[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 141 (Thursday, July 23, 1998)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 39522-39526]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-19637]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 141 / Thursday, July 23, 1998 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 39522]]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
RIN 3150-AF98
Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering amending the
event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors: to update the
current rules, including reducing or eliminating the reporting burden
associated with events of little or no safety significance; and to
better align the rules with the NRC's current needs, including revising
reporting requirements based on importance to risk and extending the
required reporting times consistent with the need for prompt NRC
action. This advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites public
comment on issues related to such an amendment.
The Commission is also interested in evaluating other current
regulations to identify areas where reporting requirements can be
simplified and/or modified to a less burdensome, more risk-informed
approach, and this advance notice of proposed rulemaking invites public
comment on identification of other reporting requirements that are
potential candidates for such modification.
DATE: Submit comments by September 21, 1998. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: The Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20055-0001, Attention:
Rulemaking and Adjudication Staff.
Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,
between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Federal workdays.
Electronic comments may be provided via the NRC's interactive
rulemaking web site through the NRC home page (http://www.nrc.gov).
From the home page, select ``Rulemaking'' from the tool bar at the
bottom of the page. The interactive rulemaking website can then be
accessed by selecting ``Rulemaking Forum.'' This site provides the
ability to upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser
supports that function. For information about the interactive
rulemaking web site, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905; e-
mail [email protected]
Certain documents related to this rulemaking, including comments
received, may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L
Street NW., (Lower Level), Washington, DC. These same documents also
may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the interactive
rulemaking website established by NRC for this rulemaking.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis P. Allison, Office for Analysis
and Evaluation of Operational Data, Washington DC 20555-0001, telephone
(301) 415-6835, e-mail dpa@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Section 50.72 has been in effect, with minor modifications, since
1983. Its essential purpose is ``* * * to provide the Commission with
immediate reporting of twelve types of significant events where
immediate Commission action to protect the public health and safety may
be required or where the Commission needs timely and accurate
information to respond to heightened public concern.'' (48 FR 39039;
August 29, 1983). Events defined in Sec. 50.72 are currently required
to be reported, by telephone, in the following time frames:
(1) Declaration of an emergency class is reported immediately after
notification of appropriate State or local agencies and not later than
1-hour after declaration.
(2) Non-emergency, 1-hour events are reported as soon as practical
and in all cases within 1 hour of occurrence.
(3) Non-emergency, 4-hour events are reported as soon as practical
and in all cases within 4 hours of occurrence.
(4) Followup notification is made immediately during the course of
the event for: further degradation in the level of plant safety, other
worsening plant conditions, declaration of an emergency class, changes
in an emergency class, termination of an emergency class, results of
ensuing evaluations of plant conditions, effectiveness of response or
protective measures taken, or information related to plant behavior
that is not understood.
Section 50.73 has also been in effect, with minor modification,
since 1983. Its essential purpose is to identify ``* * * the types of
reactor events and problems that are believed to be significant and
useful to the NRC in its effort to identify and resolve threats to
public safety. It is designed to provide the information necessary for
engineering studies of operational anomalies and trends and patterns
analysis of operational occurrences. The same information can be used
for other analytic procedures that will aid in identifying accident
precursors.'' (48 FR 33851; July 26, 1983). Events defined in
Sec. 50.73 are reported, in writing, within 30 days of discovery. Most
of these events are initially reported under Sec. 50.72. However, for
two categories of events the initial report is the 30-day LER. These
categories are: (1) Operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS
and (2) failure of independent components due to a common cause.
Experience has shown a need for change in several areas. Specific
proposals under consideration are discussed below.
State Input
Many States (Agreement States and Non-Agreement States) have
agreements with power reactors to inform the States of plant issues.
State reporting requirements are frequently triggered by NRC reporting
requirements. Accordingly, the NRC seeks State input on issues related
to amending power reactor reporting requirements. Appropriate State
agencies will be requested by letter to provide comments on this
advance notice of proposed rulemaking.
Specific NRC Proposals for Amending 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73
Objectives: The objectives of contemplated amendments would include
the following.
(1) To better align the reporting requirements with the NRC's
current reporting needs. Examples would
[[Page 39523]]
include: (a) extending the required reporting times, consistent with
the need for timely NRC action and (b) revising the reporting
requirements based on importance to risk, such as by adding reports
related to actuation of systems that are risk-significant and dropping
reports related to actuation of systems that are not risk-significant.
(2) To reduce the reporting burden, consistent with the NRC's
reporting needs. Examples include: (a) reducing or eliminating the
reporting burden associated with events of little or no safety
significance, provided reporting is not otherwise needed to support NRC
regulatory programs, and (b) simplifying the reporting effort, such as
by redesigning the LER form to employ a ``check the box'' approach to
the extent feasible.
(3) To clarify the reporting requirements where needed. The
principal example would be clarifying which events involving design or
analysis defects or deviations must be reported.
Issues and contemplated amendments: The issues under consideration
and the contemplated amendments include the following.
(1) Required initial reporting times. In the contemplated
amendments, the required initial reporting times would be as follows.
(a) Emergencies: Declaration of an emergency class would continue
to be reported immediately after notification of appropriate State or
local agencies and not later than 1-hour after declaration. Emergency
actions taken pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(x) would continue to be reported
as soon as practical and in all cases within 1 hour of occurrence.
(b) Follow up notifications: Follow up notifications during the
course of an event would continue to be made immediately.
(c) Loss of capability to perform safety function: An event or
condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a
structure or system [as described in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) and
50.73(a)(2)(v)] would be reported promptly (e.g., within 8 hours) if
the plant is in a mode where the affected structure or system is
required to be operable. Otherwise, the initial report would be
required in writing within 30 days. It should be noted that an event or
condition that could prevent fulfillment of a safety function includes
design and analysis defects and deviations. For example, if there is a
defect in an analysis and as a result of that defect a system is not
capable of performing its specified safety functions, that is a
reportable event or condition under this criterion. In addition,
reportable events or conditions can result from factors such as:
personnel errors; procedure violations; procedural errors; equipment
failures; inadequate maintenance; or deficiencies in fabrication,
construction or equipment qualification.
(d) Partial loss of capability to perform a safety function: An
operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS [as described in 10
CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)] would continue to be reported in writing within
30 days. It should be noted that an operation or condition prohibited
by the plant's TS results from any operation or condition, including a
design or analysis defect or deviation, that results in one train of a
multiple-train safety system being incapable of performing its
specified safety function for a period of time longer than allowed by
the TS.
(e) No loss of capability to perform a safety function: Conditions,
including design or analysis defects or deviations, that do not result
in a structure, system, or train being incapable of performing its
specified safety function would no longer be reportable under 10 CFR
50.72 and 50.73, unless they meet one of the other reporting criteria
discussed below. However, other regulatory requirements such as 10 CFR
50.59, 10 CFR 50.71(e), or Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 may be applicable.
(f) Other non-emergency events: Other non-emergency events that are
currently reported in 1 hour would be reported in 8 hours, except for a
condition outside the coverage of procedures, which would be deleted as
discussed further in Item (7) below. Thus, the remaining events in this
category, which would be reported in 8 hours, are summarized as
follows:
(i) Initiation of shutdown (S/D) required by (TS);
(ii) Serious degradation of plant including its principal safety
barriers;
(iii) Plant in unanalyzed condition, significantly compromising
plant safety;
(iv) External condition that poses an actual threat or
significantly hampers site personnel in the performance of duties
necessary for safe operation of the plant;
(v) Valid Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation signal
that results (or should have resulted) in discharge to the reactor
coolant system;
(vi) Internal event that poses an actual threat or significantly
hampers site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for safe
operation of the plant; and,
(vii) Major loss of capability for emergency assessment, offsite
response, or communication.
Unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS), which
is currently reported in 4 hours, would be reported in 8 hours when the
reactor is critical. Otherwise, it would be reported in writing within
30 days. Unplanned actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF)
other than the RPS, which is currently reported in 4 hours, would be
reported in 8 hours if it resulted from (a) intentional manual
actuation or (b) a valid signal (i.e., a signal in response to actual
plant conditions that warrant ESF actuation). Otherwise, it would be
reported in writing within 30 days.
Other non-emergency events that are currently reported in 4 hours
would be reported in 8 hours. These are summarized as follows:
(i) Airborne radioactive release that results in concentrations
over 20 times allowable levels in an unrestricted area;
(ii) Liquid effluent in excess of 20 times allowable concentrations
released to an unrestricted area;
(iii) Radioactively contaminated person transported to an offsite
medical facility for treatment;
(iv) News release or other government agency notification related
to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or
protection of the environment;
(v) Defect in a spent fuel storage cask structure, system, or
component which is important to safety or significant reduction in the
effectiveness of a spent fuel storage cask confinement system.
Failure of independent components due to a common cause would
continue to be reportable in writing within 30 days.
(2) Clarification of requirement for reporting an event or
condition that could prevent fulfillment of the safety function of a
structure or system. The current rules require reporting ``Any event or
condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety
function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown
condition;
(B) Remove residual heat;
(C) Control the release of radioactive material; or
(D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'' [Emphasis added.]
In the contemplated amendments, in order to eliminate any potential
for misunderstanding the requirement, the wording would be revised to
require reporting any event or condition that alone or in combination
with other existing condition(s) could have prevented the fulfillment
of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to * *
*
[[Page 39524]]
(3) Reporting of design issues: In the contemplated amendments
there would be no specific criterion to require reporting conditions
outside the design basis of the plant. However, depending on whether
they result in loss or partial loss of capability to perform a safety
function, design or analysis defects or deviations would be reported as
discussed in Items (1)(c) and (1)(d) above.
There has been some confusion and controversy about the meaning of
the current requirement to report conditions outside the design basis
of the plant. For instance, in one case the Final Safety Analysis
Report (FSAR) characterized a building design basis as follows:
pressure relief panels will relieve at about 45 psf in order to ensure
that building pressure does not exceed its design pressure of 80 psf.
When it was found that the panels would not relieve at 45 psf but would
still relieve well below 80 psf, controversy ensued between the NRC
staff and the licensee regarding whether a report was required.
Under the contemplated amendments, the pressure relief panel
example, discussed above, would not be reportable because the structure
(building that houses the potentially affected safety systems) remains
within its design capabilities so that the systems within the building
would still be capable of performing their specified safety functions.
The event would be reportable if the pressure relief panels would not
prevent the building from exceeding its design capabilities such that
the systems housed within the building would not be considered capable
of performing their specified safety functions because of potential
building collapse.
(4) Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses:
Reporting of errors in and corrections to ECCS analyses would continue
to be governed by 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) when it applies, as is
currently the case. As required by that section, failure to meet the
ECCS acceptance criteria (i.e., peak clad temperature [PCT] greater
than 2200 deg.F, excessive cladding oxidation, etc.) would be reported
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (e.g., within 8 hours) and 50.73. Errors where
PCT increases by more than 50 deg.F but remains below 2200 deg.F
would be reported in writing in 30 days. Lesser errors would be
compiled and reported annually.
(5) Reporting of information with a significant implication for
public health and safety or common defense and security: In connection
with the contemplated amendments, no changes would be made with regard
to the requirement in 10 CFR 50.9(b) to report ``* * * information
identified by the applicant or licensee as having for the regulated
activity a significant implication for public health and safety or
common defense and security.''
(6) Reporting of missed or late equipment surveillance tests.
Section 50.73 requires reporting a condition or operation prohibited by
the plant's TS. In some cases, this leads to reporting events that
consist of late surveillance tests where the oversight is corrected and
the equipment is tested. These events have proven to be of little or no
risk-significance when the equipment is found to be functional or,
alternately, the requirements of the TS are implemented (i.e., any
applicable action statements are carried out) and no systematic
breakdown of compliance with the TS is involved.
In the contemplated amendments, the reporting requirement would be
eliminated for events that consist of late TS required surveillance
tests where there is no systematic breakdown of compliance with the TS,
the oversight is corrected, the testing is performed, and the equipment
is still functional or, alternately, the requirements of the TS are
implemented.
(7) Reporting of a condition outside the coverage of procedures.
The current requirement is to report when the plant is in ``a condition
not covered by the plant's operating and emergency procedures.''
Experience indicates that this criterion does not result in needed
reports. In addition, this criterion is redundant since the other
reporting criteria capture events of safety significance.
In the contemplated amendments, the requirement to report a
condition outside the coverage of procedures would be deleted.
(8) Reporting of events that result in actuation of an ESF. The
current requirement is to report ``Any event or condition that results
in a manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature
(ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS) except when * *
*.'' This leads to confusion and variability in reporting because there
are varying definitions of what constitutes an ESF. It also leads to
reporting for systems of lesser risk-significance, such as reactor
water clean up system (RWCU) isolation.
In the contemplated amendments, instead of using the term ESF, the
rules would specify the systems for which reporting is required.
Systems with lesser risk-significance would be dropped and systems with
greater risk-significance would be added. The result would be similar
to the discussion in the NRC staff's reporting guidelines. (See NUREG-
1022, Revision 1, ``Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and
50.73,'' January 1998, Page 60.) These changes would result in the
following list:
(a) Reactor Protection System (reactor scram, reactor trip).
(b) Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (general actuation
signals affecting numerous components such as: safety injection
actuation signal, containment isolation signal, or recirculation
actuation signal).
(c) Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) for Pressurized Water
Reactors (PWRs) including: high-, intermediate-, and low-head injection
systems and the low pressure injection function of residual (decay)
heat removal systems.
(d) ECCS for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) including: high-and low-
pressure core spray systems; high-pressure coolant injection system,
feedwater coolant injection system, the low pressure injection function
of the residual heat removal system; and automatic depressurization
system.
(e) BWR Isolation Condenser System and Reactor Core Isolation
Cooling System.
(f) Containment Systems including: containment and reactor vessel
isolation systems (general containment isolation signals affecting
numerous valves, main steam isolation valve [MSIV] closure signals in
BWRs); and containment heat removal and depressurization systems,
including the containment spray and the fan cooler system.
(g) Electrical Systems including: emergency ac electrical power
systems, including emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and their
associated support systems; the hydroelectric facilities used in lieu
of EDGs at the Oconee Station; safety related gas turbine generators;
BWR dedicated Division 3 EDGs and their associated support systems; and
station blackout diesel generators (and black-start gas turbines that
serve a similar purpose and are started from the control room and
included in the plant's and emergency procedures).
(h) Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigating Systems.
(i) PWR Auxiliary Feedwater Systems.
(j) Service Water (actuation of standby, emergency service water
systems only).
(k) Reactor Building and Containment Annulus Filter Systems.
(9) Shutdown events. The current rule requires providing the
``Status of structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at
the start of the event and that contributed to the event'' and ``An
assessment of the safety consequences and implications of the
[[Page 39525]]
event. This assessment must include the availability of other systems
or components that could have performed the same function as the
components and systems that failed during the event.'' In some cases,
this does not provide enough information to estimate the risk
associated with important shutdown events.
In the contemplated amendments, these requirements would be
clarified to better indicate information required on the status of
systems that are included in the operating or emergency procedures that
could have been used in recovering from the event to support risk
assessment of the event.
(10) Human performance. The current rule requires reporting the
following information regarding human performance as a part of the
narrative description of the event contained in the written 30 day
report:
``(1) Operator actions that affected the course of the event,
including operator errors, procedural deficiencies, or both, that
contributed to the event.
(2) For each personnel error, the licensee shall discuss:
(i) Whether the error was a cognitive error (e.g., failure to
recognize the actual plant condition, failure to realize which systems
should be functioning, failure to recognize the true nature of the
event) or a procedural error;
(ii) Whether the error was contrary to an approved procedure, was a
direct result of an error in an approved procedure, or was associated
with an activity or task that was not covered by an approved procedure;
(iii) Any unusual characteristics of the work location (e.g., heat,
noise) that directly contributed to the error; and
(iv) The type of personnel involved (i.e., contractor personnel,
utility-licensed operator, utility non-licensed operator, other utility
personnel).''
Human performance information is needed to support analysis of
human error probabilities used in risk assessments. This helps in
making risk-informed decisions regarding human performance issues in
areas such as inspection program development, evaluation of licensing
actions, preparation of generic communications and resolution of
generic issues. Consistent with the advanced incident reporting system
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Committee on the Safety of Nuclear
Installations (CSNI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
the contemplated amendments would require information on how the human
performance factors listed below affected the event to the extent they
apply. (See NEA/CSNI/R(97)15, PART I, ``Improving Reporting and Coding
of Human and Organizational Factors in Event Reports,'' April 1998,
Page 15 and Page 16.)
(a) Personnel errors and human performance related issues in the
areas of procedures, training, communication, human engineering,
management, and supervision.
(b) In the area of procedures, errors due to missing procedures,
procedures which are inadequate due to technical or human factors
deficiencies, or which have not been maintained current.
(c) Training errors due to a failure to provide training, having
provided inadequate training, or training (such as simulator training
or on-the-job training) that does not provide an environment comparable
to that in the plant.
(d) Communications errors due to inadequate, untimely,
misunderstood, or missing communication or due to the quality of the
communication equipment.
(e) Human engineering issues related to the interface or lack
thereof between the human and the machine (such as size, shape,
location, function or content of displays, controls, equipment or
labels) as well as environmental issues such as lighting, temperature,
noise, radiation and work area layout.
(f) Management errors due to management expectations, corrective
actions, root cause determinations, or audits which are inadequate,
untimely or missing.
(g) In the area of supervision, errors due a lack of supervision,
inadequate supervision, job staffing, overtime, scheduling and
planning, work practices (such as briefings, logs, work packages, team
work, decision making, and housekeeping) or because of inadequate
verification, awareness or self-checking.
(h) The department for which key personnel work and the type of
work or activity being performed.
This information is already being captured in the narrative section
of most LERs submitted under the current rule, as discussed in the NRC
staff's reporting guidelines. (See NUREG-1022, Revision 1, ``Event
Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,'' January 1998, Page
110.) The amended rule would explicitly recognize the information
discussed in the guidelines.
In the amended rule, such human performance information would be
provided using a ``check the box'' approach added to the LER form, to
minimize the reporting burden.
(11) LER form. The current LER form relies heavily on a narrative
to provide information such as the human performance information
discussed above, equipment that was not available, and equipment that
was actuated. It appears that the reporting effort could be reduced by
adopting a ``check the box'' approach to the extent practical. A
narrative would still be required to convey an understanding of the
event. However, data regarding human and equipment performance, for
example, would be included in the narrative only if they are pertinent
to understanding the event.
In conjunction with the contemplated amendments, the LER form would
be redesigned to reduce the reporting effort. To the extent practical,
this approach would be compatible with equipment failure reporting in
the industry's Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX)
program.
(12) Electronic reporting. The NRC staff is currently planning to
implement an electronic reporting program, known as the Agency-wide
Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), that will in general
provide for electronic submittal of many types of reports, including
LERs. Accordingly, no separate rulemaking effort to provide for
electronic submittal of LERs is contemplated.
(13) Enforcement. Since the criteria for reporting arising from
this rulemaking would focus on matters of safety significance and be
more risk informed, the reporting criteria may be a relevant
consideration in determining the severity level of a violation under
the Enforcement Policy. The staff intends to consider the reporting
criteria in its ongoing review of the severity levels in the NRC
Enforcement Policy.
Contemplated Schedule: The contemplated schedule for the rulemaking
is as follows:
8/21/98, Conduct public workshop to discuss ANPR
9/18/98, Receive public comments on ANPR
10/16/98, Provide proposed rule package to NRC staff
working group for comment
11/27/98, Provide proposed rule package to formal
concurrence chain
1/8/99, Provide proposed rule package to CRGR and ACRS
2/5/99, Complete briefing of CRGR and ACRS
2/26/99, Provide proposed rule package to Commission
4/2/99, Publish proposed rule
5/2/99, Initial public comments due to OMB (with copies to
NRC), 30 days after publication
6/1/99, Receive OMB approval, 60 days after publication
6/15/99, Public comments due to NRC, 75 days after
publication
[[Page 39526]]
7/2/99, Provide final rule package to NRC staff working
group for comment
8/13/99, Provide final rule package to formal concurrence
chain
9/17/99, Provide final rule package to CRGR and ACRS
11/5/99, Complete briefing of CRGR and ACRS
11/26/99, Provide final rule package to Commission
1/7/00, Publish final rule
Comments requested: The Commission invites advice and
recommendations from all interested persons regarding changes to the
event reporting requirements for nuclear power reactors contained in 10
CFR 50.72 and 50.73. Comments and supporting reasons are particularly
requested on:
(1) the objectives;
(2) the contemplated amendments, including:
(a) the clarity and specificity of the contemplated criteria for
reporting design and analysis defects and deviations; and
(b) the proposed initial reporting time of 8 hours for events that
warrant prompt telephone notification but do not involve emergencies;
(3) the contemplated schedule.
To the extent feasible, commenters are requested to address the
following factors.
(1) Identify a specific reporting requirement.
(2) Describe the problem with that requirement.
(3) Describe the proposed resolution.
(4) Estimate the change in resource burden as a result of the
proposed resolution.
In order to support meaningful consideration, comments on resource
burden should provide the basis for the burden estimate in sufficient
detail to allow specific identification of what causes the burden and
how particular changes might affect the burden.
Other Reactor Reporting Requirements
Objectives: The NRC is also interested in evaluating other reactor
reporting rules (beyond 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73) to identify areas where
reporting requirements can be risk-informed and/or simplified. For
example, the time limit for reporting could be adjusted based on the
safety significance of the event or issue and the need for NRC's
immediate action. The burden associated with reporting events,
conditions or issues with little or no safety or risk significance
should be minimized.
Comments requested: Public comments are requested to identify and
propose changes to other reactor reporting requirements (beyond 10 CFR
50.72 and 50.73) that are potential candidates for modifying to a
simplified, less burdensome, more risk-informed approach. This issue
will be included in the agenda for the public meeting to discuss this
ANPR, which is identified in the schedule provided above.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50
Antitrust, Classified information, Criminal penalties, Fire
protection, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
The authority citation for this document is: 42 U.S.C. 2201; 42
U.S.C. 5841.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of July, 1998
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
L. Joseph Callan,
Executive Director for Operations
[FR Doc. 98-19637 Filed 7-22-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
