[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 156 (Thursday, August 13, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 43386-43392]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-21744]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice of an amended Record of Decision.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final
programmatic environmental impact statement, Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials (Storage and Disposition PEIS) (DOE/
EIS-0229, December 1996) in accordance with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), Council on Environmental Quality NEPA implementing
regulations, and DOE implementing procedures. The Storage and
Disposition PEIS, among other things, assesses the potential
environmental impacts of alternatives and locations for storing
weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched
uranium).
On January 14, 1997, DOE issued a Record of Decision (Storage and
Disposition ROD), 62 FR 3014, (January 21, 1997), selecting weapons-
usable fissile materials storage and surplus plutonium disposition
strategies. For plutonium storage, DOE decided to consolidate part of
its weapons-usable plutonium storage by upgrading and expanding
existing and planned facilities at the Pantex Plant (Pantex) near
Amarillo, Texas and the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South
Carolina. For plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site (Hanford)
near Richland, Washington, and other DOE sites, DOE decided that
surplus weapons-usable plutonium would remain at these sites until
disposition (or move to lag storage at a disposition facility). The
weapons-usable plutonium stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site (RFETS), near Golden, Colorado, would be moved to
Pantex and the SRS. However, the plutonium destined for the SRS, i.e.,
non-pit, weapons-usable surplus plutonium, would be moved only if: (1)
the plutonium had been stabilized under corrective actions in response
to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation
94-1 and packaged to meet the DOE storage Standard 3013-96, Criteria
for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides, (2) the construction
and expansion of the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) at
the SRS had been completed, and (3) the SRS had been selected in the
upcoming Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Environmental Impact Statement as the immobilization disposition site
for surplus weapons-usable plutonium.
In order to support the early closure of the RFETS and the early
deactivation of plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford site, DOE
is modifying, contingent upon the satisfaction of certain conditions,
some of the decisions made in its Storage and Disposition ROD
associated with surplus plutonium storage pending disposition. Namely,
DOE will take steps that allow: (1) the accelerated shipment of all
non-pit surplus weapons-usable plutonium from the RFETS (about 7 metric
tons) to the SRS beginning in about 2000, in advance of completion of
the APSF in 2001, and (2) the relocation of all Hanford surplus
weapons-usable plutonium (about 4.6 metric tons) to the SRS, between
about 2002 and 2005, pending disposition. However, consistent with the
Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD, DOE will only implement the movement
of RFETS and Hanford non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium
inventories to the SRS if the SRS is selected as the immobilization
disposition site. DOE is preparing the Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS), draft issued July 1998, as
part of the decision making process for determining an immobilization
site.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ SRS has been identified by DOE as the preferred site for the
immobilization disposition facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To accommodate the storage of Hanford surplus weapons-usable
plutonium, DOE will expand the APSF as planned in the Storage and
Disposition ROD. In addition, to accommodate the early receipt and
storage of the RFETS surplus plutonium, the Department will prepare
additional suitable storage space in Building 105-K (i.e., K-Reactor)
in the K-Area at the SRS. Portions of Building 105-K will be modified
to provide safe and secure plutonium storage. Safeguards and security
features will be upgraded, criticality monitoring devices will be
installed, structural features will be inspected and repaired, roof
vents will be added, and doors will be modified. Several areas in the
facility will be decontaminated and excess equipment will be removed to
provide additional floor space.
Modifications will also include dismantling and removing unused
process equipment in four building areas: Stack Area, Crane Maintenance
Area, Crane Wash Area, and Process Room.
Security systems in the four building areas will be reactivated and
upgraded to support using them for plutonium storage. Existing systems
including the K-Area security perimeter, security control system and
building water/power ventilation support systems will be used. Building
modifications will provide for truck loading and unloading, material
conformation, shipping accountability measurements, and storage. The
Department will also declassify (process the metal to produce
unclassified ``buttons'') some of the RFETS plutonium materials using
SRS's FB-Line (in the F-Area) and after declassification, package this
material in the APSF to meet the DOE storage Standard 3013-96, Criteria
for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides.
All plutonium materials shipped to SRS will be stable and, except
for classified metal and/or parts, will be packaged to meet the
requirements of the DOE Standard 3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of
Plutonium Metals and Oxides, before shipment. All shipments of
plutonium to SRS will be by Safe Secure Transport (SST) in accordance
with applicable DOE, U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission requirements and regulations. Some of the RFETS
plutonium material packaged and shipped will be less than 50% plutonium
by weight; as a result, there will be approximately 3% more total
weight of material and a corresponding increase in the number of
shipments than considered in the Storage and Disposition PEIS, although
the total amount of plutonium in the material will remain about the
same.
Under the previous ROD, a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus
plutonium, including plutonium from RFETS and existing onsite
plutonium, would be
[[Page 43387]]
stored at SRS in the APSF, pending disposition, provided that SRS is
selected as the immobilization site following completion of the Surplus
Plutonium Disposition EIS. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS
would begin when the APSF is completed in 2001.
With this amended ROD, a total of approximately 11.6 metric tons of
surplus weapons-usable plutonium from Hanford and RFETS (in addition to
existing onsite SRS surplus plutonium, for a total of approximately 14
metric tons of surplus plutonium) could be stored at SRS in the APSF
and Building 105-K, pending disposition, provided that SRS is selected
as the immobilization site. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS
would begin when the modifications to Building 105-K are completed,
i.e., in about 2000; shipments of plutonium from Hanford to SRS would
begin in about 2002.
This amended ROD only alters DOE's previous decision (Storage and
Disposition ROD) for the storage of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable
plutonium currently located at the RFETS and Hanford sites. No changes
are being made to other storage decisions or any decisions associated
with surplus fissile material disposition.
In accordance with 10 CFR 1021.314, DOE has prepared a Supplement
Analysis to determine if these changes require a supplement to the
Storage and Disposition PEIS under the Council on Environmental Quality
Regulations at 40 CFR 1502.9(c). The Supplement Analysis shows that the
new proposed action does not result in a substantial change to
environmental concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
Also, the Supplement Analysis shows that the proposed action does not
present significant new circumstances or information relevant to the
environmental concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
Therefore, based on the Supplement Analysis, DOE has determined that a
supplement to the Storage and Disposition PEIS is not required, and DOE
has decided not to prepare such a supplement.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the long-
term storage or the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials, or
to receive a copy of the final Storage and Disposition PEIS, the
Storage and Disposition EIS ROD or the Supplement Analysis, contact: G.
Bert Stevenson, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition (MD-4), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence
Avenue, SW., 1Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5368.
For further information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Carol M.
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC
20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Current Storage Program and Original Decision for Surplus Weapons-
Usable Plutonium
DOE is currently phasing out the storage of all weapons-usable
plutonium at RFETS. The phaseout involves shipping all RFETS pits to
Pantex, and shipping all RFETS surplus non-pit, weapons-usable
plutonium to the SRS (subject to certain conditions) starting in about
2001. As decided in the January 1997 Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD,
the stabilized non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium would not be
moved unless and until: expansion of the APSF 2 at the SRS
had been completed; the RFETS material had been stabilized and packaged
to meet the Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides
for long-term storage under corrective actions in response to the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1; and DOE
had decided to immobilize plutonium at the SRS. The Department also
decided to continue the current storage of surplus plutonium at
Hanford, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(INEEL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) pending disposition
(or movement to lag storage); and to pursue a strategy for plutonium
disposition that would immobilize surplus weapons-usable plutonium in
glass or ceramic forms and would allow the burning of some of the
surplus weapons-usable plutonium (mostly from pits) as mixed oxide fuel
in existing commercial light-water reactors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The APSF has been designed but not built. Construction is
scheduled to start in October 1998 and the facility is scheduled to
be in operation by October 2001. Expansion of the APSF refers to
increasing the vault capacity of the facility to the current design
of 5,000 storage positions (sufficient storage space for current SRS
materials and RFETS materials).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Need to Change Storage Program
Recently, DOE has estimated that accelerating the closure of RFETS
from 2010 to 2006 could save as much as $1.3 billion. Integral to
achieving an accelerated closure of the site would be removal of the
non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium to SRS two years earlier than
the current plan. Removal of the surplus plutonium at RFETS is only one
of several steps to realize the savings. Other steps are proposed or
ongoing pursuant to separate NEPA review. DOE also expects that the
transfer of non-pit, surplus weapons-useable plutonium from Hanford to
Savannah River could save as much as $150 million in upgrade and
operating costs for plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford Site.
As with the RFETS plutonium, the transfer would not be accomplished
unless DOE decided to locate the plutonium immobilization facility at
the Savannah River Site. The implementation cost for the proposed
action is estimated to be approximately $93 million.
Closing RFETS by 2006 would, among other things, require the
removal of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium metal and oxide
from RFETS by 2002. In order to remove all the non-pit, surplus
weapons-usable plutonium from RFETS by 2002, DOE would have to begin
transferring the material to the SRS by January 2000, prior to
completing the construction of the APSF.
DOE has also reevaluated plutonium storage operations at Hanford
and determined that transferring all (about 4.6 metric tons) non-pit,
surplus weapons-usable plutonium from that site for storage could save
the Department as much as $150 million by avoiding upgrade and
operating costs for plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford Site.
DOE is considering the early transfer of plutonium from Hanford to the
SRS as a means of achieving this savings.
These transfers would not occur unless DOE decides to immobilize
plutonium at the SRS. A ROD to select the immobilization site is
anticipated in early 1999 in the SPD EIS.
C. Proposed Action
The Department of Energy is proposing to accelerate the movement of
all (about 7 metric tons) of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium
at the RFETS and to move all (about 4.6 metric tons) of the surplus
weapons-usable plutonium at Hanford to the SRS for storage pending
disposition. The RFETS plutonium would be shipped to the SRS from about
January 2000 through 2002. The Hanford plutonium would be shipped to
the SRS from about 2002 through 2005.
The plutonium would not be moved to SRS unless the Department
decides to disposition (immobilize) the non-pit,
[[Page 43388]]
surplus weapons-usable plutonium at SRS, after completion of the final
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement. In
addition, the plutonium would not be shipped until it were stabilized
and packaged to meet DOE Standard 3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of
Plutonium Metals and Oxides in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. This proposed action is consistent
with DOE's objective, as explained in the ROD for the Storage and
Disposition PEIS, to reduce over time the number of locations where
plutonium is stored in the DOE complex.
Starting in about January 2000, all non-pit, surplus weapons-usable
plutonium (except for classified plutonium) would be shipped to
Building 105-K. At Building 105-K, the shipping containers \3\ would be
unloaded using a battery powered fork-lift truck. Material control and
accountability measurements would be made at Building 105-K. The
shipping containers would then be loaded onto metal pallets and
transferred to a storage location in the building. DOE would not open
any of the shipping containers in Building 105-K. While in storage, the
containers would be inspected on a regular basis to assure external
container integrity.3 DOE has successfully used (and
continues to use) shipping containers for plutonium storage at the SRS.
No problems with a loss of material confinement have been experienced
to date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ To support the proposed action, DOE would purchase
additional Type 9975 shipping containers, which are Type B
containers and would also be used for storage. This would be done so
that storing the RFETS materials in shipping containers pending
disposition will not impact the Department's supply of Type B
shipping containers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Portions of Building 105-K will be modified to facilitate plutonium
storage. Safeguards and security features will be upgraded, criticality
monitoring devices will be installed, structural features will be
inspected and repaired, and roof vents will be added and doors will be
modified. Several areas in the facility will be decontaminated and
excess equipment will be removed to provide additional floor
space.4
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ A portion of these activities could be completed as part of
maintenance, clean-up, and decontamination activities at SRS that
DOE has determined are categorically excluded from further NEPA
review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modifications will include dismantling and removing unused process
equipment in four building areas: Stack Area, Crane Maintenance Area,
Crane Wash Area, and Process Room. These areas total approximately
30,000 square feet, are within the security areas that existed for
reactor operations, and are adjacent to a currently active highly
enriched uranium storage area. Security systems in the four building
areas will be reactivated and upgraded to support using them for
plutonium storage. Existing systems including the K-Area security
perimeter, security control system and building water/power ventilation
support systems will be used. Building modifications will provide for
truck loading and unloading, material conformation, shipping
accountability measurements, and storage.
Some of the RFETS plutonium is in a classified form, which would
restrict the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from access to
the material. DOE intends to make the APSF vault, and potentially
Building 105-K, available for IAEA inspection. As a result, the RFETS
plutonium needs to be declassified. To accomplish this objective, DOE
would transfer the classified RFETS plutonium to F-Area for processing
(declassifying) in the FB-Line facility at SRS. In the FB-Line
facility, the plutonium would be melted using existing facilities and
equipment that are part of the plutonium metal production process for
which the FB-Line facility was designed. The declassification work
would not be done on a continuous basis, but rather whenever processing
capabilities were available. The RFETS plutonium would be fashioned
into metal ``buttons'' that are the traditional FB-Line product. After
the ``buttons'' are fabricated, the material would be transferred to
the APSF and packaged to meet the requirements of DOE's plutonium
storage standard. Then, the material would be placed in type B shipping
containers and transported to Building 105-K for storage.
Alternatively, the material could remain in the APSF vault, if space is
available to allow for operational flexibility.
Some of the RFETS plutonium materials would be less than 50%
plutonium by weight and would involve approximately 3% more total
weight of material and a corresponding increase in the number of
shipments than considered in the S&D PEIS.
Beginning in about 2002, SRS would begin to receive from Hanford
stabilized plutonium packaged to meet DOE's long-term standard for
placement in the APSF. Once APSF is operating, DOE could transfer a
portion of the RFETS material from Building 105-K to the APSF in order
to provide for operational flexibility. The plutonium from RFETS and
Hanford would remain in storage at the APSF and Building 105-K pending
disposition along with existing SRS surplus plutonium.
The plutonium would be transferred in type B shipping containers by
truck using methods and routes described in the Storage and Disposition
PEIS (i.e., the Department of Energy's Safe Secure Transport System).
If DOE decides to pursue the No Action alternative for the
disposition of surplus plutonium in the SPD EIS Record of Decision, the
SRS, RFETS, and Hanford materials would remain in storage at their
current sites in accordance with the No Action alternative. If the DOE
decides to immobilize surplus plutonium at Hanford, the SRS and RFETS
materials would be shipped to Hanford in accordance with the decisions
reached in the SPD EIS Record of Decision.
II. NEPA Process for Amending ROD
A. Supplement Analysis
Pursuant to DOE regulations in 10 CFR 1021.314, DOE has prepared a
Supplement Analysis, Supplement Analysis for Storing Plutonium in the
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and Building 105-K at the
Savannah River Site (July 1998), to help determine whether a supplement
to the Storage and Disposition PEIS is required under the Council on
Environmental Quality Regulations, 40 CFR 1502.9(c). The Supplement
Analysis compares the potential impacts of the new proposed action to
the impacts discussed for the plutonium storage alternatives in the
Storage and Disposition PEIS. The Supplement Analysis shows that the
new proposed action does not make a substantial change to environmental
concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. Furthermore,
the Supplement Analysis shows that there are no new significant
circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and
bearing on the proposed action or its impact.
B. Comparison of Potential Impacts
The facilities involved (i.e, Building 105-K and the APSF) are or
will be located in existing industrial areas at the SRS.
Land Resources, Site Infrastructure, Geology and Soils,
Biology Resources and Cultural and Paleontological Resources. There are
no aquatic habitats or wetlands in these areas nor are there any
threatened or endangered species. None of the affected facilities have
been nominated for inclusion in the National Register of Historic
Places, and there are no plans for such nominations.
Based on evaluations in the Storage and Disposition PEIS and
information
[[Page 43389]]
incorporated in the Supplement Analysis from the Final Environmental
Impact Statements on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (DOE/
EIS-0220, October, 1995)(IMNMS EIS) there would be little or no impact
to land resources, site infrastructure, geology and soils, biology
resources and cultural and Paleontological resources by the
construction, operation and expansion of the APSF. This is equally true
for Building 105-K since all storage operations would occur within the
existing Building 105-K structure.
It is expected that declassification of the RFETS material
would require 100 Mw hrs/yr of electricity. This work would not require
modification to the FB-line's electrical system and is well within the
capacity of the facility and the site.
Packaging and Transportation. The transportation routes to
the SRS would be the same as those assumed in the Storage and
Disposition PEIS (i.e., overland truck routes on interstate highways
and state roads). Transportation operations would not change. DOE
estimates that the total inter-site transportation impact associated
with transferring plutonium from the RFETS and Hanford to the SRS would
be 0.07 potential latent cancer fatalities, which would be
approximately the same as for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage
and Disposition PEIS.5 DOE estimates that the intra-site
transportation activities could add an additional 0.01 latent cancer
fatalities to the worker population.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The impact is the sum of the impact of transportation of
RFETS non-pit plutonium under the Preferred Alternative in the
Storage and Disposition PEIS and the incremental impact for shipping
the Hanford plutonium.
\6\ In inter-site transportation analyses, non-radiological
accidents would be the greatest contributor to fatalities. In the
case of intra-site transportation, impacts would be due primarily to
radiation doses received from normal transportation operations.
Effects from intra-site accidents, if any, would likely be
negligible. Historically, certified containers maintain their
integrity in accident situations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Quality and Noise. Storage: Accomplishing the proposed
action, including the modifications to Building 105-K, would add no
significant air quality and noise impacts above the existing site
baseline. Therefore, air quality and noise impacts from the plutonium
storage aspects of the proposed action would be essentially the same as
the air quality and noise impacts from the Preferred Alternative of the
Storage and Disposition PEIS (i.e., the Upgrade With RFETS Non-Pit
Material alternative).
Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates there would be a small
increase in non-radiological air emissions for declassification
operations (i.e., metal conversion operations in FB-Line) above the
non-radiological air emissions estimated for the No Action and the
Upgrade alternatives in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. Non-
radiological air emissions would be well within State and Federal
regulatory limits. Repackaging activities are not expected to involve
the use of chemicals, beyond a very small amount of decontamination
liquid.
Water Resources. Storage: The maximum impact to water
resources, above existing site baseline usage and discharges, expected
from plutonium storage aspects of DOE's proposed action would be about
the same as presented in the Upgrade With RFETS and LANL Material
alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS,7 i.e.,
there would be a 0.01% increase in water use and a 0.1% increase in
waste water discharges. The water impacts from the proposed action
would have a negligible effect on site water or waste treatment
capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Table 4.2.6.4-1 of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The impacts of radiological liquid discharges from Building 105-K
are included as part of the No Action alternative in the Storage and
Disposition PEIS. DOE expects there would be no significant increase
above the No Action alternative discharge levels since, during normal
operations, water is not in contact with plutonium storage containers.
Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates declassification
operations would cause a small and insignificant increase in water
usage beyond the water requirement estimated for other site operations.
Repackaging activities in the APSF are expected to have essentially
no impact to water resources beyond the site base line operations
presented in the No Action alternative of the Storage and Disposition
PEIS. 8 Repackaging operations would not significantly
increase the use of water resources beyond that required to operate the
industrial systems associated with the APSF, e.g., chillers for air
conditioning, sanitary sewer, potable water, etc., because additional
water is not used in repackaging operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Table 4.2.6.4-1 of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Socioeconomics. Storage: The socioeconomic impact of
operating Building 105-K for plutonium storage would be essentially the
same as the impact described for the Preferred Alternative of the
Storage and Disposition PEIS. The socioeconomic impact of modifying
Building 105-K and operating both APSF and Building 105-K would be well
within the impacts described for the Consolidation alternative of the
Storage and Disposition PEIS.
The socioeconomic impacts at RFETS and Hanford of moving surplus
plutonium to SRS were analyzed in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. The
analysis concluded that this action would phase out plutonium storage
at RFETS and Hanford. Approximately 200 direct job losses at Hanford,
in addition to the 2000 at RFETS, would result. Compared to the total
employment in those areas, the loss of these jobs and the impacts to
the regional economies would not be significant. The proposed action
would not change the magnitude of these impacts at RFETS, but cause
them to occur sooner.
Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates there would be
negligible additional socioeconomic effects due to operating the APSF
for repackaging of RFETS plutonium or operating FB-Line for
declassification purposes because the existing site workforce would be
used.
Public and Occupational Health and Safety (normal
operations). Storage. Public and Non-Involved Workers: Plutonium
storage operations in Building 105-K would not result in any additional
air or water radiological impacts (beyond those currently associated
with other operations in Building 105-K) because no shipping containers
or storage containers would be opened in Building 105-K. Since air and
water emissions create impacts that affect the non-involved workers and
the public, there would be no significant additional radiological
impact to the public or non-involved workers from normal operations in
Building 105-K. Therefore, the impact from the proposed action to the
public and non-involved workers would be essentially the same as the
impact from the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition
PEIS.
Involved Workers: DOE estimated that the potential health impact
from 50 years of APSF storage to individual involved workers for the
Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS was a latent
cancer fatality risk of 5x10-3 and that 1.5x10-1
latent cancer fatalities could occur in the involved worker population.
DOE estimates that the potential health impacts from 10 years of
operating Building 105-K to store plutonium could result in a risk of
latent cancer
[[Page 43390]]
fatality for the average Building 105-K involved worker of
1.5x10-3 and 2.6x10-2 latent cancer fatalities in
the Building 105-K involved worker population. Since the Storage and
Disposition PEIS bases health impacts on 50 years of storage, for
comparison purposes, the impacts from 50 years of plutonium storage in
the APSF are added to the impacts from 10 years of plutonium storage in
Building 105-K. Using this approach, the health impacts from storing
plutonium in the APSF and in Building 105-K would be 0.18 latent cancer
fatalities in the involved worker population of both facilities.
Health impacts to involved workers for the plutonium storage
aspects of the proposed action in this Supplement Analysis (0.18 latent
cancer fatalities) would be essentially the same as the health impact
estimated in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition
PEIS (0.15 latent cancer fatalities).
Declassification/Repackaging Radiological Impacts. Public, Non-
involved Workers, Involved Workers: For declassification operations the
potential health effect from the postulated radiation dose to the
maximally exposed member of the public at the Site boundary would be
1.7x10-6 latent cancer fatalities. The potential health
effect from the postulated radiation dose to the population surrounding
the SRS and to workers would be 0.068 latent cancer fatalities and
0.078 latent cancer fatalities, respectively, above those predicted in
the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
For repackaging operations (i.e., repackaging all plutonium from
the RFETS in the APSF for 2 years) the potential health effect from the
postulated radiation dose to the maximally exposed member of the public
at the site boundary would be 7.5x10-12 latent cancer
fatalities. The potential health effect from the postulated radiation
dose to the population surrounding the SRS and to workers would be
1.5x10-7 latent cancer fatalities and 2.5x10-2
latent cancer fatalities, respectively, above those predicted in the
Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. The impacts
from repackaging, only the RFETS plutonium that would be declassified
in the FB-Line would be less.
Building 105-K Modification. Public, Non-Involved Workers, Involved
Workers: No impacts to non-involved workers or the public would be
expected from the decontamination, modification, removal, and
construction work because this work is not expected to generate
significant air or water emissions. Work activities are confined to the
interior of Building 105-K and airborne radioactivity levels are
routinely monitored during work. Liquid sources would not be released
from the building during normal decontamination, removal, or
construction work. The potential health impact to workers, in the form
of the risk of latent cancer fatality, would be 4x10-4 for
18 months of decontamination and construction work and the number of
latent cancer fatalities that could be expected in the worker
population was estimated to be 2x10-2. The risks associated
with the modification of Building 105-K are approximately ten percent
of the risks estimated for storage of the plutonium in the Preferred
Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
Summary
Public: In the Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE estimated the
potential health impact to the population surrounding the SRS from
existing site operations and for the Upgrade Alternative over 50 years
was 1.1 latent cancer fatalities. Accomplishing the new proposed action
would slightly increase that potential health impact to about 1.2
latent cancer fatalities. Emissions would remain within the limits of
the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants permits
for the APSF and Building 105-K.
Workers: In the Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE estimated that
the potential health impact to the total site workforce from existing
site operations over 50 years would be 5.3 latent cancer fatalities.
Accomplishing the proposed action would increase the potential health
impact to the site workforce by 0.3 to 5.6 latent cancer fatalities.
This new estimate in total site workforce health impact is slightly
greater than the health impact of 5.3 latent cancer fatalities
estimated for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition
PEIS and is slightly lower than the health impact of 5.7 latent cancer
fatalities that DOE estimated for the Consolidation alternative in the
Storage and Disposition PEIS.
Storage Chemical Impacts. There would be no significant impact to
the public or workers from hazardous chemicals due to plutonium storage
operations in Building 105-K. There are no industrial systems or other
operations involved in the plutonium storage operations that would add
to existing Building 105-K chemical impacts.
Waste Management. Modifications to Building 105-K: DOE
estimates that decontamination and removal activities which would make
Building 105-K available for storage operations would generate 750
cubic meters of low level waste, which is less than 1% of the low-level
waste DOE expects to be generated by SRS activities as described in the
No Action alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS. DOE does not
expect to generate any significant quantities of other wastes in order
to modify Building 105-K. No high-level radioactive waste would be
generated.
Storage: DOE estimated that storing plutonium in the APSF, as
described in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition
PEIS, would not generate any of the following radioactive wastes: high-
level, transuranic, mixed transuranic, low-level, mixed low-level or
hazardous (other than minor quantities). DOE estimates that storing
plutonium in Building 105-K would not significantly change the estimate
for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.
Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates that declassifying
RFETS plutonium would generate about: 88 m\3\ of transuranic waste; 4
m\3\ of mixed waste; and 44 m\3\ of low-level radioactive waste. No
high-level waste is expected. These additional amounts of waste
represent a small fraction of these types of waste that are generated
at the site by other operations. The site has sufficient capacity to
accommodate this increase in waste volume.
Accidents. Storage: For the Building 105-K design basis
accidents, DOE estimated that the maximum impact to the population
surrounding the SRS could be 0.34 latent cancer fatalities in the
unlikely event that plutonium were released to the 105-K Building as a
result of corrosion of a storage container. This risk is greater than
the risk estimated for storage of plutonium in the Preferred
Alternative and other alternatives of the S&D PEIS; however, the risk
would be comparable to the same type of accident for the storage of
plutonium at SRS in existing storage vaults as analyzed in the
Continuing Storage Alternative for the Storage of Plutonium and Uranium
in the IMNM EIS. (The IMNM accident analysis showed 0.31 latent cancer
fatalities for the population surrounding SRS.) DOE will implement
administrative controls (including scheduled surveillances) to limit
actions or conditions that might lead to a release of radioactive
materials under accident conditions. The risk to the maximally exposed
member of the public and non-involved worker would also be greater than
the risk for storage
[[Page 43391]]
of plutonium estimated in the Preferred Alternative and other
alternatives of the Storage and Disposition PEIS but would be low (less
than 3x10-3 latent cancer fatalities).
For the postulated beyond design basis accidents, DOE estimated
that the maximum impact to the population could be 2.7x10-4
latent cancer fatalities in the event of a vault fire. This risk is
greater than the risk estimated for storage of plutonium in the
Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS, but low. The
risks to the maximally exposed public and the non-involved worker would
also be greater than the risks for the storage of plutonium estimated
in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS but
would be extremely small (less than 2x10-8 latent cancer
fatalities). DOE estimated that the involved worker may be subject to
injury and, in some cases, fatality as a result of potential beyond
design basis accidents.
Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates that for
declassification operation in the FB-Line, the risk to the public would
be 1.2x10-3 latent cancer fatalities, 2.6x10-4
latent cancer fatalities to the maximally exposed off-site individual
and 4.5x10-3 latent cancer fatalities/yr to the non-involved
worker. These risks are slightly greater than the risks for storage of
plutonium estimated in the Upgrade Alternative of the Storage and
Disposition PEIS, but are low. For repackaging operations in the APSF,
the risks are low and similar to the impacts presented for storage of
plutonium in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition
PEIS (less than 2x10-4 latent cancer fatalities).
Environmental Justice. For environmental justice impacts
to occur, there must be significant and adverse human health or
environmental impacts that disproportionately affect minority
populations and/or low-income populations. The Supplement Analysis
shows that accomplishing the proposed action would be within regulatory
limits and the impacts would be very low during routine operations.
The same Supplement Analyses also shows that accidents would not
result in a significant risk of adverse human health or environmental
impacts to the population who reside within 80 kilometers of the SRS.
Therefore, such accidents would not have disproportionately high or
adverse risk of impacts on minority or low-income populations.
Based on the analysis in this supplement analysis, no
disproportionate, high or adverse impact would be expected on minority
or low-income populations.
C. Environmentally Preferable Alternative
The environmental analyses in Chapter 4 of the Storage and
Disposition PEIS indicate that the environmentally preferable
alternative (the alternative with the lowest environmental impacts over
the 50 years considered in the PEIS) for storage of weapons-usable
fissile materials would be the Storage and Disposition PEIS Preferred
Alternative, which consists of No Action at Hanford, Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and Nevada Test Site (NTS) (no
fissile materials are or would be stored at the NTS) pending
disposition, phaseout of storage at RFETS, and upgrades at the Oak
Ridge Reservation, SRS, and Pantex. The proposed action as modified by
this amended decision is still the environmentally preferred
alternative.
III. Non-Environmental Considerations
A. Economic Analysis
DOE has estimated that accelerating the closure of RFETS from 2010
to 2006 in accordance with the DOE Closure 2006 Rocky Flats Closure
Project Management Plan could save as much as $1.3 billion. Closing
RFETS by 2006 would require the removal of non-pit, surplus weapons-
usable plutonium metal and oxide from RFETS by 2002. The early removal
of the RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium supports the
early deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning of the RFETS
plutonium storage and packaging facilities.
DOE also expects that the transfer of non-pit, surplus weapons-
usable plutonium from Hanford to the SRS, could save as much as $150
million in upgrade and operating costs for plutonium storage facilities
at the Hanford Site. As with the RFETS plutonium, the transfer would
not be accomplished unless DOE decided to locate the plutonium
immobilization disposition facility at the SRS.
The implementation cost for the proposed action is estimated to be
approximately $93 million.
B. Nonproliferation
From a nonproliferation standpoint, the highest standards for
safeguards and security will be employed during transportation and
storage. There is no change in this regard from the original PEIS ROD.
IV. Amended Decision
Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and
Disposition PEIS, and the Supplement Analysis, Storing Plutonium in the
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and Building 105-K at the
Savannah River Site (July 1998), the Department has decided to reduce,
over time, the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium
are stored, through a combination of storage alternatives in
conjunction with a combination of disposition alternatives.
The Department has decided to modify those aspects of the Storage
and Disposition ROD (62 FR 3014) concerning the storage of weapons-
usable plutonium at RFETS and Hanford, pending disposition. Other
aspects of the Storage and Disposition ROD remain unaltered. DOE has
decided to:
Modify an existing building (105-K) at SRS to allow the
receipt and storage of RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium.
If the Department decides to select SRS as the immobilization site
in the SPD EIS ROD, then the Department will:
Ship all RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium
(about 7 MT) to SRS beginning in about 2000 through about 2002;
Store RFETS non-classified plutonium metal and/or parts in
shipping containers in Building 105-K at SRS beginning in about 2000;
For RFETS classified surplus metal and/or parts,
declassify the material in the FB-Line facility and repackage the
material in the APSF (after construction of the APSF in about 2001). In
the FB-Line, the plutonium will be melted using existing facilities and
equipment that are part of the plutonium metal production process for
which FB-Line was designed;
Store the declassified material in Building 105-K in
shipping containers or the APSF vault if space is available;
Ship all Hanford non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium
(approximately 4.6 metric tons) from about 2002 through 2005 and store
this material in the APSF;
Before shipment, all plutonium transported from RFETS
(except for the classified metal and/or parts) and Hanford will be
stabilized 9 and packaged in accordance with DOE Standard-
3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides for
long-term storage. All shipments of plutonium, including the classified
metal and parts, will be by SST in
[[Page 43392]]
accordance with applicable DOE, U.S. Department of Transportation and
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements and regulations.
Plutonium will be packaged in certified Type B accident resistant
packages for transport; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Hanford plutonium fuel that is stable would not need to be
stabilized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The RFETS and Hanford Material stored at SRS may be moved
between Building 105-K and the APSF to allow for operational
flexibility.
Some of the surplus plutonium at RFETS and Hanford, approximately 1
metric ton at each site, is currently under International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a component of the United States
nonproliferation policy to remove weapons-usable fissile materials from
use for defense purposes. DOE has designed the APSF for IAEA safeguards
and intends that plutonium stored in the APSF will be available for
IAEA safeguards. Surplus plutonium under IAEA safeguards at RFETS and
Hanford that may be shipped to the SRS, will remain available for IAEA
safeguards in the APSF. Since plutonium that may be stored in Building
105-K will remain in shipping containers and not be accessible for full
IAEA safeguards controls (e.g., physical sampling, destructive
analyses), DOE is considering, with the IAEA, the application of IAEA
verification controls to ensure the plutonium stored in Building 105-K
is not diverted for defense purposes. In addition, DOE intends, as
indicated in the Storage and Disposition ROD, that DOE's program for
surplus plutonium disposition will include IAEA verification as
appropriate.
If the DOE decides to pursue the No Action alternative for the
disposition of surplus plutonium, the SRS, RFETS, and Hanford materials
would remain in storage at their current sites in accordance with the
No Action alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD. If the
DOE decides to immobilize surplus plutonium at Hanford, the SRS and
RFETS materials would be shipped to Hanford in accordance with the
decisions reached in the SPD EIS ROD.
V. Conclusion
Under the previous ROD, a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus
plutonium, including plutonium from RFETS and existing onsite
plutonium, would be stored at SRS in the APSF, pending disposition,
provided that SRS is selected as the immobilization site following
completion of the SPD EIS. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS
would begin when the APSF is completed in 2001.
With this amended ROD, a total of approximately 11.6 metric tons of
surplus plutonium from both Hanford and RFETS (in addition to existing
onsite SRS surplus plutonium, for a total of approximately 14 metric
tons of surplus plutonium) would be stored at SRS in the APSF and
Building 105-K, pending disposition, provided SRS is selected as the
immobilization site. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS would
begin when the modifications to Building 105-K are completed, i.e., in
about 2000; shipments of plutonium from Hanford to SRS would begin in
about 2002.
DOE has decided to implement a revised program to provide for safe
and secure storage of weapons-usable fissile materials. DOE will
prepare to advance the consolidation of the storage of weapons-usable
plutonium by modifying existing facilities at the SRS in South
Carolina, and phasing out surplus plutonium storage at RFETS in
Colorado and Hanford in Washington. Consistent with the Storage and
Disposition PEIS ROD, this Amended ROD supports the Department's
objectives to phase out the storage of all weapons-usable plutonium at
the RFETS and Hanford as soon as possible and to reduce the number of
sites where surplus weapons-usable plutonium is stored.
The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.
4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations in 40 CFR Parts 1500-
1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.
Issued in Washington, D.C., August 6, 1998.
Laura S. H. Holgate,
Director, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition.
[FR Doc. 98-21744 Filed 8-12-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
