
of 49 CFR 217.9. FRA's preliminary findings from an inspection of CSX's
program of operational tests and inspections indicated that while the
program itself was detailed and comprehensive, CSX's implementation of
the program fell short of the intended objectives. While the program's
provisions with respect to the number of tests supervisors are required
to conduct each month are typically met, the quality of those tests
performed is suspect. For example, FRA found that supervisors generally
conduct testing at a single location, rather than at a variety of
locations across the territory. Additionally, most of the required
tests are typically conducted during one- or two-day periods rather
than throughout the month. Consequently, FRA's initial findings
indicate that the operational tests and inspections program appears to
be a numbers-generating exercise that precludes any meaningful analysis
of the results by CSX.
Operational tests and inspections programs are intended to achieve
the following objectives:
Improve employee compliance with railroad operating rules;
Measure rules proficiency, in order to isolate areas of
non-compliance for corrective action;
Reduce human factor accidents;
Reduce personal injuries and incidents resulting from
inattention to the requirements of the railroad's operating rules;
Provide the railroad with information on rules requiring
supplemental employee training;
Provide the railroad supervisor with an immediate
evaluation of an employee's application, comprehension, and compliance
with the rules; and
Improve and maintain employee alertness.
However, without a sincere commitment from management to properly
implement the railroad's program, the objectives as described above
cannot be fully achieved. Therefore, in order to determine if the areas
of concern identified on CSX are present on other railroads, and to
evaluate compliance of individual railroads with their operational
tests and inspections programs, FRA concludes that each railroad
subject to 49 CFR part 217 should:
Within three calendar days of the date of publication of this
safety directive in the Federal Register, review its program of
operational tests and inspections required by 49 CFR 217.9 to ensure
that the recorded individual tests and inspections are conducted in
accordance with all of the program's requirements. Specifically, the
review should focus on the types of tests conducted, the means and
procedures utilized to conduct the tests, and test frequency with the
object of determining whether the program is effectively implemented.
Within the same time frame of three calender days, each railroad shall
advise FRA in writing as to what steps it has taken and what additional
steps it intends to take to ensure that the program is effectively
implemented.
Train Dispatcher Procedures
Preliminary investigatory findings following the head-on collision
of two UP freight trains at Devine, Texas, on June 22, 1997, indicate
that existing DTC procedures of carriers pertaining to the issuance of
movement authorities need to be modified in order to reduce the risk of
similar collisions.
The UP accident occurred in single track, non-signaled TWC
territory; timetable direction is northward and southward. A planned
meet of a northward train (UP 5981 North) and a southward train (UP
9186 South), was to have occurred at a passing siding identified in
UP's operating timetable as Gessner. UP 5981 North was authorized by
track warrant to operate to, and take the siding at, Gessner. UP 5981
North was also in possession of a second track warrant that authorized
movement north of Gessner after the arrival of UP 9186 South. UP 9186
South was authorized by track warrant to operate to, and hold the main
track at, Gessner. UP 9186 South was also in possession of a second
track warrant that authorized movement south of Gessner, but the track
warrant in possession of the train crew omitted a requirement to wait
at Gessner until after the arrival of UP 5981 North. Consequently, UP
9186 South passed Gessner and approximately 13 miles south of Gessner,
struck UP 5981 North head-on. The track warrants entered by the
dispatcher into the computer dispatching system established that UP
9186 South was required to wait at Gessner until after the arrival of
UP 5981 North. However, the transcript of the dispatcher's radio
communications established that the dispatcher authorized UP 9186 South
to operate south of Gessner without instructions to wait at Gessner for
the arrival of UP 5981 North.
[[Page 35331]]
Therefore, in order to avoid a recurrence of such an event, FRA
believes that, unless a railroad utilizes a computer-aided dispatching
system that employs hard coded safety-edit procedures (such as those
already in place at The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway
Company's National Operations Center in Fort Worth, Texas), the
following procedures are necessary to ensure the safe operation of
trains in non-signaled DTC territory:
1. After the contents of a movement authority have been transmitted
by the train dispatcher, and before the movement authority is repeated
by the receiving employee(s), the train dispatcher should observe the
computer monitor and state the total number of boxes (lines) marked on
the movement authority and identify the individual box (line) numbers
(e.g., ``There are four boxes (lines) marked. They are box (line)
numbers 2, 7, 8, and 15.'') For railroads that do not utilize computer-
aided dispatching systems, the train dispatcher should reexamine the
office copy of the movement authority document, state the total number
of boxes (lines) marked on the movement authority, and identify the
individual box (line) numbers. In those instances in which a train meet
is included in the movement authority, the train dispatcher should
specifically so state, e.g., ``this track warrant includes a
requirement to meet another train.'' The train dispatcher should then
instruct the receiving employee(s) to repeat the movement authority.
2. After the receiving employee(s) repeats the movement authority
back to the train dispatcher, the employee(s) should also state the
total number of boxes (lines) marked on the movement authority and
identify the individual box (line) numbers (e.g., ``There are four
boxes (lines) marked. They are box (line) numbers 2, 7, 8, and 15.'')
3. Before the train dispatcher issues the time effective (``OK''
time), the train dispatcher should confirm the total number of boxes
(lines) marked on the movement authority and identify the individual
box (line) numbers in the appropriate manner described above.
4. Within five calendar days of the date of publication of this
safety directive in the Federal Register, a railroad operating
supervisor should personally contact each train dispatcher responsible
for controlling train movements in non-signaled territory and inform
the train dispatchers in face-to-face meetings of the circumstances
surrounding the UP accident described above and the requirements of
this safety directive. The occurrence of these meetings should be
documented in writing and be made available for review by FRA upon
request during normal business hours. FRA expects that each railroad
should conduct regular observations of train dispatchers to ensure
compliance with the train dispatcher procedures specified in this
directive.
5. Within three calendar days of the date of publication of this
safety directive in the Federal Register, each railroad should:
(a) Review its operating rules and practices pertaining to
operations in non-signaled territory to determine what further
enhancements in its rules and practices are warranted, including the
possibility of eliminating the use of ``after arrival of'' orders, to
improve safety; and
(b) Submit in writing to FRA the following:
A description of the current train dispatching procedures
used in non-signaled territory and the safeguards built into the system
to prevent human error from causing accidents;
A description of the steps that the railroad is taking to
implement the train dispatcher procedure provisions of this safety
directive; and
What additional steps the railroad intends to take to
enhance the level of safety.
FRA recognizes that all collisions are avoidable, and the most
effective way to accomplish this objective is with Positive Train
Control (PTC). PTC holds the promise of achieving a level of railroad
safety not available through conventional practices. PTC systems
improve safety by preventing collisions, overspeed derailments and
other types of accidents. These systems can precisely transmit and
receive critical safety information for the movement of trains, and
eliminate problems associated with voice transmissions. However, until
these PTC systems come on line, FRA believes that all railroads should
implement intense interim measures to maximize the level of safety
available utilizing existing technology. Based on the information
obtained from FRA's two ongoing safety initiatives on CSX and UP,
subsequent audits on all other railroads, and information gathered in
response to this safety directive, FRA may modify Safety Directive 97-
1, issue additional safety directives, or take other appropriate
necessary action to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads.
Issued in Washington, D.C. on June 25, 1997.
James T. Schultz,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. 97-17132 Filed 6-27-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
