[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 176 (Monday, September 13, 1999)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 49410-49413]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-23691]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 176 / Monday, September 13, 1999 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 49410]]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 73
[Docket No. PRM-73-10]
State of Nevada; Receipt of Petition for Rulemaking
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; notice of receipt.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is publishing for
public comment a notice of receipt of a petition for rulemaking, dated
June 22, 1999, which was filed with the Commission by the State of
Nevada. The petition was docketed by the NRC on July 13, 1999, and has
been assigned Docket No. PRM-73-10. The petitioner requests that the
NRC amend its regulations governing safeguards for shipments of spent
nuclear fuel against sabotage and terrorism. The petitioner requests
that the NRC conduct a comprehensive assessment of the consequences of
terrorist attacks that have the capability of radiological sabotage,
including attacks against transportation infrastructure used during
nuclear waste shipments, attacks involving capture of nuclear waste
shipments and use of high energy explosives against a cask or casks,
and direct attacks upon a nuclear waste shipping cask or casks using
antitank missiles or other military weapons.
DATES: Submit comments by November 29, 1999. Comments received after
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
Commission is able to assure consideration only for comments received
on or before this date.
ADDRESSES: Submit written comments to the Secretary of the Commission,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001,
Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff. Hand deliver comments
to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and
4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.
For a copy of the petition, write to David L. Meyer, Chief, Rules
and Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001.
You may also provide comments via the NRC's interactive rulemaking
website at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. This site provides the capability
to upload comments as files (any format), if your web browser supports
that function. For information about the interactive rulemaking
website, contact Ms. Carol Gallagher, (301) 415-5905 (e-mail:
cag@nrc.gov).
The petition and copies of comments received may be inspected and
copied for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW.
(Lower Level), Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David L. Meyer, Chief, Rules and
Directives Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of
Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001, Telephone: 301-415-7162 or Toll Free: 800-368-5642.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
The Petitioner
The petitioner (the State of Nevada) is a corridor state for spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments, and has been a destination and origin
state for SNF shipments to and from federal research facilities. Under
current law, Nevada is the potential host state for a federal geologic
repository and could become the ultimate destination for shipments of
SNF and high-level radioactive waste (HLW). The petitioner has an
interest in protecting the citizens of Nevada from risks associated
with the transportation of SNF and HLW. The petitioner also has an
interest as the entity responsible for immediate emergency response, in
ensuring that transporters of SNF have adequately prepared for
potential emergencies within the State of Nevada. The petitioner notes
a particular concern for physical protection of SNF shipments under 10
CFR part 73.
Background
As part of this petition, the petitioner has included two separate
reports--
(1) Nuclear Waste Transportation Security and Safety Issues; The
Risk of Terrorism and Sabotage Against Repository Shipments, prepared
by Robert J. Halstead, Transportation Consultant , Portage, Wisconsin,
and James David Ballard, School of Criminal Justice, Grand Valley State
University, Grand Rapids, Michigan, dated October 1997 (Attachment A);
and
(2) The Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Waste;
A Systematic Basis for Planning and Management at National, Regional,
and Community Levels, prepared for the Nevada Nuclear Waste Project
Office by the Planning Information Corporation, dated September 10,
1996 (Attachment B).
The petitioner's primary interest is the potential for many
thousands of SNF and HLW shipments to Yucca Mountain and the Nevada
Test Site. The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act (NWPAA) of 1987
designated Yucca Mountain as the site to be characterized for a
national geologic repository for SNF and HLW. The petitioner states
that legislation pending in Congress would designate the Nevada Test
Site as sole location for a centralized interim storage facility. The
petitioner states that a study prepared for the Nevada Agency for
Nuclear Projects, estimates that 20,200 shipments (13,900 by rail/6,300
by truck) will occur over about 30 years. The same study projected
56,600 to 104,500 shipments over 40 years, for a repository combined
with an interim storage facility.
The petitioner believes that a national repository or interim
storage facility may have a greater symbolic value to terrorists as a
target for attack than at a reactor storage facility, and that the
enhanced symbolic value of the facility as a target may extend to SNF
shipments to a national repository or interim storage facility. The
petitioner states that in a review of national storage and disposal
policy options, the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB)
observed that compared to reactor sites ``a single facility with a
large stockpile of spent fuel might be a more tempting and visible
target.'' 1 The petitioner agrees with the NWTRB
[[Page 49411]]
conclusion that more analyses are needed to determine if ``either an
at-reactor or centralized storage facility would be more exposed to
theft or sabotage,'' and that these analyses should also consider SNF
shipments to a centralized facility. The petitioner also believes that
a storage or disposal facility operated by the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE), the U.S. government agency responsible for producing
nuclear weapons, may have greater symbolic value to terrorists as a
target for attack than commercial storage facilities, and that the
enhanced symbolic value may extend to DOE's shipments of SNF and HLW to
this type of facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Report of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
entitled ``Disposal and Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel--Finding the
Right Balance; A Report to Congress and the Secretary of Energy,''
at 20 (March 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The petitioner believes that the nature of the terrorist threat has
changed significantly since the Commission last evaluated the adequacy
of its SNF transportation safeguards regulations in 1984. The
petitioner believes that a general strengthening of the regulations
intended to safeguard SNF shipments is necessary because of what they
identify as new developments in two critical areas:
(1) Changes in the nature of the terrorist threat; and
(2) Increased vulnerability of shipping casks to terrorist attacks
involving high-energy explosive devices.
It is the petitioner's position that since 1984, three major
changes have occurred in the nature of the terrorist threat that argue
for a strengthening of the safeguards regulations:
(1) An increase in lethality of terrorist attacks in the United
States;
(2) An increase in serious terrorist attacks and threats against
transportation systems; and
(3) A renewal of concern about nuclear terrorism generally, and
specifically terrorist actions involving potential radioactive
contamination.
The petitioner believes that the willingness of terrorists to kill
or injure large numbers of Americans, demonstrated in the World Trade
Center and Oklahoma City bombings, compels a focus on incidents that
are clearly intended to cause, or could cause, radiological sabotage.
The petitioner believes that developments in two related areas have
increased the vulnerability of spent fuel shipping casks to terrorist
attacks involving high-energy explosive devices since the NRC last
evaluated the adequacy of its SNF transportation safeguards
regulations. Their first premise is that the capabilities and
availability of explosive devices, especially antitank weapons, have
increased significantly. Their second is that new spent fuel shipping
cask designs, developed to increase payloads without exceeding
specified weight limits, appear to be more vulnerable to attacks
involving past, current, and future weapons systems and commercial
explosives. The petitioner believes that these developments argue for a
strengthening of the safeguards regulations.
The petitioner believes that portable tank weapons have become more
powerful, more reliable, and more available worldwide since the early
1980s. The petitioner believes that most, if not all, of the antitank
missiles identified in Attachment A of the petition (Table 5), have
warheads capable of completely perforating a truck cask and its spent
fuel cargo, and most are capable of deeply penetrating or completing
perforating a rail cask and damaging the spent fuel inside. The
petitioner states that these weapons are designed to hit moving targets
at a distance of 30 meters or more, eliminating the need to capture the
cask, and facilitating selection of optimal attack times and locations.
The petitioner believes that the portability of these weapons allows
further flexibility in attack planning, including use of multiple
warheads, and in escape planning.
The petitioner believes that the SNF shipping casks are vulnerable
to attacks using military and commercial explosives, particularly
conical shaped charges. The petitioner states that DOE-sponsored tests
in the early 1980s demonstrated that an attack on a truck using a large
military shaped charge could result in release of one percent of the
SNF cargo, and that well-trained terrorists planning to capture,
control and directly attack spent fuel shipping casks are likely to use
shaped charges as their weapon of choice. The petitioner believes that
the technology of shape charges and detonation systems, especially for
applications in the construction and petroleum industries, and for
specialized purposes such as military demining, have continued to
evolve since the early 1980s. Numerous ``off the shelf'' military and
commercial shape charges weighing around one kilogram are capable of
penetrating 10 to 20 inches of steel.
The petitioner believes that new spent fuel shipping cask designs,
developed to increase payloads without exceeding specified weight
limits, appear vulnerable to attacks involving current and future
military weapons systems and commercial explosives. The petitioner
believes the casks used for shipments to a repository and/or interim
storage facility shipments will have different design configurations,
and will use different structural and shielding materials, compared to
casks currently in use, and compared to the older casks that were
assumed in the DOE and NRC sabotage consequence assessments in the
early 1980s. The petitioner states that some of these differences may
make them more vulnerable to attack with armor-piercing weapons or
high-energy explosives.
The Petition
The petitioner requests that the NRC reexamine the issue of
terrorism and sabotage against spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste shipments to determine the adequacy of the current
physical protection regulations and to assist the DOE and the affected
stakeholders in the preparation of a legally sufficient environmental
impact statement as part of the NRC licensing process for a geologic
repository or an interim storage facility.
The petitioner requests that the NRC conduct a comprehensive
assessment of consequences of three types of attacks that have the
potential for radiological sabotage--
(1) Attacks against transportation infrastructure used by nuclear
waste shipments,
(2) Attacks involving capture of a nuclear waste shipment and use
of high-energy explosives against the cask; and
(3) Direct attacks upon a nuclear shipping cask using antitank
missiles or other military weapons.
The petitioner states that the consequence assessment for
repository shipments should address the full range of impact of a
terrorism/sabotage event resulting in a release of radioactive
materials: immediate and long-term implications for public health;
environmental impacts, broadly defined; standard socio-economic
impacts, including cleanup and disposal costs and opportunity costs to
affected individuals and businesses; and so-called special socio-
economic impacts, including individual and collective psychological
trauma, and economic losses resulting from public perceptions of risk
and stigma effects.
The petitioner requests that the Commission reexamine the design
basis threat used to design safeguards systems to protect shipments of
SNF against acts of radiological sabotage. The current regulations
under 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1)(i), require licensees to design safeguards
systems to protect shipments against attacks involving several well-
trained and dedicated individuals, hand-held automatic weapons, a four-
wheel drive land vehicle, and hand-carried equipment, including
incapacitating agents and explosives. The regulations
[[Page 49412]]
should also specify that the attackers may receive insider (employee)
assistance and use a four-wheel drive land vehicle bomb.
The petitioner requests that the Commission clarify the meaning of
``hand-carried equipment'' within the current design basis threat. The
petitioner requests that the NRC amend the design basis threat to
include use of explosive devices and other weapons larger than those
commonly considered to be hand-carried or hand-held, and the use of
vehicles other than four-wheel drive civilian land vehicles. The
petitioner states that well-trained and dedicated adversaries could
conceivably obtain and use military attack vehicles or military
aircraft armed with bombs, missiles, or other powerful weapons. The
petitioner believes that the possibility of attacks involving stolen or
otherwise diverted military weapons system should be given special
consideration considering the number and nature of military
installations in Nevada and along the transportation corridors to
Nevada.
The petitioner requests that the NRC reexamine the definition of
``radiological sabotage'' in 10 CFR 73.2. Currently, NRC regulations
define ``radiological sabotage'' as ``* * * any deliberate act directed
against a plant or transport in which an activity licensed pursuant to
the regulations in * * * (10 CFR part 73) is conducted, or against a
component of such a plant or transport which could directly or
indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to
radiation.''
The petitioner believes that the wording ``could directly or
indirectly endanger'' implies a judgment by the NRC regarding the
consequences of the action, as opposed to the intentions of the
individuals carrying out the action. The petitioner states that actions
against SNF shipments that are intended to cause a loss of shielding or
a release of radioactive materials should be included in the definition
of ``radiological sabotage,'' regardless of the success or failure of
the action. The petitioner states that the definition should include
deliberate actions that cause, or are intended to cause, economic
damage or social disruption regardless of the extent to which public
health and safety are actually endangered by exposure to radiation. The
petitioner believes that an incident involving an intentional release
of radioactive materials, especially in a heavily populated area, could
cause widespread social disruption and substantial economic losses even
if there were no immediate human casualties and few projected latent
cancer fatalities. The petitioner believes that local fears and
anxieties would be amplified by national and international media
coverage. The petitioner believes that adverse economic impacts would
include the cost of emergency response, evacuation, decontamination and
disposal; opportunity costs to affected individuals, property-owners,
and businesses; and economic losses resulting from public perceptions
of risk and stigma effects.
The petitioner requests that the NRC reexamine its regulations
requiring advance route approval requirements, in light of the expected
increase in SNF shipments once a Federal repository or interim storage
facility begins operations. The petitioner states that neither the
current physical protection regulations, nor the U.S. Department of
Transportation's routing regulations, require shippers and carriers to
minimize shipments through highly populated areas. The petitioner
states that since 1979, the NRC has approved many highway routes
through heavily populated areas, including I-15 through Las Vegas, NV,
and I-80 through Reno-Sparks, NV. The petitioner states that a
transportation risk assessment recently published by the NRC assumes
that tens of thousands of truck shipments to a repository at Yucca
Mountain, NV, could travel through Las Vegas, NV, and other heavily
populated areas of Clark County, Nevada.
The current regulations requiring advance route approval require
licensees to provide for advance approval by the NRC of the routes used
for road and rail shipments of spent fuel, and of any U.S. ports where
vessels carrying spent fuel shipments are scheduled to stop [10 CFR
73.37(b)(7)].
The petitioner believes that the NRC should specifically require
shippers and carriers to identify primary and alternate routes that
minimize highway and rail shipments through heavily populated areas.
The petitioner states that the NRC should adopt the route selection
criteria in NUREG-0561 2 as part of the regulations, and
specifically require shippers and carriers to minimize use of routes
that fail to comply with the route selection criteria.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Copies of NUREGS may be purchased from the Reproduction and
Distribution Section, Office of the Chief Information Officer, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Copies are
also available from the National Technical Information Service, 5285
Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161. A copy is also available for
inspection and/or copying at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L
Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The petitioner requests that the NRC reexamine its regulations
requiring armed escorts for SNF shipments by road. These current
regulations state, in part:
Sec. 73.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor
fuel in transit.
(c) * * *
(1) A transport vehicle within a heavily populated area is:
(i) Occupied by at least two individuals, one of whom serves as
escort, and escorted by an armed member of the local law enforcement
agency in a mobile unit of such agency: or
(ii) Led by a separate vehicle occupied by at least one armed
escort, and trailed by a third vehicle occupied by at least one
armed escort.
(2) A transport vehicle not within any heavily populated area
is:
(i) Occupied by at least one driver and one other individual who
serves as escort; or
(ii) Occupied by a driver and escorted by a separate vehicle
occupied by at least two escorts; or
(iii) Escorted as set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section.
* * * * *
The petitioner requests that the NRC amend its regulations to
eliminate the differential armed escort requirements based on
population. The petitioner contends that the current requirements for
shipments within a heavily populated area should be uniformly applied
to all road shipments. The petitioner believes that residents of small
cities, towns, and rural areas along shipment routes are entitled to
the same level of protection as residents of heavily populated areas.
The petitioner states that there are many Nevada locations outside of
designated, heavily populated areas with significant population
concentrations within one-half mile of a potential SNF shipment route.
The petitioner asserts that many difficult-to-evacuate facilities, such
as schools, hospitals, industrial plants, shopping centers, hotels, and
resorts, are located immediately adjacent to potential truck shipment
routes in small cities and towns; several major water supplies and
outdoor recreation facilities with high, seasonal population densities
are located in close proximity to potential truck shipments routes in
rural Nevada.
The petitioner also requests the NRC to increase the armed escort
requirements for truck shipments. The petitioner believes that new,
high-capacity, legal-weight truck SNF shipping cask designs may be
particularly vulnerable to attacks involving high-energy explosive
devices. At a minimum, the NRC should consider requiring at least one
armed escort each in a lead vehicle and a chase vehicle, with one
escort being a state or local law enforcement officer.
[[Page 49413]]
The petitioner requests that the NRC eliminate the differential
armed escort requirements for rail shipments based on population. The
current regulations state, in part:
Sec. 73.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor
fuel in transit.
(d) * * *
(1) A shipment car within a heavily populated area is
accompanied by two armed escorts (who may be members of a local law
enforcement agency), at least one of whom is stationed at a location
on the train that will permit observation of the shipment car while
in motion.
(2) A shipment car not within any heavily populated area is
accompanied by at least one escort stationed at a location on the
train that will permit observation of the shipment car while in
motion.
* * * * *
The petitioner states that in Nevada and other western states, many
small cities and towns grew up around rail lines and rail service
facilities. In these communities, there are significant population
concentrations within one-half mile of a potential SNF rail shipment
route. In Nevada and other western states, mainline railroads are
frequently located in river valleys near major water supplies. The
petitioner also states that mainline railroads of national economic
significance may, in-and-of themselves, be as attractive as targets for
terrorists as heavily populated areas. The Union Pacific Salt Lake
City-Los Angeles mainline through southern Nevada, potentially the
primary shipment route to Yucca Mountain, is a rail route of national
economic significance.
The petitioner requests that the NRC, as part of re-examining its
physical protection requirements, consider increasing substantially the
armed escort requirements for rail shipments. The petitioner believes
that new high-capacity (125 ton) rail shipping cask designs may be
particularly vulnerable to attacks involving antitank missiles, and
that armed escorts aboard the train could be incapacitated at the
beginning of an attack, or as a result of a train derailment. The
petitioner requests that the NRC consider requiring at least two armed
escorts in an escort vehicle, in addition to the two armed escorts
aboard the train.
Based on recent experience during the foreign research reactor SNF
shipments through Nevada, the petitioner believes the NRC should also
consider requiring continuous, real-time aircraft surveillance along
certain rail route segments through rough terrain and through heavily
populated areas. The NRC should evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages of requiring a level of protection comparable to that
provided for rail shipments of strategic special nuclear materials
(SNM); seven armed escorts stationed in a variety of configurations
aboard the train or in one or more escort vehicles.
The petitioner requests that the NRC adopt additional planning and
scheduling requirements for the physical protection of SNF shipments
based on the precautions already applied to shipments of SNM. The
current regulations for shipments of SNM state, in part:
Sec. 73.26 Transportation physical protection systems, subsystems,
components, and procedures.
(b) * * *
(1) Shipments shall be scheduled to avoid regular patterns and
preplanned to avoid areas of natural disaster or civil disorders,
such as strikes or riots. Such shipments shall be planned in order
to avoid storage times in excess of 24 hours and to assure that
deliveries occur at a time when the receiver at the final delivery
point is present to accept the shipment.
* * * * *
The petitioner requests that the NRC amend the general requirements
for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit by
adopting the same planning and scheduling requirements for special
nuclear material in transit.
The petitioner requests that the NRC require all rail shipments of
SNF to be made in dedicated trains. Considering the potentially large
number of cross-country rail shipments to a repository and/or storage
facility, more than 12,000 rail cask shipments of SNF and more than
1,000 rail cask shipments of HLW, the petitioner believes that the
performance objectives set forth in Sec. 73.37(a)(1) can only be met by
requiring all rail shipments to be made in dedicated trains. The
petitioner also requests that the NRC consider the physical protection
implications of shipping SNF in dedicated trains compared to general
rail freight service. While continuing to believe that the use of
dedicated trains should be mandatory, the petitioner acknowledges
arguments that dedicated trains pose certain disadvantages from a
physical protection standpoint. The petitioner states that dedicated
trains may facilitate target tracking and attack scheduling by
potential adversaries, and multiple casks in a short train may
facilitate target selection and weapon delivery. According to the
petitioner, the NRC's consequence assessment should evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of shipping SNF in dedicated trains,
assuming both current and enhanced requirements or rail shipment armed
escorts.
The Petitioner's Conclusions
The petitioner submits that the foregoing regulatory amendments and
the need for a comprehensive assessment are necessitated by changes in
the nature of the terrorist threat and increased vulnerability of
shipping casks to terrorist attacks involving high-energy explosive
devices, as set forth in the petition. In the interest of safeguarding
the public health, safety, and welfare, the petitioner urges the
Commission to undertake the tasks outlined in the petition.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 7th day of September, 1999.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 99-23691 Filed 9-10-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
