[Federal Register Volume 63, Number 171 (Thursday, September 3, 1998)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 46899-46900]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 98-23490]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 571
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Denial of Petition for
Rulemaking
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Denial of petition for rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: This document denies a petition for rulemaking submitted by
Dr. Richard H. McSwain to regulate the bottom of automotive fuel tanks
to protect them from rupture by roadway hazards. Neither the
information submitted by the petitioner nor information otherwise
available to the agency indicate that the matter identified by the
petitioner is a safety problem warranting regulatory action.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues: Dr. William J.J.
Liu, Office of Crashworthiness Standards, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590.
Telephone: (202) 366-4923. Facsimile (202) 366-4329.
For legal issues: Nicole Fradette, Office of Chief Counsel, NCC-20,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20590. Telephone: (202) 366-2992. Facsimile (202) 366-
3820.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: By petition dated July 17, 1997, Dr. Richard
H. McSwain requested the agency to issue a regulation that would
protect the bottom of automotive fuel tanks from roadway hazards. The
petitioner asserted that, over the past five years, numerous deaths
have occurred from vehicle fires caused by the rupture of the bottom of
the vehicle's fuel tank by roadway hazards.1 Dr. McSwain did
not quantify the number of those deaths, but did enclose news articles
about several allegedly related crashes. He also stated that European
motor vehicle standards require the protection of the fuel tank bottom
and enclosed Volume 2 of the German ``Motor Vehicle Construction and
Use Regulations'' (1995) and Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)
Regulation No. 34, ``Uniform Provision Concerning the Approval of
Vehicles with Regard to the Prevention of Fire Risks'' (01 Series,
Addendum 33 to Amendment 1, January 18, 1979).
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\1\ The petitioner did not define what he meant by ``roadway
hazards.'' The agency understands the petitioner to be referring to
roadway debris and not the roadway elements, such as guardrails and
curbs.
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The petitioner also stated that several U.S. government agencies
have recognized the need for protection of fuel tank bottoms. In
support of that claim, he enclosed a 1970 Multidisciplinary Accident
Investigation report of a case involving a vehicle fire prepared for
the U.S. National Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB), a predecessor of NHTSA.
The NHSB study examined a major vehicle fire that occurred following a
severe crash in which the vehicle's structure was severely deformed,
compressing the fuel tank between the left and right frame rails. The
tank ruptured at the seams, allowing fuel to escape. The fuel was
ignited by the sparks created when the vehicle hit a concrete culvert.
The NHSB study recommended incorporating additional protection in fuel
tanks to prevent them from rupturing in a crash. The study also
recommended installing a protective lining inside of the fuel tank to
prevent fuel spillage in the event of a fuel tank rupture.
The petitioner also submitted a 1984 National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) Safety Recommendation directed to the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association (MVMA). The NTSB recommendations were the
result of a study of a severe crash that occurred when 22 vehicles
drove at speeds ranging from 5 to 50 mph into the dense smoke of a
grass fire and were involved in multiple collisions. The fuel tanks of
seven of the vehicles ruptured, spilling fuel. The fuel ignited and a
major fire ensued. The NTSB study encouraged vehicle manufacturers to
develop and apply more effective technology to ensure fuel system
integrity during high speed crashes.
To promulgate or amend a vehicle safety requirement, NHTSA must
decide that a safety problem exists, that the problem is significant
enough to warrant regulation, and that the requirement would reduce the
problem and thus meet the need for motor vehicle safety. In this
instance, NHTSA has found no basis for concluding that there is a
safety problem warranting regulatory action with respect to the
rupturing of the bottom of fuel tanks by roadway hazards.
Although the petitioner enclosed several news accounts of vehicle
fires caused by ruptured fuel tanks, specifically four news items of
severe crashes, and two old case studies of severe crashes, he did not
demonstrate that there was a significant safety problem with vehicle
fuel tank ruptures by roadway hazards. Further, NHTSA is not aware of
information from other sources, including its own, demonstrating the
existence of a significant problem.
Most of the information submitted by the petitioner does not appear
to relate to the issue of the susceptibility of the bottom of fuel
tanks to rupture by roadway hazards. The agency notes that the vehicle
fire discussed in the NHSB study occurred when the fuel tank ruptured
due to the intrusion of the vehicle frame into the sides, not the
bottom, of the fuel tank. The NHSB study did not specifically recommend
regulating the bottom of fuel tanks. Further, the 1984 NTSB study
recommended that the MVMA develop and apply more effective technology
to reduce breaches in the fuel system and to minimize any fuel loss if
a breach occurs, particularly in crashes involving
[[Page 46900]]
high speed differentials. The NTSB study did not specifically recommend
regulating the underside of fuel tanks.
The agency notes that, contrary to the petitioner's statement,
neither the 1979 ECE Reg. No. 34 nor the 1995 German ``Motor Vehicle
Construction and Use Regulations'' specify tests for the bottom of fuel
tanks. Moreover, NHTSA has compared Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard (FMVSS) No. 301, Fuel System Integrity, to several foreign
fuel system integrity standards, including ECE Reg. No. 34, and
determined that NHTSA's standard requires more stringent crash tests
than the ECE standard (60 FR 18566; April 12, 1995). As to the media
reports about particular crashes that the petitioner believes involved
the rupturing of the bottom of fuel tanks, the agency notes that only
one of the four news reports clearly stated that the vehicle fire was
caused by the rupture of the underside of the vehicle's fuel tank by
roadway debris. The other three reports simply stated that the
vehicles' fuel tanks ruptured after the vehicles struck a guardrail
and, in one case, rolled over. Although the three reports did not
specify the location of the ruptures, the description of the crashes
indicate that the ruptures did not occur in the underside of the
vehicles.
In addition to the information submitted by the petitioner, the
agency considered its own information. As part of its research now
underway relating to a possible upgrade of FMVSS No. 301, (49 CFR
571.301), NHTSA has collected data regarding vehicle crash fires. The
data do not show a significant problem with vehicle fires resulting
from the rupture of fuel tanks by roadway debris. According to a review
of 1993-1995 Fire Case Reports from the National Automotive Sampling
System (NASS) 2, 74.1 percent of all vehicle fires originate
in the vehicle's engine compartment and 18.9 percent originate in the
fuel tank. According to the review, most of the fires associated with
the fuel tank involved ignition of gasoline leaking from ruptures or
punctures due to collisions with other vehicles or due to single
vehicles hitting roadway curbs, sign posts, embankments, etc., not
roadway debris. The review identified five cases of vehicle fires
originating in the undercarriage area between 1993 and 1995. In the
first case, the crash investigation report stated that the fire
occurred in the engine compartment ``due to the undercarriage damage.''
The case was later reclassified as a ``front'' fire. In the second
case, the crash investigation report stated that the fire occurred
during the vehicle's rollover sequence, off the roadway, after the
vehicle hit a roadway ``curbstone'' at 40-45 mph and ruptured its fuel
tank. In this case, one occupant suffered a Maximum Abbreviated Injury
Scale 6 burn injury. In the third case, the crash investigation report
stated that the vehicle struck and ran over a roadway sign post. The
report said that the fire occurred off the roadway when the ``stump''
of the sign post punctured the vehicle's fuel tank ``igniting the fumes
and or fuel.'' In the fourth case, the crash investigation report
stated that the vehicle went out of control and ``went off the left
side of the roadway down a steep embankment.'' It added that the fire
occurred when gasoline from a leaking or ruptured fuel tank ignited. In
the fifth case, the crash investigation report stated that the fire
occurred when the vehicle hit an open man-hole and its ``rear wheel
sunk into the [hole] causing the gas tank to contact the roadway.'' No
occupant suffered a burn injury in the third, fourth, and fifth cases.
As previously stated, none of these fires occurred as a result of
roadway debris striking the undercarriage of the vehicle. Even if the
petitioner were referring in his petition to these types of events as
well as fire occurrences due to roadway debris, any rulemaking action
to only address this problem would be very limited in scope and would
not be significant enough to warrant an amendment of FMVSS No. 301.
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\2\ ``Clinical Review of NASS Fire Case Reports,'' Contract No.
DTNH22-93-C-07034, January 24, 1997.
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On April 12, 1995, NHTSA published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) announcing the agency's plans to consider upgrading
FMVSS No. 301 by making the crash requirements more stringent and by
broadening the standard's focus to include mitigation concepts related
to fuel system components and environmental and aging tests related to
fuel system components (60 FR 18566). The notice announced a three-
phase approach to upgrade the standard: Phase 1, Component Level
Performance; Phase 2, System Level Performance; and Phase 3,
Environmental and Aging Effects.
As part of its ongoing effort to upgrade the standard, the agency
is conducting research and evaluation on high incidence cases of
vehicle fires, including ones associated with rear impact crashes and
with the engine compartment originated fires occurring in frontal
crashes. Further, the agency is seriously pursuing an upgrade of the
current rear impact requirements of FMVSS No. 301. This should result
in improved vehicle fuel system protection, including improved fuel
tank integrity. The agency conducted a series of rear impact tests on
various vehicle sizes and is currently planning a series of
repeatability tests. The results of this research program will serve as
a basis for an agency decision as to whether to issue a proposal to
amend the standard.
In accordance with 49 CFR part 552, this completes the agency's
review of the petition. The agency has concluded that there is no
reasonable possibility that the amendment requested by the petitioner
would be issued at the conclusion of a rulemaking proceeding. After
considering all relevant factors, the agency has decided to deny the
petition.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30103, 30162; delegation of authority at 49
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Issued on: August 27, 1998.
L. Robert Shelton,
Associate Administrator for Safety Performance Standards.
[FR Doc. 98-23490 Filed 9-2-98; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
