[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 162 (Monday, August 23, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 45908-45911]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-21751]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[Docket No. PRM-50-66]
Nuclear Information and Resource Service; Petition for Rulemaking
Denial
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a petition
for rulemaking (PRM-50-66) from the Nuclear Information and Resource
Service (NIRS). The petitioner requested that NRC amend its regulations
to require licensees of operating nuclear power plant facilities to
conduct a full-scale emergency planning exercise that involves coping
with a date-sensitive, computer-related failure resulting from a Year
2000 (Y2K) issue. The petitioner requested that NRC take this action to
ensure that licensees of nuclear facilities have developed and can
implement adequate contingency and emergency plans to address potential
major system failures that may be caused by a Y2K computer problem. NRC
is denying the petition because the Commission has determined that the
actions taken by the licensees to implement systematic and structured
Y2K readiness contingency plans for critical Y2K dates in concert with
existing required emergency response plans and procedures, and NRC's
oversight of the licensees' implementation of these Y2K readiness
contingency plans provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection
to public health and safety.
ADDRESSES: Copies of the petition for rulemaking, the public comments
received, and the NRC's letters to the petitioners are available for
public inspection or copying in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L
Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC, as well as NRC's rulemaking
web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matthew Chiramal, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, telephone 301-415-2845, E-mail address mxc@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
NRC received three related petitions for rulemaking (PRM-50-65,
PRM-50-66, and PRM-50-67), each dated December 10, 1998, submitted by
the NIRS concerning various aspects of Y2K issues and nuclear safety.
This petition (PRM-50-66) requested that NRC adopt regulations that
would require facilities licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Part 50 to
develop and implement adequate contingency and emergency plans to
address potential system failures. The first petition (PRM-50-65)
requested that NRC adopt regulations that would require facilities
licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 50, and 70 to be Y2K
compliant. The third petition (PRM-50-67) requested that NRC adopt
regulations that would require facilities licensed by NRC under 10 CFR
Parts 50
[[Page 45909]]
and 70 to provide reliable sources of backup power.
Because of the nature of these petitions and the date-specific
issues they address, the petitioner requested that the petitions be
addressed on an expedited schedule.
On January 25, 1999, NRC published a notice of receipt of this
petition for rulemaking in the Federal Register (64 FR 3791). It was
available on the NRC's rulemaking website and NRC Public Document Room.
The notice of receipt of petition for rulemaking invited interested
persons to submit comments by February 24, 1999.
The Petition
The petitioner requested that NRC adopt the following text as a
rule: 1
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\1\ In preliminary discussion, the petitioner stated, ``We also
believe that other major fuel cycle facilities should be subject to
a similar rule.'' However, the petitioner provided no supporting
reasoning, no regulatory text, and no specific request that NRC
adopt such a rule. Therefore, NRC has considered only the
specifically requested rule language.
All licensees subject to 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E will
conduct a full-scale emergency planning exercise (as normally
required under 10 CFR 50.47) during 1999. This exercise shall
include a component that includes failure of one or more computer or
other digital systems (this is popularly known as the ``Y2K bug'')
on January 1, 2000, or other relevant date. Licensees that do not
conduct, or that fail, this exercise shall close their facilities
licensed under this Part by December 1, 1999, until such time as the
licensees have conducted a successful exercise.
NRC shall publish and provide to each licensee, within 30 days
of the date of this rule, a Regulatory Guide that outlines potential
emergency exercise scenarios. NRC shall publish and provide to each
licensee, by December 1, 1999, a Regulatory Guide that describes the
various scenarios that have been undertaken and the successful (and
unsuccessful) responses to the problems posed.
The petitioner stated that although the probability of the
occurrence of Y2K-related events that would require emergency response
and the implementation of contingency plans is unknown, it would fall
within the range of safety matters for which NRC requires emergency
planning exercises. Furthermore, the petitioner asserts that addressing
Y2K-related problems will require the use of potentially unfamiliar
contingency plans, relying on ingenuity to circumvent failure of
essential communications systems or failure of offsite emergency
responders to perform their tasks effectively and coping with issues
not normally tested during emergency exercises.
The petitioner considers it prudent to require each licensee to
conduct an exercise and that each exercise address a different aspect
of the Y2K problem. The petitioner suggested that some exercises should
test problems initiated by Y2K-related failures and that others should
test problems exacerbated by Y2K-related failures. The petitioner
believes that this approach would provide some familiarity with the
possible range of issues that could develop and create an overall
industry capability to effectively address potential Y2K problems.
Under the petitioner's suggested regulation, the licensees would
develop exercise scenarios that would be approved by NRC in an
expedited fashion, and NRC would publish and distribute regulatory
guides that would outline potential emergency response scenarios and
describe the scenarios that were tested and the successful responses to
the problem posed.
The petitioner stated that these actions would provide reasonable
assurance that nuclear power plant licensees have developed and can
implement adequate contingency and emergency plans to address major
system failures that may be caused by the Y2K problem.
Public Comments on the Petition
In response to this petition, NRC received 64 comment letters,
including 1 letter signed by 25 citizens from the State of Michigan, 3
from nuclear associated industries, 11 from utilities, 13 from private
organizations, 1 from the State of Illinois Department of Nuclear
Safety, and 35 from private citizens.
Forty-six letters supported the petition, of which 13 were from
private organizations, 32 were from private citizens, and one which was
signed by 25 citizens of the State of Michigan. Thirty-nine of these 46
letters communicated a brief statement in support of the petition.
Seven of the 46 letters, of which 3 were from private individuals and 4
were from private organizations, discussed reasons for supporting the
petition.
In some letters, support of the petition was based on belief that
actual emergency response exercises will provide invaluable information
in addressing Y2K issues because of the complexity of Y2K issues and
the lack of experience of licensees of nuclear facilities in responding
to such an event.
Others letters stated that all emergency plans rely heavily on
offsite sources of help, such as police, fire, and other essential
services, but that these services, as well as critical communications
entities, may also be vulnerable to the Y2K problem if they are not
properly assessed, remedied, and tested. Some letters cited numerous
problems that have occurred in previous emergency planning exercises,
irrespective of the Y2K problem. An example stated was the Pilgrim
exercise of December 13, 1995, in which the Boston Edison Company was
unable to communicate to the proper authorities. Other examples cited
the occurrence of lost electrical buses. Some letters communicated the
importance of testing and retesting for every conceivable contingency.
Eighteen letters opposed the petition, of which 3 were from private
citizens, 3 were from nuclear associated industries, one was from the
State of Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety, and 11 were from
utilities. The letters opposing the petition stated that the additional
emergency planning exercise suggested by the petition is not needed to
ensure public health and safety. These letters indicated that NRC
analysis and industry testing have confirmed that safety systems will
function to shut down a reactor if required, that licensees and NRC are
developing contingency plans for key Y2K rollover dates, and that these
contingency plans will evaluate specific risk factors and, where
appropriate, provide mitigation strategies to allow continued safe
operation. These letters stated that this effort provides a rational
review and systematic approach to issues that could affect the
continued safe operation of a plant within the conditions of its
license, which the commenters believe is a more effective approach for
ensuring that plants continue to operate and meet commitments.
Reasons for Denial
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency Plans''; 10 CFR 50.54,
``Conditions of Licenses,'' paragraphs (q), (s), and (t); and Appendix
E to 10 CFR Part 50, nuclear facilities are required to provide
emergency response capabilities that take into account a variety of
circumstances and challenges, to exercise their plans periodically to
develop and maintain key skills of involved personal, and to identify
deficiencies in the emergency plan and personnel and take appropriate
actions to correct identified deficiencies. In accordance with 10 CFR
50.54(q), nuclear power reactor licensees are required to follow and
maintain in effect emergency plans that meet the planning standards in
10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to Part 50. In part,
licensees are required to train
[[Page 45910]]
and test their organization and associated equipment to ensure that
under all conditions and contingencies, such as power outages and
computer and communication failures, appropriate emergency response is
available and effective in an emergency.
To accomplish these requirements, licensees conduct numerous
exercises and drills throughout the year. Inherent in the nature of
emergency response is the realization that in an emergency, equipment
may fail, loss of power may occur, personnel may not be available, and
weather conditions may cause the emergency or escalate it. It is
typical that, in the development of scenarios for exercises and drills,
as well as in employee training programs, communication links, plant
computers, and display and monitoring equipment are ``out of service''
or ``fail'' at inappropriate times. The NRC staff commonly oversees
exercises that include these types of problems and the licensee's staff
benefits from having to work around this training obstacle when a
particular approach has been blocked. The NRC staff has observed
licensees resorting to manual and backup systems to respond effectively
and overcome these obstacles.
In terms of the effects of the Y2K problem, the NRC staff believes
that the Y2K problem is not unique--it is a software error. Although
the cause of computer and equipment failure may be different under Y2K,
the result and the expected response are the same as situations
encountered during many previous emergency exercises and drills.
Therefore, there is no need to require licensees to conduct additional
exercises to test specifically for potential Y2K failures.
In addition to existing emergency response plans, licensees of
operating nuclear power plants and decommissioning power plants where
spent fuel is stored at the plant site are preparing and implementing
Y2K contingency plans as part of the plant-specific Y2K program.
Operating nuclear power plant-specific Y2K contingency plans are based
on the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute/Nuclear Utilities Software
Management Group NEI/NUSMG 98-07,2 ``Nuclear Utility Year
2000 Readiness Contingency Planning,'' dated August 1998, which
provides a process and a method for preparing and implementing a
facility-specific integrated contingency plan that considers specific
risks from internal and external sources. The Y2K contingency plans are
generally built upon existing contingency activities (such as emergency
preparedness, disaster recovery, storm damage restoration, grid
restoration, and station blackout) and plant emergency procedures,
coupled with the consideration that potential Y2K-related failures
could affect many systems and components. Among the external events
that are considered for contingency planning are--
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\2\ NEI/NUSMG 98-07 was preceded by NEI/NUSMG 97-07, ``Nuclear
Utility Year 2000 Readiness,'' dated October 1997, which presented a
strategy for developing and implementing a nuclear utility Y2K
program.
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the loss of emergency plan equipment and services: pagers,
radios, sirens and meteorology information, and
the loss of essential services: telephone, microwave,
water, satellites, networks, security, police, and fire-fighting
capability.
The need for simulated exercises, development of special
procedures, and Y2K contingency plan specific training is considered in
the Y2K contingency planning process. Contingency plan verification is
included in NEI/NUSMG 98-07 guidelines to provide confidence that the
plans can be executed as intended. The contingency planning efforts, as
outlined in NEI/NUSMG 98-07, provide additional training, staffing, and
material procurement for occurrences that could happen at any time but
that have a higher probability of occurring during the critical Y2K-
related dates. Licensees and NRC are currently developing contingency
plans for critical Y2K rollover dates. These contingency plans evaluate
specific risk factors and, where appropriate, provide mitigation
strategies to cope with plant-specific effects of the most probable and
serious failures that might be initiated or exacerbated by the Y2K
problem.
On May 11, 1998, NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 98-01, ``Year 2000
Readiness of Computer Systems at Nuclear Power Plants.'' In GL 98-01,
NRC requested that all operating nuclear power plant licensees submit
written responses regarding their facility-specific Y2K readiness
programs in order to obtain confirmation that licensees are addressing
the Y2K problem effectively. All licensees have responded to GL 98-01,
stating that they have adopted plant-specific programs that are
intended to make the plants Y2K ready by July 1, 1999. These programs
are patterned on industry guidelines (NEI/NUSMG 97-07, ``Nuclear
Utilities Year 2000 Readiness'') that have been found acceptable by
NRC. GL 98-01 also requests a written response, no later than July 1,
1999, confirming that these facilities are Y2K ready, including
contingency planning. Licensees who are not Y2K ready by July 1, 1999,
must provide a status report and schedule for the remaining work to
ensure timely Y2K readiness.
NRC considers the guidance in NEI/NUSMG 98-07, when properly
implemented, as an acceptable approach for licensees to mitigate and
manage Y2K-induced events that could occur on Y2K-critical dates.
As part of its oversight of licensee Y2K program activities, NRC
staff audited the contingency planning effort of six licensee
facilities. These audits were completed during June 1999. These audits
focused on the licensee's approach to addressing both internal and
external Y2K risks to safe plant operation, based on the guidance in
NEI/NUSMG 98-07. The audits at these facilities examined in detail
back-up measures the utilities have in place to deal with possible Y2K
problems, either on site or off site, including problems with the loss
of emergency plan equipment and services (pagers, radios, sirens, and
meteorology), the loss of essential services (telephone, microwave,
water, satellites, networks, security, police), and the failure of the
offsite emergency responders to perform their task effectively.
Additionally, NRC regional staff reviewed Y2K activities at all
operating nuclear power plants to verify the status of licensee efforts
to ensure that all plants will be able to function safely on January 1,
2000, and beyond. The reviews: (1) verify that all NRC licensees have
implemented Y2K program activities; (2) evaluate the progress they have
made to ensure that they are on schedule to achieve Y2K readiness; and
(3) assess their contingency plans for addressing Y2K-related issues.
The regional staff is using guidance prepared by the NRC Headquarters
staff that is based on NRC GL 98-01, NEI/NUSMG 97-07, and NEI/NUSMG 98-
07. These reviews were completed by July 1999.
The offsite components of emergency preparedness and response,
which are the responsibility of States, counties, and municipalities,
are already utilized by those governmental entities to address a wide
range of events (e.g., grid failures, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes,
snowstorms, industrial accidents). These events often involve
widespread loss of normal capabilities and services (e.g., loss of
electricity and telephone service, blocking of roads) coupled with the
need for a multi-capability response. NRC is also working closely with
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on its plans to conduct
Y2K workshops for the State and local radiological emergency
preparedness community. NRC and nuclear facilities licensees will
participate in these workshops. NRC is an active member of
[[Page 45911]]
the Emergency Services Sector Working Group for Y2K, which is headed by
FEMA. In addition, to facilitate Agreement State efforts to address the
Y2K issue, a link to State Government Year 2000 Web sites has been
provided by the NRC. NRC will make every effort to share with the
States any Y2K issue that may also affect Agreement States or Agreement
State licensees.
NIRS has not explained why the approach currently being pursued by
the licensees, the nuclear industry, and NRC does not provide
reasonable assurance of adequate emergency response capabilities during
the transition from 1999 to 2000.
In the case of research and training/test reactors, licensees of
these facilities also have established programs to evaluate and correct
Y2K deficiencies. Many research reactors will be shut down on January
1, 2000, as the institutions operating them (e.g., universities and
laboratories) will be closed for the holiday. Further, these reactors
often have passive safety features and low power levels, which ensure
minimal potential offsite consequences. In addition, NRC staff
concluded that any research reactor in operation on January 1, 2000,
could be readily shut down manually using emergency procedures and
existing shutdown systems, even if their operational systems should
experience a Y2K problem.
Conclusion
Plant-specific industry planning for Y2K contingencies, which is
built upon existing emergency response plans and procedures required by
the current emergency preparedness regulations, provides a reasonable
assurance that adequate protection measures will be taken in the event
of radiological emergency during Y2K critical dates. Imposing a new
prescriptive rule as proposed in the petition in an area in which the
industry action is already exceeding the actions that address the
petitioner's general issues would be counterproductive to the ongoing
Y2K readiness efforts of the licensees. Therefore, the additional full-
scale emergency planning exercise requested by the NIRS is not
necessary to ensure emergency response capabilities to provide
reasonable assurance of adequate protection to public health and safety
despite the occurrence of Y2K problems.
For these reasons, the Commission denies the petition.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 17th day of August, 1999.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Andrew L. Bates,
Acting Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 99-21751 Filed 8-20-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
