00-27181. Special Conditions: Canadair Model CL-600-2B19 Series Airplanes; High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF).

AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION:

Final special conditions; request for comments.

SUMMARY:

These special conditions are issued for Canadair Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes modified by Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics. These modified airplanes will have a novel or unusual design feature when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. The modification incorporates the installation of a new Head-Up Guidance System (HGS). The HGS will utilize electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the protection of this system from the effects of high-intensity-radiated fields (HIRF). These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.

DATES:

The effective date of these special conditions is October 17, 2000. Comments must be received on or before November 22, 2000.

ADDRESSES:

Comments on these special conditions may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Transport Airplane Directorate, Attention: Rules Docket (ANM-114), Docket No. NM177, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; or delivered in duplicate to the Transport Airplane Directorate at the above address. All comments must be marked: Docket No. NM177. Comments may be inspected in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Gerald Lakin, FAA, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone [phone]; facsimile [phone].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

 

Comments Invited

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon issuance; however, interested persons are invited to submit such written data, views, or arguments, as they may desire. Communications should identify the regulatory docket number and be submitted in duplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered by the Administrator. These special conditions may be changed in light of the comments received. All comments received will be available in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons, both before and after the closing date for comments. A report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking will be filed in the docket. Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to these special conditions must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: “Comments to Docket No. NM177.” The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

Background

On June 26, 2000, Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics, 16600 S.W. 72nd Avenue, Portland, OR 97224, applied for a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for Canadair Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes. The Model CL-600-2B19 is a Model Regional Jet Series 100 passsenger airplane with two AVCO Lycoming ALF-502L or ALF-502L-2 engines. These airplanes will incorporate a Head-Up Guidance System (HGS), manufactured by Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics, which displays attitude and heading information.

The HGS performs critical functions associated with the display of attitude and heading information to the pilot. These functions can be susceptible to disruption of both command and response signals as a result of electrical and magnetic interference caused by high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) external to the airplane. This disruption of signals could result in loss of critical flight displays and annunciations, or could present misleading information to the pilot.

Type Certification Basis

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101, Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics must show that the Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes, as changed, continue to meet the applicable provisions of the regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A21EA, or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the change. The regulations incorporated by reference in the type certificate are commonly referred to as the “original type certification basis.” The regulations included in the certification basis for the Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes include Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-62, plus additional requirements listed in the type certificate data sheet that are not relevant to these special conditions.

If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., part 25, as amended) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of part 34 and the noise certification requirements of part 36.

Special conditions, as appropriate, are issued in accordance with § 11.49, as required by §§ 11.28 and 11.29, and become part of the airplane's type certification basis in accordance with § 21.101(b)(2).

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1).

Novel or Unusual Design Features

As stated earlier, the Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes modified by Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics will incorporate a HGS system, which performs critical functions. The HGS system contains electronic equipment for which the current airworthiness standards of part 25 do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the protection of this equipment from the adverse effects of HIRF. This system may be vulnerable to HIRF external to the airplane. Accordingly, this system is considered to be a novel or unusual design feature.

Discussion

There is no specific regulation that addresses the requirements for protection of electrical and electronic systems from HIRF. Increased power levels from ground-based radio transmitters and the growing use of sensitive electrical and electronic systems to command and control airplanes have made it necessary to provide adequate protection.

To ensure that a level of safety is achieved that is equivalent to that intended by the regulations incorporated by reference, special conditions are needed for the Model CL-600-2B19 airplanes modified to include the Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics HGS system. These special conditions will require that this system, which performs critical functions, be designed and installed to preclude component damage and interruption of function due to both the direct and indirect effects of HIRF.

High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF)

With the trend toward increased power levels from ground-based transmitters, plus the advent of space and satellite communications coupled with electronic command and control of the airplane, the immunity of critical digital avionics systems to HIRF must be established.

It is not possible to precisely define the HIRF to which the airplane will be exposed in service. There is also uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of airframe shielding for HIRF. Furthermore, coupling of electromagnetic energy to cockpit-installed equipment through the cockpit window apertures is undefined. Based on surveys and analysis of existing HIRF emitters, an adequate level of protection exists when compliance with the HIRF protection special condition is shown with either paragraph 1 or 2 below:

1. A minimum threat of 100 volts rms per meter electric field strength from 10 KHz to 18 GHz.

a. The threat must be applied to the system elements and their associated wiring harnesses without the benefit of airframe shielding.

b. Demonstration of this level of protection is established through system tests and analysis.

2. A threat external to the airframe of the following field strengths for the frequency ranges indicated. Both peak and average field strength components from the Table are to be demonstrated.

Frequency	Field strength (volts per meter)
	Peak	Average
10 kHz-100 kHz	50	50
100 kHz-500 kHz	50	50
500 kHz-2 MHz	50	50
2 MHz-30 MHz	100	100
30 MHz-70 MHz	50	50
70 MHz-100 MHz	50	50
100 MHz-200 MHz	100	100
200 MHz-400 MHz	100	100
400 MHz-700 MHz	700	50
700 MHz-1 GHz	700	100
1 GHz-2 GHz	2000	200
2 GHz-4 GHz	3000	200
4 GHz-6 GHz	3000	200
6 GHz-8 GHz	1000	200
8 GHz-12 GHz	3000	300
12 GHz-18 GHz	2000	200
18 GHz-40 GHz	600	200
The field strengths are expressed in terms of peak of the root-mean-square (rms) over the complete modulation period.

The threat levels identified above are the result of an FAA review of existing studies on the subject of HIRF, in light of the ongoing work of the Electromagnetic Effects Harmonization Working Group of the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee.

Applicability

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to Canadair Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes modified by Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics to include the Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics HGS system. Should Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on Type Certificate A21EA to incorporate the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on Canadair Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes modified by Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplanes.

The substance of the special conditions has been subjected to the notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. For this reason, and because a delay would significantly affect the certification of the airplane, which is imminent, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment described above.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25

• Aircraft
• Aviation safety
• Reporting and recordkeeping requirements

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.

The Special Conditions

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the supplemental type certification basis for Canadair Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes modified by Rockwell Collins Flight Dynamics.

1. Protection from Unwanted Effects of High-Intensity Radiated Fields (HIRF). Each electrical and electronic system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capability of these systems to perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the airplane is exposed to high-intensity radiated fields.

2. For the purpose of these special conditions, the following definition applies: Critical Functions: Functions whose failure would contribute to or cause a failure condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 17, 2000.

Donald L. Riggin,

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.