96-23700. United States v. USA Waste Services, Inc. and Sanifill, Inc.; Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement  

  • [Federal Register Volume 61, Number 181 (Tuesday, September 17, 1996)]
    [Notices]
    [Pages 48971-48982]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 96-23700]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
    
    Antitrust Division
    
    
    United States v. USA Waste Services, Inc. and Sanifill, Inc.; 
    Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement
    
        Notice is hereby given pursuant to the Antitrust Procedures and 
    Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 16 (b) through (h), that proposed Final 
    Judgment, Stipulation, and Competitive Impact Statement have been filed 
    with the United States District Court in the District of Columbia in 
    United States v. USA Waste Services, Inc. and Sanifill, Inc., Civil 
    Action No. 1:96CV02031.
        On August 30, 1996, the United States filed a Complaint alleging 
    that the proposed acquisition by USA Waste Services, Inc. of the stock 
    of Sanifill, Inc. would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
    18. The proposed Final Judgment, filed the same time as the Complaint, 
    requires the companies, among other things, to divest a dry waste 
    landfill and certain commercial and residential hauling assets in 
    Houston, Texas; make available certain municipal solid waste landfill 
    capacity rights in the Houston area and the Johnstown, Pennsylvania 
    area; and amend specified waste hauler contract terms in the Johnstown 
    area in a way which fosters competition.
        Public comment is invited within the statutory 60-day comment 
    period. Such comments and response thereto will be published in the 
    Federal Register and filed with the Court. Comments should be directed 
    to J. Robert Kramer, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust Division, 
    United States Department of Justice, 1401 H Street, N.W., Suite 3000, 
    Washington, D.C. 20530 (telephone: 202/307-0924).
        Copies of the Complaint, Stipulation and Order, Proposed Final 
    Judgment, and Competitive Impact Statement are available for inspection 
    in Room 215 of the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 325 
    7th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 514-2841. Copies of 
    these materials may be obtained upon request and payment of a copying 
    fee.
    Constance K. Robinson,
    Director of Operations.
    
    In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
    
        United States of America, State of Texas, by and through its 
    Attorney General, Dan Morales and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by 
    and through its Attorney General, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr. Plaintiffs, 
    v. USA Waste Services, Inc., and Sanifill, Inc. Defendants.
    
    [Civil Action No.: 1:96-CZ02031]
    
    Filed: August 30, 1996.
    
    Judge Gladys Kessler
    
    Stipulation on Jurisdiction and Agreed Final Judgment
    
        It is stipulated by and between the undersigned parties, through 
    their respective attorneys, that:
        1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this 
    action and over each of the parties hereto, and venue of this action is 
    proper in the District of Columbia.
        2. The parties consent that a Final Judgment in the form hereto 
    attached may be filed and entered by the Court, upon the motion of any 
    party or upon the Court's own motion, at any time after compliance with 
    the requirements of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (15 
    U.S.C. 16(b)-(h)), and without further notice to any party or other 
    proceedings, provided that plaintiffs have not withdrawn their consent, 
    which they may do at any time before the entry of the proposed Final 
    Judgment by serving notice thereof on defendants and by filing that 
    notice with the Court.
        3. The parties shall abide by and comply with the provisions of the 
    proposed Final Judgment pending entry of the Final Judgment, and shall, 
    from the date of the filing of this Stipulation, comply with all the 
    terms and provisions thereof as though the same were in full force and 
    effect as an order of the Court.
        4. In the event plaintiffs withdraw their consent or if the 
    proposed Final Judgment is not entered pursuant to this Stipulation, 
    this Stipulation shall have no effect whatever and the making of this 
    Stipulation shall be without prejudice to any party in this or any 
    other proceeding.
    
        Dated: August 30, 1996.
    
        Respectfully submitted,
    
        For Plaintiff United States of America:
    Anne K. Bingaman,
    
    Assistant Attorney General.
    
    Lawrence R. Fullerton,
    
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
    
    
    [[Page 48972]]
    
    
    Constance K. Robinson,
    
    Director of Operations.
    
    J. Robert Kramer II,
    
    PA Bar # 23963.
    
    Willie L. Hudgins,
    
    DC Bar # 37127.
    
    David R. Bickel,
    
    DC Bar # 393409.
    
    Joel A. Christie,
    
    WI Bar # 1019438.
    
    Michael K. Hammaker,
    
    DC Bar # 233684.
    
    Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H 
    St., NW., Suite 3000, Washington, DC 20530, (202) 307-1168.
    
        For Plaintiff State of Texas:
    Dan Morales,
    
    Attorney General of Texas.
    
    Jorge Vega,
    
    First Assistant Attorney General.
    
    Laquita A. Hamilton,
    
    Deputy Attorney General for Litigation.
    
    Thomas P. Perkins, Jr.,
    
    Chief, Consumer Protection Division.
    
    Mark Tobey,
    
    Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Chief for Antitrust.
    
    Amy R. Krasner,
    Assistant Attorney General, TX Bar No. 00791050.
    
    Office of the Attorney General of Texas, P.O. Box 12548, Austin, TX 
    78711-2548, (512) 463-2185.
    
        For Plaintiff Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
    Thomas W. Corbett, Jr.,
    
    Attorney General of Pennsylvania.
    
    Carl S. Hisiro,
    
    Chief Deputy Attorney General.
    
    James A. Donahue, III,
    
    Senior Deputy Attorney General.
    
    Carron M. Trainer,
    
    Deputy Attorney General.
    
    Garrett S. Gallia,
    
    Deputy Attorney General.
    
    Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Antitrust Section, 
    14th Floor, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, PA 17120, (717) 787-4530.
    
        For Defendant USA Waste Services, Inc.:
    Gregory T. Sangalis,
    
    Vice-President, General Counsel, and Secretary.
    
        For Defendant Sanifill, Inc.:
    Kirk K. Van Tine,
    
    DC Bar # 257139, Baker & Botts, LLP, 1299 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, 
    Washington, DC 20004.
    
    Attorneys for Sanifill, Inc.
    
        So ordered on this ____, day of 1996.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    United States District Court Judge
    
    Certification of Service
    
        I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served upon 
    USA Waste Services, Inc., Sanifill, Inc., the Office of the Attorney 
    General of the State of Texas, and the Office of the Attorney General 
    of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by placing a copy of the United 
    States' Explanation of Consent Decree Procedures in the U.S. mail, 
    directed to each of the above-named parties at the addresses given 
    below, this 30th day of August, 1996.
    
    USA Waste Services, Inc.: c/o James R. Weiss, Preston, Gates, Suite 
    500, 1735 New York Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20006.
    Sanifill, Inc.: c/o Kirk K. Van Tine, Baker & Botts, LLP, 1299 
    Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20004.
    State of Pennsylvania: James A. Donahue, III, Senior Deputy Attorney 
    General, Antitrust Section, 14th Floor, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, 
    PA 17120.
    State of Texas: Mark Tobey, Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Chief 
    for Antitrust, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, P.O. Box 12548, 
    Austin, TX 78711-2548.
    David R. Bickel,
    Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H 
    Street, N.W., Suite 3000, Washington, D.C. 20503, (202) 307-1168.
    
    Final Judgment
    
        Whereas, plaintiffs, United States of America (``United States''), 
    the State of Texas (``Texas''), and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
    (``Pennsylvania''), having filed their Complaint herein on August 30, 
    1996, and plaintiffs and defendants, by their respective attorneys, 
    having consented to the entry of this Final Judgment without trial or 
    adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and without this Final 
    Judgment constituting any evidence against or an admission by any party 
    with respect to any issue of law or fact herein;
        And whereas, defendants have agreed to be bound by the provisions 
    of this Final Judgment pending its approval by the Court;
        And whereas, prompt and certain divestiture of certain assets, the 
    provision of certain disposal airspace rights, and the prompt 
    modification of contract terms to assure that competition is not 
    substantially lessened is the essence of this agreement;
        And whereas, the parties intend to require defendants to divest, as 
    viable business operations, the Divestiture Assets specified herein;
        And whereas, defendants have represented to plaintiffs that the 
    divestiture and contract changes required below can and will be made 
    and that defendants will later raise no claims of hardship or 
    difficulty as grounds for asking the Court to modify any of the 
    divestiture or contract provisions contained below;
        Now, therefore, before the taking of any testimony, and without 
    trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon 
    consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and 
    decreed as follows:
    
    I
    
    Jurisdiction
    
        This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action 
    and over each of the parties hereto. The Complaint states a claim upon 
    which relief may be granted against the defendants under Section 7 of 
    the Clayton Act, as amended (15 U.S.C. Sec. 18).
    
    II
    
    Definitions
    
        As used in this Final Judgment:
        A. ``Solid waste hauling'' means the collection and transportation 
    to a disposal site of municipal solid waste (but not construction and 
    demolition waste; medical waste; organic waste; special waste, such as 
    contaminated soil; sludge; or recycled materials) from residential, 
    commercial and industrial customers. Solid waste hauling includes hand 
    pick-up, containerized pick-up and roll-off service.
        B. ``USA Waste'' means defendant USA Waste Services, Inc., a 
    Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Dallas, Texas, and its 
    successors and assigns, their subsidiaries, affiliates, directors, 
    officers, managers, agents and employees.
        C. ``Sanifill'' means Sanifill, Inc., a Delaware corporation with 
    its headquarters in Houston, Texas, and its successors and assigns, 
    their subsidiaries, affiliates, directors, officers, managers, agents 
    and employees.
        D. ``Houston Area'' means Harris County, Texas; Chambers County, 
    Texas; Brazoria County, Texas; Fort Bend County, Texas; Montgomery 
    County, Texas; Walker County, Texas; and Galveston County, Texas.
        E. ``Johnstown Area'' means Cambria County, Pennsylvania; Blair 
    County, Pennsylvania; Indiana County, Pennsylvania; Somerset County, 
    Pennsylvania; and northeast Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania.
    
    [[Page 48973]]
    
        F. ``Houston Hauling Assets'' means the frontload commercial 
    business of Sanifill that provides solid waste hauling services in the 
    Houston Area, and, at the option of the purchaser, the rearload 
    residential business of Sanifill presently served by Sanifill's 
    Channelview garage located at 999 Ashland in Channelview, Texas. These 
    assets include all customer lists, contracts and accounts, including 
    all contracts for disposal of solid waste at disposal facilities, and, 
    with respect to the rearload residential business, assignable 
    contracts, all trucks, containers, equipment, material, and supplies 
    associated with these assets.
        G. ``Sunray Assets'' means the operating, permitted Type 4 landfill 
    (also known as the North County Landfill) and other related assets of 
    USA Waste with an office at 2015 Wyoming in League City, Texas. These 
    include the current permit Number 1849 and permit application Number 
    1849A filed with the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, 
    all customer lists, contracts and accounts, including all equipment, 
    material, and supplies associated with these assets. These assets are 
    not required to include the assets of any hauling business in operation 
    at the Sunray site.
        H. ``Airspace Rights'' means the right of independent private 
    haulers to dispose municipal solid waste at the Pellegrene Landfill in 
    the Johnstown Area over a ten-year period beginning on the date of the 
    divestiture as described more fully in Section IX.
        I. ``Airspace Assets'' means the right to dispose, over a ten-year 
    period beginning on the date of the divestiture, of up to a total of 
    2,000,000 tons of municipal solid waste in amounts of up to a total of 
    270,000 tons per year at the Hazelwood Landfill located at 4971 Tri-
    City Beach Road in Baytown, Texas and the Brazoria County Landfill 
    located at 10310 FM in Angleton, Texas.
        J. ``Divestiture Assets'' refers to the Houston Hauling Assets, 
    Sunray Assets, and Airspace Assets.
        K. ``Small Container'' means a 1 to 10 cubic yard container.
        L. ``Small Containerized Solid Waste Hauling Service'' means 
    providing solid waste hauling service to commercial customers by 
    providing the customer with a Small Container that is picked up 
    mechanically using a frontload, rearload, or sideload truck, and 
    expressly excludes hand pick-up service, and service using a compactor 
    attached to or part of a small container.
        M. ``Customer'' means a Small Containerized Solid Waste Hauling 
    Service customer.
    
    III
    
    Applicability
    
        A. The provisions of this Final Judgment apply to the defendants, 
    their successors and assignees, their subsidiaries, affiliates, 
    directors, officers, managers, agents, and employees, and all other 
    persons in active concert or participation with any of them who shall 
    have received actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service 
    or otherwise.
        B. Defendants shall require, as a condition of the sale or other 
    disposition of all or substantially all of the Divestiture Assets, that 
    the acquiring party or parties agree to be bound by the provisions of 
    this Final Judgment.
    
    IV
    
    Divestiture of Assets
    
        A. Defendants are hereby ordered and directed, within 90 days from 
    the filing of this Final Judgment, to divest the Divestiture Assets, 
    unless the United States, after consultation with Texas, consents that 
    only some portion of the Divestiture Assets need be divested. 
    Defendants are further ordered and directed to notify plaintiffs in 
    writing immediately when they have completed the divestitures.
        B. Unless the United States, after consultation with Texas, 
    otherwise consents, divestiture under Section IV.A, or by the trustee 
    appointed pursuant to Section V, shall be accomplished in such a way as 
    to satisfy the United States, in its sole determination after 
    consultation with Texas, that the Houston Hauling Assets can and will 
    be operated by the purchaser as a viable, ongoing business engaged in 
    solid waste hauling, and that the Sunray Assets can and will be 
    operated by the purchaser as a viable, ongoing business engaged in 
    solid waste disposal in the Houston Area. Divestiture under Section 
    IV.A or by the trustee, shall be made to a purchaser or purchasers for 
    whom it is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States, after 
    consultation with Texas, that (1) the purchase or purchases is or are 
    for the purpose of competing effectively in solid waste hauling, dry 
    waste disposal, or both, and (2) the purchaser or purchasers has or 
    have the managerial, operational, and financial capability to compete 
    effectively in solid waste hauling and/or disposal.
        C. In accomplishing the divestitures ordered by this Final 
    Judgment, defendants promptly shall make known, by usual and customary 
    means, the availability of the Divestiture Assets and Airspace Rights 
    described in this Final Judgment. Defendants shall inform any person 
    making an inquiry regarding a possible purchase that the sale is being 
    made pursuant to this Final Judgment and provide such person with a 
    copy of this Final Judgment. Defendants shall also offer to furnish to 
    all bona fide prospective purchasers, subject to customary 
    confidentiality assurances, all information regarding the Divestiture 
    Assets customarily provided in a due diligence process except such 
    information subject to attorney-client or work-product privileges. 
    Defendants shall make available such information to plaintiffs at the 
    same time such information is made available to any other person. In 
    giving notice of the availability of the Houston Hauling Assets, 
    defendants shall not exclude any persons bound by any non-compete 
    obligations to Sanifill.
        D. Defendants shall not require of the purchaser or purchasers, as 
    a condition of sale, that any current employee of the Divestiture 
    Assets be offered or guaranteed continued employment after the 
    divestiture.
        E. Defendants shall take all reasonable steps to accomplish quickly 
    the divestiture contemplated by this Final Judgment.
        F. As part of the sale of the Airspace Assets, defendants will 
    include an agreement to accept waste from the purchaser or anyone 
    designated by the purchaser to dispose of waste at the landfills. As 
    agents of the purchaser, defendants will operate the gate, scale house, 
    and disposal area under terms and conditions no less favorable than 
    those provided by defendants' vehicles or the vehicles of any 
    municipality in the Houston Area, except as to price and credit terms.
    
    V
    
    Appointment of Trustee
    
        A. In the event that Defendants have not divested all of their 
    assets required by Section IV.A by the time set forth in Section IV.A, 
    the Court shall, on application of the United States, after 
    consultation with Texas, appoint a trustee selected by the United 
    States to effect the divestiture required by Section IV.A. After the 
    appointment of a trustee becomes effective, only the trustee shall have 
    the right to sell the assets required to be divested pursuant to 
    Section IV.A. The trustee shall have the power and authority to 
    accomplish the divestiture at the best price then obtainable upon a 
    reasonable effort by the trustee, subject to the provisions of Section 
    VI of this Final Judgment, and shall have such other powers as the 
    Court shall deem appropriate.
    
    [[Page 48974]]
    
    Defendants shall not object to a sale by the trustee on any grounds 
    other than the trustee's malfeasance, or on the grounds that the sale 
    is contrary to the express terms of this Final Judgment. Any such 
    objections by defendants must be conveyed in writing to plaintiffs and 
    the trustee within ten (10) days after the trustee has provided the 
    notice required under Section VI.
        B. The trustee shall serve at the cost and expense of defendants, 
    on such terms and conditions as the Court may prescribe, and shall 
    account for all monies derived from the sale of the assets sold by the 
    trustee and all costs and expenses so incurred. After approval by the 
    Court of the trustee's accounting, including fees for its services, all 
    remaining money shall be paid to defendants and the trust shall then be 
    terminated. The compensation of such trustee shall be reasonable and 
    based on a fee arrangement providing the trustee with an incentive 
    based on the price and terms of the divestiture and the speed with 
    which it is accomplished.
        C. Defendants shall use their best efforts to assist the trustee in 
    accomplishing the required divestiture. The trustee and any 
    consultants, accountants, attorney, and other persons retained by the 
    trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books, 
    records, and facilities of the Divestiture Assets, and defendants shall 
    develop financial or other information relevant to such assets as the 
    trustee may reasonably request, subject to reasonable protection for 
    trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial 
    information. Defendants shall take no action to interfere with or to 
    impede the trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture.
        D. After its appointment, the trustee shall file monthly reports 
    with the parties and the Court setting forth the trustee's efforts to 
    accomplish the divestiture order under this Final Judgment. If the 
    trustee has not accomplished such divestiture within six months after 
    its appointment, the trustee shall thereupon promptly file with the 
    Court a report setting forth (1) the trustee's efforts to accomplish 
    the required divestiture, (2) the reasons, in the trustee's judgment, 
    why the required divestiture has not been accomplished, and (3) the 
    trustee's recommendations. The trustee shall at the same time furnish 
    such report to the parties, who shall each have the right to be heard 
    and to make additional recommendations consistent with the purposes of 
    the trust. The Court shall thereafter enter such orders as it shall 
    deem appropriate in order to carry out the purpose of the trust, which 
    may, if necessary, include extending the trust and the term of the 
    trustee's appointment by a period requested by the United States, after 
    consultation with Texas.
        E. Defendants shall give 30 days' notice to the United States, 
    Texas, and Pennsylvania prior to acquiring any interest that is not 
    otherwise reportable under the Hart-Scott Rodino Act in any assets, 
    capital stock, or voting securities, other than in the ordinary course 
    of business, of any person that, at any time during the twelve months 
    immediately preceding the acquisition, was engaged in the solid waste 
    hauling industry in the Houston Area or the Johnstown Area where that 
    person had small container revenues in excess of $500,000 per year or 
    total revenues in excess of $1 million per year. However, nothing 
    herein shall preclude defendants from acquiring less than five (5) 
    percent of the stock of a publicly traded company.
        F. Defendants shall give 30 days' notice to the United States, 
    Texas, and Pennsylvania prior to acquiring any interest that is not 
    otherwise reportable under the Hart-Scott Rodino Act in any assets, 
    capital stock, or voting securities, other than in the ordinary course 
    of business of any person that, at any time during the twelve months 
    immediately preceding the acquisition, was engaged in the municipal 
    solid waste or dry waste disposal industry in the Houston Area or the 
    Johnstown Area, where the revenues of that person, when aggregated with 
    the revenues of any person or persons acquired in the previous six 
    months, exceed the revenue limits of paragraph E above. However, 
    nothing herein shall preclude defendants from acquiring less than five 
    (5) percent of the stock of a publicly traded company.
        G. The purchaser or purchasers of the Divestiture Assets, or any of 
    them, shall not, without the prior written consent of the United 
    States, after consultation with Texas, sell any of those assets to, or 
    combine any of those assets with, those of defendants during the life 
    of this decree. Furthermore, the purchaser or purchasers of the 
    Divestiture Assets, or any of them, shall notify plaintiffs 45 days in 
    advance of any proposed sale of all or substantially all of the assets, 
    or change in control over those assets, acquired pursuant to this Final 
    Judgment.
    
    VI
    
    Notification
    
        A. Defendants or the trustee, whichever is then responsible for 
    effecting the divestiture required herein, shall notify plaintiffs of 
    any proposed divestiture required by Section IV or V of this Final 
    Judgment. If the trustee is responsible, it shall similarly notify 
    defendants. The notice shall set forth the details of the proposed 
    transaction and list the name, address, and telephone number of each 
    person not previously identified who offered or expressed an interest 
    or desire to acquire any ownership interest in the Divestiture Assets 
    or any of them, together with full details of the same. Within fifteen 
    (15) days after receipt of the notice, plaintiffs may request 
    additional information concerning the proposed divestiture, the 
    proposed purchaser, and any other potential purchaser. Defendants or 
    the trustee shall furnish the additional information within fifteen 
    (15) days of the receipt of the request. Within thirty (30) days after 
    receipt of the notice or within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the 
    additional information, whichever is later, the United States, after 
    consultation with Texas, shall notify in writing defendants and the 
    trustee, if there is one, if it objects to the proposed divestiture. If 
    the United States fails to object within the period specified, or if 
    the United States notifies in writing defendants and the trustee, if 
    there is one, that it does not object, then the divestiture may be 
    consummated, subject only to defendant's limited right to object to the 
    sale under Section V.A. Upon objection by the United States, after 
    consultation with Texas, or by defendants under Section V.A, the 
    proposed divestiture shall not be accomplished unless approved by the 
    Court.
        B. Thirty (30) days from the date when defendants consummate the 
    acquisition, but in no event later than October 30, 1996, and every 
    thirty (30) days thereafter until the divestiture has been completed, 
    defendants shall deliver to plaintiffs a written report as to the fact 
    and manner of compliance with Section IV of this Final Judgment. Each 
    such report shall include, for each person who during the preceding 
    thirty (30) days made an offer, expressed an interest or desire to 
    acquire, entered into negotiations to acquire, or made an inquiry about 
    acquiring any ownership interest in the Divestiture Assets or any of 
    them, the name, address, and telephone number of that person and a 
    detailed description of each contact with that person during that 
    period. Defendants shall maintain full records of all efforts made to 
    divest the Divestiture Assets or any of them.
    
    [[Page 48975]]
    
    VII
    
    Financing
    
        Defendants shall not finance all or any part of any purchase made 
    pursuant to Sections IV or V of this Final Judgment without the prior 
    written consent of the United States, after consultation with Texas and 
    Pennsylvania.
    
    VIII
    
    Prohibited Conduct
    
        With respect to the Johnstown Area, defendants are enjoined and 
    restrained as follows:
        A. Except as set forth in paragraph VIII.B. and G., defendants 
    shall not enter into any contract with a Customer for a service 
    location that:
        (1) Has an initial term longer than one (1) year;
        (2) Has any renewal term longer than one (1) year;
        (3) Requires that the Customer give defendants notice of 
    termination more than thirty (30) days prior to the end of any initial 
    term or renewal term;
        (4) Requires that the Customer pay liquidated damages in excess of 
    three times the greater of its prior monthly charge or its average 
    monthly charge over the most recent six months during the first year of 
    the initial term of the Customer's contract;
        (5) Requires that the Customer pay liquidated damages in excess of 
    two times the greater of its prior monthly charge or its average 
    monthly charge over the most recent six months after the Customer has 
    been a Customer of a defendant for a continuous period in excess of one 
    (1) year;
        (6) Requires the Customer to give defendants notice of any offer by 
    or to another solid waste hauling firm or requires the Customer to give 
    defendants a reasonable opportunity to respond to such an offer for any 
    period not covered by the contract (sometimes referred to as a ``right 
    to compete'' clause);
        (7) Is not easily readable (e.g., formatting and typeface) or is 
    not labeled, in large letters, SERVICE CONTRACT; or
        (8) Requires a Customer to give defendants the right or opportunity 
    to provide hauling service for recyclables or more than one solid waste 
    hauling service for a Customer unless the Customer affirmatively 
    chooses to have defendant do so by so stating on the front of the 
    contract.
        B. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph VIII.A. of this 
    Final Judgment, defendants may enter into a contract with a Customer 
    for a service location with an initial term in excess of one year 
    provided that:
        (1) The Customer has acknowledged in writing that the defendants 
    have offered to the Customer the form contracts defendants are required 
    under VIII.A. and D. to offer generally to Customers by notice in the 
    form attached hereto as Exhibit B;
        (2) The Customer has the right to terminate the contract after one 
    year by giving notice to defendants thirty (30) days or more prior to 
    the end of that one year period;
        (3) The contract otherwise complies with the provisions of 
    paragraph VIII.A. (2)-(8); and
        (4) The number of service locations subject to contracts permitted 
    under subparagraph B. does not exceed 25% of the total number of 
    service locations for small containerized solid waste hauling service 
    in any year.
        C. From the date of the filing of an executed Stipulation, 
    defendants shall offer to new Customers with service locations only 
    contracts that conform to the requirements of paragraphs VIII.A. or B. 
    of this Final Judgment, except as provided in VIII.G.
        D. Except as provided in VIII.G., within thirty (30) days following 
    the entry of this Final Judgment, defendants shall send to all existing 
    Customers with service locations with contracts having an initial term 
    longer than one year and which otherwise do not conform with paragraph 
    VIII.B. a notice in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A. If the 
    customer elects to accept the offered contract language, defendants 
    shall execute such an agreement.
        E. Except as provided in VIII.G., for each Customer with a contract 
    having an initial term longer than one year and that otherwise does not 
    conform to paragraphs VIII.B. that enters a renewal term 120 days after 
    entry of this Final Judgment, defendants shall send a reminder to that 
    Customer, in the form attached hereto as Exhibit B, ninety (90) days or 
    more prior to the effective date of the renewal term. This remainder 
    may be sent to the Customer as part of a monthly bill, but if it is, it 
    must be displayed on a separate page and in large print.
        F. Upon entry of this Final Judgment, defendants may not enforce 
    those contract provisions that are inconsistent with this Final 
    Judgment.
        G. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Final Judgment, 
    defendants may enter into contracts with municipal or governmental 
    entities that are not in compliance with paragraphs VIII.A.-F. provided 
    that those contracts are awarded to defendants on the basis of a formal 
    request for bids or a formal request for proposals issued by the 
    Customer.
        H. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Final Judgment, 
    defendants shall not be required to do business with any Customer.
        I. Defendants may not oppose any efforts by any persons to amend 
    any county plans to add any landfill, to permit a new landfill, or to 
    permit expansion of an existing landfill.
    
    IX
    
    Airspace Rights
    
        A. Defendants shall provide the Airspace Rights at the Pellegrene 
    Landfill, located at SR 2019 Lucisboro Road in Homer City, Pennsylvania 
    as follows:
        (1) Defendants are obligated to accept up to 200 tons per day and 
    up to 62,400 tons per year during the ten-year period;
        (2) Subject to applicable county plans, these Airspace Rights will 
    be available to any independent private hauler for waste collected in 
    the Pennsylvania counties of Cambria, Blair, Westmoreland, and Somerset 
    until the tonnage limits in IX.A(1) are met; and
        (3) Defendants will provide these Airspace rights under terms and 
    conditions no less favorable than those provided to defendants' 
    vehicles or the vehicles of any municipality in the Johnstown area, 
    except as to price and credit terms.
        B. For purposes of measuring the tonnage of airspace rights 
    provided under Section IX,
        (1) Construction and demolition or other Type 4 materials and waste 
    delivered in transfer trailers are not included in the tonnage limits 
    set forth in IX.A.(1);
        (2) ``Independent private hauler'' refers to any private firm, not 
    including municipalities, providing solid waste collection services, 
    but no disposal services, in the Johnstown Area.
    
    X
    
    Preservation of Assets
    
        Until the divestitures required by the Final Judgment have been 
    accomplished:
        A. Defendants shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the 
    Houston Hauling Assets will be maintained and operated in the ordinary 
    course of business and consistent with past practices, and shall (1) 
    maintain all insurance policies and all permits that are required for 
    the operation of the assets, and (2) maintain books of account and 
    records in the usual, regular, and ordinary manner and consistent with 
    past practices.
    
    [[Page 48976]]
    
        B. Defendants shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the 
    Sunray Assets will be maintained and operated as an independent, 
    ongoing, economically viable and active competitor in the provision of 
    dry waste disposal services in the Houston Area, with management 
    operations, books, records and competitively-sensitive sales, marketing 
    and pricing information and decision-making kept separate and apart 
    from, and not influenced by, that of Sanifill's solid waste hauling and 
    disposal businesses.
        C. Defendants shall use all reasonable efforts to maintain and 
    increase sales of solid waste hauling and disposal services provided by 
    the Divestiture Assets, and they shall maintain at 1995 or previously 
    approved levels, whichever is higher, promotional, advertising, sales, 
    marketing and merchandising support for such services.
        D. Defendants shall take all steps necessary to ensure that the 
    Divestiture Assets are fully maintained in operable condition, and 
    shall maintain and adhere to normal or previously approved repair, 
    improvement and maintenance schedules for the Divestiture Assets.
        E. Defendants shall not, except as part of a divestiture approved 
    by plaintiffs, remove, sell or transfer any Divestiture Assets, other 
    than solid waste hauling and disposal services provided in the ordinary 
    course of business.
        F. Defendants shall take no action that would jeopardize the sale 
    of Divestiture Assets.
        G. Defendants shall appoint a person with oversight responsibility 
    for the Divestiture Assets to insure compliance with this section of 
    the Final Judgment.
    
    XI
    
    Compliance Inspection
    
        For the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this 
    Final Judgment, and subject to any legally recognized privilege, from 
    time to time.
        A. Duly authorized representatives of the United States, Texas, or 
    Pennsylvania, including consultants and other persons retained by the 
    plaintiffs, shall, upon the written request of the Assistant Attorney 
    General in charge of the Antitrust Division or the Attorney General of 
    the State of Texas or the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of 
    Pennsylvania, respectively, and on reasonable notice to defendants made 
    to its principal offices, be permitted:
        1. access during office hours to inspect and copy all books, 
    ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and 
    documents in the possession or under the control of defendants, which 
    may have counsel present, relating to any matters contained in this 
    Final Judgment; and
        2. subject to the reasonable convenience of defendants and without 
    restraint or interference from them, to interview defendants' 
    directors, officers, employees, and agents who may have counsel 
    present, regarding any such matters.
        B. Upon the written request of the Assistant Attorney General in 
    charge of the Antitrust Division or the Attorney General of the State 
    of Texas or the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 
    respectively, made to defendants at their principal offices, defendants 
    shall submit such written reports, under oath if requested, with 
    respect to any of the matters contained in this Final Judgment as may 
    be requested.
        C. No information nor any documents obtained by the means provided 
    in this Section XI shall be divulged by any representative of the 
    United States or the Office of the Attorney General of Texas or of the 
    Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania to any person other than 
    a duly authorized representative of the Executive Branch of the United 
    States or of the Office of the Attorney General of Texas or of the 
    Office of the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, except in the course of 
    legal proceedings to which the United States, Texas or Pennsylvania is 
    a party (including grand jury proceedings), or for the purpose of 
    securing compliance with this Final Judgment, or as otherwise required 
    by law.
        D. If at the time information or documents are furnished by 
    defendants to plaintiffs, defendants represent and identify in writing 
    the material in any such information or documents for which a claim of 
    protection may be asserted under Rule 26(c)(7) of the Federal Rules of 
    Civil Procedure, and defendants mark each pertinent page of such 
    material, ``Subject to claim of protection under Rule 26(c)(7) of the 
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,'' then plaintiffs shall give ten (10) 
    days notice to defendants prior to divulging such material in any legal 
    proceeding (other than a grand jury proceeding) to which any defendant 
    is not a party.
    
    XII
    
    Retention of Jurisdiction
    
        Jurisdiction is retained by this Court for the purpose of enabling 
    any of the parties to this Final Judgment to apply to this Court at any 
    time for such further orders and directions as may be necessary or 
    appropriate for the construction, implementation, or modification of 
    any of the provisions of this Final Judgment, for the enforcement of 
    compliance herewith, and for the punishment of any violations hereof.
    
    XIII
    
    Termination
    
        This Final Judgment will expire on the tenth anniversary of the 
    date of its entry.
    
    XIV
    
    Public Interest
    
        Entry of this Final Judgment is in the public interest.
    
    Dated:-----------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Court approval subject to procedures of Antitrust Procedures and 
    Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. 16
    
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    United States District Judge
    
    Notice to Customers
    
        Dear Valued Customer:
        [Insert name of local operating company] is offering a new one 
    year contract to all small containerized solid waste hauling 
    customers with service locations in [insert market here]. We would 
    like to take this opportunity to offer this contract to you. Of 
    course, if you prefer, you can continue with your existing contract.
        In most cases, this new contract will have terms that are more 
    advantageous to customers than their current contracts. This new 
    contract has the following features:
         An initial term of one year (unless you request a 
    longer term);
         A renewal term of one year;
         At the end of your initial term, you may take no action 
    and your contract will renew or you can choose not to renew the 
    contract by simply giving us notice at any time up to 30 days prior 
    to the end of your term;
         If you can request a contract with a term longer than 
    one year, you can cancel that contract after one year by giving us 
    notice at any time up to 30 days prior to the end of the first year;
         If you terminate the contract at any other time, you 
    will be required to pay, as liquidated damages, no more than three 
    times the greater of your prior monthly or average monthly charge. 
    If you've been a customer continuously for more than one year, the 
    liquidated damages would be reduced to two times the greater of your 
    prior monthly or average monthly charge;
         You will not be required to give us notice of any offer 
    from another waste hauling firm or to give us an opportunity to make 
    a counteroffer although you may do so if you wish;
         You will be able to choose on the contract which 
    specific types of waste hauling services you would like us to 
    perform.
        You may obtain a new contract containing these terms by calling 
    [insert telephone number or sales rep name and number].
    
    [[Page 48977]]
    
    Exhibit A
    
        If you prefer, you may continue with your existing contract. If 
    you retain your existing contract, we will not enforce any terms 
    that are inconsistent with the new form contract terms.
        We thank you for your business and look forward to a continued 
    relationship with you. If you have any questions, please call 
    [insert contact person and phone number].
    
    Reminder to Customers
    
        Your contract will automatically renew on [MM/DD/YY] unless we 
    receive your cancellation by [MM/DD/YY].
        You may also obtain a new form contract with some terms more 
    advantageous to you than your current contract.
        You may obtain a new contract containing these terms by calling 
    [insert telephone number or sales rep name and number].
    
    Exhibit B
    
    Competitive Impact Statement
    
        The United States, pursuant to Section 2(b) of the Antitrust 
    Procedures and Penalties Act (``APPA''), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(b)-(h), 
    files this Competitive Impact Statement relating to the proposed Final 
    Judgment submitted for entry in this civil proceeding.
    
    I
    
    Nature and Purpose of the Proceeding
    
        On August 30, 1996, the United States filed a civil antitrust 
    Complaint which alleges that the proposed acquisition of the voting 
    stock of Sanifill, Inc. (``Sanifill'') by USA Waste Services, Inc. 
    (``USA Waste'') would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
    Sec. 18. The Complaint alleges that the combination of these two 
    significant competitors would lessen competition substantially in the 
    provisions of small containerized waste hauling services and landfill 
    disposal services in the Houston, Texas and Johnstown Pennsylvania 
    areas. As defined in the Complaint, the Houston area encompasses Harris 
    County, Texas; Chambers County, Texas; Brazoria County, Texas, Fort 
    Bend County, Texas; Montgomery County, Texas; Walker County, Texas and 
    Galveston County, Texas; including the municipalities located, in whole 
    or in part, in those counties (``Houston market''). The Johnstown area 
    encompasses Indiana County, Pennsylvania; Somerset County, 
    Pennsylvania; Cambria County, Pennsylvania; northeastern Westmorland 
    County, Pennsylvania; and Blair County, Pennsylvania, including the 
    municipalities located, in whole or in part, in those counties 
    (``Johnstown market''). The prayer for relief in the Complaint seeks: 
    (1) A judgment that the proposed acquisition would violate Section 7 of 
    the Clayton Act; and (2) a permanent injunction preventing USA Waste 
    from acquiring control of Sanifill.
        When the Complaint was filed, the United States also filed a 
    proposed settlement that would permit USA Waste to complete its 
    acquisition of Sanifill, but require certain divestitures and contract 
    modifications that will preserve competition in the Houston and 
    Johnstown markets. This settlement consists of a Stipulation and Order 
    and a proposed Final Judgment.
        The proposed Final Judgment orders USA Waste to divest the Sanifill 
    garage located at 999 Ashland, Channelview, Texas 77530; Sanifill's 
    frontload commercial hauling business that provides solid waste hauling 
    services in the Houston market, most of the rearload residential 
    business of Sanifill presently served by Sanifill's Channelview 
    facility (``Houston Hauling Assets''), and USA Waste's North County 
    Landfill located at 2015 Wyoming, League City, Texas (``Houston 
    Landifill Site'').
        In addition, USA Waste is ordered to sell the right to use landfill 
    capacity for up to 2,000,000 tons of municipal solid waste (``MSW'') 
    over a ten year period beginning on the date of divestiture (and capped 
    at an annual total of 270,000 tons) at one or both of the following 
    sites in the Houston market: the Hazelwood Landfill located at 4719 
    Tri-City Beach Road, Baytown, Texas 77520 and the Brazoria County 
    Landfill located at 10310 FM 523, Angleton, Texas. (``Houston Airspace 
    Assets''). USA Waste must complete the divestiture of the Houston 
    Assets, the Houston Landfill Site, and the Houston Airspace Assets 
    within ninety (90) days after the date on which the proposed Final 
    Judgment was filed (i.e., August 30, 1996), in accordance with the 
    procedures specified therein.
        The Stipulation and Order and proposed Final Judgment requires USA 
    Waste to ensure that, until the divestitures mandated by the proposed 
    Final Judgment have been accomplished, the Houston Hauling Assets and 
    the Houston Landfill Site will be maintained and operated as an 
    independent, ongoing, economically viable and active competitor. USA 
    Waste must preserve and maintain the assets to be divested as salable, 
    ongoing concerns, with competitively sensitive business information and 
    decision-making divorced from that of USA Waste. USA Waste will appoint 
    a person or persons to monitor and ensure its compliance with these 
    requirements of the proposed Final Judgment.
        Further, the proposed Final Judgment orders USA Waste to take 
    certain actions to eliminate any anticompetitive impact from the 
    proposed acquisition on the Johnstown market. USA Waste is ordered to 
    offer less restrictive service contracts to their small container solid 
    waste hauling customers in the Johnstown market. It must provide at 
    least 30 days written notice to the U.S. Department of Justice and the 
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office in advance of 
    its purchase of any significant waste hauling or waste disposal company 
    in the Johnstown market. It shall not oppose the addition of any 
    landfill, existing or new, to any county landfill plan in the Johnstown 
    market. And further, USA Waste shall make available a total of 200 tons 
    per day of MSW landfill capacity over a ten year period beginning on 
    the date of divestiture at the following site in the Johnstown market: 
    the Pellegrene Landfill located at SR 2019 Lucisboro Road, Homer City, 
    Pennsylvania 15748. The Pelligrene Landfill capacity shall be made 
    available by the defendants for use by any and all independent private 
    MSW haulers.
        The United States and the defendants have stipulated that the 
    proposed Final Judgment may be entered after compliance with the APPA. 
    Entry of the proposed Final Judgment would terminate the action, except 
    that the Court would retain jurisdiction to construe, modify, or 
    enforce the provisions of the proposed Final Judgment and to punish 
    violations thereof.
    
    II
    
    Description of the Events Giving Rise to the Alleged Violation
    
        USA Waste is the third largest solid waste hauling and disposal 
    company in the nation, and several municipal, commercial, industrial 
    and residential customers in 24 states. In 1995, USA Waste had total 
    revenues of over $730 million.
        Sanifill is one of the top ten companies in the solid waste hauling 
    and disposal business in the United States with operations in 23 
    states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Mexico and Canada. In 
    1995, Sanifill had total revenues of about $257 million.
        On June 22, 1996, USA Waste agreed to acquire all of the voting 
    stock of Sanifill for a purchase price of $1.5 billion. This 
    transaction, which would take place in the highly concentrated Houston 
    and Johnstown small container hauling and landfill disposal industries, 
    precipitated the government's suit.
    
    [[Page 48978]]
    
    The Transaction's Effects in the Houston and Johnstown Markets
    
    A. The Solid Waste Hauling Industry
        The Complaint alleges that small containerized hauling services and 
    landfill disposal services constitute lines of commerce, or relevant 
    product markets, for antitrust purposes, and that the Houston area and 
    the Johnstown area constitute appropriate sections of the country, or 
    relevant geographic markets. The Complaint alleges the effect of USA 
    Waste's acquisition may be to lessen competition substantially in the 
    provision of small containerized hauling services in the Houston and 
    Johnstown markets and landfill disposal services in the Houston market.
        Solid waste hauling involves the collection of paper, food, 
    construction material and other solid waste from homes, businesses and 
    industries, and the transporting of that waste to a landfill or other 
    disposal site. These services may be provided by private haulers 
    directly to residential, commercial and industrial customers, or 
    indirectly through municipal contracts and franchises.
        Service to commercial customers accounts for a large percentage of 
    total hauling revenues. Commercial customers include restaurants, large 
    apartment complexes, retail and wholesale stores, office buildings, and 
    industrial parks. These customers typically generate a substantially 
    larger volume of waste than that generated by residential customers. 
    Waste generated by commercial customers is generally placed in metal 
    containers of one to ten cubic yards provided by their hauling company. 
    One to ten cubic yard containers are called ``small containers.'' Small 
    containers are collected primarily by front-end load vehicles that lift 
    the containers over the front of the truck by means of a hydraulic 
    hoist and empty them into the storage section of the vehicle, where the 
    waste is compacted. Specially-rigged rear-end load vehicles can also be 
    used to service some small container customers, but these trucks 
    generally are not as efficient as front-end load vehicles and are 
    limited in the size of containers they can safely handle. Front-end 
    load vehicles can drive directly up to a container and hoist the 
    container in a manner similar to a forklift hoisting a pallet; the 
    containers do not need to be manually rolled into position by a truck 
    crew as with a rear-end load vehicle. Service to commercial customers 
    that use small containers is called ``small containerized hauling 
    service.''
        Solid waste hauling firms also provide service to residential and 
    industrial (or ``roll-off'') customers. Residential customers, 
    typically households and small apartment complexes that generate small 
    amounts of waste, use noncontainerized solid waste hauling service, 
    normally placing their waste in plastic bags or trash cans at curbside. 
    Rear-end load vehicles are generally used to collect waste from 
    residential customers and from those commercial customers that generate 
    relatively small quantities of solid waste, similar in amount and kind 
    to those generated by residential customers. Generally, rear-end 
    loaders use a two or three person crew to manually load the waste into 
    the rear of the vehicle.
        Industrial or roll-off customers include factories and construction 
    sites. These customers either generate noncompactible waste, such as 
    concrete or building debris, or very large quantities of compactible 
    waste. They deposit their waste into very large containers (usually 20 
    to 40 cubic yards) that are loaded onto a roll-off truck and 
    transported individually to the disposal site where they are emptied 
    before being returned to the customer's premises. Customers, like 
    shopping malls, use large, roll-off containers with compactors. This 
    type of customer generally generates compactible trash, like cardboard, 
    in very great quantities; it is more economical for this type of 
    customer to use roll-off service with a compactor than to use a number 
    of small containers picked up multiple times a week.
        There are no practical substitutes for small containerized hauling 
    service. Small containerized hauling service customers will not 
    generally switch to noncontainerized service because it is too 
    impractical and costly for those customers to bag and carry their trash 
    to the curb for hand pick-up. Small containerized hauling service 
    customers also value the cleanliness and relative freedom from 
    scavengers afforded by that service. Similarly, roll-of service is much 
    too costly and takes up too much space for most small containerized 
    hauling service customers. Only customers that generate the largest 
    volumes of solid waste can economically consider roll-off service, and 
    for customers that do generate large volumes of waste, roll-off service 
    is usually the only viable option.
        Solid waste hauling services are generally provided in very 
    localized areas. Route density (a large number of customers that are 
    close together) is necessary for small containerized solid waste 
    hauling firms to be profitable. In addition, it is not economically 
    efficient for trash hauling equipment to travel long distances without 
    collecting significant amounts of waste. Thus, it is not efficient for 
    a hauler to serve major metropolitan areas from a distant base. 
    Haulers, therefore, generally establish garages and related facilities 
    within each major local area served. Local laws or regulations may 
    further localize markets. For example, flow control regulations in 
    Pennsylvania can designate the facilities where trash picked up within 
    a geographic area must be disposed. Other local regulations may 
    prohibit the depositing of trash from outside a particular jurisdiction 
    in disposal facilities located within that jurisdiction. By designating 
    certain disposal facilities, these laws and regulations can dictate 
    which disposal facilities can compete for waste from these local 
    jurisdictions and how a hauler can set up its routes.
        The Complaint alleges that USA Waste's acquisition of Sanifill 
    would substantially lessen competition for the provision of small 
    containerized hauling service in the Houston and Johnstown markets. 
    Actual and potential competition between USA Waste and Johnstown for 
    the provision of small containerized hauling service in the Houston and 
    Johnstown markets will be eliminated.
        USA Waste and Sanifill are two of the largest providers of small 
    containerized hauling service in the Houston and Johnstown markets. In 
    the Houston market, USA Waste has a 24 percent share and Sanifill has a 
    7 percent share. The acquisition would increase the Herfindahl-
    Hirschmann Index (HHI) by about 325 to about 2225.
        In the Johnstown market, USA Waste has a 31 percent share and 
    Sanifill has a 14 percent share. The acquisition would increase the HHI 
    by about 850 to about 2550.
        Solid waste hauling is an industry highly susceptible to tacit or 
    overt collusion among competing firms. Overt collusion has been 
    documented in more than a dozen criminal and civil antitrust cases 
    brought in the last decade and a half. Such collusion typically 
    involves customer allocation and price fixing, and where it has 
    occurred, has been shown to persist for many years.
        The elimination of one of a small number of significant 
    competitors, such as would occur as a result of the proposed 
    transaction in the alleged markets, significantly increases the 
    likelihood that consumers in these markets are likely to face higher 
    prices or poorer quality service.
        A new entrant cannot constrain the prices of larger incumbents 
    until it
    
    [[Page 48979]]
    
    achieves minimum efficient scale and operating efficiencies comparable 
    to the incumbent firms. In small containerized hauling service, 
    achieving comparable operating efficiencies requires achieving route 
    density comparable to existing firms, which typically takes a 
    substantial period of time. A substantial barrier to entry is created 
    by the use of long-term contracts coupled with selective pricing 
    reductions to specific customers to deter new entrants into small 
    containerized hauling service and to hinder them in winning enough 
    customers to build efficient routes. Further, even if a new entrant 
    endures and grows to a point near minimum efficient scale, the entrant 
    will often be purchased by an incumbent firm and will be removed as a 
    competitive threat.
    B. Landfill Disposal Services
        Most commercial solid waste is taken by haulers to landfills for 
    disposal. Access to a suitable MSW landfill at a competitive price is 
    essential to a hauling company performing commercial containerized 
    hauling service because disposal costs account for approximately 30-50 
    percent of the revenues received for this service. Suitable MSW 
    landfills are difficult and time consuming to obtain because of the 
    scarcity of appropriate land, high capital costs, local resident 
    opposition, and government regulation. Several years are required to 
    process an application, with no guarantee of success.
        In Texas, dry waste can be taken to what are referred to as a MSW 
    (Type 1) landfill or to a dry waste (Type 4) landfill. Access to a 
    suitable landfill at a competitive price is essential to a hauling 
    company collecting dry waste because disposal costs can account for 
    over 60% of the revenues for this service. Dry waste landfills are 
    difficult and time consuming to obtain because to permit and build a 
    Type 4 landfill in Texas, one must go through a process similar to that 
    for permitting a Type 1 landfill. Several years are required to process 
    an application, with no guarantee of success.
        USA Waste's acquisition of Sanifill would substantially lessen 
    competition for the provision of MSW landfill and dry waste landfill 
    service in the Houston market. Actual and potential competition between 
    USA Waste and Sanifill for the provision of MSW and dry waste landfill 
    service in the Houston market will be eliminated.
        USA Waste and Sanifill are two leading providers of MSW landfill 
    and dry waste landfill services in the Houston market. There are nine 
    MSW landfills (owned by four firms) and approximately 18 dry waste 
    landfills (owned by seven firms) in the Houston area. USA Waste and 
    Sanifill each operate one MSW landfill; Sanifill has 11 dry waste 
    landfills (four operating) and USA Waste has one dry waste landfill.
        As a result of the acquisition, the concentration of MSW and dry 
    waste landfill services in the Houston market will be substantially 
    increased, which is likely to result in price increases. The 
    acquisition would increase the HHI in MSW landfill disposal service by 
    225 points to 3550; and in dry waste landfills by 650 points to 4000. 
    In the Houston market, there are no alternative types of facilities 
    available for the disposal of either MSW waste or dry waste. Although 
    dry waste can be taken to either a MSW landfill or a dry waste 
    landfill, prices at the MSW landfill are significantly higher than at 
    the dry waste landfill, so that MSW landfills are not normally used for 
    dry waste. Accordingly, haulers are not likely to switch to another 
    disposal service despite an increased concentration in the ownership of 
    MSW or dry landfills and a likely price increase resulting from the 
    merger.
    C. Harm to Competition as a Consequence of the Acquisition
        The Complaint alleges that the transaction would have the following 
    effects, among others: competition for the provision of small 
    containerized hauling service in the Houston and Johnstown markets and 
    landfill disposal service in the Houston market will be substantially 
    lessened; actual and potential competition between USA Waste and 
    Sanifill in the provision of small containerized hauling service and 
    landfill disposal service in the Houston market will be eliminated; and 
    prices for small containerized hauling service in the Houston and 
    Johnstown markets and landfill disposal service in the Houston market 
    are likely to increase above competitive levels.
    
    III
    
    Explanation of the Proposed Final Judgment
    
    A. The Houston Market
        The provisions of the proposed Final Judgment are designed to 
    eliminate the anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in small 
    containerized hauling services in the Houston market by establishing a 
    new, independent and economically viable competitor in that market. The 
    proposed Final Judgment requires USA Waste and Sanifill, within 90 days 
    of August 30, 1996, to divest, as viable ongoing businesses, the 
    Houston Hauling Assets, Houston Landfill Site and the Houston Airspace 
    Assets. The divestitures would include the small containerized hauling 
    service assets, landfill disposal assets, and such other assets as may 
    be necessary to insure the viability of the small container and 
    landfill businesses. If USA Waste and Sanifill cannot accomplish these 
    divestitures within the above-described period, the Final Judgment 
    provides that, upon application (after consultation with the State of 
    Texas) by the United States as plaintiff, the Court will appoint a 
    trustee to effect divestiture.
        The proposed Final Judgment provides that the assets must be 
    divested in such a way as to satisfy plaintiff United States (after 
    consultation with the State of Texas) that the operations can and will 
    be operated by the purchaser or purchasers as viable, ongoing 
    businesses that can compete effectively in the relevant market. The 
    defendants must take all reasonable steps necessary to accomplish the 
    divestitures, shall cooperate with bona fide prospective purchasers 
    and, if one is appointed, with the trustee.
        If a trustee is appointed, the proposed Final Judgment provides 
    that USA Waste and Sanifill will pay all costs and expenses of the 
    trustee. The trustee's commission will be structured so as to provide 
    an incentive for the trustee based on the price obtained and the speed 
    with which divestiture is accomplished. After his or her appointment 
    becomes effective, the trustee will file monthly reports with the 
    parties and the Court, setting forth the trustee's efforts to 
    accomplish divestiture. At the end of six months, if the divestiture 
    has not been accomplished, the trustee and the parties will make 
    recommendations to the Court which shall enter such orders as 
    appropriate in order to carry out the purpose of the trust, including 
    extending the trust or the term of the trustee's appointment.
        In addition, the proposed Final Judgment intends to eliminate the 
    anticompetitive effects of the acquisition in the Houston area market 
    for MSW disposal services by requiring USA Waste and Sanifill to sell 
    the rights to disposal of 2 million tons of MSW waste over ten years at 
    their only two MSW landfills in the area. The Final Judgment limits the 
    amount disposed of in any one year to 270,000 tons and requires that 
    USA Waste and Sanifill will provide the necessary services to dispose 
    of the waste to the purchaser or any agents designated by the purchaser 
    in a nondiscriminatory manner. The 270,000 ton limit is approximately 
    80%
    
    [[Page 48980]]
    
    of the total capacity used in 1995 at the Sanifill MSW landfill. 
    Sanifill will retain some of the hauling operations that used this 
    landfill in 1995 and needs some capacity to compete for large disposal 
    contracts against its two larger landfill competitors in the area. The 
    availability of this significant capacity limits the impact of any 
    increase in MSW landfill concentration in the Houston market. The 
    availability of this landfill capacity further helps to ensure the 
    success of any entity purchasing the Houston Hauling Assets in 
    competing with other haulers in the Houston market.
        Pursuant to its terms, the proposed Final Judgment mandates that 
    USA Waste also divest its sole dry waste (Type 4) landfill in the 
    Houston area market. USA Waste's divestiture of the North County 
    Landfill eliminates any possible anticompetitive effect related to the 
    merger and its impact on dry waste landfills in the Houston area 
    market.
        Finally, the requirement of the proposed Final Judgment that 
    defendants provide 30 days written notice of any proposed purchase of 
    significant waste hauling or disposal companies in the Houston market 
    insures that the U.S. Department of Justice and the State of Texas 
    General's Office will be able to review, consider and oppose if 
    necessary any future consolidation in the market for a period of ten 
    years.
    B. The Johnstown Market
        The proposed Final Judgment also requires USA Waste and Sanifill to 
    offer less restrictive contracts to small containerized hauling 
    customers in the Johnstown area market. These changes to the contracts 
    involve substantially shortening the term of contracts USA Waste and 
    Sanifill use from three years to one year, substantially reducing the 
    amount of liquidated damages, and eliminating other terms that could 
    make entry more difficult. The proposed Final Judgment generally 
    requires that these revised contracts shall be offered immediately to 
    all new small containerized hauling customers. Within 30 days of the 
    entry of the proposed Final Judgment, USA Waste and Sanifill must offer 
    the revised contract to all their non-municipal small containerized 
    hauling service customers in the Johnstown market. These changes in the 
    contract will make it easier for a new entrant to gain customers and 
    set up an efficient route or for a small hauler to expand its route if 
    prices increase. In the Johnstown area, a rural market in which most 
    haulers offer rearload small containerized hauling services and there 
    are a number of small containerized haulers, contract relief should 
    substantially eliminate any anticompetitive effects in the small 
    containerized hauling market.
        The proposed Final Judgment further limits any anticompetitive 
    effect in the small containerized hauling market related to the USA 
    Waste acquisition of Sanifill in the Johnstown market in several ways. 
    First, the defendants are required to make available specified MSW 
    landfill airspace rights to independent haulers for a ten year period. 
    Defendants are obliged to accept up to 200 tons per day and up to 
    62,400 tons per year during this period at the Pelligrene landfill 
    under non-price terms no less favorable than those provided to 
    defendants' vehicles or the vehicles of any municipality in the 
    Johnstown market. Second. USA Waste and Sanifill are required to 
    refrain from opposing in any way the addition of new or existing 
    landfills to any county landfill plan in the Johnstown market from 
    entry of the Final Judgment and refrain from opposing any permit 
    application for a new landfill or expansion of an existing landfill for 
    a period of ten years. Finally, the requirement that defendants provide 
    at least 30 days written notice of any proposed purchase of significant 
    waste hauling or disposal companies in the Johnstown area market 
    insures that the U.S. Department of Justice and the Commonwealth of 
    Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office will be able to review, consider 
    and oppose if necessary any future consolidation in the market for a 
    period of ten years.
        The United States concluded divestiture was not necessary in the 
    Johnstown market. It determined that a change in the type of contracts 
    used with small containerized hauling service in this market, combined 
    with the additional notice and landfill capacity agreements reached 
    with the parties, will adequately address the competitive concerns 
    posed by USA Waste's acquisition of Sanifill. A number of factors led 
    to that decision, including the number of existing competitors in the 
    market; the size of the population; the number, location and density of 
    commercial establishments requiring small containerized hauling 
    service; and the extensive use of rear-end load mixed (hand and 
    containerized) collection routes. Absent the long-term contracts and 
    limitations on landfill access, these firms could be expected to expand 
    significantly their containerized hauling operations in response to an 
    anticompetitive price increase. Requiring USA Waste and Sanifill to 
    offer less restrictive contracts within the market and to provide 
    access to landfill capacity to independent haulers eliminates a major 
    barrier to entry and expansion, thus constraining any possible 
    anticompetitive price increase by the post-acquisition firm.
        The relief sought in the various markets alleged in the Complaint 
    has been tailored to insure that, given the specific conditions in each 
    market, the relief will protect consumers of small containerized 
    hauling services and landfill disposal services from higher prices and 
    poorer quality service in those markets that might otherwise result 
    from the acquisition.
    
    IV
    
    Remedies Available to Potential Private Litigants
    
        Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15) provides that any 
    person who has been injured as a result of conduct prohibited by the 
    antitrust laws may bring suit in federal court to recover three times 
    the damages the person has suffered, as well as costs and reasonable 
    attorneys' fees. Entry of the proposed Final Judgment will neither 
    impair nor assist the bringing of any private antitrust damage action. 
    Under the provisions of Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 
    16(a)), the proposed Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any 
    subsequent private lawsuit that may be brought against defendant.
    
    V
    
    Procedures Available for Modification of the Proposed Final Judgment
    
        The United States and defendant have stipulated that the proposed 
    Final Judgment may be entered by the Court after compliance with the 
    provisions of the APPA, provided that the United States has not 
    withdrawn its consent. The APPA conditions entry upon the Court's 
    determination that the proposed Final Judgment is in the public 
    interest.
        The APPA provides a period of at least 60 days preceding the 
    effective date of the proposed Final Judgment within which any person 
    may submit to the United States written comments regarding the proposed 
    Final Judgment. Any person who wishes to comment should do so within 
    sixty (60) days of the date of publication of this Competitive Impact 
    Statement in the Federal Register. The United States will evaluate and 
    respond to the comments. All comments will be given due consideration 
    by the Department of Justice, which remains free to withdraw its 
    consent to the proposed judgment at any time prior to entry. The 
    comments and the response of the United States will be filed with the 
    Court and
    
    [[Page 48981]]
    
    published in the Federal Register. Written comments should be submitted 
    to: J. Robert Kramer II, Chief, Litigation II Section, Antitrust 
    Division, United States Department of Justice, 1401 H Street, N.W., 
    Suite 3000, Washington, D.C. 20530.
        The proposed Final Judgment provides that the Court retains 
    jurisdiction over this action, and the parties may apply to the Court 
    for any order necessary or appropriate for the modification, 
    interpretation, or enforcement of the Final Judgment.
    
    VI
    
    Alternatives to the Proposed Final Judgment
    
        The United States considered, as an alternative to the proposed 
    Final Judgment, litigation against defendants USA Waste and Sanifill. 
    The United States could have brought suit and sought preliminary and 
    permanent injunctions against USA Waste's acquisition of the voting 
    stock Sanifill. The United States is satisfied, however, that the 
    divestiture of the described assets, the provision of significant 
    landfill capacity to competitors, and the contract relief outlined in 
    the proposed Final Judgment will encourage viable waste hauling and 
    disposal competitors in the markets identified by the United States as 
    requiring the relief implemented. The United States is satisfied that 
    the proposed relief will prevent the acquisition from having 
    anticompetitive effects in those markets. The divestiture, the 
    provision of landfill capacity and the proposed contractual relief will 
    restore the markets to the structure that existed prior to the 
    acquisition, will preserve the existence of independent competitors in 
    those areas, and will allow for new entry and expansion by existing 
    firms in those markets where contract relief is sought. For the reasons 
    discussed above, infra at pages 17-18, the United States concluded 
    divestiture was not necessary in the Johnstown market because the 
    contractual, notification, and landfill capacity agreements reached 
    with the parties adequately address the competitive concerns.
    
    VII
    
    Standard of Review Under the APPA for Proposed Final Judgment
    
        The APPA requires that proposed consent judgments in antitrust 
    cases brought by the United States be subject to a sixty-day comment 
    period, after which the court shall determine whether entry of the 
    proposed Final Judgment ``is in the public interest.'' In making that 
    determination, the court may consider--
    
        (1) The competitive impact of such judgment, including 
    termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and 
    modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated effects of 
    alternative remedies actually considered, and any other 
    considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment;
        (2) The impact of entry of such judgment upon the public 
    generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the 
    violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the 
    public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the 
    issues at trial.
    
    15 U.S.C. 16(e) (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals for the 
    District of Columbia Circuit recently held, the APPA permits a court to 
    consider, among other things, the relationship between the remedy 
    secured and the specific allegations set forth in the government's 
    complaint, whether the decree is sufficiently clear, whether 
    enforcement mechanisms are sufficient, and whether the decree may 
    positively harm third parties. See United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 
    1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
        In conducting this inquiry, ``the Court is nowhere compelled to go 
    to trial or to engage in extended proceedings which might have the 
    effect of vitiating the benefits of prompt and less costly settlement 
    through the consent decree process.'' \1\ Rather,
    
        \1\ 119 Cong. Rec. 24598 (1973). See, United States v. Gillette 
    Co., 406 F.Supp. 713, 715 (D.Mass. 1975). A ``public interest'' 
    determination can be made properly on the basis of the Competitive 
    Impact Statement and Response to Comments filed pursuant to the 
    APPA. Although the APPA authorizes the use of additional procedures, 
    15 U.S.C. Sec. 16(f), those procedures are discretionary. A court 
    need not invoke any of them unless it believes that the comments 
    have raised significant issues and that further proceedings would 
    aid the court in resolving those issues. See, H.R. 93-1463, 93rd 
    Cong. 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in (1974) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
    6535, 6538.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    absent a showing of corrupt failure of the government to discharge 
    its duty, the Court, in making its public interest finding, should * 
    * * carefully consider the explanations of the government in the 
    competitive impact statement and its responses to comments in order 
    to determine whether those explanations are reasonable under the 
    circumstances.
    
    United States v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. para. 
    61,508, at 71,980 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
        Accordingly, with respect to the adequacy of the relief secured by 
    the decree, a court may not ``engage in an unrestricted evaluation of 
    what relief would best serve the public.'' United States v. BNS, Inc., 
    858 F.2d 456, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) quoting United States v. Bechtel 
    Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 
    (1981); see also, Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Precedent 
    requires that
    
    the balancing of competing social and political interests affected 
    by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first 
    instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. The court's 
    role in protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the 
    government has not breached its duty to the public in consenting to 
    the decree. The court is required to determine not whether a 
    particular decree is the one that will best serve society, but 
    whether the settlement is ``within the reaches of the public 
    interest.'' More elaborate requirements might undermine the 
    effectiveness of antitrust enforcement by consent decree.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \2\ United States v. Bechtel, 648 F.2d at 666 (citations 
    omitted) (emphasis added); see United States v. BNS. Inc., 858 F.2d 
    at 463; United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 
    1127, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. 
    Supp. at 716. See also United States v. American Cynamid Co., 719 
    F.2d at 565.
    
        The proposed Final Judgment, therefore, should not be reviewed 
    under a standard of whether it is certain to eliminate every 
    anticompetitive effect of a particular practice or whether it mandates 
    certainty of free competition in the future. Court approval of a final 
    judgment requires a standard more flexible and less strict than the 
    standard required for a finding of liability. ``[A] proposed decree 
    must be approved even if it falls short of the remedy the court would 
    impose on its own, as long as it falls within the range of 
    acceptability or is `within the reaches of public interest.' (citations 
    omitted).'' \3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
        \3\ United States v. American Tel. and Tel Co., 552 F. Supp. 
    131, 150 (D.D.C. 1982) aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 
    U.S. 1001 (1983) quoting United States v. Gillette Co., supra, 406 
    F. Supp. at 716; United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 
    619, 622 (W.D. Ky 1985).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    VIII
    
    Determinative Documents
    
        There are no determinative materials or documents within the 
    meaning of the APPA that were considered by the United States in 
    formulating the proposed Final Judgment.
        For Plaintiff United States of America:
    
        Dated: September 6, 1996.
    J. Robert Kramer II,
    
    PA Bar #23963.
    
    Willie L. Hudgins,
    
    DC BAR #37127.
    
    Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    
    David R. Bickel,
    
    DC Bar #393409.
    
    Joel A. Christie,
    
    WI Bar #1019438.
    
    Michael K. Hammaker,
    
    DC Bar #233684.
    
    
    [[Page 48982]]
    
    
    Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H 
    St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 307-1168.
    
    Certification of Service
    
        I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served upon 
    USA Waste Services, Inc., Sanifill, Inc., the Office of the Attorney 
    General of the State of Texas, and the Office of the Attorney General 
    of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by placing a copy of this 
    Competitive Impact Statement in the U.S. mail, directed to each of the 
    above-named parties at the addresses given below, this 6th day of 
    September, 1996.
    
    USA Waste Services, Inc.: c/o James R. Weiss, Preston, Gates, Suite 
    500, 1735 New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20006
    Sanifill, Inc.: c/o Kirk K. Van Tine, Baker & Botts, LLP, 1299 
    Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20004
    State of Pennsylvania: James A. Donahue, III, Senior Deputy Attorney 
    General, Antitrust Section, 14th Floor, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, 
    PA 17120
    State of Texas: Mark Tobey, Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Chief 
    for Antitrust, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, P.O. Box 12548, 
    Austin, TX 78711-2548
    David R. Bickel,
    Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 1401 H 
    Street, N.W., Suite 3000, Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 307-1168.
    [FR Doc. 96-23700 Filed 9-16-96; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4410-01-M
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
09/17/1996
Department:
Antitrust Division
Entry Type:
Notice
Document Number:
96-23700
Pages:
48971-48982 (12 pages)
PDF File:
96-23700.pdf