[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 135 (Friday, July 12, 1996)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 36691-36698]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-17785]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Highway Administration
49 CFR Part 393
[FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31]
RIN 2125-AD42
Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Antilock
Brake Systems
AGENCY: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: The FHWA is proposing to amend the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) to require that air-braked truck tractors
manufactured on or after March 1, 1997, and air-braked single-unit
trucks, buses, trailers, and converter dollies manufactured on or after
March 1, 1998, be equipped with antilock brake systems (ABSs) that meet
the requirements of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No.
121. The FHWA is also proposing that hydraulic braked trucks and buses
manufactured on or after March 1, 1999, be equipped with ABSs that meet
the requirements of FMVSS No. 105. This rulemaking is intended to
ensure that the in-service brake standards of the FMCSRs are consistent
with the FMVSSs and to improve the safety of operation of commercial
motor vehicles (CMVs) by reducing the incidence of accidents caused by
jackknifing and other losses of directional stability and control
during braking. With regard to CMVs manufactured prior to the dates
previously mentioned, the FHWA is not proposing that motor carriers be
required to retrofit such vehicles with ABSs. However, the FHWA is
requesting comments on this subject.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 10, 1996.
ADDRESSES: Submit written, signed comments to FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31,
room 4232, HCC-10, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Highway
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590-0001. All
comments received will be available for examination at the above
address from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., e.t., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. Those desiring notification of receipt of
comments must include a self- addressed, stamped postcard.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Larry W. Minor, Office of Motor
Carrier Research and Standards, HCS-10, (202) 366-4009; or Mr. Charles
E. Medalen, Office of the Chief Counsel, HCC-20, (202) 366-1354,
Federal Highway Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20590-0001. Office hours are from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., e.t., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Section 4012 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991 (ISTEA) (Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914, 2157) directs the
Secretary of Transportation to initiate a rulemaking concerning methods
for improving the braking performance of new commercial
[[Page 36692]]
motor vehicles,1 including truck tractors, trailers, and their
dollies. Congress specifically directed that the rulemaking examine
antilock systems, as a means of improving brake compatibility, and
methods of ensuring effectiveness of brake timing.
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\1\ For the purposes of section 4012, the term ``commercial
motor vehicle'' means any self-propelled or towed vehicle used on
highways to transport passengers or property if such vehicle has a
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 11,794 kilograms (kg) (26,001
pounds) or more. The NHTSA's final rule on ABS applies to medium and
heavy vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,001 pounds) or more.
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The NHTSA Rulemaking
In response to the ISTEA, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) published a final rule amending Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 105, Hydraulic Brake Systems, and
FMVSS No. 121, Air Brake Systems, to require that medium and heavy
vehicles be equipped with an antilock brake system (ABS) to improve the
lateral stability (i.e., traction) and steering control of these
vehicles during braking (60 FR 13216, March 10, 1995). For truck
tractors, the ABS requirement is supplemented by a 48.3 kilometer per
hour (30-mph) braking-in-a-curve test on a low coefficient of friction
surface using a full brake application. By improving lateral stability
and control, these requirements will significantly reduce jackknifing
and other losses of control during braking as well as the deaths and
injuries caused by those control problems.
In addition, the NHTSA final rule requires all powered heavy
vehicles to be equipped with an in-cab lamp to indicate ABS
malfunctions. Truck tractors and other trucks equipped to tow air-
braked trailers are required to be equipped with two separate in-cab
lamps: One indicating malfunctions in the towing vehicle ABS and the
other in the trailer ABS. The requirement for the in-cab lamp to alert
the driver of malfunctions in the trailer ABS applies to trucks and
truck tractors manufactured on or after March 1, 2001 (61 FR 5949,
February 15, 1996). Trailers produced during an initial 11-year period
(March 1, 1998 through March 1, 2009) must also be equipped with an
external malfunction indicator that is visible to the driver of the
towing tractor (61 FR 5949).
The amendments to FMVSS No. 105 become effective on March 1, 1999.
With the exception of the in-cab indicator for trailer ABS
malfunctions, the amendments to FMVSS No. 121 become effective on March
1, 1997, for truck tractors, and on March 1, 1998, for air-braked
trailers, converter dollies, single unit trucks, and buses.
FHWA Notice of Intent
On March 10, 1995, the FHWA published a notice of intent to
initiate a rulemaking concerning requirements for ABSs on CMVs
operating in interstate commerce (60 FR 13306). The notice of intent
included an extensive discussion of the NHTSA's ABS fleet study
conducted between 1988 and 1993. A copy of the study has been placed in
FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31. The NHTSA tracked the maintenance performance
histories of 200 truck tractors and 50 semitrailers equipped with ABSs,
as well as the histories of a comparison group of 88 truck tractors and
35 semitrailers that were not equipped with ABSs, to determine the
incremental maintenance costs and patterns associated with installing
ABSs on these heavy vehicles.\2\
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\2\ ``An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability,
Maintainability, and Durability of Antilock Braking Systems (ABS)
for Heavy Truck Tractors,'' DOT Report No. 807 846, March 1992, and
``An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability, Maintainability, and
Durability of Antilock Braking Systems (ABS) for Semitrailers,'' DOT
Report No. 808 059, October 1993.
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The authors concluded that, based upon the data collected during
the fleet study, currently available ABSs are reliable, durable, and
maintainable. While an ABS is not a zero-cost maintenance item, its
presence on a vehicle did not substantially increase maintenance costs
(less than one percent for tractors, less than two percent for
trailers) or decrease vehicle operational availability.
The NHTSA data indicate that ABSs are neither difficult nor unduly
expensive to maintain. The fleet test results do not indicate that the
level of maintenance required to keep an ABS functional is unreasonable
relative to the safety benefits that will result from the use of these
systems.
The FHWA concluded that a rulemaking should be initiated to propose
amending the FMCSRs to include ABS requirements and solicited comments
on this decision.
Discussion of Comments
The FHWA received 11 comments in response to the March 10, 1995,
notice. The commenters were: Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety
(AHAS); AlliedSignal Truck Brake Systems Company (AlliedSignal); the
American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA); Mr. G. Frank Brda, a former
CMV owner-operator; Heavy Duty Brake Manufacturers Council (HDBMC);
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS); Midland-Grau Heavy Duty
Systems; National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII); Mack
Trucks, Inc.; National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA); and,
Rockwell WABCO Vehicle Control Systems (Rockwell).
Generally the commenters were in favor of the FHWA initiating a
rulemaking to require that motor carriers maintain the ABSs. However,
the ATA, NADA, and AlliedSignal expressed concern about the FHWA
proceeding with a notice of proposed rulemaking. The specific concerns
or issues raised by the commenters are discussed below.
Interpretation of Sec. 396.3
The ATA and AlliedSignal believe that Sec. 396.3, Inspection,
repair, and maintenance, would adequately cover the ABS requirement and
that a new provision may not be necessary. The ATA states that:
This language makes it clear that a system necessary for safety
must be maintained in proper condition. It also includes the
flexibility to hold that the system can be disconnected if, because
of existing circumstances, doing so is the safest policy. For
example, we can foresee a time when some failure in an ABS system
will imperil braking. Until a cure for that problem is developed,
unplugging the specific model involved may be the most prudent
course.
The ATA believes NHTSA's research shows serious operational
problems with ABSs and the failure warning lamp systems that were not
reflected in the FHWA's March 10, 1995, notice of intent. The ATA
suggests a review of the NHTSA reports ``to get an understanding of
both the reliability and safety limitations of ABSs which were
indirectly covered by the agency and point to serious concerns about
the technology.'' The ATA summarized its recommendation to the FHWA as
follows:
ATA believes that properly administered, FMCSR 396.3(a)(1) can
be used to assure that carriers provide appropriate maintenance for
ABS and recommends that this be the strategy the agency follows in
this matter. Given present experience and that NHTSA itself has
pointed to serious operational difficulties, we believe more about
its actual performance must be known before attempting to write a
detailed ABS in-use regulation.
AlliedSignal shared the ATA's views on Sec. 396.3 stating that
``[t]he current FMCSR 396.3(a)(1) assures that operators maintain brake
systems in good working order and therefore possibly negating the need
to change FMCSR 396.''
The FHWA does not agree with the ATA and AlliedSignal. Section
[[Page 36693]]
396.3(a)(1) requires that parts and accessories be in safe and proper
operating condition at all times. This includes parts and accessories
specified in part 393 and any additional parts and accessories which
may affect the safety of operation of the vehicle, including but not
limited to, frame and frame assemblies, suspension systems, axles and
attaching parts, wheels and rims, and steering systems. The FHWA has
historically interpreted Sec. 396.3(a)(1) as applying only to the parts
and accessories required by part 393. Parts and accessories that are
not required by part 393 are considered additional or optional
equipment which is not necessary for the safe and proper operation of
commercial motor vehicles. The applicability of Sec. 396.3(a)(1) to
optional equipment is limited to only those cases in which a failure or
defect in the equipment creates a hazard to the motoring public or
adversely affects the performance or function of any piece of equipment
required by part 393.
If the FHWA does not establish a requirement for ABSs under part
393, such systems could only be considered as optional equipment under
the FMCSRs. Since a failure of the ABS would not affect the foundation
brake system, a CMV could meet all of the current requirements of
subpart C of part 393 with an inoperative ABS. Therefore, the FHWA
could not require motor carriers to systematically inspect, repair, and
maintain ABSs unless part 393 is amended.
In response to the ATA's concern that motor carriers need the
flexibility to disconnect ABSs if, ``because of existing circumstances,
doing so is the safest policy,'' the FHWA does not foresee the
development of such problems. In the event that an ABS or vehicle
manufacturer, or the NHTSA determines that there is a safety-related
defect, the manufacturers are responsible for notifying purchasers of
the defective equipment and remedying the problem free of charge (49
CFR part 577, Defect and Noncompliance Notification). If a manufacturer
or the NHTSA indicates there is an ABS defect of the severity alluded
to by the ATA, the FHWA would immediately notify all Federal officials
responsible for enforcing the FMCSRs and State officials responsible
for enforcing compatible State regulations to ensure that carriers are
not unfairly penalized for inoperable ABSs. However, in the absence of
a notification from a vehicle or ABS manufacturer or the NHTSA, the
FHWA does not intend to allow motor carriers to disconnect the ABSs.
Research on ABS Operation and Failure Modes
The NADA and the ATA believe the FHWA should evaluate in-use ABS
operation and failure modes prior to establishing a requirement for
motor carriers to maintain the systems. The NADA indicated that
``[u]ntil such an evaluation is undertaken, an ABS maintenance rule
would be premature.'' The ATA states:
There are several problems with ABS which will impact its
inspection and repair.
As NHTSA's ABS studies showed and our follow up research
confirms * * * there are numerous troubles with this technology.
Many of the problems involve the failure warning system. False
warning signals are a daily occurrence in fleets with a large number
of ABS equipped vehicles. Examples of such problems are codes for
malfunctions which, when checked, didn't occur; alien codes not
defined in the maintenance manual and phantom codes which come and
go, typically disappearing before the vehicle gets to the shop and
hopefully unrelated to a serious problem.
In addition to lamps illuminating when no failure can be found,
electrical failures occur which do not cause either the warning lamp
to come on or a failure code to be set, sometimes because the
warning system itself has failed. Also, the warning lamp does not
signal all mechanical failures and, as FMVSS 121 is now written, it
is not required to do so.
The warning light system is not directly connected to each part
of the ABS. Typically it is coupled to the ECU which grounds the
lead when a failure is detected. The ECU makes its decision by
taking input from many sources and using electronic logic to
calculate whether all is well. The only thing one can say for sure
when the warning light is on is that the bulb filament is intact and
receiving electrical power.
Given the warning lamp limitations cited above, its use as an
enforcement tool to assess whether ABS is working properly is
questionable. As it is presently configured, there is no quick,
accurate, easy way to do a complete functional test of the total ABS
short of making a panic stop and watching for wheel lockup,
something impractical for roadside inspection.
In addition to concerns about research, the ATA believes the FHWA
should ensure that the availability of spare parts to keep ``any
vintage ABS acceptably functioning for 20 years'' prior to requiring
motor carriers to maintain the ABSs. The ATA states:
There is a very good possibility that in twenty years, there
will be no source of repair parts for today's ABS. Certainly there
is nothing available now with which to fix most of the 1970's
systems. While it can be argued that the deletion of the requirement
for ABS from FMVSS 121 eliminated the market, we are not convinced
that this was the only major factor impacting the aftermarket spare
component arena. Other influences were an extremely small market and
the need to retain antiquated processes to build outmoded parts.
The ATA further states that ``[i]f FHWA/OMC plans to require that
carriers keep systems in repair, then it is only fair that the agency
help assure the job can be done.''
The FHWA does not consider the issues raised by the ATA and NADA to
be sufficient reasons to delay issuing a proposal to require carriers
to maintain the ABSs required by the NHTSA. Neither the ATA nor the
NADA identify specific safety-related issues that would justify
postponing an in-service requirement for ABS. The NHTSA fleet study
provides a clear indication of how ABSs behave in a real-world
environment. Further, there is no documentation of an ABS defect or
malfunction contributing to an accident as the ATA suggests may occur
in the future.
The NHTSA studied the reliability, maintainability, and durability
of ABSs installed in 200 truck tractors that were operated in normal
revenue service by 17 fleets. All of the ABSs which were available in
1988 were included in the test and the antilock systems were installed
on truck tractors produced by all of the major United States truck
tractor manufacturers. During the two-year test, the ABS equipped
tractors accumulated approximately 40 million miles of in-service
revenue-producing operation. Maintenance activities for all 200 ABS-
equipped tractors as well as 88 comparable tractors without ABSs were
monitored and recorded. Each of the ABS-equipped tractors had on-board
data recorders to monitor each ABS operation and keep a record of truck
mileage, number of brake applications, brake pressure distribution, and
acceleration during braking. To verify that these records were
representative of normal non-ABS operation, 16 truck tractors out of
the 88 control trucks were also equipped with on-board data recorders.
All accidents involving the participating tractors were investigated,
with particular attention being given to those which might have
involved braking and/or ABS operation.
The NHTSA also conducted a two-year study of the performance,
reliability, maintainability, and durability of ABSs installed on 50
semitrailers that were operated in normal revenue service by five
fleets. All ABSs which were available in 1990 were included in the
test, and the ABSs were installed on semitrailers produced by three
different manufacturers. The ABS-equipped semitrailers accumulated
approximately four million miles of in-service revenue-producing
operation.
[[Page 36694]]
Maintenance activities for all 50 ABS-equipped semitrailers as well as
35 comparable semitrailers without ABS were monitored and recorded. The
on-board recorders kept a record of semitrailer mileage, number of
brake applications, brake pressure distribution, voltage, and
deceleration during braking.
The authors of the studies concluded that, based upon the data
collected during the fleet study, the 1988 ABSs used on the truck
tractors, and the 1990 ABSs used on the trailers, were reliable,
durable, and maintainable. The researchers acknowledge that
installation-related problems were encountered during the study. The
problems included adjustments, repairs, or, in some cases replacement,
of wiring cables, wiring connectors, sensors, modulator valves, or
other components. The researchers indicated that many of these problems
were related to the experimental nature of the ABS installations on the
test vehicles.
As the NHTSA indicated in its report on the truck tractor study,
only one U.S. heavy truck manufacturer (Freightliner Corporation)
offered ABS as a fully-engineered production option on its line of
trucks. In contrast, other manufacturers had only limited experience
installing small numbers ofcurrent-generation ABSs and, therefore, had
not worked out many of the detailed design aspects of installing the
systems. Some of the manufacturers had no experience with the systems
they agreed to install for the purposes of the fleet study. Many of the
ABS installations required a collaborative effort on the part of ABS
suppliers, truck manufacturers, wheel and hub suppliers, and wiring
harness suppliers. As a result, the quality of some of the
installations was not typical of what would be expected for production-
line installations.
The FHWA believes the NHTSA fleet study provides sufficient data
concerning the reliability, durability, and maintainability for ABSs
and that it is not necessary to conduct additional research. Although
the NHTSA experienced installation-related ABS problems, there is no
indication that production-line ABSs installed to meet the NHTSA
requirements would have problems of the proportion experienced in the
fleet study. Neither the ATA nor the NADA have identified flaws in
NHTSA's research methodology or explained what additional aspects of
ABS operation need to be studied.
With regard to the ATA's concerns about ABS malfunction indicators,
the FHWA does not anticipate widespread problems on vehicles
manufactured on and after the effective date of the NHTSA requirements.
If the ABS malfunction indicator is activated, it is a clear signal
that a repair or adjustment to the system is necessary. Either the
malfunction signal is correct (indicating a problem with one or more
ABS components (ECU, wheel sensors, etc.)) and the ABS is not fully
operational, or the malfunction indicator is faulty and the ABS is
fully operational. In either case, the cause for the malfunction signal
should be properly diagnosed and corrected. Establishing a requirement
under the FMCSRs will ensure that motor carriers take the appropriate
steps to have the problem diagnosed and corrected.
In response to the ATA's comments about the FHWA helping to assure
that motor carriers can maintain the ABSs for 20 years, the agency is
responsible for establishing safety regulations and does not have
authority to regulate the availability of spare parts. The FHWA notes
that most motor carriers do not keep CMVs for 20 years. Those that
choose to keep vehicles in service for such periods must take full
responsibility for ensuring, at a minimum, that the vehicles meet all
safety requirements that were applicable at the time the vehicles were
manufactured. Motor carriers have the option of upgrading or
retrofitting the vehicles brake systems to meet subsequent safety
standards. Therefore if parts are not available in 20 years to maintain
the ABSs with which the vehicles were originally equipped (in
accordance with the NHTSA requirements), motor carriers have the option
of retiring those vehicles from service in interstate commerce, or
retrofitting the vehicles with ABSs for which spare parts are
available. In any case, the NHTSA's ABS requirements will create a
permanent market for replacement parts.
Retrofitting
Several of the commenters discussed retrofitting of vehicles
manufactured prior to the effective dates of the NHTSA requirements.
Most of these commenters indicated that the FHWA should not require
retrofitting. The ATA indicated that manufacturers have made ABS an
integral part of vehicle design and that ABS is not a technology which
can safely and effectively be retrofitted. The ATA states:
Installation of this equipment requires additional wiring and
wheel sensor hardware that would be very costly and difficult or
impossible to install in some existing vehicles, especially on power
units.
To monitor the motion of wheels, ABS relies on some sort of
device to sense their speed. This equipment is either a part of the
axle hub or is internal to the axle itself. In either case, fitting
it to existing vehicles not so equipped is very difficult. Heat
treated axle housings may have to be drilled and the scrap ``chips''
generated kept from contaminating the axle lubricant, both of which
require special knowledge and equipment. Wheel end hardware may need
changing and this could require special, off-vehicle, welding and
machining of hub flanges and even fabrication of parts to assure
existing wheels and drums can be retained.
The ATA also indicated that wiring must be properly routed to avoid
electromagnetic interference with ABS signals and mandated warning
lamps. The ATA emphasized that none of these activities are within the
normal scope of work of either truck maintenance facilities or garages
specializing in air brake systems.
The ATA concluded:
FHWA/OMC (Office of Motor Carriers) has adopted the proper
strategy in not suggesting ABS retrofit and that stance should be
maintained. ATA requests that FHWA/OMC confirm it discourages
retrofitting because there are serious difficulties associated with
such installations on a broad scale and there are technical
considerations that have not been fully explored which could
introduce operational and safety problems.
With regard to comments in support of a retrofitting requirement,
the NAII, in its November 8, 1993, comments in response to the NHTSA's
NPRM on ABS (the NAII included a copy of its 1993 comments with its
response to the FHWA's notice of intent), stated:
Requiring ABS on all heavy vehicles would save among 379 and 600
lives annually, prevent between 19,825 and 34,517 injuries and save
approximately $541 million to $650 million in property damage, a
figure that does not include medical costs and lost time costs. With
the immediate benefit of saving lives and avoiding injuries, we go
beyond the NPRM to urge that antilock brakes be required to be
retrofitted onto existing medium and heavy vehicles and that the
implementation date for all vehicles be accelerated to two years
after final rulemaking.
The FHWA agrees with the ATA that it would be inappropriate to
propose an ABS retrofitting requirement. The FHWA believes the NHTSA
research provides a strong indication of the types of technical
problems that would be expected if motor carriers were required to
retrofit vehicles with ABS.
As noted earlier, at the time the NHTSA conducted its research on
ABS for truck tractors, only one heavy truck manufacturer offered ABS
as a fully- engineered production option on its line of trucks. In
contrast, most of the remaining truck tractor manufacturers had only
limited experience installing
[[Page 36695]]
small numbers of ``current-generation'' ABSs and, therefore, had not
worked out many of the detailed design aspects of installing the
systems. The retrofitting of ABSs on truck tractors required teamwork
on the part of ABS suppliers, truck manufacturers, wheel and hub
suppliers, and wiring harness suppliers. Even with this team effort,
some of the test vehicles were delivered to the participating motor
carriers with pre-existing problems that, for one reason or another,
prevented the ABS from functioning properly.
In all, 116 out of the 200 truck tractors (58 percent) experienced
installation/preproduction design related problems. The researchers
indicated that the relatively high percentage is indicative of the
``newness'' of the systems in North American applications. Table 1
summarizes the types of problems that were experienced in the truck
tractor portion of the fleet study. Table 2 summarizes installation-
related problems in the semitrailer portion of the fleet study.
Table 1.--Truck-Tractor ABS Installation/Pre-Production Design-Related
Problems by System Component Needing Work
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
trucks Number of
requiring trucks
inspections, requiring
ABS component adjustments replacements
or repairs of this
of this component
component
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wiring Cables............................... 12 \2\ 23
Wiring Connectors........................... 29 10
Sensors and Related Parts................... 5 10
Modulator Valves and Related Parts.......... 13 \3\ 50
ECUs........................................ 17 \2\ 20
Others \1\.................................. 7 0
Total No. Of Trucks per Column.............. 57 102
Overall No. of Trucks Involved in
Installation/Pre-Production Design Related
Problems
(1)116
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Others include: rewiring due to installation oversights; two
miscellaneous wire resecurements; and the addition of one ground strap
to adjust the ECU.
\2\ One problem represented all of these replacements.
\3\ One problem involved 40 of these trucks, while another involved 10
trucks.
Note: Individual column numbers are not additive since specific trucks
may have needed maintenance on more than one component.
Table 2.--Semitrailer ABS Installation/Pre-Production Design-Related
Problems by System Component Needing Work
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
semitrailers Number of
requiring semitrailers
inspections, requiring
ABS component adjustments replacements
or repairs of this
of this component
component
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wiring Cables............................... 0 2
Wiring Connectors........................... 11 0
Sensors and Related Parts................... \2\ 3 10
Modulator Valves and Related Parts.......... 0 0
ECUs........................................ 0 5
Others \1\.................................. 0 26
Total No. of Semitrailers per Column........ 14 31
Overall No. Of Semitrailers Involved in
Installation/Pre-Production Design- Related
Problems
(1) 31
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Others include: Isolation diode installation and replacement of ECU
grommets.
\2\ Sensor adjustment resulted from incorrectly adjusted wheel bearings
on new semitrailers.
Note: Individual column numbers are not additive since specific
semitrailers may have needed maintenance on more than one component.
The NHTSA report on the truck tractor portion of the fleet study
indicates the percentage of installation-related problems is similar to
that observed by many of the participating fleets when they receive
newly-built vehicles. However, the FHWA believes the percentage of
malfunctions would be much greater if motor carriers were required to
attempt retrofitting innumerable configurations of air-braked vehicles.
The FHWA considers NHTSA's fleet study to be a best-case scenario for
retrofitting ABS in that the vehicle and brake manufacturers (as well
as wheel and hub manufacturers) worked together to complete the
installations of the ABS. Even with this collaborative effort of
experienced engineers, numerous problems related to the retrofitting
process surfaced during the fleet study.
Although many motor carriers have excellent maintenance programs
and talented engineering staff, the FHWA believes that the majority of
motor carriers could not retrofit their vehicles without a substantial
amount of technical assistance from vehicle and component
manufacturers. Without this technical assistance it is more likely than
not that many of the retrofitted ABS installations would not be
performed correctly, thereby creating the potential for a degradation
of the CMV's braking performance. It is unrealistic to expect
manufacturers to be able to help more than 300,000 motor carriers
complete the retrofitting of several million vehicles while working on
the design and installation of ABSs on newly manufactured vehicles.
Further, it is unlikely that a collaborative effort between vehicle and
component manufacturers and the motor carriers would result in better
installations than those experienced in the NHTSA fleet study.
The FHWA believes the cost of retrofitting a commercial motor
vehicle with ABS is likely to be higher than original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) installations because the vehicle will have to be
removed from revenue service during the retrofitting process. This is
not the case for brand new vehicles. Also, repeated adjustments or
repairs of the type described in the NHTSA research reports would mean
more down time for the retrofitted vehicles.
In addition, Sec. 396.25 of the FMCSRs, Qualifications of brake
inspectors, prohibits motor carriers from allowing their employees to
be responsible for ensuring that brake-related inspection, repair, and
maintenance tasks are performed correctly unless the employee has at
least one year of training and/or experience. This requirement was
issued in response to section 9110 of the Truck and Bus Safety and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1988 (49 U.S.C. 31137(b)). Therefore, motor
carriers that lack sufficient staff with at least one year of training
and/or experience at retrofitting ABSs prior to the effective date of a
retrofitting requirement would have to rely on commercial garages or
similar facilities to fulfill a retrofitting requirement. Since many of
these facilities would also have very little if any experience
retrofitting ABSs, there is no assurance that they could do a better
job than the motor carriers' employees. Therefore, most motor carriers
could not allow their employees to attempt the retrofitting of ABSs,
and would not have a practical means to satisfy a retrofitting
requirement.
Inspection Procedures
Several of the commenters discussed roadside inspection procedures
to determine if ABSs are in working order. The HDBMC recommends that
the FHWA ``provide for maintenance of
[[Page 36696]]
ABS systems by regulation and include a[n] ABS roadside inspection
procedure.'' The HDBMC recommends that the roadside inspection
procedure include a check of the ABS malfunction indicator.
Midland-Grau also recommends that vehicle inspections include
checking the operational status of the ABS. Midland-Grau states:
The majority of antilock systems on the market have an initial
startup check sequence along with on-board diagnostics which
monitors the operational status of the ABS. The startup sequence
consists of watching the malfunction indicator light on the dash to
flash along with listening to the ABS modulator valve to exhaust
(blow-down). This operation can be performed simply by having the
driver perform the following steps:
1. Shut down the vehicle's engine by turning off the ignition
switch[;]
2. Have the driver fully apply the brakes[; and,]
3. With the brakes fully applied have the driver turn on the
ignition switch[.]
When the driver follows the above sequence of steps the ABS
malfunction indicator lamp should flash once followed by the ABS
modulator valves exhausting (blow-down). If the ABS is not operating
properly then either the ABS malfunction light will remain on and/or
the ABS modulator valves will not exhaust (blow-down). This quick
check insures that the ABS is fully operational.
Rockwell recommends that the inspection procedure be simple and
straightforward. Rockwell states that ``[t]he inspections should: (1)
[b]e conducted in a short amount of time, (2) [p]rovide meaningful
information about the condition of the ABS[,] and (3) [u]tilize the
self-diagnostic system capabilities required by rulemaking.'' Rockwell
believes the inspection should consist of a basic bulb check of the ABS
indicator lamp followed by a verification that the ABS indicator lamp
deactivates at the end of the check function.
The FHWA appreciates the information provided by the brake
manufacturers and will share this information with the Commercial
Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA)--the organization of Federal, State and
Provincial government agencies and representatives from private
industry in the United States, Canada and Mexico dedicated to
improvement of commercial vehicle safety. State agencies responsible
for conducting roadside inspections are members of the CVSA. The FHWA
will work with the appropriate committees within the CVSA to develop
the necessary training material to help inspectors identify ABS
components and determine if the ABS malfunction indicators are working
properly. However, the FHWA does not intend to include roadside
inspection procedures in the FMCSRs. The establishment of inspection
procedures for use by State officials is a non-regulatory function that
is best left to the CVSA with assistance from the FHWA, the NHTSA, and
brake manufacturers.
With regard to the responsibilities of motor carriers in
maintaining the ABSs required by the NHTSA, the FHWA intends to work
with industry groups and brake manufacturers to develop educational
material to help motor carriers understand how the ABSs operate
(including the malfunction indicators), and to identify appropriate
industry sources for information concerning ABS maintenance. The FHWA
does not believe that including detailed systematic, inspection,
repair, and maintenance requirements in part 396 of the FMCSRs would
benefit the industry. The FHWA requests comments on this issue.
Discussion of the Proposal
Creation of Section 393.55
The FHWA proposes to amend the FMCSRs by adding a new Sec. 393.55,
Antilock Brake Systems. This section would be added to subpart C of
part 393, Brakes. The provisions of paragraph (a) would require that
hydraulic braked trucks and buses manufactured on or after March 1,
1999, be equipped with an ABS that meets the requirements of FMVSS No.
105. Paragraph (b) would require indicator lamps on hydraulic-braked
vehicles to alert the driver of ABS malfunctions. Paragraph (c) would
require that each air-braked truck tractor manufactured on or after
March 1, 1997, be equipped with an ABS that meets the requirements of
FMVSS No. 121. Paragraph (c) would also cover air braked trucks, buses,
trailers, and converter dollies manufactured on or after March 1, 1998.
The requirement for ABS malfunction indicators on air braked vehicles
would be covered under paragraph (d). Paragraph (e) would cover the
requirement for the external indicator lamp on trailers and converter
dollies manufactured between March 1, 1998, and March 1, 2009.
Applicability to Canadian and Mexican Vehicles
The FHWA is not proposing an exemption for CMVs operated in the
United States by Canada- and Mexico-based motor carriers. Although the
Federal governments of Canada and Mexico have not indicated whether
they intend to require ABSs for CMVs operating in their countries, the
FHWA believes that it is appropriate to require ABS on foreign-based
vehicles manufactured on or after the effective dates of the NHTSA
requirements if those vehicles are operated within the United States.
This preliminary decision is consistent with the applicability of the
requirements of parts 393 and 396 of the FMCSRs and ensures that all
CMVs operating in interstate or foreign commerce within the United
States are required to meet the same safety standards.
Currently subpart C of part 393 cross references FMVSS No. 105
(Hydraulic Brake Systems), FMVSS No. 106 (Brake Hoses), and FMVSS No.
121 (Air Brake Systems) as well as several other CMV-related FMVSSs.
The FHWA's cross references have the net effect of requiring that
vehicles operated by Canada- and Mexico-based motor carriers be
equipped with safety features/equipment that are compatible with the
NHTSA requirements irrespective of where the vehicle was originally
manufactured, or whether the vehicle was manufactured for sale or use
in the United States. Commercial motor vehicles that do not meet all of
the applicable requirements of part 393 cannot be operated in the
United States. As such, commercial motor vehicles operated by foreign-
based motor carriers are currently required by the FHWA to have, at a
minimum, brake systems that comply with the applicable provisions of
FMVSS Nos. 105, 106, and 121 in effect on the date of manufacture.
On September 6, 1995 (60 FR 46236), the FHWA published its final
rule on automatic brake adjusters and brake adjustment indicators. The
final rule requires motor carriers to maintain automatic brake
adjusters on hydraulic- braked CMVs manufactured on or after October
20, 1993, and air-braked CMVs manufactured on or after October 20,
1994, the effective dates of NHTSA's requirement for automatic brake
adjusters. Further, air braked vehicles that have exposed pushrods and
are manufactured on or after October 20, 1994, must have brake
adjustment indicators. The preamble to the final rule states:
These provisions will apply to all CMVs operated in the United
States, irrespective of the country where the CMV is based.
Canadian and Mexican vehicles manufactured on or after the
effective dates of the NHTSA rules will be required to conform to
this regulation.
Although the FHWA does not have data on the extent to which CMVs
manufactured for sale in Canada and Mexico comply with the current
brake- related FMVSSs and FMCSRs, it is
[[Page 36697]]
unlikely that there are technical reasons that would preclude
manufacturers of these vehicles from offering ABS as an option. As
previously mentioned, foreign-based motor carriers are currently
required to operate commercial motor vehicles that comply with all of
the applicable requirements of part 393 while in the United States.
The FHWA contacted the Truck Manufacturers Association (TMA) to
determine the availability of ABS on air braked vehicles sold in Canada
and Mexico. The TMA's membership includes the Ford Motor Company;
Freightliner; General Motors (GM); Mack Trucks, Inc. (Mack), Navistar
International Transportation Corporation (Navistar); PACCAR, Inc.
(Kenworth and Peterbilt); and, Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corporation
(Volvo).
The TMA indicated that five of the manufactures that sell medium
and heavy-duty trucks in Canada install ABS as standard equipment.
Another manufacturer offers ABS as optional equipment for the Canadian
market. With regard to the Mexican market, none of the TMA's members
installs ABS as standard equipment. Only two of the TMA's members offer
ABS as optional equipment. However, another member indicated it would
make ABS available on units manufactured in Mexico in the near future.
The FHWA also contacted Dina, a Mexican manufacturer of heavy
trucks, and determined that ABS is offered as optional equipment.
Based upon the information obtained from the TMA and Dina, the FHWA
believes that requiring Canadian and Mexican CMVs manufactured on or
after the effective dates of NHTSA's ABS requirements, is appropriate.
The FHWA notes that ABS is not yet commercially available for
hydraulically-braked medium and heavy vehicles in the United States,
Canada or Mexico. However, given the March 1, 1999, effective date of
the FMVSS No. 105 requirements for ABS, the FHWA believes these systems
will be commercially available in time for motor carriers to comply
with the FMCSRs.
The FHWA specifically requests comments from Canada and Mexico-
based motor carriers and original equipment manufacturers that sell
vehicles for the Canadian and Mexican markets.
Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
All comments received before the close of business on the comment
closing date indicated above will be considered and will be available
for examination in the docket room at the above address. Comments
received after the comment closing date will be filed in the docket and
will be considered to the extent practicable, but the FHWA may issue a
final rule at any time after the close of the comment period. In
addition to late comments, the FHWA will also continue to file in the
docket relevant information that becomes available after the comment
closing date, and interested persons should continue to examine the
docket for new material.
Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
The FHWA has determined that this action is not a significant
regulatory action within the meaning of Executive Order 12866. No
serious inconsistency or interference with another agency's actions or
plans is likely to result, and it is unlikely that this regulatory
action will have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more. The FHWA's regulation would only require maintenance of ABSs; the
NHTSA final rule published on March 10, 1995, is the regulation which
actually requires installation of ABSs. The data collected by NHTSA
indicates that the level of maintenance required to keep an ABS
functional would only increase incrementally and would not be
unreasonable relative to the safety benefits that would result from the
use of these systems. Therefore it is anticipated that the economic
impact of this proposal would be minimal.
The preamble to NHTSA's March 10, 1995, final rule included
estimates of the increased costs of operating heavy vehicles equipped
with ABS. Three categories of operating costs were examined: Lifetime
maintenance costs; lifetime fuel costs due to the additional weight of
the ABS; and lifetime revenue loss due to payload displacement. The
range of the increase in total lifetime operating costs related to
equipping vehicles with ABS is from $201.47 for single-unit trucks and
buses to $786.65 for truck tractors. The NHTSA indicated that the total
estimated increase in lifetime vehicle operating costs associated with
ABS for all commercial motor vehicles is $232 million. A copy of the
NHTSA's final economic assessment is included in FHWA Docket No. MC-94-
31.
In addition, the FHWA has determined that this action is not a
significant regulatory action under the Department of Transportation's
regulatory policies and procedures because it does not concern a matter
about which there is substantial public controversy, it will not have a
substantial effect on State and local governments, or initiate a
substantial regulatory program or change in policy.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-
612), the FHWA has evaluated the effects of this rule on small entities
and has determined that it would not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities. The FHWA finds that this
rule would not significantly increase costs for motor carriers because
FHWA regulations only require maintenance of brake systems and the data
collected by the NHTSA shows that the presence of an ABS on a vehicle
would not substantially increase maintenance costs (less than one
percent for tractors and less than two percent for trailers) or
decrease vehicle operational availability.
Executive Order 12612 (Federalism Assessment)
This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has been determined
that this rulemaking does not have sufficient Federalism implications
to warrant the preparation of a Federalism assessment. These new safety
requirements would not directly preempt any State law or regulation,
and no additional costs or burdens would be imposed on the States as a
result of this action. Furthermore, the State's ability to discharge
traditional State governmental functions would not be affected by this
rulemaking.
Executive Order 12372 (Intergovernmental Review)
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Number 20.217, Motor
Carrier Safety. The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372
regarding intergovernmental consultation on Federal programs and
activities do not apply to this program.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This action does not contain a collection of information
requirement for the purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44
U.S.C. 3501-3520.
National Environmental Policy Act
The agency has analyzed this rulemaking for the purpose of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347) and has
determined that this action would not have any effect on the quality of
the environment.
[[Page 36698]]
Regulation Identification Number
A regulation identification number (RIN) is assigned to each
regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations.
The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda
in April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of
this document can be used to cross reference this action with the
Unified Agenda.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 393
Highway safety, Motor carriers, Motor vehicle safety.
Issued on: July 8, 1996.
Rodney E. Slater,
Federal Highway Administrator.
In consideration of the foregoing, the FHWA proposes to amend title
49, Code of Federal Regulations, subchapter B, chapter III, as follows:
PART 393--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 393 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Sec. 1041(b) of Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914, 1993
(1991), 49 U.S.C. 31136 and 31502; 49 CFR 1.48.
2. Section 393.5 is amended by adding the definition of antilock
brake system, in alphabetical order, to read as follows:
* * * * *
Antilock Brake System or ABS means a portion of a service brake
system that automatically controls the degree of rotational wheel slip
during braking by:
(1) Sensing the rate of angular rotation of the wheels;
(2) Transmitting signals regarding the rate of wheel angular
rotation to one or more controlling devices which interpret those
signals and generate responsive controlling output signals; and
(3) Transmitting those controlling signals to one or more
modulators which adjust brake actuating forces in response to those
signals.
* * * * *
3. In subpart C, Sec. 393.55 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 393.55 Antilock brake systems.
(a) Hydraulic brake systems. Each truck and bus manufactured on or
after March 1, 1999, and equipped with a hydraulic brake system, shall
be equipped with an antilock brake system that meets the requirements
of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 105 (49 CFR
571.105, S5.5).
(b) ABS malfunction indicators for hydraulic braked vehicles. Each
hydraulic braked vehicle subject to the requirements of paragraph (a)
of this section shall be equipped with an ABS malfunction indicator
system that meets the requirements of FMVSS No. 105 (49 CFR 571.105,
S5.3).
(c) Air brake systems. (1) Each truck tractor manufactured on or
after March 1, 1997, shall be equipped with an antilock brake system
that meets the requirements of FMVSS No. 121 (49 CFR 571.121,
S5.1.6.1(b)).
(2) Each air braked commercial motor vehicle other than a truck
tractor, manufactured on or after March 1, 1998, shall be equipped with
an antilock brake system that meets the requirements of FMVSS No. 121
(49 CFR 571.121, S5.1.6.1(a) for trucks and buses, S5.2.3 for
semitrailers, converter dollies and full trailers).
(d) ABS malfunction circuits and signals for air braked vehicles.
(1) Each truck tractor manufactured on or after March 1, 1997, and each
single unit air braked vehicle manufactured on or after March 1, 1998,
shall be equipped with an electrical circuit that is capable of
signaling a malfunction that affects the generation or transmission of
response or control signals to the vehicle's antilock brake system (49
CFR 571.121, S5.1.6.2(a)).
(2) Each truck tractor manufactured on or after March 1, 2001, and
each single unit vehicle that is equipped to tow another air-braked
vehicle, shall be equipped with an electrical circuit that is capable
of transmitting a malfunction signal from the antilock brake system(s)
on the towed vehicle(s) to the trailer ABS malfunction lamp in the cab
of the towing vehicle, and shall have the means for connection of the
electrical circuit to the towed vehicle. The ABS malfunction circuit
and signal shall meet the requirements of FMVSS No. 121 (49 CFR
571.121, S5.1.6.2(b)).
(3) Each semitrailer, trailer converter dolly, and full trailer
manufactured on or after March 1, 2001, and subject to the requirements
of paragraph (b)(2) of this section, shall be equipped with an
electrical circuit that is capable of signaling a malfunction in the
trailer's antilock brake system, and shall have the means for
connection of this ABS malfunction circuit to the towing vehicle. In
addition, each trailer manufactured on or after March 1, 2001, that is
designed to tow another air-brake equipped trailer shall be capable of
transmitting a malfunction signal from the antilock brake system(s) of
the trailer(s) it tows to the vehicle in front of the trailer. The ABS
malfunction circuit and signal shall meet the requirements of FMVSS No.
121 (49 CFR 571.121, S5.2.3.2).
(e) Exterior ABS malfunction indicator lamps for trailers. Each
trailer (including a trailer converter dolly) manufactured on or after
March 1, 1998 and before March 1, 2009, shall be equipped with an ABS
malfunction indicator lamp which meets the requirements of FMVSS No.
121 (49 CFR 571.121, S5.2.3.3).
[FR Doc. 96-17785 Filed 7-11-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-22-P
