[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 142 (Tuesday, July 25, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 38061-38062]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-18195]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-397]
Exemption
In the matter of Washington Public Power Supply System; (WPPSS
Nuclear Project No. 2).
I
On December 20, 1983, the Commission issued Facility Operating
License No. NPF-21 to Washington Public Power Supply System (the
licensee) for the WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2. The license provides,
among other things, that the licensee is subject to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect.
II
It is stated in 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for physical
protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against
radiological sabotage,'' paragraph (a), that ``the licensee shall
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high
assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.''
It is specified in 10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,''
paragraph (1), that ``the licensee shall control all points of
personnel and vehicle access into a protected area.'' Section
73.55(d)(5) requires that ``a numbered picture badge identification
system shall be used for all individuals who are authorized access to
protected areas without escort.'' Section 73.55(d)(5) also states that
an individual not employed by the licensee (e.g., contractors) may be
authorized access to protected areas without escort provided the
individual ``receives a picture badge upon entrance into the protected
area which must be returned upon exit from the protected area.''
The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access
control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve
badges at the entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals
with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when departing the
site.
An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow personnel
not employed by the licensee who have unescorted access to take their
badges offsite instead of returning them when exiting the site. By
letter dated March 1, 1995, the licensee requested an exemption from
certain requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.
III
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions in this part as it determines are
authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common
defense and security, and are otherwise in the public interest.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the Commission may authorize a licensee
to provide alternative measures for protection against radiological
sabotage provided the licensee demonstrates that the alternative
measures have ``the same high assurance objective'' and meet ``the
general performance requirements'' of the regulation, and ``the overall
level of system performance provides protection against radiological
sabotage equivalent'' to that which would be provided by the
regulation.
Currently, unescorted access to the protected area of WNP-2 is
controlled through the use of a photograph on a badge with a keycard
attached (hereafter, these are referred to as ``the badge''). The
security officers at the entrance station use the photograph on the
badge to visually identify the individual requesting access. The
individual is then given the badge to allow access. The badges for both
licensee employees and contractor personnel who have been granted
unescorted access are issued upon entrance at the access point. Another
security officer in the same control area collects the badges upon exit
from the protected area. The badges are then placed in a badge rack
located at the badge issue station and stored at the entrance until the
individual again needs access into the protected area. In accordance
with 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5), individuals not employed by the licensee
(e.g., contractors) are not allowed to take badges offsite.
Under the proposed system, each individual who is authorized for
unescorted entry into the protected area would have the physical
characteristics of their hand (hand geometry) registered with their
badge number in the access control computer. Access is then initiated
by the individual requesting access by placing their badge up to the
card reader and their hand on a measuring surface. The computer then
compares the hand geometry to that registered for the badge number. If
the characteristics of the hand geometry stored in the computer match
the badge number, access is granted. If the characteristics of the hand
geometry do not match the badge number, access is denied. This provides
a non-transferable means of identifying that the individual processing
the badge is the individual who was granted unescorted access. This
method also provides a positive means of assuring that a stolen or lost
badge could not be used to gain access, thus eliminating the need to
issue and retrieve the badges while maintaining the same high level of
assurance that access is granted to only authorized individuals. All
other access processes, including search function capability, would
remain the same. The system will not be used for visitors requiring
escorted access. The access process will continue to be under the
observation of security personnel located within the
[[Page 38062]]
hardened cubicle who have final control over the release of the
entrance station turnstiles. A numbered badge identification system
will continue to be used for all individuals who are authorized access
to the protected areas. Badges will continue to be displayed by all
individuals while inside the protected area.
The licensee will use hand geometry equipment that will meet the
detection probability of 90 percent with a 95 percent confidence level.
Testing evaluated by Sandia National Laboratory (Sandia report
entitled, ``A Performance Evaluation of Biometric Identification
Devices,'' SAND91-0276 UC-906 Unlimited Release, printed June 1991),
demonstrated that the proposed hand geometry system is capable of
meeting the proposed detection probability and confidence level. Based
on the results of the Sandia report and on the licensee's experience
with photo-identification processes, the proposed system will have a
false acceptance rate less than the current system.
For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection
against radiological sabotage meet the same high assurance objective
and the general performance requirements of the regulation, and that
the overall level of system performance provides protection against
radiological sabotage equivalent to that which would be provided by the
regulation.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
73.5, this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Washington
Public Power Supply System an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR
73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges, by individuals
not employed by the licensee who are authorized unescorted access to
the protected area, upon exit from the protected area, such that these
personnel can take their badges offsite.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not result in any significant adverse
environmental impact (60 FR 35965).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 17th day of July 1995.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Jack W. Roe,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects III/IV, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 95-18195 Filed 7-24-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
