[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 159 (Tuesday, August 18, 1998)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 44224-44229]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-22292]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 43 and 64
[IB Docket No. 98-148; FCC 98-190]
1998 Biennial Regulatory Review--Reform of the International
Settlements Policy and Associated Filing Requirements
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: On August 6, 1998, the Federal Communications Commission
adopted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to adopt significant
changes to the Commission's International Settlements Policy (ISP) and
associated rules. The changes in this policy are intended to promote
greater competition and lower international calling prices. The
Commission proposes to lift regulations under the existing policy that
restricts the kinds of arrangements U.S. carriers may enter into with
foreign telecommunications carriers in World Trade Organization (WTO)
member countries. This action is part of the FCC's biennial review to
eliminate or modify rules where appropriate.
DATES: Comments are due on or before September 16, 1998 and reply
comments are due on or before October 16, 1998.
ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, N.W., Room
222, Washington, D.C. 20554.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert C. McDonald, Attorney-Advisor,
Policy and Facilities Branch, Telecommunications Division,
International Bureau, (202) 418-1470.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 98-190, adopted on August 6, 1998. The full
text of this NPRM is available for inspection and copying during normal
business hours in the FCC Reference Center (Room 239) of the Federal
Communications Commission, 1919 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20554.
The complete text of this NPRM is available over the Internet on the
Commission's World Wide Web page, http://www.fcc.gov. The text of the
NPRM also may be purchased from the Commission's copy contractor,
International Transcription Service, Inc., 1231 20th Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 857-3800.
Summary of Notice
1. The Commission proposes to scale back significantly on the
Commission's application of the International Settlements Policy (ISP)
and associated filing requirements. The ISP has governed U.S. carriers'
bilateral accounting rate negotiations with foreign carriers for many
years. These policies have largely been a success in safeguarding U.S.
carrier dealings with monopoly foreign carriers. These rules may not,
however, be necessary on routes where there is competition in the
foreign market and they may, in fact, impede the further development of
competition on such routes. In light of the significant number of
countries that recently have introduced competition in their
telecommunications markets, the NPRM proposes significant changes to
the Commission's ISP and associated rules.
2. The Commission initiated this proceeding in response to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires the Commission to review
all regulations that apply to operations or activities of any provider
of telecommunications service and to repeal or modify any regulation it
determines to be no longer necessary in the public interest.
3. The ISP and related filing requirements were implemented to
prevent whipsawing. These rules currently apply to U.S. carrier
arrangements for IMTS with all foreign carriers, except where a U.S.
carrier receives authorization to enter into an alternative settlement
arrangement under our flexibility policy or to provide ISR. We believe,
however, that whipsawing is a concern that is largely associated with
foreign carriers with monopoly power. Where U.S. carriers are able to
terminate international traffic by interconnecting with a carrier that
lacks market power, we believe that whipsawing is not a significant
danger. We thus seek comment in this Notice on whether we should
continue to apply the ISP and related filing requirements to U.S.
carrier arrangements with foreign carriers from WTO Member countries
that lack market power in the relevant foreign telecommunications
market.
4. With respect to the ISP, there also appears to be little danger
that a foreign carrier that lacks market power will have the ability to
whipsaw U.S. carriers. Indeed, without market power over facilities and
services essential to terminate international traffic, an attempt at
whipsawing by a foreign carrier that lacks market power should be
countered by a defection by U.S.
[[Page 44225]]
carriers to another operator. We thus tentatively conclude that we
should not apply the ISP to agreements concluded with foreign carriers
from WTO Member countries that lack market power on the relevant route.
U.S. carriers would therefore be free to enter unencumbered into
commercial negotiations with foreign carriers in WTO Member countries
that lack market power. We seek comment on whether carriers that lack
market power in the foreign market may retain some ability to whipsaw
where government policies or other foreign market conditions preclude
real competition. We tentatively conclude that the long term benefits
of removing our ISP for arrangements with foreign carriers that lack
market power will outweigh any short-term risks involved. We seek
comment on this tentative conclusion.
5. We also seek comment on whether to exempt U.S. carriers from
filing contracts and accounting rate information under section 43.51
and 64.1001 of our rules for arrangements with foreign carriers that
lack market power. 47 CFR 43.51, 64.1001. We tentatively conclude that
we should amend the Sec. 43.51 contract filing requirement and the
Sec. 64.1001 accounting rate filing requirements so that contracts and
accounting rate information for arrangements with foreign carriers that
lack market power in WTO Member countries would not need to be filed
with the Commission. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
6. In the Foreign Participation Order, 62 FR 64741, December 9,
1997, recon. pending, we adopted a presumption, for the purpose of
applying the No Special Concessions rule, that carriers with less than
50 percent market share in the relevant markets lack sufficient market
power to affect competition adversely in the United States. We propose
to apply this same 50 percent market share presumption for purposes of
determining whether to apply our ISP and related filing requirements.
We seek comment on how, if we adopt our proposal to eliminate the ISP
and filing requirements for arrangements with foreign carriers that
lack market power in WTO Member countries, we should make the
determination that the foreign carrier lacks market power. For example,
should the Commission make an affirmative finding whether a foreign
carrier possesses market power, or should we leave the determination of
whether a foreign carrier falls outside our presumptive 50 percent
market share screen, so that the ISP and our filing requirements apply,
to the carrier that concludes the arrangement? We note that carriers
that accept a special concession from a foreign carrier that lacks
market power are currently required to file publicly contracts with the
Commission along with information that the foreign carrier has a market
share of less than 50 percent in the relevant markets. Opposing parties
thus have the opportunity to rebut this presumption by demonstrating
that the carrier indeed possesses market power. If we were to adopt our
tentative conclusion to eliminate the contract filing requirement for
agreements with foreign carriers that lack market power in the foreign
market, we seek comment on whether the Commission and potential
competitors would lack the information needed to determine whether an
agreement qualifies for the exception to our filing requirement and No
Special Concessions rule.
7. We believe that, in most foreign markets, the determination of
whether a carrier has market power is clear cut, because most foreign
markets are divided between a former incumbent with a market share of
well over 50 percent and new entrants with market shares far below 50
percent. Nevertheless, we recognize that there may be some need to
preserve Commission oversight to ensure that carriers do not engage in
exclusive dealings with foreign carriers that possess market power.
This oversight should, however, be balanced with our goal of allowing
carriers the freedom to negotiate agreements freely with carriers that
lack market power. We seek comment on several alternatives for
determining whether to apply our ISP and related filing requirements to
a particular arrangement. First, we could adopt a rule that
arrangements with foreign carriers with less than 50 percent market
share do not have to be filed, and not require any filing to
substantiate the claim that the foreign carrier lacks market power.
Second, we could require that a carrier that seeks to enter an
arrangement with a foreign carrier that lacks market power identify the
route and file a certification that the carrier on the foreign end of
the international route lacks market power, without revealing the
identity of the foreign correspondent. Third, we could require a
carrier to identify the foreign carrier and publicly file data
indicating that the foreign carrier possesses less than 50 percent
market share in each of the relevant markets or file a petition for
declaratory ruling that a foreign carrier with greater than 50 percent
market share nevertheless lacks market power. We also seek comment on
whether, if we adopt this third proposal, we should allow confidential
treatment for such filings.
8. We seek to simplify our regulatory requirements to the greatest
extent possible, consistent with our commitment to preventing abuse of
market power by foreign carriers in their dealings with U.S. carriers.
We seek comment on whether our proposal to eliminate the ISP and
related filing requirements for arrangements with foreign carriers that
lack market power in WTO Member countries achieves this goal. We
tentatively conclude that this approach is warranted because carriers
without market power have a substantially diminished ability to whipsaw
U.S. carriers. We further tentatively conclude that this approach is
consistent with the regulatory framework we adopted in our Foreign
Participation Order, 62 FR 64741, December 9, 1997, recon. pending. We
seek comment on our proposed approach for regulating arrangements
between U.S. carriers and foreign carriers that lack market power in
WTO Member countries, and on any other approaches that would further
our goals.
9. We also seek comment on whether, under certain circumstances, we
should decline to apply the ISP and related filing requirements to U.S.
carrier arrangements with all foreign carriers in selected WTO Member
country markets, including arrangements with those carriers that
possess market power. We seek comment on what standard we should employ
for identifying routes on which we should not apply the ISP. We propose
to decline to apply the ISP on routes where the Commission has already
authorized ISR.
10. Alternatively, we seek comment on whether a settlement rate
threshold lower than a benchmark rate is appropriate. For example, we
could apply the current best practices rate of $.08 per minute,
established in our Benchmarks Order, as the threshold. Under this
proposal, we would decline to apply our ISP on routes where at least 50
percent of the traffic is settled at a rate of $.08 per minute or less.
Commenters suggesting an alternative settlement rate threshold should
provide a documented basis for any threshold suggested.
11. We also seek comment on whether any other standard is
appropriate. For instance, we could decline to apply the ISP only in
cases where 50 percent of traffic on the route is settled at or below
benchmark rates and the foreign market permits U.S. carriers to provide
service via ISR. We seek comment on these alternatives, and on any
other alternative standard we could adopt to
[[Page 44226]]
identify routes on which we need not apply our ISP.
12. We also seek comment on whether we should decline to apply our
Sec. 43.51 contract filing and Sec. 64.1001 accounting rate filing
requirements to the extent we decline to apply the ISP on certain
routes. See 47 CFR 43.51, 64.1001. We seek comment on whether we should
require public filing, require confidential filing or remove the filing
requirements altogether for arrangements on certain routes where we
decline to apply the ISP. For instance, if we remove these filing
requirements generally, should we maintain them for arrangements
entered into with foreign carriers with market power, or only for
affiliated foreign carriers with market power?
13. Our proposal to eliminate the ISP and related filing
requirements on routes where we permit ISR would greatly reduce
regulatory oversight for arrangements between U.S. carriers and foreign
carriers on those routes. We believe that our proposal will further our
goal of eliminating unnecessary regulatory burdens, while continuing to
prevent abuse of market power by foreign carriers in their dealings
with U.S. carriers. We seek comment on our proposed approach for
eliminating regulatory requirements on routes where we believe they are
not necessary, and on any other approaches that would further our
goals.
14. We further seek comment on what modifications we can make to
our flexibility policy to encourage more carriers to negotiate
alternative settlement arrangements. Specifically, we propose to modify
our flexibility policy to limit the filing of commercial information on
routes that qualify for flexibility. Our current flexibility rules
require a carrier seeking to implement a flexible arrangement to obtain
approval by filing a petition for declaratory ruling with the
Commission. Under our rules, carriers must include a summary of the
terms and conditions of the alternative settlement arrangement in their
petition. In addition, carriers are required under Sec. 43.51 of our
rules to file a copy of all settlement arrangements, including
alternative settlement arrangements.
15. We seek comment on whether these filing requirements inhibit
carriers from negotiating alternative settlement arrangements. Would a
foreign carrier be less willing to negotiate a favorable arrangement
with one U.S. carrier if the terms of the agreement must be disclosed
to all competing carriers in the U.S. market? We seek comment on
whether we should modify our flexibility policy for alternative
settlement arrangements which do not trigger our safeguards. Thus, for
alternative settlement arrangements affecting less than 25 percent of
the inbound or outbound traffic on a particular route, and for
arrangements that are not between affiliated carriers or carriers
involved in a joint venture, we propose to allow carriers to file a
petition for authorization to enter into a flexible settlement
arrangement without including a summary of the terms and conditions of
the agreement or identifying the foreign correspondent in their
petition. We also seek comment on whether we should decline to apply
our Sec. 43.51 contract filing requirement for alternative settlement
arrangements in these circumstances. We note that under this proposal,
carriers could only seek approval without filing agreements with the
Commission to the extent the presumption in favor of flexible treatment
is not rebutted (i.e. there are not multiple facilities-based
competitors capable of terminating international traffic operating in
the foreign market).
16. We also seek comment on the two safeguards we adopted in our
Flexibility Order, 62 FR 5535, February 6, 1997, recon. pending. The
first of these safeguards requires that any alternative arrangement
affecting more than 25 percent of the outbound or inbound traffic on a
particular route may not contain unreasonably discriminatory terms and
conditions and must be publicly filed. The other safeguard requires
that all alternative arrangements between affiliated carriers and
carriers involved in non-equity joint ventures be publicly filed. We
adopted these safeguards to protect against potential anticompetitive
actions by foreign and U.S. carriers with a significant share of their
markets, and to provide a ``safety net'' for possible unanticipated
consequences of our flexibility policy. We tentatively conclude that we
should maintain these safeguards. We seek comment on this tentative
conclusion and on our tentative conclusion to modify our filing
requirements for alternative settlement arrangements that do not
trigger our safeguards. We also seek comment, however, on whether we
should modify the safeguard that currently requires all flexible
arrangements entered into with affiliated carriers and joint-venture
partners to be publicly filed with the Commission. Where the U.S.
carrier's foreign affiliate does not possess market power in the
foreign market, there is little danger that a flexible arrangement
would have anticompetitive effects. The current safeguard, however,
requires a U.S. carrier to make public flexible arrangements entered
into with its foreign affiliate even if it lacks market power. We
therefore seek comment on whether we should only require public
availability of flexible arrangements entered into by U.S. carriers
with affiliated carriers or with joint-venture partners that possess
market power in the foreign market.
17. If we adopt these proposals, we propose to modify the
flexibility policy to require only that a carrier file a certification
that the arrangement does not trigger our flexibility safeguards (i.e.,
that it affects less than 25 percent of traffic on the route and is not
with an affiliate or joint venture partner) and to identify the
destination market. We propose to permit other parties to file comments
to rebut the presumption in favor of flexibility (demonstrating that
the foreign market lacks multiple facilities-based competitors), but
not comment on the nature of the flexible arrangement itself. We
believe that this approach would enable U.S. carriers to enter into
innovative arrangements that would otherwise not be viable if the full
contents of the agreement were disclosed.
18. We note that these proposed modifications to our flexibility
rule may not be needed if we adopt our proposals in this Notice to lift
the ISP and related filing requirements for settlement arrangements
with foreign carriers that lack market power in WTO Member countries
and settlement arrangements on WTO country routes where we permit ISR.
Our flexibility policy provides an exception to the ISP. Thus, to the
extent our ISP does not apply, our flexibility rules would be
irrelevant. We seek comment on the proposals in this Notice for
modifying our flexibility policy, and on any other modifications to our
flexibility policy that would further our goals of encouraging the
negotiation of more market-based arrangements and eliminating
unnecessary regulatory burdens.
19. We also seek comment on whether we should modify our ISR rules
as a mechanism for putting greater pressure on settlement rates. We
seek comment in this NPRM on whether we can permit ISR on more routes,
consistent with our commitment to prevent one-way bypass. For example,
should we permit carriers to provide ISR for a limited amount of
traffic on routes where we would otherwise not authorize the provision
of ISR? We believe that a limited offering of ISR could put significant
pressure on settlement rates, while limiting the potential damage from
one-way bypass. Another approach might be to decide in advance to lift
our ISP requirement at some future point when international markets
have become sufficiently
[[Page 44227]]
competitive overall, e.g. when 50 percent of routes have been approved
for ISR. We note that regulators in other markets that allow ISR, such
as the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, and others, do not impose
restrictions on ISR similar to those we have in place in the United
States. We seek comment on whether it is possible to deter foreign
carriers from engaging in one-way bypass that distorts the U.S. market
through an approach other than prohibiting ISR altogether. For example,
in the Benchmarks Order, 62 FR 45758, August 29, 1997, recon. pending,
appeal filed, Cable & Wireless et al. v. FCC, No. 97-1612 (D.C. Cir.
filed Sept. 26, 1997), we adopted a safeguard that would impose
sanctions on a carrier whose provision of ISR results in a market
distortion, i.e., one-way bypass. We adopted a presumption that a
market distortion would occur if the ratio of inbound/outbound traffic
increases by ten or more percent over two successive reporting periods.
We seek comment on whether this or a different competitive safeguard
would be an effective means of preventing one-way bypass in lieu of our
existing safeguards, either now or as competitive conditions evolve.
20. We seek comment on the effect of adopting the above proposals
on our No Special Concessions rule as well as on the existing ISR and
flexibility policies. We also seek comment on whether additional
safeguards are necessary to address any possible competitive distortion
that may result from limiting the scope of our ISP. We note that if we
adopt our proposals to scale back our application of the ISP, our
flexibility and ISR policies will apply only to arrangements with
foreign carriers with market power in foreign markets to which the
Commission does not allow ISR and to arrangements with carriers in non-
WTO Member countries.
21. Our No Special Concessions rule prohibits U.S. international
carriers from ``agreeing to accept special concessions directly or
indirectly from any foreign carrier with respect to any U.S.
international route where the foreign carrier possesses sufficient
market power on the foreign end of the route to affect competition
adversely in the U.S. market * * *.'' 47 CFR 63.14(a). We seek comment
on whether to maintain the No Special Concessions rule for U.S. carrier
arrangements with foreign carriers with market power if we adopt the
proposal in this Notice not to apply the ISP and related filing
requirements on ISR routes. It may be necessary to maintain the No
Special Concessions rule because it applies more broadly than the ISP.
For example, the No Special Concessions rule prohibits U.S. carriers
from agreeing to accept from a foreign carrier that possesses market
power exclusive arrangements with respect to operating agreements,
interconnection of international facilities, private line provisioning
and maintenance, as well as quality of service. The ISP, however,
applies only to the settlement of international traffic and allocation
of return traffic. We seek comment on whether such exclusive
arrangements with a foreign carrier that possesses market power could
adversely affect competition in the U.S. market on routes where we
permit ISR, such that we should continue to apply the No Special
Concessions rule.
22. We also seek comment on the extent to which the No Special
Concessions rule applies within the context of our ISR and flexibility
policies in light of the changes to our rules proposed in this Notice.
In the Flexibility Order, 62 FR 5535, February 6, 1997, recon. pending,
the Commission stated that arrangements approved under the flexibility
rules are permitted as an exception to the No Special Concessions rule.
By contrast however, we have not made clear how the No Special
Concessions rule applies to the settlement of traffic under an ISR
arrangement. An ISR arrangement between a foreign carrier and a U.S.
carrier, for example, could be viewed as a prohibited special
concession if the foreign carrier also exchanges traffic in a
traditional correspondent relationship with other U.S. carriers under
financial terms and conditions that differ from those governing the ISR
arrangement. We believe that such an interpretation of our No Special
Concessions rule was not contemplated when we adopted our ISR policy.
We therefore tentatively conclude that our No Special Concessions rule
does not apply to the terms and conditions under which traffic is
settled, including allocation of return traffic, by a U.S. carrier on
an ISR route. Notwithstanding an ISR arrangement, however, the No
Special Concessions rule would prohibit exclusive arrangements with a
foreign carrier with market power with respect to interconnection of
international facilities, private line provisioning and maintenance, as
well as quality of service. We seek comment on this tentative
conclusion. We also seek comment on whether we should apply the No
Special Concessions rule in this manner if we decide to retain the No
Special Concessions rule for U.S. carrier arrangements that deviate
from the ISP on ISR routes, as discussed above.
23. Finally, although we seek to remove regulatory impediments to
competition, we recognize that carriers that possess market power in
the foreign market may have the potential to leverage that market power
into the U.S. market. By removing the ISP and transparency
requirements, we may be removing measures which limit the ability of
such carriers to distort competition in the U.S. market. We therefore
seek comment on whether we should adopt additional safeguards to
prevent a competitive distortion, such as one-way inbound bypass, and
on measures we should take in the event a competitive distortion
occurs. For instance, we seek comment on whether we should modify our
reporting requirements in order to more easily detect such a
competitive distortion. We also seek comment on what measures we can
take to ensure that the Commission is able to take swift action in the
event of a competitive distortion. We recognize, however, that any
safeguards we adopt may, to the extent they are not absolutely
necessary, preclude carriers from responding to market influences and
concluding agreements that may bring settlement rates closer to cost.
24. We note in particular that removing our ISP and filing
requirements may, in certain cases, allow carriers to conclude some
types of arrangements upon which the Commission has not yet ruled. For
example, commenting parties in other proceedings have expressed concern
regarding whether carriers may negotiate arrangements to accept
``groomed'' traffic, i.e. traffic that terminates in particular
geographic regions. If we adopt our above proposal to remove the ISP
and our filing requirements with respect to arrangements with carriers
with market power in selected markets, we would no longer require pre-
approval or public filing of such arrangements. We seek comment on
whether these types of grooming arrangements present a potential for
anticompetitive effects, particularly with respect to arrangements
between foreign carriers with market power and incumbent local exchange
carriers. We also seek comment on whether the potential for such
anticompetitive effects would justify an exception to our proposals to
relax our application of the ISP or whether it would justify
application of other safeguards.
25. Currently, the Commission requires that carriers seek approval
for changes in their accounting rate arrangements with foreign
correspondents. Under the procedures set out in the Commission's rules,
carriers seeking such approval must file
[[Page 44228]]
either a modification request or a notification. The notification
requirement applies to simple reductions in the applicable accounting
rate. Such notifications must be filed prior to the effective date of
the change in the accounting rate. Grant of these filings is automatic
the day after filing. The accounting rate modification filing
procedures apply to all other changes in accounting rates (except
flexibility filings), including retroactive changes in the applicable
accounting rate. Modification filings are automatically granted 21 days
after filing if the filing is unopposed and the International Bureau
has not notified the applicant that approval of the modification may
not serve the public interest. Where a filing is not automatically
granted, approval is only granted by formal action of the Bureau. The
Bureau's experience indicates that there is confusion regarding the
filing procedures applicable to a given agreement. For instance, in
many cases carriers seek to use notification filing procedures for
accounting rate arrangements that should be filed under modification
procedures, causing increased staff workload and additional paperwork
for filing parties.
26. In light of the confusion caused by the existence of two
standards for accounting rate filings, along with the fact that few
filings are made under the notification procedure, we find that
adopting the notification filing procedure has not had its intended
effect of removing regulatory barriers to simple reductions in
accounting rates. On the contrary, it is our experience that having two
procedures for accounting rate filings has made procedures more
complicated than they need to be. We therefore tentatively conclude
that we should remove the option of filing a notification and require
that all accounting rate filings be governed under the existing
procedures for accounting rate modifications. We seek comment on this
tentative conclusion.
27. Our international settlements policy requires that U.S.
carriers not accept exclusive settlement arrangements with foreign
carriers and prohibits U.S. carriers from entering into any arrangement
not made available to all U.S. carriers providing service on the route.
For this reason, carriers making modification or notification filings
are required under our rules to serve a copy of their filings on all
facilities-based carriers providing services on the same route.
28. The Commission is implementing an electronic filing system that
will replace the current paper filing system for accounting rate
modifications. This system will automatically generate reports of all
accounting rate filings and will be available over the Internet on the
Commission's web page. We seek comment on whether, in light of detailed
information regarding accounting rate filings that will be available on
the Internet, we can eliminate the increasingly cumbersome requirement
that copies of accounting rate filings be served on all carriers
providing service on a given route. We seek comment, alternatively, on
whether the Commission should issue a public notice when it receives
accounting rate filings instead of maintaining the service requirement.
Due to the significant volume of such filings, we tentatively conclude
that the information contained in public notices for accounting rate
filings would be far less helpful than the information that will be
available on the Commission's web page.
29. We seek comment on these proposed changes to our accounting
rate modification and notification filing requirements. We also seek
comment on any other modifications that would simplify our regulations
but also enable the Commission and interested parties to obtain the
information necessary to monitor accounting rate agreements
effectively, where necessary.
30. Following adoption of the Flexibility Order, 62 FR 5535,
February 6, 1997, recon. pending, the Commission received petitions for
reconsideration from several parties, requesting that the Commission
alter its competitive safeguards to differing degrees. In light of the
above proposals to modify our ISP, we seek further comment on the
issues raised by parties that filed petitions for reconsideration in
the Flexibility proceeding. We invite interested parties to comment on
the issues raised in the petitions for reconsideration of the
Flexibility Order in light of the recent changes in our rules and the
proposals detailed above.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Certification
31. The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) requires that an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis be prepared for notice-and-comment
rulemaking proceedings, unless the agency certifies that ``the rule
will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.'' The RFA generally defines
``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A small business concern is one which: (1) is independently owned
and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3)
satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business
Administration (SBA). The rule changes proposed in this Notice may
directly affect approximately 10 facilities-based international
telecommunications carriers. Neither the Commission nor SBA has
developed a definition of ``small entity'' specifically applicable to
these international carriers. Therefore, the definition to be used is
the most appropriate definition under the SBA rules, which here is the
definition of Communications Services, Not Elsewhere Classified (NEC).
Under this definition, a small entity is one with $11.0 million or less
in annual receipts. Based on information filed with the Commission, the
subject facilities-based international telecommunications carriers do
not fall within the above definition of ``small entity'' because they
each have more than $11.0 million in annual receipts. We therefore
certify that this document will not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities. The Commission will send a
copy of this document, including this certification, to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.
Initial Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis
32. This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking contains a proposed
information collection and will be submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).
Comment Filing Procedures
33. Pursuant to Secs. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47
CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on or before
September 16, and reply comments on or before October 16. Comments may
be filed using the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS)
or by filing paper copies. See Electronic Filing of Documents in
Rulemaking Proceedings, 63 FR 24121 (May 1, 1998).
34. Comments filed through the ECFS can be sent as an electronic
file via the Internet to http://www.fcc.gov/e-file/
ecfs.html. Generally, only one copy of an electronic
submission must be filed. If multiple docket or rulemaking numbers
appear in the caption of this proceeding, however, commenters must
transmit one electronic copy of the comments to each docket or
rulemaking number referenced in the caption. In completing the
transmittal screen,
[[Page 44229]]
commenters should include their full name, Postal Service mailing
address, and the applicable docket or rulemaking number. Parties may
also submit an electronic comment by Internet e-mail. To get filing
instructions for e-mail comments, commenters should send an e-mail to
ecfs@fcc.gov, and should include the following words in the body of the
message, ``get form .'' A sample form and
directions will be sent in reply.
35. Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and
four copies of each filing. If more than one docket or rulemaking
number appear in the caption of this proceeding, commenters must submit
two additional copies for each additional docket or rulemaking number.
All filings must be sent to the Commission's Secretary, Magalie Roman
Salas, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 1919
M St. N.W., Room 222, Washington, D.C. 20554.
36. Parties who choose to file by paper should also submit their
comments on diskette. These diskettes should be submitted to: Donna
Christianson, International Bureau, Federal Communications Commission,
2000 M Street, N.W., Room 836, Washington, D.C. 20554. Such a
submission should be on a 3.5 inch diskette formatted in an IBM
compatible format using WordPerfect 5.1 for Windows or compatible
software. The diskette should be accompanied by a cover letter and
should be submitted in ``read only'' mode. The diskette should be
clearly labelled with the commenter's name, proceeding (Docket No. 98-
148), type of pleading (comment or reply comment), date of submission,
and the name of the electronic file on the diskette. The label should
also include the following phrase ``Disk Copy--Not an Original.'' Each
diskette should contain only one party's pleadings, preferably in a
single electronic file. In addition, commenters must send diskette
copies to the Commission's copy contractor, International Transcription
Service, Inc., 1231 20th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.
Ordering Clauses
37. Accordingly, it is ordered that, pursuant to Secs. 1, 4(i)-(j),
201(b), 214, 303(r) and 403 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(j), 214, 303(r), and 403, this Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking is hereby adopted.
38. It is further ordered that the commission's office of public
affairs, reference operations division, shall send a copy of this
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, including the Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Certification, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration.
List of Subjects in 47 CFR Parts 43, and 64
Communications common carriers, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
Federal Communications Commission
Magalie Roman Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 98-22292 Filed 8-17-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P
