[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 162 (Friday, August 21, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44851-44853]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-22524]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Pit Disassembly and Conversion Demonstration Environmental
Assessment and Research and Development Activities
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Finding of no significant impact.
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SUMMARY: An environmental assessment (EA) has been prepared to assess
potential environmental impacts associated with a U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) proposed action to test an integrated pit disassembly and
conversion process on a relatively small sample of pits and plutonium
metal at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico. The
proposed action would involve performing work in a series of
interconnected gloveboxes using remote handling, automation, and
computerized control systems to minimize operator exposure where
possible, increase safety, and minimize the amount of waste generated
by the process. Based on the analysis in the EA and considering
comments received, DOE has determined that the proposed action is not a
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). Therefore, the preparation of an environmental impact statement
(EIS) is not required. The EA also discusses other on-going research
and development activities, which have already been reviewed pursuant
to NEPA, and which concern pit disassembly and conversion, potential
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, and immobilization of surplus
plutonium.
ADDRESSES AND FURTHER INFORMATION: Single copies of the EA and further
information concerning the proposed action are available from: Mr. G.
Bert Stevenson, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of Fissile Materials
Disposition (MD-4), U.S. Department of Energy, PO Box 23786,
Washington, DC 20026-3786, (202) 586-5368.
For further information regarding the DOE NEPA Process, contact:
Ms. Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance,
Office of Environment, Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Energy,
1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or
(800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Purpose and Need
DOE needs to develop the capability to disassemble surplus
plutonium pits which are sealed in metallic shells. (A pit is a nuclear
weapons component.) In order to develop this capability in a timely
manner, safety and operational design information must be obtained from
the actual disassembly of up to 250 representative pits and the
conversion of the recovered plutonium to plutonium metal ingots and
plutonium dioxide. The resulting experience would be used to supplement
information developed to support the design of a full-scale disassembly
and conversion facility should DOE decide to construct such a facility
in the Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement
(SPD EIS) Record of Decision (ROD).
Background
DOE is implementing a long-term program to provide safe and secure
storage of weapons-usable fissile materials, and to allow for the
timely disposition of weapons-usable plutonium declared surplus to
national security needs. The program's goal is to ensure that there is
a high standard of security and accounting of these materials while in
storage, and that the surplus plutonium is never used again in nuclear
weapons.
In January 1997, DOE issued the ROD for the Storage and Disposition
of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (Storage and Disposition Final PEIS). In the PEIS ROD,
DOE announced a decision to pursue a strategy to dispose of surplus
United States plutonium that allows for two separate approaches: (1)
Immobilization of some (and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium;
and (2) using some of the surplus plutonium as MOX fuel in existing
commercial reactors. In that decision, DOE explained that the timing
and extent to which either or both of the disposition approaches are
ultimately deployed would depend in part on the follow-on SPD EIS, as
well as technology development and research.
Proposed Action
In order to meet the purpose and need for this action, DOE proposes
that an integrated Pit Disassembly and Conversion Demonstration take
place at LANL's Plutonium Facility-4 in Technical Area-55. No new
facilities are needed to support this demonstration; however, minor
internal modifications
[[Page 44852]]
would be made to existing facilities. These minor modifications,
relating to the installation of new gloveboxes, would not involve
worker exposure.
Implementation of this demonstration requires direct demonstration
activities, such as pit bisection, and general support activities, such
as receipt and storage of plutonium, that are typical support
activities at LANL. These direct and support activities include the
following:
Shipment of pits and non-pit, clean plutonium metal from
offsite to LANL;
Receipt, unpackaging, and placement into storage of
offsite pit and non-pit, clean plutonium metal;
Interim storage of pit and non-pit, clean plutonium metal,
awaiting use in the demonstration;
Removal of any external pit features;
Bisection and disassembly of pits;
Processing pit hemishells to separate the plutonium from
other materials;
Recasting the plutonium to metal ingots or converting it
to plutonium dioxide;
Thermally processing the plutonium to remove gallium and
other impurities;
Sealing the plutonium in an appropriate container for
storage;
Decontaminating the container;
Sealing the decontaminated container in a second
container;
Performing nondestructive assay on all components for
material accountability purposes; and
Storing the resulting plutonium metal and plutonium
dioxide until an ultimate disposition decision is made.
These direct and support activities are analyzed in this EA to capture
the cumulative impact of this demonstration.
Technical Area-55 has historically performed plutonium processing
activities similar to those required in this demonstration, and
currently disassembles pits in a series of individual gloveboxes. Most
of the plutonium, in the form of pits or metal, to be used in the
demonstration would be taken from storage at LANL. Additional surplus
pits may be shipped from the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas, or the
Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) near Golden,
Colorado, if there is a need to test additional types of pits.
Plutonium in the form of metal would be shipped, if needed, from the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) near
Idaho Falls, Idaho; the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South
Carolina; or the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in
Livermore, California. Highly enriched uranium would be recovered from
some of the pits during the disassembly process and shipped to DOE's
Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) for storage in accordance with DOE's Y-12
Plant EA and the Storage and Disposition Final PEIS.
Alternatives Considered
In addition to the No Action Alternative, the EA also discusses the
consideration of DOE sites other than LANL for this proposed action.
No Action: Under the No Action Alternative, an integrated pit
disassembly and conversion line would not be demonstrated at LANL.
Research related to these activities would continue to be performed in
a series of individual gloveboxes. Information that would be generated
as a result of the proposed Pit Disassembly and Conversion
Demonstration (e.g., specifications for the main operating line and
information needed to optimize the layout in terms of shielding,
residence time in the gloveboxes, and distance between gloveboxes)
would not be available under the No Action Alternative.
Consideration of Other DOE Sites: Other DOE sites were considered
for this proposed action. The only other site, however, that was a
potential alternative was LLNL because it is the only other DOE
national laboratory with extensive, operating plutonium facilities that
could be used to conduct the demonstration. LLNL was eliminated from
further consideration because, among other things, LLNL's plutonium
administrative limits are significantly lower and would restrict the
proposed demonstration. Furthermore, because much of the plutonium that
would be used in the demonstration is already located at LANL, it would
need to be transported to LLNL. In addition, the capabilities at LANL
were readily available during the timeframe in which DOE needed the
demonstration to be conducted. Also, the majority of the gloveboxes
that would be used in the demonstration are already at LANL.
Consequently, there would be no need to decontaminate LANL gloveboxes
for the express purpose of sending them to LLNL for use in the
demonstration.
DOE also considered other potential disassembly and conversion
options as alternatives to the proposed demonstration. However, none of
the potential options are reasonable alternatives and, therefore, are
not analyzed in detail in the EA. As one potential option, DOE
considered a demonstration that would involve disassembling a fewer
number of pits. However, this option would not encompass all of the
types of surplus pits that would be involved in surplus plutonium
disposition (immobilization or MOX fuel) or continued safe storage. As
such, this option would not meet the purpose and need for the proposed
demonstration and would not generate complete information. For
conversion, DOE considered the potential alternative of converting only
plutonium from pits, but not non-pit plutonium metal, to plutonium
dioxide. Since this option would exclude plutonium metal, this option
would not test and demonstrate conversion of all types of surplus
plutonium material that may be subject to disposition under the MOX or
immobilization approaches, would not generate complete information, and
would not fully meet the purpose and need for the proposed
demonstration. In addition, DOE considered converting plutonium to a
metal form only. This option would not test and demonstrate conversion
of pit plutonium to the oxide form most suitable for either
immobilization or MOX fuel. Thus, this option would not generate
complete information, and would not fully meet the purpose and need for
the proposed action.
Environmental Impacts
The environmental consequences of the proposed action are not
expected to result in any appreciable risks to members of the public,
workers, or the environment. The results of evaluations in key impact
areas are summarized, as follows:
Water Quality Impacts--A small amount of process water would be
used as part of the decontamination module. This process water, less
than 100 liters (26 gallons) per year, would be handled in accordance
with LANL's procedures for the treatment and disposal of liquid low-
level waste. No increased release of radionuclides is expected by
liquid pathways as a result of the proposed action.
Air Quality Impacts--As a part of this demonstration, it is
estimated that small amounts of plutonium and americium would be
released into the atmosphere. The maximally exposed individual (MEI) is
estimated to receive an effective dose equivalent of 0.043 mrem per
year from the demonstration and a total dose from all site operations
of 4.3 mrem per year. There is not expected to be any airbourne release
of beryllium as a result of the demonstration. Any hazardous compounds
released would be very small quantities related to routine cleaning
operations connected with the demonstration.
[[Page 44853]]
Radiological Impacts--Total radiological releases would be
significantly lower than either the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) limit or past annual releases from LANL. The resulting
maximum concentrations for radionuclides measured at the location of
the MEI for the demonstration is estimated to be less than two percent
of the EPA limit. Radiological impacts associated with the proposed
action could increase LANL total site impacts by a small percentage
(1.0 percent for the MEI, 1.3 percent for the surrounding population,
and 1.3 percent for the average individual).
Under the proposed action, the estimated annual average dose to pit
disassembly workers would be 750 mrem. The annual dose received by the
plutonium workers who would perform these activities would increase by
35 person-rem to 90 person-rem. Doses to individual workers would be
kept to minimal levels by current administrative policies, exposure
monitoring, and the as low as reasonably achievable program.
Accident Impacts--The spectrum of plausible accidents and abnormal
events associated with the proposed action was evaluated to identify
those with the highest radiological impacts. The consequences of the
hydride-oxidation (HYDOX) process accidents are more severe and
therefore envelope process accident consequences. The hydrogen
deflagration in the reactor vessel was identified as having the highest
potential consequences to the public. A mitigated accident, where
credit is taken for the building's ventilation system including high-
efficiency particulate air filters and other features, would result in
a source term of 1.4 x 10-8 grams of plutonium and a MEI
dose at the site boundary, near the Royal Crest Trailer Court, of
2.8 x 10-8 rem. The likelihood of this accident occurring
was categorized as ``unlikely.'' Workers in the room at the time of the
deflagration may be injured by flying glass and other missiles
depending on their proximity to the deflagration.
Waste Management Impacts--The proposed action would generate
transuranic waste, low-level waste, mixed low-level waste, and
hazardous waste, but the volume generated is expected to be small.
Therefore, the projected increase in the total waste volume for each
category would have little or no impact on current LANL waste
management processes and procedures.
Transportation Impacts--Under the proposed action, plutonium in the
form of pits, might be shipped to LANL from RFETS or the Pantex Plant
and in the form of metal from INEEL, SRS, or LLNL. Highly enriched
uranium recovered from these pits would be shipped to ORR. The greatest
risk to the public from these proposed shipments would be from a
traffic accident involving the safe secure trailer (SST) or the escort
vehicles and not from radiological exposure. If the demonstration is
implemented, it is estimated that this proposed action would result in
a risk to the public (either as a latent cancer or a traffic accident)
of less than 5 chances in 1,000 of a fatality.
Socioeconomic Impacts--The proposed action would not affect
employment at LANL because no additional personnel are anticipated to
be required to support the demonstration. It is standard practice for
workers at LANL to move from one project to another without any impact
on the overall employment level. No significant socioeconomic effects,
therefore, would be expected to result from the proposed action.
Environmental Justice Impacts--Implementation of the proposed
action would pose no significant risk to the general population
including minority and low-income populations. No disproportionately
high and adverse impacts on minority and low-income populations would
result from implementation of the proposed action.
Other Environmental Impacts--The demonstration would be located
within an existing building, Plutonium Facility-4. Therefore, there
would not be any new construction that could affect floodplains,
wetlands, biological resources, or cultural resources.
Cumulative Impacts--The Draft Site-Wide Environmental Impact
Statement on the Continued Operation of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory (Draft LANL Site-Wide EIS), which is incorporated by
reference in the EA, discusses the cumulative impacts of the proposed
demonstration, ongoing LANL operations, potential expanded LANL
operations, and other activities in the LANL region. As explained in
the Draft LANL Site-Wide EIS, expanded operations at LANL, including
the proposed demonstration and other activities, would result in an
additional latent cancer fatality risk of about .0002 over the lifetime
of the MEI.
No Action Alternative Impacts--Under the No Action Alternative, an
integrated pit disassembly and conversion line would not be
demonstrated at LANL. There would, therefore, be no change in the
current environmental or health effects associated with work done in
Plutonium Facility-4 and Technical Area-55, and these facilities would
continue to operate as they do currently.
Transportation Risks Associated with the No Action Alternative--
Under the No Action Alternative, pits or plutonium metal would not be
shipped to LANL from INEEL, LLNL, RFETS, SRS or Pantex, and there would
not be any highly enriched uranium recovered from these pits, so there
would be no shipments of highly enriched uranium to ORR. However, DOE
has committed to consolidate its inventory of weapons-grade plutonium,
so the pits at RFETS would continue to be be shipped to Pantex, where
they would be stored pending a decision on their ultimate disposition
in accordance with the ROD that would be issued after the SPD Final EIS
is completed. The greatest risk to the public from this alternative
would continue to be from a traffic accident involving the SST or its
escort vehicles and not from radiological exposure.
Determination
Based on the analysis in the EA, and after considering the
preapproval review comments, I conclude that the proposed action does
not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA. Therefore,
an EIS for the proposed action is not required.
Issued in Washington, DC, this 14th day of August 1998.
Andre I. Cygelman,
Acting Director, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, Department of
Energy.
[FR Doc. 98-22524 Filed 8-20-98; 8:45 am]
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