[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 181 (Thursday, September 18, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49046-49047]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-24962]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Notice of Safety Advisory
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 97-2 addressing safety
practices to reduce the risk of casualties from runaway locomotives,
cars, and trains caused by a failure to properly secure unattended
rolling equipment left on sidings or other tracks.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis Yachechak, Operating Practices
Specialist, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., RRS-11, Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone
202-632-3370), or Nancy L. Goldman, Trial Attorney, FRA, Office of
Chief Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3167).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A fatal head-on collision between a Union
Pacific Railroad Company (UP) freight train and an unattended, runaway
UP locomotive consist near Fort Worth, Texas, on August 20, 1997, has
caused FRA to focus on the effectiveness of certain railroad procedures
for protection of people and property from hazards caused by failure to
properly secure locomotives, cars, and other rolling equipment left
unattended on sidings or other tracks.
FRA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are
investigating the accident. In addition, FRA inspection teams are on
UP's property to conduct safety assurance reviews on all aspects of the
issue. The facts and findings developed in the investigations will be
published when the individual investigations are complete.
In the meantime, FRA's preliminary findings indicate that the UP
crew applied the hand brake on the lead locomotive of the locomotive
consist and then applied the independent air brake. The crew then
released the independent brake to verify that the hand brake would
hold, which it appeared to do. The crew then reapplied the independent
brake. Three of the four locomotives in the locomotive consist were
already shut down. The remaining locomotive was then shut down and the
crew left the locomotive consist unattended. Sometime later, however,
it is believed that the air brakes eventually leaked off and that the
single hand brake did not, by itself, sufficiently secure the
locomotive consist, enabling it to roll out of the siding eastward and
onto the main track where it collided head-on with a UP freight train.
Securement Procedures
The Federal power brake regulations at 49 CFR 232.13(f) require
that, ``The automatic air brake must not be depended upon to hold a
locomotive, cars or train, when standing on a grade, whether locomotive
is attached or detached from cars or train. When required, a sufficient
number of hand brakes must be applied to hold train, before air brakes
are released. When ready to start, hand brakes must not be released
until it is known that the air brake system is properly charged.''
Based upon FRA's review of the Fort Worth incident, and its
awareness of other incidents involving improper securement of rolling
equipment, it appears evident that further guidance regarding
securement procedures may be of assistance to our nation's railroads.
This advisory may be especially beneficial to those railroads that may
not be aware of current practices in the industry regarding securement
of rolling equipment. Accordingly, FRA believes that the following
recommended procedures for the proper securement of unattended rolling
equipment can be taken to reduce the likelihood of future accidents,
which each railroad can then adapt to meet its own individual
circumstances.
Recommended Action
FRA believes that the likelihood of further accidents, such as the
one that occurred on the UP on August 20, 1997, would be greatly
reduced by the inclusion of certain additional measures into railroads'
procedures for securement of unattended locomotives, cars, and trains
left on sidings or other tracks. Therefore, FRA recommends that each
railroad adopt and implement its own procedures incorporating the
following actions, or equally effective measures, with respect to a
locomotive, car, or train that is left unattended:
1. Consistent with the railroad's rules and procedures, place each
locomotive, car, or train on a track that is protected by a permanent
derail or apply a portable derail, if available.
2. On cars: (a) Apply the appropriate number of handbrakes; to
assist
[[Page 49047]]
crewmembers in this regard, railroads should develop and implement a
process or procedure, such as a matrix, that would provide specific
guidance in determining the appropriate number of hand brakes to apply,
considering grade, tonnage, and other local conditions prevalent at the
time of securement, for example, high winds or extreme cold; (b) where
appropriate, remove slack from the train, or as commonly referred to in
the industry, ``bunch the slack'; and (c) detach any locomotives from
the cars to allow an emergency brake application.
3. On locomotives, fully apply all hand brakes on all unattended
locomotives in the consist. If the grade exceeds one percent, or
whenever it is otherwise required by railroad rules, in addition, chock
or chain the front and back of at least one pair of wheels in the
locomotive consist. Railroads should develop and implement procedures
that would then verify that the hand brakes will hold the locomotive
consist. Further, railroad instructions should address: (a) The
throttle position; (b) status of the reverse lever; (c) position of the
generator field switch; (d) status of the independent brakes; (e)
position of the isolation switch; and (f) position of the automatic
brake valve. The above procedures should also take into account winter
weather conditions as they relate to throttle position and reverser
handle.
FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97-2, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC on September 15, 1997
Edward R. English,
Director, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance.
[FR Doc. 97-24962 Filed 9-17-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
