94-17807. Resolution of Potential Conflict of Interest  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 140 (Friday, July 22, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
    [Page 0]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-17807]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: July 22, 1994]
    
    
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    DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
    
     
    
    Resolution of Potential Conflict of Interest
    
        The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has identified 
    and resolved a potential conflict of interest situation related to its 
    contractor, Mr. Nicholas P. Armenis. This Notice satisfies the 
    requirements of 10 CFR 1706.8(e) with respect to publication in the 
    Federal Register. Under the Board's Organizational and Consultant 
    Conflict of Interests Regulations, 10 CFR Part 1706 (OCI Regulations), 
    an organizational or consultant conflict of interest (OCI) means that 
    because of other past, present, or future planned activities or 
    relationships, a contractor or consultant is unable, or potentially 
    unable, to render impartial assistance or advice to the Board, or the 
    objectivity of such offeror or contractor in performing work for the 
    Board is or might be otherwise impaired, or such offeror or contractor 
    has or would have an unfair competitive advantage. While the OCI 
    Regulations provide that contracts shall generally not be awarded to an 
    organization where the Board has determined that an actual or potential 
    OCI exists and cannot be avoided, the Board may waive this requirement 
    in certain circumstances.
        The Board's mission is to provide advice and recommendations to the 
    Department of Energy (DOE) regarding public health and safety matters 
    related to DOE's defense nuclear facilities. This includes the review 
    and evaluation of the content and implementation of health and safety 
    standards including DOE orders, rules, and other safety requirements, 
    relating to the design, construction, operation and decommissioning of 
    DOE defense nuclear facilities. In late 1991, Congress amended the 
    Board's enabling Act, broadening the Board's jurisdiction over defense 
    nuclear facilities to include the assembly, disassembly, and the 
    testing of nuclear weapons. With this increase in responsibility, the 
    Board revised its priorities to include reviews of additional 
    facilities, including, principally the Pantex Plant (Pantex), Nevada 
    Test Site (NTS), and additional facilities at Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant. The 
    Board also recognized the need to direct its attention to the 
    activities of the weapons design laboratories such as Los Alamos 
    National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
    (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratory (Sandia).
        Two matters of immediate concern to the Board are the safety of 
    ongoing weapons disassembly operations and maintenance of the 
    capability to safely conduct nuclear testing operations. While the DOE 
    had been engaged in these activities for decades, significant changes 
    in the national security posture resulted in shifts in emphasis within 
    DOE. Unprecedented numbers of simultaneous nuclear weapon retirements 
    strained DOE's capabilities to develop and implement safe and well-
    engineered procedures. A Congressionally-mandated and Presidentially-
    extended nuclear testing moratorium removed the primary mechanism 
    (i.e., an active, ongoing testing program) by which the capability to 
    execute tests safely was exercised and ensured. At the same time, the 
    weapons programs at the nuclear weapons laboratories were losing 
    skilled and experienced personnel due to retirement, downsizing, and 
    reassignments. This combination of issues required the Board to 
    increase its attention, and with it the number of associated reviews, 
    at both Pantex and the NTS. Further, the Board recognized that it 
    needed individuals with expertise in multiple technical disciplines, 
    not previously required, to effectively meet the challenges and 
    responsibilities of its new authority. These technical disciplines 
    included conventional and nuclear explosive technology and safety, 
    nuclear materials handling and storage, criticality safety, and nuclear 
    weapons assembly, disassembly, storage and testing.
        While the Board initiated an employee recruitment effort for 
    individuals with formal training and experience in weapons related 
    disciplines, it also recognized a need for technical assistance from 
    outside experts who have direct relevant experience in this area. The 
    Board identified Mr. Nicholas P. Armenis as an individual with the 
    requisite knowledge and experience needed to provide the Board with 
    immediate assistance in the weapons area and entered into an agreement 
    with him for support services. Under this arrangement, Mr. Armenis 
    provides technical expertise with respect to the design of nuclear 
    weapons currently being returned to Pantex for dismantlement, including 
    historical insight related to specific design and test details of the 
    weapons systems. In particular, his expertise related to the mechanical 
    aspects of weapons physics packages is being utilized to ensure the 
    safe disassembly, handling, and storage of these nuclear weapons 
    systems. Through the Board's direction, he has participated in reviews 
    of various weapon dismantlement procedures, observed the complete 
    dismantlement of selected weapons, and provided valuable insight into 
    DOE developed operating and inspection standards for these activities. 
    The Board believes that its activities, supported by Mr. Armenis, have 
    contributed to the following achievements at Pantex; institution of a 
    practice whereby the responsible DOE laboratories (LANL, LLNL, Sandia) 
    review procedures for disassembly of nuclear weapons for identification 
    of potential safety questions; and improved conduct of operations in 
    disassembly of nuclear weapons.
        The Board has subsequently learned that Mr. Armenis is providing 
    consulting services to LANL that may create a potential conflict of 
    interest with his work for the Board. Specifically, Mr. Armenis assists 
    the LANL staff in compiling complete development reports for weapons 
    that are presently in the stockpile and in preparing final 
    documentation for NTS tests that have been executed since none of the 
    weapons have been thoroughly documented and final NTS device data has 
    not been compiled. His efforts involve working with LANL engineers in 
    the proper compilation of data to assure consistency in methods and to 
    prevent the exclusion of critical details of this historical 
    reconstruction of information.
        The Board reviewed this situation and concluded that, even if the 
    circumstances could give rise to a potential conflict of interest 
    situation, it is nonetheless in the best interest of the Government to 
    have Mr. Armenis continue to provide support to the Board for the 
    reasons described below. Mr. Armenis possesses a comprehensive 
    understanding of nuclear weapons assembly and dismantlement procedures 
    based on his approximately forty years of direct involvement in these 
    activities. He spent thirty years working at LANL as a design engineer 
    and supervisor involved in the design and assembly of nuclear devices 
    from 1948 through 1977. He also assisted in the technical management 
    and administration of a LANL unit which was responsible for nuclear 
    design, nuclear device assembly, production specifications liaison with 
    DOE contractors, and feasibility studies for various weapon programs. 
    Further, since his departure from LANL, Mr. Armenis has worked as a 
    consultant for his former employer in this technical area. His efforts 
    included reviews of NTS test device records to determine document 
    retention issues and the research of weapon development records. This 
    research has resulted in written histories of the development of 
    various stockpile weapons. Therefore, Mr. Armenis's unparalleled blend 
    of hands-on expertise in the development of assembly and disassembly 
    procedures of nuclear weapons, coupled with his more recent work in 
    research and recreation of these activities, makes him uniquely 
    qualified to assist the Board in its health and safety reviews of 
    current DOE weapons disassembly efforts.
        The Board also examined Mr. Armenis's current financial 
    relationship with LANL, which includes a vested pension program and 
    approximately twelve weeks a year of the consulting work described 
    above, and considered the potential effect it may have on his 
    objectivity in performing the Board's work. Based on this review, the 
    Board determined that these relationships should not interfere with his 
    work for the Board since the pension, and any future increases, is 
    calculated according to fixed formulas and prior contributions, and the 
    relative value of his LANL consulting effort is low compared to the 
    number of hours actually worked by Mr. Armenis each year.
        Further, the continued use of Mr. Armenis by the Board is 
    consistent with the spirit and intent of Board Recommendation 93-6 to 
    the Secretary of Energy dated December 10, 1993. This recommendation 
    highlights the need for DOE to retain access to capability and capture 
    the unique knowledge of individuals who have been engaged for many 
    years in certain critical defense nuclear activities in order to avoid 
    future safety problems in these and related areas. The Board's concern 
    is that while documentation essential to DOE's current weapons 
    dismantlement program exists on the design and safety aspects of 
    nuclear weapons, it is also important, for safety reasons, to involve 
    individuals from the design laboratories of LANL, LLNL, and Sandia. 
    These individuals should participate in reviews of detailed 
    dismantlement procedures and specialized procedures and should respond 
    to problems encountered in the course of weapon dismantlement. The 
    design individuals from the laboratories most needed in connection with 
    dismantlement of a specific weapon are those who had been active in the 
    original design of that weapon.These individuals are believed to 
    possess information not recorded in documentation, such as reasons for 
    specific design features and personal knowledge of any problems that 
    have arisen during design, fabrication, and stockpile life. Therefore, 
    while the Board believes that DOE must retain and utilize certain 
    expertise in the weapons area, it also recognizes the value of 
    acquiring specialized technical support from Mr. Armenis in the 
    fulfillment of its health and safety responsibilities.
        The Board also recognized that it is unlikely that the work being 
    performed by Mr. Armenis could be satisfactorily performed by anyone 
    else whose experience and affiliations would not give rise to a 
    conflict of interest question. That is because the individuals who have 
    the requisite expertise in this area could only have obtained such 
    expertise through previous or current employment or consulting 
    relationship with one or more of the weapons design laboratories. The 
    pertinent experience of other qualified individuals would therefore 
    likely raise similar conflicting questions.
        Finally, as the Board is required under its OCI Regulations, where 
    reasonably possible, to initiate measures which attempt to mitigate an 
    OCI, Mr. Armenis and the Board agreed to the following during contract 
    performance. Should the effort Mr. Armenis is currently performing for 
    LANL change from only providing assistance in the historical recreation 
    of past weapons activities to one of assessing the adequacy or safety 
    of current weapons disassembly procedures or some other task which 
    would directly conflict with work he performs for the Board, he will 
    immediately notify the Board, which then will take further action as 
    appropriate. Also, the efforts of Mr. Armenis will be overseen by 
    experienced technical staff of the Board who are able to ensure that 
    all of his resultant work products are impartial and contain full 
    support for any findings and recommendations issued thereunder.
        Accordingly, on the basis of the determination described above and 
    pursuant to the applicable provisions of 10 CFR part 1706, the Chairman 
    of the Board granted a waiver of any conflicts of interests (and the 
    pertinent provisions of the OCI Regulations) with the Board's contract 
    with Mr. Nicholas P. Armenis that might arise out of his existing 
    relationship with LANL.
    
        Dated: July 18, 1994.
    Joe Neubeiser,
    Acting General Manager.
    [FR Doc. 94-17807 Filed 7-21-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 6802-KD-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
07/22/1994
Department:
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Document Number:
94-17807
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: July 22, 1994