[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 171 (Thursday, September 4, 1997)]
[Notices]
[Pages 46793-46796]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-23618]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Notice of Safety Advisory
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 97-1 addressing safety
practices to reduce the risk of casualties from train derailments
caused by damage to tracks, roadbed, and bridges resulting from
uncontrolled flows of
[[Page 46794]]
water and similar weather-related phenomena.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge
Engineer, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 400 Seventh
Street, S.W., RRS-15, Mail Stop 25, Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone
202-632-3340) or Daniel L. Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief
Counsel, FRA, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10,
Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone 202-632-3186).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A recent derailment involving train number 4
of the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) on The
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) near Kingman,
Arizona, on August 9, 1997, has caused FRA to focus on the
effectiveness of railroad procedures for protection of trains and
personnel from hazards caused by severe weather conditions. The
investigation of that accident by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) and FRA continues. The facts and findings developed in the
investigation will be published when the investigation is complete.
Special Inspection Procedures
The Federal Track Safety Standards (49 CFR part 213) state, ``In
the event of fire, flood, severe storm, or other occurrence which might
have damaged track structure, a special inspection must be made of the
track involved as soon as possible after the occurrence.'' (49 CFR
213.239). This provision is purposely general in nature, because it is
not practicable to specify in a minimum safety standard all the
conditions which could trigger a special inspection, nor the manner in
which any particular special inspection must be conducted. However, in
accordance with the primary purpose of the Track Safety Standards and
associated railroad safety laws, these special inspections should be
conducted so as to effectively prevent derailments. In light of recent
occurrences and past experience, FRA now believes it necessary to issue
this safety advisory to provide railroads with recommended procedures
to further this objective.
FRA has investigated several train derailments in which damage from
unexpected moving water was a causal factor. Incidents reported to FRA
between January 1982 and March 1996 included 26 derailments caused by
washouts of bridges or bridge approaches, and 16 derailments caused by
washouts or water damage to culverts or subgrade not near a bridge. In
most cases, the railroad had some form of notification of the severe
weather conditions and either initiated or performed an inspection.
When the derailment occurred, either the inspector had not reached the
derailment site before the train, had inspected the track and not
recognized a hazardous condition, or had performed the inspection
before the damage had become detectible. FRA believes that more
specific measures can be taken by each railroad that conducts
operations on track subject to hazards from flowing water to reduce the
likelihood of future derailments caused by those hazards.
Vulnerable Structures and Track
FRA believes that several types of bridge and drainage structure
components should be identified as vulnerable and be given special
consideration in any decision related to the operation of trains both
during and following a severe rainstorm. In particular, bents, piers,
and abutments that rest directly on soil or degradable rock near the
surface might be rapidly undermined in a severe rainstorm. Similarly,
stream bed configurations in which the water course takes a bend or a
change in slope near the track are often unpredictable in times of
heavy flow. During such conditions, soil displacement can progress
rapidly in an unpredictable manner in locations that are not visible to
a person above the water surface. The size of a drainage structure, and
whether it is categorized as a bridge or a culvert, is not as important
as the vulnerability of the structure and its supported track to the
effects of flowing water.
Recommended Action
FRA believes that the chance of further derailments, such as
occurred near Kingman, Arizona, on August 9, 1997, would be greatly
reduced by the inclusion of certain additional measures into the
procedures for special inspections followed in the railroad industry in
the event of a threat of a severe rainstorm, at the level of a flash
flood. FRA has determined that each railroad that controls the
operation of trains on Class 4 or higher track, or passenger trains in
commuter or intercity service, should have in place a program to
protect its train operations from the effects of damage to tracks and
structures caused by severe weather conditions, particularly flash
floods. Therefore, FRA issues the following advisory to each affected
railroad:
1. The railroad should have in place a procedure that will assure
that all notifications issued by the National Weather Service (NWS) of
flash flood warnings will be received within 15 minutes of issuance
from the NWS, directly or through a contract weather forecasting
service, by the train dispatchers or other employees controlling the
movement of trains on all track of Class 4 or higher or upon which
passenger trains operate in commuter or intercity service, within the
warning area. In the case of such track located outside of the warning
area but subject to damage from water resulting from the storm, the
information should be obtained in time to permit timely response by the
railroad.
2. After the receipt of a warning of a flash flood which might
damage track or bridges, the railroad should notify train crews and
limit the speed of all freight and passenger trains to that which will
permit the train to operate safely, consistent with the potential water
levels and visibility conditions, on all track subject to damage from
the flood. The limitations should continue until a special inspection
in accordance with 49 CFR 213.239 has been performed of that track and
it is determined that a hazard no longer exists. In making that
inspection and determination, the time taken for the heaviest flow of
water to reach the track should be considered.
3. Each railroad affected by this advisory should identify its
bridges carrying track of Class 4 or higher or over which passenger
trains operate in commuter or intercity service, which are vulnerable
to damage from flash floods or similar weather-related phenomena.
Particular attention should be given to bridges which incorporate
piers, bents, or abutments, which are founded on soil or degradable
rock which could lose its integrity as a result of scour by moving
water, and which are commonly referred to as ``mud sills'' or ``spread
footings.''
4. The information developed in paragraph 3 should be compiled and
made available to each person who can be called upon to perform special
inspections on the subject track following a flash flood warning.
Consideration should be given to placing identifying marks on bridges
that need particular attention in special inspections, along with the
bridge number, to assist inspectors in locating them with certainty
during inclement weather. Consideration should also be given to the use
of automated high water detectors or similar sensing and warning
systems on specific bridges which could incur water damage that would
be hidden from or not otherwise detectible by a human inspector.
5. In addition to the bridge-specific information called for in
paragraph 3,
[[Page 46795]]
each affected railroad should implement a training program for the
persons performing special inspections. The training should include
methods to recognize and protect the safety of railroad operations from
the damaging characteristics of flowing water in general, with
particular regard to the effects of a watercourse that takes a
significant change in horizontal direction or vertical profile near the
track; the effects of drift material accumulation on scour and the
capacity of the waterway opening; and the potential for damage by
impact of heavy floating objects.
6. Refresher training of track inspectors on the subjects addressed
in paragraph 5 should be conducted at least once each calendar year.
Where practicable, that refresher training should include a joint
inspection by a track inspector and a cognizant bridge maintenance or
engineering employee over the inspector's assigned territory. During
that joint inspection they should locate the vulnerable components in
the bridges identified in paragraph 3, discuss the precautions to be
taken in the event of indications of distress in those components,
observe drainage conditions on and adjacent to the right-of-way, and
note changes for inclusion in the revisions of information called for
in paragraph 9.
7. If a track inspector is assigned to perform a special inspection
in accordance with paragraph 2, and bridges identified as vulnerable
are in the track segment subject to damage from the flash flood, a
cognizant bridge maintenance or engineering employee should be readily
available by telephone or radio to assist in the interpretation of
findings by the track inspector.
8. Each affected railroad should brief all of its track and bridge
inspectors on the contents of this advisory. These briefings should
occur within 14 calendar days of the date of publication of this safety
advisory in the Federal Register.
9. FRA believes that the actions described in paragraphs 3, 4, and
5 should be completed within 60 calendar days of the date of
publication of this safety advisory in the Federal Register. During
this period, each affected railroad should complete an initial review
of its bridges for vulnerability to high or rapidly flowing water and
provide that information to its inspectors. More detailed reviews
should be substantially completed and provided to inspectors during
calendar year 1998 and then maintained in a current status.
10. FRA requests a letter within 45 calendar days of the date of
publication of this safety advisory in the Federal Register from each
affected railroad specifying the actions it has taken and will initiate
to enhance the safety of train operations in the event of a flood or a
high or rapid water condition. Such letters should be addressed to the
Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, RRS-1, Mail Stop 25, 400
Seventh Street S.W., Washington, DC 20590.
Paperwork Reduction Act Provisions
This advisory does not require that any records or reports be kept
or submitted. It merely recommends that railroads collect or provide
certain information. Nevertheless, because some might see these
recommendations as paperwork burdens, FRA will seek approval of them.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law No. 104-13,
Section 2, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as revised at 44 U.S.C. 3501-
3520), and its implementing regulations, 5 CFR 1320.13, FRA is
requesting the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to conduct an
emergency review and approval of the information collection items
contained in this safety advisory. FRA is seeking OMB's approval of
these information collection items by September 5, 1997.
FRA invites interested respondents to comment on the following
summary of proposed information collection activities regarding (i)
whether the information collection activities are necessary for FRA to
properly execute its functions, including whether the activities will
have practical utility; (ii) the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the
burden of the information collection activities, including the validity
of the methodology and assumptions used to determine the estimates;
(iii) ways for FRA to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information being collected; and (iv) ways for FRA to minimize the
burden of information collection activities on the public by automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology (e.g., permitting electronic
submission of responses). See 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iv); 5 CFR
1320.8(d)(1)(i)-(iv). FRA believes that soliciting public comment will
promote its efforts to reduce the administrative and paperwork burdens
associated with the collection of information mandated by Federal
regulations. In summary, FRA reasons that comments received will
advance three objectives: (i) Reduce reporting burdens; (ii) ensure
that the agency organizes information collection items in a ``user
friendly'' format to improve the use of such information; and (iii)
accurately assess the resources expended to retrieve and produce
information requested. See 44 U.S.C. 3501.
Provided below are summaries of the seven information collection
activities FRA will submit for clearance by OMB as required by the PRA:
Title: Identify vulnerable bridges.
OMB Control Number: New.
Abstract: Each railroad affected by this advisory should identify
its bridges carrying track of Class 4 or higher, or over which
passenger trains operate in commuter or intercity service, which are
vulnerable to damage from flash floods or other weather-related events
that may be included in its severe weather operating program.
Form Number(s): N/A.
Affected Public: Businesses.
Respondent Universe: 25 railroads with 20,000 bridges.
Frequency of Submission: One time.
Total Responses: 25.
Average Time Per Response: 10 minutes per bridge.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 3,400 hours one time.
Status: Emergency processing by OMB.
Title: Compile and publish information to inspectors.
OMB Control Number: New.
Abstract: The information developed in paragraph 3 should be
compiled and made available to each person who can be called upon to
perform special inspections on the subject track following a flash
flood warning.
Form Number(s): N/A.
Affected Public: Businesses.
Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.
Frequency of Submission: No submission.
Total Responses: 1,200.
Average Time Per Response: 2.5 hours initially, 1 hour annually
thereafter.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 3,000 hours one time, 1,200
hours annually thereafter.
Status: Emergency processing by OMB.
Title: Place identifying markings on bridges that need special
attention.
OMB Control Number: New.
Abstract: Consideration should be given to placing identifying
marks on bridges that need particular attention in special inspections,
along with the bridge number, to assist inspectors in locating them
with certainty during inclement weather.
Form Number(s): N/A.
Affected Public: Businesses.
Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.
Frequency of Submission: No submission.
[[Page 46796]]
Total Responses: 1,000.
Average Time Per Response: 3 hours initially, 15 minutes annually
thereafter.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 3,000 hours one time, 250
hours annually thereafter.
Status: Emergency processing by OMB.
Title: Training Program for Inspectors.
OMB Control Number: New.
Abstract: Each affected railroad should implement a training
program for the persons performing special inspections.
Form Number(s): N/A.
Affected Public: Businesses.
Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.
Frequency of Submission: No submission.
Total Responses: 25.
Average Time Per Response: 441.6 hours one time, 88 hours annually
thereafter.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 11,040 hours one time, 2,200
hours annually thereafter.
Status: Emergency processing by OMB.
Title: Provide initial briefing to inspectors.
OMB Control Number: New.
Abstract: Each affected railroad should brief all of its track and
bridge inspectors on the contents of this advisory. These briefings
should occur within 14 calendar days of the date of publication of this
safety advisory in the Federal Register.
Form Number(s): N/A.
Affected Public: Businesses.
Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.
Frequency of Submission: None.
Total Responses: 300.
Average Time Per Response: 4 hours.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 2,400 hours.
Status: Emergency processing by OMB.
Title: Review of bridges for vulnerability to high water, initial
and annual.
OMB Control Number: New.
Abstract: FRA believes that the actions described in paragraphs 3,
4, and 5 should be completed within 60 calendar days of the date of
publication of this safety advisory in the Federal Register. During
this period, each affected railroad should complete an initial review
of its bridges for vulnerability to high or rapidly flowing water and
provide that information to its inspectors. More detailed reviews
should be substantially completed and provided to inspectors during
calendar year 1998 and then maintained in a current status.
Form Number(s): N/A.
Affected Public: Businesses.
Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.
Frequency of Submission: None.
Total Responses: 1,000.
Average Time Per Response: 2 hours initially in 1998, 30 minutes
annually thereafter.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 2,000 hours initially in 1998,
500 hours annually thereafter.
Status: Emergency processing by OMB.
Title: Notify FRA of bridge safety inspection programs in place.
OMB Control Number: New.
Abstract: FRA requests a letter within 45 calendar days of the date
of publication of this safety advisory in the Federal Register from
each affected railroad specifying the actions it has taken and will
initiate to enhance the safety of train operations in the event of a
flood or a high or rapid water condition. Such letters should be
addressed to the Associate Administrator for Safety, FRA, RRS-1, Mail
Stop 25, 400 Seventh Street S.W., Washington, DC 20590.
Form Number(s): N/A.
Affected Public: Businesses.
Respondent Universe: 25 railroads.
Frequency of Submission: One time.
Total Responses: 25.
Average Time Per Response: 4 hours one time.
Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 200 hours one time.
Status: Emergency processing by OMB.
FRA cannot impose a penalty on persons for violating information
collection requirements which do not display a current OMB control
number, if required. Here, of course, FRA is not issuing information
collection requirements and has no intention of imposing penalties
under any provisions of this safety advisory. FRA intends to obtain
current OMB control numbers for any information collection items
contained in this Safety Advisory. The OMB control number, when
assigned, will be announced by separate notice in the Federal Register.
For further information please contact Ms. Gloria Swanson, Office
of Planning and Evaluation Division, RRS-21, Federal Railroad
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590
(telephone: (202) 632-3318) or MaryAnn Johnson, Office of Information
Technology and Productivity Improvement, RAD-20, Federal Railroad
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20590
(telephone: (202) 632-3226). (These telephone numbers are not toll-
free.)
FRA may modify Safety Advisory 97-1, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate necessary action to ensure the
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 2, 1997.
James T. Schultz,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. 97-23618 Filed 9-3-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
