[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 186 (Tuesday, September 26, 1995)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49572-49576]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-23885]
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
[A-570-601]
Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof, Finished and
Unfinished, From the People's Republic of China; Preliminary Results of
Antidumping Administrative Review
AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,
Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice of preliminary results of antidumping duty
administrative review of tapered roller bearings and parts thereof,
finished and unfinished, from the People's Republic of China.
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SUMMARY: In response to requests by the petitioner and one respondent,
the Department of Commerce (the Department) is conducting an
administrative review of the antidumping duty order on tapered roller
bearings and parts thereof, finished and unfinished (TRBs), from the
People's Republic of China (PRC). The period of review (POR) is June 1,
1993, through May 31, 1994. The review indicates the existence of
dumping margins during this period.
We have preliminarily determined that sales have been made below
foreign market value (FMV). If these preliminary results are adopted in
our final results of administrative review, we will instruct the U.S.
Customs Service to assess antidumping duties equal to the difference
between United States price (USP) and FMV. Interested parties are
invited to comment on these preliminary results.
EFFECTIVE DATE: September 26, 1995.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles Riggle, Hermes Pinilla, Andrea
Chu, Kris Campbell or Michael Rill, Office of Antidumping Compliance,
Import Administration, International Trade Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce, 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.,
Washington DC 20230; telephone (202) 482-4733.
Applicable Statute and Regulations
The Department is conducting this administrative review in
accordance with section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (the
Act). Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the statute and to
the Department's regulations are references to the provisions as they
existed on December 31, 1994.
Background
On June 7, 1994, the Department published in the Federal Register
(59 FR 29411) a notice of opportunity to request an administrative
review of the antidumping duty order on TRBs from the PRC. In
accordance with 19 C.F.R. 353.22(a), the petitioner, The Timken
Company, requested that we conduct an administrative review. In
addition, respondent Shanghai General Bearing Company (Shanghai)
requested revocation pursuant to 19 C.F.R. 353.25(b) (revocation based
on not selling subject merchandise at less than foreign market value
for three consecutive years). We published a notice of initiation of
this antidumping duty administrative review on August 24, 1994 (59 FR
43537), covering the period June 1, 1993, through May 31, 1994 (the 7th
review period).
On July 26, 1994, we notified the PRC government, through its
embassy in Washington, that we were conducting this review and
requested information relevant to the issue of whether the companies
named in the initiation request are independent from government
control. See Separate Rates, infra. On the same date, we also notified
the PRC Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) of
this review.
On July 28, 1994, a representative from MOFTEC informed us that the
Secretary General of the Basic Machinery Division of the Chamber of
Commerce for Import & Export of Machinery and Electronics (CCCME) would
be the designated contact for the PRC in this review. On December 5,
1994, we sent a copy of the questionnaire to the Secretary General of
CCCME and requested that the questionnaire be forwarded to all PRC
companies identified in our initiation notice.
We also sent questionnaires to the Hong Kong companies listed in
our initiation notice, using addresses supplied in the petitioner's
initiation request as well as information from the Hong Kong branch of
the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service.
On December 7-9, 1994, we conducted a presentation of the
questionnaire in Beijing. The following companies attended the
presentation: China National Machinery & Equipment Import & Export
Corporation (CMC), Liaoning Machinery Import & Export Corporation
(Liaoning), Henan Machinery & Equipment Import & Export Corporation
(Henan), China National Automotive Industry Import & Export Guizhou
Corporation (Guizhou Automotive), Luoyang Bearing Factory (Luoyang),
Jilin Province Machinery Import & Export Corporation (Jilin), Tianshui
Hailin Import & Export Corporation (Tianshui), Wafangdian Bearing
Industry Import & Export Corporation (Wafangdian), Guizhou Machinery
Import & Export Corporation (Guizhou), Zhejiang Machinery Import &
Export Corporation (Zhejiang), and a voluntary respondent that did not
request a review and which was not named in the initiation notice,
Xiangfan International Trade Corporation (Xiangfan).
We received responses to our questionnaire from fourteen companies,
consisting of the companies that attended the questionnaire
presentation, Shanghai, and two Hong Kong resellers: Premier Bearing
and Equipment Company, Ltd. (Premier), and Chin Jun Industrial, Ltd.
(Chin Jun).
Scope of Review
Imports covered by this review are shipments of TRBs and parts
thereof, finished and unfinished, from the PRC. This merchandise is
classifiable under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) item numbers
8482.20.00, 8482.91.00.60, 8482.99.30, 8483.20.40, 8483.20.80,
8483.30.80, 8483.90.20, 8483.90.30 and 8483.90.80. Although the HTS
item numbers are provided for convenience and customs purposes, our
written description of the scope of this proceeding is dispositive.
Separate Rates
1. Background and Summary of Findings
It is the Department's standard policy to assign all exporters of
the merchandise subject to review in non-market economy (NME) countries
a single rate, unless an exporter can demonstrate an absence of
government control, both in law and in fact, with respect to exports.
To establish whether an exporter is sufficiently independent of
government control to be entitled to a separate rate, the Department
analyzes
[[Page 49573]]
the exporter in light of the criteria established in the Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Sparklers from the
People's Republic of China (56 FR 20588, May 6, 1991) (Sparklers), as
amplified in Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value:
Silicon Carbide from the People's Republic of China (59 FR 22585, May
2, 1994) (Silicon Carbide). Evidence supporting, though not requiring,
a finding of de jure absence of government control over export
activities includes: (1) An absence of restrictive stipulations
associated with an individual exporter's business and export licenses;
(2) any legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies; and
(3) any other formal measures by the government decentralizing control
of companies. See Sparklers at 20589. Evidence relevant to a de facto
analysis of absence of government control over exports is based on four
factors: (1) whether the respondent sets its own export prices
independent from the government and other exporters; (2) whether the
respondent can retain the proceeds from its export sales; (3) whether
the respondent has the authority to negotiate and sign contracts; and
(4) whether the respondent has autonomy from the government regarding
the selection of management. See Silicon Carbide at 22587; see also
Sparklers at 20589.
The Department preliminarily determined that Guizhou, Henan, Jilin,
Luoyang, Liaoning, Wafangdian, Guizhou Automotive, and Shanghai were
entitled to separate rates during the concurrent administrative reviews
of the 1990-91, 1991-92, and 1992-93 review periods (each covering the
period June 1-May 31). See (cite to 4-6 prelim., unsigned as of 7/26).
Information submitted by these companies for the record in the current
review is consistent with these findings. Further, there have been no
allegations of changes in control of these companies in this review.
Therefore, we preliminarily determine that the government does not
exercise control over the export activities of these firms.
Accordingly, we will calculate rates separate from the PRC rate for
each of the above companies.
In the 1989-90 review, we determined that CMC was entitled to a
separate rate. See Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative
Review: Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts Thereof from the People's
Republic of China (56 FR 67590, 67597, December 31, 1991). Information
submitted by CMC for the record in the current review, including
information gathered at verification concerning certain criteria that
were not analyzed in the 1989-90 separate rate determination (see
Additional Separate Rate Criteria Applied to CMC, infra), is consistent
with this finding, and there have been no allegations in this review of
changes in the control of CMC's export activities. Accordingly, we have
preliminarily determined that the government does not exercise control
over CMC's export activities, and that CMC is therefore entitled to a
separate rate in this review.
Tianshui, Zhejiang, and Xiangfan also meet both the de jure and de
facto criteria and are therefore entitled to separate rates (see De
Jure Analysis and De Facto Analysis, infra).
Finally, with respect to Premier and Chin Jun, no separate rates
analysis is required because these companies are privately owned
trading companies located in Hong Kong.
2. De Jure Analysis: Tianshui, Zhejiang, and Xiangfan
Information submitted during this review indicates that Tianshui,
Zhejiang, and Xiangfan are owned ``by all of the people''. In Silicon
Carbide (at 22586), we found that the PRC central government had
devolved control of state-owned enterprises, i.e., enterprises owned
``by all the people''. As a result, we determined that companies owned
``by all the people'' were eligible for individual rates, if they met
the criteria developed in Sparklers and Silicon Carbide.
The following laws, which have been placed on the record in this
case, indicate a lack of de jure government control over these
companies, and establish that the responsibility for managing companies
owned by ``all the people'' has been transferred from the government to
the enterprise itself. These laws include: ``Law of the People's
Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole
People,'' adopted on April 13, 1988 (1988 Law); ``Regulations for
Transformation of Operational Mechanism of State-Owned Industrial
Enterprises,'' approved on August 23, 1992 (1992 Regulations); and the
``Temporary Provisions for Administration of Export Commodities,''
approved on December 21, 1992 (Export Provisions). The 1988 Law states
that enterprises have the right to set their own prices (see Article
26). This principle was restated in the 1992 Regulations (see Article
IX). Finally, the 1992 ``Temporary Provisions for Administration of
Export Commodities'' list those products subject to direct government
control. TRBs do not appear on this list and are not therefore subject
to the constraints of these provisions.
Consistent with Silicon Carbide, we preliminarily determine that
the existence of these laws demonstrates that Tianshui, Zhejiang, and
Xiangfan, companies owned by ``all the people,'' are not subject to de
jure government control with respect to export activities. In light of
reports 1 indicating that laws shifting control from the
government to the enterprises themselves have not been implemented
uniformly, an analysis of de facto control is critical in determining
whether respondents are, in fact, subject to government control with
respect to export activities.
\1\ See ``PRC Government Findings on Enterprise Autonomy,'' in
Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China-93-133 (July 14, 1993)
and 1992 Central Intelligence Agency Report to the Joint Economic
Committee, Hearings on Global Economic and Technological Change:
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and China, Pt.2 (102 Cong.,
2d Sess.).
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3. De Facto Analysis: Tianshui, Zhejiang, and Xiangfan
The following record evidence, which is contained in the
questionnaire responses, indicates a lack of de facto government
control over the export activities of Tianshui, Zhejiang, and Xiangfan.
We have found that these respondents' pricing and export strategy
decisions are not subject to any entity's review or approval, and that
there are no government policy directives that affect these decisions.
There are no restrictions on the use of respondents' revenues or
profits, including export earnings.
Each company's general manager has the right to negotiate and enter
into contracts, and may delegate this authority to other employees
within the company. There is no evidence that this authority is subject
to any level of governmental approval.
The general manager is elected by an employees' assembly. The
election results are then recorded with the relevant provincial or
municipal bureau (e.g., the Zhejiang Provincial Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation Commission in the case of Zhejiang). There is no
evidence that these bureaus control the selection process or that they
have rejected a general manager selected through the employee election
process. The employee assemblies can remove the general manager,
typically under the authority of the company's Articles of Association,
in the case of mismanagement or violation of Chinese law.
Decisions made by respondents concerning purchases of subject
merchandise from other suppliers are
[[Page 49574]]
not subject to government approval. Finally, respondents' sources of
funds are their own savings or bank loans, and they have sole control
and access to their bank accounts, which are held in each company's
name.
Based on the foregoing analysis of the evidence of record, we find
no evidence of either de jure or de facto government control over the
export activities of Tianshui, Zhejiang, and Xiangfan. Accordingly,
each of these exporters will receive a separate rate.
Because we have preliminarily determined that the voluntary
respondent Xiangfan is entitled to a separate rate and no review was
requested for this company, we have not reviewed its entries during the
93-94 review period (see Background section above). Therefore, the
current cash deposit rate established for this company in the 1989-90
review of this case (i.e., the 1989-90 PRC rate) will continue to apply
for future cash deposits unless this rate is replaced by a more recent
PRC rate (i.e., from the concurrent 1990-91, 1991-92, and 1992-93
reviews) before the publication of these final results.
4. Additional Separate Rate Criteria Applied to CMC
The Department's determination that CMC was entitled to a separate
rate during the administrative review of the 1989-90 POR was made
pursuant to the de jure criteria cited above, as well as the de facto
criteria developed in Sparklers (criteria (1) and (2) above). However,
this determination was made prior to the development of the additional
de facto criteria that were considered in Silicon Carbide (criteria (3)
and (4) above). Accordingly, for the preliminary results of this review
we have examined the extent to which CMC maintains the authority to
negotiate and sign contracts and its degree of autonomy in the
selection of management. Record evidence relevant to these criteria
indicates that CMC independently negotiates contracts free of
government control and is autonomous in its selection of management.
Although CMC's response to our separate rates questionnaire
indicates that the general manager and deputy general manager are
appointed by MOFTEC, a more detailed examination of this issue at
verification revealed that MOFTEC's only involvement is a requirement
that the selection of these managers be recorded with MOFTEC. Our
verification findings indicate that these managers are selected by an
employee assembly, which in turn is elected by the employees of the
company. At verification we examined the ballots used for the election
of the employee assembly as well as CMC's Articles of Association,
which detail the procedural requirements for such elections. Our
discussions with company officials indicated that MOFTEC could annul
the election results but it has never done so.
Our verification findings also indicate that the authority to
negotiate and enter into contracts on behalf of CMC rests with the
managers of each subsidiary department (e.g., CMC Baili, the export
division of CMC) and that such contract negotiation is not subject to
the approval of any outside entity.
5. Separate Rate Determinations for Non-responsive Companies
For those companies for which we initiated a review and which did
not respond to the questionnaires, as best information available (BIA),
we have determined that these companies do not merit separate rates.
See ``Best Information Available'' section below.
United States Price
For sales made by Luoyang, Zhejiang, Tianshui, Wafangdian,
Liaoning, Jilin, Guizhou, Guizhou Automotive, and Premier, we based the
USP on purchase price, in accordance with section 772(b) of the Act,
because the subject merchandise was sold to unrelated purchasers in the
United States prior to importation into the United States, and because
exporter's sales price (ESP) methodology was not indicated by other
circumstances. For sales made by Shanghai and Chin Jun, we based USP on
ESP, in accordance with section 772(c) of the Act, because sales to the
first unrelated purchaser took place after importation into the United
States. CMC and Henan had a combination of purchase price and ESP sales
subject to review.
We calculated purchase price based on, as appropriate, the FOB,
CIF, or C&F port price to unrelated purchasers. We made deductions for
brokerage and handling, foreign inland freight, ocean freight, and
marine insurance. When marine insurance and ocean freight were provided
by PRC-owned companies, we based the deduction on surrogate values. See
Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Saccharin from
the People's Republic of China, 59 FR 58818, 58825 (November 15, 1994).
We valued foreign inland freight deductions using surrogate data based
on Indian freight costs. We selected India as the surrogate country for
the reasons explained in the ``Foreign Market Value'' section of this
notice. We calculated ESP based on the packed, ex-warehouse price from
the U.S. subsidiary to unrelated customers. We made deductions from ESP
for U.S. packing in the United States, ocean freight, foreign brokerage
& handling, foreign inland freight, marine insurance, customs duty,
U.S. brokerage, U.S. inland freight insurance and U.S. inland freight.
Foreign Market Value
Section 773(c)(1) of the Act provides that the Department shall
determine the FMV using a factors of production methodology if (1) the
merchandise is exported from an NME country, and (2) the information
does not permit the calculation of FMV using home market prices, third-
country prices, or constructed value (CV) under section 773(a).
In the most recent review of this order, the Department treated the
PRC as an NME country. In its April 17, 1995, questionnaire response,
Shanghai requested that the Department accept Shanghai's actual costs,
claiming that its costs were market-driven. However, in order to accept
the costs of a company in an NME country, the Department must determine
that the industry in which that company operates, not just a particular
company, is market-oriented. See, e.g., Preliminary Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Postponement of Final Determination:
Pure and Alloy Magnesium from the Russian Federation, 59 FR 55427,
55430 (November 7, 1994) (``an NME-country respondent may argue that
market-driven prices characterize its particular industry and,
therefore, despite NME status, that foreign market value should be
calculated using actual home market prices or costs'' (emphasis
added)).
Because neither Shanghai, nor any other company in these reviews,
has argued that the TRB industry in the PRC is market-oriented, we
continue to consider that industry to be non-market-oriented and,
therefore, we have applied our standard NME methodology and surrogate
values to Shanghai's factors of production to determine FMV and
movement costs.
Except as noted below, we calculated FMV based on factors of
production in accordance with section 773(c) of the Act and section
353.52 of our regulations. We chose India as the most comparable
surrogate on the basis of the criteria set out in section 353.52(b).
See Memorandum from Director, Office of Policy to Program Manager,
Office of Antidumping Compliance, dated November 23, 1994. Further,
information on the record indicates that India is a significant
producer of TRBs. See Memorandum from the analyst to
[[Page 49575]]
the file, dated July 27, 1995. We used publicly available information
relating to India to value the various factors of production.
We valued the factors of production as follows:
For hot-rolled alloy steel bars and rods, and irregular
coils, used in the production of rollers, hot-rolled alloy steel bars
and rods, used in the production of cups and cones, cold-rolled strip
and sheet, used in the production of cages, and bearing quality and
non-bearing quality steel scrap, we used import prices obtained from
Monthly Statistics of the Foreign Trade of India, Volume II- Imports.
We used data from the annual issue of this source, which covers the
period April 1993-March 1994, and also factored in the remaining POR
months of April - May 1994. We made further adjustments to include
freight costs incurred between the steel supplier and the TRB factory.
We used actual costs for certain steel inputs because they were
purchased from a market-economy country. See Final Determination of
Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Oscillating Fans and Ceiling Fans from
the PRC, 56 FR 55271, 55275 (October 25, 1991).
For direct labor, we used 1993 data from Investing,
Licensing & Trading Conditions Abroad, India, published in November
1993 by the Economist Intelligence Unit. We then adjusted the 1993
labor value to the POR to reflect inflation using wholesale price
indices (WPI) of India as published in the International Financial
Statistics by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We calculated the
labor cost for each component by multiplying the labor time requirement
by the surrogate labor rate. Indirect labor is reflected in the
selling, general and administrative (SG&A) and overhead rates.
For factory overhead, we used information obtained from a
financial report of a producer of similar merchandise in India. From
this source, we were able to calculate factory overhead as a percentage
of total cost of manufacture.
For SG&A expenses, we used information obtained from the
same financial report used to obtain factory overhead. This information
showed SG&A expenses as a percentage of the cost of manufacture. SG&A
expenses were less than 10 percent of the cost of manufacture.
Therefore, we used the statutory minimum of 10 percent of the cost of
manufacture for SG&A, in accordance with sections 773(c)(1) and 773(e)
of the Act.
For profit, we used the profit rate of the same Indian
producer of similar merchandise from which we derived a rate for
factory overhead.
For export packing, we applied BIA (section 776(c) of the
Act) because the respondents did not supply sufficient factor
information by which to calculate packing costs. We used, as BIA, one
percent of the total ex-factory cost and SG&A expenses combined. This
percentage, obtained from publicly available data, was used in the
Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Tapered Roller
Bearings from Italy, 52 FR 24198 (June 29, 1987). This methodology is
consistent with the Department's valuation of packing in the Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Tapered Roller
Bearings from the People's Republic of China, 56 FR 67590 (December 31,
1991). We used this percentage because there was no publicly available
information from a comparable surrogate country.
For foreign inland freight, we used the price reported in
a December 1989 cable from the U.S. Embassy in India submitted for the
Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Shop Towels of
Cotton from the People's Republic of China, 56 FR 4040 (February 1,
1991). We adjusted the value of freight to the POR using a WPI
published by the IMF.
Currency Conversion
We made currency conversions in accordance with 19 C.F.R.
353.60(a). Currency conversions were made at the rates certified by the
Federal Reserve Bank.
Best Information Available
Section 776(c) of the Act provides that whenever a party refuses or
is unable to produce information requested in a timely manner and in
the form required, or otherwise significantly impedes an investigation,
the Department shall use BIA. In deciding what to use as BIA, 19 C.F.R.
353.37(b) provides that the Department may take into account whether a
party refused to provide requested information. Thus, the Department
determines on a case-by-case basis what is BIA. Whenever a company
refuses to provide the information requested in the form required, or
otherwise significantly impedes the Department's review, the Department
will normally assign to that company the higher of (1) the highest rate
for any firm in the less-than-fair-value (LTFV) investigation or prior
administrative reviews of sales of subject merchandise from that same
country; or (2) the highest rate found in that review for any firm.
When a company has cooperated with the Department's request for
information but fails to provide the information requested in a timely
manner or in the form required, the Department will normally assign to
that company the higher of either: (1) the highest of the rates found
for that firm in the LTFV investigation or prior administrative
reviews; or (2) the highest calculated rate found in that review for
any firm. (See Antifriction Bearings from France, et al.; Final Results
of Review, 58 FR 39729 (July 26, 1993).)
Non-responsive companies
We have assigned non-cooperative BIA to those companies for which
we initiated a review and which did not respond to the questionnaires.
In accordance with the non-cooperative BIA formula stated above, this
represents the highest rate for any firm from the LTFV investigation or
any review of sales of subject merchandise from the PRC. As noted in
the separate rates section above, we have determined that the non-
responsive companies do not merit separate rates. Therefore, the non-
cooperative BIA for these companies forms the basis for the PRC rate.
The PRC rate is 57.86 percent for this review.
Responsive Companies
Premier
Premier, a reseller of TRBs from the PRC based in Hong Kong, stated
it could not respond to the Department's supplemental questionnaire,
which requested factors of production data. We asked Premier for
factors of production data with the intent of using this information
to: (1) perform a cost of production test on third-country sales, and
(2) calculate CV when necessary. Premier stated that it was not in a
position to request factors of production information from its
suppliers. The Department then sent factors of production
questionnaires to Premier's suppliers in an effort to obtain the
information. We did not receive any responses from Premier's suppliers.
In addition, the Department found significant errors in reported sales
data at verification of Premier. Therefore, for these preliminary
results we have applied, as cooperative BIA, the higher of the highest
rate ever applicable to Premier or the highest calculated rate in this
review.
Preliminary Results of the Review
As a result of our comparison of the USP to FMV, we preliminarily
determine that the following dumping margins exist for the period June
1, 1993, through May 31, 1994:
[[Page 49576]]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Margin
Manufacturer/exporter (percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Premier Bearing and Equipment, Limited...................... 75.87
Guizhou Machinery Import and Export Corporation............. 5.38
Henan Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation. 1.42
Luoyang Bearing Factory..................................... 2.12
Shanghai General Bearing Company, Ltd....................... 0.07
Jilin Machinery Import and Export Corporation............... 60.91
Chin Jun Industrial Ltd..................................... 1.94
Wafangdian Bearing Factory.................................. 75.87
Liaoning Machinery Import & Export Corporation.............. 12.06
China National Machinery & Equipment Import and Export
Corporation................................................ 0.13
China Nat'l Automotive Industry Import and Export Guizhou
Corporation................................................ 1.44
Tianshui Hailin Import and Export Corporation............... 0.00
Zhejiang Machinery Import & Export Corporation.............. 7.83
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parties to the proceeding may request disclosure within five days
of the date of publication of this notice. Any interested party may
request a hearing within 10 days of publication. Any hearing, if
requested, will be held approximately 44 days after the publication of
this notice. Interested parties may submit written comments (case
briefs) within 30 days of the date of publication of this notice.
Rebuttal comments (rebuttal briefs), which must be limited to issues
raised in the case briefs, may be filed not later than 37 days after
the date of publication. The Department will publish a notice of final
results of this administrative review, including the results of its
analysis of issues raised in any such written comments.
The Department shall determine, and the Customs Service shall
assess, antidumping duties on all appropriate entries. Individual
differences between USP and FMV may vary from the percentages stated
above. The Department will issue appraisement instructions directly to
the Customs Service.
Furthermore, the following cash deposit requirements will be
effective upon publication of the final results of this administrative
review for all shipments of the subject merchandise entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the publication
date, as provided for by section 751(a)(1) of the Act: (1) For the
companies named above that have separate rates and were reviewed
(Premier, Guizhou Machinery, Henan, Luoyang, Shanghai General, Jilin,
Chin Jun, Wafangdian, Liaoning, CMEC, Guizhou Automotive, Tianshui,
Zhejiang), the cash deposit rates will be the rates for these firms
established in the final results of this review; (2) for Xiangfan,
which we preliminarily determine to be entitled to a separate rate, the
rate will continue be that which currently applies to this company
(8.83 percent) unless modified by a more recent PRC rate (e.g., from
the concurrent 90-91, 91-92, or 92-93 reviews); (3) for all remaining
PRC exporters, all of which were found to not be entitled to separate
rates, the cash deposit will be 57.86 percent; and (4) for other non-
PRC exporters of subject merchandise from the PRC, the cash deposit
rate will be the rate applicable to the PRC supplier of that exporter.
These deposit requirements, when imposed, shall remain in effect until
publication of the final results of the next administrative review.
This notice also serves as a preliminary reminder to importers of
their responsibility under 19 C.F.R. 353.26 to file a certificate
regarding the reimbursement of antidumping duties prior to liquidation
of the relevant entries during this review period. Failure to comply
with this requirement could result in the Secretary's presumption that
reimbursement of antidumping duties occurred and the subsequent
assessment of double antidumping duties.
This administrative review and notice are in accordance with
section 751(a)(1) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(a)(1)) and 19 C.F.R.
353.22.
Dated: September 13, 1995.
Susan G. Esserman,
Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.
[FR Doc. 95-23885 Filed 9-25-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
