E7-10756. Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11, MD-11F, DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, and MD-10-30F Airplanes

AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY:

The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11, MD-11F, DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, and MD-10-30F airplanes. This proposed AD would require measuring the electrical resistance of the bond between the No. 2 fuel transfer pump adapter surface of the fuel tank and the fuel transfer pump housing flange, and performing corrective and other specified actions as applicable. This proposed AD results from a design review of the fuel tank systems. We are proposing this AD to prevent inadequate bonding between the No. 2 fuel transfer pump adapter surface of the fuel tank and the fuel transfer pump housing flange. Inadequate bonding could result in a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank if the fuel transfer pump and structure interface are not submerged in fuel, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

DATES:

We must receive comments on this proposed AD by July 20, 2007.

ADDRESSES:

Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this proposed AD.

• DOT Docket Web site: Go to http://dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
• Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590.
• Fax: [phone].
• Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for the service information identified in this proposed AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Serj Harutunian, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; telephone [phone]; fax [phone].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number “FAA-2007-28351; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-074-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the proposed AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the proposed AD in light of those comments.

We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://dms.dot.gov,, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed AD. Using the search function of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit http://dms.dot.gov.

Examining the Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov,, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone [phone]) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.

Discussion

The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled “Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements” (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (“SFAR 88,” Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).

Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.

In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action.

We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

Model DC-10 airplanes have a fuel boost pump and a fuel transfer pump mounted to the fuel tank No. 2 lower skin. The instructions for early DC-10s called out electrical bonding to structure on both fuel transfer pump housings; however, a later drawing change did not call out bonding for the fuel transfer pump housing. The same condition exists on Model MD-11 airplanes. It is unknown whether there is an adequate bond on these airplanes, and operators need to make that determination. Inadequate bonding could result in a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank if the fuel transfer pump and structure interface are not submerged in fuel, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

We have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletins DC10-28-250 and MD11-28-129, both dated July 26, 2006. The service bulletins describe procedures for measuring the electrical resistance between the No. 2 fuel transfer pump adapter surface of the fuel tank and the fuel transfer pump housing flange, and performing corrective and other specified actions as applicable. The corrective actions include electrically bonding the fuel tank No. 2 fuel transfer pump access door surfaces and fuel pump housing if the resistance measurement is more than 2.5 milliohms. The other specified actions include an electrical resistance bonding test to verify the electrical resistance between the fuel transfer pump housing and the structure is 2.5 milliohms maximum. For airplanes on which the electrical resistance is not achieved, the procedures include reworking the electrical bond until that electrical resistance is achieved. Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of the Proposed AD

We have evaluated all pertinent information and identified an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of this same type design. For this reason, we are proposing this AD, which would require accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously.

Costs of Compliance

There are about 573 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. This proposed AD would affect about 399 airplanes of U.S. registry. The proposed measurement would take about 1 work hour per airplane, at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of the proposed AD for U.S. operators is $31,920, or $80 per airplane.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed regulation:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

• Air transportation
• Aircraft
• Aviation safety
• Safety

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13

[Amended]

2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

McDonnell Douglas: Docket No. FAA-2007-28351; Directorate Identifier 2007-NM-074-AD.

Comments Due Date

(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by July 20, 2007.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11, MD-11F, DC-10-30 and DC-10-30F (KC-10A and KDC-10), DC-10-40, DC-10-40F, and MD-10-30F airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in Boeing Service Bulletins DC10-28-250 and MD11-28-129, both dated July 26, 2006.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from a design review of the fuel tank systems. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadequate bonding between the No. 2 fuel transfer pump adapter surface of the fuel tank and the fuel transfer pump housing flange. Inadequate bonding could result in a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank if the fuel transfer pump and structure interface are not submerged in fuel, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

Measure Electrical Resistance/Corrective & Other Specified Actions

(f) Within 60 months after the effective date of this AD: Measure the electrical resistance of the bond between the No. 2 fuel transfer pump adapter surface of the fuel tank and the fuel transfer pump housing flange in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin DC10-28-250 or MD11-28-129, both dated July 26, 2006, as applicable.

(1) If the resistance measurement is 2.5 milliohms or less: No further action is required by this paragraph.

(2) If the resistance measurement is more than 2.5 milliohms: Before further flight, electrically bond the fuel tank No. 2 fuel transfer pump housing surfaces in accordance with the service bulletin.

(3) Before further flight thereafter, do an electrical resistance bonding test to verify the electrical resistance between the fuel transfer pump housing and the structure is 2.5 milliohms maximum. If that electrical resistance is not achieved, rework the electrical bond until the electrical resistance is achieved. Do the actions in accordance with the service bulletin.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (LAACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on May 25, 2007.

Ali Bahrami,

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.