[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 159 (Thursday, August 18, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-20261]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: August 18, 1994]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-280, 50-281, 50-338, 50-339]
Virginia Electric and Power Company (Surry Power Station Units 1
and 2) (North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2); Exemption
I
Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37, which authorize
operation of the Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, and NPF-4 and NPF-
7, which authorize operation of the North Anna Power Station Units 1
and 2. The licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or
hereafter in effect.
The facilities consist of two pressurized water reactors at each of
the licensee's two sites, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, located in
Surry County, Virginia, and North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2,
located in Louisa County, Virginia.
II
Title 10 CFR 73.55, ``Requirements for physical protection of
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological
sabotage,'' paragraph (a), in part, states that ``The licensee shall
establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high
assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.''
10 CFR 73.55(d), ``Access Requirements,'' paragraph (1), specifies
that ``The licensee shall control all points of personnel and vehicle
access into a protected area.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) requires that ``A
numbered picture badge identification system shall be used for all
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without
escort.'' 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) also states that an individual not
employed by the licensee (i.e., contractors) may be authorized access
to protected areas without escort provided the individual ``receives a
picture badge upon entrance into the protected area which must be
returned upon exit from the protected area * * *''
The licensee proposed to implement an alternative unescorted access
control system which would eliminate the need to issue and retrieve
badges at each entrance/exit location and would allow all individuals
with unescorted access to keep their badge with them when departing the
site.
An exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to allow
contractors who have unescorted access to take their badges offsite
instead of returning them when exiting the site. By letter dated May
27, 1994, the licensee requested an exemption from certain requirements
of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) for this purpose.
III
Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the Commission
may, upon application of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant such exemptions from the requirements of the
regulations in this part as it determines are authorized by law and
will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security,
and are otherwise in the public interest. Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the
Commission may authorize a licensee to provide alternative measures for
protection against radiological sabotage provided the licensee
demonstrates that the alternative measures have ``the same high
assurance objective'' and meet ``the general performance requirements''
of the regulation, and ``the overall level of system performance
provides protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that
which would be provided by the regulation.
Currently, employee and contractor identification badges, coupled
with their associated access control cards, are issued and retrieved on
the occasion of each entry to and exit from the protected areas of the
Surry and North Anna sites. Station security personnel are required to
maintain control of the badges while the individuals are offsite. This
practice has been in effect at the Surry and North Anna Power Stations
since each operating license was issued. Security personnel retain each
identification badge, as well as the associated access control card,
when not in use by the authorized individual, within appropriately
designed storage receptacles inside a bullet-resistant enclosure. An
individual who meets the access authorization requirements is issued an
individual picture identification card and an individual access control
card which allows entry into preauthorized areas of the station. While
entering the plant in the present configuration, an authorized
individual is ``screened'' by the required detection equipment and by
the issuing security officer. Having received the badge, the individual
proceeds to the access portal, inserts the access control card into the
card reader, enters a personal identification number (PIN), and passes
through the turnstile which unlocks if the preset criteria are met.
Once inside the station, the individual's PIN is not required in order
to further utilize the access authorization card.
This present procedure is labor intensive since security personnel
are required to verify badge issuance, ensure badge retrieval, and
maintain the badges in orderly storage until the next entry into the
protected area. The regulations permit employees to remove their badges
from the site, but an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(d)(5) is required to
permit contractors to take their badges offsite instead of returning
them when exiting the site.
Under the proposed system, all individuals authorized to gain
unescorted access will have the physical characteristics of their hand
(hand geometry) recorded with their badge number. Since the hand
geometry is unique to each individual and its application in the entry
screening function would preclude unauthorized use of a badge, the
requested exemption would allow employees and contractors to keep their
badges at the time of exiting the protected area. The process of
verifying badge issuance, ensuring badge retrieval, and maintaining
badges could be eliminated while the balance of the access procedure
would remain intact. Firearm, explosive, and metal detection equipment
and provisions for conducting searches will remain as well. The
security officer responsible for the last access control function
(controlling admission to the protected area) will also remain isolated
within a bullet-resistant structure in order to assure his or her
ability to respond or to summon assistance.
Use of a hand geometry biometrics system exceeds the present
verification methodology's capability to discern an individual's
identity. Unlike the photograph identification badge, hand geometry is
nontransferable. During the initial access authorization or
registration process, hand measurements are recorded and the tamplate
is stored for subsequent use in the identity verification process
required for entry into the protected area. Authorized individuals
insert their access authorization card into the card reader and the
biometrics system records an image of the hand geometry. The unique
features of the newly recorded image are then compared to the template
previously stored in the database. Access is ultimately granted based
on the degree to which the characteristics of the image match those of
the ``signature'' template.
Since both the badge and hand geometry would be necessary for
access into the protected area, the proposed system would provide for a
positive verification process. Potential loss of a badge by an
individual, as a result of taking the badge offsite, would not enable
an unauthorized entry into protected areas.
The access process will continue to be under the observation of
security personnel. They system of identification badges coupled with
their associated access control cards will continue to be used for all
individuals who are authorized access to protected areas without
escorts. Badges will continue to be displayed by all the individuals
while inside the protected area. Addition of a hand geometry biometrics
system will provide a significant contribution to effective
implementation of the security plan at each site.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55, the NRC staff
has determined that the proposed alternative measures for protection
against radiological sabotage meet ``the same high assurance
objective,'' and ``the general performance requirements'' of the
regulation and that ``the overall level of system performance provides
protection against radiological sabotage equivalent'' to that which
would be provided by the regulation.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
73.5, an exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or
property or common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Virginia Electric and
Power Company an exemption from those requirements of 10 CFR
73.55(d)(5) relating to the returning of picture badges upon exit from
the protected area such that individuals not employed by the licensee,
i.e., contractors, who are authorized unescorted access into the
protected area, can take their badges offsite.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the
quality of the human environment (59 FR 40927).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of August 1994.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Steven A. Varga,
Director, Division of Reactor Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 94-20261 Filed 8-17-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
