[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 146 (Thursday, July 30, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40780-40781]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-20383]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-97-3129; Notice 2]
Ford Motor Company; Grant of Application for Decision of
Inconsequential Noncompliance
Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, Michigan, has estimated that
approximately 853,000 of its 1995-1997 Ford Explorer and 1997 Mercury
Mountaineer multipurpose passenger vehicles with console armrests fail
to comply with 49 CFR 571.302, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) No. 302, ``Flammability of Interior Materials,'' and has filed
an appropriate report pursuant to 49 CFR Part 573, ``Defect and
Noncompliance Reports.'' On September 11, 1997, Ford applied to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to be exempted
from the notification and remedy requirements of 49 U.S.C. Chapter
301--``Motor Vehicle Safety'' on the basis that the noncompliance is
inconsequential to motor vehicle safety.
On November 25, 1997, NHTSA published a notice of receipt of the
application in the Federal Register (62 FR 62798) and requested
comments on it. The agency received no comments.
FMVSS No. 302, Paragraphs S4.2 and S4.3, specify that any portion
of a single or composite material which is within \1/2\ inch of the
occupant compartment air space, when tested in accordance with
paragraph S5, shall not burn, nor transmit a flame across its surface,
at a rate of more than 4 inches per minute. Composite is defined as a
material that adheres to other material(s) at every point of contact.
FMVSS No. 302's burn rate testing requires a 4-inch wide by 14-inch
long sample, wherever possible (S5.2).
The Ford Explorer and Mercury Mountaineer armrests have multi-layer
cover materials: a 1.5mm thick exterior cover, a 2mm thick second layer
Ethylene Vinyl Acetate/Polyethylene (EVA/PE), referred to in the
application as ``plus pad,'' a 13mm thick third layer foam bun pad, and
a 3mm polycarbonate substratum. The subject of Ford's application is
the 2mm thick ``plus pad'' layer.
Ford acknowledged that the ``plus pad'' material does not adhere to
its 1.5mm exterior cover material or the 13mm foam bun under it at
every point of contact. Therefore, as specified in FMVSS No. 302, the
``plus pad'' material cannot be tested with other materials as a
composite material and has to be tested separately. Ford reported that
when the ``plus pad'' material was tested separately, it showed a burn
rate range from 8 to 10 inches per minute--a noncompliance with FMVSS
No. 302. Ford stated that all other affected materials in the armrest
satisfy the 4-inch per minute maximum burn rate. Ford explained that
the supplier of the ``plus pad'' material only ``certified'' the raw
material for FMVSS No. 302 by testing 11mm thick samples, not the
designed 2mm thickness.
Ford supported its application for inconsequential noncompliance
with the following:
A. Ford stated that the FMVSS No. 302 burn rate testing requirement
of cutting a sample from the ``normal configuration and packaging in
the vehicle'' is conservative in regard to the actual fire spreading
potential of the tested material.
B. The 2mm ``plus pad'' failed the FMVSS No. 302 test requirements
when tested as a single material. However, a series of further testing
demonstrates that the noncompliance does not adversely affect occupant
safety because it does not increase the burn rates of the assembly or
the adjacent materials in the assembly to levels higher than specified
by FMVSS No. 302.
C. The ``plus pad'' accounts for less than 10 percent of the
armrest material and is an insignificant percentage of the vehicle's
remaining materials. All other flammable interior materials of the
subject vehicles complied with FMVSS No. 302. Therefore, the
noncompliance of the ``plus pad'' offers an insignificant portion of
interior materials that could potentially support an interior fire.
Ford attached the following summary results of several alternative
tests, including a ``worst case scenario'' test:
1. FMVSS No. 302 type tests (cover, plus pad, and foam)--treated
the assembly materials as a composite material.
2. FMVSS No. 302 type tests (cover, plus pad, and foam)--added
simulations of cut and torn of the materials:
a. Cut the cover layer longitudinally,
b. Cut a hole in the cover layer, and
c. Cut through the cover layer and the ``plus pad'' longitudinally.
3. FMVSS No. 302 type tests (plus pad and foam)--with the cover
layer completely removed to simulate a worst case scenario.
4. Cut a complete armrest assembly in half along the lateral-
vertical plane:
a. Exposed the opposite of the cut end to the flame, and
b. Exposed the cut cross-section to the flame.
All test results were less than FMVSS No. 302's maximum permissible
4-inch per minute burn rate, thereby meeting the standard.
In conclusion, Ford requested NHTSA to grant the inconsequentiality
petition since the ``plus pad'' complied with FMVSS No. 302's
requirements in every other test except that when tested by itself.
Ford's request was based on the fact that the ``plus pad'' represents
an insignificant adverse effect on interior material burn rate and the
potential for
[[Page 40781]]
occupant injury due to interior fire and that the noncompliance
presents no reasonably anticipated risk to motor vehicle safety.
On October 30, 1997, NHTSA wrote Ford for additional information
about the tests described in the application. Ford responded to the
request on November 20, 1997. Following an evaluation of the
information provided by Ford, on December 4, 1998, the agency requested
Ford to conduct an additional ``composite'' test, i.e., with the cover,
plus pad, and foam bun. The additional test would simulate another
possible ``worst case scenario'' different from the one Ford performed.
Ford did not conduct the additional test requested by the agency and
requested to be provided with an opportunity to explain its position.
On February 19, 1998, NHTSA and representatives from Ford met at the
agency. The Ford representatives explained why they believed that
sufficient data were already provided to NHTSA for reviewing the
application. Subsequent to the meeting, Ford sent a letter to NHTSA on
March 12, 1998, formally responding to the agency's December 4, 1997,
request. The March 12, 1998, letter explained that the term ``worst
case scenario'' used in the Ford application was intended to describe
its ``functional composite'' test results which simulate long term
vehicle use conditions (durability performance). All the above-
mentioned correspondence has been placed in the docket.
NHTSA has thoroughly evaluated the data Ford provided and carefully
considered its subsequent explanations about the data. It agrees with
Ford. The agency has concluded that the ``plus pad'' in the
noncompliant Ford Explorer and Mercury Mountaineer vehicles is unlikely
to pose a flammability risk due to the unlikelihood of its exposure to
an ignition source, if the exterior cover is not present in the first
instance.
NHTSA's evaluation of the consequentiality of this noncompliance
should not be interpreted as a diminution of the agency's safety
concern for the flammability of interior materials. Rather, it
represents NHTSA's assessment of the gravity of this specific
noncompliance based upon the likely consequences. Ultimately, the issue
is whether this particular noncompliance is likely to create a risk to
safety. NHTSA is not aware of any occupant injuries to date in vehicle
post-crash fires that were caused by burning of console armrests in the
Ford Explorer and Mercury Mountaineer vehicles. Based on the foregoing,
NHTSA has decided that Ford Motor Company has met its burden of
persuasion that the noncompliance herein described is inconsequential
to motor vehicle safety. Accordingly, the application is granted, and
Ford Motor Company is exempted from providing the notification of the
noncompliance that is required by 49 U.S.C. 30118, and from remedying
the noncompliance, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30120.
(49 U.S.C. 30118 and 30120; delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.50
and 501.8)
Issued on: July 27, 1998.
L. Robert Shelton,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 98-20383 Filed 7-29-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
