98-23523. General Administrative Regulations; Nonstandard Underwriting Classification System  

  • [Federal Register Volume 63, Number 170 (Wednesday, September 2, 1998)]
    [Proposed Rules]
    [Pages 46703-46705]
    From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
    [FR Doc No: 98-23523]
    
    
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    Proposed Rules
                                                    Federal Register
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
    the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
    notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
    the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
    
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    Federal Register / Vol. 63, No. 170 / Wednesday, September 2, 1998 / 
    Proposed Rules
    
    [[Page 46703]]
    
    
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    DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
    
    Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
    
    7 CFR Part 400
    
    RIN 0563-AB66
    
    
    General Administrative Regulations; Nonstandard Underwriting 
    Classification System
    
    AGENCY: Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, USDA.
    
    ACTION: Proposed rule.
    
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    SUMMARY: The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) proposes to 
    remove and reserve Subpart O of the General Administrative Regulations, 
    effective for the 2000 (2001 for Texas and Arizona and California 
    Citrus) and succeeding crop years. This proposed action is intended to 
    eliminate the unintended adverse effects of the Nonstandard 
    Underwriting Classification System (NCS), simplify and update program 
    underwriting rules consistent with the program's current and future 
    anticipated experience, and to ensure that crop insurance premiums are 
    applied to all producers in a fair and consistent manner.
    
    DATES: Written comments and opinions on this proposed rule and related 
    preliminary cost-benefit analysis will be accepted until close of 
    business October 19, 1998 and will be considered when the rule and 
    cost-benefit analysis are to be made final.
    
    ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written comments to 
    the Director, Claims and Underwriting Services Division, Risk 
    Management Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, 1400 
    Independence Avenue, S.W., STOP 0803, room 6749-S, Washington, D.C., 
    20250-0803. A copy of each response will be available for public 
    inspection and copying from 7:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., EDT, Monday through 
    Friday, except holidays, at the above address.
    
    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information and a copy of 
    the preliminary cost-benefit analysis to the General Administrative 
    Regulations; Nonstandard Underwriting Classification System, contact 
    Michael F. Hand, Director, Claims and Underwriting Services Division, 
    Risk Management Agency, at the Washington, D.C. address listed above, 
    telephone (202) 720-3439.
    
    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
    
    Executive Order 12866
    
        The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has determined this rule 
    to be economically significant and, therefore, this rule has been 
    reviewed by OMB.
    
    Cost-Benefit Analysis
    
        A preliminary cost-benefit analysis has been completed and is 
    available to interested persons at the address listed above. The 
    preliminary cost-benefit analysis summarizes the impact of the rule in 
    the following manner:
        (1) NCS first was established in 1991 as an effort to control 
    losses attributed to persons whose insurance experience differed 
    materially from the norm for an area. For a number of reasons, it has 
    come under criticism;
        (2) A review of the current NCS process determined that it cannot 
    meet desired performance goals under any circumstances. Therefore, a 
    replacement is needed;
        (3) Recent actuarial research and premium rate models developed for 
    other products indicate that the current actuarial processes used by 
    FCIC do not produce an adequate premium rate for yields lower than the 
    county average in many situations, especially when the county average 
    premium rate is relatively low. A simulation of the effects of higher 
    premium rates at the lower yields indicates that the NCS-rated premiums 
    paid by the few NCS individuals who chose to insure can be replaced. In 
    addition, additional premiums will be collected from persons who have 
    not yet been detected by the NCS, thereby reducing the number of 
    persons who might qualify even if NCS were continued;
        (4) This analysis concludes that the benefits of the current NCS 
    are extremely small in terms of recovering accrued losses paid by 
    individuals who are selected under it. It is a labor-intensive system 
    that requires substantial resources, both computer and human, to 
    operate. It adds complexity to the delivery of the crop insurance 
    product. In the aggregate, the benefits are small compared to the 
    resources expended for its operation; and
        (5) The proposed alternative process is consistent with the 
    mandates of the Federal Crop Insurance Act that require simplification 
    of the program to the maximum extent while assuring actuarial 
    soundness. More producers will be affected in any year under the 
    alternative, but many of these producers ultimately may have been 
    selected under the NCS after 3 or more losses had occurred. The 
    alternative targets specific units that may be the primary cause of 
    losses rather than affecting the entire operation of individuals. It 
    does not create the stigma currently associated with the NCS. The 
    alternative is demonstrated to be actuarially sound, with the effect of 
    reducing excess losses currently carried in the baseline. This 
    reduction in excess losses offsets additional subsidies to producers 
    and insurance providers that result from the change. The additional 
    cost to producers occurs solely because those persons selected for the 
    NCS now overwhelmingly elect to cancel insurance coverage rather than 
    pay the sharply higher premiums that are imposed under it.
        FCIC encourages and welcomes any comments you may have with respect 
    to the preliminary cost-benefit analysis findings. Before publishing 
    the final rule, FCIC will complete a final cost-benefit analysis and 
    your comments will be taken into consideration in developing that final 
    cost-benefit analysis.
    
    Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
    
        This rule does not contain information collection requirements that 
    require approval by OMB under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
    U.S.C. chapter 35).
    
    Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    
        Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), Public 
    Law 104-4, establishes requirements for Federal agencies to assess the 
    effects of their regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal 
    governments or the private sector. This rule contains no Federal 
    mandates (under the regulatory provisions of title II of the UMRA) for 
    State, local, and tribal governments or
    
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    the private sector. Therefore, this rule is not subject to the 
    requirements of sections 202 and 205 of the UMRA.
    
    Executive Order 12612
    
        It has been determined under section 6(a) of Executive Order 12612, 
    Federalism, that this rule does not have sufficient federalism 
    implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment. The 
    provisions contained in this rule will not have a substantial direct 
    effect on States or their political subdivisions, or on the 
    distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
    government.
    
    Regulatory Flexibility Act
    
        This regulation will not have a significant economic impact on a 
    substantial number of small entities. NCS program determinations are 
    applied equally to all producers on a county basis and affect only a 
    small number of policyholders (approximately 1-2 percent of all 
    policyholders nationwide). Further, since this rule proposes to 
    eliminate the NCS program, the burden on the insurance providers will 
    be significantly reduced. Therefore, this action is determined to be 
    exempt from the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 
    605), and no Regulatory Flexibility Analysis was prepared.
    
    Federal Assistance Program
    
        This program is listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic 
    Assistance under No. 10.450.
    
    Executive Order 12372
    
        This program is not subject to the provisions of Executive Order 
    12372 which require intergovernmental consultation with State and local 
    officials. See the Notice related to 7 CFR part 3015, subpart V, 
    published at 48 FR 29115, June 24, 1983.
    
    Executive Order 12988
    
        This rule has been reviewed in accordance with Executive Order 
    12988 on civil justice reform. The provisions of this rule will not 
    have a retroactive effect. The provisions of this rule will preempt 
    State and local laws to the extent such State and local laws are 
    inconsistent herewith. The administrative appeal provisions published 
    at 7 CFR part 11 must be exhausted before any action against FCIC for 
    judicial review may be brought.
    
    Environmental Evaluation
    
        This action is not expected to have a significant impact on the 
    quality of the human environment, health, and safety. Therefore, 
    neither an Environmental Assessment nor an Environmental Impact 
    Statement is needed.
    
    Background
    
        FCIC proposes to remove and reserve the General Administrative 
    Regulations (7 CFR part 400, subpart O; Nonstandard Underwriting 
    Classification System) effective for the 2000 (2001 for Texas and 
    Arizona and California Citrus) and succeeding crop years.
        NCS began as an underwriting process in 1991 to identify those 
    insureds who were collecting a disproportionate percentage of all crop 
    insurance indemnities and individually adjust their coverages and rates 
    to offset their higher risk. NCS has been used to avoid inequitable, 
    across-the-board rate increases which would otherwise be required to 
    achieve actuarial sufficiency.
        Under NCS, rate increases can be substantial, and coverage 
    reductions severe, depending upon an insured's loss experience. 
    Insureds selected may request a reconsideration, followed by two levels 
    of appeal. The insured also retains recourse to formal litigation.
        Insureds are selected for NCS based on loss frequency and loss 
    severity as compared with general crop insurance experience in the 
    area. An insured must have at least three years of insurance experience 
    in which indemnities exceed the annual premiums paid by the producer. 
    Loss years also must represent 60 percent or more of the years the 
    person was insured during the 10-year base period. To meet the loss 
    severity requirement, the insured generally must have an ``adjusted 
    loss ratio'' (a loss ratio adjusted to account for different premium 
    rate levels) of 2.0 or greater. Loss severity requirements are 
    established by crop and region to recognize different premium rate 
    levels between different crops and regions.
        The NCS process is standardized to ensure equitable treatment of 
    all insureds. Disaster adjustment procedures have been developed to 
    recognize catastrophic conditions affecting crop production. Under this 
    process, the loss history of the insured is adjusted when area-wide 
    disasters affect crop production. For years in which the county yield 
    deviates greatly from the long-term county average, a factor is 
    determined to reduce the amount of indemnity which is used for NCS 
    purposes for that crop year, thus mitigating the effect of widespread 
    crop disasters.
        NCS has been criticized by producers and their representatives for 
    several years and became a major issue with the repetitive floods in 
    the Upper Midwest and multi-year droughts in the Southwest. Complaints 
    have included claims that the current NCS procedures: (1) do not 
    adequately exclude widespread causes of loss (disaster adjustment) as 
    intended; (2) fail to recognize diverse conditions within a county; (3) 
    unfairly impact new or marginally profitable insureds caught by 
    repetitive disasters; (4) set too high a premium for those insureds 
    listed; and (5) are applied unfairly to non-NCS insureds through share 
    arrangements with insureds selected for NCS. Additionally, the current 
    NCS process can be complicated to explain to the insureds and their 
    agents who service crop insurance policies. The NCS process is also 
    labor intensive for RMA and insurance providers at a time of 
    increasingly smaller budgets and reduced resources. Reducing or 
    eliminating program regulations that provide little benefit or can be 
    accomplished through other more appropriate or cost efficient means is 
    consistent with the Federal Crop Insurance Act requirement for 
    simplification and the Administration's emphasis for regulatory 
    reduction.
        On Wednesday, September 17, 1997, FCIC published an Advanced Notice 
    of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) in the Federal Register at 62 FR 48798 to 
    announce a public comment period and to seek comments from the public 
    on options to improve NCS. Following publication of the ANPR, the 
    public was afforded 30 days to submit written comments and opinions. 
    Twenty-two comments were received from crop insurance agents, 
    producers, insurance providers, and producer associations in response 
    to the ANPR.
        Three comments received from a crop insurance agent and insurance 
    provider were substantive and contained proposals that were considered 
    in the review process. The proposals included using a yield floor 
    surcharge as a means of increasing rates for producers with below 
    average production histories and a recommendation to reinstate 
    experience tables, which had been used in the past to surcharge 
    insurance premiums on the basis of the producer's loss ratio. 
    Additionally, nine comments recommended that NCS be eliminated 
    altogether, six suggested that a moratorium be imposed while further 
    study was conducted, four noted that the current actual production 
    history (APH) program sufficiently addresses adverse crop insurance 
    loss experience, and one did not address NCS specifically, advocating a 
    production expense insurance plan in place of the current crop 
    insurance program.
    
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        FCIC stated in the advanced notice that if NCS were eliminated, 
    with no additional action taken for adverse loss experience, the 
    average policy premium would have to increase by $78 to offset NCS 
    losses not currently used to calculate premium rates. FCIC's objective 
    has been to derive an alternative that would result in an equitable 
    process to charge appropriate premiums for insureds with adverse 
    experience, but not to the extent of the premium increases that can 
    result under the current NCS program.
        The current APH process assesses higher premiums on insureds with 
    lower than average yields. Three comments suggested that the APH 
    process could be used to offset the increased rates that would be 
    necessary if NCS were abolished. RMA analyses conducted during the 
    development of the Revenue Assurance crop insurance program, and 
    separately in a study conducted by Millman and Robertson (a consulting 
    actuarial firm), indicate a need to raise the rates for insureds with 
    lower than average yields. RMA has reviewed its current APH program and 
    developed an alternative rating methodology to adjust premium rates for 
    below average yields to compensate for the additional risk associated 
    with adverse loss experience. RMA recognizes that further analysis and 
    study had to be completed of NCS producers and their adverse experience 
    to determine the impact on the crop insurance program.
        A recommendation from the ANPR relating to yield floor surcharges 
    suggested that rates should be increased based on the number of times 
    producers fall below the yield floor. For the major crops, premium 
    rates are calculated on the actual APH yield, recognizing the risk for 
    that yield (for other crops, there are procedures that apply a 5 
    percent surcharge to the applicable rates found on the actuarial table 
    in order to accomplish the same result). The comment to the ANPR 
    suggested that for every succeeding year a producer falls below the 
    floor, the premium surcharge would be raised to recognize the increased 
    risk associated with lower actual yields.
        RMA examined increasing premium rates based on the producer's lower 
    APH yields and using a yield floor surcharge to determine if this 
    process would adequately address the need for increased premiums to 
    account for adverse loss histories based on the frequency and severity 
    of losses. Surcharges based on the frequency with which floor yields 
    apply are not effective because they would not serve to simplify 
    administration of the crop insurance program and could penalize 
    insureds under prolonged and unfavorable growing conditions. The 
    administrative complexities of this suggestion outweighed the expected 
    program benefits.
        By February 1998, RMA had completed the final review of the NCS 
    program. The results indicated that modifying the existing NCS 
    regulations would not address most of the criticism. The review also 
    confirmed that the overall impact of NCS was relatively small. For the 
    1997 crop year, NCS was applied to approximately 50,000 crop policies, 
    equaling 1-2 percent of the total crop policies nationwide. NCS 
    included approximately $2.2 billion (about 2 percent of the total) in 
    liability and $0.9 billion (nearly 10 percent of the total ) in losses 
    during the life of the program.
        The review indicated that NCS had been applied to only a small 
    percentage of the total number of insureds who had collected at least 
    three losses, had adverse loss ratios, and were responsible for a 
    significant share of the losses paid. The analysis also indicated that 
    the number of active NCS policies had declined 52 percent from 1996 to 
    1997 (4,800 to 2,300) and that the liability associated with NCS 
    policies declined from $37 million in 1996 to only $20 million in 1997.
        The results indicated that many insureds selected for NCS canceled 
    their insurance policies because, in general, NCS was applied after 
    losses had reached a point where the cost was too high for these 
    insureds to continue to participate in the program. The conclusion was 
    that any replacement to NCS must intervene more quickly before losses 
    are too great to expect recovery.
        The Federal Crop Insurance Act, as amended, directs the premium 
    rate to be adequate to cover anticipated losses and a reasonable 
    reserve. Program improvements, including revised APH procedures, 
    improved policy underwriting, updated T-yields, other actuarial 
    modifications, and improved producer tracking implemented since 1991 
    have corrected many of the problem areas that created the need for NCS.
        In order to correct the identified NCS deficiencies, RMA determined 
    that any rate adjustment must fit the existing actuarial structure, 
    avoid excessive operational changes, and promote simplification, as 
    mandated by the Federal Crop Insurance Act.
        When the existing NCS regulation is removed, RMA will replace NCS 
    with an alternative rating system that increases the rate for insureds 
    with lower than average yields in recognition of the additional risk 
    associated with these insureds. This change in the rating process will 
    be more proactive in recognizing situations which may result in adverse 
    loss experience and determining a rate appropriate for these 
    situations.
        By using an alternative that simply requires adjustment to the 
    current rating methodology as a replacement for NCS, the proposed 
    removal of the NCS regulation can be implemented beginning with crops 
    planted in the fall of 1998. The general financial impact on insureds 
    will be variable (but generally moderate) rate increases for those 
    units with lower than average yields. More specific details on the 
    financial impact of this action can be found in the ``cost-benefit 
    analysis'.
        By implementing this alternative rating process, RMA will: (1) 
    eliminate the ``lag'' year currently included in the process; (2) make 
    adjustments automatic, thereby improving the process for insureds, 
    agents, and RMA; (3) incorporate the adjustments into the actuarial 
    tables, which will eliminate the currently maintained lists and 
    required notification requirements; (4) calculate adjustments on a unit 
    rather than policyholder basis; and (5) increase premiums less abruptly 
    once adjustments are triggered.
    
    List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 400
    
        Crop insurance, Nonstandard Underwriting Classification System.
    
    Proposed Rule
    
        Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Federal 
    Crop Insurance Corporation hereby proposes to amend 7 CFR part 400, 
    subpart O, as follows:
    
    PART 400--GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
    
    Subpart O--Nonstandard Underwriting Classification System; 
    Regulations for the 1991 and Succeeding Crop Years
    
        1. The authority citation for 7 CFR part 400, subpart O, is revised 
    to read as follows:
    
        Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1506(1), 1506(p).
    
    
    Secs. 400.301-400.309  (Subpart D) [Removed and Reserved]
    
        2. In part 400, subpart O is removed and reserved.
    John Zirschky,
    Acting Manager, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation.
    [FR Doc. 98-23523 Filed 9-1-98; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 3410-08-P Department
    
    
    

Document Information

Published:
09/02/1998
Department:
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
Entry Type:
Proposed Rule
Action:
Proposed rule.
Document Number:
98-23523
Dates:
Written comments and opinions on this proposed rule and related preliminary cost-benefit analysis will be accepted until close of business October 19, 1998 and will be considered when the rule and cost-benefit analysis are to be made final.
Pages:
46703-46705 (3 pages)
RINs:
0563-AB66: General Administrative Regulations; Nonstandard Underwriting Classification System
RIN Links:
https://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/0563-AB66/general-administrative-regulations-nonstandard-underwriting-classification-system
PDF File:
98-23523.pdf
CFR: (1)
7 CFR 400