99-23473. Airworthiness Directives; Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER) Model EMB-120RT and -120ER Series Airplanes  

  • [Federal Register Volume 64, Number 178 (Wednesday, September 15, 1999)]
    [Rules and Regulations]
    [Pages 49974-49977]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 99-23473]
    
    
    
    [[Page 49974]]
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    
    Federal Aviation Administration
    
    14 CFR Part 39
    
    [Docket No. 98-NM-261-AD; Amendment 39-11315; AD 99-19-28]
    RIN 2120-AA64
    
    
    Airworthiness Directives; Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. 
    (EMBRAER) Model EMB-120RT and -120ER Series Airplanes
    
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
    
    ACTION: Final rule.
    
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    SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), 
    applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-120RT and -120ER series 
    airplanes, that requires repetitive detailed visual inspections to 
    detect discrepancies of the brake assemblies on the main landing gear 
    (MLG), and replacement of the brake assemblies with new or serviceable 
    brake assemblies, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports 
    of fatigue cracking or splitting of the brake stator disk at the 
    thermal expansion slots. The actions specified by this AD are intended 
    to prevent failure of the brake assemblies of the MLG due to cracking 
    or splitting of the stator disk, which could result in loss of brake 
    effectiveness and could cause the airplane to leave the runway surface.
    
    DATES: Effective October 20, 1999.
        The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in 
    the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as 
    of October 20, 1999.
    
    ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be 
    obtained from BFGoodrich, Aircraft Wheels and Brakes, P.O. Box 340, 
    Troy, Ohio, 45373. This information may be examined at the Federal 
    Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules 
    Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Small 
    Airplane Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, One Crown 
    Center, 1895 Phoenix Boulevard, suite 450, Atlanta, Georgia; or at the 
    Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 
    700, Washington, DC.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rob Capezzuto, Aerospace Engineer, 
    Systems and Flight Test Branch, ACE-116A, FAA, Small Airplane 
    Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, One Crown Center, 
    1895 Phoenix Boulevard, suite 450, Atlanta, Georgia 30349; telephone 
    (770) 703-6071; fax (770) 703-6097.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal 
    Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness 
    directive (AD) that is applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-120RT 
    and -120ER series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on 
    October 14, 1998 (63 FR 55059). That action proposed to require 
    repetitive visual inspections to detect discrepancies of the brake 
    assemblies on the main landing gear (MLG), and replacement of the brake 
    assemblies with new brake assemblies, if necessary.
    
    Comments
    
        Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate 
    in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to 
    the four comments received.
    
    Request to Withdraw Proposed AD
    
         One commenter, the manufacturer, states that it discussed 
    with the Brazilian airworthiness authority the ``cracked/splitted 
    stator brakes'' that were impairing the expected service life of the 
    brakes of Model EMB-120 series airplanes. Upon request by the Brazilian 
    airworthiness authority, the manufacturer incorporated the inspections 
    specified by BFGoodrich Service Bulletins 2-1585-32-1 and 2-1479-32-2 
    into the ``EMB-120 Maintenance Review Board (MRB)'' document, temporary 
    revision No. 3. The commenter contends that, since the MRB is an FAA-
    approved document applicable to all U.S.-registered airplanes and 
    includes the same inspection procedures as the service bulletins, 
    issuance of the proposed AD would be a duplication and, therefore, is 
    unnecessary.
        The FAA does not concur. Although the MRB is an FAA-approved 
    document, the procedures specified in that document are recommended 
    (rather than mandatory) for U.S. operators. The FAA finds that 
    accomplishment of the inspections as part of a recommended action in 
    the MRB report would not ensure an acceptable level of safety. In light 
    of this and the identified unsafe condition, the FAA has determined 
    that issuance of this AD is necessary in order to mandate repetitive 
    detailed visual inspections for discrepancies of the brake assemblies 
    on the MLG in paragraph (a) of this AD.
         One commenter states that the proposed rule is not 
    justified because the actions required do not effectively prevent brake 
    rotor failure or promote safety. The commenter suggests that additional 
    research needs to be accomplished to determine answers to the following 
    questions. Why are some operators having problems with brake rotors 
    when others, such as the largest operator of Model EMB-120 series 
    airplanes in the world, are not? Is the problem of rotor breakage 
    associated with landing cycles, or is it associated with brake rotor 
    over-temperature situations? Have there been any runway excursions or 
    passenger injuries as a result of brake rotor failure on Model EMB-120 
    series airplanes?
        The FAA does not concur that the proposed AD is not justified. 
    BFGoodrich's investigation of the brake stator rotors indicates that 
    fatigue cracking began to occur between 600 and 1,000 flight hours, 
    which clearly shows that a service difficulty does exist with the 
    rotors. To address this problem, BFGoodrich issued Service Bulletins 2-
    1585-32-1 and 2-1479-32-2, both Revision 1, dated June 17, 1998. 
    Although the exact cause of the cracking is unknown at this time, 
    BFGoodrich has informed the FAA that the cracking and splitting [of the 
    brake stator disks] are due to overheat and thermal distortion of the 
    stator disks. The FAA considers that the number of landing cycles and 
    over-temperature conditions are related to the identified unsafe 
    condition. Although no runway excursions or passenger injuries have 
    been reported as a result of the identified unsafe condition to date, 
    the FAA has determined that the procedures required by this AD are 
    necessary to prevent an unsafe condition from occurring and to ensure 
    continued operational safety. No change to the final rule is necessary 
    in this regard.
    
    Request to Increase the Compliance Time for the Inspections
    
        Three commenters request that the compliance times for the initial 
    and repetitive inspections be increased.
        One commenter requests revising the initial inspection in paragraph 
    (a) of the proposed AD to ``within 400 hours after the effective date 
    of this AD'' and repeating the inspections thereafter ``at an interval 
    not to exceed 400 hours.'' The commenter contends that such an 
    extension of the compliance time would allow accomplishment of these 
    inspection requirements during an operator's regularly scheduled ``A'' 
    checks. The commenter adds that some operators do not have certified 
    inspectors at remote line stations to support a mandatory inspection 
    requirement to accomplish the repetitive inspections at each wheel 
    change, although it is preferred to have
    
    [[Page 49975]]
    
    line mechanics inspect the brakes at each wheel removal.
        Another commenter states that the repetitive inspection interval 
    required by the proposed AD of ``300 landings'' would require very 
    labor intensive and costly tracking and planning, which would make 
    operators prone to ``overfly'' errors. The commenter contends that 
    repetitive inspection intervals should include the option of using 
    airframe hours and should be based on an operator's existing 
    maintenance/inspection program, as determined by each operator's 
    continuing analysis and surveillance system. Based on a sampling of 
    COEX brake removal data due to stator/disc breakage, an ``A-check'' 
    interval of 400 hours would provide an equivalent level of safety for 
    our fleet.
        Another commenter states that a ``300 cycle re-inspection 
    requirement'' is impractical and does not increase safety. There is no 
    documented time at which cracks appear, nor is there any documentation 
    of crack propagation rates. In addition, the ``300 cycle interval'' at 
    each wheel change required by the proposed AD appears to be arbitrary 
    with no supporting data.
        The FAA concurs with the commenters' requests to extend the 
    compliance time for the inspections. Based on information provided by 
    one of the commenters, the FAA recognizes that ``400 flight hours'' 
    corresponds more closely to the interval representative of most of the 
    affected operators' normal maintenance schedules, where special 
    equipment and trained maintenance personnel will be available if 
    necessary. The FAA does not consider that this extension will adversely 
    affect safety. Paragraph (a) of the final rule has been changed to 
    specify the compliance times for the initial detailed visual inspection 
    as: ``Within 400 flight hours after the effective date of this AD,'' 
    and the repetitive inspections [in paragraphs (a) and (b)] as: ``at an 
    interval not to exceed 400 flight hours.''
    
    Request to Change Brake Replacement Requirement
    
        Three commenters request changing the proposed AD to require 
    replacement of the brake assembly with a ``serviceable'' rather than a 
    ``new'' brake assembly. One commenter contends that it is doubtful the 
    brake manufacturer can maintain production levels to support Model EMB-
    120 series airplanes with new replacement units. Another commenter 
    contends that there is no justification for requiring a new part to be 
    installed as a replacement because, in every instance, a 
    ``serviceable'' part should be acceptable for replacement.
        The FAA concurs that the replacement of discrepant brake assemblies 
    with serviceable parts is acceptable. The FAA has provided operators 
    with the option of replacing any discrepant brake assemblies with 
    either a new or serviceable brake assembly. This option provides 
    greater flexibility to the operators in meeting the requirements of 
    this AD and alleviates any problems regarding parts availability, while 
    still providing an acceptable level of safety for the fleet. The FAA 
    has revised the preamble and paragraph (b) of the final rule 
    accordingly.
    
    Request to Consider Adding Brake Assemblies to the Applicability
    
        One commenter requests that the FAA consider whether the 
    applicability of the proposed AD should include brake assemblies, part 
    numbers (P/N) 2-1585 and 2-1479-1, that have been modified with parts 
    manufacturer approval (PMA) heat sink components.
        The FAA finds that this AD would apply to airplanes equipped with 
    brake assemblies having part number (P/N) 2-1585 or 2-1479-1, if those 
    assemblies have been modified with PMA heat sink components and if the 
    PMA approval was based on identicality. Such components are identical 
    to the original part in materials and dimensions and, therefore, may be 
    subject to the same identified unsafe condition. However, investigation 
    reveals that the only known PMA's to these brake assemblies were 
    obtained through test and computation. Because there are no known PMA's 
    to these brake assemblies that have been obtained through identicality, 
    no change to the applicability of the final rule is necessary.
    
    Request to Revise the Preamble of the Proposal
    
        One commenter requests revising the Summary of the proposed AD by 
    clarifying that the brake stator disk is located at the ``thermal 
    expansion slots'' rather than at the ``cut-out slots.'' The FAA concurs 
    and has changed the Summary of the final rule accordingly.
        That same commenter also requests revising the ``Discussion'' 
    paragraph of the proposed AD to clarify that the cause of the cracking 
    and splitting are the result of overheat and thermal distortion of the 
    stator disks, although the exact cause of these conditions have not 
    been determined at this time. The FAA recognizes that the suggested 
    change provides improved technical accuracy. However, since the 
    ``Discussion'' paragraph of the preamble to the NPRM is not restated in 
    the final rule, no change to the final rule is necessary.
        That same commenter also requests revising the ``Explanation of 
    Relevant Service Information'' paragraph of the proposed AD to change 
    one of the discrepancies listed in that paragraph from ``wear of 
    plates'' to ``excessive distortion of the wear plates.'' The FAA 
    acknowledges that the suggested change improves technical accuracy. 
    Even though the referenced paragraph does not appear in the final rule, 
    the FAA considers that the suggested change is appropriate for 
    paragraph (a) of the final rule and has changed that paragraph 
    accordingly.
    
    Request to Revise the Cost Impact in the Proposed AD
    
        One commenter requests revising the Cost Impact paragraph of the 
    proposed AD. The commenter states that the referenced service bulletins 
    estimate that the inspection at a tire change would be 15 minutes per 
    brake, or one hour per airplane. However, if the inspections were not 
    accomplished at a tire change, additional time and cost (approximately 
    2 hours per airplane) would be required to jack the airplane and remove 
    the wheel/tire assembly to enable the inspection.
        The FAA does not concur. As explained earlier in this AD, no 
    additional time would be required for the inspections because the 
    compliance times are extended in the final rule, which should allow the 
    operator to perform the inspection during a tire change. No change to 
    the final rule was necessary in this regard.
    
    Differences Between Service Bulletin and This AD
    
        Operators should note that BFGoodrich Service Bulletins 2-1585-32-1 
    and 2-1479-32-2, both Revision 1, dated June 17, 1998, specify an 
    ``examination'' of the brake assembly and a ``visual examination'' of 
    each stator disk expansion slot. However, this final rule requires a 
    ``detailed visual inspection'' to determine the existence of any 
    discrepancies of the brake assemblies on the MLG. A note has been added 
    to the final rule to define that inspection.
    
    Conclusion
    
        After careful review of the available data, including the comment 
    noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public 
    interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously 
    described. The FAA has determined that these changes will
    
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    neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the 
    scope of the AD.
    
    Interim Action
    
        This is considered to be interim action until final action is 
    identified, at which time the FAA may consider further rulemaking.
    
    Cost Impact
    
        The FAA estimates that 227 Model EMB-120RT and -120ER series 
    airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD, that it will 
    take approximately 1 work hour per airplane to accomplish the required 
    inspection, and that the average labor rate is $60 per work hour. Based 
    on these figures, the cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is 
    estimated to be $13,620, or $60 per airplane, per inspection cycle.
        The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that 
    no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD 
    action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the 
    future if this AD were not adopted.
    
    Regulatory Impact
    
        The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct 
    effects on the States, on the relationship between the national 
    government and the States, or on the distribution of power and 
    responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in 
    accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final 
    rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the 
    preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
        For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is 
    not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 12866; 
    (2) is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
    Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a 
    significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial 
    number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory 
    Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action 
    and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained 
    from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption 
    ADDRESSES.
    
    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
    
        Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
    reference, Safety.
    
    Adoption of the Amendment
    
        Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
    Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of 
    the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
    
    PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
    
        1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
    
        Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
    
    
    Sec. 39.13  [Amended]
    
        2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new 
    airworthiness directive:
    
    99-19-28  Empresa Brasileira De Aeronautica S.A. (EMBRAER): 
    Amendment 39-11315. Docket 98-NM-261-AD.
    
        Applicability: Model EMB-120RT and -120ER series airplanes, 
    equipped with BFGoodrich brake assemblies having part number (P/N) 
    2-1585 or 2-1479-1; certificated in any category.
    
        Note 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the 
    preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been 
    modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the 
    requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, 
    altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of 
    this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an 
    alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of 
    this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of 
    the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition 
    addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been 
    eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to 
    address it.
    
        Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished 
    previously.
        To prevent failure of the brake assemblies of the main landing 
    gear (MLG) due to cracking or splitting of the stator disk, which 
    could result in loss of brake effectiveness and could cause the 
    airplane to leave the runway surface, accomplish the following:
        (a) Within 400 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, 
    perform a detailed visual inspection for discrepancies (e.g., 
    locking or hanging up, broken or damaged stators, and excessive 
    distortion of the wear plates) of the brake assemblies on the MLG, 
    in accordance with paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, as 
    applicable. Repeat the inspections thereafter at intervals not to 
    exceed 400 flight hours.
        (1) For airplanes equipped with BFGoodrich main brake assemblies 
    having P/N 2-1479-1: Inspect in accordance with BFGoodrich Service 
    Bulletin 2-1479-32-2, Revision 1, dated June 17, 1998.
        (2) For airplanes equipped with BFGoodrich main brake assemblies 
    having P/N 2-1585: Inspect in accordance with BFGoodrich Service 
    Bulletin 2-1585-32-1, Revision 1, dated June 17, 1998.
    
        Note 2: For the purposes of this AD, a detailed visual 
    inspection is defined as: ``An intensive visual examination of a 
    specific structural area, system, installation, or assembly to 
    detect damage, failure, or irregularity. Available lighting is 
    normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at 
    intensity deemed appropriate by the inspector. Inspection aids such 
    as mirror, magnifying lenses, etc., may be used. Surface cleaning 
    and elaborate access procedures may be required.''
        (b) If any discrepancy is detected during any inspection 
    required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, 
    replace the brake assembly with a new or serviceable brake assembly, 
    in accordance with section 32-41-05 of EMBRAER EMB-120 Brasilia 
    Maintenance Manual, dated April 30, 1992. Repeat the inspections 
    required by paragraph (a) of this AD thereafter at intervals not to 
    exceed 400 flight hours.
        (c) Within 10 days after accomplishing any inspection required 
    by this AD, if a discrepant brake assembly is detected, submit a 
    report of the inspection results to BFGoodrich, Aircraft Wheels and 
    Brakes, P.O. Box 340 Troy, Ohio, 45373. Information collection 
    requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the 
    Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the 
    Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have 
    been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.
    
    Alternative Methods of Compliance
    
        (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the 
    compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be 
    used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification 
    Office (ACO), FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. Operators shall 
    submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal 
    Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the 
    Manager, Atlanta ACO.
    
        Note 3: Information concerning the existence of approved 
    alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be 
    obtained from the Atlanta ACO.
    
    Special Flight Permits
    
        (e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with 
    sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
    CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where 
    the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
    Incorporation by Reference
        (f) Except as provided by paragraph (b) of this AD, the 
    inspections and replacement shall be done in accordance with 
    BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 2-1479-32-2, Revision 1, dated June 17, 
    1998, and BFGoodrich Service Bulletin 2-1585-32-1, Revision 1, dated 
    June 17, 1998, as applicable. This incorporation by reference was 
    approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 
    5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from 
    BFGoodrich, Aircraft Wheels and Brakes, P.O. Box 340, Troy, Ohio 
    45373. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane 
    Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the 
    FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Atlanta Aircraft Certification 
    Office, One Crown Center, 1895 Phoenix Boulevard, suite 450, 
    Atlanta, Georgia; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 
    North Capitol Street, NW, suite 700, Washington, DC.
    
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        (g) This amendment becomes effective on October 20, 1999.
    
        Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 2, 1999.
    Dorenda D. Baker,
    Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
    Service.
    [FR Doc. 99-23473 Filed 9-14-99; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
    
    
    

Document Information

Effective Date:
10/20/1999
Published:
09/15/1999
Department:
Federal Aviation Administration
Entry Type:
Rule
Action:
Final rule.
Document Number:
99-23473
Dates:
Effective October 20, 1999.
Pages:
49974-49977 (4 pages)
Docket Numbers:
Docket No. 98-NM-261-AD, Amendment 39-11315, AD 99-19-28
RINs:
2120-AA64: Airworthiness Directives
RIN Links:
https://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/2120-AA64/airworthiness-directives
PDF File:
99-23473.pdf
CFR: (1)
14 CFR 39.13