[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 109 (Monday, June 8, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31234-31237]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-15139]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-245, 50-336, and 50-423]
Northeast Utilities (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2,
and 3); Issuance of Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has issued a Director's Decision with regard to a Petition
dated February 2, 1998, filed by Ms. Deborah Katz, Ms. Rosemary
Bassilakis, and Mr. Paul Gunter on behalf of the Citizens Awareness
Network (CAN) and the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS)
(Petitioners). The Petition pertains to the Millstone Nuclear Power
Station, Units 1, 2, and 3.
The Petitioners requested that the NRC immediately: (1) revoke
Northeast Utilities' (NU's, the licensee's) license to operate
Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 as the result of ongoing intimidation and
harassment of its workforce by NU management; (2) revoke NU's license
to operate Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 as the result of persistent
licensee defiance of NRC regulations and directives to create a
``questioning attitude'' for its workers to challenge management on
nuclear safety issues without fear of harassment, intimidation, or
reprisals by NU; and (3) refer the Nuclear Oversight Department's Focus
98 List and the reported NU management attempt to destroy the list to
the Department of Justice for investigation of a potential coverup.
As the bases for these assertions, the Petition states that an NU
document (Nuclear Oversight Department's Focus 98 List, dated January
11, 1998) directs the group to address areas needing improvement by
focusing on the ``inability to ``isolate'' cynics from the group
culture'' and ``pockets of negativism.'' The Petition further states
that the list demonstrates the sustained and unrelenting policy of NU's
senior management to undermine a safety-conscious workplace at
Millstone, and that despite 2 years of increased regulatory scrutiny of
the managerial mistreatment of its workers and the corporation's
mismanagement of its employees' safety concerns program, a ``chilled
atmosphere'' remains intact and entrenched.
As a basis for the Petitioners' request for a Department of Justice
investigation, the Petition makes the following statement: ``Since it
has been reported that NU management employees attempted to destroy the
list, NRC has a duty to refer this apparent deliberate attempt to evade
the otherwise lawful exercise of authority by NRC to the Department of
Justice for complete investigation. This alleged attempt to cover up
wrong doing by NRC's licensee is a potential obstruction of justice
that should be fully and fairly investigated.''
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has denied
the Petition. The reasons for this denial are explained in the
``Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206'' (DD-98-04), the
complete text of which follows this notice and is available for public
inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman
Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public
document rooms located at the Learning Resources Center, Three Rivers
Community-Technical College, New London Turnpike, Norwich, Connecticut,
and at the Waterford Library, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford,
Connecticut.
A copy of the Director's Decision will be filed with the Secretary
of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance with 10 CFR
2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided for by this
regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission 25 days after the date of issuance unless the Commission, on
its own motion, institutes a review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of June 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206
[DD-98-04]
I. Introduction
On February 2, 1998, Ms. Deborah Katz, Ms. Rosemary Bassilakis, and
Mr. Paul Gunter filed a Petition, pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206), on behalf of the
Citizens Awareness Network (CAN) and the Nuclear Information and
Resource Service (NIRS) (Petitioners).
The Petitioners requested that the NRC take the following immediate
actions: (1) revoke Northeast Utilities' (NU's or the licensee's)
license to operate Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 as the result of ongoing
intimidation and harassment of its workforce by NU management; (2)
revoke NU's license to operate Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 as the
result of persistent licensee defiance of NRC regulations and
directives to create a ``questioning attitude'' for its workers to
challenge management on nuclear safety issues without fear of
harassment, intimidation, or reprisals by NU; and (3) refer the Nuclear
Oversight Focus 98 List and the reported NU management attempt to
destroy the list to the Department of Justice for investigation of a
potential coverup.
As bases for the Petitioners' assertions, the Petition states that
an NU document (Nuclear Oversight Department's Focus 98 List, dated
January 11, 1998) directs the Nuclear Oversight group to address areas
needing improvement by focusing on the ``inability to `isolate' cynics
from the group culture'' and ``pockets of negativism.'' The Petition
further states that the list demonstrates the sustained and unrelenting
policy of NU's senior management to undermine a safety-conscious
workplace at Millstone, and that despite 2 years of increased
regulatory scrutiny of the managerial mistreatment of its workers and
the corporation's mismanagement of its
[[Page 31235]]
employees' safety concerns program, a ``chilled atmosphere'' remains
intact and entrenched.
As a basis for the Petitioners' request for a Department of Justice
investigation, the Petition states that ``[s]ince it has been reported
that NU management employees attempted to destroy the list, NRC has a
duty to refer this apparent deliberate attempt to evade the otherwise
lawful exercise of authority by NRC to the Department of Justice for
complete investigation. This alleged attempt to cover up wrong doing by
NRC's licensee is a potential obstruction of justice that should be
fully and fairly investigated.''
On March 11, 1998, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the Petition and
informed the Petitioners that the Petition had been assigned to the
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to prepare a response and that
action would be taken within a reasonable time regarding the specific
concerns raised in the Petition. The Petitioners were also informed
that their request for immediate action to revoke the operating license
and refer the incident to the Department of Justice was denied because,
due to the three Millstone units being shut down, protection of public
health and safety did not warrant immediate action. The Petitioners
were also informed that the NRC would consider the licensee's response
to the staff's February 10, 1998, request for information concerning
the incident before the Commission allows restart of any Millstone
unit. To this extent, the Petitioners' request for immediate action was
partially granted.
II. Discussion
The NRC staff has completed its evaluation of the Petitioners'
requests. The following discussion is based on information provided by
the licensee and information independently obtained by the NRC staff.
The Petitioners' first two requests are similar in nature and are
addressed in Section II.A. The third request is addressed in Section
II.B.
A. Request To Revoke the Operating License for Millstone Units 1, 2,
and 3
The Petitioners based this request on their assertion of ongoing
intimidation and harassment of the workforce by NU management and
persistent licensee defiance of NRC regulations and directives to
create a ``questioning attitude'' for its workers to challenge
management on nuclear safety issues without fear of harassment,
intimidation, or reprisals. As support for their assertions, the
Petitioners referred to the wording in a document prepared by NU's
Nuclear Oversight Department titled ``Focus 98: Director/VP View of
Nuclear Oversight (1/11/98).'' The document listed seven ``Positive
Qualities of Nuclear Oversight'' and seven ``Areas Needing
Improvement.'' Within ``Areas Needing Improvement'' was a category
entitled ``Current SCWE [safety-conscious work environment] and
issues.'' One of the six areas listed in this category was ``inability
to ``isolate'' cynics from group culture.''
On January 29, 1998, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
became aware of the Nuclear Oversight Department's Focus 98 document.
The NRC was concerned that language contained in the document was not
consistent with encouraging a questioning attitude necessary for
fostering a safety-conscious work environment. As a result, the NRC
required the licensee, in a February 10, 1998, letter, to describe in
writing, under oath or affirmation (1) the circumstances surrounding
the creation and distribution of the document and whether the events
constitute a violation of 10 CFR 50.7; (2) how this document came into
existence, in light of NU's efforts to create a safety-conscious work
environment, and NU's assessment of the document's effect on the
willingness of employees to raise concerns with the Company; and (3)
any remedial actions needed to prevent recurrence.
NU responded to the NRC's request in March 12, March 26, and April
24, 1998, letters. NU's March 12, 1998, response included reference to
an NU-directed investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
creation and distribution of the Focus 98 document. The March 12, 1998,
response also contained a redacted copy of a survey conducted in
February 1998 by consultants Nilsson and Associates to determine
whether the events that the Petitioners complained about negatively
impacted the Millstone workforce and had created any reluctance to
raise safety issues at the Millstone facility. The investigation report
was transmitted to the NRC by the March 26, 1998, letter. The April 24,
1998, letter provided additional information regarding the collection
of the Focus 98 document. In its submittals, NU described two Nuclear
Oversight Department meetings relevant to the development of the Focus
98 document, its use, and its distribution.
The first meeting was held on January 11, 1998, and involved the
Vice President--Nuclear Oversight, his three Directors, the Executive
Assistant to the Vice President, and a consultant to the Vice
President. The meeting was held to prepare for an upcoming Nuclear
Oversight management team-building session and explore the strengths
and weaknesses of the Nuclear Oversight organization for discussion at
that meeting. Each of the six participants brought to the meeting
approximately three strengths and three weaknesses that each considered
applicable to Nuclear Oversight, and it was from these inputs that the
Focus 98 document list of ``Positive Qualities of Nuclear Oversight''
and ``Areas Needing Improvement'' was developed. The inputs from the
meeting participants were recorded and grouped, and the licensee's
consultant used this information to prepare the one-page Focus 98
document. Prior to the January 21, 1998, team-building session, the
Focus 98 document had been distributed to the January 11, 1998, meeting
participants for review and had generated no comments. NU concluded
from its investigation, including interviews with each of the meeting
participants, that the participants did not intend for the wording to
convey the notion that Nuclear Oversight management should seek to
isolate individuals who have raised concerns in the past, nor did
management intend to send the signal that it views people who raise
concerns as ``cynics'' or bad influences on the organization. NU
concluded that the phrases in the document ``isolation of `cynics,'' '
``too much negative energy (personnel issues),'' and ``pockets of
negativism'' were poorly chosen words that were intended to convey the
belief that the Nuclear Oversight organization recognizes that there
are people who have ill feelings toward NU and who are seeking to
impose their views on others who may disagree, and that this imposition
was affecting the organization. NU pointed out in its submittal that
the document was intended to generate discussion and did not represent
policy or direction of Nuclear Oversight management.
The second meeting was held on January 21, 1998, and involved
Nuclear Oversight management ranging from first-line supervisors to the
Vice President--Nuclear Oversight. The purpose of the meeting was
Nuclear Oversight team building and one topic on the agenda was a
discussion of the organization's strengths and weaknesses. The Focus 98
document was distributed when the organization's strengths and
weaknesses were to be discussed. NU states that soon after the Focus 98
document was distributed, several managers/supervisors objected to the
included phrase ``inability to
[[Page 31236]]
`isolate' cynics from group culture.'' NU further states that the Vice
President and Directors were initially surprised by the reaction, and
ultimately agreed that the words had been poorly chosen and were not
reflective of management's position.
On the basis of its investigation, NU concluded that the
circumstances of the creation of the Focus 98 document indicated that
no one in management intended to encourage any form of discrimination
against anyone engaging in protected activity. NU also responded that
no action took place because of the document's existence and, thus, no
person who had engaged in protected activity suffered any adverse
employment action.
The NRC staff reviewed NU's responses to the NRC's February 10,
1998, letter, including the investigation report, and separately
interviewed eight people involved in the preparation, use, and
distribution of the Focus 98 document. The staff determined that the
Focus 98 document had been developed as material for establishing
talking points for a then-upcoming January 21, 1998, management team-
building session. The staff also determined that points listed in the
Focus 98 document under ``Areas Needing Improvement'' were intended by
those participating in the January 11, 1998, meeting to convey
potential organizational weaknesses as points for discussion, and not
to represent current or future management policy. The staff also found
that the Focus 98 document had been developed informally, with no
formal review and approval process, for use as a handout at an upcoming
Nuclear Oversight Department team-building session.
The NRC staff's reviews, including interviews with NU staff
involved in the incident, confirmed that the general purpose of the
Nuclear Oversight management team meeting on January 21, 1998, was to
improve Nuclear Oversight organizational interactions. Furthermore, the
NRC staff found that the Focus 98 document was intended to facilitate
the discussion of one of many topic areas to be covered at the all-day
meeting. The NRC staff's inquiries confirmed that Nuclear Oversight
management was surprised by the immediate reaction and concern of the
January 21, 1998, meeting participants regarding certain language in
the Focus 98 document, and that following a discussion of the wording,
management recognized the unintended implication of the words. After
reviewing the available information, the NRC staff concludes that the
wording at issue used in the Focus 98 document was no more than poorly
selected terminology intended to convey a perceived Nuclear Oversight
organizational weakness.
In its March 12, 1998, response, NU stated that once it became
apparent that non-supervisory employees in the Nuclear Oversight
Department, who had not attended either the January 11 or January 21,
1998, meetings, knew about the troubling language in the Focus 98
document, NU took several actions to mitigate and assess the potential
consequences to ensure that the release of the Focus 98 document and
surrounding circumstances did not cause a chilling effect on the
organization. On January 29, 1998, the Vice President--Nuclear
Oversight held an all-hands meeting with members of his organization at
which he apologized for the language in the document and assured the
organization that he and the Directors were not trying to discourage
anyone from voicing concerns. That same day, the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Millstone and the Vice President--Nuclear
Oversight met with the Millstone leadership team and described the
circumstances surrounding the document. On January 30, 1998, NU issued
a site-wide communication discussing the two meetings in detail. NU
also assessed the effect of the document on the workforce through
investigations and surveys. NU directed the consulting firm Nilsson and
Associates to conduct an in-depth assessment of the document's effect
on Nuclear Oversight Department employees and on employees who interact
with the Nuclear Oversight Department. The assessment found that none
of the 56 people interviewed indicated that the document has made them
reluctant to raise concerns.
The Petitioners also refer generally, as a basis for their request,
to ongoing NU intimidation and harassment of its workforce and
persistent licensee defiance of NRC regulations and directives to
create a safety-conscious work environment. NU performance in these
areas has been extensively assessed. An NRC Order issued on October 24,
1996, required NU to take specific actions to resolve problems in its
processes for handling employee safety concerns at the Millstone
station. As required by the Order, NU developed and implemented a
comprehensive plan for reviewing and dispositioning safety issues
raised by its employees, and for ensuring that employees who raise
safety concerns can raise them without fear of retaliation. NU's plan
included elements to (1) improve the operation of its Employee Concerns
Program organization; (2) enhance management and employee training
related to establishing and maintaining a safety-conscious work
environment; (3) form an Employee Concerns Oversight Panel; and (4)
identify and respond to organizational safety-conscious work
environment challenges. NU began implementing the plan in February
1997, and substantially completed implementation by January 1998. As
required by the Order, NU also submitted for NRC approval a proposed
independent third-party oversight program organization to oversee
implementation of its comprehensive plan. Little Harbor Consultants
Inc. (LHC) was approved by the NRC as the third-party oversight
organization and has been performing that function since April 1997.
LHC's assessments of NU's programs to improve the safety-conscious
work environment at Millstone station have noted significant
improvements in the past year. Based on information gained from
interviews with NU staff, program reviews, and assessment of licensee
responses to emerging personnel issues, LHC concluded at an April 7,
1998, meeting with NRC and NU that programs have improved and are at an
acceptable level. As reported in an LHC quarterly report for the first
3 months of 1998, transmitted to the NRC on April 22, 1998, LHC's
interviews with 298 NU employees, conducted in February 1998, showed an
improved work environment. LHC concluded from the results of these
interviews that at Millstone improvements have been made regarding the
willingness of the workforce to raise concerns, the confidence of the
workforce that safety concerns will be handled properly, the existence
of a questioning attitude, and the lack of any chilling effect.
The NRC has monitored and assessed LHC's oversight activities and
independently assessed NU's actions to upgrade its Employee Concerns
Program and improve the safety-conscious work environment at the
Millstone station. The NRC's April 21, 1998, letter to John Beck,
President, LHC, documents the NRC staff's evaluation of LHC's oversight
of NU's programs for handling employee concerns. The staff found that
LHC's oversight activities have been thorough and complete and that LHC
has effectively carried out its oversight activities. The NRC's April
20, 1998, letter to NU forwarded the results of the NRC staff's
evaluation of the Employee Concerns Program and safety-conscious work
environment at the Millstone station. The NRC staff's assessment of
these NU programs found that they were improved and functioning
effectively.
Based on the above, the Petitioners' request that the NRC revoke
Millstone's operating licenses for workforce
[[Page 31237]]
intimidation and actions to prevent the establishment of a
``questioning attitude'' with regard to employees voicing safety
concerns is denied.
B. Request for Investigation of NU Attempt To Destroy Focus 98 Document
The Petitioners also request that the NRC refer the Focus 98
document and NU's attempt to destroy the document to the Department of
Justice for investigation of a potential coverup. The Petitioners base
this request on reports that NU management attempted to destroy the
document. The Petitioners consider the NRC to have a duty to refer this
apparently deliberate attempt to evade the otherwise lawful exercise of
authority by the NRC to the Department of Justice for a complete
investigation.
In its March 12, 1998, letter to the NRC, NU states that
participants at the January 21, 1998, management team meeting agreed
that the words in the document were poorly chosen and, at the
suggestion of a consultant who was facilitating the meeting, the
participants agreed that the Focus 98 document should not be
distributed further because of the deficient wording. NU states that
most meeting participants dropped off their copy of the document with
the consultant when the meeting was over at the end of the day, and
others left it on tables in the room before they left. NU stated that
no one attempted to ensure that all the Focus 98 documents were
returned, counted the returned documents to determine if some had not
been turned in, or ordered the participants to turn in the documents.
The NRC staff reviewed NU's responses to the NRC's February 10,
1998, letter, including NU's investigation report, and conducted
separate interviews of individuals involved with the distribution and
collection of the Focus 98 document. Information from interviews
conducted by the staff confirmed that meeting participants generally
concluded that certain wording in the Focus 98 document was
inappropriate and susceptible to misinterpretation. Also, the staff's
information was consistent with NU's report that there was general
agreement by meeting participants to leave the document at the meeting.
The staff concludes that NU's actions to address the Focus 98 document
were not inappropriate. Therefore, the Petitioners' request to refer
the Focus 98 document and its recall and destruction to the Department
of Justice is denied.
III. Conclusion
The NRC staff has determined, for the reasons provided in the above
discussion, that the incident involving preparation and distribution of
the Focus 98 document does not represent action by NU to discriminate
against persons in the Nuclear Oversight Department. Although wording
in the document may have been inappropriate, the process for
preparation of the document, the informal nature of the document, and
the use of the document as discussion points on organizational
strengths and weaknesses, all indicate that the language in question in
the document involved a matter of poor word choice. The NRC staff also
has determined that efforts to collect the Focus 98 document after its
distribution at the end of the January 21, 1998, Nuclear Oversight
Department team-building session were not inappropriate, and that NU,
given the nature and use of the document, had no regulatory obligation
to provide it to the NRC or inform the NRC of its existence. As
discussed previously, the NRC was concerned that a document prepared
for use at an NU organizational function could contain such
inappropriate language, even if unintended. The NRC was further
concerned that the document could have a ``chilling effect'' on the NU
workforce. The NRC's February 10, 1998, letter to NU required NU to
respond to these NRC concerns. Based on the NRC staff's review of NU's
response and the NRC's own independent assessment of the event, the NRC
staff is satisfied with the actions taken by the licensee to assess the
chilling effect of the incident and to prevent recurrence. Accordingly,
the Petitioners' requests for revocation of NU's license to operate
Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 for reasons associated with development of
the Focus 98 document are denied. The Petitioners' request that the NRC
refer the matter of the document's collection and destruction to the
Department of Justice for investigation is also denied.
As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Director's
Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the
Commission's review. This Decision will constitute the final action of
the Commission 25 days after issuance unless the Commission, on its own
motion, institutes review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of June 1998.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 98-15139 Filed 6-5-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
