[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 148 (Wednesday, July 31, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39953-39955]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-19451]
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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Resolution of Potential Conflict of Interest
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has identified
and resolved potential conflicts of interest situations related to its
proposed contractor, MPR Associates, Incorporated (MPR). This Notice,
which is a summary of the facts related to this decision, satisfies the
requirements of 10 CFR 1706.8(e) with respect to publication in the
Federal Register. Under the Board's Organizational and Consultant
Conflicts of Interest Regulation, 10 CFR Part 1706 (OCI Regulations),
an organizational or consultant conflict of interest (OCI) means that
because of other past, present or future planned activities or
relationships, a contractor or consultant is unable, or potentially
unable, to render impartial assistance or advice to the Board, or the
objectivity of such offeror or contractor in performing work for the
Board is or might be otherwise impaired, or such offeror or contractor
has or would have an unfair competitive advantage. While the OCI
Regulations provide that contracts shall generally not be awarded to an
organization where the Board has determined that an actual or potential
OCI exists and cannot be avoided, the Board may waive this requirement
in certain circumstances.
The Board is tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the safe
operation of the Department of Energy's (DOE's) defense nuclear
facilities in order to ensure that the health and safety of the workers
and the general public are adequately protected. One such facility is
the Savannah River Site, which operates an In-Tank Precipitation (ITP)
facility that provides highly radioactive material to the Defense Waste
Processing Facility for conversion into vitrified logs for long-term
storage.
The Board has become aware of a potential health and safety matter
at the Savannah River Site involving the ITP facility. Specifically,
the ITP chemical process results in the generation of benzene in
solution in an unpredictable manner. Furthermore, the benzene, a
flammable substance, is released from the solution at an anomalous
rate. These unpredictable phenomena could be due to catalysts,
radioactive hydrolysis, turbulence, or other factors. Of overriding
concern to the Board is that the result of these phenomena, in
combination with oxygen intrusion, creates the potential for a
deflagration or explosion of the vapor within the tank
[[Page 39954]]
and the subsequent release of highly radioactive material to the
environment.
In order to prevent the potential for a deflagration or explosion,
certain aspects of the ITP chemical process must be established and
fully understood. The first issue involves determining what caused an
unexpected chemical excursion to occur in Tank 48H of the ITP facility
where excess sodium tetraphenylborate rapidly decomposed to benzene.
The second issue that requires assessment occurred during the excursion
and revealed the fact that the benzene, by some yet to be understood
mechanism, was not immediately released into the tank vapor space. As
the fortuitous retention of the benzene was not due to a safety system
design feature, determining what caused the benzene to be retained must
be comprehended as its release could have compromised the safety system
and resulted in a serious threat to the safety of the workers and the
general public. Lastly, the adequacy of the safety system design must
be addressed based on the chemical excursion and benzene retention
determinations. It is therefore imperative that a comprehensive
understanding of the causes for the unresolved benzene issues be
acquired and appropriate safety measures be put into effect.
Consequently, the Board informed DOE that no additional tank waste
or sodium tetraphenylborate should be added to Tank 48H until the
tetraphenylborate decomposition and benzene release mechanism are well
understood and adequate safety measures are instituted.
The Board does not have the breadth of required expertise readily
available to conduct an in-depth safety evaluation of the ITP chemical
process. The Board determined that outside technical experts possessing
the prerequisite combination of chemical engineering expertise and
nuclear safety experience were essential to the expeditious and
proficient evaluation of the Board's concerns. To accomplish this, the
Board identified MPR Associates, Incorporated (MPR) as an organization
which could immediately provide the necessary expert technical
assistance needed to assess the safety implication of this situation.
The scope of this assistance includes such areas as identification of
benzene generation and release mechanisms, potential hazard prevention
and mitigation, and establishment of safety class systems and controls.
MPR's technical expertise is precisely the kind of support that is
critical to the successful performance of the Board's requirement.
Specifically, MPR will provide the expert services of Mr. Julian
Nichols, a chemical engineer with extensive background knowledge and
experience gained from his long-term efforts on similar problems within
the commercial nuclear industry and through performance of safety-
related activities at the Savannah River Site under previous contract
to the Board.
However, MPR brought potential conflict of interest situations to
the Board's attention based on their current contractual relationships
with DOE through six subcontracts. A brief description of each scope of
work follows:
1. Westinghouse Savannah River. Under this subcontract arrangement,
MPR is performing an assessment of the Savannah River Site's integrated
High-Level Waste System against commercial nuclear safety standards.
2. Westinghouse Hanford Company. This subcontract agreement
requires MPR to provide direct support to the Spent Nuclear Fuel
Project by participating in the K Basin Independent Technical
Assessment and providing management and technical assistance in other
projects of this nature.
3. Sandia National Laboratories. MPR is conducting an annealing
demonstration of a U.S. reactor pressure vessel to determine if
annealing is an economically viable option that can adequately address
technical, engineering, and institutional issues.
4. Sandia National Laboratories. The scope of the contract is to
provide on-going engineering support to the Sandia Fissile Materials
Disposition Technical Integration Team in specific planning and
technical management tasks related to DOE's decision making process in
the technology areas of nuclear power and materials management.
5. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Under this agreement,
MPR is providing technical support in the analysis and development of
federal facility compliance requirements, health and ecological risk
assessments, and review of various policy guidance documents related to
``deactivation end states.''
6. Energetics. This subcontract requires MPR to provide technical
assistance in the evaluation of a proposal submitted for a full-scale
demonstration of fossil-fuel-fired vitrification technology for the
vitrification of radionuclide and hazardous-material contaminated
soils.
While MPR's anticipated contractual work for the Board and each
DOE-related project would not necessarily create an actual overlap of
work at this time, and hence no direct OCI, potential OCI's do exist
due to MPR's concurrent relationships on behalf of DOE and the Board,
as the Savannah River Site, for instance, is a defense nuclear facility
under the Board's jurisdiction. Consequently, as a result of its
relationships with DOE, the ability of MPR to provide objective to the
Board could be questioned.
The Board reviewed each potential conflict of interest situation
and concluded that it is nonetheless in the best interests of the
Government to have MPR perform the ITP chemical process safety
evaluation due to their extensive experience with similar technical
issues gained primarily in the commercial nuclear area coupled with
their ability to respond immediately to this need. The determination
was made that even if there were conflicts of interest as a result of
the DOE-related work, it was outweighed by the need for an immediate
in-depth safety evaluation of the ITP chemical process by a known
expert in order to contend with the health risk that could result from
deflagration or explosion of the vapor within Tank 48H.
In accordance with the OCI Regulations, the Board also considered
the value of MPR's subcontracts with DOE, which MPR disclosed
represented a small fraction of its total revenues. In the Board's
view, the revenues from the DOE-related projects do not make MPR
financially dependent on DOE.
The Board also considered whether a source other than MPR existed
which has the caliber of qualified staff capable of responding to the
Board's needs without having potential OCI situations. Three other
potential contractors were considered but they did not possess the
necessary combination of expertise and experience to satisfy the
requirements of the Board's urgent needs. The Board is not aware of any
other firm with the level of background knowledge and experience
essential to the successful undertaking of the Board's requirement. In
the Board's opinion, MPR, a nationally-recognized, well-respected
expert firm in the nuclear industry, is the only source known to the
Board that can satisfactorily perform the evaluation required by the
Board. The Board's view is supported by MPR's previous involvement with
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission when the need for immediate
expert advice arose in the wake of the Three-Mile Island nuclear
accident, and the Board's own experience with MPR, including the expert
technical assistance MPR rendered in connection with the Board's
investigation of leaks in the heat exchangers at the K-Reactor, and the
evaluation of an F-Canyon tank
[[Page 39955]]
corrosion issue at the Savannah River Site.
Finally, the Board is required under the OCI Regulations to
initiate measures which attempt to mitigate an OCI where reasonably
possible. The efforts of MPR will be overseen by experienced technical
staff members of the Board to ensure that all resultant work products
are impartial and reflect full support for any findings and
recommendations contained therein.
Accordingly, on the basis of the determination described above and
pursuant to the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 1706, the Chairman of
the Board granted a Waiver of any conflicts of interests (and the
pertinent provisions of the OCI Regulations) with the effort to be
performed by MPR under contract to the Board that might arise out of
the contractual relationships with DOE.
Dated: July 25, 1996.
Kenneth M. Pusateri,
General Manager.
[FR Doc. 96-19451 Filed 7-30-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670-01-M
