[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 162 (Thursday, August 21, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44494-44495]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-22178]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389]
Florida Power and Light Company, et al., St. Lucie Plant, Units 1
and 2; Exemption
I
The Florida Power and Light Company, et al. (FPL or the licensee)
is the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-67 and NPF-16,
which authorize operation of the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2. The
licenses provide, among other things, that the licensee is subject to
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter
in effect.
The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors at the
licensee's site located in St. Lucie County, Florida.
II
Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
``Criticality Accident Requirements,'' requires that each licensee
authorized to possess special nuclear material (SNM) shall maintain a
criticality accident monitoring system in each area where such material
is handled, used, or stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of 10 CFR
70.24 specify detection and sensitivity requirements that these
monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1) also specifies that all areas
subject to criticality accident monitoring must be covered by two
detectors. Subsection (a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to
maintain emergency procedures for each area in which this licensed SNM
is handled, used, or stored and provides that (1) the procedures ensure
that all personnel withdraw to an area of safety upon the sounding of a
criticality accident monitor alarm, (2) the procedures must include
drills to familiarize personnel with the evacuation plan, and (3) the
procedures designate responsible individuals for determining the cause
of the alarm and placement of radiation survey instruments in
accessible locations for use in such an emergency. Subsection (b)(1) of
10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to have a means to identify quickly
personnel who have received a dose of 10 rads or more. Subsection
(b)(2) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees to maintain personnel
decontamination facilities, to maintain arrangements for a physician
and other medical personnel qualified to handle radiation emergencies,
and to maintain arrangements for the transportation of contaminated
individuals to treatment facilities outside the site boundary.
Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts Part 50 licensees from the
requirements of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for SNM used or to be
used in the reactor. Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that any
licensee who believes that there is good cause why he should be granted
an exemption from all or part of 10 CFR 70.24 may apply to the
Commission for such an exemption and shall specify the reasons for the
relief requested.
III
The SNM that could be assembled into a critical mass at St. Lucie,
Units 1 and 2, is in the form of nuclear fuel; the quantity of SNM
other than fuel that is stored on site is small enough to preclude
achieving a critical mass. The Commission's technical staff has
evaluated the possibility of an inadvertent criticality of the nuclear
fuel at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, and has determined that it is
extremely unlikely for such an accident to occur if the licensee meets
the following seven criteria:
1. Only one fuel assembly is allowed out of a shipping cask or
storage rack at one time.
2. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%
confidence level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and
flooded with pure water.
3. If optimum moderation occurs at low moderator density, then the
k-effective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence
level in the event that the fresh fuel storage racks are filled with
fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and flooded with a
moderator at the density corresponding to optimum moderation.
4. The k-effective does not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%
confidence level in the event that the spent fuel storage racks are
filled with fuel of the maximum permissible U-235 enrichment and
flooded with pure water.
5. The quantity of forms of special nuclear material, other than
nuclear fuel, that are stored on site in any given area is less than
the quantity necessary for a critical mass.
6. Radiation monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63,
are provided in fuel storage and handling areas to detect excessive
radiation levels and to initiate appropriate safety actions.
7. The maximum nominal U-235 enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight
percent.
By letter dated February 19, 1997, and supplemented July 10, 1997,
the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR 70.24. In this request
the licensee addressed the seven criteria given above. The Commission's
technical staff has reviewed the licensee's submittals and has
determined that St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, meets the criteria for
prevention of inadvertent criticality; therefore, the staff has
determined that it is extremely unlikely for an inadvertent criticality
to
[[Page 44495]]
occur in SNM handling or storage areas at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2.
The purpose of the criticality monitors required by 10 CFR 70.24 is
to ensure that if a criticality were to occur during the handling of
SNM, personnel would be alerted to that fact and would take appropriate
action. The staff has determined that it is extremely unlikely that
such an accident could occur; furthermore, the licensee has radiation
monitors, as required by General Design Criterion 63, in fuel storage
and handling areas. These monitors will alert personnel to excessive
radiation levels and allow them to initiate appropriate safety actions.
The low probability of an inadvertent criticality, together with the
licensee's adherence to General Design Criterion 63, constitutes good
cause for granting an exemption to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
IV
The Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 70.14, this
exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or
the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the Florida Power and
Light Company, et al., an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR
70.24.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will have no significant impact on the
environment (62 FR 43363).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of August 1997.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Collins,
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-22178 Filed 8-20-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-U
