94-18849. Arizona Public Service Company, et al.; Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Receipt of Petition for Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 and 2.202  

  • [Federal Register Volume 59, Number 148 (Wednesday, August 3, 1994)]
    [Unknown Section]
    [Page 0]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 94-18849]
    
    
    [[Page Unknown]]
    
    [Federal Register: August 3, 1994]
    
    
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    NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
    [Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530]
    
     
    
    Arizona Public Service Company, et al.; Palo Verde Nuclear 
    Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3; Receipt of Petition for 
    Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206 and 2.202
    
        Notice is hereby given that by letter of May 27, 1994, Thomas J. 
    Saporito, on behalf of himself and Florida Energy Consultants, Inc. 
    (petitioners), has raised numerous concerns regarding the Palo Verde 
    Nuclear Generating Station (Palo Verde) operated by the Arizona Public 
    Service Company (licensee). He supplemented his original petition, 
    raising additional issues on July 8, 1994. Petitioners request that the 
    NRC (1) institute a show cause proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 for 
    the modification, suspension, or revocation of the Palo Verde operating 
    licenses; (2) issue a notice of violation against the licensee for 
    continuing to employ The Atlantic Group (TAG) as a labor contractor at 
    Palo Verde; (3) investigate alleged material false statements made by 
    William F. Conway, Executive Vice President at Palo Verde, during his 
    testimony at a DOL hearing (ERA Case No. 92-ERA-30) and that, in the 
    interim, the NRC require that he be relieved of any authority over 
    operations at Palo Verde; (4) investigate the licensee's statements in 
    an August 10, 1993, letter from Mr. Conway to NRC Administrator, Mr. 
    Bobby H. Faulkenberry, regarding Mr. Saporito, in which the licensee 
    said that Mr. Saporito gave materially false, inaccurate, and 
    incomplete information on his application for unescorted access to Palo 
    Verde, so that as a result of that event, he lacks trustworthiness and 
    reliability for access to Palo Verde; (5) investigate pursuant to 10 
    CFR 50.7 the circumstances surrounding the February 1994 termination of 
    licensee employee Joseph Straub, a former radiation protection 
    technician at Palo Verde, to determine if his employment was illegally 
    terminated by the licensee for having engaged in ``protected activity'' 
    during the course of his employment; (6) require that the licensee 
    respond to a ``chilling effect'' letter regarding the circumstances 
    surrounding Mr. Straub's termination from Palo Verde and whether any 
    measures were taken to ensure that his termination did not cause a 
    chilling effect at Palo Verde; and (7) initiate appropriate actions to 
    require the licensee to immediately conduct eddy current testing on all 
    steam generators at Palo Verde, because the steam generator tubes were 
    recently subjected to cracks.
        As bases for these requests, petitioners allege that (1) a show 
    cause proceeding is necessary because the public health and safety 
    concerns alleged are significant and to permit public participation to 
    provide NRC with new and relevant information; (2) past practices of 
    TAG demonstrate that employees of TAG were retaliated against for 
    having raised safety concerns while employed at Palo Verde; (3) 
    citations to testimony from transcripts and numerous newspaper articles 
    (appended as exhibits to the petition), demonstrate that Mr. Conway's 
    testimony is not credible; (4) statements in the August 10, 1993, 
    letter are inaccurate and materially false and characterize Mr. 
    Saporito as an individual lacking trustworthiness and reliability for 
    access to Palo Verde, so that such negative characterizations have 
    blacklisted him from continued employment in the nuclear industry, 
    which is all in retaliation for him raising safety concerns about 
    operations at Palo Verde; thus, petitioners ask that these statements 
    be rescinded; (5) an investigation into the termination of Mr. Straub 
    is warranted in view of the fact that the licensee has engaged in 
    similar illegal conduct in the past where the NRC has required the 
    licensee to pay fines; (6) Mr. Straub is entitled to reinstatement with 
    pay and benefits pending the NRC's investigation into his termination 
    to offset any chilling effect his termination had on the Palo Verde 
    workforce; and (7) the stress corrosion and cracking in the steam 
    generators is a recurring problem of which the licensee is aware and 
    has failed to properly correct, in addition to cooling tower problems, 
    so that the NRC should be concerned about proper maintenance of safety 
    systems and equipment there.
        On July 8, 1994, petitioners filed a supplement raising six 
    additional issues. Petitioners request that the NRC (1) institute a 
    show cause proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202 for the modification, 
    suspension or revocation of the Palo Verde operating licenses for Units 
    1, 2 and 3; (2) modify the Palo Verde operating licenses to require 
    operation at 86% power or less; (3) require the licensee to submit a No 
    Significant Hazards safety analysis to justify operation of those units 
    above 86% power; (4) take immediate action (e.g. confirmatory order) to 
    cause the licensee to reduce operation to 86% power or less; (5) 
    require the licensee to analyze a design basis SGTR event to show that 
    the offsite radiological consequences do not exceed a small fraction of 
    the limits of 10 CFR Part 100; and (6) require the licensee to 
    demonstrate that its emergency operating procedures for SGTR events are 
    adequate and the plant operators are sufficiently trained in emergency 
    operating procedures.
        As bases for these requests, petitioners allege that (1) the 
    licensee experienced a steam generator tube rupture in the free span 
    area on Unit 2 on March 14, 1993; (2) during a January, 1994 inspection 
    on Unit 2, 85 axial indications were identified, the longest indication 
    being 7.5 inches; (3) more extensive testing will confirm the existence 
    of circumferential crack indications in the expansion transition area; 
    (4) in May 1994, steam generator sludge from Units 1 and 2 indicates a 
    lead content of 4,000-6,000 ppm, which is unusually high, accelerates 
    the crevice corrosion process, and is believed to be caused by a 
    feedwater source deficiency; (5) the licensee failed to properly 
    implement operational procedures regarding the March 14, 1993 steam 
    generator tube rupture event, citing eight instances; (6) the 
    licensee's failure to comply with approved procedures in the above 
    event is indicative of a problem plant that warrants further NRC 
    action; (7) the NRC is aware of additional licensee weaknesses 
    regarding the steam generator tube event, citing four instances; (8) 
    the licensee cannot assure that the radiation dose limits are satisfied 
    for applicable postulated accidents; (9) the licensee is not 
    maintaining an adequate level of public protection in that the offsite 
    dose limits will be exceeded during a steam generator tube rupture; 
    (10) the licensee cannot demonstrate that a Palo Verde unit can safely 
    shut down and depressurize to stop steam generator tube leakage prior 
    to a loss of reactor water storage tank inventory; (11) steam generator 
    tubes are an integral part of the reactor coolant boundary, and that 
    tube failures could lead to containment bypass, and therefore must be 
    carefully considered by the NRC and the licensee, (12) the licensee 
    cannot demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A, which 
    establishes the fundamental requirements for steam generator tube 
    integrity; (13) the licensee has failed to comply with NRC requirements 
    under NUREG-0800 to show that in the case of a steam generator tube 
    rupture event, the offsite conditions and single failure do not exceed 
    a small fraction of the limits of 10 CFR part 100; and (14) the 
    licensee has posed an unacceptable risk to public health and safety by 
    raising power on all three Palo Verde units above 86%, considering the 
    severe degradation of the steam generator tubes.
        This request is being treated pursuant to 10 CFR Secs. 2.206 and 
    2.202 of the Commission's regulations. The request has been referred to 
    the Director of the Office of Enforcement and the Director of the 
    Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. In a letter of July 26, 1994, the 
    petitioners' requests that the Commission take immediate action to 
    require eddy current testing on all Palo Verde steam generators, and 
    reduce operation of the Palo Verde units to 86% power or less, have 
    been denied. As provided by Sec. 2.206, appropriate action will be 
    taken on this request within a reasonable time. A copy of the petition 
    is available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 
    2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and local public document room 
    a the Phoenix Public Library, 12 East McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona 
    85004.
    
        Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 26th day of July 1994.
    
        For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
    Joseph R. Gray,
    Deputy Director, Office of Enforcement.
    [FR Doc. 94-18849 Filed 8-2-94; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 7590-01-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
08/03/1994
Department:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Entry Type:
Uncategorized Document
Document Number:
94-18849
Pages:
0-0 (1 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Federal Register: August 3, 1994, Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530