94-21249. Department of the Army Privacy Program  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 166 (Monday, August 29, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
    [Page 0]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-21249]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: August 29, 1994]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
    
    Department of the Army
    
    32 CFR Part 505
    
    [Department of the Army Reg. 340-21]
    
     
    
    Department of the Army Privacy Program
    
    AGENCY: Department of the Army, DoD.
    
    ACTION: Proposed rule.
    
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    SUMMARY: The Department of the Army proposes to revised an existing 
    exemption rule. The exemption rules is for the system of records notice 
    identified as A0381-100bDAMI, entitled Technical Surveillance Index.
    
    DATE: Comments must be received no later than October 28, 1994, to be 
    considered by the agency.
    
    ADDRESSES: Send comments to the U.S. Army Information Systems Command, 
    ATTN: ASOP-MP, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-5000.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Pat Turner at (602) 538-6856 or 
    DSN 879-6856.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Executive Order 12866. The Director, 
    Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense has 
    determined that this Privacy Act rule for the Department of Defense 
    does not constitute `significant regulatory action.' Analysis of the 
    rule indicates that it does not have an annual effect on the economy of 
    $100 million or more; does not create a serious inconsistency or 
    otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; 
    does not materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlement, grants, 
    user fees, or loan programs or the right and obligations of recipients 
    thereof; does not raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of 
    legal mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth 
    in Executive Order 12866 (1993).
    
        Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980. The Director, Administration 
    and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense certifies that this 
    Privacy Act rule for the Department of Defense does not have 
    significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
    because it is concerned only with the administration of Privacy Act 
    systems of records within the Department of Defense.
    
        Paperwork Reduction Act. The Director, Administration and 
    Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, certifies that this 
    Privacy Act rule for the Department of Defense imposes no information 
    requirements beyond the Department of Defense and that the information 
    collected within the Department of Defense is necessary and consistent 
    with 5 U.S.C. 552a, known as the Privacy Act of 1974.
    
    List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 505
    
        Privacy.
    
        Accordingly, the Department of the Army proposes to amend 32 CFR 
    part 505 as follows:
    
        1.The authority citation for 32 CFR part 505 continues to read as 
    follows:
    
        Authority: Pub. L. 93-597, 88 Stat. 1896 (5 U.S.C. 552a)
    
        2.Section 505.5(e), paragraph ag. is revised to read as follows:
    * * * * *
        ag. System identifier and name: A0381-l00bDAMI, Technical 
    Surveillance Index.
        (1) Exemption. This system of records may be exempt from the 
    provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d)(1) through (d)(5), (e)(1), 
    (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I).
        (2) Authority. 5 U.S.C .552a(k)(1), (k)(2) or (k)(5).
        (3) Reasons. From subsection (c)(3) because disclosing the 
    identities of agencies to which information from this system has been 
    released could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or 
    potential criminal violation or intelligence operation; of the 
    existence of that investigation or operation; of the nature and scope 
    of the information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities or of 
    the identify of confidential sources, witnesses, and intelligence or 
    law enforcement personnel and could provide information to enable the 
    subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Granting access to such 
    information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation; 
    endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, 
    intelligence or law enforcement personnel, and their families; lead to 
    the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or 
    the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and 
    procedures. In addition, granting access to such information could 
    disclose classified and sensitive sources and operational methods and 
    could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of 
    others.
    
        From subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5) because granting access to 
    records in this system of records could inform the subject of an 
    investigation of an actual or potential criminal violation; of the 
    existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the 
    information and evidence obtained as to his/her activities; or of the 
    identity of confidential sources, witnesses and intelligence or law 
    enforcement personnel and could provide information to enable the 
    subject to avoid detection or apprehension. Granting access to such 
    information could seriously impede or compromise an investigation; 
    endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, 
    intelligence or law enforcement personnel and their families; lead to 
    the improper influencing of witnesses; the destruction of evidence or 
    the fabrication of testimony and disclose investigative techniques and 
    procedures. In addition, granting access to such information could 
    disclose classified, sensitive sources and operational methods and 
    could constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of 
    others.
    
        From subsection (e)(1) because it is not always possible to detect 
    the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages 
    of an investigation or operation. Relevance and necessity are often 
    questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information 
    is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can 
    be established. In addition, during the course of the investigation or 
    operation, the investigator may obtain information which is incidental 
    to the main purpose of the investigative jurisdiction of another 
    agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated. Furthermore, 
    during the course of the investigation or operation, the investigator 
    may obtain information concerning violation of laws other than those 
    which are within the scope of his/her jurisdiction. In the interest of 
    effective intelligence operations and law enforcement, criminal law 
    enforcement investigators and military intelligence agents should 
    retain this information, since it can aid in establishing patterns of 
    criminal or intelligence activity and can provide valuable leads for 
    other law enforcement or intelligence agencies.
    
        From subsections (e)(4)(G) and (e)(4)(H) because this system of 
    records is being exempt from subsections (d) of the Act, concerning 
    access to records, these requirements are inapplicable to the extent 
    that this system of records will be exempt from subsections (d)(1) 
    through (d)(5) of the Act. Although the system would be exempt from 
    these requirements, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the 
    U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command have published information 
    concerning its notification, access, and contest procedures for their 
    respective areas because, under certain circumstances, the Deputy Chief 
    of Staff for Intelligence or the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations 
    Command could decide it is appropriate for an individual to have access 
    to all or a portion of his/her records in this system of records.
    
        From subsection (e)(4)(I) because it is necessary to protect the 
    confidentiality of the sources of information, to protect the privacy 
    and physical safety of confidential sources and witnesses and to avoid 
    the disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures. Although the 
    system will be exempt from this requirement, the Deputy Chief of Staff 
    for Intelligence and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command have 
    published such a notice in broad, generic terms.
    
        Dated: August 22, 1994.
    
    
    L. M. Bynum,
    Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
    [FR Doc. 94-21249 Filed 8-26-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 5000-04-F
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
08/29/1994
Department:
Army Department
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Action:
Proposed rule.
Document Number:
94-21249
Dates:
Comments must be received no later than October 28, 1994, to be considered by the agency.
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: August 29, 1994, Department of the Army Reg. 340-21
CFR: (1)
32 CFR 505