[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 164 (Tuesday, August 25, 1998)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45233-45236]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-22780]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Nevada Operations Office; Notice Inviting Research Grant
Applications
AGENCY: Nevada Operations Office, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice inviting research grant applications under Financial
Assistance Program Notice 98-01.
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SUMMARY: The Office of Research and Development (NN-20), of the Office
of Nonproliferation and National Security (NN), U.S. Department of
Energy, in keeping with its mission to strengthen the Nation's
capabilities in the areas of nonproliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and national security through the support of science,
engineering, and mathematics, announces its interest in receiving grant
applications from academic researchers, preferably in a corroborative
partnership with one of the DOE National Laboratories. The purpose of
this program is to enhance our national capability to detect illicit
proliferation activities and our national capabilities to protect
critical information and materials through research and development.
DATES: All applications, referencing Program Notice NN-98-01, should be
received not later than 4:30 PM, PST, on or before September 24, 1998
in order to be accepted for merit review and to permit timely
consideration for award.
ADDRESSES: Applications should be sent to U.S Department of Energy,
Nevada Operations Office, Contracts Management Division, ATTN: Darby A.
Dieterich, P.O. Box 98518, Las Vegas, NV 89193-8518.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Questions of a technical nature should
be addressed to the following personnel: Peter G. Mueller, DOE/NV
Emergency Management Division, (702) 295-1777; or Carolyn R. Roberts,
DOE/NV Emergency Management Division, (702) 295-2611. Other questions
should be addressed to Darby A. Dieterich, Contracts Management
Division, (702) 295-1560.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION--RESEARCH TOPIC AREAS: It is anticipated that
awards resulting from this notice will be made in the November 1998
timeframe. Another notice will be published in the near future setting
forth a schedule for future submittals and associated reviews. In
addition, an Internet address will be established containing Office of
Research and Development (NN-20) program information for use in
preparing and submitting future applications.
If the academic research entity does not have a current
relationship with a National Laboratory, this partnership may be set up
after the award of the grant with the aid of NN-20 at Office of
Nonproliferation and National Security, NN-20, Office of Research and
Development, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW,
Washington, DC 20585. General research program and related topic areas
include, but are not limited to the following:
[[Page 45234]]
Radiation Detection Technology Program
The Radiation Detection Technology Program (RDTP) provides for
basic research on new detectors and technology, advanced applications,
prototype demonstrations, and field testing to analyze signatures
associated with Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), nuclear weapons and
weapon components and radioactive materials. The focus areas include
Improved Instrumentation for Man-portable Analysis Systems, Development
of New Materials as Detectors, and Advances in Algorithms and Onboard
Decision-Making.
Improved instrumentation performance for man-portable analysis
systems is focused on reducing the size, cost, and dependence on the
skill of the operator; providing sensor selectivity; improving the
quality of detectors; increasing sensitivity of detection; improving
the selectivity and automating the analyses; and increasing the speed
and accuracy of detection. R&D programs should also exploit advances in
all emerging technologies to incorporate the flexibility of fieldable
systems, e.g., advanced micro circuitry and thin film batteries.
Development of new materials as detectors seeks to improve
detection capability through the utilization of new sensor materials.
Classical efforts to detect radiation relied on ionization (e.g.,
Geiger counter) or reactions such as fission (fission counter) or
absorption (boron trifluoride). Relatively recent advances in materials
have resulted in breakthroughs in sensitivity and accuracy (e.g.,
lithium drifted germanium) at the expense of the requirement to cool
the crystal to liquid nitrogen temperatures. New work is aimed at
employing materials such as cadmium zinc telluride (CdZnTe), bismuth
iodide, and lead iodide which offer the possibility of increased
sensitivity and accurate spectral analysis without the need for
external cooling. In addition to the use of these new materials to
achieve a room temperature capability, the use of miniature mechanical
coolers offers another route to the goal of improved sensitivity with
portability.
Advances in algorithms and onboard decision making are focused on
providing analytical capabilities in real time. Advances in computer
technology, reduction of the size and power requirements, and micro
miniaturization provide the capability to incorporate advanced
algorithms for real time data analysis into fieldable instruments.
These capabilities are becoming essential to effective SNM detection
and control.
Cooperative Monitoring Program
The Cooperative Monitoring Program is focused in the topic areas of
chemical sensors, arrays, and networks for detection of signature
species in environmental samples indicative of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons activities; data fusion methodologies to interpret
large quantities of data from heterogeneous sensor networks;
microanalytical technologies for chemical analyses of signature
species; and tags and seals for arms control applications. The
applications emphasis is on a cooperative and collaborative environment
in which stakeholders are participating appropriately in the monitoring
to enhance confidence, trust, and transparency.
Advanced Chemical Sensors, Arrays, and Networks are required for
cooperative monitoring of facilities for treaty verification, IAEA
safeguards, personnel protection, etc. These may be used either in a
permanent system of monitor sensors or in periodic on-site inspections
of declared activities. Both approaches require rugged and sensitive
chemical instruments that will analyze the environment for specific
signature compounds to verify that the facility (e.g., a chemical
manufacturing plant or a nuclear fuel storage repository) is performing
as declared. In other non-cooperative instances, it may be desirable to
determine if signature compounds are present for illicit or undeclared
operations at an industrial facility. Both qualitative identification
of signature species and quantitative amounts of the species are
needed. Chemical signature species must be detectable at trace levels
such as ppb or ppt, and near-real-time analysis is desirable.
Biochemical and metabolic phenomena offer opportunities for innovative
sensors, both in terms of the receptor side of the sensor and the
potential suite of analytes that can be monitored.
Data Fusion Methodologies are vital to the analysis of data from
arrays and networks of sensors. Such systems are capable of generating
huge quantities of data, most of which portray normal events and
conditions. When a rare event or a potential threat condition occurs,
it is critical to be able to recognize this occurrence in near-real
time.
Therefore, data analysis techniques are needed that can manage
large quantities of differing types of data and can subject these data
to complex filters and algorithms to detect abnormal or threat
conditions with very low incidences of false alarms. Data management
systems that can learn the patterns of normal data by analysis of real
(noisy) data and continually update the definition of normal through
self-learning processes are desirable.
Microtechnologies for Chemical Analyses are needed to make routine
laboratory analysis methods available in the field. Conventional
workhorse tools for chemical analysis such as gas chromatography, mass
spectrometry, and various other spectroscopic methods are powerful and
well accepted in a laboratory environment, but usually are not amenable
in their laboratory format for flexible monitoring and surveillance
activities in a field environment.
In recent years, the technologies used to make microelectronic
devices are being adapted to make miniature analogs of classical
laboratory instruments for chemical analysis. Biochemical phenomena and
analytical techniques are also amenable to miniaturization via
microtechnologies. This revolution in chemical analysis instrumentation
is in its relative infancy, and there appear to be many opportunities
to miniaturize the bench-and laboratory-scale instruments. The benefits
of miniaturization for chemical analysis are similar to the benefits
for electronics products--low power requirements, lightweight for
portability, and enhanced ruggedness and reliability. New sampling
technologies are needed to take advantage of the real-time potential of
miniaturized instruments.
Tags and Seals are enjoying a renewed interest as a result of
domestic and international arms control applications.
Broad Area Search and Analysis Program
The Broad Area Search and Analysis (BASA) program addresses the
difficulties associated with the detection and classification of
proliferation facilities, particularly those that are located
underground. Sensor development and analysis activities fall into
several research topic areas: Multispectral/Hyperspectral/Ultraspectral
imaging, Synthetic Aperture Radar, Advanced Airborne Systems, Power
Line Monitoring, and Geophysical Methods. The potential for false
alarms as a result of any single technique may be quite high. Hence,
the final BASA research area is Data Fusion to optimize the facility
characterization while minimizing the false alarm probability.
[[Page 45235]]
Multispectral/Hyperspectral/Ultraspectral Systems include imaging
throughout the visible, infrared, and ultraviolet spectral bands.
Nominally, multispectral systems contain 2-19 bands of data and are
relatively mature. Hyperspectral systems include 20-299 bands and are
relatively new sensors. Ultraspectral systems have 300 or more bands.
Correspondingly, data from the multispectral systems have been used for
decades and is mature while the exploitation of the data from
hyperspectral is in its adolescence and ultraspectral data analysis is
in its infancy.
The thrust of the research in this area is in algorithm development
for new exploration tools to interpret alterations of the natural
patterns that occur as the result of man's activities. The alterations
may be the result of perturbations in drainage patterns, development of
vegetation stress, deposition of effluents and their effects, overt or
covert construction, etc. Such alterations can often be observed from
great distances such as satellite orbits. Thus there is great potential
for exploiting alterations by systems that cover large or nationwide
areas. Significant issues include calibration, removal of atmospheric
effects and the ability to find information of interest. The algorithms
must be able to distill large quantities of data to the essential,
proliferation-relevant information for data transmission and effective
visualization by decision-makers.
New concepts are also welcome for 1) specialized, deployable,
adaptive or reconfigurable processor hardware; 2) combined passive/
active optical systems; or 3) self-unfolding/adjusting optics to
package large systems in small satellites.
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology is advancing rapidly as
we develop the systems and the processing means to utilize this
technology. The Interferometric SAR has shown great potential for
digital terrain mapping, coherent change detection, motion detection,
and other uses. The thrust of research in this area for the future will
be in increasing our processing capabilities, particularly near-real
time processing, so that we can then push forward with plans for
increased systems capabilities. The great advantage which radar systems
have over optical systems is their ability to image under any weather
conditions. The primary disadvantage is that they provide a
monochromatic image of reflective surfaces rather than a full or false
color imaging. However, future dual or multiband SAR systems offer the
potential of textural or polarization information that may correlate
with surface types.
New concepts for using passive microwave sensors and imaging arrays
are also welcome.
Power Line Monitoring includes several technology thrusts that
utilize data either obtained from or derived from power line systems.
Engineering principles and grid modeling of power line configurations
may be used together with observable line configurations to determine
the likelihood of missing or buried elements. Transient pulses may be
introduced into the lines to confirm or refute the modeled behavior.
The passive electromagnetic fields emanating from the power lines may
be mapped, modeled, and analyzed.
Geophysical Methods include gravity, magnetics, and electromagnetic
induction (EMI). Gravity and magnetics look for variations in the
earth's natural fields due to the presence of clandestine facilities.
The deficiency of mass due to excavation of an underground facility
generates a gravity low and the presence of ferromagnetic materials
such as iron in the reinforced concrete and machinery of the facility
generates a magnetic high. Thus one may look for a localized
perturbation of the normal fields as an indication of an underground
facility. The field perturbations generated by such facilities decay
rapidly and generally must be observed within a few thousand meters.
Effective use of these technologies may require the development of both
improved instruments and stabilized airborne platforms. These
development tasks are formidable and require a demonstration of the
utility of the techniques, modeling to show the potential at extended
distances, and an evaluation of the merits of such technology.
Data Fusion is needed to merge the information from the disparate
technologies cited in the previous sections. Each individual sensor
measures some phenomenology that may be indicative of proliferation
activity. The false alarm rate for any given technique may be quite
high. e.g. there are numerous reasons why there may be a gravity low or
why vegetation may be stressed, etc. But combined with other
techniques, the false positive rate is expected to be significantly
lower.
Remote Chemical Detection Program
The goal of the Remote Chemical Detection Program is to be able to
detect chemicals from a stack/vent plume at a distance. Innovative
algorithms which can quickly analyze large volumes of hyperspectral or
ultraspectral data are needed. The goal is to process data from passive
and/or active sensors into usable information. Key issues include
removal of atmospheric effects, backgrounds and other interferences in
the mid-wave infrared (3-5 microns) or in the long-wave infrared (8-14
micron) regions. Algorithms which require a pixel-by-pixel removal of
these effects are too computationally intensive and will not be
considered. Proposals should be tied to specific sensors and contain
benchmarks for how new algorithms improve on the state-of-the-art.
Counter Nuclear Smuggling Program
The primary technical goals of the Counter Nuclear Smuggling
Program are to improve capabilities to detect and intercept diverted
nuclear materials, and to provide improved analytical tools to aid
forensics and attribution assessment. The primary technical challenges
that arise from these goals are: to develop operationally useful,
automated and cost-effective nuclear material detectors; to develop
robust techniques to detect highly enriched uranium; to develop systems
to detect nuclear materials in transit; to develop technologies to
search for nuclear material; and to develop the tools and the data
bases for forensic and attribution assessment of foreign nuclear
material. To address these challenges the Counter Nuclear Smuggling R&D
program is organized into the following program elements: Fundamental
Detection Technology; Highly Enriched Uranium Detection; Nuclear
Material Tracking and Search; and Forensics and Attribution Assessment.
Fundamental Detection Technology is aimed at means for detecting
the intrinsic and/or stimulated radiation from concealed Special
Nuclear Materials (SNM). This type of technology would allow technical
barriers to be employed for detecting and deterring illicit movement of
nuclear materials. The overall objective is to develop new sensors that
are intelligent, provide automated response, operate at room
temperature, consume little power, have good resolution, are cost
effective, and have a low false alarm rate. This can be accomplished at
many levels including basic and applied research on detection
materials, integration of current high resolution room temperature
materials (in particular cadmium zinc telluride) into fieldable
detector systems, development of alternative cooling systems for high
resolution detectors, and miniaturization by exploiting Application
Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) and microfabrication technology.
[[Page 45236]]
Highly Enriched Uranium Detection is extremely difficult in a
passive mode, and HEU is the most likely material a terrorist would use
for a nuclear device. For this reason, there is interest in advancing
active interrogation technologies into prototype HEU detection systems.
The primary emphasis is on developing systems for choke point
monitoring of luggage, small packages, large containers, trucks, rail
cars and sea-going containers. Novel techniques to improve passive or
active detection of HEU are encouraged.
Nuclear Material Tracking and Search capabilities need to be
improved for materials and/or weapons in transit. Possible methods to
improve material tracking include data fusion techniques to improve the
capability of integrated networks of sensors and the tagging of
materials. The goal is to develop systems which can be deployed in
areas around key facilities to detect and track in-coming or out-going
nuclear materials to facilitate interception. Tagging techniques to
improve the ability to monitor the movement of nuclear materials are
also feasible. These measures are typically expected to be extrinsic
devices, e.g. RF transmitters integrated into storage or shipping
containers to track material while in transit or moving inside storage/
handling facilities.
Nuclear material search is extremely important and difficult when
diversion is suspected or known but location and recovery have not yet
occurred. Search requires cueing, e.g. by INTEL or tip-off, to reduce
the search region to a feasible size. DOE Emergency Response,
Radiological Assistance Program and Nuclear Emergency Search Teams have
the pre-eminent nuclear search capability. This program element
involves the development of techniques, systems, and devices to improve
the capabilities of this community. Both passive and active techniques
will be explored.
Forensics and Attribution Assessment focuses on the development of
relevant databases and forensics tools to aid in attribution
assessment. The goal of attribution assessment is to identify the
diversion point, the original source of the material, and the
perpetrators. Recently, a laboratory exercise on a blind sample of
seized nuclear material indicated that the DOE laboratories have
extensive analytical capabilities to characterize such materials.
Lacking is the ability to identify the diversion point, the original
source of the material, and the perpetrator. To improve these
capabilities, research on trace detection and attribution assessment is
needed. This will require research into potential unique
characteristics (isotopes, isotope ratios, etc.) and the relevant
databases to attribute the nuclear material to the original source,
which in turn will help identify the perpetrator.
Issuance: Issued in Las Vegas, Nevada, on August 13, 1998.
G. W. Johnson,
Head of Contracting Activity.
[FR Doc. 98-22780 Filed 8-24-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
