2015-13497. 36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY:

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.

ACTION:

Notice.

SUMMARY:

The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated July 21, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, [phone].

The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittals 15-17 with attached transmittal, policy justification, and Sensitivity of Technology.

Dated: May 29, 2015.

Aaron Siegel,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

Transmittal No. 15-17

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended

(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia

(ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment *	$1.25 billion
Other	$ .65 billion
Total	$1.90 billion
* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: ten (10) MH-60R multi-mission helicopters with fourteen (14) APS-153(V) Multi-Mode radars (10 installed, 2 spares and 2 for testing); twenty-four T-700 GE 401 C engines (20 installed and 4 spares); twelve (12) APX-123 Identification Friend or Foe transponders (10 installed and 2 spares); fourteen (14) AN/AAS-44C(V) Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems Forward Looking Infrared Radars (10 installed, 2 spares, and 2 for testing); twenty-six (26) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation Systems with Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module (20 installed and 6 spares); Link-16 capability; one-thousand (1,000) AN/SSQ-36/53/62 Sonobuoys; thirty-eight (38) AGM-114R Hellfire II missiles; five (5) AGM-114 M36-E9 Captive Air Training missiles; four (4) AGM-114Q Hellfire Training Missiles; three-hundred eighty (380) Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System rockets; twelve (12) M-240D crew served weapons; and twelve (12) GAU-21 crew served weapons. Also included are spare engine containers; facilities study and design; spare and repair parts; support and test equipment; communication equipment; aerial refueling services; ferry support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

(iv) Military Department: Navy (SBU, GBQ, TCZ) Army (HEW).

(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.

(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.

(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 20 May 2015.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters

The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a sale of ten (10) MH-60R multi-mission helicopters fourteen (14) APS-153(V) Multi-Mode radars (10 installed, 2 spares and 2 for testing); twenty-four T-700 GE 401 C engines (20 installed and 4 spares); twelve (12) APX-123 Identification Friend or Foe transponders (10 installed and 2 spares); fourteen (14) AN/AAS-44C(V) Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems Forward Looking Infrared Radars (10 installed, 2 spares, and 2 for testing); twenty-six (26) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation Systems with Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module (20 installed and 6 spares); and Link-16 capability; one-thousand (1,000) AN/SSQ-36/53/62 Sonobuoys; thirty-eight (38) AGM-114R Hellfire II missiles; five (5) AGM-114 M36-E9 Captive Air Training missiles; four (4) AGM-114Q Hellfire Training Missiles; three-hundred eighty (380) Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System rockets; twelve (12) M-240D crew served weapons; and twelve (12) GAU-21 crew served weapons. Also included are spare engine containers; facilities study and design; spare and repair parts; support and test equipment; communication equipment; aerial refueling services; ferry support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated cost is $1.9 billion.

This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic regional partner, which has been, and continues to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East.

The proposed sale will improve Saudi Arabia's capability to meet current and future threats from enemy weapon systems. The MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter will provide the capability to identify, engage, and defeat maritime security threats along with the ability to perform secondary missions including vertical replenishment, search and rescue, and communications relay. Saudi Arabia will use the enhanced capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its homeland defense.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in Stratford, Connecticut; and Lockheed Martin Corporation in Owego, New York. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of additional U.S. Government and/or contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

Transmittal No. 15-17

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended

Annex—Item No. vii

(vii) Sensitivity of Technology

1. The MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter focuses primarily on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare missions. The MH-60R carries several sensors and data links to enhance its ability to work in a network centric battle group and as an extension of its home ship/main operating base. The mission equipment subsystem consists of the following sensors and subsystems: An acoustics systems consisting of a dipping sonar and sonobuoys, Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) with integral Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) interrogator, Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Integrated Self-Defense (ISD), and Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS). The aircraft processes sensor data onboard, and transmits data via Common Data Link (CDL) (also referred to as Hawklink), or Link-16. It can carry AGM-114A/B/K/R Hellfire missiles, as well as Mk 46 or Mk 54 torpedoes to engage surface and sub-surface targets. The Saudi MH-60R platform will include provisions for both the Mk 46 and the Mk 54 light weight torpedo. The MH-60R weapons system is classified up to Secret. Unless otherwise noted below, MH-60R hardware and support equipment, test equipment and maintenance spares are unclassified except when electrical power is applied to hardware containing volatile data storage. Technical data and documentation for MH-60R weapons systems (to include sub-systems and weapons listed below) are classified up to Secret. The sensitive technologies include:

a. The AGM-114R HELLFIRE missile is an air-to-surface missile with a multi-mission, multi-target, precision strike capability. The HELLLFIRE can be launched from multiple air platforms and is the primary precision weapon for the United States Army. The highest level for release of the AGM-114R HELLFIRE II is Secret, based upon the software. The highest level of classified information that could be disclosed by a proposed sale or by testing of the end item is Secret; the highest level that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or training is Confidential. Reverse engineering could reveal Confidential information. Vulnerability data, countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and threat definitions are classified Secret or Confidential.

b. Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS) laser guided rocket to counter the fast attack craft and fast inshore attack craft threat. APKWS hardware is Unclassified.

c. Communications security devices contain sensitive encryption algorithms and keying material. The purchasing country has previously been released and utilizes COMSEC devices in accordance with set procedures and without issue. COMSEC devices will be classified up to Secret when keys are loaded.

d. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) (KIV-77) contains embedded security devices containing sensitive encryption algorithms and keying material. The purchasing country will utilize COMSEC devices in accordance with set procedures. The AN/APX-123 is classified up to Secret.

e. GPS/PPS/SAASM—Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a space-based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) that has reliable location and time information in all weather and at all times and anywhere on or near the Earth when and where there is an unobstructed line of sight to four or more GPS satellites. Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) (AN/PSN-11) is used by military GPS receivers to allow decryption of precision GPS coordinates. In addition, the GPS Antenna System (GAS-1) provides protection from enemy manipulation of the GPS system. The GPS hardware is Unclassified. When electrical power is applied, the system is classified up to Secret.

f. Ku-Band CDL (AN/ARQ-59; also referred to as Hawklink) and Link-16 capability to enable network centric capabilities, and improve data communications leading to a Common Operating Picture (COP). Link-16 implementation will be consistent with capabilities already in operation with Saudi Arabian defense forces. CDL implementation will utilize commercial encryption. The AN/ARQ-59 hardware is unclassified when COMSEC module is not loaded with a key, when a key is loaded it is classified up to Secret. The Link-16 hardware is Unclassified. When electrical power is applied it is classified up to Secret.

g. Acoustics algorithms are used to process dipping sonar and sonobuoy data for target tracking and for the Acoustics Mission Planner (AMP), which is a tactical aid employed to optimize the deployment of sonobuoys and the dipping sonar. Acoustics hardware is Unclassified. The acoustics system is classified up to Secret when environmental and threat databases are loaded and/or the system is processing acoustic data.

h. The AN/APS-153 multi-mode radar with an integrated IFF and Inverse Synthetic Aperture (ISAR) provides target surveillance/detection capability. The AN/APS-153 hardware is unclassified. When electrical power is applied and mission data loaded, the AN/APS-153 is classified up to Secret.

i. The AN/ALQ-210 (ESM) system identifies the location of an emitter. The ability of the system to identify specific emitters depends on the data provided by Saudi Arabia. The AN/ALQ-210 hardware is Unclassified. When electrical power is applied and mission data loaded, the AN/ALQ-210 system is classified up to Secret.

j. The AN/AAS-44C(V) Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) uses the Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS) that allows it to operate in day/night and adverse weather conditions. Imagery is provided by an Infrared sensor, a color/monochrome DTV, and a Low-Light TV. The AN/AAS-44C(V) hardware is Unclassified. When electrical power is applied, the AN/AAS-44C(V) is classified up to Secret.

k. Ultra High Frequency/Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) Radios (ARC 210) contain embedded sensitive encryption algorithms and keying material. The purchasing country will utilize COMSEC devices in accordance with set procedures. The ARC-210 hardware is Unclassified. When electrical power is applied and mission data loaded, the ARC-210 is classified up to Secret.

l. Satellite Communications Demand Assigned Multiple Access (SATCOM DAMA) and Single Channel Ground to Air Radio Systems (SINCGARS), which provide increased, interoperable communications capabilities with US forces. SATCOM DAMA and SINCGARS hardware is Unclassified. When electrical power is applied and mission data loaded these systems are classified up to Secret.

2. All the mission data, including sensitive parameters, is loaded from an off board station before each flight and does not stay with the aircraft after electrical power has been removed. Sensitive technologies are protected as defined in the program protection and anti-tamper plans. The mission data and off board station are classified up to Secret.

3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities.

4. A determination has been made that the recipient country can provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.

5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to Saudi Arabia.