[Federal Register Volume 61, Number 179 (Friday, September 13, 1996)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48474-48479]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 96-23352]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials at the Savannah River Site
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Supplemental record of decision.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials
[[Page 48475]]
at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented. Some
of the particular materials considered in the EIS could present
environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage
condition.
On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a Record of Decision (ROD) and
Notice of Preferred Alternatives (60 FR 65300) on the interim
management of several categories of nuclear materials at the SRS,
including a narrowing of alternatives under consideration for the
stabilization of plutonium-239 and neptunium-237 solutions in H-Canyon,
and obsolete neptunium targets in K-Reactor.
On February 8, 1996, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD (61 FR 6633) for
the stabilization of Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad
targets. DOE also indicated that it was considering a DOE staff
operations study, Facility Utilization Strategy for the Savannah River
Site Chemical Separation Facilities (December 1995) before making a
decision on the stabilization of the remaining two categories of
nuclear materials at the SRS evaluated in the Interim Management of
Nuclear Materials EIS--plutonium-239 solutions, and neptunium-237
solution and obsolete targets.
After further consideration of the facility utilization strategy
study, the Final EIS, budget and schedule projections, and comments
from interested parties, DOE is now issuing the following decision
concerning these materials:
Neptunium-237 Solution and Targets
DOE has decided to dissolve, chemically separate and process in F-
Canyon the neptunium-237 contained in nine (9) obsolete reactor targets
and the existing neptunium-237 in solution currently in the H-Canyon.
The resulting glass will be stored in canisters inside the shielded
canyon facility in F-Canyon or the new Actinide Packaging and Storage
Facility, when constructed, until DOE implements programmatic decisions
on long-term storage, use or disposition of the material.
Plutonium-239 Solutions
DOE has decided to stabilize the plutonium-239 solutions stored in
the H-Canyon facility to a metal, using the F-Canyon and FB-Line
facilities. The plutonium solutions will be converted to metal using
the currently operating F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities. The plutonium
will be packaged in accordance with DOE's storage standard for
plutonium and stored in an existing SRS vault until the Actinide
Packaging and Storage Facility is available. The plutonium will be
stored at the SRS until DOE implements long-term storage and
disposition decisions on weapons useable forms of plutonium. The
plutonium from this stabilization action will be prohibited from use in
nuclear weapons. In addition, DOE is pursuing options for placing this
material under international (e.g., IAEA) safeguards.
By stabilizing these materials in the F-Canyon DOE can avoid both
start up and decontamination costs associated with a portion of the HB-
Line that has never been operated. Moreover, this course of action will
effect the expeditious completion of actions necessary to stabilize and
convert these materials into forms suitable for safe storage and
prepare the facilities for potential shutdown and deactivation.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim
management of nuclear materials at the SRS or to receive a copy of the
Final EIS, the initial ROD and Notice, the first supplemental ROD, or
this second supplemental ROD contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA
Compliance Officer, U.S. Department of Energy, Savannah River
Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031, Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031,
(800) 242-8259, Internet: drew.grainger@srs.gov
For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of
NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave
a message at (800) 472-2756.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared the final
environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials'' (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995), to assess the potential
environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials
at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until
decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented. Some
of the particular materials considered in the EIS could present
environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage
condition.
The Final EIS identified processing to oxide using the H-Canyon and
HB-Line facilities as the preferred alternative for the neptunium-237
solution and targets and the plutonium-239 solutions.
On December 12, 1995, DOE issued a ROD and Notice of Preferred
Alternatives (60 FR 65300) on the interim management of several
categories of nuclear materials at the SRS. In addition, DOE indicated
that neptunium-237 solution and targets would be stabilized either by
processing to oxide or vitrification, and that plutonium-239 solutions
in H-Canyon would be stabilized through processing to metal, processing
to oxide, or vitrification. DOE stated that it would select and
implement one stabilization method for each of these material
categories, and that the stabilization method chosen would be dependent
upon further reviews of costs, schedules, and facility utilization
options.
On February 8, 1996, DOE issued a Supplemental ROD (61 FR 6633) for
the stabilization of two of the remaining categories of nuclear
materials (Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets)
analyzed in the Final EIS.
On February 29, 1996, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, the
Department's management and operating contractor for the Savannah River
Site, advised DOE that, while engaged in a scheduled upgrade of safety
authorization basis documentation, it had discovered that seismic
(earthquake) analyses performed in the early 1980s were based on
assumptions that are inconsistent with the as-built condition of the
canyon facilities. As a result of this discovery, the transfer of
nuclear materials into the canyon facilities was suspended while
detailed analyses and reviews were conducted to ensure the safety of
the canyon facilities and to determine if the information contained in
the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials Final EIS was sufficient.
The F-Canyon analyses have been completed; the H-Canyon analyses are
expected to be completed in September 1996. The completed F-Canyon
analyses indicate that the ability of the F-Canyon facilities to
withstand a severe earthquake is equal to or better than that predicted
in existing Safety Analysis Reports and the EIS. Based on a Supplement
Analysis, DOE determined that a Supplemental EIS for nuclear materials
stabilization in F-Canyon is not required.
After further consideration of the facility utilization strategy
study, the Final EIS, budget and schedule projections, and comments
from interested parties, DOE is now issuing its decisions for the
stabilization of neptunium-237 solution and obsolete targets, and
plutonium-239 solutions, the remaining two categories of nuclear
materials at the SRS evaluated in the
[[Page 48476]]
Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS.
II. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS
DOE evaluated the following alternatives for managing the
neptunium-237 solution and obsolete reactor targets, and the plutonium-
239 solutions at the SRS: (A) Continuing Storage (i.e., ``No Action''
within the context of NEPA), (B) Processing to Oxide, (C) Processing
and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility
(DWPF), and (D) Vitrification (F-Canyon). In addition, Processing to
Metal was also evaluated for the plutonium-239 solutions. The following
is a brief description of the alternatives evaluated.
A. Continuing Storage (No Action)
Under this alternative, DOE would continue to store the materials
in their current physical and chemical form. DOE would relocate or
repackage materials stored in vaults or tanks to consolidate the
material or to respond to an immediate safety problem. Periodic
sampling, destructive and non-destructive examination, weighing, visual
inspection and similar activities would continue in order to monitor
the physical and chemical condition of the nuclear material. Chemicals
would be added to existing solutions in order to maintain concentration
and chemistry within established parameters. Repackaging would include
removing materials from damaged storage containers and placing them in
new containers or placing the damaged containers in larger containers.
A variety of activities could be required to maintain the materials
in their current physical and chemical form. For example, DOE would
maintain facilities in good working condition and would continue to
provide utilities (water, electricity, steam, compressed gas, etc.) and
services (security, maintenance, fire protection, etc.) for each
facility. Training activities would ensure that personnel maintain the
skills necessary to operate the facilities and equipment. DOE would
continue with ongoing projects to alleviate facility-related
vulnerabilities associated with storage of the materials and projects
to upgrade or replace aging equipment (ventilation fans, etc.).
B. Processing to Oxide
DOE would convert existing solutions of neptunium-237 and
plutonium-239 to an oxide in HB-Line. Additional neptunium-237 solution
would be generated in the processing of the obsolete reactor targets.
After conversion of the plutonium and neptunium solutions to oxides,
the oxides would be packaged and stored in accordance with applicable
criteria in an existing vault until a new Actinide Packaging and
Storage Facility is available.
C. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF
DOE would perform research and development work to develop a method
for chemically adjusting existing solutions and solutions that would
result from the dissolution of the obsolete neptunium-237 targets in
order to transfer them to the high level waste tanks in H-Area. The
research and development work would be done to ensure nuclear
criticality safety due to the amount of plutonium-239 in the existing
solutions, and to evaluate the effects of the nuclear materials on the
systems and facilities used to store and treat the liquid high level
waste.
Upon completion of the studies, existing solutions of neptunium-237
and plutonium-239 would be chemically adjusted and transferred to the
high level waste tanks via underground pipelines. DOE would transport
the obsolete targets from the K-Reactor area to F- or H-Canyon where
they would be dissolved in nitric acid. The resulting solutions would
be chemically adjusted and transferred to the high level waste tanks
via underground pipelines. The solutions would be mixed with the
existing volume of high level waste stored in the F- or H-Area tanks.
The bulk of the radioactivity in the solutions would eventually be
immobilized in borosilicate glass in the vitrification process at the
DWPF. The glass would be contained within stainless steel canisters
that would be stored in a facility adjacent to the DWPF pending
geologic disposal by DOE. The bulk of the liquid would be immobilized
by the Saltstone Facility into a grout containing very low levels of
radioactivity. The grout would be poured into concrete vaults located
at the Saltstone Facility.
D. Vitrification (F-Canyon)
For this alternative, DOE would utilize the vitrification
capability that it decided in the December 12, 1995, ROD to install in
F-Canyon for the stabilization of the americium and curium solution.
The existing solutions of neptunium-237 and plutonium-239, currently
stored in H-Canyon, would be transported to F-Canyon for vitrification
upon development or procurement of a suitable shipping container. The
obsolete neptunium-237 targets would be transported from K-Reactor area
to F-Canyon, dissolved in nitric acid, and the neptunium chemically
separated from other materials (principally aluminum). The resulting
neptunium would be vitrified in conjunction with the existing neptunium
solution. Neptunium separated from the processing of the Mark-16 and
Mark-22 fuels pursuant to the February 8, 1996 ROD would be vitrified
in conjunction with the existing neptunium materials. For the
plutonium-239 this vitrified form would not meet the requirements of
the storage standard (DOE Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals
and Oxides (DOE-STD-3013-94)), which prescribes stable oxide or metal.
Furthermore, the vitrified form would require additional processing to
prepare its disposition.
E. Processing to Metal
This alternative applies only to the plutonium-239 solutions. Under
this alternative, DOE would transport the plutonium-239 solutions from
H-Canyon to F-Canyon using the same container described above to
transport the neptunium-237 solution. In F-Canyon, the plutonium
solutions would be converted to plutonium metal using the FB-Line
facility. After conversion, the metal would be packaged and stored in
accordance with DOE's plutonium storage standard (DOE-STD-3013-94) in
an existing vault until a new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility
is available. A new glove box is being installed in FB-Line to provide
the equipment necessary to meet the storage standard criteria for the
packaging of plutonium metal. The plutonium metal would be stored at
the SRS until programmatic decisions are made and implemented by DOE on
long-term storage or disposition.
III. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives
The Final EIS for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials
analyzed the potential environmental impacts that could result from
implementation of the above management alternatives. DOE has concluded
that there would be minimal environmental impact from implementation of
any of these alternatives in the areas of geologic resources,
ecological resources (including threatened or endangered species),
cultural resources, aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land
use. Impacts in these areas would be limited because facility
modifications or construction of new facilities would occur within
existing buildings or industrialized portions of the SRS. DOE
[[Page 48477]]
anticipates that the existing SRS workforce would support any
construction projects and other activities required to implement any of
the alternatives. As a result, DOE expects negligible socioeconomic
impacts from implementing any of the alternatives.
Management alternatives requiring the use of the large chemical
separations facilities would have greater environmental impacts (e.g.,
radiological, waste generation) during the actual dissolving,
processing or conversion activities than simply storing these materials
in the F- and H-Canyon facilities. After dissolving, processing and
conversion activities have stabilized these materials, however, impacts
of normal facility operations related to management of these materials
would decline, and potential impacts of accidents associated with these
materials would be reduced, with certain kinds of accidents eliminated
(e.g., solution spills or releases). Potential health effects from
normal operations from any of the alternatives, including those
involving the operation of the canyon facilities, would be low and well
within regulatory limits. All of the alternatives require some use of
the canyon facilities.
Annual impacts from normal operations and potential accidents
associated with nuclear material storage would be reduced after
material stabilization alternatives are implemented. Since actively
operating facilities have potentially larger environmental impacts,
stabilization alternatives requiring longer periods of time to complete
are estimated to have relatively higher impacts than alternatives
requiring less time to complete.
Continuing Storage (or ``No Action'') alternatives would result in
low annual environmental impacts, but the impacts would continue for an
indefinite period of time. Stabilization alternatives would be expected
to result in slightly higher annual environmental impacts than ``No
Action'' in the near-term, but would result in lower environmental
impacts upon completion of the stabilization action. Under Continuing
Storage alternatives, although chemicals would be added to existing
solutions in order to maintain concentrations and chemistry within
established parameters, no actions would be taken to chemically or
physically stabilize the storage conditions. All of the stabilization
alternatives, upon completion of the actions required, would reduce the
potential for accidents and associated consequences. Several of the
stabilization alternatives would involve a short-term increase in the
risks from accidents until the required actions are completed.
Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous
liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable
federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS
facilities. Similarly, high level liquid waste, transuranic waste,
mixed hazardous waste and low level solid waste generated by
implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing
waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are
within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities
for storage, treatment or disposal.
SRS facilities that will be used to stabilize and store the nuclear
materials incorporate engineered features to limit the potential
impacts of facility operations to workers, the public and the
environment. All of the engineered systems and administrative controls
are subject to DOE Order requirements to ensure safe operation of the
facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified;
therefore DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.
IV. Other Factors
In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing
the various alternatives, DOE considered other factors in making the
decisions announced in this supplemental ROD. These other factors
included: (1) The need to construct and operate modified or new
facilities (e.g., a vitrification facility) and the reliability of
older facilities, (2) nonproliferation concerns, involving potential
impacts to United States nonproliferation policy as affected by both
the operation of certain facilities and the attractiveness of the
managed nuclear materials for potential weapons use, (3) implementation
schedules, (4) technology availability, (5) labor availability and core
competency, (6) level of custodial care for the continued safe
management of the nuclear materials, (7) cost and budget
considerations, (8) technical uncertainty (e.g., radiation and
chemically induced changes to solution chemistry, criticality concerns
for undeveloped processes), and (9) comments received during the
scoping period for the EIS on the Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials, and comments received on the Draft and Final EISs.
V. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives
As described in the Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear
Materials, certain management alternatives are expected to result in
lower environmental impacts than others. However, a single alternative
was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all environmental
factors evaluated by DOE. For example, an alternative might be expected
to result in lower releases of hazardous pollutants to air or water
than other alternatives, but might generate slightly higher amounts of
radioactive waste. DOE reviewed the environmental impacts estimated for
the alternatives evaluated for the neptunium-237 solution and targets,
and plutonium-239 solutions, and identified the following as the
environmentally preferable alternative for each material. The health
and environmental effects from any of the alternatives are all low and
well within regulatory limits.
Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon)
Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable
alternative for stabilizing solutions and targets containing neptunium.
Although vitrification in F-Canyon is estimated to result in slightly
higher radiological doses to the SRS workers, it is estimated to result
in the lowest potential radiological doses to the offsite public.
Similarly, although it could result in higher airborne emissions of
hazardous pollutants than the other alternatives, the levels of liquid
effluent emissions would be comparable to the other alternatives.
Vitrification (F-Canyon) would generate the least amount of high level,
transuranic and mixed waste, and would generate comparable amounts of
low level waste to the other alternatives.
Plutonium-239--Vitrification (F-Canyon)
Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable
alternative for stabilizing the plutonium-239 solutions stored in H-
Canyon. Of the stabilization alternatives, vitrification in F-Canyon is
estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite
public and the SRS workers; result in comparable levels of hazardous
pollutant emissions to the air and water; and result in the least
amount of transuranic, mixed, and low level waste with comparable
amounts of high level waste. However, as indicated above, this
alternative would require additional processing of the vitrified
plutonium to prepare it for disposition.
[[Page 48478]]
VI. Decision
After careful consideration of the issues and public comments
received concerning the stabilization and management of SRS nuclear
materials, the analyses of environmental impacts (including the ability
of the F-Canyon facilities to withstand severe seismic events) and
other factors, DOE has made the following decisions for the interim
management of neptunium-237 and plutonium-239:
Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon)
DOE has decided to stabilize the neptunium-237 solution and
obsolete reactor targets by vitrification in F-Canyon (the
environmentally preferable alternative). The neptunium solution will be
transported from H-Canyon to F-Canyon in a container meeting DOE Order
0460.1, PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION SAFETY requirements. Transport of
the package will be subjected to management controls, such as
restrictions on vehicle speed, route specifications, and escort
requirements. The nine obsolete reactor targets will be transported
from K-Reactor to F-Canyon. At F-Canyon, the targets will be dissolved
and processed to separate the neptunium from other materials
(principally aluminum). These other materials will be sent to the high
level waste tanks for eventual treatment through the Saltstone and DWPF
facilities. The existing neptunium solution and those generated from
the obsolete reactor targets will be placed in a glass matrix, using
vitrification equipment to be installed in F-Canyon (as announced in
the December 12, 1995 ROD and Notice for the vitrification of the
americium and curium solution). In addition, neptunium separated from
the stabilization of the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels (as announced in the
February 8, 1996 supplemental ROD) will be stabilized in conjunction
with these other solutions. The resulting stainless steel canisters
containing the neptunium glass will be stored in the F-Canyon or a new
Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, when constructed, until DOE
implements programmatic decisions on the future use or disposition of
the neptunium.
DOE selected vitrification in F-Canyon for several reasons.
Although the SRS has an existing facility (HB-Line, Phase II) designed
to purify and convert neptunium (and plutonium-239) to an oxide, it has
never been operated. DOE can avoid both the costs to start up this
portion of the HB-Line facility and the future decontamination of the
facility by vitrifying the solution in F-Canyon. DOE could transfer the
neptunium solution in H-Canyon to the adjacent high level waste tanks
and eventually vitrify them in the DWPF. However, the physical form of
glass produced by the DWPF would render any future recovery and use of
the neptunium impractical due to cost and technical complexity.
To maintain the neptunium in a concentrated physical form, thus
preserving the potential for future use (for the potential production
of plutonium-238), DOE evaluated alternatives for converting the
neptunium to either an oxide or glass. Either form could support future
use of the material, if required. DOE has found that the glass form
offers significant advantages over the oxide form for future storage
and handling. The glass matrix produced by the vitrification process
provides some ``self-shielding'' compared to oxide. This reduces the
radiation levels associated with the neptunium, thereby reducing
exposure to workers. The glass matrix is also a much less dispersible
form of radioactive material compared to the oxide in the event of a
severe facility- related accident, such as a major fire. DOE has
decided to dissolve and process the nine obsolete reactor targets
because it would be advantageous to recover and consolidate the
neptunium-237 into a single physical form for continued safe storage.
The amount of material to be dissolved and processed is very small and
can be done at minimal cost.
Potential waste generation impacts are lower for the selected
vitrification alternative than for the processing to oxide alternative.
Potential safety and health impacts to workers and the public, and
potential impacts to air and water resources are comparable between the
two alternatives. Potential safety, health and environmental impacts
are low and well within regulatory and management control limits.
Plutonium-239--Processing to Metal
DOE has decided to stabilize the plutonium-239 solutions by
processing them to metal in the currently operating F-Canyon and FB-
Line facilities. Plutonium-239 solutions will be transported from H-
Canyon to F-Canyon in a container meeting DOE Order 0460.1, PACKAGING
AND TRANSPORTATION SAFETY requirements. Transport of the package will
be subjected to management controls, such as restrictions on vehicle
speed, route specifications, and escort requirements. The plutonium-239
solutions will undergo processing as necessary to remove impurities
that would interfere with the conversion to metal process in FB-Line.
The resulting stabilized plutonium metal will be packaged in accordance
with DOE's storage standard (DOE-STD-3013-94) and stored in an existing
vault at the SRS until a new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility is
available. The plutonium will be stored until DOE implements long-term
storage and disposition decisions on weapons useable forms of
plutonium.
As indicated above, the SRS could use a never-before operated
portion of the HB-Line to stabilize the plutonium-239 to an oxide.
Startup and future decontamination costs associated with this facility
will be avoided by processing the plutonium to metal in the F-Canyon
and FB-Line facilities. DOE evaluated transferring the plutonium-239
solutions to the adjacent high level waste tanks for storage and
subsequent vitrification in DWPF. This alternative would be more
technically complex and potentially more expensive, and added
criticality controls would be needed for tanks and facilities used for
storage and treatment of the high level liquid waste.
DOE also considered vitrifying the plutonium in F-Canyon (the
environmentally preferable alternative) using the same equipment in F-
Canyon as planned for the vitrification of the americium/curium and
neptunium solutions. This would produce a glass matrix with similar
safe storage characteristics as described above for the vitrified
neptunium. Demonstration and research activities are currently ongoing
concerning vitrification of surplus plutonium pursuant to the
Department's Materials Disposition program, but those activities focus
primarily on stable forms of plutonium that are not in solution.
Additional research and analytical work would be required for
vitrification of plutonium solutions which may pose a health, safety or
environmental concern in the next 10 years to ensure adequate
criticality controls for the conversion process and for the safe
storage of the product. It is expected that vitrification equipment
modifications would be required to ensure adequate criticality control.
Thus, while vitrification is not as viable as processing to metal in
the near term, the decision to stabilize the plutonium to metal is
compatible with all alternatives being considered for disposition of
surplus weapons-useable plutonium.
Potential waste generation impacts from processing to metal are
comparable to the vitrification (environmentally preferable)
alternative for high level waste, but greater for transuranic and
[[Page 48479]]
low level wastes. Potential safety and health impacts to workers and
the public, and potential impacts to air and water resources for the
conversion activity are comparable for the processing to metal, oxide,
or vitrification alternatives. Potential safety, health and
environmental impacts are low and well within regulatory and management
control limits.
The selected stabilization action will result in plutonium metal, a
weapons-usable product. However, the quantity produced (including the
metal to be produced as a result of decisions made in the December 12,
1995 ROD and Notice) will be a small fraction of DOE's existing
inventory of plutonium metal, and DOE believes this small amount does
not present nuclear proliferation concerns. None of the stabilization
alternatives would denature the plutonium in a way that would preclude
its recovery and use in nuclear weapons manufacture. The stabilized
plutonium will not be used for nuclear explosive purposes. In addition,
DOE is pursuing options for placing surplus plutonium-239 under
international (e.g., IAEA) safeguards.
Finally, as noted above, the H-Canyon seismic analyses are expected
to be completed in September 1996. A decision now to move neptunium and
plutonium solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon is permissible and
appropriate prior to the completion of the H-Canyon analyses because
removal of the materials from H-Canyon would not involve operation of
the HB-Line, but would result in reducing the amount of nuclear
materials present in H-Canyon. No additional nuclear materials will be
introduced into H-Canyon until the on-going seismic analyses are
complete.
VII. Conclusion
The Final EIS analyzes interim management alternatives for nuclear
materials at the SRS. Those alternatives and the decisions associated
with the safe management of these materials directly affect the
operational status of the nuclear material processing facilities at the
Site. The decisions in this supplemental ROD, as in the December 12,
1995 ROD and Notice and February 8, 1996 Supplemental ROD, are
structured to effect the completion of actions necessary to stabilize
or convert nuclear materials into forms suitable for safe storage and
prepare the facilities for potential subsequent shutdown and
deactivation. The actions being implemented will support efficient,
cost-effective consolidation of the storage of nuclear materials and
will result in stabilization of the nuclear materials and alleviation
of associated vulnerabilities within the time frame recommended by the
DNFSB.
The stabilization decisions utilize existing facilities and
processes to the extent practical; can be implemented within expected
budget constraints and with minimal additional training for involved
personnel; rely upon proven technology; use an integrated approach
considering a multiplicity of factors; and represent the optimum use of
facilities to stabilize the materials in the shortest amount of time.
Only minor modifications of the canyon facilities will be required
(loading and unloading stations, and modification to the vitrification
equipment to be installed for the americium/curium solution
stabilization as announced in the December 12, 1995 ROD and Notice).
Several years will be required to achieve stabilization of the
nuclear materials within the scope of this and the previous RODs.
Stabilization of the candidate nuclear materials will entail the
operation of many portions of the chemical processing facilities and,
consistent with DNFSB Recommendation 94-1, will preserve DOE's
capabilities for the management and stabilization of other nuclear
materials until programmatic decisions are made.
Issued at Washington, DC, September 6, 1996.
Alvin L. Alm,
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.
[FR Doc. 96-23352 Filed 9-12-96; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P
