[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 181 (Thursday, September 18, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49034-49043]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24807]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-245, 50-336, and 50-423 and Docket No. 50-213]
Northeast Utilities, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2,
and 3 and Haddam Neck Plant; Issuance of Partial Director's Decision
Under 10 CFR 2.206
Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has issued a Partial Director's Decision with regard to a
Petition dated November 25, 1996, as amended on December 23, 1996,
filed by Ms. Deborah Katz and Mr. Paul Gunter on behalf of the Citizens
Awareness Network (CAN) and the Nuclear Information and Resource
Service (NIRS), hereafter referred to as ``Petitioners.'' The Petition
pertains to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and
the Haddam Neck Plant.
The Petitioners requested that the NRC: (1) Immediately suspend or
revoke Northeast Utilities' (NU's or Licensee's) licenses to operate
its nuclear facilities in Connecticut; (2) investigate possible
Licensee material misrepresentations to the NRC; (3) continue the
shutdown of the Licensee's facilities until the Department of Justice
completes its investigation and the results are reviewed by the NRC;
(4) continue the shutdown until the NRC evaluates and approves the
Licensee's remedial actions; (5) continue listing the Licensee's
facilities on the NRC's ``Watch List'' should any facility resume
operation; (6) bar any predecommissioning or decommissioning activity
at any of the Licensee's nuclear facilities in Connecticut until the
Licensee and the NRC take certain identified steps to assure that such
activities can be safely conducted; (7) initiate an investigation into
how the NRC allowed the asserted illegal situation at the Licensee's
nuclear facilities in Connecticut to exist and continue for more than a
decade; and (8) immediately investigate of the need for enforcement
action for alleged violation of 10 CFR Part 50, appendix B, with
respect to nitrogen calculations.
The bases for the assertions are Licensee and NRC inspection
findings and Licensee documents referred to in the Petition and a VHS
videotape, Exhibit A, which accompanied the Petition. The videotape
records an August 29, 1996, Citizens Regulatory Commission televised
interview of a former Millstone Station employee expressing his views
on Licensee management. Areas identified in the Petition include
inadequate surveillance testing, operation outside the design basis,
inadequate radiological controls, failed corrective action processes,
and degraded material condition. The Petition asserts that this
information demonstrates that there are inadequate quality assurance
programs at the Licensee's nuclear facilities in Connecticut, that the
Licensee has made material false statements regarding its Millstone
units, and that safe decommissioning of the Haddam Neck facility is not
possible because of the deficiencies in the design and licensing bases
of the facility.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has
partially granted the Petition. The reasons for this partial grant are
explained in the ``Partial Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR
2.206'' (DD-97-21), the complete text of which follows this notice and
is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document
Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, at the
local public document rooms located at the Learning Resources Center,
Three Rivers Community-Technical College, New London Turnpike, Norwich,
Connecticut, and at the temporary local public document room located at
the Waterford Library, ATTN: Vince Juliano, 49 Rope Ferry Road,
Waterford, Connecticut, for Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3; and at the
Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut, for the
Haddam Neck Plant.
A copy of the Partial Director's Decision will be filed with the
Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance
with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Commission's regulations. As provided for
by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of
the Commission (for Requests 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8) 25 days after the date
of issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a
review of the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of September.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.,
Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Partial Director's Decision Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206
[DD-97-21]
I. Introduction
On November 25, 1996, as amended on December 23, 1996, Ms. Deborah
Katz and Mr. Paul Gunter filed a Petition on behalf of the Citizens
[[Page 49035]]
Awareness Network (CAN) and the Nuclear Information and Resource
Service (NIRS), hereafter, referred to as Petitioners. These two
submittals will hereafter be referred to as the Petition. The Petition
was filed with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the NRC
Executive Director for Operations pursuant to Sec. 2.206 of Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206).
The Petitioners requested that the NRC take the following actions:
(1) Immediate suspension or revocation of Northeast Utilities' (NU's or
Licensee's) licenses to operate its nuclear facilities in Connecticut;
(2) investigation of possible NU material misrepresentations to the
NRC; (3) continued shutdown of the NU facilities until the Department
of Justice completes its investigation and the results are reviewed by
the NRC; (4) continued shutdown until the NRC evaluates and approves NU
remedial actions; (5) continued listing of the NU facilities on the
NRC's Watch List should any facility resume operation; (6) prohibition
of any predecommissioning or decommissioning activity at any NU nuclear
facility in Connecticut until NU and the NRC take certain identified
steps to assure that such activities can be safely conducted; (7)
initiation of an investigation into how the NRC allowed the asserted
illegal situation at NU's nuclear facilities in Connecticut to exist
and continue for more than a decade; and (8) an immediate investigation
of the need for enforcement action for alleged violation of 10 CFR part
50, Appendix B.1
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\1\ Petitioners requested copies of the Licensee's calculations
performed in response to the event at the Haddam Neck Plant that
resulted in the introduction of a nitrogen bubble into the reactor
vessel. The calculations requested were discussed during a
predecisional enforcement conference held on December 4, 1996. The
calculations were provided to the Petitioners on July 21, 1997.
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The bases for the Petitioners' assertions are NU and NRC inspection
findings and NU documents referred to in the Petition and a VHS
videotape, Exhibit A, which accompanied the Petition. No new
information regarding Licensee activities was provided by the
Petitioners except for the alleged violation referred to in Request 8.
The Petitioners assert, in Request 8, that NU relied partly on draft
calculations in its presentation at a public predecisional enforcement
conference with the NRC staff, which included a discussion of an event
at the Haddam Neck Plant. The Petitioners further assert that the
calculations had not been reviewed and approved in accordance with the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.
The areas of concern identified in the Petition include inadequate
surveillance testing, operation outside the design as specified in the
updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), inadequate radiological
controls, failed corrective action processes, and the degraded material
condition of the plants. The Petitioners also assert that this
information demonstrates that there are inadequate quality assurance
programs at NU's nuclear facilities in Connecticut, that NU has made
material false statements regarding its Millstone units, and that safe
decommissioning of the Haddam Neck Plant is not possible given the
defective nature of the design and licensing bases for the facility.
The videotape records an August 29, 1996, Citizens Regulatory
Commission televised interview of a former Millstone Station employee
expressing his views on NU management. The tape has been transcribed
and placed on the dockets of the facilities cited. The videotape
interview included the former employee's views relating to NU's poor
management in allowing degradation of the material condition of the
plant; poor radwaste practices resulting in potential radiation
exposure to employees; and harassment, intimidation, and subsequent
illegal termination of employees raising safety concerns.
On January 23, 1997, the NRC acknowledged receipt of the Petition
and informed the Petitioners that the Petition had been assigned to the
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to prepare a response and that
action would be taken within a reasonable time regarding the specific
concerns raised in the Petition. The Petitioners were also informed
that the requests for immediate action were denied. The Petitioners
were further informed that copies of the Petition and videotape were
sent to the NRC's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in response to
Petitioners' Request 7 and parts of Requests 5, 6, and 8.
II. Discussion
The NRC staff has reviewed the Petition and, with the exception of
Request 8, has not identified any new information regarding either the
Millstone or the Haddam Neck facilities. Both of the facilities have
been the subject of close NRC scrutiny for several years.
Millstone Facility
With regard to the Millstone units, the NRC staff has been
concerned for the last several years about the number and duration of
violations at the Millstone site in the broad programmatic areas of
design and licensing bases, testing, and radiological controls.
Programmatic concerns in these areas, along with concerns in other
areas, were major contributors to the decline in performance at the
Millstone site. In the most recent systematic assessment of licensee
performance (SALP) report of August 26, 1994, the NRC staff stated in
the cover letter that it had noted several performance weaknesses,
common to all three Millstone units. Among these were continuing
problems with procedure quality and implementation, the informality in
several maintenance and engineering programs (contributing to instances
of poor performance), and the failure to resolve several longstanding
problems at the site. In addition to these programmatic problems, the
Licensee has had significant problems in dealing with employee concerns
involving safety issues at the site.
On November 4, 1995, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 1 for a
scheduled refueling outage. The NRC sent a letter to the Licensee on
December 13, 1995, requiring the Licensee, before restarting Millstone
Unit 1, to inform the NRC, pursuant to section 182a of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and 10 CFR 50.54(f), of the
actions taken to ensure that in the future the Licensee would operate
that facility according to the terms and conditions of the unit's
operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the unit's FSAR.
In January 1996, the NRC designated the three Millstone units as
Category 2 on the NRC's Watch List. Plants on the Watch List in this
category have weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention until the
licensees demonstrate improved performance for an extended period of
time.
On February 20, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 2 when
it declared both trains of the high-pressure safety injection (HPSI)
system inoperable because of a design issue. There was a potential that
the HPSI throttle valves could become plugged with debris when taking
suction from the sump during recirculation mode.
On March 30, 1996, the Licensee shut down Millstone Unit 3 after
finding that containment isolation valves for the auxiliary feedwater
turbine-driven pump were inoperable because the valves did not meet NRC
requirements. In response to a Licensee root cause analysis of
inaccuracies in the Millstone Unit 1 FSAR, identifying the potential
for similar configuration control problems at Millstone Units 2 and 3
and the existing design configuration issues identified at these units,
the NRC issued 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to the Licensee on March 7 and
April 4, 1996. These
[[Page 49036]]
letters required that the Licensee inform the NRC of the corrective
actions taken regarding design configuration issues at Millstone Units
2 and 3 before the restart of each unit.
In June 1996, the NRC designated the three units at Millstone as
Category 3 on the NRC's Watch List. Plants in this category have
significant weaknesses that warrant maintaining them in a shutdown
condition until the Licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that it has
both established and implemented adequate corrective actions to ensure
substantial improvement. This category also requires Commission
approval before operations can be resumed.
On August 14, 1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order directing
the Licensee to contract with a third party to implement an Independent
Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) to confirm the adequacy
of its efforts to reestablish the design basis and configuration
controls for each of the three Millstone units. The ICAVP is intended
to provide additional assurance, before a unit restart, that the
Licensee has identified and corrected existing problems in the design
and configuration control processes for that unit.
On April 16, 1997, the NRC issued another 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter,
which superseded the previously mentioned 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters and
consolidated its requests for information and periodic updates. The
information requested included: (1) The identification of significant
items needed to be accomplished before restart; (2) identification of
items to be deferred until after restart; (3) NU's process and
rationale for deferring items; and (4) a description of the actions
taken by NU to ensure that future operation will be conducted in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the operating licenses, the
Commission's regulations, and the FSARs. The Licensee provided the
initial information requested by letter dated May 29, 1997. Additional
information and updates will be provided in accordance with the time
intervals specified in the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter.
During eight NRC inspections conducted between October 1995 and
August 1996, more than 60 apparent violations of NRC requirements were
identified at the Millstone site. These apparent violations were
discussed at a public predecisional enforcement conference held at the
Millstone site on December 5, 1996. During the meeting, the Licensee
stated that management failed to provide clear direction and oversight,
performance standards were low, management expectations were weak, and
station priorities were inappropriate. The NRC staff is nearing
completion of its evaluation of potential enforcement action to address
these apparent violations and their overall impact on the safe
operation of the Millstone units.
Additionally, the Licensee has had a chronic problem of not dealing
effectively with employee concerns at the Millstone site. On December
12, 1995, the NRC established a review group to conduct an independent
evaluation of the history of the Licensee's handling of employee
concerns related to licensed activities at the Millstone facility. The
review group determined that, in general, an unhealthy work
environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and did not
welcome or promote questioning attitudes, has existed at the Millstone
facility for the last several years. To address this problem, the NRC
issued an Order on October 24, 1996, that directed NU to devise and
implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by
Millstone employees and to ensure an environment free from retaliation
or discrimination. In addition, the Order required NU to have an
independent third party oversee its employee concerns program. The
third party is responsible for providing periodic reports to NU and the
NRC detailing its findings and recommendations. The third-party
findings and the NU responses to them will be assessed by the NRC staff
for any restart issues.
The NRC regards compliance with regulations, license conditions,
and Technical Specifications (TSs) as mandatory. However, the NRC also
recognizes that plants will not operate trouble-free.2 This
is clearly articulated in Criterion XVI, Appendix B, Part 50, ``Quality
Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power plants and Fuel Reprocessing
plants.'' Criterion XVI states that ``measures shall be established to
assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures,
malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and
equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected.''
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\2\ The NRC's approach to protecting public health and safety
includes the philosophy of defense-in-depth, which supports the
identification and correction of degraded or nonconforming
conditions discussed above. Briefly stated, this philosophy (1)
requires the application of conservative codes and standards, to
establish substantial safety margins in the design of nuclear
plants; (2) requires high quality in the design, construction, and
operation of nuclear plants to reduce the likelihood of
malfunctions, and promotes the use of automatic safety system
actuation features; (3) recognizes that equipment can fail and
operators can make mistakes and therefore requires redundancy in
safety systems and components to reduce the chances that
malfunctions or mistakes will lead to accidents that release fission
products from the fuel; and (4) recognizes that, in spite of these
precautions, serious fuel damage accidents can happen and therefore
requires containment structures and safety features to prevent the
release of fission products. In the unlikely event of an offsite
fission product release, emergency plans are in place to provide
reasonable assurance that protective actions can and will be taken
to protect the population around nuclear power plants. These
emergency plans are coordinated with local and State officials and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
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The appropriate response to an identified deficiency can and should
vary, depending on the safety significance of the deficiency. For
example, for rapidly developing situations, when prompt action is
required to assure plants are not in an unsafe condition, automatic
safety systems are in place to shut down the reactor. In other, less
time-critical situations, TSs relating to structures, systems, and
components (SSCs) vital to the safe operation of a nuclear plant
require that specific actions be taken within a predetermined time
period when the SSC is determined to be inoperable. The time period is
dependent on the safety significance of the SSC. NRC Generic Letter 91-
18, ``Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual
Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on
Operability,'' provides guidance for licensees to determine what
actions are required and when they need to be taken for identified
degraded or nonconforming conditions.
The conduct of NRC regulatory oversight at the Millstone site is
based on the recognition that it is the Licensee's primary
responsibility to demonstrate that corrective actions have been
effectively implemented. Thus, the Licensee must determine that a unit
is in conformance with applicable NRC regulations, its license
conditions, and its FSAR and that applicable licensing commitments have
been met before the NRC staff can recommend that the Commission approve
the restart of any unit. The Licensee's conformance with NRC
regulations, license conditions, and licensing commitments is
fundamental to NRC's confidence in the safety of licensed activities.
In short, the Licensee has the primary responsibility for the safe
operation of its facilities.
In a June 20, 1996, letter to the NRC, the Licensee described its
Configuration Management Plan (CMP), which is its principal program to
provide reasonable assurance that weaknesses at the Millstone units
have been effectively corrected. The CMP includes efforts to understand
and correct the licensing
[[Page 49037]]
and design bases issues that led the NRC to issue the 10 CFR 50.54(f)
letters and Order actions to prevent recurrence of those issues. The
Licensee stated that the objective of the CMP was to document and meet
the licensing and design bases requirements of each unit and to ensure
that adequate programs and processes are in place to maintain control
of these requirements.
The Licensee's CMP must either correct each FSAR deficiency or
evaluate it to ensure that the change to the facility does not involve
any unreviewed safety question or change to the facility TSs. NU has
documented a large number of deficiencies, which vary in scope and
safety significance for each unit. These lists contain significant
deficiencies that must be corrected before restart and others that the
Licensee is planning to correct after the restart. In its continuing
reviews of the deficiency lists, the NRC staff will determine whether
the Licensee has appropriately scheduled safety-significant items for
completion before restart and whether those items that the Licensee
will defer until after restart are appropriate for each unit. The
results of these efforts will be documented in NRC inspection reports.
The NRC's regulatory oversight of the Licensee's corrective actions
requires extensive planning and program integration. To focus more
regulatory attention on all of the restart issues related to the
Millstone units, the NRC has established a Special Projects Office
(SPO) within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to oversee these
activities. The SPO has developed a comprehensive and multifaceted
oversight program to verify the adequacy of NU's corrective actions,
programs, and processes. The breadth and significance of the problems
identified at the Millstone site require this program. The SPO has
developed a Restart Assessment Plan (Assessment Plan) for each of the
Millstone units, which includes: (1) the appropriate aspects of NRC
Inspection Manual, Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, ``Staff Guidelines For
Restart Approval''; (2) oversight of NU's ICAVP; and (3) oversight of
NU's corrective actions relating to employee concerns involving safety
issues. The activities associated with the Assessment Plan are in
addition to the normal inspection and licensing activities being
carried out at the Millstone site.
MC 0350 establishes the guidelines for approving the restart of a
nuclear power plant after a shutdown resulting from a significant
event, a complex hardware problem, or serious management deficiencies.
The primary objective of the guidelines in MC 0350 is to ensure that
NRC's restart review efforts are appropriate for the individual
circumstances, are reviewed and approved by the appropriate NRC
management levels, and provide objective measures of restart readiness.
The Assessment Plan for each unit includes those issues listed in
MC 0350 that the NRC staff has identified as relevant to the shutdown
of the unit. Each Assessment Plan also includes additional issues
determined to be applicable to the specific situation. The Assessment
Plans include all actions the NRC expects NU to take before the NRC
staff recommends to the Commission that a unit be permitted to restart.
Accordingly, the staff will use the Assessment Plan for each Millstone
unit to track and monitor all significant actions necessary to support
a decision on restart approval of the unit.
The Assessment Plan for each Millstone unit includes the
requirement to review the NU Operational Readiness Plan, the deficiency
lists associated with the Assessment Plan, including restart and
deferred items, the corrective action program, work planning and
controls, the procedure upgrade program, the nuclear oversight function
(quality assurance), outstanding enforcement items, and a Significant
Issues List (SIL), which includes issues identified by both NU and the
NRC as issues requiring resolution before restart. NRC MC 93802,
``Operational Safety Team Inspection'' (OSTI), provides the framework
for a team inspection to be performed during the later stages of the
restart process. The inspection will be structured to focus on the
pertinent issues at each of the Millstone units.
Within the SPO, a Millstone Restart Assessment Panel (RAP) has been
formed in accordance with MC 0350. The RAP meets to assess the
Licensee's performance and its progress in completing the designated
restart activities. The RAP is composed of the Director, SPO
(chairman); the Deputy Directors of Licensing, Inspections, and
Independent Corrective Action Verification Program Oversight; the
Project Managers for the three Millstone units; the Inspection Branch
Chief; the Senior Resident Inspectors for the three Millstone units;
and the appointed Division of Reactor Safety representative. The RAP
holds periodic meetings with the Licensee to discuss the Licensee's
corrective actions and schedules of each Millstone unit. These meetings
are noticed and are open to the public. An additional meeting with the
public is usually held that same day in the evening to summarize the
meeting with the Licensee, provide an update on NRC activities, and
address comments from the public.
The purpose of the ICAVP, as stated in the Confirmatory Order, is
to confirm that the plant's physical and functional characteristics are
in conformance with its licensing and design bases. The ICAVP audit
required by the NRC is expected to provide independent verification,
beyond NU's quality assurance and management oversight, that the
Licensee has identified and satisfactorily resolved existing
nonconformances with the design and licensing bases; documented and
utilized the licensing and design bases to resolve nonconformances; and
established programs, processes, and procedures for effective
configuration management in the future. NU has started programs to
identify and understand the root causes of the licensing and design
bases issues that led to NRC issuance of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters to
NU and to implement corrective actions that will ensure that NU
maintains the design configuration and that each unit is in conformance
with its licensing basis. NU has indicated that the scope of its
corrective programs will include those systems that it has categorized
as either Group 1 (safety-related and risk-significant) or Group 2
(safety-related or risk-significant). The ICAVP audit must provide
insights into the effectiveness of NU's programs so that the results
can be reasonably extrapolated to the structures, systems, and
components that were not reviewed in the audit.
As a practical matter, the NRC cannot do a 100-percent verification
of the Licensee's corrective actions, processes, and programs for each
Millstone unit. However, a comprehensive and multifaceted oversight
process has been developed by the NRC staff to provide a high level of
confidence that the Licensee has implemented required corrective
actions and that all of the issues on the SILs have been resolved. The
independent third-party evaluations required by the NRC will be used to
enhance NRC confidence that the Licensee's corrective action programs
have been effectively implemented at each unit.
NRC activities (including oversight of the ICAVP) to ensure that
effective corrective actions are being taken by the Licensee will
provide additional assurance that the Licensee's corrective action
programs have been effectively implemented. These activities will
include in-process reviews of the ICAVP contractor's activities,
reviews of the ICAVP results, and additional independent reviews of
compliance with the design and licensing bases of
[[Page 49038]]
selected systems. The State of Connecticut's Nuclear Energy Advisory
Council has provided input to the NRC staff for selecting the systems
which will be reviewed by the ICAVP contractor and has been invited to
observe the NRC staff's ICAVP inspections.
When the restart review process has identified, corrected, and
reviewed relevant issues regarding each Millstone unit, a restart
authorization process will be initiated for that unit. Upon receipt of
a staff recommendation and a briefing on any ongoing investigations,
the Commission will meet to assess the recommendation and vote on
whether to allow the restart of the unit. The same process will be
followed for the remaining units.
Haddam Neck Facility
With regard to the Haddam Neck Plant, the Licensee shut down the
plant on July 22, 1996, as required by the facility's TSs, because of
concerns that the containment air recirculation fans service water
piping may exceed design loads during certain accident scenarios. The
Licensee determined that these concerns and other hardware and
programmatic problems identified before and during the forced outage
should be resolved before restarting the plant. Thus, the Licensee
decided to begin Refueling Outage 19 on August 17, 1996. On October 9,
1996, the owners of the Haddam Neck Plant stated that a permanent
shutdown of the plant was being considered by the Board of Trustees
based on an economic analysis of operations, expenses, and the cost of
replacement power. Subsequently, all fuel assemblies were removed from
the reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool.
From November 21, 1995, to November 22, 1996, the NRC conducted
numerous inspections at the Haddam Neck Plant to review several facets
of plant performance. These inspections included a Special Team
inspection by NRC headquarters staff focused on engineering
performance; a special Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection of a
reactor vessel nitrogen intrusion event in late August and early
September 1996 that lowered the reactor vessel water level; a special
radiation protection inspection of a significant contamination event in
November 1996; an emergency preparedness inspection to observe the
Licensee's response during an emergency exercise held in August 1996;
and several resident inspections. Numerous violations, as well as
several significant regulatory concerns, were identified during these
inspections. Most of the violations were discussed at a transcribed
public predecisional enforcement conference at the Millstone training
building in Waterford, Connecticut, on December 4, 1996. The December 4
conference was open to the public and focused on the broader
programmatic deficiencies underlying the violations that contributed to
the problems at Haddam Neck. A Notice of Violation and Proposed
Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $650,000 was issued on
May 12, 1997, and subsequently paid by the Licensee.
The restart process described for the three Millstone units is not
applicable to the Haddam Neck Plant. By letter dated December 5, 1996,
the Licensee certified to the NRC, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i)
and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that it had decided to permanently cease
operations at the Haddam Neck Plant and had permanently removed the
fuel from the reactor. The Licensee further noted that a Post-Shutdown
Decommissioning Activities Report (PSDAR) and a site-specific
decommissioning cost estimate would be submitted in accordance with 10
CFR 50.82, ``Termination of License.''
It is important to note that the NRC continues to identify problems
at both the Millstone site and the Haddam Neck Plant, as documented in
inspection reports issued after this Petition was filed. These findings
indicate that the corrective actions required to restart the Millstone
units have not yet been fully implemented. The NRC staff will not
recommend that the Commission allow the restart of a Millstone unit
until the Commission has determined, in accordance with the Assessment
Plan, that the necessary corrective actions have been effectively
implemented for the unit.
As for Haddam Neck, a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued
to the Licensee on March 4, 1997, concerning radiological-control
problems at the Haddam Neck Plant. This CAL is an example of the type
of action that the NRC takes to assure that the limited activities at
the site will be conducted in a safe manner and in accordance with
regulatory requirements. The CAL prohibits the Licensee from performing
any radiological work except that required to maintain the plant in a
safe configuration until the corrective actions identified in the CAL
have been implemented.
III. NRC Response to Requested Actions
In summary, the Licensee's implementation of its Configuration
Management Plan (CMP) for each Millstone unit, response to the elements
in the NRC staff's Restart Assessment Plan (Assessment Plan) for each
Millstone unit, implementation of actions to improve programs to
address employee concerns at the Millstone site, and the implementation
of the decommissioning process specified in 10 CFR 50.82 for the Haddam
Neck Plant, as discussed above, are the bases for the NRC staff's
responses discussed in this Partial Director's Decision to the specific
actions that the Petitioners requested be taken against NU. The
Petitioners' requested actions and the NRC staff's responses are
discussed below.3
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\3\ In this Partial Director's Decision, Petitioners' Requests
have been identified as Requests 1 through 8. These requests
correspond to Requests A.1 through 5, B and C in the initial
Petition, and Request II.A in the amendment to the Petition.
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1. Petitioners request that the NRC immediately suspend or revoke
NU's license to operate Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck) and the
Millstone Nuclear reactors due to chronic, negligent management of the
reactors which, for over a decade, has endangered and continues to
endanger occupational and public health and safety and the environment
due to resultant and cumulative major safety problems and violation of
NRC regulations.
The Petitioners base their request to suspend or revoke the
operating licenses of Haddam Neck and the three Millstone units on NU
reports and NRC inspection findings referred to in the Petition and on
a videotape in which a former Millstone Station employee expresses his
views on NU management and plant conditions. As previously noted, based
on the NRC staff review of these materials, the Petitioners have
identified no new information.
With regard to the Millstone units, the units are currently in an
extended shutdown and significant management changes at NU have been
made in the past year. The NRC's focus is on evaluating improved
performance, hardware and programmatic upgrades, and corrective
actions. Specifically, NRC review and inspection emphasis will be
directed toward the results of NU's actions to correct identified
weaknesses in areas such as design controls, radiological controls,
quality assurance, work control practices, corrective action processes,
and the handling of employee concerns.
The previous discussion provides an overview of the Assessment
Plans that the SPO has developed for assessing the adequacy of NU's
corrective actions being taken prior to Commission approval of restart
for any of the Millstone units. The NRC staff will have to reach a
determination that the
[[Page 49039]]
corrective actions taken by NU provide reasonable assurance that future
operation will be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the design
basis, as documented in the FSAR, of each unit before recommending that
the Commission approve the restart of any one of the units. Upon
receipt of an NRC staff recommendation and a briefing on ongoing
investigations, the Commission will hold a meeting to assess the
recommendation and then vote on whether to approve the restart of each
unit.
The restart process discussed for the Millstone units does not
apply to Haddam Neck. The Licensee has certified to the NRC that
operations at the facility have permanently ceased and that fuel has
been permanently removed from the reactor.
The Petitioners' request to take immediate action was denied in the
letter of January 23, 1997, which acknowledged receipt of the Petition.
The request to suspend or revoke the licenses for the three Millstone
units is denied based on the NRC staff's conclusion that such action is
not warranted by the facts. Programmatic and review efforts are in
place. If these efforts are successful, the NRC would allow the
Millstone units to resume operation. The request to suspend or revoke
the license to operate the Haddam Neck Plant is moot since the Licensee
has certified to the NRC that the plant has permanently ceased
operation and the fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.
2. The Petitioners request that the NRC investigate the possibility
that NU made material misrepresentations to the NRC concerning
engineering calculations and other information or actions relied upon
to assure the adequacy of safety systems at the Haddam Neck and
Millstone reactors. The Petitioners said NU made possible material
misstatements either through lack of rigor and thoroughness or by
providing intentionally misleading information.
The NRC has ongoing investigations related to alleged wrongdoing by
NU personnel. The investigative results will be reviewed for possible
enforcement action. Depending on the results of the ongoing evaluations
of inspections and investigations, both NU as an organization and NU
employees found to have engaged in deliberate misconduct will be
subject to appropriate enforcement action. Consistent with the General
Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement Actions (NUREG-
1600), some enforcement action is normally taken against a licensee for
violations caused by significant acts of wrongdoing by its employees.
Such action could include a civil penalty or an order. In deciding
whether to also take action directly against the responsible employees,
the NRC considers a number of factors such as the employee's level in
the organization, the employee's training and experience, the degree of
supervision, the employee's attitude, and the degree of management
responsibility or culpability. A decision to take action directly
against an individual is significant and normally will be taken only
when the NRC is satisfied that the individual has engaged in deliberate
misconduct. The action taken could include prohibiting the individual
from involvement in licensed activities for a period of years.
As the NRC is currently evaluating alleged wrongdoing by NU
personnel, the Petitioners' request is granted.
3. Petitioners request that the NRC revoke NU's operating licenses
for the Haddam Neck and the Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 reactors if an
investigation determines that NU deliberately provided insufficient
and/or false or misleading information to the NRC. If the NRC chooses
not to revoke NU's licenses, the Petitioners specifically request that
the reactors remain off-line until a United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) independent investigation is complete and the NRC reviews
the conclusions and recommendations contained therein for potential
consequences to the Licensee and its agents under NRC regulations. The
Petitioners note in a footnote that a DOJ report will likely produce
information essential to the NRC's evaluation of NU's management
problems. The Petitioners further stated that such information should
influence any NRC decision concerning NU's future operation of nuclear
reactors in Connecticut.
Since the NRC investigations are ongoing, the NRC cannot respond to
the first portion of the request to revoke the licenses of the three
Millstone units at this time.
The response to the Petitioners' Request 1 applies to the part of
Request 3 asking that the reactors remain off line until the
investigations are complete. As noted, the Commission will consider the
status of all ongoing investigations, including any referrals to DOJ,
in its deliberations before voting on the restart of any of the
Millstone units.
The part of the request relating to revoking the licenses of the
three Millstone units is deferred until all investigations are
complete. The request that the reactors remain off line until the
investigations are complete is denied.
This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck Plant, which has
already permanently ceased operation.
4. The Petitioners request that, if NRC chooses not to revoke NU's
licenses to operate the Haddam Neck Plant and the Millstone Units 1, 2,
and 3 reactors and allows the reactors to return to operation, the
reactors remain on the NRC's Watch List to oversee reactor operations
until NU management demonstrates to the NRC that:
a. NU is able to fulfill NRC regulatory requirements;
b. NU has met all prior commitments concerning the repair,
modification, maintenance, and documentation of the nuclear power
stations;
c. NU has retrained all staff in the application and interpretation
of NRC's regulations; and
d. NU has removed from any positions of responsibility for
operation and/or management of the reactors all persons whom DOJ, NRC,
or other government investigators and/or civil or criminal prosecutions
find to have made material misrepresentations to the NRC during the
past decade of mismanagement.
Due to the significance and programmatic nature of the concerns
evolving from the various NRC reviews and inspections at the Millstone
Station and the fact that each unit is shut down pending resolution of
these issues, the Commission put the Millstone units in Category 3 of
the Watch List. Accordingly, restart of any of the units is subject to
Commission approval. SIL issues, which require resolution for safe
operation, will have been addressed and a process will be in place to
resolve any deferred items. If the Commission approves restart of any
unit, that unit will be placed in Category 2 of the Watch List, where
it will remain until the Licensee has demonstrated that satisfactory
operational performance can be sustained at the unit.
The restart process, as previously discussed, will assure that the
management attributes identified by the Petitioners in Request 4.a, b,
and c, will be adequately considered within the context of the SPO's
Assessment Plans before the NRC staff recommends that the Commission
allow the restart of any unit. Request 4.d will be considered in the
restart process when the Commission is briefed regarding investigation
efforts and recommendations.
The request to retain the Millstone units on the NRC's Watch List,
if the Commission approves restart, is granted.
[[Page 49040]]
Any unit permitted to restart will be placed in Category 2 of the Watch
List, where it will remain until the Licensee has demonstrated that
satisfactory performance can be sustained at the unit. Request 4.a, b,
c, and d will be considered as set forth above.
This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck Plant because the
Haddam Neck Plant has permanently ceased operation. The NRC will
continue its oversight of the defueled facility.
5. Petitioners request that, as a minimum, the NRC keep Haddam Neck
and the Millstone 1, 2, and 3 nuclear reactors off line until NU's
chronic mismanagement has been analyzed, remedial management programs
have been implemented, and the NRC has evaluated and approved the
effectiveness of the Licensee's actions. As a minimum, NU should:
a. Thoroughly analyze root causes for deficiencies in NU's FSARs,
its documentation of licensing and design bases, its safety analysis,
its engineering, its quality assurance, its as low as reasonably
achievable (ALARA) programs, and other necessary or required
documentation.
b. Create a complete, accurate FSAR-mere ``reform'' is impossible
when the basic document is inadequate and inaccurate;
c. Reevaluate of any of its activities initiated under (or which NU
should have initiated under) 10 CFR 50.59 in order to confirm the
validity of such activities, particularly to determine the extent to
which the FSAR does not match ``as built'' configurations. This
reevaluation requires more than a paper audit; it requires checking
actual physical plant against the existing documentation, component by
component and system by system and creating correct documentation where
it is lacking and/or inadequate;
d. Institute and document an effective ALARA review of all
operational and nonoperational activities that expose workers and/or
the public to radiation;
e. Thoroughly document the root causes of NU's chronic and systemic
mismanagement including, documentation of the NRC Region I inspection
program's staff and management failures over the past decade to detect
and deal with this problem;
f. Demonstrate, over a substantial period of time to the
satisfaction of the NRC, NU's commitment to respect NRC regulatory
requirements and consistently follow them;
g. Retrain all personnel involved in day-to-day operations so that
they are thoroughly conversant with NRC regulations; and
h. Update and document Plant Design Change Requests (PDCRs) to
include all changes to the reactor's design, and verification by the
NRC staff of these design changes, with closeouts of PDCRs receiving
the highest priority.
As previously noted, NRC regulatory oversight programs at the
Millstone Station are based on the recognition that the Licensee is
primarily responsible for demonstrating that corrective actions have
been effectively implemented. Before the NRC staff can recommend that
the Commission approve the restart of a Millstone unit, the Licensee
must determine that the unit conforms with applicable NRC regulations,
license conditions, and the FSARs and that applicable licensing
commitments have been met. The Licensee's conformance with NRC
regulations, license conditions, and licensing commitments is
fundamental to the NRC's confidence in the safety of licensed
activities.
The significant actions that the NRC is taking to monitor the
Licensee's activities have been discussed in detail earlier in this
Decision. Based on that discussion, the actions requested in Request
5.a through h, with the exception of the part of 5.e relating to NRC
staff performance, will be adequately addressed within the context of
the SPO's Assessment Plan for each of the Millstone units.
With regard to Request 5.e, the part of 5.e relating to the
performance of the NRC staff is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process
and will not be addressed in the Director's Decision relating to this
Petition. This issue has been referred to the NRC's OIG for action as
appropriate.
The request to keep the Millstone units off line until the items
identified in Request 5.a through h, with the exception of the part of
Request 5.e relating to NRC's previous actions in dealing with the
Licensee, is granted to the extent that the issues will be considered
within the SPO's Assessment Plan for each of the units.
This request does not apply to the Haddam Neck facility, which has
permanently ceased operation.
6. Petitioners request that, if NU decides to shut down any or all
of the nuclear power reactors at issue herein with the intent to
commence the decommissioning process, the NRC not permit any
decommissioning or predecommissioning activity to take place until:
a. All the documentation mentioned in earlier requests is available
to the NRC and on site at the reactors;
b. All personnel involved in the decommissioning process have been
retrained (or trained) in the use and interpretation of the applicable
NRC regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations;
c. The NRC has appropriately evaluated and replaced personnel and
has restructured the NRC Region I inspection program, its management,
and the supervising NRC directorate to eliminate the regulatory anarchy
that plagued the Connecticut nuclear reactors during the past 10 years;
and
d. The NRC makes certain that NU does not employ any persons in
management or operations who made material misrepresentations to the
NRC about the status of operations, repairs, modifications, or
maintenance of NU's Connecticut reactors.
On October 9, 1996, the owners of the Haddam Neck Plant stated that
the Board of Trustees was considering a permanent shutdown of the
plant, based on an economic analysis of operations, expenses, and the
cost of replacement power. All fuel assemblies were removed from the
reactor and placed in the spent fuel pool for temporary storage. By
letter dated December 5, 1996, the Licensee certified to the NRC,
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(i) and 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), that it
had determined to permanently cease operations at the Haddam Neck Plant
and that the fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor. The
Licensee further noted that a Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities
Report (PSDAR) and the site-specific decommissioning cost estimate
would be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82, ``Termination of
License.'' The PSDAR will be submitted to the NRC and a copy sent to
the affected state(s) within 2 years after operations have permanently
ceased. The report must include, among other things, a description of
the planned decommissioning activities and a schedule for their
implementation. No major decommissioning activities may be performed
until 90 days after the NRC receives the PSDAR.
The current activities at the site include the operation,
monitoring, and maintenance of the spent fuel pool; radioactive waste
management; radiological protection; and fire protection. These
activities, including any activities relating to decommissioning, must
be in compliance with the current license requirements, which apply
when the reactor is defueled.
The degree of regulatory oversight required during decommissioning
of a nuclear power reactor is considerably less than during its
operational phase. When the reactor is operating, the fuel
[[Page 49041]]
in the reactor core undergoes a controlled nuclear fission reaction
that generates a high neutron flux and large amounts of heat. Safe
control of the nuclear reaction involves the use and operation of many
complex systems, adherence to operational limits, testing of components
and systems to assure their operability, specified procedure adherence,
and operator actions. Once the fuel has been permanently removed and
temporarily stored in the spent fuel pool, the fuel is still highly
radioactive and generates heat caused by radioactive decay. However, no
neutron flux is generated and the fuel slowly cools as its energetic
decay products diminish. Since the spent fuel is stored in a
configuration that precludes the nuclear fission, no generation of new
radioactivity can occur. However, the same areas of the facility
contain radioactive contamination and those areas must still be
controlled to minimize radiation exposure to personnel and to control
the spread of radioactive material.
The NRC staff continues to be concerned about the failures of the
Haddam Neck radiological controls program (which recently resulted in
the unplanned exposure of two individuals), long-standing discrepancies
in the calibration of several radiation monitors that are used to
monitor and control radiological effluent releases, and the inadequate
control of radioactive material that resulted in the undetected release
of contaminated equipment to a nonlicensed vendor.
In response, the NRC has taken comprehensive and significant
actions to resolve concerns in the area of radiological controls,
including the issuance of a CAL on March 4, 1997, confirming the
Licensee's commitment to respond to the findings in Inspection Reports
50-213/96-12, dated December 19, 1996, and 50-213/97-02, dated March
21, 1997. The CAL restricts the Licensee from performing any
radiological work except that required to maintain the plant in a safe
configuration. The CAL identifies four significant activities required
of the Licensee to bring its management and implementation of radiation
control programs up to a standard acceptable to the NRC. The activities
are to (1) identify, in writing, specific compensatory measures that
the Licensee will establish to assure sufficient management control and
oversight of ongoing or planned activities that require radiological
controls; (2) engage the services of an independent assessor to assess
the quality and performance of the Licensee's radiological control
programs and their implementation; (3) by May 30, 1997, based on the
results of that independent assessment, (a) identify problems,
determine root causes, and develop broad-based and specific corrective
actions; (b) identify performance measures that may be used to
determine the effectiveness of radiological control programs; and (c)
submit a plan and schedule to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region I,
for implementing improvements in the radiological control programs; and
(4) before eliminating any interim compensatory measures, meet with the
Region I Administrator to describe program implementation and
performance improvements achieved or planned.
In summary, the NRC is following the decommissioning process as
specified in 10 CFR 50.82, which requires that no major activities may
be performed until 90 days after the NRC receives the PSDAR. The
Licensee must comply with all the applicable operating license
requirements in effect for the defueled reactor relating to activities
currently being performed at the Haddam Neck Plant. Further, the NRC
will take appropriate actions for any defueled reactor to assure
compliance with its license and license conditions, such as the actions
described above for the failure of adequate radiological controls at
Haddam Neck. The Haddam Neck Plant is the only reactor that the
Licensee has determined to permanently shut down and decommission.
The request to forbid decommissioning activities or
predecommissioning activity at any NU nuclear power reactor until all
the requested actions identified in the Petition, including items a, b
and d, of Request 6, have been completed is denied for the reasons
stated above. The NRC staff has determined that the NRC requirements
that govern decommissioning and the activities being undertaken by the
Licensee in response to the CAL are sufficient to assure that the
activities at the Haddam Neck facility are being conducted in a safe
manner. Request 6.c, relating to the performance of the NRC staff, is
beyond the scope of the 2.206 process and will not be addressed in the
Director's Decision relating to this Petition. This issue has been
referred to the NRC's OIG.
7. The Petitioners request that the NRC commence an investigation
into how it allowed the illegal situation at NU's Connecticut reactors
to exist and to continue over a decade. Particularly, Petitioners
request that the Commission order its staff (directors of the
responsible directorates, managers, and Region I management and staff)
to answer the following questions, and hold these persons accountable
for their answers and actions regarding the past 10 years at NU's
Connecticut nuclear power reactors:
a. What documents did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and
NRC Project Directors and Project Managers review during 10 years of
NU's out-of-compliance operation?
b. If NU provided documents that somehow deceived the Region I
inspector, how does the information in these documents relate to the
everyday workings and activities conducted during the otherwise
undocumented decade of operations at the Millstone and Haddam Neck
plants?
c. How did Region I inspectors, their supervisors, and NRC Project
Directorates and Managers find that NU was conducting operations in a
way that keeps worker and public exposures to radiation ALARA when NU
was not adequately documenting either its licensing basis or the basis
of reactor operations?
d. Knowing, as Region I inspectors must have known, of excessive
worker exposures (for example, due to a long standing problem with
leaking pipes as documented by an NU worker in the video tape provided
with this Petition Exhibit A), how did the Region I inspectors certify
that operations at the Millstone and Haddam Neck plants were being
conducted ALARA? How did the supervisors, and those in the NRC Project
Directorate, make the same certifications?
e. During the undocumented decade, how did Region I inspectors,
their supervisors, and NRC Project Directors and Managers manage to
track NU's activities at the Millstone and Haddam Neck plants under 10
CFR 50.59?
f. To what extent have NRC Region I inspectors, their supervisors,
and NRC Project Directors and Managers allowed the same type of
problems to develop at other nuclear power reactors in New England
(i.e., Maine Yankee, Pilgrim, Seabrook, Vermont Yankee, and Yankee
Rowe)?
g. Is there any connection between licensees employing Yankee
Atomic Electric Company's consulting and engineering services and the
serious problems with documentation and lack of compliance with the
licensing and design bases nuclear power stations in New England or in
other parts of the country?
This request is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process. It concerns
the performance of the NRC staff and will not be addressed in the
Director's
[[Page 49042]]
Decision relating to this Petition. This request has been referred to
the NRC's OIG.
8. In the amendment to the Petition, the Petitioners request that
the NRC take the following actions to enforce its regulations against
NU. As part of the 2.206 process, the NRC should provide copies of
Haddam Neck's nitrogen calculations to the Petitioners and conduct an
independent review to see if the calculations meet the requirements of
10 CFR part 50, appendix B. If appendix B requirements were violated,
the Petitioners are concerned that the Licensee cannot safely
decommission the Haddam Neck Plant. Accordingly, NU's operating
licenses for its Connecticut reactors should be revoked, and NU should
not be permitted to commence decommissioning until it has complied with
the conditions outlined in the main body of the original Petition.
Finally, the Commission should inquire into the NRC staff's failure to
discern this situation and its continuing failure to enforce the terms
and conditions of NU's license and NRC regulations.
As noted above, the assertion by the Petitioners that the
calculations performed by the Licensee violated NRC requirements is a
new issue not previously considered by the NRC staff.
The subject calculations were performed subsequent to an event at
the Haddam Neck Plant that resulted in the formulation of a nitrogen
bubble in the reactor vessel. The results of the calculations, which
were one of several methods used to confirm the water level during the
event, were discussed by the Licensee during a public predecisional
enforcement conference held on December 4, 1996.
By letter dated July 3, 1997, the Licensee provided information,
including the requested calculations, relating to the different methods
used for determining the reactor vessel water level resulting from the
nitrogen intrusion event. This information has been placed in the NRC's
Public Document Room and the Local Public Document Rooms. The
Petitioners were provided a copy of the calculations as an enclosure to
a Petition status letter dated July 21, 1997, since the calculations
are relevant to the Petitioners' concern, are not proprietary, and are
in the public domain.
On September 5, 1996, while investigating the root cause of the
undetected accumulation of nitrogen gas in the reactor vessel, the
Licensee performed a special test (ST 11.7-197, ``Determination of
Reactor Vessel Level'') to verify reactor vessel level. This test was
necessary because the reactor vessel level indication system and the
core exit thermocouples had been removed from service in accordance
with the Licensee's refueling procedures. The reactor level measurement
problem had been exacerbated by the nitrogen gas intrusion, which
displaced water from the reactor vessel into the pressurizer, resulting
in an unquantified decrease in reactor vessel inventory. During the
course of the event, the shift manager had requested that the worst-
case (lowest) reactor vessel level achieved during the event be
determined. As noted in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-213/96-80, ``NRC
Augmented Inspection Team Review of the Undetected Introduction of
Nitrogen Gas into the Reactor Vessel During Plant Shutdown,'' the plant
staff completed a preliminary analysis on September 4, 1996. It was
further noted that, at the end of the onsite inspection activities, the
Licensee had yet to complete a final volumetric inventory balance
calculation. In the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of
Civil Penalties in the amount of $650,000 issued on May 12, 1997, the
Licensee was cited for failure to take timely corrective actions
following the nitrogen intrusion event, including the failure to timely
establish the actual lowest reactor vessel level resulting from the
event.
Subsequently, the Licensee completed two calculations: (1)
Calculation 96-MDE-1515-MY, ``Reactor Vessel Level Determination,''
prepared on October 2, 1996, independently reviewed on November 1,
1996, and approved on November 5, 1996; and (2) Calculation 96-MDE-
1536-MY, ``Reactor Vessel Level Determination,'' prepared on October 4,
1996, independently reviewed on November 22, 1996, and approved on
December 1, 1996. These calculations were performed consistent with the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.
Also, during the December 4, 1996, predecisional enforcement
conference, the Licensee presented the results of reactor vessel water
level simulations, which were calculated using the RELAP5/MOD3 code.
These simulation results were presented by the Licensee to corroborate,
with a diverse methodology, the lowest reactor vessel water level
determined by Calculations 96-MDE-1515-MY and 96-MDE-1536-MY. The
results of the RELAP5/MOD3 reactor vessel water level simulations
presented by the Licensee during the predecisional enforcement
conference were only used to corroborate and provide additional insight
into the reactor vessel water level that had been determined through
Calculations 96-MDE-1515-MY and 96-MDE-1536-MY. These two calculations
had been independently reviewed and performed consistent with the
applicable provisions in the Licensee's 10 CFR part 50, Appendix B,
``Quality Assurance Program,'' and are considered by the NRC staff to
suffice to demonstrate the reactor vessel water level.
Under these circumstances, the RELAP5/MOD3 simulations were not
required to have been independently verified.
Thus, the assertion by the Petitioners that the calculations
discussed during the predecisional enforcement conference violated 10
CFR part 50, appendix B, requirements is unfounded and no further
actions by the NRC are required. The part of Request 8 relating to the
performance of the NRC staff is beyond the scope of the 2.206 process
and will not be addressed in the Director's Decision relating to this
Petition. This part of Request 8 has been referred to the NRC's OIG.
IV. Conclusion
The NRC staff has determined, for the reasons provided in the above
discussion, that: Request 2 is granted for both the Millstone units and
the Haddam Neck Plant; Requests 4 and 5 are partially granted for the
Millstone units; Request 1 and parts of Requests 3, 4, 6, and 8 are
denied for the three Millstone units; Requests 6 and 8 are partially
denied for the Haddam Neck Plant; Request 3 is partially deferred for
the three Millstone units; Requests 1, 3, 4, and parts of Request 5 are
not applicable to Haddam Neck; and Request 7 and parts of Requests 5,
6, and 8 are beyond the scope of the 2.206 process and are not
addressed. The deferred parts of Request 3 will be addressed in a Final
Director's Decision after any possible wrongdoing is fully considered
by the NRC staff.
As provided for in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this Partial Decision
will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's
review. This Partial Decision will constitute the final action of the
Commission (for Petitioners Requests 1, 2, 5, 6, and 8) 25 days after
issuance unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes review of
the Decision in that time.
Dated at Rockville, MD, this 12th day of September.
[[Page 49043]]
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Frank J. Miraglia Jr.,
Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 97-24807 Filed 9-17-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
