00-9247. Airworthiness Directives; Various Transport Category Airplanes Equipped with Mode “C” Transponder(s) with Single Gillham Code Altitude Input
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Start Preamble
Start Printed Page 21133
AGENCY:
Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.
ACTION:
Final rule; rescission.
SUMMARY:
This amendment rescinds Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-23-22 R1, which is applicable to various transport category airplanes equipped with Mode “C” transponder(s) with single Gillham code altitude input. That AD requires repetitive tests to detect discrepancies of the Mode “C” transponder(s), air data computer, and certain wiring connections; and corrective actions, if necessary. The requirements of that AD were intended to prevent false advisories that direct the flightcrew to change course and either climb or descend, which could result in the flightcrew deviating the airplane from its assigned flight path, and a possible mid-air collision. Since the issuance of that AD, test data have been collected that demonstrate that the repetitive tests are unnecessary.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
April 20, 2000.
Start Further InfoFOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Peter Skaves, Aerospace Engineer, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface Branch, ANM-111, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2795; fax (425) 227-1320.
End Further Info End Preamble Start Supplemental InformationSUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
On November 4, 1999, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued AD 99-23-22, amendment 39-11418 (64 FR 61493, November 12, 1999), as revised by AD 99-23-22 R1, amendment 39-11473 (64 FR 70181, December 16, 1999), applicable to various transport category airplanes equipped with Mode “C” transponder(s) with single Gillham code altitude input. That AD requires repetitive tests to detect discrepancies of the Mode “C” transponder(s), air data computer, and certain wiring connections; and corrective actions, if necessary. That action was prompted by reports that, during level flight, the Traffic Alert Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) issued false advisories that directed the flightcrew to change course and either climb or descend. Such false advisories, if not corrected, could result in the flightcrew deviating the airplane from its assigned flight path and a possible mid-air collision.
Actions Since Issuance of Previous AD
The compliance time for the initial test of the Mode “C” transponder(s) with single Gillham altitude code input, as required by AD 99-23-22 R1, has passed. Therefore, the FAA assumes that the test has been conducted at least once, and all applicable corrective actions have been accomplished, on all transport category airplanes affected by that AD. The following is a summary of the airplane inspections and test results:
Aircraft Test Results (AD 99-23-22 R1)
Aircraft test results reviewed = 1,142
Aircraft passing tests without corrective action required = 1,055
Aircraft failing tests with corrective action required = 87
Percent of aircraft that failed the AD test = 7.6%
Aircraft Wiring/Avionics Failures
Mode “C” transponder failures = 49
Air Data Computer (ADC) failures = 14
Encoding altimeter failures = 3
Gillham code wiring failures = 1
Miscellaneous wiring failures = 8
Failures sources under review = 12
The results of the transponder tests required by AD 99-23-22 R1 revealed that numerous Mode “C” transponders failed the test, and many of the Mode “C” test failures have been determined to be caused by a particular transponder type. All other test failures reported by operators appear to be random and isolated.
The FAA concludes that continued repetitive tests on the applicable airplane models listed in AD 99-23-22 R1 are unnecessary since the corrective actions have been accomplished on all transport category airplanes identified in that AD.
In addition, the FAA has determined that the repetitive performance of the tests required by AD 99-23-22 R1 may result in increased or accelerated component wear, which could contribute to reports of incorrect airplane altitude.
Future Rulemaking
Over 50 percent of the airplane test failures have been reported by operators to be caused by Mode “C” transponders. The FAA is conducting further reviews to determine whether a systematic root cause failure of that Mode “C” transponder exists. Based on the results of these reviews, the FAA may consider further rulemaking to address potential problems concerning the Mode “C” transponder.
FAA's Determination
Because the results of the tests required by AD 99-23-22 R1 have identified and corrected the causes of the identified unsafe condition, and because repetitive performance of the test may increase or accelerate component wear and contribute to reports of incorrect airplane altitude, the FAA has determined that it is necessary to rescind AD 99-23-22 R1 to prevent operators from performing unnecessary and potentially harmful repetitive tests.
Since this action rescinds a requirement to perform unnecessary actions, it has no adverse economic impact and imposes no additional burden on any person. Therefore, notice and public procedures hereon are unnecessary, and the rescission may be made effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
The Rescission
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
Start PartPART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
End Part Start Amendment Part1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
End Amendment Part[Amended]2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding an airworthiness directive removing amendment 39-11473.
End Amendment Part99-23-22 R2 Transport Category Airplanes: Amendment 39-11686. Docket No. 2000-NM-81-AD. Rescinds AD 99-23-22 R1, Amendment 39-11473.
Applicability: Transport category airplanes, as listed below, certificated in any category, equipped with any Mode “C” transponder with single Gillham code altitude input, including, but not limited to, the transponder part numbers listed below. Whether a Mode “C” transponder has a single Gillham code altitude input may be determined by reviewing the transponder installation instructions.
Airplane Models
Airbus Industrie
A300
A310
British Aerospace
BAe Avro 146-RJ
BAe ATP
Fokker
F28 Mark 0070
F28 Mark 0100 Start Printed Page 21134
F28 Mark 1000-4000
Lockheed
L-1011 TriStar
L-188 Electra
CASA
CN-235
Dassault Aviation
Mystere Falcon 50
Mystere Falcon 900
Mystere Falcon 200
Fan Jet Falcon Series G
Boeing (MDC)
DC-10-30
DC-10-40
DC-9
DC-9-81
DC-9-82
DC-9-83
DC-9-87
Boeing 707
Boeing 727
Boeing 737
Boeing 747
Bombardier
CL-215-1A10
CL-215-6B11
CL-600-1A11
CL-600-2A12
CL-600-2B16
Gulfstream
G1159 (G-II)
G-1159A (G-III)
G-IV
Mode “C” Transponder Part Numbers
Rockwell Collins
622-2224-001
622-2224-003
522-2703-001
522-2703-011
787-6211-001
787-6211-002
Bendix
066-1056-00
066-1056-01
066-1123-00
2041599-6508
Wilcox
97637-201
97637-301
IFF
APX-100
APX-101
This rescission is effective April 20, 2000.
Start SignatureIssued in Renton, Washington, on April 7, 2000.
Donald L. Riggin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 00-9247 Filed 4-19-00; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-U
Document Information
- Effective Date:
- 4/20/2000
- Published:
- 04/20/2000
- Department:
- Federal Aviation Administration
- Entry Type:
- Rule
- Action:
- Final rule; rescission.
- Document Number:
- 00-9247
- Dates:
- April 20, 2000.
- Pages:
- 21133-21134 (2 pages)
- Docket Numbers:
- Docket No. 2000-NM-81-AD, Amendment 39-11686, AD 99-23-22 R2
- RINs:
- 2120-AA64: Airworthiness Directives
- RIN Links:
- https://www.federalregister.gov/regulations/2120-AA64/airworthiness-directives
- PDF File:
- 00-9247.pdf