[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 2, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 39475-39479]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-18997]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 39476]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of Commercial Space Transportation
[Docket 50324]
Commercial Space Transportation; Grant of Petition for Waiver of
Safety Criterion for METEOR Reentry Vehicle System
AGENCY: Office of the Secretary; Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, DOT.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY:- Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch. 701, formerly the
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended, and the Department of
Transportation licensing regulations, the Department of Transportation
(the Department) has been evaluating a proposed commercial reentry
vehicle system as part of the first application for a license to place
a reentry vehicle into space. EER Systems Corporation, the operator of
the proposed reentry vehicle system, has petitioned the Department for
relief from the first of three safety criteria against which its
vehicle is being assessed. The Department has determined to waive the
accuracy and reliability criterion in light of the applicant's proposed
operations and that doing so will not jeopardize public safety. This
notice sets forth the basis for the Department's determination to grant
the petition.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ronald K. Gress, Deputy Associate
Director for Licensing and Safety, Office of Commercial Space
Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street
SW., Washington, DC 20590 (202) 366-2929.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background -
The Department of Transportation's (the Department) Office of
Commercial Space Transportation (Office) is evaluating the first
commercial reentry vehicle system, known as METEOR (Multiple Experiment
to Earth Orbit and Return), to determine whether it may be launched
into space. The Office is conducting its review as part of the
Department's responsibility to license and otherwise regulate
commercial space launch activities under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch.
701--''Commercial Space Launch Activities,'' formerly the Commercial
Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended. Under 49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX, ch.
701, the Department has broad authority to determine whether the launch
of an otherwise unlicensed payload, such as a reentry vehicle system,
should be prevented because the launch would jeopardize public health
and safety, safety of property, or any national security or foreign
policy interest of the United States (49 U.S.C. 70104(c)). The Office
is the Secretary's designee for carrying out the Department's mandate
under the statute.
OCST's Payload Determination Process-
The Office's approach to evaluating the first commercial reentry
vehicle system is described in two Notices previously published in the
Federal Register (57 FR 10213-10216, published March 24, 1992; and 57
FR 55021, published November 23, 1992). Under that approach, the
applicant or operator of the reentry vehicle system is required to
apply for and obtain a favorable payload determination, consisting of:
(i) A vehicle safety approval (VSA), whereby the applicant demonstrates
that its integrated system is capable of being operated safely, and
(ii) an operations review approval (ORA), whereby the operator
demonstrates its capability to operate the system safely. Both
approvals (VSA and ORA) are necessary to obtain a favorable payload
determination.-
The first Notice set forth the three criteria against which the
COMET (COMmercial Experiment Transporter) reentry vehicle system would
be assessed for purposes of obtaining a VSA. The latter Notice set
forth the Office's intent to issue a single license authorizing the
launch into space of the COMET reentry vehicle system, subject to,
among other things, a favorable payload determination for the reentry
vehicle system. Although the three criteria enumerated by the Office in
the first Notice were developed in response to the COMET Program, which
has since been discontinued, they are equally applicable to the pending
application for METEOR.\1\ -
\1\ The COMET Program, as originally administered, was suspended
in May 1994, when NASA determined not to augment a grant to the
Center for Space Transportation and Applied Research (CSTAR), which
was responsible for procuring the COMET mission. Nearly a year
later, EER Systems Corporation (EER), one of the original
participants in the COMET Program, advised the Office that it had
taken over the COMET Program and would be responsible for the entire
program, including the reentry. The spacecraft, originally developed
by Space Industries, Inc., as part of the COMET Program, has been
renamed METEOR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EER Systems Corporation (EER) is proposing to operate and reenter
the METEOR reentry vehicle system and has applied to the Office for a
payload determination. By letter dated May 1, 1995, EER petitioned the
Office requesting relief from the probability of accuracy criterion
(Criterion 1) enumerated in the March 24, 1992 Notice.
The METEOR Program-
Under the METEOR Program, EER is proposing to launch the METEOR
reentry vehicle system to low earth orbit using its newly-developed
Conestoga launch vehicle. The Conestoga will be launched from NASA's
Wallops Flight Facility, Virginia. EER is currently authorized to
launch the Conestoga launch vehicle under License No. LLS 94-030. The
authorization to launch is conditional upon issuance by the Office of
final mission approval, including a favorable payload determination,
for the METEOR reentry vehicle system. -
The METEOR Program is similar to COMET. EER is proposing to launch
METEOR to a 40.5 degree inclination low earth orbit (approximately 250
nautical miles) where it will remain on orbit for approximately 30 days
for long duration microgravity experiments. Upon command from EER
ground personnel, the reentering portion of the system (the reentry
vehicle) will separate from the service module, its retromotor will
activate, and the reentry vehicle will reenter along a ballistic
trajectory to a designated landing site on earth. The reentry vehicle
is smaller than the Mercury capsules used to return astronauts to earth
in the early years of the manned space program, weighs about 730 pounds
and is roughly three feet high by 52 inches in diameter at its widest
point. The reentry vehicle is unguided; however, its ability to land
within the designated site is affected by several factors determined
immediately preceding initiation of reentry, including pointing
accuracy, timing of the retroburn, and duration of the retroburn. Upon
descent, a parachute is released to assure a soft landing. The service
module will remain on orbit and continue to support microgravity
experiments for approximately 130 days or more. The service module's
orbit will eventually decay and it will reenter the earth's atmosphere,
burning up during reentry and presenting no greater risk to public
safety than other reentering orbital debris.
In a significant departure from the COMET Program, EER's proposal
designates an oceanic landing site, whereas the COMET proposal had
designated the Utah Test and Training Range, a 24 x 51 mile U.S.
Government facility located in a sparsely populated area of Utah. EER
is proposing to reenter the METEOR reentry vehicle in the Atlantic
Ocean and has designated as its landing site an area that is 18.4
nautical miles wide and 87.1 nautical miles long, centered around a
targeted mid-point
[[Page 39477]]
approximately 85 miles off the coast of Virginia.
Vehicle Safety Approval Criteria -
The three criteria enumerated in the March 24, 1992 Notice for the
first COMET mission, and now METEOR, all of which would have to be
satisfied under the Notice, are as follows:-
1. The probability of the reentry vehicle landing outside the
designated landing site shall not be greater than three in one thousand
missions. -
2. The additional risks to the public in the immediate vicinity of
the landing site (i.e., the area within 100 miles of the designated
landing site) shall not exceed the normal background risks to which
those individuals would ordinarily be exposed but for the reentry
missions. This normal background risk is characterized as: the
probability of any casualty occurring within the 100-mile zone shall
not exceed one in a million on an annual basis. In addition, the
probability of any casualty occurring within the zone shall not exceed
one in a million for a single mission.-
3. The additional risks to the general public beyond the 100-mile
zone around the designated landing site, and to property on orbit,
shall not exceed normal background risks to which the public would
ordinarily be exposed but for the reentry missions. This normal
background risk is characterized as: the probability of any casualty
occurring shall not exceed one in a million on an annual basis. In
addition, the probability of any casualty occurring in the area that is
both outside of the designated landing site and the 100-mile zone
around the site shall not exceed one in a million for a single mission.
-
The March 24, 1992 Notice also provides supporting rationale for
the criteria and explains their separate but interrelated safety
objectives generally as follows:-
Criterion 1 is intended to assure reliable, accurate,
incident-free reentry operations in order to foster public acceptance
of commercial space transportation and minimize public exposure to
risk. Criterion 1 assumes nominal pre-reentry operations conditions and
addresses factors that affect accuracy after reentry is initiated. In
its petition, EER has requested that OCST waive this criterion. -
Criterion 2 is intended to limit risks to the population
that believes it may be more exposed to hazards resulting from
commercial reentry operations because of their proximity to the
designated landing site and to ensure they face no greater risk from
commercial reentry operations than ordinary background risk. Criterion
2 becomes most relevant in the event of a system error or failure that
causes a deviation from the vehicle's planned trajectory.-
Criterion 3 is intended to limit risks to the general
public to ensure it, too, faces no additional risk beyond ordinary
background risk as a result of commercial reentry activities. Criterion
3 addresses the risks posed by an essentially random reentry as a
result of a major system failure during the reentry process.-
As stated in the March 24, 1992 Notice, the criteria
acknowledge that some hazards, and therefore risks accompany the
proposed reentry activity. The criteria reflect those hazards reduced
to acceptable levels of risk. Through the criteria, the Office has
established a level of acceptability comparable to that employed in
other safety regulatory regimes, such as those administered by the
Environmental Protection Agency, and consistent with risk thresholds
utilized by Federal launch ranges as part of range safety. -
Since early 1992, when the criteria addressing the COMET Program
proposal were established, the design of the reentry vehicle system and
the proposal to reenter it have evolved and matured. These developments
have allowed the Office to assess specific aspects of reentry risks and
their impact on public safety with greater clarity. -
The three criteria are intended to address the risks to public
safety that result from a human-induced reentry. For the majority of
its mission, the risks presented by the METEOR reentry vehicle system
are the same as those presented by other space payloads. It is the fact
that the METEOR reentry vehicle is operated so as to land at a
designated landing site and designed to withstand the stress of reentry
that raises the potential of risk to public safety. Accordingly, in
evaluating whether METEOR satisfies the criteria, the Office considers
only human-induced or intentional reentries. The Office has determined
that a human-induced reentry occurs when reentry is intentionally
initiated upon command from ground personnel and the vehicle returns to
earth within one orbit. The Office believes that there should be a
direct relationship between initiating reentry and the reentry event
itself for it to be considered human-induced or intentional. If the
vehicle does not reenter upon command within one orbit, the direct
relationship is broken and the vehicle remains on orbit as any other
payload. A malfunctioning vehicle that remains on orbit and then
reenters the atmosphere as a result of orbital decay or other
intervening events has not completed a human-induced or intentional
reentry and the criteria do not apply.\2\ Thus, the Office considers
only those system failures or nominal system variations that may occur
during the course of a ``human-induced'' or intentional reentry in
assessing METEOR's ability to meet Criteria 1, 2 and 3.
\2\ Even if an operator attempts an intentional reentry, it may
fail for a number of reasons. METEOR includes a number of built-in
fail-safe systems that automatically terminate the reentry sequence
if certain conditions that would cause an inaccurate or otherwise
unsafe reentry are detected. In addition, a system required for
reentry to proceed could fail, leaving the reentry vehicle on orbit
for more than one orbit. In both instances, there has not been a
human-induced reentry and the spacecraft assumes a status
essentially equivalent to other objects left in space. In the
Office's assessment of the vehicle, neither of these failure
scenarios are considered in determining whether the criteria have
been met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petition to Waive Criterion 1--
EER's petition requesting relief from Criterion 1 is based, in
part, on its misunderstanding of performance-based criteria. In
establishing performance-based criteria for COMET, the Office stated
its belief that, unlike design standards, ``performance-based criteria
allow the maximum flexibility in developing a safe and cost-effective
product. The Office further believes that performance-based criteria
enhance the public interest by encouraging innovation and technology
development. This environment promotes safe space transportation
services at lower cost and helps assure that customers' needs are
addressed.'' (57 FR 10213, 10215) -
In its petition, EER asserts, among other things, the difficulty of
using performance-based standards to demonstrate reliability in the
absence of flight performance history. EER further maintains that
satisfying Criteria 2 and 3, without Criterion 1, would be sufficient
to ensure that public safety is not compromised. EER suggests that
Criterion 1 affords no additional protection to the public beyond that
provided by satisfying Criteria 2 and 3.
Although the Office disagrees with EER's characterization of
performance-based standards, the Office has evaluated whether Criterion
1 may be waived for the METEOR reentry mission without jeopardizing
public safety. The Office undertook this evaluation because it is
consistent with the Department's statutory mandate to issue a favorable
payload determination allowing METEOR to be launched for its intended
reentry mission if the Office finds that the proposed mission can be
conducted without jeopardizing public safety and U.S. national
interests. -
[[Page 39478]]
In conducting its evaluation, the Office considered the
relationship between accuracy (Criterion 1) and public safety. While
accuracy contributes significantly to assuring public safety and is
important to developing public and consumer confidence, the Office
considered whether there are circumstances in which intentional reentry
can occur and public safety is assured without the demonstrated level
of accuracy required by Criterion 1. Next, the Office considered
whether these circumstances would, in fact, occur in carrying out the
METEOR reentry mission. Finally, the Office considered whether, if
Criterion 1 is waived, additional measures are appropriate to ensure
that public safety is protected.--
The Office has determined that there are circumstances in which the
relationship of reentry vehicle accuracy to public safety becomes less
significant. The three criteria were developed to have a mutually
reinforcing effect on public safety. Although their objectives are
interrelated, they were designed so that Criterion 1 can compensate if
the ability of the reentry vehicle system to meet Criteria 2 and 3 is
marginal, and vice versa. Stated another way, the probability of a
casualty is, among other things, a function of the probability of
missing the landing site. Other contributing factors include the size
and mass of the vehicle upon impact, its contents, and the population
distribution in the area where the vehicle could impact if it missed
the designated landing site. For example, if a reentry vehicle is
extremely small and contains no hazardous materials, the probability of
a casualty during a reentry would be quite low, even if the vehicle had
little probability of landing in the designated site. However, the
probability of a casualty could be high if that vehicle were quite
large, contained explosives or hazardous materials, or if the vehicle
was likely to impact in a densely populated area if it missed the
designated landing site. Thus, under certain conditions, it may be
possible to relax or eliminate an accuracy criterion if the risk to
public safety remains within acceptable levels. They are as follows:-
If it can be shown that there are well-defined areas
within which the vehicle is most likely to land if it misses the
designated landing site, and that the risk to the population within
these areas is within acceptable limits;-
If it can be shown that the vehicle, if it misses the
designated landing site, is unlikely to survive rentry or is likely to
reenter in a condition that presents little risk to exposed populations
because it contains little mass, no hazardous materials, or both; or--
If it can be shown that risk mitigation measures (e.g.,
public notices or warnings, emergency response plans) can be
implemented to limit the risk to exposed populations to acceptable
levels in the event the vehicle misses the designated landing site. --
To determine whether any of these circumstances will exist for
METEOR, the Office analyzed a broad range of failure scenarios that may
occur when a human-induced or intentional reentry occurs. In conducting
risk scenario analyses, the Office used a conservative approach in that
it did not consider the mitigating effects of a parachute system built
into the reentry vehicle to soften landing impacts. -
In the event of a minor system error or failure, such as one that
alters the aerodynamic characteristics of the vehicle as it descends,
the Office determined that the dispersion area or ``footprint'' within
which the vehicle would be expected to land would most likely be
enlarged, shifted, or both. The vehicle would still land in the general
vicinity of the landing site, that is, within the 100-mile zone. Given
EER's designated landing site in the Atlantic Ocean, the 100-mile zone
around the designated landing site is principally ocean area or some
sparsely populated land areas. Based on dispersion, vehicle break-up
and other risk analyses, the Office determined that risk to public
safety would remain well within the threshold of normal background risk
identified in Criterion 2.
In the event of a major system failure which causes a random
reentry, such as severe misalignment of the vehicle during retroburn
resulting in insufficient thrust to deorbit along the desired
trajectory, the Office determined that the only population placed at
risk would be those persons residing along the orbital path, or ground
trace, of the final orbit. This area occupies a swath approximately 20
miles wide and extending approximately 3,000 miles beyond the
designated landing site. The area is so limited because of the limited
cross-range capability of the vehicle. Because of the inclination of
the orbit and the designated landing site, most of this ground trace is
over uninhabited broad ocean. The effect of alignment or burn errors
increases very rapidly with the magnitude of the error, so that if the
METEOR reentry vehicle travels beyond 3,000 miles from the intended
landing site it will remain in space for more than one orbit. Although
the ground trace includes some areas of the United States, the
likelihood of landing on land is small, given that most of the ground
trace is over ocean. Moreover, the areas of the United States in which
the reentry vehicle could land are relatively sparsely populated and,
based on dispersion, vehicle break-up and other risk analyses, the
Office found that risk to public safety would remain within the
threshold of normal background risk identified in Criterion 3. -
A gross failure that causes the vehicle to remain on orbit for more
than one orbit after the intended reentry need not be considered under
the vehicle safety criteria. Nevertheless, the Office evaluated the
risks associated with a gross failure and determined that risk to
public safety still would remain well within the threshold of normal
background risk identified in Criterion 3. In fact, the Office
determined that an intact reentry module that impacted on earth or the
reentering debris from the reentry of the entire vehicle system (the
reentry vehicle joined to the service module) would be smaller than,
and therefore pose less risk than, the debris believed to survive the
reentry of large abandoned satellites or spent upper stages of Titan,
Atlas, and Delta launch vehicles. -
Accordingly, the Office has determined that there are circumstances
in which intentional reentry of METEOR can occur and public safety will
be assured without the demonstrated level of accuracy required under
Criterion 1, and that these circumstances do, in fact, exist for
METEOR. There are well-defined areas within which the reentry vehicle
is most likely to land if it misses the designated landing site. The
risk to the population within these areas falls within acceptable
limits. The small size and mass of the reentry vehicle and the lack of
hazardous materials on the vehicle would minimize the potential risk to
public safety if it misses the designated landing site. Moreover, under
certain failure scenarios, the reentry vehicle would break up and
reenter in small bits of debris, much of which would likely burn up as
it passes through the atmosphere. -
The Office has concluded that, in light of the performance
characteristics of the METEOR reentry vehicle, the proposed mission
including an oceanic landing, the small size of the reentry vehicle and
the absence of hazardous materials on the reentry vehicle, public
safety and U.S. national interests would not be jeopardized if the
landing accuracy (Criterion 1) is waived. However, as a condition of
the waiver, the Office is requiring that EER implement a public
information communications plan under which the affected public would
be informed of
[[Page 39479]]
the reentry activity, including the estimated time and location. EER
must also have in place an emergency response plan whereby local
officials may be notified in the event of an off-site landing and
vehicle recovery can be conducted effectively. -
In addition, NASA's Wallops Flight Facility has agreed to provide
range safety support for the reentry which includes coordination,
through appropriate Federal agencies, of notices to air and marine
traffic in the vicinity of the designated landing site to minimize
risks during the reentry. -
Accordingly, the Office has determined that, for METEOR, Criterion
1 may be waived and the relief requested in EER's petition is
granted.\3\-
\3\ At the time the COMET Program was suspended, a petition
submitted by Space Industries, Inc., as applicant for a payload
determination, was pending. No final action was taken in light of
the decision to discontinue the COMET Program. In granting the
petition for METEOR, the Office has made no determination as to
whether doing so would have been appropriate for COMET or any other
reentry vehicle system or mission.
Issued in Washington, DC, this 28th day of July, 1995.--
Frank C. Weaver,
Director, Office of Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 95-18997 Filed 7-28-95; 3:05 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-62-U
