[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 160 (Friday, August 19, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-20364]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: August 19, 1994]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part V
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Coast Guard
_______________________________________________________________________
33 CFR Part 168
Escort Vessels for Certain Tankers; Final Rule
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 168
[CGD 91-202]
RIN 2115-AE10
Escort Vessels for Certain Tankers
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is requiring escort vessels for certain oil
tankers transiting Prince William Sound, Alaska, and Puget Sound,
Washington. This rulemaking is mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 (OPA 90). The regulations will reduce the chances of a tanker
running aground or colliding as a result of loss of propulsion or
steering control, thereby potentially reducing the risk of an oil
spill.
EFFECTIVE DATE: November 17, 1994.
ADDRESSES: Unless otherwise indicated, documents referred to in this
preamble are available for inspection or copying at the office of the
Executive Secretary, Marine Safety Council (G-LRA/3406), U.S. Coast
Guard Headquarters, 2100 Second Street SW., room 3406, Washington, DC
20593-0001 between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The telephone number is (202) 267-1477.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Jordan, Project Manager, OPA 90
Staff, at (202) 267-6751.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Drafting Information
The principal persons involved in drafting this document are Thomas
Jordan, Project Manager, Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90) Staff, and Mary-Jo
Cooney, Project Counsel, Oil Pollution Act (OPA 90) Staff.
Regulatory History
On July 7, 1992, the Coast Guard published a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) entitled ``Escort Vessels for Certain Oil Tankers''
in the Federal Register (57 FR 30058). When the Coast Guard received
comments to the NPRM which were not as extensive as expected, it
reopened the comment period (58 FR 16391, March 26, 1993) to solicit
more specific comments on certain issues.
The Coast Guard also published an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) (58 FR 25766, April 27, 1993) seeking comment on
other U.S. waters where an escort should be required, and other vessels
that should also be escorted. That regulatory project (CGD 91-202a) is
ongoing.
In response to many comments, public hearings were held in
Anchorage, Alaska on June 3, 1993, Valdez, Alaska on June 5, 1993 and
Seattle, Washington on June 7, 1993 (58 FR 25959, April 29, 1993; and
58 FR 29157, May 19, 1993). The Alaska hearings were also
teleconferenced to include several outlying communities in the Exxon
Valdez impact area. Transcripts of those hearings have been placed in
the public dockets for these rulemakings (CGD 91-202 and CGD 91-202a)
and are available for inspection or copying at room 3406, U.S. Coast
Guard Headquarters.
At this time, the Prince William Sound Disabled Tanker Towing Study
(DTTS) Group is sponsoring a special study concerning the present
tanker escort operations in Prince William Sound (PWS). The study group
is made up of representatives from five regional interest groups: the
PWS Tanker Association, the PWS Regional Citizens' Advisory Council,
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, the Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation, and the Coast Guard. Although the DTTS is a
separate project from this rulemaking, it is of particular value to
this rulemaking because of the technical information it will develop on
the maneuvering characteristics of disabled tankers under the control
of different combinations of escort vessels. Part 1 of the DTTS,
entitled ``Evaluation of Existing Equipment, Personnel and
Procedures,'' has been completed and is available to the public through
the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). The Coast Guard
published a notice of availability (NOA) (59 FR 1411; January 10, 1994)
for Part 1. The NOA reprinted the Executive Summary from Part 1, and
provided information for ordering copies of the study from NTIS. Part 2
of the study is expected to be completed in spring 1994; the Coast
Guard will publish another NOA when details are available.
Background and Purpose
Section 4116(c) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (Pub. L.
101-380) requires the Secretary of Transportation to initiate
rulemaking to define areas where single-hulled tankers over 5,000 gross
tons (GT) transporting oil in bulk must be escorted by at least two
``towing vessels'' (as defined in 46 U.S.C. 2101) or by some other
vessels which the Secretary considers appropriate. By statute, these
defined areas must include Prince William Sound, Alaska, and Rosario
Strait and Puget Sound, Washington (including those portions of the
Strait of Juan de Fuca east of Port Angeles, Haro Strait, and the
Strait of Georgia subject to United States jurisdiction). The Secretary
also has the authority to extend the escort rule to other U.S. waters
as appropriate.
The rulemaking authority has been delegated to the Coast Guard,
which will implement section 4116(c) in two separate rulemaking
projects: CGD 91-202 addresses escort requirements for the Prince
William Sound and Puget Sound waters named in the statute, and CGD 91-
202a addresses escort requirements for other waters.
Discussion of Comments and Changes
Comments received by the Coast Guard in response to the NPRM and
public hearings are discussed as follows:
1. Role of escort vessels. Four comments suggested that the
guidelines concerning the role of the escort must be clearly specified
and defined. One comment stated that the principal purpose of the
escort should be to prevent tanker accidents by steering or retarding
disabled tankers. One comment stated that an escort should be able to
safely assist a tanker moving near its maneuvering speed, alter the
tanker's speed or course, apply lateral force, and overtake the tanker
within confined waters.
The Coast Guard generally agrees with these comments. The role of
the escort vessels is to assist a tanker that is experiencing a loss of
propulsion or steering control and is therefore at risk of collision or
grounding. However, it must be pointed out that escort vessels may not
always be able to prevent all tanker accidents. This rule requires that
reasonably capable escort vessels be immediately on hand to assist a
tanker as circumstances permit. The decision to respond, however, must
be left to the professional judgement of the escort vessel's master,
who must always first consider the risk to the escort vessel and its
crew.
2. Benefit of escort vessels. Four comments stated that they did
not believe that the presence of escort vessels improves the safety of
the transit; two comments further stated that safety is actually
reduced because of increased vessel traffic (due to the escort vessels
themselves) which increases opportunities for collisions. Additionally,
another comment asserted that tug escorts would increase the risk of
collision in Puget Sound. However, one comment points out that there
are significant safety benefits gained by providing escorts for certain
vessels.
Although escort vessels may not always be able to prevent a tanker
accident, the Coast Guard believes that escort vessels can successfully
control a tanker under many circumstances. Having reasonably capable
escort vessels on hand, coupled with the tanker master's duty to
operate the tanker within the performance capabilities of the escort
vessels, will provide the maximum feasible assurance that the transit
can be safely made. The Coast Guard disagrees that vessel traffic would
be substantially increased: in Prince William Sound the increased
traffic would be two escort vessels once every two months; in Puget
Sound the increased traffic would average four escort vessels per day,
which is not a significant increase.
3. Definitions. Thirteen comments related to the various
definitions proposed in the NPRM, or proposed additional definitions.
Accordingly, Sec. 168.5 of this rule adds, revises, and deletes certain
terms that were proposed in the NPRM.
Definitions of ``disabled tanker'' and ``escort transit'' have been
added.
The definition of ``escort vessel'' has been revised in order to
reflect the fact that a variety of vessel types can perform escort
services other than just the ``towing vessels'' cited in the statute.
Furthermore, a vessel that may be suitable for escorting a particular
tanker under certain transit conditions may not be suitable for
escorting other tankers, or even the same tanker under other
conditions. The necessary elements of an escort vessel are that: it is
dedicated exclusively to the tanker for the duration of its transit;
and it is properly equipped for its intended role in an emergency
response (pushing, towing, etc.). The second element means that it is
not necessary for the escort vessels to have duplicative capabilities.
For example, one escorting vessel does not have to be outfitted with
towing gear if another escorting vessel is adequately outfitted.
The definition of ``laden'' replaces the NPRM's definition of
``transporting oil in bulk'' because it is more precise.
The definition of ``single hull tanker'' has been added, although
it still maintains the same vessel applicability as proposed in the
NPRM: any tanker that is not double-hulled.
Definitions of ``tanker owner or operator'' and ``tanker master''
have been added. They distinguish a shoreside owner or management
organization (that has overall operational control of the tanker),
including a demise (bareboat) charterer, from a tanker's master (who is
the licensed, onboard person in charge of the tanker).
The NPRM's definition of ``static bollard pull'' has been deleted
because it is not used in the rule.
4. Responsibilities. The NPRM originally made the tanker master
responsible for selecting the escort vessels. Six comments were
received on this issue, and all of them generally expressed the opinion
that the tanker master should not be responsible for selecting or
deciding escort vessel suitability. Some comments argued that the
tanker master may not be sufficiently familiar with the local waters,
weather conditions or other navigational considerations to select the
best escort vessels; these are some of the reasons why pilots are
embarked when any vessel enters a port. Some comments also argued that
escort vessel selections might be made by the tanker's shoreside
management company, putting the tanker master under considerable
pressure to accept whatever vessels have been dispatched.
The Coast Guard generally agrees that proper selection of escort
vessels requires some specialized knowledge and pre-planning which
might be beyond the abilities of the tanker master to accomplish. Such
knowledge might have to be developed from tanker-specific maneuvering
and control studies. Also, tanker owners or operators may wish to make
contractual arrangements with escort vessel operators to ensure
appropriate vessels are available at favorable rates. Because the
resources to conduct studies or make contractual agreements are
controlled by the tanker's owners or operators (shoreside management),
it is more appropriate that they should be ultimately responsible for
the escort vessel selection and providing the tanker master with any
specialized information.
Therefore, Sec. 168.10 makes the tanker owners or operators
responsible for escort vessel selection and informing the tanker master
of the performance capabilities of the escort vessels. The master is
responsible for operating the tanker within those performance
capabilities.
The regulations do not preclude owners or operators from
authorizing masters or other agents to make selections, although the
tanker owners or operators will have to furnish the necessary technical
information for proper escort vessel selection.
5. Applicable vessels. OPA 90 specifically targets single hull tank
ships of more than 5,000 gross tons (GT) (5,000 GT corresponds to
approximately 10,000 deadweight tons (DWT), which is the tonnage
measurement more commonly applied to tankers). The NPRM proposed to
include tankers with only double bottoms or double sides but exclude
double hulled tankers.
Eight comments to the NPRM addressed the issue of hull design (i.e.
single hull, double hull, double bottom, or double sides). Most of
these comments stated that double hulls should not be excluded from the
escort requirements. Two comments did agree with the double hull
exclusion, another comment also agreed with the double hull exclusion
and stated that double bottom tankers should also be excluded. One
comment suggested that the escort requirements should apply to all
tankers over 5,000 GT, (regardless of construction) and another comment
suggested that they should apply to all vessels carrying oil
(regardless of construction or size). One comment suggested that all
single-hulled oil tankers should be included whether laden or unladen.
The Coast Guard is of the opinion that Congress did not intend for
tankers that meet the OPA 90 double hull design requirements to be
escorted. Therefore, the originally-proposed hull design standard has
not been revised: double hull tankers are excluded, but all other
single hull, double bottom, and double side tankers are included.
Eleven comments addressed size limits for applicable tankers,
suggesting either to raise the gross tonnage threshold (thereby
excluding some tankers greater than 5,000 GT) or require escorts for
only those tankers carrying more than a particular quantity of oil. One
comment pointed out that smaller tankers are less of a threat to the
environment than larger ones, and therefore should not have to be
escorted. Two of the comments support the proposed size requirements.
OPA 90 specifically includes tankers down to 5,000 GT; therefore, the
proposed size limit has not been changed.
Four comments were received which advocated excluding those tankers
with twin screw propulsion systems, on the grounds that a simultaneous
failure of both propulsion systems was unlikely. OPA 90 requires
tankers that are not double-hulled to be escorted, regardless of
propulsion system.
Therefore, Sec. 168.20 makes the regulations applicable to all U.S.
and foreign-flag single hull tankers of more than 5,000 GT, including
tankers with only double bottoms or double sides, or double hull
tankers that do not meet the dimensional standards of 33 CFR 157.10d
(which are the OPA 90 double hull standards). The regulations do not
apply to tankers less than 5,000 GT or tank barges of any size.
6. Applicable cargoes. The NPRM proposed to include ``oil''
cargoes, without distinguishing between petroleum and non-petroleum
(i.e., animal or vegetable) oils. Six comments indicated that tankers
carrying animal and vegetable oils should be excluded from the escort
regulations. One comment went on to say that if these oils are
included, then the ruling would have a detrimental economic impact on
his small business. The issue of requiring escorts for tankers carrying
only animal and vegetable oils, and other non-petroleum oils, warrants
further consideration. This will be addressed in the ongoing rulemaking
(CGD 91-202a) which concerns other U.S. waters where an escort may be
required and other criteria for defining the vessels that should be
escorted. Therefore, Sec. 168.30 of this rule applies only to petroleum
oils (MARPOL Annex I), which are listed in 46 CFR Table 30.25-1 as
pollution category I cargoes.
Four comments noted that many hazardous chemical cargoes can pose
serious risks to the marine environment or public health, and argued
that vessels carrying these cargoes should also be escorted. One
comment stated that additional regulations are needed to cover the
transfer of hazardous substances not covered by the proposed
regulations. The Coast Guard has determined that including hazardous
material cargoes is outside the statutory authority of OPA 90. However,
the Coast Guard will be seeking further comment on this issue as part
of the ``other waters'' escort vessel rulemaking and may propose
regulations to include certain hazardous material and or NLS cargoes
under authority of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (33 U.S.C. 1221
et seq.).
7. Applicable waters. Twenty comments addressed what U.S. waters
should be included under the escort regulations.
For Prince William Sound, 12 comments stated that escorts should be
continuously required all the way from Port Valdez to Hinchinbrook
Entrance (including the mid-Sound region). Four comments stated that
escorts should only be required at Port Valdez and Hinchinbrook
Entrance but not in mid-Sound because there is enough sea room in mid-
Sound for a tanker to safely drift while waiting for the arrival of
assist tugs dispatched from Port Valdez. The Coast Guard agrees that
escorts are appropriate for all regions of Prince William Sound, and
the rule so provides.
For the Puget Sound escort zone, the NPRM proposed a western
boundary of longitude 123 deg.24.5' West, but excluded tankers
transiting to and from the Ediz Hook anchorage of Port Angeles (which
would require them to skirt just inside that boundary). Three comments
suggested moving the western boundary of the escort zone to the
entrance to the Straits of Juan de Fuca (Cape Flattery), while 2
comments suggested moving the western boundary eastwards to coincide
with the existing escort zone established by Washington state. One
comment suggested the applicable area be extended to the Ediz Hook
anchorage adjacent to the Port Angeles Harbor. As a result of comments,
this rule revises the western boundary by shifting it approximately 11
nautical miles eastwards to include the U.S. waters east of the line
connecting New Dungeness Light (Washington) with Discovery Island Light
(Canada). This new boundary location therefore coincides with the
existing Federal boundary line governing maximum tanker size in Puget
Sound waters (33 CFR 161.143), as well as the boundary line for
escorting as required by the existing Washington state regulations.
This change still excludes the Ediz Hook anchorage.
The remaining comments nominated additional waters besides Prince
William Sound and Puget Sound, such as Cook Inlet, Alaska, and the
Olympic coast, Washington. These comments will be considered in the
separate ``other waters'' rulemaking project (CGD 91-202a).
8. Number of escort vessels. One comment suggested that the Coast
Guard define the required capabilities of an escort vessel rather than
only specifying any particular number of escort vessels. Another
comment supported the requirements for two escorts in Prince William
Sound. Two comments suggested that smaller tankers be allowed to use
only one escort vessel. Two comments disagreed with requiring the usage
of two escort vessels and suggested that one would be adequate in most
cases. OPA 90 requires a minimum of two escort vessels for the Prince
William Sound and Puget Sound waters stipulated in the statute.
Therefore, regulations for those waters which cite OPA 90 authority
must incorporate this statutory minimum requirement.
9. Relative positioning of escort vessels. Among other provisions,
the NPRM proposed that the escort vessels be ``available in close
proximity to the tanker at all times.'' Twelve comments addressed the
issue of where the escort vessels should be positioned (relative to the
tanker) during the escort transit. In lieu of a close proximity
requirement, some comments suggested a specified maximum distance from
the tanker, such as one-half mile. However, other comments argued that
a specified distance was unnecessarily restrictive. The latter comments
pointed out that the closer any vessel is to a tanker, the greater the
risk of a collision. These comments argued that, in open waters, the
escort vessel should have the flexibility to position itself at any
safe distance as judged by its master, so long as it could still
respond in a timely fashion. The Coast Guard agrees with the ``timely
response'' approach, and has revised this rule accordingly. This will
effectively require the tanker and escort vessel masters to
continuously evaluate the situation and reposition themselves, as
appropriate, at different points along the transit route. This does not
preclude the escort vessels from remaining in the shelter of the
tanker's lee if weather conditions and prudent seamanship warrant; the
tanker should then adjust its speed to compensate for any delays before
the escort vessels could move into position to render assistance in an
emergency.
10. Performance requirements. The NPRM proposed that the escort
vessels be ``capable of providing sufficient maneuvering forces to
substantially influence the speed and direction of travel of the
tanker.'' Twelve comments addressed the issue of performance
capabilities of the escort vessels. One comment recommended that a tug
escort have the capability to push or tow a disabled ship away from the
danger of grounding or collision. One comment suggested that tug
escorts should have the ability to stop a disabled vessel within 10
vessel lengths from the declaration of an emergency (this comment
qualified its suggestion by recognizing that such a standard would be
very dependent upon the harbor conditions). Another comment suggested
that tug escorts be capable of meeting the demands of assisting the
escorted tanker. Another comment contended that performance and design
criteria for tug escorts will be dictated by an effective escort
program, and suggested that local geography, local man-made hazards,
and regulated vessel speeds be considered when developing tug escort
capabilities criteria. Four comments addressed the performance
standards as outlined in the NPRM. One comment suggested that
performance standards should be geographically-specific. Two comments
recommended that performance based criteria be coupled with the
tanker's tonnage, weather, or sea conditions. Additionally, one comment
was specifically concerned with weather conditions and suggested that
oil tankers only be allowed to operate in Prince William Sound when
weather conditions would permit safe operation of the tug escorts. This
comment further suggested that the realistic adverse weather limits for
safe escorting operations is approximately 40-knot wind speed in 10-
foot seas. Another comment generally supported the performance-based
criteria as proposed in the NPRM, but suggested that operating
parameters also be considered.
The Coast Guard agrees that performance requirements should be more
detailed. Accordingly, Sec. 168.50 of this rule has been revised to
include towing, stopping, holding, and turning requirements for
controlling a tanker within specified parameters under various failure
and weather scenarios, and to require that the tanker not be operated
beyond a speed at which the escort vessels can reasonably be expected
to bring it safely under control within the navigational limits of the
waterway. The requirements were developed after reviewing several
tanker/tug maneuvering studies that were submitted to the docket, and
considering that the largest tankers in Prince William Sound are about
265,000 DWT (deadweight tons) and the largest in the Puget Sound waters
are 125,000 DWT.
The underlying basis of the performance requirements is to: (1)
Ensure sufficient power to perform a rescue tow of a tanker (or to
substantially reduce its drift rate in severe winds); and (2) provide
steering and stopping forces that are equivalent to what the tanker
could do itself (with its own steering and propulsion system) at a
speed of 6 knots. The Coast Guard believes that, in conjunction with an
appropriate tanker speed during the transit, both conventional tugs and
tractor tugs that meet the performance requirements can reasonably be
expected to safely accomplish effective emergency control of disabled
tankers. Discussion of the specific performance requirements is as
follows:
Towing: The regulations require an escort vessel to be capable of
towing the tanker at 4 knots in calm conditions and hold it in a steady
position against a 45-knot headwind.
Stopping: The regulations require that the escort vessel(s) be able
to stop the tanker within the same distance that the tanker would have
been able to crash-stop itself from a speed of 6 knots using its own
propulsion system.
Holding on steady course: The regulations require that the escort
vessel(s) be able to hold the tanker on a steady course against a 35-
degree locked rudder at 6 knots. This means that the escort vessels
must be able to apply a counteractive turning moment equal and opposite
to the turning moment generated by the locked rudder, taking into
consideration the geometry of the escort vessel's applied force on the
tanker's hull (points of application, angle of assist, etc.).
Turning: The regulations require that the escort vessel(s) be able
to turn the tanker 90 degrees, assuming a free-swinging rudder and an
initial speed of 6 knots, in the same distance (advance and transfer)
as it would have been able to turn itself using a hard-over rudder. The
geometry of the escort vessels' applied forces on the tanker must
similarly be taken into consideration.
These requirements are based upon the 6-knot maneuvering
characteristics of the tanker because this is the upper speed limit at
which conventional tugs can safely make connections to the tanker.
However, the Coast Guard recognizes that not all steering or propulsion
failures will require immediate intervention by the escort vessels. In
many instances, there could be enough sea room in the waterway for the
tanker to safely drift to a stop without assistance from escort
vessels. The regulations, therefore, allow a tanker to transit at any
speed provided that there is sufficient sea room to accommodate the
disabled tanker's travel (advance and transfer) until it has naturally
slowed down to the speed where the escort vessels can move in and bring
it under control. For example, a tanker can make a transit at 10 knots
if there is adequate sea room on both sides of its trackline to
tolerate a locked rudder at that speed. In a constrained waterway,
however, or in adverse weather conditions, prudent seamanship may
require the tanker to reduce its transit speed, or expand the
performance capabilities of its escort vessels (such as by adding
another escort vessel, pre-tethering, etc.), or both.
11. Other operational requirements. One comment concerning other
operational requirements suggested that escort vessels be required to
be pre-tethered to a tanker before entering especially constrained
waterways (the hazard presented by Middle Rock in Valdez Narrows was
specifically mentioned as an example). Although the Coast Guard agrees
that, under certain conditions, pre-tethering may be appropriate, it
may not be necessary under other circumstances. Pre-tethering may
entail a safety risk to the escort vessel and its crew; it should be
viewed as an option that the tanker and escort vessel masters may
utilize after discussing the sea and weather conditions at the
anticipated time of transit.
Six comments on other operational requirements urged that specific
speed limits be set as part of the regulations; however, three comments
disagreed. The Coast Guard also does not agree that specific speed
limits are necessary because Sec. 168.50(a)(3) requires that a tanker
not be operated beyond a speed at which the escort vessels can
reasonably be expected to safely bring the tanker under control.
12. Escort plans. The NPRM proposed that escort vessel operators
prepare written information on the capabilities of their vessels and
submit the information to the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port
(COTP) for review and approval. The approved information would then be
used by the tanker master to select escort vessels during the pre-
escort conference. Ten comments recommended requiring tanker-specific
escort plans rather than escort vessel-specific plans (on the argument
that the appropriate approach to escort vessel selection must be based
on the needs of the tanker rather than the abilities of the escort
vessels). Two comments suggested alternatives to selecting the escort
vessels at the pre-escort conference: one comment recommended that the
Coast Guard COTP be responsible for prior approval and designation, and
the other comment recommended that each affected port establish a
clearinghouse for certified escort vessels.
Because the regulations contain specific performance criteria, and
because the responsibility for selecting appropriate escort vessels is
on the tanker owners or operators, the Coast Guard has reconsidered its
originally proposed requirement for submittal and approval of written
escort plans, and decided that there is no longer any need. Tanker and
escort vessel owners or operators can work together to match tanker
needs with escort vessel capabilities without Coast Guard
participation. Tanker owners or operators can make arrangements for
appropriate escort vessels in advance of the tanker's arrival, and
retain the flexibility of making those arrangements in several ways,
such as pre-contracting, establishing local clearinghouses of escort
vessels, etc. Therefore, the NPRM's original requirement for submittal
of written escort plans has been deleted.
13. Pre-escort conference. The NPRM originally had two purposes for
the pre-escort conference: (1) for the tanker master to determine the
suitability of the escort vessels (on the basis of written information
submitted at the conference); and (2) a joint conference for the tanker
master, pilot and escort vessel masters to discuss and plan the escort
transit.
Eight comments were received concerning the pre-escort conference.
In general, the comments agreed that it could be used for exchanging
safety and tactical information between the tanker master, pilot, and
escort vessel masters. One comment noted that the current briefing
practice in Washington state is sufficient. However, four comments
pointed out that the conference, as proposed, would occur too late to
actually select the escort vessels. Rejection of an escort vessel at
that point could lead to tanker delays and congestion while waiting for
a replacement escort. They argued that dispatching several escort
vessels to meet a tanker, of which only two or three would be selected,
would waste the time and expense of the non-selected vessels. Two
comments were concerned that lengthy pre-escort conferences would
similarly cause delays and congestion. Further, one of the comments
indicated that this would cause undesirable economic pressure for the
vessel master and pilot.
The Coast Guard recognizes that the pre-escort conference may be
too late for selecting or rejecting the escort vessels. As previously
discussed in paragraph (4), escort vessel selection is now the
responsibility of the tanker owner or operators. This will allow them
to make arrangements for appropriate escort vessels in advance of the
tanker's arrival (or departure, if outbound).
Section 168.10 has been revised to reflect the changed
responsibilities for selecting escort vessels and to state more clearly
the purpose of the conference and the topics to be discussed.
14. Additional mission requirements. Fourteen comments addressed
additional mission requirements for the escort vessels, nominating
firefighting, salvage, lightering, and pollution response capabilities
(the spill response capability of the Alyeska Pipeline Service
Company's Ship Escort and Response Vessel System (SERVS) vessels in
escort service in Prince William Sound were specifically mentioned).
One comment stated that spill containment and firefighting are
excessive secondary functions that the escort should not be expected to
perform. The Coast Guard has determined that none of these capabilities
can be easily retrofitted aboard the existing fleet of tugs, which will
make up the bulk of the escort vessel resources. This is because most
tugs do not have sufficient deck area to accommodate the additional
mission equipment, nor sufficient above-water height (and associated
stability) to serve as effective firefighting platforms. However, the
regulations do not preclude using vessels with such capabilities if
they are available.
15. Coordination with vessel response plans (VRPs). Five comments
suggested coordination of the escort regulations with the special
vessel response plan (VRP) requirements for tank vessels operating in
Prince William Sound, as required by section 5005 of OPA 90 and the
Interim Final Rule for vessel response plans (58 FR 7376, February 5,
1993). One of these special VRP requirements is to provide ``escort
vessels with skimming capability.'' The concern of the comments is that
there will be two Federal definitions of ``escort vessel:'' one
definition in the VRP regulations (which would include skimming
requirements), and the other definition in the escort vessel
regulations (without any skimming requirements). This could lead to
confusion or unnecessary expense.
The Coast Guard agrees that there should be a single, consistent
definition of ``escort vessel'' throughout all the OPA 90 rulemakings.
The intent of the special VRP requirement is for a vessel with skimming
(response) capability to accompany a laden tanker across Prince William
Sound. The Coast Guard has determined that this is a spill response
capability that is separate from the emergency control measures that
the escort vessels are intended to provide under this rulemaking.
Accordingly, the final rule for the VRP rulemaking will be revised by
eliminating the term ``escort vessel'' and substituting in its place
the term ``escorting response vessel.'' As previously noted, this does
not preclude a single, appropriately-equipped vessel from fulfilling
both requirements (escorting and skimming) in Prince William Sound.
16. Prince William Sound Disabled Tanker Towing Study. Nine
comments were received suggesting that the escort regulations should be
postponed until completion of the Prince William Sound Disabled Tanker
Towing Study (DTTS), in order to benefit from the findings of that
study.
At this time the Coast Guard has reviewed Part 1 of the DTTS, as
well as several other technical studies concerning escorting and
control of disabled tankers, and expects that the regulations will be
supported by the final DTTS results. Therefore, the Coast Guard
believes that it can now move ahead with this rulemaking.
17. Discussion of other comments. Two comments suggested that the
Vessel Traffic Systems (VTS) be expanded instead of requiring escort
vessels. One comment, however, disagreed with the usage of the VTS
system, saying that such a system failed in the EXXON VALDEZ disaster;
this comment suggested using another emergency towing arrangement. Two
comments recommended that VTS control be employed for small tallow
tankers. Further, one of these comments suggested that when such
employment is not feasible, a single escort should be used. The Coast
Guard does not agree that a VTS can substitute for the immediate, on-
site assistance that an escort vessel can provide. It should be noted
that the VTS and escort vessel requirements of OPA 90 are separate, and
the use of one does not obviate the need for the other.
One comment recommended that the Coast Guard should ensure
construction of double hull U.S. flag vessels which have a redundant
propulsion system. The Coast Guard has determined that this is beyond
the scope of the escort vessel rulemaking.
Assessment
Because of substantial public interest, this rule is a significant
regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and has
been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget under that order.
It requires an assessment of potential costs and benefits under section
6(a)(3) of that order. It is significant under the regulatory policies
and procedures of the Department of Transportation (44 FR 11040;
February 26, 1979). A final Assessment is available in the docket for
inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES.
Summary of Final Assessment
Certain oil tankers transiting through both Prince William Sound
and Puget Sound are already subject to state-level escort requirements.
The final Assessment for this rulemaking evaluates the economic impact
of the proposed Federal regulations by analyzing the incremental cost
increases beyond the costs already incurred due to the state
regulations. In Prince William Sound, the crude oil tankers operating
out of Port Valdez are already escorted in accordance with the Alyeska
Pipeline Service Company contingency plan which was approved by the
State of Alaska. Therefore, there is not much incremental impact from
the Federal regulations: only approximately six tankers per year
deliver refined products to the Navy fuel depot at Whittier (these
tankers are not required to be escorted under Alaska regulations). In
Puget Sound, an estimated 1,256 tanker transits per year are affected:
approximately 879 transits where one escort vessel is already engaged
(under Washington state regulations) will now require at least one
additional escort vessel to meet the Federal regulations. Also, because
the Federal regulations encompass tankers down to 5,000 GT
(approximately 10,000 DWT), an estimated 377 additional tanker transits
per year will now require at least two escort vessels (these tankers
presently do not require any escorts because the Washington state
regulations only extend down to 40,000 DWT). Therefore, the regulations
are estimated to initially increase vessel traffic by 12 escort vessel
transits per year in Prince William Sound and 1,633 escort vessel
transits per year in Puget Sound. However, these numbers will decline
as single hull tankers are phased out of service.
The OPA 90 phase-out schedule requires single hull tankers to be
removed from service by 2010, but allows certain tankers with double
sides or double bottoms to remain in service until 2015. Because it was
not possible to project how many tankers of each design (single-hulled,
double-bottomed, or double-sided) will be in service over the next 20
years, the Assessment assumes that all tankers subject to this
rulemaking are single-hulled (i.e., will be removed from service by
2010). Therefore, the incremental escort vessel cost to the oil tanker
industry will decrease to zero by that year. The Assessment
conservatively assumes the same phase out schedule as used for the
Regulatory Evaluation of the double hull rulemaking, although tanker
owners or operators in these waters may choose to replace their single
hull tankers at an earlier time.
As a result of comments to the NPRM, the regulations have been
revised in certain respects. These revisions also affect some of the
economic assumptions and calculations in the original preliminary
Regulatory Evaluation. Accordingly, the final Assessment has been
revised as follows:
(1) Certain costs have been recalculated, using new cost data for
escort vessel services. The Assessment assumes the average cost of an
escort vessel is $1,350 per hour;
(2) New costs have been added, recognizing that tanker owners or
operators may have to conduct various sea trials and computer
simulation studies (in order to determine the maneuvering and control
characteristics of their tankers). Even though this information is not
directly required by regulation, it is still an indirect cost that will
be borne by industry;
(3) The benefit analysis has been significantly revised (discussed
later);
(4) Costs and benefits have been recalculated at a 7 percent
discount rate, in order to be consistent with current OMB directives
and other OPA 90 regulatory assessments (the original preliminary
Regulatory Evaluation discounted all costs at 10 percent).
In Prince William Sound, the Assessment estimates that the
incremental escort cost is $94,500 per tanker transit from Hinchinbrook
Entrance to Whittier (via Bligh Reef pilot station) and return, using
two escort vessels dispatched from Port Valdez. This cost-per-transit
is relatively high because the tanker must pay for the total round-trip
dispatch time of the escort vessels. Because these tankers are operated
or chartered by the Navy, the escort costs will ultimately be borne by
the U.S. Government (Department of Defense).
In Puget Sound, the Assessment assumes that there is sufficient
inbound or outbound tanker traffic such that a tanker will only be
paying for one-way dispatch time of the escort vessels. However, unlike
Prince William Sound, there are several possible destination terminals
in Puget Sound; accordingly, escorted transit times range from 1 to 7
hours. Therefore, the average cost-per-transit is estimated to be
$6,750 (5 hrs at approximately $1,350 per hour) for all tankers, in
1994 dollars.
The Assessment estimates that the first-year cost of the
regulations (1995) will be $11.4 million, and the total discounted
program cost (1995 to 2015) will be $57.7 million, in 1990 dollars. The
tanker industry can reduce these costs by switching to double-hulled
tankers earlier than assumed in the Assessment, or it can increase
these costs by continuing to use double-sided or double-bottomed
tankers after 2010.
The original preliminary Regulatory Evaluation attempted to
statistically estimate the benefits of the regulations. The Coast Guard
has subsequently determined that there is no statistical basis for such
estimations without making extreme assumptions of debatable validity.
This is because the occurrence of a steering or propulsion failure is
not related to the size of the tanker or its cargo capacity. Further,
such failures do not necessarily result in a collision or grounding,
nor do collisions or groundings necessarily result in rupture of cargo
tank(s). And even if a tank were ruptured, there is no predicting the
actual amount of outflow that would occur.
Therefore, the final Assessment makes a presumption of
effectiveness by assuming that the regulations would avert at least one
collision or grounding that would otherwise spill 300,000 barrels of
oil (This is derived from the approximate capacity of two cargo tanks
on a midsize oil tanker of 80,000 DWT.). This averted oil spill could
occur at any time during the 15-year period from 1995 (the first full
year that the regulations will be in effect) to 2010 (when the last
single hull oil tanker is phased out of service).
The monetary benefits of these regulations include avoided cleanup
costs, third-party compensation (lost earnings to fishermen, etc.) and
natural resource damages. Historically, these costs have varied
enormously from spill to spill because of the great range of factors
affecting the impact of oil spills, such as type of product,
environment, time of year, location, and weather conditions.
Accordingly, it is not possible to establish a definitive monetized
(dollar) benefit value for unspilled oil. Therefore, the Assessment
does not perform benefit calculations using dollar amounts. Instead, it
uses the unspilled oil quantity, discounted at 7 percent back to 1990
barrels. If the averted 300,000 barrel spill were assumed to occur in
1995, the discounted quantity would be 213,896 barrels. If it were
assumed to occur in 2010, the discounted quantity would be 77,526
barrels.
Accordingly, the final Assessment has determined that the cost of
these regulations ranges from $270 to $744 per discounted barrel of
unspilled oil.
Small Entities
The Coast Guard has evaluated the impact of this rulemaking on
small entities in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.). The small entity impact analysis is incorporated
into the final Assessment for this rulemaking.
In response to the NPRM and public hearings, only six comments have
been received to date concerning the impact of escort regulations on
small businesses. The comments stated that the regulations would have
detrimental economic impact on small businesses in the Puget Sound
region if tallow and vegetable oil cargoes were included. However, the
regulations do not include non-petroleum oil cargoes.
The Coast Guard has determined that most of the tankers that are
affected by the regulation in Prince William Sound and Puget Sound are
owned either by oil companies or large shipping corporations. Since few
small entities will be affected, the Coast Guard certifies under
section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.)
that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Collection of Information
This rule contains no collection-of-information requirements under
the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The original NPRM
contained collection of information requirements in the form of written
information that had to be prepared by escort vessel operators and
submitted to the local Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP). As
discussed elsewhere, the requirement has been deleted.
Federalism
The Coast Guard has analyzed this rule under the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 and has determined that
this rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant
the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
This rule establishes standards and requirements for the escort of
single hull tankers over 5,000 GT in Prince William Sound, Alaska and
Puget Sound (and certain associated waters around Puget Sound),
Washington. The authority to regulate such traffic is delegated to the
Coast Guard by the Secretary of Transportation whose authority is
committed by statute.
While these regulations establish minimal requirements for escort
of certain tanker traffic through these designated areas, the Coast
Guard does not intend to preempt the states from issuing more stringent
requirements provided they are not in direct conflict with Federal law
or this rulemaking.
Environment
The Coast Guard considered the environmental impact of this
rulemaking and concluded that the preparation of an Environmental
Impact statement is not necessary. An Environmental Assessment and a
Finding of No Significant Impact are available in the docket for
inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES.
The primary effect of the regulation will be a reduction in the
probability of petroleum oil spills in Puget and Prince William Sounds.
The only other impact will be a minor increase in vessel traffic
(escort vessels) moving through Puget and Prince William Sounds: the
estimated 1,276 additional escort vessel transits per year represent an
average of 3 to 4 additional vessels per day; this will decrease as
single hull tankers are phased out of service.
List of Subjects in 33 CFR Part 168
Cargo vessels, Navigation (water), Oil pollution, Water pollution
control.
For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Coast Guard adds 33
CFR part 168 as follows:
PART 168--ESCORT REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTAIN TANKERS
Sec.
168.01 Purpose.
168.05 Definitions.
168.10 Responsibilities.
168.20 Applicable vessels.
168.30 Applicable cargoes.
168.40 Applicable waters and number of escort vessels.
168.50 Performance and operational requirements.
168.60 Pre-escort conference.
Authority: Section 4116(c), Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 520 (46
U.S.C. 3703 note).
Sec. 168.01 Purpose.
(a) This part prescribes regulations in accordance with section
4116(c) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (Pub. L. 101-380).
The regulations will reduce the risk of oil spills from laden, single
hull tankers over 5,000 GT by requiring that these tankers be escorted
by at least two suitable escort vessels. The escort vessels will be
immediately available to influence the tankers' speed and course in the
event of a steering or propulsion equipment failure, thereby reducing
the possibility of groundings or collisions.
(b) The regulations in this part establish minimum escort vessel
requirements. Nothing in these regulations should be construed as
relieving the master of a tanker from the duty to operate the vessel in
a safe and prudent manner, taking into account the navigational
constraints of the waterways to be traversed, other vessel traffic, and
anticipated weather, tide, and sea conditions, which may require
reduced speeds, greater assistance from escort vessels, or other
operational precautions.
Sec. 168.05 Definitions.
As used in this part--
Disabled tanker means a tanker experiencing a loss of propulsion or
steering control.
Escort transit means that portion of the tanker's voyage through
waters where escort vessels are required.
Escort vessel means any vessel that is assigned and dedicated to a
tanker during the escort transit, and that is fendered and outfitted
with towing gear as appropriate for its role in an emergency response
to a disabled tanker.
Laden means transporting in bulk any quantity of applicable cargo,
except for clingage and residue in otherwise empty cargo tanks.
Single hull tanker means any self-propelled tank vessel that is not
constructed with both double bottom and double sides in accordance with
the provisions of 33 CFR 157.10d.
Tanker master means the licensed onboard person in charge of the
tanker.
Tanker owner or operator means the owner or shoreside organization
(individual, corporation, partnership, or association), including a
demise charterer, responsible for the overall management and operation
of the tanker.
Sec. 168.10 Responsibilities.
(a) The tanker owner or operator shall:
(1) select escort vessels that can meet the performance
requirements of this part; and
(2) inform the tanker master of the performance capabilities of the
selected escort vessels. This information must be provided to the
master before beginning the escort transit.
(b) The tanker master shall operate the tanker within the
performance capabilities of the escort vessels, taking into account
speed, sea and weather conditions, navigational considerations, and
other factors that may change or arise during the escort transit.
(c) In an emergency, the tanker master may deviate from the
requirements of this part to the extent necessary to avoid endangering
persons, property, or the environment, but shall immediately report the
deviation to the cognizant Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP).
Sec. 168.20 Applicable vessels.
The requirements of this part apply to laden, single hull tankers
of 5,000 gross tons or more.
Sec. 168.30 Applicable cargoes.
The requirements of this part apply to any petroleum oil listed in
46 CFR Table 30.25-1 as a pollution category I cargo.
Sec. 168.40 Applicable waters and number of escort vessels.
The requirements of this part apply to the following waters:
(a) Prince William Sound: Each tanker to which this part applies
must be escorted by at least two escort vessels in those navigable
waters of the United States within Prince William Sound, Alaska, and
the adjoining tributaries, bays, harbors, and ports, including the
navigable waters of the United States within a line drawn from Cape
Hinchinbrook Light, to Seal Rocks Light, to a point on Montague Island
at 60 deg.14.6' North, 146 deg.59' West, and the waters of Montague
Strait east of a line between Cape Puget and Cape Cleare.
(b) Puget Sound and certain associated waters: Each tanker to which
this part applies must be escorted by at least two escort vessels in
those navigable waters of the United States and Washington State east
of a line connecting New Dungeness Light with Discovery Island Light
and all points in the Puget Sound area north and south of these lights.
This area includes all the navigable waters of the United States within
Haro Strait, Rosario Strait, the Strait of Georgia, Puget Sound, and
Hood Canal, as well as those portions of the Strait of Juan de Fuca
east of the New Dungeness-Discovery Island line.
Sec. 168.50 Performance and operational requirements.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of Sec. 168.10, at all
times during the escort transit each tanker to which this part applies:
(1) Must be accompanied by escort vessels that meet the performance
requirements of paragraph (b) of this section (but not less than the
number of escorts required by Sec. 168.40).
(2) Must have the escort vessels positioned relative to the tanker
such that timely response to a propulsion or steering failure can be
effected.
(3) Must not exceed a speed beyond which the escort vessels can
reasonably be expected to safely bring the tanker under control within
the navigational limits of the waterway, taking into consideration
ambient sea and weather conditions, surrounding vessel traffic,
hazards, and other factors that may reduce the available sea room.
(b) The escort vessels, acting singly or jointly in any combination
as needed, and considering their applied force vectors on the tanker's
hull, must be capable of--
(1) Towing the tanker at 4 knots in calm conditions, and holding it
in steady position against a 45-knot headwind;
(2) Stopping the tanker within the same distance that it could
crash-stop itself from a speed of 6 knots using its own propulsion
system;
(3) Holding the tanker on a steady course against a 35-degree
locked rudder at a speed of 6 knots; and
(4) Turning the tanker 90 degrees, assuming a free-swinging rudder
and a speed of 6 knots, within the same distance (advance and transfer)
that it could turn itself with a hard-over rudder.
Sec. 168.60 Pre-escort conference.
(a) Before commencing an escort transit, the tanker master shall
confer, by radio or in person, with the tanker pilot and the masters of
the escort vessels regarding the escort operation.
(b) The purpose of the pre-escort conference is for all parties to
plan and discuss particulars of the escort transit.
(c) At a minimum, the following topics must be addressed during the
pre-escort conference:
(1) The destination, route, planned speed, other vessel traffic,
anticipated weather, tide, and sea conditions, and other navigational
considerations;
(2) The type and operational status of communication, towing,
steering, and propulsion equipment on the tanker and escort vessels;
(3) The relative positioning and reaction time for the escort
vessels to move into assist positions, including, if appropriate, pre-
tethering the escort vessels at crucial points along the route;
(4) The preparations required on the tanker and escort vessels, and
the methods employed in making an emergency towline connection,
including stationing of deck crews, preparation of messenger lines,
bridles, and other towing gear, and energizing appropriate deck
equipment;
(5) The manner in which an emergency towline connection would be
made (which escort vessel will respond, how messengers and towlines
will be passed, etc.);
(6) Other relevant information provided by the tanker master, pilot
or escort vessel masters.
Dated: August 12, 1994.
Robert E. Kramek,
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant.
[FR Doc. 94-20364 Filed 8-18-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-14-P
