[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 160 (Wednesday, August 19, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44477-44478]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-22331]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Assessment and Recommendations for Fissile Material Packaging
Exemptions and General Licenses; Availability of NUREG/CR
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is announcing the
availability of NUREG/CR-5342, ``Assessment and Recommendations for
Fissile Material Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses Within 10
CFR Part 71,'' dated July 1998.
ADDRESSES: Copies of NUREG/CR-5342 may be obtained by writing to the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box
[[Page 44478]]
37082, Washington, DC 20402-9328. Copies are also available from the
National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road,
Springfield, VA 22161-0002. A copy is also available for inspection and
copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW
(Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555-0001.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Philip G. Brochman, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-8592, e-mail
[email protected]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: NRC is announcing the availability of NUREG/
CR-5342, ``Assessment and Recommendations for Fissile Material
Packaging Exemptions and General Licenses Within 10 CFR Part 71.'' This
final report contains an assessment of the technical and regulatory
bases for the NRC's regulations in Part 71 related to the transport of
fissile material under general license or fissile exemption limits and
provides recommendations on potential changes to the regulations.
I. Background
In September 1996, an NRC licensee identified that the fissile
material exemption standards in Sec. 71.53 do not provide adequate
criticality safety for certain shipments of fissile material
1 (i.e., highly-enriched uranium in the presence of
beryllium oxide). The NRC licensee determined through calculation, that
a planned shipment, which contained large amounts of low-concentration,
highly-enriched uranium'which met the fissile exemption material limits
in Sec. 71.53(d)--and which was also mixed with a large amount of
beryllium, could result in a nuclear criticality 2 under
certain conditions. As a consequence, the Commission issued an
emergency final rule to revise the fissile material exemption limits in
Part 71 (62 FR 5907; February 10, 1997). The Commission also requested
that the public submit comments on the final rule, during a 30-day
period following the rule's publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fissile material is defined in Part 71 as: plutonium-238,
plutonium-239, plutonium-241, uranium-233, uranium-235, or any
combination of these radionuclides. Transportation packages used for
shipment of materials containing these radionuclides must meet
specific standards and operating limits designed to preclude nuclear
criticality during transport, unless excepted by specific
regulations.
\2\ For transportation purposes, nuclear criticality means a
condition in which an uncontrolled, self-sustaining, and neutron-
multiplying fission chain reaction occurs. Nuclear criticality is
generally a concern when sufficient concentrations and masses of
fissile material and neutron moderating material exist together in a
favorable configuration. Neutron moderating material cannot achieve
criticality by itself in any concentration or configuration.
However, It can enhance the ability of fissile material to achieve
criticality by slowing down neutrons or reflecting neutrons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In developing the emergency final rule, the NRC staff noted that
the regulatory and technical bases for the fissile material exemption
limits and general license provisions of Part 71 were not internally
consistent nor well documented. Additionally, all seven of the
commenters on the final rule objected to parts of the rule as being
unduly burdensome and overly restrictive. The NRC determined that
further evaluation into the regulatory and technical bases for these
regulations was necessary.
Subsequently, the NRC contracted with Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL) to: (1) perform an independent evaluation of the regulations
related to the transport of fissile material under the fissile material
exemption and general license limits of Part 71; (2) review the
technical issues raised by public comments on the emergency final rule;
(3) perform independent calculations of the minimum critical mass
limits for different combinations of fissile material and moderating
material; and (4) identify potential changes to the fissile material
exemption and general license limits of Part 71 which may be warranted.
The results of ORNL's study are contained in NUREG/CR-5342 and are
available for public review. The NRC is currently reviewing the
recommendations contained in this report.
II. Electronic Access
NUREG/CR-5342 is also available electronically in the Reference
Library area of the NRC's Home Page under Technical Reports (http://
www.nrc.gov).
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
In accordance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Act of
1996, NRC has determined that this action is not a major rule and has
verified this determination with Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of July 1998.
For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Susan F. Shankman,
Deputy Director, Licensing and Inspection Directorate, Spent Fuel
Project Office, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 98-22331 Filed 8-18-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
