[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 177 (Wednesday, September 14, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-22656]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: September 14, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
28 CFR Part 16
[AAG/A Order No. 94-94]
Exemption of System of Records Under the Privacy Act
AGENCY: Department of Justice.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Department of Justice, FBI, revises Sec. 16.96 of Title 28
of the Code of Federal Regulations to exempt a Privacy Act system of
records from subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a (c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1),
(2), and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(5), (e)(8), (f) and (g) of the
Privacy Act. The system of records is the FBI Counterdrug Information
Indices System. Information in the system consists of automated indices
related to the law enforcement activities and responsibilities of the
FBI regarding drug law enforcement. These exemptions are necessary to
avoid interference with the law enforcement functions and
responsibilities of the FBI. Reasons for the exemptions are set forth
in the text below.
EFFECTIVE DATE: September 14, 1994.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Patricia E. Neely, (202) 616-0178.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This order relates to individuals rather
than small business entities. Nevertheless, pursuant to the
requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, it is
hereby stated that the order will not have a ``significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.''
List of Subjects in Part 16
Administrative Practices and Procedure, Courts, Freedom of
Information Act, Government in the Sunshine Act, and Privacy Act.
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Attorney General by 5
U.S.C. 552a and delegated to me by Attorney General Order No. 793-78,
28 CFR Part 16 is amended as set forth below.
Dated: August 29, 1994.
Stephen R. Colgate,
Assistant Attorney General for Administration.
1. The authority for Part 16 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, 552a, 552b(g), 553; 18 U.S.C.
4203(a)(1); 28 U.S.C. 509, 510, 534; 31 U.S.C. 3717, 9701.
2. Title 28 CFR, Section 16.96 is amended by adding paragraphs (l)
and (m) as set forth below.
Sec. 16.96 Exemption of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--Limited
Access
* * * * *
(l) The following system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a
(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e) (1), (2), and (3), (e)(4) (G) and (H), (e)(5),
(e)(8), (f) and (g).
(1) FBI Counterdrug Information Indices System (CIIS) (JUSTICE/
FBI--016)
(m) These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in
this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2).
Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the
following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) because making available to a record
subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning him/her
would reveal investigative interest by not only the FBI, but also by
the recipient agency. This would permit the record subject to take
appropriate measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy
evidence, intimidate potential witnesses or flee the area to avoid the
thrust of the investigation.
(2) From subsection (c)(4) to the extent it is not applicable
because an exemption is being claimed from subsection (d).
(3)(i) From subsections (d), (e)(4) (G) and (H) because these
provisions concern individual access to records, compliance with which
could compromise sensitive information, interfere with the overall law
enforcement process by revealing a pending sensitive investigation,
possibly identify a confidential source or disclose information which
would constitute an unwarranted invasion of another individual's
personal privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, or
constitute a potential danger to the health or safety of law
enforcement personnel.
(ii) In addition, from paragraph (d), because to require the FBI to
amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant or untimely,
because of the nature of the information collected and the essential
length of time it is maintained, would create an impossible
administrative and investigative burden by forcing the agency to
continuously retrograde its investigations attempting to resolve
questions of accuracy, etc.
(4)(i) From subsection (e)(1) because it is not possible in all
instances to determine relevancy or necessity of specific information
in the early stages of a criminal or other investigation.
(ii) Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing;
what appears relevant and necessary when collected ultimately may be
deemed otherwise. It is only after the information is assessed that its
relevancy and necessity in a specified investigative activity can be
established.
(iii) In any investigation the FBI might obtain information
concerning violations of law not under its jurisdiction, but in the
interest of effective law enforcement, dissemination will be made to
the agency charged with enforcing such law.
(iv) In interviewing individuals or obtaining other forms of
evidence during an investigation, information could be obtained, the
nature of which would leave in doubt its relevancy and necessity. Such
information, however, could be relevant to another investigations or to
an investigative activity under the jurisdiction of another agency.
(5) From subsection (e)(2) because the nature of criminal and other
investigative activities is such that vital information about an
individual often can only be obtained from other persons who are
familiar with such individual and his/her activities. In such
investigations it is not feasible to principally rely upon information
furnished by the individual concerning his own activities.
(6) From subsection (e)(3) because disclosure would provide the
subject with information which could impede or compromise the
investigation. The individual could seriously interfere with undercover
investigative activities and could take appropriate steps to evade the
investigation or flee a specific area.
(7) From subsection (e)(5) because in the collection of information
for law enforcement purposes it is impossible to determine in advance
what information is accurate, relevant, timely and complete. With the
passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or untimely information may
acquire new significance as further investigation brings new details to
light. The restrictions imposed by subsection (e)(5) would restrict the
ability of trained investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise
their judgment in reporting on investigations and impede the
development of criminal intelligence necessary for effective law
enforcement.
(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the notice requirements of this
provision could seriously interfere with a law enforcement activity by
alerting the subject of a criminal or other investigation of existing
investigative interest.
(9) From subsection (f) to the extent that this system is exempt
from the provisions of subsection (d).
(10) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system of records
is exempt from the provisions of subsection (d).
[FR Doc. 94-22656 Filed 9-13-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-02-M
