[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 213 (Friday, November 3, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 55904-55931]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-27185]
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_______________________________________________________________________
Part III
Department of Transportation
_______________________________________________________________________
Coast Guard
_______________________________________________________________________
33 CFR Part 157
46 CFR Parts 31 and 35
Operational Measures To Reduce Oil Spills From Existing Tank Vessels
Without Double Hulls; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 213 / Friday, November 3, 1995 /
Proposed Rules
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 157
46 CFR Parts 31 and 35
[CGD 91-045]
RIN 2115-AE01
Operational Measures To Reduce Oil Spills From Existing Tank
Vessels Without Double Hulls
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.
ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: The Coast Guard proposes regulations that would require the
owners, masters, or operators of tank vessels of 5,000 gross tons (GT)
or more that do not have double hulls and that carry oil in bulk as
cargo to comply with certain operational measures. The proposed
regulations contain requirements for bridge resource management
training, rest hour minimums, enhanced surveys, maneuvering performance
capability requirements, and other measures aimed at reducing the
likelihood of an oil discharge from these vessels. Additionally, the
Coast Guard proposes to amend requirements for the carriage of onboard
emergency lightering equipment. These proposed regulations represent
the second step in the Coast Guard's three-step effort to establish
structural and operational measures for tank vessels without double
hulls as required by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).
DATES: Comments must be received on or before February 1, 1996.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to the Executive Secretary, Marine
Safety Council (G-LRA/3406) (CGD 91-045), U.S. Coast Guard
Headquarters, 2100 Second Street SW., Washington, DC 20593-0001, or may
be delivered to room 3406 at the same address between 8 a.m. and 3
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The telephone
number is (202) 267-1477. Comments on collection-of-information
requirements must be mailed also to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street
NW., Washington DC 20503, ATTN: Desk Officer, U.S. Coast Guard.
The Executive Secretary maintains the public docket for this
rulemaking. Comments will become part of this docket and will be
available for inspection or copying at room 3406, U.S. Coast Guard
Headquarters, between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
A copy of the material listed in ``Incorporation by Reference'' of
this preamble and references for this preamble are available for
inspection at room 1312, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters and have also
been included in the public docket.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
LCDR Suzanne Englebert, Project Manager, Standards Evaluation and
Development Division, at (202) 267-6490. This number is equipped to
record messages on a 24-hour basis.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Request for Comments
The Coast Guard encourages interested persons to participate in
this rulemaking by submitting written data, views, or arguments.
Persons submitting comments should include their names and addresses,
identify this rulemaking (CGD 91-045) and the specific section of this
proposal to which each comment applies, and give the reason for each
comment. Please submit two copies of all comments and attachments in an
unbound format, no larger than 8\1/2\ by 11 inches, suitable for
copying and electronic filing. Persons wanting acknowledgment of
receipt of comments should enclose stamped, self-addressed postcards or
envelopes.
The Coast Guard will consider all comments received during the
comment period. It may change this proposal in view of the comments.
On January 20, 1994, the Coast Guard held a public meeting on
structural and operational measures for tank vessels. The Coast Guard
plans no additional public meetings. Persons may request a public
meeting by writing to the Marine Safety Council at the address under
ADDRESSES. The request should include the reasons why a meeting would
be beneficial. If it determines that an additional opportunity for oral
presentations will aid this rulemaking, the Coast Guard will hold a
public meeting at a time and place announced by a later notice in the
Federal Register.
Drafting Information. The principal persons involved in drafting
this document are LCDR Suzanne Englebert, Project Manager, and
Jacqueline Sullivan, Project Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel.
Regulatory History
Section 4115(b) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (which
appears as a statutory note following 46 U.S.C. 3703a) directs the
Coast Guard to develop structural or operational requirements for tank
vessels of 5,000 gross tons or more without double hulls to serve as
regulations until 2015, when all tank vessels operating in U.S. waters
are required to have double hulls under section 4115(a) of OPA 90 (46
U.S.C. 3703a). Regulations issued under the authority of section
4115(b) must provide as substantial protection to the environment as is
economically and technologically feasible.
On November 1, 1991, the Coast Guard published an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) (56 FR 56284) which discussed structural
and operational measures intended to meet the requirements of section
4115(b) of OPA 90. The ANPRM included a request for data on the
technical and economic feasibility of those measures for use on vessels
covered by section 4115(b). Eighty-eight comments were received by the
close of the extended comment period, which ended on January 30, 1992
(57 FR 1243).
After reviewing the comments, the Coast Guard published a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) entitled ``Structural and Operational
Measures to Reduce Oil Spills from Existing Tank Vessels Without Double
Hulls'' (Existing Vessels) on October 22, 1993 (58 FR 54870). The Coast
Guard issued two subsequent correction notices on November 19, 1993 (58
FR 61143), and December 14, 1993 (58 FR 65298), which made technical
corrections to the NPRM. In response to several comments received on
the NPRM, the Coast Guard published on December 16, 1993, a notice of
public meeting and extension of comment period (58 FR 65683).
The Coast Guard held a public meeting on January 20, 1994, to
obtain information from the public on the proposed regulations. Topics
addressed by speakers included applicability, differences between tank
barges and tankships, exemptions, and economic and technical
feasibility of the proposed regulations. Some of the basic assumptions
of the proposed regulations related to certain structural measures were
also discussed, particularly their reliance on Regulation 13G of Annex
I of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78).
Information on the public meeting is available for public review at the
address under ADDRESSES.
In light of the comments received at the public meeting and in
response to the written comments received on the NPRM, the Coast Guard
is reviewing the proposed requirements for structural measures. To
expedite the implementation of section 4115(b) of OPA 90, the Coast
Guard developed a three-pronged approach which
[[Page 55905]]
encompassed three separate rulemaking projects. First, the Coast Guard
issued a final rule on August 5, 1994, requiring the carriage of
emergency lightering equipment and the inclusion of the vessel's
International Maritime Organization (IMO) number in the advance notice
of arrival report (59 FR 40186); second, it is issuing this
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) regarding additional
operational measures; and third, it is reviewing comments on the NPRM
for major structural measures and revising the Regulatory Assessment
(RA) before issuing an SNPRM regarding structural requirements for tank
vessels. Structural measures that will be addressed in this third step
include hydrostatic loading requirements, structural refit of existing
hull areas, emergency cargo off-loading capabilities and other
structural adaptations or major cargo carrying adjustments.
Background and Purpose
Section 4115 of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) (Pub. L.
101-380) mandates regulations to provide improved protection from oil
spills from tank vessels in waters subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States due to collisions and groundings. This section applies to
tank vessels that are constructed or adapted to carry, or that carry
oil in bulk as cargo or cargo residue.
The Coast Guard has determined that the applicability of these
proposed regulations would reflect section 4115(a) of OPA 90 which
requires certain existing tank vessels without double hulls to be
phased out of operation by 2015. The Coast Guard rulemaking
implementing section 4115(a) entitled ``Double Hull Standards for
Vessels Carrying Oil in Bulk'' (CGD 90-051) (57 FR 36222) added 33 CFR
157.10(d), which establishes the applicability of the regulations. The
regulations also apply to certain tank vessels carrying oil in bulk as
cargo operating in U.S. waters, including vessels unloading oil as
cargo at deepwater ports, lightering in established lightering zones,
or lightering more than 60 miles from the territorial sea baseline;
they also apply to non-dedicated oil spill response vessels (OSRVs).
The Navigation and Inspection Circular (NVIC) 10-94, ``Guidance for
Determination and Documentation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA
90) Phaseout Schedule for Existing Single Hull Vessel Carrying Oil in
Bulk,'' provides a detailed explanation of the applicability of section
4115(a).
In the preamble to the Existing Tank Vessels NPRM, the Coast Guard
proposed to limit the applicability of the rule to ``oil tankers'' as
defined in 33 CFR 157.03(oo) rather than tank vessels as defined in 33
CFR 157.03(v). The NPRM specifically excluded vessels carrying only
animal fats and vegetable oils because the proposed structural
requirements were believed to be too costly for vessels carrying only
non-petroleum oils. Additionally, the exemption was proposed in an
effort to be consistent with the international standards of MARPOL 73/
78, which also establishes structural measures for certain existing
vessels. The Coast Guard has determined that the operational
requirements proposed in this SNPRM would be applied to all existing
tank vessels, including vessels which carry only non-petroleum oils.
The Coast Guard has long contended that a discharge of non-petroleum
oils can be as damaging to the environment as a discharge of petroleum
oil, especially if spilled in bulk. In 1992, an IMO study entitled
``Harmful Effects on Birds of Floating Lipophilic Substances Discharge
from Ships On the Plumage of Birds'' was published by the Netherlands
Institute for Sea Research. This study gives numerous examples of
lethal contamination of seabirds by certain non-petroleum oils spilled
from ships. This study is available for public inspection at the
address under ADDRESSES. The Coast Guard also researched the number of
tank vessels potentially affected by this proposal and found no tank
vessels which are certificated to carry only non-petroleum oils. The
Coast Guard requests comments on the impact of this proposed rulemaking
on vessels that carry only non-petroleum oils. Comments on the impact
of the proposed rulemaking on areas that could be adversely affected by
a non-petroleum spill are also requested.
The Coast Guard proposes to revise the applicability of
Sec. 157.400 of the Existing Tank Vessels final rule issued on August
5, 1994 (59 FR 40186), which requires oil tankers to carry emergency
lightering equipment and report the vessel's IMO number in the advance
notice of arrival report. The SNPRM proposes to apply the lightering
equipment requirement to all tank vessels. A separate rulemaking
proposes to change the reporting requirements of a vessel's IMO number
to include vessels 300 gross tons (GT) or more.
To clarify how each of these regulations, both existing and
proposed, apply to foreign flag vessels, the Coast Guard proposes to
amend the applicability section of 33 CFR part 157. The proposed change
would ensure that, to be consistent with international law, the
regulations do not apply to foreign flag vessels in innocent passage in
U.S. navigable waters, including the territorial sea of the United
States, or while operating in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) unless
they are engaging in lightering operations or off-loading oil in bulk
at a deepwater port.
This proposal would also require a barge owner to assume additional
responsibility for the actions of the towing vessel. Barge operations
for loading cargo are generally handled by company representatives or
facility personnel. However, navigational control of the tank barge has
historically been the responsibility of the towing vessel. Although
section 4115(b) of OPA 90 did not specifically recognize the towing
vessel's shared role in tank barge operations, the towing vessel's role
in the navigation and control of the tank barge must be addressed to
reduce accident risk from tank barges. The proposed regulations require
the tank barge owner or operator to ensure the towing vessel meets
certain standards comparable to those proposed for tankships.
This additional level of control should have a minimal effect on
tank barge companies because most tank barge owners or operators also
own the towing vessels and employ their crews. For those tank barge
companies that rely on leased towing vessels to move their tank barges,
these proposed requirements could result in some additional contractual
arrangements, additional oversight of the towing vessel companies, or
hiring criteria that incorporate these requirements. These measures
would ensure that tank barge owners exercise direct control over the
manner in which their cargo is transported. This direct oversight is
prudent for tank barge owners because in most cases, under section 1002
of OPA 90, tank barge owners are held financially responsible for any
removal costs and damages for discharged oil. The Coast Guard is
soliciting comments on the extension of certain towing vessel
requirements to the tank barge industry.
Discussion of Comments and Changes
Background information on proposals for structural measures for
existing vessels without double hulls is provided in the preambles to
the ANPRM and the NPRM. Operational measures were discussed in both the
ANPRM and the NPRM; however, the NPRM focused on measures to reduce oil
outflow after collisions and groundings, not on the mishap risk
reduction for these vessels.
[[Page 55906]]
The Coast Guard has issued many requirements that could be
considered operational in nature. Other regulations mandated by OPA 90
affect the marine industry, especially the tank vessel fleet. To
address the most common hazardous operational deficiencies on tank
vessels today, the Coast Guard has conducted a qualitative evaluation
of the tank vessel operating system. Previous studies of this type
include (1) ``Research Needs to Reduce Maritime Collisions, Rammings,
and Groundings'' by the Maritime Transportation Research Board (1981);
(2) ``Development and Assessment of Measures to Reduce Accidental Oil
Outflow from Tank Ships'' by the Coast Guard (May 1989); and (3)
``Human Error in Merchant Marine Safety'' by the Maritime
Transportation Research Board (1976). These studies along with other
risk analysis literature formed the baseline for the ``fault trees''
depicted in the following figures:
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Figure 1 shows how a qualitative evaluation of a marine system can
identify effective improvements for existing or proposed regulations.
Figure 2 identifies the general pollution hazard created by tank
vessels. The scope of this analysis was further narrowed to those areas
where a tank vessel without a double hull may pose a higher risk than
other vessels or to areas where inconsistencies exist between
requirements for U.S. domestic vessels and foreign certificated
vessels. The Coast Guard developed detailed qualitative models for
structural and fire or explosion accidents because the majority of the
existing tank vessel fleet is older and not required to conform to many
of the recent safety regulations. Collisions, allisions, and groundings
were considered because of the oil spill potential of these incidents.
The operational spill segment of the fault tree in Figure 2 and the
terminal operations portion are only included in this analysis in areas
where present regulations do not hold U.S. and foreign vessels to
comparable standards. Figures 3 through 6 display the detailed
qualitative models and associated high risk components within each
identified hazard.
This type of analysis contains a subjective element. The Coast
Guard has drawn from the knowledge of its experienced inspectors and
licensed mariners to develop the fault trees identified in Figures 3-6.
These fault trees are not meant to be comprehensive, instead they are
used to clarify further discussion within this proposed regulation by
identifying major operational causes of oil discharges and the measures
that could potentially mitigate these causes from a tank vessel without
a double hull.
As an example of this process, 33 CFR 164.35(g) requires all ships
of 1,600 GT or more to post a list in the wheelhouse which identifies
the vessel's general maneuvering characteristics. This requirement
mitigates problems arising from ``lack of knowledge'' which may cause a
collision, allision, or grounding as identified in Figure 5. In
analyzing this requirement's effectiveness to mitigate this ``lack of
knowledge'' component, it becomes clear that the requirement may not be
as effective as it could be. A discussion of this issue can be found in
a recent ``Marine Technology'' paper entitled ``Maneuvering Information
for the Pilot/Navigator: Its Source Value and Limitations,'' written by
Mr. Thomas G. Knierim (Vol 31, No. 2, April 1994, pp. 123-144).
The Coast Guard received a total of 132 comments on the Existing
Vessel NPRM. Thirty of these comments discussed over 70 issues relating
to operational measures. The following discussion is divided into seven
categories: (1) General comments which address broad issues and the
general content of the NPRM; (2) comments on proposed revisions to
emergency lightering equipment requirements in 33 CFR 157.410; (3)
comments on personnel training and information (see the fault-tree
components of Figures 5 and 6 which address failure to perform a task,
failure to correctly perform a task, and lack of knowledge or
training); (4) comments on vessel maintenance surveys (see the
components of Figures 3 through 6 for equipment failure, hull
structural failure, or failure due to explosion); (5) comments on
navigation and maneuverability (see the components of Figures 5 and 6
involving a lack of knowledge, training, or the use of incorrect
information); (6) comments on requirements for the control and movement
of tank barges (see the components of Figure 6 related to towing vessel
operations and equipment); (7) comments on operational measures that
are not addressed elsewhere in this SNPRM.
1. General
Several comments expressed concern that the proposed regulations do
not reflect congressional intent. The comments stated that the NPRM
improperly emphasized structural measures without adequate regard for
operational measures which could have an equal or greater benefit for
the environment at less cost. They also stated that the failure to
assess significant regulatory alternatives violates the statutory
mandate of OPA 90 and the requirements of Executive Order 12866. This
SNPRM proposes operational measures that meet both the statutory
mandate of OPA 90 and the mandate of the Executive Order.
Some of the comments stated that the requirements proposed in the
NPRM would not satisfy the statutory mandate to provide ``as
substantial protection to the environment as is economically and
technologically feasible'' as required by section 4115(b) of OPA 90.
One comment stated that operational measures would do more to protect
the environment because 80 percent of all oil pollution is caused by
human error, not by structural malfunctions. Several comments indicated
that the operational measures could be implemented more quickly than
structural measures. Many comments stressed the need for operational
measures to prevent collisions or groundings, rather than structural
requirements to reduce oil outflow after a vessel collision or
grounding.
This SNPRM proposes operational measures for both foreign and U.S.
vessels that should improve the overall quality of tank vessel
operations. Rulemakings complementing this effort propose navigation
equipment for towing vessels and towing vessel operating license
changes.
One comment suggested that vessel owners should be able to choose
from a list of measures that, when used together, would equal a
specified level of protection. This would require that each operational
measure be assigned a credit based upon additional prevention or
decreased oil outflow.
The Coast Guard considered various ways of allotting credits and
developing a minimum level of protection. This concept did not address
the different objectives of each proposed requirement. For example, how
could a requirement for the pilot to plan a passage, intended to reduce
the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding (Figure 5), be
quantified in relation to a maintenance program intended to reduce the
risk of a structural failure (Figure 3)? Blurring the lines between
failure modes and risk components would not achieve equitable risk
reduction among affected tank vessels. An ``a la carte'' idea was also
researched to compare each failure mode with a list of possible risk
reduction measures. Equivalencies between each measure could not be
determined because, even among the components, an accurate quantitative
assessment method was not available.
Instead, the Coast Guard evaluated these operational measures in
terms of the failure mode which they address, whether vessel personnel,
navigation, or maintenance practices. The Coast Guard is proposing
minimum training requirements to address vessel personnel, information
requirements and minimum equipment and tests to address navigation and
maneuvering problems, and survey and physical prevention measures to
address the integrity of the vessel's structure. Where the same risk
component is addressed, within each measure, some equivalency
determinations are provided to allow individual companies or vessels to
tailor requirements to their operational needs. The proposed measures
consider both the technical and economical feasibility mandates of the
statute.
Other comments recommended that the Coast Guard strictly enforce
its current pollution prevention regulations. The Coast Guard enforces
the requirements of both international and domestic law. Additional
[[Page 55913]]
enforcement measures have been established and implemented that include
the increased scrutiny of certain vessels that consistently violate
laws or have a history of casualties. Until the effectiveness of these
recent enforcement measures has been assessed, the Coast Guard does not
intend to propose additional measures.
One comment requested that Canadian or other foreign flag vessels
passing through the St. Lawrence Seaway in route to a Canadian port be
exempt from these proposals. The comment estimated that the true cost
of the proposals would be four to five times those quoted by the Coast
Guard. Another comment requested that tankers calling at deepwater
ports, where there are already various operational measures in effect,
be exempted. One comment requested exemption for vessels which lighter
60 miles offshore and for those that call at the Louisiana. Offshore
Oil Port (LOOP) because section 3703a of title 46 of the United States
Code does not apply to them. As previously discussed, these vessels do
have phaseout requirements and are subject to the provisions in section
4115(b). The Coast Guard has determined that the proposed operational
measures are appropriate and do not conflict with St. Lawrence Seaway
or LOOP operations.
One company requested that asphalt carriers be exempted from the
proposed rule; the Coast Guard does not agree. Asphalt is a petroleum-
based cargo and the requirements contained in this portion of the
rulemaking present no unique difficulties for an asphalt carrier.
Two comments requested that vessels transporting oil to American
Samoa be exempted because of the remoteness of the islands and the
fragility of the economy. Both comments stated that vessels calling
there satisfy international requirements and will have no incentive to
incur the additional cost these rules would impose. One of these
comments contended that if this regulation were applied to these
vessels, the supply of crude oil and petroleum products to American
Samoa would be in jeopardy and the cost of fuel would rise. The other
comment specifically requested that vessels transporting oil to the
Pacific Islands be exempt from the requirements of the proposed rule
that exceed the requirements of Regulation 13G of MARPOL 73/78. This
would include the Hawaiian Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the
commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and other U.S.
possessions in the Western Pacific. The comment stated that the small
number of foreign tanker operators willing to comply with the
regulation, coupled with the limited U.S. flag product tanker fleet,
will severely limit the supply of essential petroleum products to the
Pacific Islands.
The Coast Guard believes that the operational requirements
contained in this rulemaking are economically feasible for vessels
transporting oil to all of these areas. Equivalency provisions offer
flexibility in compliance with certain requirements. Incorporated
international standards accommodate both the foreign and domestic
industry. The Coast Guard requests comments on the impact of this
proposed rulemaking on vessels transporting oil to specific remote
geographic areas like American Samoa and other Pacific Islands.
Comments on the impact of the proposed rulemaking on areas that are
economically dependent on tourism or fishing are also requested.
2. Emergency Lightering Requirements
The Coast Guard is proposing revisions to requirements for
emergency lightering equipment published in a final rule on August 5,
1994, (59 FR 40186) entitled ``Emergency Ligthering Equipment and
Advanced Notice of Arrival Requirements for Existing Tank Vessels
Without Double Hulls.'' Section 157.410(c) of the final rule referenced
the requirements of 46 CFR part 56.25 for cast iron and malleable iron
fittings and flanges. Cast iron and malleable iron have very high
failure rates in cargo piping systems due to their low cycle fatigue
susceptibility and tendency to weaken when subjected to high
temperatures. To ensure that these fittings are not installed in piping
lines carrying flammable or combustible fluids near open flame, or any
parts reaching temperatures above 260 deg.C (500 deg.F), this SNPRM
proposes to amend Sec. 157.410(c) to specifically prohibit the use of
such valves or fittings.
3. Personnel Training and Information
Data attributes 80 percent of marine accidents to some form of
human error. Human factors are broadly defined as a scientific and
engineering discipline concerned with analysis, research, design
development, and evaluation of human/human, human/machine, human/
information and human/environment interfaces. Human factors issues
include any condition or circumstance which affects the quality of
human performance required to accomplish a complex task or series of
tasks safely and effectively. As related to vessel navigation, this
applies to four general subjects: error trapping or human intervention,
task or mission coordination, team communication, and vessel
integration. Error trapping or human intervention is responsible for
``near misses'' as discussed in the report entitled ``The Role of Human
Error in Design, Construction, and Reliability of Marine Structures''
published by the Ship Structure Committee (SSC-378, November 1994).
Error trapping occurs when humans intervene to interrupt potentially
catastrophic combinations of actions and events to bring systems back
to within safe operating conditions. This SNPRM emphasizes human
factors issues which would reduce the risk of accidents caused by ship
personnel: failing to perform tasks, incorrectly performing tasks,
lacking knowledge or training to perform assigned tasks, using
incomplete or incorrect information, and failing to identify or correct
social or managerial problems.
Because the prevention of accidents through improving the people
involved in the system is an effective way to reduce risk within the
marine industry, the Coast Guard established a task group on January
13, 1995 (60 FR 3289), formed by the Chief, Office of Marine Safety,
Security and Environmental Protection to develop a long-term strategy
to focus prevention efforts on casualties caused by human error. The
Coast Guard's Prevention Through People (PTP) initiative has
established a framework by which the Coast Guard, other government
agencies, and the maritime industry, nationally and internationally,
can work together outside of the regulatory process to manage maritime
risks systematically. The task force report entitled ``Prevention
Through People'' stresses the use of risk management tools to identify
root causes and cost effective preventive measures; the employment of
proactive action to detect, assess, and prevent human errors that
affect safety; and improvement of investigative methods, data
collection, analyses, and feedback. This report is available for public
inspection at the address under ADDRESSES.
Training. The Coast Guard received several comments on improving
personnel training. Six comments stated that additional personnel
training was needed to ensure the competency of the crew. One of these
comments urged the Coast Guard to require specific in-house training.
Another of these comments suggested that drug and alcohol testing and
awareness training be required.
Proposed Secs. 157.415 and 157.420 include training requirements
and performance standards to ensure the development and retention of
certain skills. Drug and alcohol testing program requirements already
exist and are applicable to the crews of tank vessels. For this SNPRM,
existing drug and
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alcohol requirements were considered. The Coast Guard has determined
that additional requirements are not needed for drug and alcohol
testing or awareness training at this time. The Coast Guard, however,
commends companies with programs that exceed Federal requirements.
Three comments stated that bridge management training, including
simulator training, would improve the competency of the crew. They
recommended that vessels carry a bridge management manual which
codifies the company's standards, practices, policies, and procedures.
Two different risk reduction solutions were proposed by the
comments. The first solution addressed additional training requirements
for improving crew navigational skills or development of management
skills for the bridge crew. The second solution pertained to developing
extensive operational procedures for various shipboard operations and
navigational situations. Both risk reduction solutions address the lack
of knowledge and the management components noted in Figure 5.
Company management generally develops various operational
procedures in the form of bridge reference material. The crew is then
expected to review the material and refer to it, if time permits, prior
to acting in an emergency or a unique situation. Several sections of
OPA 90 contain extensive planning requirements for emergency situations
(i.e., the Vessel Response Plan requirement in 33 CFR part 155.) In
contrast to these written procedures, recently developed team training
techniques focus on the operation of the bridge team during both normal
and emergency situations. This type of training is an example of
reducing the risk of a marine casualty through improving the response
of the people directly involved with the system.
The Coast Guard has proposed general bridge management training
requirements to the Standards of Training and Watchkeeping (STW)
Subcommittee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) since
1991. However, the STW Subcommittee has not yet developed a training
standard. The Coast Guard consider such training desirable for the
crews of all vessels. This rulemaking may serve as the precedent for
future regulations addressing the reduction of accident risk due to
human error through team management training programs.
The bridge resource management (BRM) training proposed in
Sec. 157.415 of this SNPRM is similar to the techniques and practices
that have been used in the aviation field. BRM is not intended to teach
the more ``traditional'' aspects of bridge watchstanding (i.e.,
navigation, shiphandling, and collision avoidance); rather, it focuses
on integrating ``traditional'' technical skills with human factors
skills to reduce the risk of human error-related accidents. These
concepts reflect an emphasis on effective communication among
watchstanders; the proper delegation of tasks and responsibilities; the
importance of using all available resources (equipment, information,
and personnel); and the need for watchstanders to understand the way
stress and fatigue affect their performance.
The Coast Guard seeks uniform curriculum requirements for both U.S.
and foreign licensed officers, and is presently working within IMO to
develop these requirements. If IMO develops and adopts a resolution or
other instrument that includes BRM skills and course curriculum, the
Coast Guard intends to substitute, incorporate by reference or propose
rules which reflect these international standards. In the interim, a
general course curriculum was developed based on review of various
existing courses used to train pilots, masters, mates, and military
personnel. The Coast Guard proposes this general curriculum to ensure
that the training courses emphasize open team communications, task
coordination, and the integration of operations. Specific course length
and a requirement for simulator training have not been included. The
following references were used to develop the general course curriculum
proposed in this rulemaking:
(1) IMO Guidelines ``Human Relationships, 1.21'' and ``Ship
Simulator and Bridge Teamwork, 1.22'';
(2) American Petroleum Institute's ``Guidelines for Developing
Bridge Management Teams'';
(3) U.S. proposal papers for both the Standards, Training and
Watchkeeping Subcommittee (STW 25/3/14, STW 26/4/13) and the Safety of
Navigation Subcommittee (NAV 38/13);
(4) Presentation on ``Bridge Resource Management'' by Mr. Richard
T. Johnson, et al. (Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers
Panel 0-44), to the International Conference on Marine Simulation and
Ship Manoeuvrability (MARSIM 93), Saint John, Newfoundland, Canada,
September 1993;
(5) SAS Flight Academy's course curriculum for its ``Bridge
Resource Management'' course;
(6) ARCO Marine's Bridge Team Management Training course curriculum
utilizing SimShip and the Star 360 deg. simulator; and
(7) The Coast Guard's student handbook for its course on ``Team
Coordination Training.''
The training proposed in Sec. 157.415 would be required for
designated officers in charge of a navigational watch serving on either
tankships and towing vessels. The Towing Safety Advisory Committee
(TSAC) recommended that this type of training be required for towing
vessel personnel as well as tankship personnel because it is an
effective means of preventing accidents. Thus, an example of the
personnel affected by Sec. 157.415 would be the master, chief mate, one
second mate, and the two third mates (a typical tankship officer
complement) or the master and two mates (a towing vessel's officer
complement). These individuals would be required to attend the initial
BRM training and refresher training no less than once every 5 years.
Initial course completion including a series of performance standards
and course completion documentation is proposed in Sec. 157.415 to
verify that a vessel's officers have been adequately trained. The 5-
year refresher training would coincide with present license renewal
requirements. For U.S. licensed individuals, a rulemaking to propose
requirements for this training and provisions for an endorsement
directly onto the license is under development.
The Coast Guard recognizes that vessel owners, masters, or
operators would be required to research course availability and to
establish training programs to comply with the proposed bridge resource
management training requirements. Therefore, in Sec. 157.415(a) the
Coast Guard is proposing that compliance with these requirements would
not be required until 1 year after the effective date of the final
rule. In addition, the Coast Guard recognizes that a substantial pool
of merchant mariners already have received comparable BRM training and
is proposing that these individuals be credited for the completion of
this training if it has occurred within 3 years of the effective date
of the final rule.
A more aggressive measure to address the entire crew and their
interaction with the vessel operations is ``Vessel Resource
Management'' training. This training course would apply to engine room
personnel as well as other personnel assigned to the vessel. The
integration of support services, bridge functions, engine room
functions, maintenance, and communications with facilities or company
management would be covered by this training. The Coast Guard
recognizes the value of this
[[Page 55915]]
training and solicits comments on whether this type of comprehensive
training should be required or recommended.
Training of unlicensed watchstanding personnel is also imperative.
The Coast Guard is proposing vessel specific watch training for those
watchstanding personnel who assist the officer in charge of a
navigational watch. TSAC also recommended that this training
requirement be applied to towing vessel personnel. This training would
ensure that unlicensed watchstanders receive training tailored to
management expectations and the equipment on board either the tankship
or the primary towing vessel, prior to taking on watchstanding duties.
General subjects for training are listed in Sec. 157.420(a) to ensure
watchstanders receive instruction on essential items that would enable
them to provide accurate and useful information to the officer in
charge of a navigational watch or other senior personnel. To ensure
this training remains current and to account for personnel changes or
equipment upgrades, an annual refresher of this watchstanding training
is proposed.
The Coast Guard has included a proposed definition for the term
``officer in charge of a navigational watch'' to clarify which
personnel would be required to complete the bridge resource management
training. This term would also provide consistency with the terminology
of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW). The proposed definitions
for ``primary towing vessel'' and for ``fleeting or assist towing
vessel'' would clarify that personnel on the towing vessel responsible
for the navigation and control of the tank barge during most of the
voyage would be required to have bridge resource management training,
vessel specific watch training, and certain other requirements proposed
in this rulemaking. This distinction is made because (1) during assist
towing operations, the towing vessel personnel that made the transit
with the barge (the primary towing vessel) generally stay on site and
direct the mooring or anchoring operation; (2) in most cases, the tank
barge company has management control over the primary towing vessel and
its personnel because they directly own the vessel and employ its crew;
and (3) this would ensure integrated tug barge operations are included
in the rulemaking.
Pilot Licensing Programs. Three comments suggested improvements to
the pilot licensing process. One comment recommended more aggressive
pilot licensing and revocation procedures and the adoption of more
rigorous penalty standards. Another comment recommended a comprehensive
review of mariner licensing standards and more rigorous enforcement of
current regulations such as background checks; one recommended checking
the National Drivers Register (NDR) before issuing a license.
A separate NPRM published on March 13, 1995 (60 FR 13570), proposed
the incorporation of an NDR check prior to issuing a license. A
licensing study is underway and revisions to current requirements are
anticipated. In conjunction with the licensing study, a 1994 National
Research Council Committee on Advances in Navigation and Piloting
report entitled ``Minding the Helm'' (ISBN 0-309-04829-X) discusses and
recommends several actions that could be taken by the Coast Guard to
improve marine navigation and piloting. The Coast Guard is presently
reviewing this report and anticipates future rulemakings to implement
some of the recommendations.
Minimum Rest Hour Requirement. Another component of the accident
hazards, shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6, deals with fatigue. Current work
hour restrictions and rest hour requirements attempt to mitigate the
risk of accidents. The Coast Guard evaluated existing requirements and
proposes to expand the rest hour requirement for both foreign and U.S.
crew members with duties directly related to vessel safety and oil
transfer operations.
Proposed Sec. 157.425 would require the owner, master, or operator
of each tank vessel to ensure crew members involved in navigation,
engineering, or oil transfer operations are provided a minimum of 6
continuous hours of rest within 12 hours prior to departing port or
prior to cargo transfer operations. Because the operation and safe
navigation of the tank barge hinges on the actions of the towing vessel
personnel, tank barge owners would have to ensure that the towing
vessel master or operator, any crew member assigned to helm or lookout
tasks, as well as any personnel assigned tankerman duties for the barge
cargo complied with these requirements. For tank barge companies that
do not directly own the towing vessel or employ its crew, this
requirement could be met by management oversight of the towing vessel
company, a contractual agreement, or by towing vessel hiring practices.
A definition for ``rest hour'' is proposed to be added to
Sec. 157.03. This term is borrowed from STCW. Watchstanding, assigned
clerical duties, assigned painting, maintenance, or housekeeping duties
all fall within a crewman's typical daily work load. A rest hour is
that period during which a crew member has no assigned tasks. A rest
hour, however, does include the time spent on drills or during an
emergency situation. The Coast Guard also recognizes travel to a work
site is not addressed in this proposal. The intention of this proposal
is to ensure that well rested individuals are assigned to tasks that
are important to vessel operations. Travel can have a negative effect
on an individual's alertness; however, some commute time to the job
site is standard for every profession. The Coast Guard is soliciting
comments on when and how travel time should be factored into a rest
hour requirement.
The Coast Guard recognizes the benefit of adequate rest for all
mariners and is working within the IMO framework to establish an
international standard. If IMO develops and adopts a resolution or
other instrument that includes provisions for rest, the Coast Guard
intends to substitute, incorporate by reference, or propose rules which
reflect these international standards. The Coast Guard is also
considering the incorporation of the more stringent work hour and rest
hour requirements found in section 4114 of OPA 90 to include foreign
tankships and other tank vessels. These work hour requirements have
been included in the Designation of Lightering Zones Final Rule
published on August 29, 1995 (60 FR 45006). The Coast Guard is
soliciting comments on the feasibility of expanding application of the
work hour and rest hour restrictions of section 4114 or the adoption of
similar IMO provisions, under the authority of section 4115(b) of OPA
90.
4. Vessel Maintenance Surveys
Figure 3 depicts the qualitative evaluation of a structural failure
hazard to a tank vessel. These types of hazards have been reduced in
the past through drydock examinations, classification society
requirements, and construction requirements such as the welding
qualifications of 46 CFR part 57. The Coast Guard analyzed past
requirements addressing structural failures and equipment failures as
indicated in Figures 5 and 6. More significantly, because these vessels
have been scheduled for a mandatory phase-out, it is suspected that the
human factors issues related to management's reluctance to sufficiently
supply or upkeep the vessel, and the vessel operator's failure to
inspect or test the
[[Page 55916]]
tank vessel equipment may become more frequent. Vessel owners or
operators may begin to weigh the maintenance investment against the
short-lived return and could down-scale vessel upkeep accordingly. The
Coast Guard recognizes this possibility and has evaluated existing
requirements that would ensure vessel structure and equipment remain in
safe operating condition. This analysis indicated that some additional
measures could reduce the risk of a structural or equipment failure,
and the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding due to equipment or
upkeep problems.
The Coast Guard received several comments on improved maintenance
aboard vessels. Three comments suggested that the Coast Guard require
internal audits of vessel operations, equipment, and personnel for
compliance with all applicable regulations and company standards. One
comment recommended preventive maintenance programs on ships; another
suggested formal in-house ship inspection programs.
In Secs. 157.430 and 157.435, the Coast Guard is proposing a two-
step approach to ensuring existing tank vessels are maintained at a
level that will reduce the risk of a structural or equipment failure.
Under this proposal, tankships, integrated tug barges, and tank barges
would be required to (1) have an enhanced survey or an enhanced survey
equivalent, and (2) conduct frequent vital system surveys.
Enhanced Surveys. Proposed Sec. 157.430(a) would require an
enhanced survey for all tank vessels of 5,000 GT or more as detailed in
IMO Resolution A.744(18), entitled ``Guidelines on the Enhanced
Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil
Tankers.'' To prevent the need for additional drydockings, the
requirement would reflect either the frequency of the U.S. scheduled
drydock exam requirements in 46 CFR part 31 or that of a foreign
vessel's flag administration. This requirement already exists under the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
1973 and the related amendment to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78; however, the
U.S. has expanded the scope of this requirement to include tank vessels
of 5,000 GT or more that do not have double hulls. This survey requires
detailed visual inspection as well as specific gauging. This survey
should reduce the risk of both a global and local structural failure by
closely recording and inspecting the hull prior to the vessel's
phaseout date. It would also ensure that a detailed survey of the cargo
piping and hull are available for Coast Guard examination. This would
enable the Coast Guard to affirm that vessel upkeep is adequate for
safe operation.
Alternate Enhanced Surveys. To allow companies flexibility and
credit for existing in-house survey programs, tankships not required to
meet Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 and all tank barges would have the option
of meeting an equivalent standard. This provision is proposed in
Sec. 157.430(b) and would allow companies with established in-house
survey programs to simply upgrade them slightly and include oversight
provisions.
The Coast Guard anticipates that many tank barge owners and small
tankship owners already have preventive maintenance programs that
include routine hull gaugings, pipe gaugings, and inspections beyond
current Coast Guard requirements. These programs provide company
management personnel with material condition documentation necessary
for long-range company planning of vessel replacement or overhaul
scheduling. Proposed Sec. 157.430(b) would permit the company to follow
its own program rather than start an entirely new process if the
company can document that the present survey process is comparable in
scope and recordkeeping to the IMO requirements. In addition, this
section would require oversight of these programs to ensure that the
vessel is adequately surveyed until it is phased out of service. Review
of the gauging and inspection analysis would provide clear assessment
of the vessel's structural soundness. The enhanced survey or preventive
maintenance program reports would be required to be retained on board
or made available within 24 hours to enable Coast Guard personnel to
readily assess the vessel's suitability for service and also to assist
in any emergency cargo transfer operations or emergency repairs.
Vital Systems Surveys. While an enhanced survey reduces the risk of
both catastrophic and local hull failure, it does not directly address
risk of equipment failure or the risk of a fire or an explosion.
Figures 3 through 6 indicate certain mechanical or equipment failures
which may contribute to or cause these types of accidents. The Coast
Guard researched the present inspection and regulatory requirements in
effect for each system. Many of these systems are inspected annually by
either flag or port administrations. However, while 33 CFR 164.25
requires some tests and inspections, it does not detail some of the
systems unique to tank vessels. While most companies already have
routine equipment maintenance and inspection programs, several systems
are overlooked or not included in these programs.
In Sec. 157.435, the Coast Guard is proposing more frequent surveys
of systems deemed vital to the safe transfer of cargo, fire and
explosion risk reduction, and maintaining navigational control. To
ensure these systems get the maintenance they need to remain safe,
these inspections would be conducted by vessel personnel, company
personnel, or company designated representatives that are knowledgeable
of the equipment's safe operating parameters and that have the
authority, capability, and responsibility to initiate corrective action
when equipment is not functioning properly. Because tank barge systems
require similar vigilance to ensure they remain safe, tank barge
owners, masters, or operators would be included in this requirement and
would have a responsibility to ensure the barge systems outlined in
proposed Sec. 157.435 are surveyed by the appropriate personnel.
Those systems related to vessel control, such as steering and
navigational equipment, are presently required to be tested and
inspected as specified in 33 CFR part 164 if the vessel is 1,600 GT or
more. For towing vessels, the Coast Guard recently proposed similar
control and navigational equipment checks. However, the inspection of
the emergency towing equipment required in the IFR published December
22, 1993 (58 FR 67988), is not covered in 33 CFR part 164. This
emergency towing equipment is generally located on the vessel's deck
and is required to be rigged for ready use. This towing equipment along
with mooring lines and similar equipment are included as a vital system
survey because of their exposure to prolonged adverse environmental
conditions and their infrequent use. The Coast Guard solicits comments
on these vital systems survey requirements. The Coast Guard
specifically requests comment on whether additional systems should be
surveyed to prevent equipment failure, which could lead to an oil
spill, fire, or an explosion during cargo transfer operations, and
whether specific emergency systems should be inspected more frequently
than proposed or required.
This proposal also would require the inspection findings to be
logged in the Oil Record Book required by 33 CFR 151, in the vessel's
log, or other similar onboard documentation to ensure that the master
or operator is aware of the condition of these vital systems.
[[Page 55917]]
No reporting requirements are proposed in Sec. 157.435; however,
there are existing port specific reporting requirements or port entry
restrictions that would remain in effect if this proposal became a
final rule. The Coast Guard solicits comments on reporting requirements
for the failure of specific components within the proposed vital
systems.
5. Navigation and Maneuverability
Improved navigation equipment and maneuvering systems would
mitigate the risk of a collision, allision, or grounding attributable
to lack of knowledge or reliance on incomplete or incorrect data. These
two components within Figure 5 and 6 can be effectively addressed in
various ways. Present regulations reflect highly technical navigation
equipment requirements for tank vessels in 33 CFR part 164. This
navigation equipment is being improved almost daily as computing
systems and programming capabilities increase. Human error in reading
the equipment or interpreting the data is also addressed within present
requirements through radar operator endorsement requirements and other
licensing requirements. The risk of an accident due to navigation
equipment failure is also mitigated by the reporting requirements of 33
CFR parts 160 (Ports and Waterways Safety) and 164 (Navigation).
Maneuvering systems are addressed in present requirements for
information about the vessel's maneuvering characteristics and
reliability of the vessel's control systems.
Autopilot Alarm. One comment stated that vessels should be equipped
with an alarm that sounds when the helm is turned more than 5 deg. from
amidships while the autopilot is engaged.
The Coast Guard agrees with this practical and simple alarm
requirement and in Sec. 157.440(a) is proposing a requirement for an
additional alarm on all tankships with installed autopilot equipment.
As recommended by TSAC, a tank barge owner or operator would be
required to ensure that the towing vessel has a means to indicate to
the towing vessel operator that the autopilot is engaged and manual
rudder commands would not be effective unless the autopilot is shut
off. Because a towing vessel wheelhouse is generally arranged for a
single operator and the autopilot system is simplistic, a physical
indicator to remind the master or operator that the autopilot is
engaged would serve as adequate warning. On tankships, there are
multiple watchstanders, frequent duty rotations, and complex autopilot
systems that make it easier to lose track of the autopilot status. An
alarm requirement on a tankship would ensure both the officer in charge
of a navigational watch and the helmsman are aware of the autopilot
status.
Accident data indicates that there have been incidents when bridge
crew personnel were unaware of the autopilot status and attempted to
manually steer the vessel while the autopilot was engaged. In some
instances their actions did not result in the desired change to the
ship's heading or rudder angle due to the autopilot settings. The
requirements proposed under Sec. 157.440 would be in addition to
requirements in 33 CFR 164.13 which restrict the use of an autopilot on
tank vessels of 1,600 GT or more in certain areas and under certain
conditions. These two requirements would not conflict because 33 CFR
part 164 restricts the use of the autopilot, while this proposal would
alert the tankship officer in charge of a navigational watch and the
helmsman if the helm is turned manually while the autopilot is engaged.
The Coast Guard is soliciting comments on the inclusion of a
requirement for primary towing vessels to have a restriction on the use
of the autopilot similar to 33 CFR 164.13(d).
Maneuvering Performance Capability. Proposed Sec. 157.445 addresses
both the lack of knowledge component and the use of incorrect or
incomplete information component in Figure 5. Maneuvering performance
capability is directly related to the vessel's design and can easily be
established. The standards for ship maneuverability outlined in IMO
Resolution A.751(18) use conventional trial maneuvers to evaluate vital
maneuverability characteristics. IMO has deliberated ship maneuvering
issues since 1968. Resolution A.601(15), entitled ``Provision and
Display of Maneuvering Information On Board Ships,'' was adopted in
1987. Resolution A.751(18) was adopted in November 1993, and is based
on the premise that vessel maneuvering characteristics can be assessed
from the results of typical sea trials. It differs from the present
posting requirements of 33 CFR part 164 in two fundamental ways: (1) It
scales maneuvering test results against minimum criteria; and (2) it
requires zigzag maneuvers to establish first and second overshoot
angles.
This performance standard serves to highlight those vessels with
poor control capabilities due to design, or vessels that experience
dynamic instability during some maneuvers. Under proposed
Sec. 157.445(b), the owner, master, or operator must inform the COTP if
the vessel fails to meet the IMO minimum criteria in any of the seven
test areas. This provides the port state a guideline for recognizing
the capabilities of approaching vessels and for taking appropriate
action to reduce the risk of a grounding, allision, or collision.
Providing advance notice to the Captain of the Port (COTP) that a
vessel does not meet this performance standard mitigates the external
factor component of Figure 5.
The Coast Guard also recognizes the twofold potential for these
test results to assist a pilot: (1) They provide overshoot angle
information; and (2) they provide the maneuvering information in
relationship to the ship's length. This type of information is not
contained within IMO's Resolution A.601(15) maneuvering wheelhouse
poster nor in the existing 33 CFR part 164 wheelhouse maneuvering
characteristic requirement. Posting of the test results of this
performance standard would provide pilots with nondimensional
maneuvering information. In addition, a thorough knowledge of this
performance standard and its development would enable the pilot to
compare the test results among vessels. It provides a benchmark for
quantifying how well the vessel can be expected to respond under
general conditions.
The Coast Guard has considered the applicability of these
performance standards. The IMO resolution applies only to vessels of
100 meters or more in length constructed on or after July 1, 1994. The
Coast Guard proposes to apply these requirements to all tankships of
5,000 GT or more that do not have double hulls. The IMO performance
criteria was based on a study of 600 existing vessel designs and
reflects simple, practical changes to current ship maneuverability
trials. For those vessels which do not meet this standard, the proposed
regulation does not bar them from port entry. Proposed Sec. 157.445(b)
would allow vessels which do not meet the standard to continue port
entry; however, a vessel would be required to comply with a mandatory
reporting requirement to ensure that the COTP is alerted to the
inferior maneuvering performance of the vessel.
The Coast Guard recognizes that vessel owners and operators would
require adequate time to perform the maneuverability tests required by
this proposed requirement; therefore, under proposed Sec. 157.445(a),
the Coast Guard intends to delay the implementation of this proposed
measure until 1 year after the final rule is published in the Federal
Register.
[[Page 55918]]
Maneuvering and Vessel Status Information. Section 157.450 proposes
to incorporate by reference an IMO resolution with three specific
requirements: (1) standardizing the presentation of the maneuvering
information required by 33 CFR part 164; (2) requiring the use of a
pilot card; and (3) requiring a maneuvering booklet to be available to
the master on board the vessel. The maneuvering poster required by this
resolution incorporates all of the information that is required to be
displayed by a vessel of 1,600 GT or more under 33 CFR part 164. This
proposed requirement would ensure that every tankship presents this
maneuvering data in the same format so the pilot can quickly assess the
maneuvering characteristics of the vessel. The pilot card provides a
``snapshot'' of the vessel's current equipment status and maneuvering
information unique to the transit. The maneuvering booklet gives
detailed information on the specific maneuvering capabilities at
various drafts and in various hydrodynamic situations. These details,
along with squat characteristics, are essential for difficult transits
through constricted channels and for damage control situations in the
event of a marine casualty.
All three of these requirements have been recommended by the Coast
Guard since 1989 through NVIC 7-89, ``Maneuvering Information.'' Use of
standardized forms to help prevent omission of important information is
a common theme within bridge resource management philosophy. The Coast
Guard also solicits comments on whether the pilot card should have
additional information.
Minimum Under-keel Clearance. Three comments favored the
implementation of minimum under-keel clearance requirements to prevent
groundings. The Coast Guard agrees and in Sec. 157.455 is proposing
regulations which would establish a minimum under-keel clearance
requirement for all tank vessels departing or entering a port. This
proposed regulation is intended for both tankships and tank barges. The
tank barge company would be required to ensure the tank barge meets
this minimum under-keel clearance requirement either through
establishing and enforcing company policy, through a contractual
agreement with the towing vessel company, through hiring practices, or
through direct company oversight of the tank barge's under-keel
clearance calculations prior to port entry or departing port.
This requirement has been suggested in several forms over the past
10 years. The Coast Guard, with the aid of the Navigation Safety
Advisory Council (NAVSAC), considered a draft for similar requirements
in 1991. After much debate, it decided not to pursue a federally-
mandated clearance requirement. The difference between the current
proposal and past proposals is fundamental. Past proposals considered
``real-time'' or actual under-keel depth and minimum under-keel depth
throughout a transit. Problems with this type of requirement were
substantial. The accuracy of the onboard depth sounder, the number of
depth sounders and their hull placement, and the inconsistencies
between published data and actual water depth, all complicated the task
of regulating actual under-keel depth.
The proposed requirements in Sec. 157.455 are based on anticipated
under-keel depth and represent a fundamental passage planning
requirement. IMO has provided guidance on general under-keel clearance
considerations since 1978 in its ``Guide to the Planning and Conduct of
Passages'' (SN/Circ. 92, 23 October 1978). As a passage planning
requirement, this proposal would reduce human error by ensuring the
hazard components (shown in Figures 5 and 6) related to failure to do a
task, failure to correctly perform a task, incomplete or incorrect
information, and lack of knowledge or training are addressed on those
tank vessels presenting a higher oil spill risk, due to design, if a
grounding occurs. Conscientious operators already carefully calculate
the deepest draft of the vessel and then review the intended route to
ensure there is adequate depth underneath the keel. Several companies
already have policies dictating this planning requirement and several
U.S. ports, such as the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, already
have established guidance for minimum under-keel clearances. NAVSAC
recommended that an adequate depth for transit determination be made by
a joint agreement between the local Captain of the Port (COTP) and the
port and harbor safety authority or association or other similar group.
This recommendation would be appropriate if the safe navigation of a
particular port indicates that it is necessary to establish permanent
under-keel clearance requirements. The Coast Guard recognizes that some
local COTP and port and harbor safety authorities presently have or may
wish to establish clearance requirements. This proposal would not
preempt present or future local standards. The proposal establishes an
anticipated minimum under-keel clearance of at least .5 meters (2 feet)
for all ports. If a local standard is less than the proposed .5 meter
clearance, the proposed notification requirement enables the COTP to
positively control the local policy. It is anticipated that a local
under-keel clearance requirement that is more stringent than the .5
meter clearance would be enforced through a joint COTP and harbor
safety authority agreement. This proposed clearance reflects general
industry standards and provides an added cushion of safety for vessels
while operating in areas where charted depths may not have been updated
by surveying agencies for sometime. Tank vessels fitted with double
bottoms would be exempt from this under-keep clearance requirement
because within the risk framework developed for this rulemaking, the
double bottoms provide protection from oil spills that may be caused by
this type of accidental or non-emergency intentional grounding.
A vessel's log or similar onboard documentation should indicate
that the master or operator has considered the factors that may affect
a vessel's draft and has reviewed the appropriate scaled charts, tide
tables, and other applicable publications to calculate the anticipated
controlling depth. Charts and publications may contain conflicting
water depth information. Some of these variances are due to different
survey periods, survey techniques, or recording purposes. The most
conservative depth should be used to calculate the anticipated depth.
This preventive measure would require all affected vessels to
carefully plan port transits. Grounding would not indicate a violation
of the requirements in proposed Sec. 157.455 if the owner, master, or
operator has properly logged or documented the proposed planning
requirements and can recreate the calculations done prior to port entry
or departure. Satisfying the planning requirements, however, does not
relieve the owner, master, or operator of ensuring that other
navigational requirements and practices are followed.
Intentional grounding during a transit, unless done to reduce the
risk of a collision or allision, or during a similar type of emergency,
would violate the regulation if done with without the express approval
of the COTP. This proposed restriction on intentional grounding is not
intended to unconditionally prohibit this practice rather, it focuses
on ensuring that the local COTP understands the vessel's operation and
agrees to the practice. In areas where port bottom conditions are
[[Page 55919]]
known and do not pose a threat to the integrity of the hull, approval
for certain vessels to load cargo by intentionally grounding would be
acceptable. An anticipated caveat to a vessel being allowed to
routinely ground for loading operations is a specific shell plate and
weld condition survey or some other type of structural review provision
to ensure the vessel remains structurally fit for the additional
loading stresses.
Pilotage Passage Plans. One comment recommended that the Coast
Guard require pilot passage plans. This would require the pilot to
prepare a written passage plan prior to boarding a vessel, provide
copies of the plan to the bridge team, and discuss the plan with the
bridge team prior to beginning the passage. Guidance on this issue has
been developed by IMO and is entitled, ``Guide to the Planning and
Conduct of Passages'' (SN/Circ. 92, 23 October 1978).
Although many pilots already prepare plans for passage through a
port, the vessel's crew also needs to actively communicate with the
pilot prior to a port transit. This proposed rulemaking addresses only
the vessel's responsibility to accurately inform the pilot of the
vessel's status and to monitor the pilot during a transit by
incorporation of pilot cards and bridge resource management training.
The Coast Guard and IMO are undertaking a separate initiative to
address the pilot's responsibilities to the vessel.
Navigation Equipment. Several comments stressed the need for
improved navigation equipment and suggested requiring state-of-the-art
navigation equipment such as a Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver
and collision avoidance radar. Other suggestions included electronic
charts, advanced sonar systems and a speed log.
Within both the international community and among U.S. vessel
operators, a significant amount of discussion has centered on the value
of navigational information versus the training of navigators. While
equipment with additional capabilities is extremely useful,
navigational safety also depends on the officer using this information.
The Coast Guard has determined that the present automatic radar
plotting aid (ARPA) requirements and the electronic positioning device
required in 33 CFR part 164 set an adequate minimum standard. The
proposed bridge resource management training would give the officers
responsible for vessel navigation the tools they need to interpret and
use all the information gathering systems at their disposal. The Coast
Guard is considering future proposals for Electronic Chart Display and
Information System (ECDIS) or differential GPS (DGPS) capabilities on
vessels. While ECDIS may indicate the ship's actual position on an
electronically generated chart, any requirement for electronic
positioning devices is premature until standards for equipment have
been developed and DGPS signals can provide an accurate, high integrity
signal throughout the United States. However, owners purchasing new
units should consider a GPS unit capable of receiving a DGPS signal or
interfacing with a differential receiver.
VEssel Traffic Service Systems. Several comments stated that the
Coast Guard needs to develop stronger rules for Vessel Traffic Service
Systems (VTS). Three comments stated that the Coast Guard should
require a vessel's mandatory participation in a harbor's active VTS.
Other comments stated that more ports were in need of VTS. One comment
stated that the VTS existing in Valdez, AK, San Francisco, CA, New
Orleans, LA, and New York, NY, have deficiencies including inadequate
funding, lack of maintenance and poor training. Most comments stated
that VTS are an obvious measure to reduce oil pollution which should be
improved and extended to more ports.
Section 4107(b)(1)(B) of OPA requires the Secretary to study the
need for new, expanded or improved VTS. The 1991 Port Needs Study
(Vessel Traffic Service Benefits) documents the benefits and costs of
Coast Guard VTS in 23 selected ports on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific
coasts. The study employs a comprehensive cost-benefit model that
considers the far-reaching consequences of marine accidents based on
navigational risk. The results are being used by the Coast Guard to
make capital investment decisions for the entire VTS program. One
change is the establishment of requirements and procedures which
simplify previous VTS regulations and mandate participation in all VTS
(59 FR 36316; July 15, 1994). Other VTS developments are being proposed
in separate documents and are not within the ambit of this rulemaking.
Voyage Data Recorder (Black Box). Another comment suggested
installation of a comprehensive event recorder (black box) to allow
investigators to reconstruct the events leading to a near-miss or
marine casualty.
As indicated in Figures 3 through 6, a black box would not directly
reduce the risk of an accident. Present regulations require recording
capabilities on depth sounding devices and logging requirements for
various other navigation indicators. This information has been used in
the past to reconstruct accident events. A comprehensive recording
system such as a black box could improve investigation quality and
reduce the time needed to reconstruct accident events. Additionally, it
might be a factor in reducing the risk of future casualties if used as
a management oversight tool to heighten management's awareness of
vessel operations. In addition, use of the black box could provide
information on near-misses which could be used to assess regulatory
effectiveness and pinpoint potential areas of traffic or operational
concern.
Other types of recorders that include active warning systems
(linked into existing VTS or capable of alarming a vessel automatically
in a potential collision situation) are in use on some offshore oil
platforms. These early warning systems work in conjunction with DGPS
and ECDIS. Because of their dependence on DGPS and ECDIS, the Coast
Guard believes that it is premature to require active warning systems.
While voyage data recorders and early warning systems are both
technologically feasible, they are costly. A general requirement for an
automatic, tamper proof voyage recording system that would record
voice, radar, position information, engine, and course data would
impose significant costs. This SNPRM solicits comments on a voyage data
recorder requirement, inclusion of an early warning capability in a
recording device, and recommended provisions for near miss data
collection.
Escort Vessels
Several comments pointed out the value of escort vessels. One
comment also recommended requiring bow thrusters for tankers without
tug escorts. The escort vessel issue is being addressed in a separate
regulatory project. This proposed rule considers escorts as a possible
alternative when the vessel does not meet certain maneuverability
performance standards. The Coast Guard has determined that the proposed
requirements for emergency steering capabilities combined with
maneuvering performance standards would reduce the risk of a collision,
allision, or grounding due to poor maneuverability and mitigates some
of the equipment failure components in Figure 5. Comments on possible
requirements for bow thrusters are solicited in this proposed
rulemaking.
Routing Restrictions.
Several comments suggested various route restrictions to increase
safety.
[[Page 55920]]
Four comments recommended more stringent pilotage requirements. Five
comments recommended limitation of vessel movement. Two other comments
recommended voluntary routing. One comment recommended mandatory speed
limits. One comment suggested that the Coast Guard identify those ports
with rocky bottoms and prohibit entry by tankers without double
bottoms. Such provisions directly correlate with the risks of
structural failure (Figure 3) from impact.
Although the Coast Guard recognizes that groundings and collisions
could be reduced through routing restrictions, it does not have the
authority at this time to enforce mandatory routing restrictions or
exclusionary transit zones on foreign vessels outside of U.S. navigable
waters. At the sixty-fifth session of the Marine Safety Committee
(MSC), in May of 1995, the Committee adopted amendments to the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, and its
Protocol of 1978, which would permit the establishment of mandatory
routing measures through IMO. This MSC resolution, MSC 46(65), becomes
effective January 1, 1997.
Present routing practices off the coast of California are voluntary
and were developed after extensive research. Diverse weather patterns,
vessel traffic, marine life considerations, and other factors pose
safety problems in some geographic areas. Because of the unique nature
of each port and offshore area, the Coast Guard has traditionally left
speed limit, safety zone and other restrictions to the local COTP. As
required by section 4111(b) of OPA 90, the Coast Guard is currently
studying tanker routing and solicits comments on establishing routing
restriction requirements.
6. Additional Operational Requirements for Tank Barges
Several comments suggested improvements to towing vessels. One
comment stated that the Coast Guard should require navigation equipment
on towing vessels. Another comment stated that independent emergency
steering capability should be required on towing vessels. One comment
recommended restrictions on tandem towing when loaded, requiring twin
screw tugs, and requiring towing vessel horsepower to barge deadweight
ratios. One comment recommended that the Navigational Safety
requirements of 33 CFR part 164 be extended to towing vessels. One
comment suggested two independent propulsion systems.
The Coast Guard has issued several rulemakings affecting the entire
commercial towing industry. The recent proposed rulemaking entitled
``Navigation Safety Equipment for Towing Vessels'' (60 FR XXXX)
contains several of the requirements mentioned above. It proposes
requirements for vessels engaged in towing that are 8 meters or more in
length. These requirements include certain navigational equipment, such
as radar; searchlights; and electronic position fixing devices,
depending on the vessel's area of operation; general navigation safety
requirements; and towline inspections for vessels engaged in towing
astern. Further requirements on licensing for towing vessel operators
also may be proposed.
Emergency Steering Capability. In Sec. 157.460(a), the Coast Guard
is proposing that the owner or operator of a tank barge would be
responsible for ensuring the primary towing vessel has either twin
screws with independent power or a backup steering system. Twin
propulsion designs with separate engine controls, dual shafts, and
propellers certainly would meet the intent of this requirement and are
allowed under this proposal. To reduce the impact of this regulation
and to allow vessel owners time to schedule shipyard facilities, the
Coast Guard proposes a 1-year delayed implementation of this
requirement.
This requirement was proposed after review of the risks of
equipment failure and loss of steering as shown in Figures 5 and 6.
Loss of steering for tankships is addressed by 33 CFR 164.39, 46 CFR
58.25, and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea,
1974, and its Protocol of 1978, with amendments, Chapter II-1, Part C,
regulation 29. Therefore, this SNPRM does not propose additional
steering requirements for tankships.
Fendering Systems. The qualitative evaluation of the structural
failure hazard (Figure 3) revealed that structural fractures due to the
stress on local hull areas of a tank barge, where a towing vessel or a
pier routinely comes in contact with the barge, have not been addressed
and could contribute to the cause of some oil spills. While this type
of fracturing may be identified by the enhanced survey requirements
proposed in Sec. 157.430 of this SNPRM, a more fundamental and cost
effective solution is adequate fendering. Because fendering on a barge
would be very costly, would decrease structure accessibility under the
fendering system, and may increase the rate of local structural
deterioration surrounding the fendering system, the Coast Guard is
proposing that the owner or operator of a tank barge would be
responsible for ensuring the primary towing vessel and any other assist
or fleeting towing vessels have adequate fendering systems. This
proposal would require vessel owners and operators to ensure towing
vessel fendering systems are assessed through management policy, on-
site inspection or oversight, contractual arrangements, or hiring
practices as an important protective measure for their barge's
structural integrity. Fleeting and assist towing vessels are included
in this proposal because during docking operations, the forces they
exert on the barge hull also contribute to the fracture problem.
Although there are no international or domestic guidelines for
appropriate fender technical specifications, Sec. 157.460(b) proposes a
performance guidelines for preventing metal to metal contact of the
towing vessel and the tank barge.
7. Other Operational Measures
Many of the comments proposed improvements through other
operational measures, including planning improvements. Two comments
recommended cargo loading and casualty planning. The comments stated
that the risk of pollution could be reduced significantly through a
strategic cargo loading plan which included criteria for loading a
partial cargo or discharging at several ports. For example, if cargo is
retained after discharging at the first port of call, cargo can be
retained in center tanks instead of wing tanks. One comment stated that
effective casualty planning would reduce the likelihood of a pollution
incident; these plans are not currently required.
Hydrostatic balanced loading minimizes the accidental oil outflow
by strategically loading cargo tanks to take advantage of the
hydrostatic balance between the cargo and sea water. This concept is
presently being studied and will be considered in the Existing Vessel
Structural Measures rulemaking. Casualty planning requirements are
addressed in ``Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plans'' (59 FR 51332;
October 7, 1994).
Three comments were received regarding emergency transfer systems
(ETS). Two of these comments supported the implementation of ETS while
one comment stated that ETS was unproven and not likely to prevent
pollution. These systems generally require additional cargo piping and
pump refit or installation. It should also be noted that the Coast
Guard has completed a report to Congress entitled, ``The Feasibility of
Using Segregated Ballast Tanks (SBT) for Emergency
[[Page 55921]]
Transfer of Cargo and Storage of Recovered Oil,'' 1995. In this study,
it was found that in the event of a vessel casualty, such as a
collision or grounding, there are often fundamental changes in the
vessel's stability condition which make it potentially unsafe and
inadvisable to use SBT for emergency transfer of cargo. The regulatory
assessment study for the third portion of this project will address
these systems and any special considerations in their use.
Three comments recommended that wing tanks be kept empty. One
stated that empty wing tanks would reduce the likelihood of oil outflow
in collisions by 100 percent and in groundings by at least 50 percent,
compared to estimates of 30 percent and 15 percent provided in the
Existing Tank Vessels NPRM. This comment specifically suggested that
the wing tanks remain empty rather than ballasted with water or other
non-petroleum cargo. Significant structural refit to reinforce
bulkheads between empty wing tanks and cargo tanks, possible piping
refit, and substantial stability reassessment may be required. The
Coast Guard is soliciting comments on the economic and technical
feasibility of this proposal.
One comment recommended emergency retrieval equipment or emergency
towing pendants similar to those provided for in Washington State
regulations. Four comments stated that tow wire maintenance and
inspection should be required. An interim final rule (IFR) requiring
emergency towing equipment was published in the Federal Register on
December 22, 1993, entitled, ``Discharge Removal Equipment for Vessels
Carrying Oil'' (58 FR 67988). This required the majority of existing
tank vessels to have an emergency towing wire meeting an IMO standard.
This IMO standard has been revised to incorporate a requirement that
the equipment can be deployed automatically and by a limited number of
crew. The Coast Guard supported these changes at IMO and intends to
implement these new requirements in a future rulemaking. In addition,
an NPRM entitled, ``Navigation Safety Equipment for Towing Vessels''
published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register proposes
minimum tow wire standards and inspection requirements.
Amendments to 46 CFR Part 31
To ensure cross reference to the proposed enhanced survey
requirements, tables (a) and (b) in 46 CFR 31.10-21 would be revised to
direct individuals using 46 CFR part 31 to Sec. 157.430(a); however, it
does not change existing drydock requirements.
Amendment to 46 CFR Part 35
To ensure cross reference to part 157, Sec. 35.01-40(c) of title 46
of the CFR is revised to refer individuals using 46 CFR part 35 to the
applicable pollution prevention requirements.
Incorporation by Reference
The following material, in part, would be incorporated by reference
in Sec. 157.02: IMO Assembly Resolution A.601(15) with Appendices 1-3,
``Provision and Display of Manoeuvring Information on Board Ships'';
IMO Assembly Resolution A.744(18) Annex B, ``Guidelines on the Enhanced
Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil
Tankers''; IMO Assembly Resolution A.751(18) with Explanatory Notices
in MSC/Circ.644, ``Interim Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability''; and
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) ``International Safety
Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals'' (Second Edition). Copies of the
materials are available for inspection where indicated under ADDRESSES.
Copies of the material are available for the sources listed in
Sec. 157.02.
Before publishing a final rule, the Coast Guard will submit this
material to the Director of the Federal Register for approval of the
incorporation by reference.
Assessment
This proposal is a significant regulatory action under section 3(f)
of Executive Order 12866 and has been reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget under that order. It requires an assessment of
potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that order. It is
significant under the regulatory policies and procedures of the
Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 11040; February 26, 1979).
A draft Assessment has been prepared and is available in the docket
for inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES. The
Assessment is summarized as follows.
This rulemaking would apply to all existing vessels of 5,000 GT or
more that do not have double hulls and that carry oil, including non-
petroleum oil, in bulk as cargo. An estimated 1359 existing tank
vessels (190 U.S. tankships, 1080 foreign tankships, 86 U.S. tank
barges and 3 foreign tank barges) currently operating on the U.S.
navigable waters would be affected by this proposed rulemaking.
Industry Cost
Some of the proposed operational measures require actions prior to
each port transit or cargo transfer. As a result, vessels on coastwise
or frequent transit schedules would incur higher expenses than vessels
with a lower frequency of port calls. In contrast, the decrease in
fleet size as vessels arrive at their phaseout date results in a
downward trend in estimated annual costs from 1996 through 2014.
First year compliance cost of this SNPRM would total about $183.8
million. Annual costs of the proposal would trend downward, leveling
out at $5.8 million during 2012-2014, the final years that the proposal
would be in effect. The present value of this proposal is discounted at
7 percent throughout this assessment in accordance with current Office
of Management and Budget guidance to reflect the costs or benefits as
they would have been in the year OPA 90 was enacted. The present value
of this proposal, discounted at 7 percent, would total $443.6 million.
U.S. tankships and tank barges would together account for an estimated
one-third of total costs, and foreign tank vessels and barges would
account for the remainder. A discussion of costs for each proposed
requirement follows.
The costs associated with the operational measures proposed in this
SNPRM were developed based on vessel type, vessel use, and average
vessel size. The cost analysis was applied to tankships and tank
barges. Cost analysis calculations were based upon the following
assumptions:
(1) The proposed rulemaking would come into effect in 1996;
(2) The recurring cost of this rulemaking would reflect the future
vessel population decrease as required by the phaseout schedule in
section 4115(a) of OPA 90 and shown in NVIC 10-94;
(3) Both costs and benefits developed for this rulemaking are
discounted at 7 percent back to 1990; and
(4) All recurring costs are calculated for the year 2001.
Emergency Lightering Equipment. Lightering equipment costs were
based on the costs used in the Emergency Lightering Equipment and
Advanced Notice of Arrival Requirements for Existing Tank Vessels
Without Double Hulls Final Rule (59 FR 40186). This SNPRM proposes to
expand the applicability of these emergency lightering requirements
from oil tankers to all tank vessels. No U.S. tank vessels with
exclusive non-petroleum oil cargo carriage authority are in operation.
[[Page 55922]]
There would be no costs to U.S. tankships or tank barges. An estimated
114 foreign tankships and 2 foreign tank barges carry non-petroleum
cargo and may be affected by this change. The onetime costs for this
proposed requirement for foreign tankships is estimated to be $456,000-
$1.1 million and for foreign tank barges would be $8,000-$19,000. Based
on the average onetime cost for foreign tankships and tank barges, the
present value of point-estimate costs for emergency lightering
discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would be $530,000.
Bridge Resource Management Training. The cost of proposed
Sec. 157.415 would vary based on crew complement, crew salary, and
estimated existing training programs. Based on typical crew compliments
and accounting for personnel turnovers, seven tankship officers were
assumed to require this training per tankship while six officers were
used to estimate the cost to each tank barge. Crew daily wages were
estimated based on American Institute of Merchant Shipping (AIMS) data,
Tanker Advisory Report statistics, and American Waterways Operators
(AWO) information. Although simulator training is not proposed as a
required element of the BRM training course, past completion of an
existing Coast Guard approved bridge resource management course would
meet the proposed requirements. An estimated 60 percent of U.S.
tankships and tank barge companies have already met this training
requirement for their deck officers through commercial bridge
management courses. An estimated 30 percent of the foreign vessels
operating on routes within U.S. waters have trained their officers in
management-type curriculum. The commercial bridge management course
fees, approximately $5,000 per person (for a 5-day course), were used
to estimate the cost of this proposal. The refresher training course
offered by commercial vendors was estimated to be $500 per person.
Total cost of the proposed BRM training requirement to industry for
U.S. tankships would be $3.7 million. Foreign tankship total initial
estimated cost would be $33.0 million. The U.S. tank barge total
initial estimated cost would be $2.0 million. The total cost to the
foreign tank barge industry would be $79,000. The present value of the
costs of BRM training discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would total $35.1
million.
Vessel Specific Watch Training. The Coast Guard estimates the
additional cost incurred by proposed Sec. 157.420 would be negligible.
The cost attributed to time loss due to this training is negligible
because this type of training falls within the scope of a master's
present responsibility to ensure the crew is ``fit for duty.''
Recordkeeping requirements are addressed in the ``Collection of
Information'' section.
Minimum Rest Hour Requirement. To meet proposed Sec. 157.425,
shoreside augmentation of the vessel crew to allow the vessel officers
and crew members time to rest, is estimated to include one officer
(assume average second mate salary) and two tankerman (assume average
third mate salary) for each port visit on a tankship and one tankerman
(assume average mate salary) for a tank barge. On U.S. vessels, one
officer was not included because under 46 U.S.C. 8104(a), the master is
presently required to meet this rest hour minimum. Shoreside
augmentation requirements would vary based on the number of port visits
per vessel correlated with an estimate on average visit length. Careful
crew scheduling and time management could reduce the amount of
augmentation required prior to departing port. It is estimated that
U.S. tankships would require shoreside augmentation prior to 60 percent
of their port departures, foreign tankships would require augmentation
prior to 40 percent of their port departures, and tank barges (both
foreign and U.S.) would require 80 percent augmentation to meet this
proposal. If shoreside augmentation would be required prior to a port
departure, a full day's wage for the estimated number of personnel
required for augmentation was used. The cost for posting a notice to
crew members on the rest hour minimums was not calculated because it is
minimal.
The 1-year cost for augmented shoreside manning on U.S. tankships
would be $2.2 million and for foreign tankships would be $1.5 million.
The 1-year cost for augmented shoreside manning on U.S. tank barges
would be $991,000. The 1-year cost for augmented manning for foreign
tank barges would be $6,500. By 2001, the total cost of this proposed
requirement to the U.S. tankship industry would be $1.55 million, and
to foreign tankships, $1.03 million. For the tank barge industry, this
recurring augmentation cost would be $714,000 for the U.S. industry and
slightly less than $4,000 for the foreign industry. The present value
of the costs of rest hour minimums discounted at 7 percent to 1990
would total $19.7 million.
Enhanced Survey and Alternate for Enhanced Survey. Those tankships
regulated by flag administrations signatory to MARPOL 73/78 and having
adopted Regulation 13G of Annex I are presently required to complete
the proposed enhanced survey of Sec. 157.430(a) starting in 1995. For
this proposed rulemaking, no cost is associated to this group of
vessels for the enhanced survey requirement. U.S. tankships presently
are not required to meet Regulation 13G of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78.
Under this proposal, they would be required to conduct enhanced surveys
and incur the cost associated with these surveys.
The cost of an enhanced survey for a vessel classed by a recognized
classification society is estimated to be 25 percent higher than the
cost of the special survey currently performed by the class societies.
This cost includes the fee for the surveyor's time and required
documentation. For a 21,000 GT tankship, the increased cost for a
surveyor and a final report is estimated to be $11,000. Additional
costs to the industry for this proposed requirement would include
making approximately two tank interiors accessible to the surveyor
through the use of scaffolding, ladders, lines, or other arrangements
and additional gauging requirements (approximately 30 percent more than
present classification society requirements). Some additional repair
costs could also be incurred after a review of the survey is completed.
Cost estimates do not include the cost to drydock the vessel, gas free
it for inspection, or keep it in the drydock. These costs are already
incurred with present drydocking requirements.
It is estimated that 64 tankships are either not classed or are
classed by classification societies not recognized by the Coast Guard.
These vessels would incur additional costs associated with a design
review and a condition survey for reclassification by a recognized
society. Classification costs or enhanced survey costs for vessels
already required to drydock, but never classed or not classed by a
recognized classification society, would be $514,000.
Tank barges are not required to meet Regulation 13G of Annex I of
MARPOL 73/78. Proposed Sec. 157.430(b) allows tank barges and vessels
smaller than the MARPOL cutoff to substitute comparable company
programs for the enhanced survey requirements. Because the company
program clause assumes the owner has an established survey program and
would not need to conduct extensive additional repairs, the cost of
these company programs would be less than the cost of a classification
survey.
The cost estimates associated with proposed Sec. 157.430 (a) and
(b) were amortized to reflect a 12-month period. First year cost
averages would be $14.9
[[Page 55923]]
million for U.S. tankships; $23.0 million for foreign tankships; $2.3
million for U.S. tank barges; and $80,000 for foreign tank barges.
Because the cost estimates have been averaged and it has been assumed
that the vessels affected by this rulemaking would be in service for at
least two drydock enhanced surveys prior to their phaseout, recurring
cost would be the same as the first year costs listed above. The Coast
Guard recognizes this recurring cost estimate is conservative; however,
as the fleet population diminishes the average cost of an enhanced
survey may increase due to the age and possible repair requirements of
the remaining tank vessels subjected to the survey. The present value
of the costs of the enhanced survey discounted at 7 percent to 1990
would total $67.38 million.
Vital Systems Surveys. The cost of proposed Sec. 157.435 would vary
based on port departure frequency, crew salary, and the estimated time
required for each survey. A survey would be required before a tank
vessel begins cargo transfer operations or prior to a vessel departing
port. An estimate of port departures was calculated based on 1993 Coast
Guard data and reflects an average departure frequency of 28 for U.S.
tankships, 32 for U.S. tank barges, 6 for foreign tankships, and 7 for
foreign tank barges. Three surveys were estimated for each port
departure.
Crew members affected by this proposed requirement would be senior
personnel. For tank barge surveys, an average towing vessel master's
wage was used for cost evaluation. For tankship surveys, an average
chief mate's wage and a chief engineer's wage were used for cost
evaluation. Survey time was estimated at 1 hour on a tankship (\1/2\
hour each for both the chief mate and the chief engineer) and
approximately 48 minutes for the master of a primary towing vessel or a
senior tank barge representative.
The vital systems survey cost for U.S. tankships would be $660,000
with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of $472,000. The cost to foreign
tankships would be $465,000 with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of
$322,000. The survey cost to U.S. tank barges would be $289,000 with a
recurring cost (for year 2001) of $208,000. The survey cost to foreign
tank barges would be $2,500 with a recurring cost (for year 2001) of
$1,500. The present value of the costs of vital systems discounted at 7
percent to 1990 would total $6.0 million.
Autopilot Alarm or Indicator. The cost for the alarm or indicator
proposed in Sec. 157.440 was calculated based on the assumption that 10
percent of the U.S. tankships presently meet this requirement, none of
the foreign tankships presently have this capability, and 3 towing
vessels would require an indicator for every 2 tank barges affected by
this rulemaking. It was also assumed that the tank barge company owned
the towing vessel and would incur the cost of this requirement. The
estimated installation cost of a visual and audible autopilot alarm is
$5,000 on electronic tankship steering systems and the estimated
autopilot indicator cost is $100. The cost attributed to the testing of
this alarm would be negligible based on the short amount of time
required to test the device and the preexisting requirement to do so
under 33 CFR 164.25. This proposal would have a onetime estimated cost
to U.S. tankships of $855,000; to foreign tankships, $5,400,000; to
U.S. tank barges, $12,900; and to foreign tank barges, $500. The
present value of autopilot alarm costs discounted at 7 percent to 1990
would total $4.2 million.
Maneuvering Performance Capability. To meet proposed Sec. 157.445,
tankships would require additional maneuvering tests and also
recalculation or confirmation of previous maneuvering characteristics
presently required by 33 CFR 164.35(g). Additional tests are proposed
primarily to evaluate overshoot angles and time to check yaw. Computer
simulations of these performance tests would not be accepted. A cost of
$18,500 was based on an independent subcontractor coming on board a
tankship to conduct the tests and provide the documentation required.
This estimate reflects industry cost for test preparation, equipment,
personnel, transportation, vessel operational delay, data processing,
and final report collation. It was assumed that the tests required to
meet this performance standard proposal have not been completed by any
of the tankships affected by this SNPRM. The total onetime cost to the
U.S. tankship industry would be $3.5 million and the cost to the
foreign tankship industry would be $20.0 million. The present value of
maneuvering performance capability costs discounted at 7 percent to
1990 would total $15.7 million.
Maneuvering and Vessel Status Information. No additional
maneuvering tests would be required for proposed Sec. 157.450, however,
some recalculation of data from the original tests used to develop the
wheelhouse poster of 33 CFR 164.35(g) may be required. To compile a
maneuvering booklet, additional calculations and documentation also may
be required. A cost estimate of $1,080 was developed for this proposal
and reflects an average U.S. licensed naval architect fee for 4 hours
spent to recalculate wheelhouse poster data and 16 hours spent to
assemble the maneuvering booklet. Vessel population estimates indicated
that 75 percent of both foreign and U.S. tankships presently meet the
wheelhouse poster requirement and 20 percent presently meet the
maneuvering booklet requirement. The cost attributed to the pilot card
requirement would be negligible because the cost of the pilot cards
themselves would be minimal while the time spent to complete them would
be incorporated into the scope of an officer in charge of a
navigational watch's normal duties.
Proposed Sec. 157.450 has a onetime cost attributed to the
wheelhouse poster and the maneuvering booklet. The estimated onetime
cost of this proposal would be $142,000 for the 190 U.S. tankships and
$805,000 for the 1,080 foreign tankships. The present value of
maneuvering and vessel status information costs discounted at 7 percent
to 1990 would total $631,000.
Minimum Under-keel Clearance. The cost estimate for proposed
Sec. 157.455 assumed that tankships presently entering or departing
U.S. navigable waters operate with an under-keel clearance range of
0.15 meters to 2.00 meters and an average anticipated under-keel
clearance of 0.6 meters (2 feet). Present tank barge under-keel
clearances were estimated to be much less than tankship averages. An
estimate of the number of port entries and departures was made for each
vessel type. Tank barges were estimated to be affected by this proposal
during each port entry and each port departure. U.S. tankships were
estimated to be affected by this proposal during each port entry and
during 35 percent of the port departures. Foreign tankships were
estimated to be affected by this proposal during each port entry and
during 20 percent of the port departures.
The cost of the proposal was estimated to be a 3 percent loss of
cargo carrying capacity for each .3 meters needed to decrease the tank
vessel's draft. An estimate of required draft decrease or cargo loss
due to this proposal was made for each vessel type. It was estimated
that 30 percent of the affected tank barge (10,000 GT average size)
population would not lose cargo carrying capacity due to this proposal,
50 percent of the population would lose 3 percent of their cargo
carrying capacity, and 20 percent would lose 6 percent of their cargo
carrying capacity. It was estimated that 75 percent of the affected
U.S. tankship (33,300 GT average size) and foreign tankship (50,000 GT
average size) population
[[Page 55924]]
would not lose cargo carrying capacity due to this proposal, 20 percent
of the tankship population would lose 3 percent of their cargo carrying
capacity, and 5 percent of the tankship population would lose 6 percent
of their cargo carrying capacity. The cost attributed to the proposed
recording requirement would be negligible because the time spent
completing the vessel log entry or other similar documentation would be
incorporated into the scope of the officer of a navigational watch's
normal duties.
As a result of the reduced cargo capacity, the first year cost of
proposed Sec. 157.455 for a U.S. tankship would be $18 million. Foreign
tankship costs would be $35.1 million. U.S. tank barge costs would be
$12.4 million and foreign tank barge costs would be $142,000. By 2001,
the total cost of proposed Sec. 157.455 to the U.S. tankship industry
would decrease to $13 million, and the cost to foreign tankships would
decrease to $27.3 million. For the tank barge industry, the recurring
cost of under-keel clearance would be $13.3 million for the U.S.
industry and $142,000 for the foreign industry. The present value of
the costs of under-keel clearance discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would
total $292.6 million.
Emergency Steering Capability. Proposed Sec. 157.460(a) applies to
the primary towing vessels engaged in towing tank barges of 5,000 GT or
more without a double hull. An estimated total of 134 towing vessels
would be affected by this proposal. Of these vessels, research
indicates 80 percent presently meet this proposed requirement. It was
assumed that the towing vessels that do not meet this proposed
requirement are owned by the tank barge company. The cost to
reconfigure the towing vessel's steering gear would be $25,000 based on
an independent subcontractor installing additional piping and tankage
on an existing hydraulic steering system.
The onetime emergency steering requirement cost would be $645,000
for U.S. tank barge companies; and $25,000 for foreign tank barge
owners or operators. The present value of emergency steering capability
costs discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would total $446,000.
Fendering System. Proposed Sec. 157.460(b) applies to the primary
towing vessels and the fleeting or assist towing vessels engaged in
maneuvering tank barges of 5,000 GT or more without double hulls. A
total of 312 towing vessels would be affected by this proposal. Of
these vessels, research indicates 80 percent presently have adequate
fendering systems. It was assumed that those towing vessels that do not
meet this proposed requirement are owned by the tank barge company or
the tank barge company would realize a cost increase in the leasing of
an adequately fendered towing vessel. The cost to add or reconfigure
the towing vessel's fendering system would be $1,320 based on a towing
vessel's personnel installing an additional 8 linear feet of commercial
fenders during a routine maintenance period.
Proposed Sec. 157.460(b) would have an estimated initial cost to
U.S. tank barges of $79,500; and to foreign tank barges of $3,000.
Recurring costs, reflecting the diminishment of the tank barge fleet by
2001, would be $57,000 for U.S. tank barges and $2,000 for foreign tank
barges. The present value of the cost of fendering systems discounted
at 7 percent of 1990 would total $329,000.
Government Cost
Federal Government cost would include Coast Guard personnel time
and resources to review survey records and documentation required by
this proposed SNPRM during annual tank vessel examinations (foreign
vessels) or annual inspections (U.S. vessels). The length of time added
to a typical examination or inspection would vary based on the type of
service in which the vessel engages. The Coast Guard is estimating that
these requirements would increase the time of examination or inspection
by an average of 0.5 hours for any given requirement. The various
requirements range from 0.25 hours to inspect log entries or records to
8 hours to review documentation of an enhanced survey on a U.S.
tankship or tank barge.
Government costs attributable to implementation of this rule are
based on twelve proposed requirements. The Coast Guard examination or
inspection would evaluate relevant documentation on BRM training,
vessel specific training, minimum rest hours, enhanced surveys, vital
systems surveys, maneuvering performance capability information,
maneuvering information, and minimum under-keel clearance. During an
annual examination or inspection the Coast Guard inspector would also
ensure the emergency lightening equipment, the autopilot alarm or
indicator, the emergency steering gear and the fendering systems on the
towing vessels meet the proposed requirements.
The proposed maneuvering performance test requirement, specified in
Sec. 157.445(b), instructs tankships that do not meet the IMO criteria
to report their maneuvering capability to the COTP 24 hours prior to
port entry. Requests of this nature are not anticipated to be frequent.
For this cost estimate, 10 percent of the existing tankship population
was assumed to require some deviation from the IMO criteria. To review
a vessel request for port entry and determine appropriate operational
restrictions would take Coast Guard personnel an average of 4 hours.
Therefore, the government cost analysis assumes the increased
annual inspection time would average 6.95 hours for U.S. tank vessels
and 4.75 hours for foreign tank vessels. In addition, deviation
requests from U.S. tankships for the proposed maneuvering performance
standard would be 76 hours while requests from foreign tankships would
average 432 hours. Based on a $35.00 per hour wage estimate for a Coast
Guard inspector, the Coast Guard expects the 1,188 additional man-hours
of inspection and deviation request evaluation time would cost $39,801
annually.
Cost-Benefit Evaluation
Costs. Cost estimates were based on the forecast 19-year life for
this proposed rulemaking. For all proposed requirements, the
undiscounted costs of compliance are projected to be $897.6 million.
The present value of the costs of this proposed regulation discounted
at 7 percent to 1990 would total $443.6 million.
Benefits. Pollution mitigation benefits from the proposed
operational measures would accrue mainly in areas around loading
terminals, narrow channels, and in open waters during lightering
operations.
A review of casualty and spill data was conducted in an attempt to
pinpoint past accident frequency as related to each proposed
operational measures. However, the complex cumulative effect of human
error and equipment failure made it difficult to quantify the benefits
of each measure. For example, the grounding of the foreign tankship
WORLD PRODIGY off Brenton Reef in Rhode Island Sound was caused by a
combination of fatigue, poor bridge resource management, and
insufficient passage planning (especially under-keel clearance) which
lead to this 1989 oil spill. The major explosion aboard the U.S.
tankship MT SURF CITY was caused by poor tank entry precautions and
undetected bulkhead deterioration between a cargo tank and a ballast
tank. Because of the interrelationship between the proposed
requirements that focus on a reduction in human error along with the
proposed requirements for improved equipment inspections and
capabilities, the Coast
[[Page 55925]]
Guard chose to quantify the benefits using a gross estimate of benefits
for this SNPRM regulatory assessment.
A preliminary estimate of the anticipated benefits and resultant
cost-benefit for each measure was conducted and is described in detail
within the regulatory assessment. This preliminary estimate included a
review of certain tank vessel casualties from 1989 through 1994, the
resultant oil spill or potential for an oil spill, vessel damage, and
loss of life. Benefits were estimated for each proposed measure by
reviewing the casualty report, analyzing each casualty's root causes,
and estimating a percentage of the recorded or estimated spillage
associated with each root cause. The actual and potential amounts of
oil spilled were then broken down from these estimated root cause
percentages and accredited to each of the proposed measures, if
applicable.
Using Figures 3 through 6 of this SNPRM, a risk effectiveness
factor was developed that estimated the percentage of causal factors
leading to an accident that would be eliminated if each proposed
measure was established. A range of total anticipated benefits over the
19-year span of this rulemaking was estimated for each proposed measure
by annualizing the per-vessel benefits resulting from the actual and
potential spill data, extrapolating this into a cumulative present
value of oil spills avoided based on the number of vessels remaining in
service each year, and multiplying this cumulation by the measure's
effectiveness factor. The Coast Guard intends to include an estimate or
qualitative discussion of the benefits of each proposed measure in the
final rule. Relevant comments are requested on the methodology used for
the preliminary benefit analysis as well as each measure's anticipated
benefits and its economic feasibility.
The gross estimate of benefits for this rulemaking was conducted
and involved an assessment of casualty data over the past 20 years. The
Coast Guard estimates that the proposed measures would avert at least
one major spill of about 300,000 barrels over the next 19 years. This
is equivalent to a spill resulting from a collision between two 70,000
GT tankships, with cargo loss from at least two tanks on each tank
vessel. Alternatively, this would be equivalent to a grounding that
results in a complete loss of cargo from a small (21,000 GT) tankship.
The monetary benefits of the proposed regulation would include the
avoided costs of spill cleanup, third-party compensation (lost earnings
to fishermen, etc.), and natural resource damages. Historically,
casualty reports have either not addressed these avoided costs, or
their results have been widely disputed. There are many reasons for
this. For example, there are numerous factors affecting the possible
impact associated with an oil spill, such as type of product,
environment, time of year, location, and weather conditions. Therefore,
the assessment of damage and associated costs were subjective and in
some cases, even in large spills, they were never confirmed.
Accordingly, the Coast Guard uses the unspilled oil quantity in barrels
as the benefit value, discounted at 7 percent back to 1990. If the
averted 300,000-barrel spill were to occur in 1996, when the final rule
is scheduled to take effect, the discounted benefit would be the value
of avoiding a 213,896 barrel spill in 1990. If the averted 300,000-
barrel spill were to occur in 2014, the discounted benefit would be the
value of avoiding a 77,526 barrel spill in 1990.
Cost-Benefit. The benefit of this proposed rule would range from
the value of avoiding a 77,526 barrel spill in 1990 to the value of
avoiding a 213,896 barrel spill in 1990, depending on when the averted
spill is assumed to occur. The net present value of the cost of this
proposed rulemaking would range from $2,075 to $5,700 per barrel of
unspilled oil, when a mean present value of $3,900 per barrel of
unspilled oil. This compares with, for example, $13,000 per barrel of
unspilled oil for the ``Discharge Removal Equipment for Vessels
Carrying Oil'' IFR (58 FR 67988); $12,500 per barrel of unspilled oil
for the ``Vessel Response Plans'' IFR (58 FR 7376); $7,000 per barrel
of unspilled oil for the ``Overfill Devices'' IFR (59 FR 53286); and
$1,300 per barrel of unspilled oil for the ``Response Plans for Marine
Transportation-Related Facilities'' IFR (58 FR 7330).
Small Entities
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.), the
Coast Guard must consider whether this proposal, if adopted, will have
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. ``Small entities,'' may include (1) small businesses and not-
for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and
are not dominant in their fields and (2) governmental jurisdictions
with populations of less than 50,000.
This rulemaking considered small business impact for vessels
privately held by independent companies with an estimated capital
investment value of less than $500 million or companies that have less
than 500 employees. State and local governments, which altogether own
less than a dozen tank vessels, will not be significantly affected.
Not-for-profit organizations do not engage in the transportation of oil
in bulk by water.
There are a number of companies meeting the definition of small
business operating in each segment of industry (tankship, tank barge,
and towing vessel). Of the 190 U.S. tankships affected by this proposed
rulemaking, 16 are owned by 6 small businesses. Many of these company's
tankships are over 30 years old, have less cargo carrying capacity than
their competition, and are laid up due to market or company financial
conditions. Six small businesses own or operate 32 of the affected U.S.
tank barge population. No foreign small businesses own or operate
foreign tank vessels that would be affected by this proposed
rulemaking. Tank barge companies are required under this proposal to
enlist towing vessels with certain capabilities and trained personnel.
Indirectly, some towing vessel companies may also be affected by these
proposed requirements; however, the Coast Guard has determined that
most tank barge owners also own their towing vessels or regularly
contract with a limited number of towing companies.
An economic impact is unavoidable, as the statute clearly targets
existing vessels of 5,000 GT or more than carry oil in bulk as cargo
and that do not have double hulls. The present value of the total cost
to the industry of this proposal discounted at 7 percent to 1990 would
total $443.6 million. However, the Coast Guard has proposed several
measures within this rulemaking to accommodate small business needs and
provide flexibility to small entities affected by this rulemaking.
The proposed training requirements include allowances for
comparable company training courses and a 1-year compliance delay. In-
house training by smaller businesses would be accepted as long as the
curriculum and demonstration of skill provisions could be met. Company
programs are anticipated to cost a fraction of commercial training and
should provide smaller businesses with a means to train personnel at a
lower cost than the present commercial courses.
Additionally, the proposed rulemaking acknowledges past course
completion; thus, personnel would be given a longer time to meet this
requirement if they have completed similar courses, either company-
sponsored or commercial, within 3 years of the effective date of the
rule. Maritime schools and many commercial courses have been offering
this type of curriculum since 1991. Allowing for the
[[Page 55926]]
delayed compliance date and past course completion, the training course
phase-in period would be 4 years. This longer phase-in period should
assist smaller companies in setting up a suitable in-house or
commercial course program. It also recognizes that a substantial number
of merchant mariners in the industry are already trained. The 4-year
phase-in is also intended to ease the competitive burden of obtaining
commercial course slots, should entities choose to use commercial
training facilities.
Small business needs are accommodated in the proposed enhanced
survey requirement by allowing companies owning tank barges or tank
vessels less than 30,000 dwts to conduct their own surveys and to
choose among various organizations for program oversight.
To accommodate small businesses in the tank barge industry, the
cost of reconfiguring a towing vessel owned by the tank barge company
was minimized by requiring the proposed autopilot alarm to be an
indicator; a simple sign placed on the wheel would suffice. This gives
a comparable warning in the small confines of the one-man towing vessel
wheelhouse as would an alarm for the larger, multiple-person, complex
bridge of a tankship. The proposed emergency steering capability
requirement accommodates a range of designs by allowing for either a
secondary steering system or twin propulsion capability. This allows
the majority of tank barge companies to continue using their vessels or
the vessels they typically lease; however, it also ensures that the
master or operator would have some maneuvering capability in an
electrical, hydraulic or engine failure, which would be a benefit to
all operators.
Smaller tankship companies should have the capability to conduct
the maneuvering performance standard tests of IMO Resolution A.751(18).
While the assessment cost of this item is for a commercial company to
conduct the maneuvering tests, this proposed rulemaking in no way
prohibits a company from conducting the tests in-house. The guidelines
and technical details of the tests are well documented and are within
the capabilities of a licensed master or pilot. The equipment needed
for these types of maneuvering tests, such as a DGPS, is available on
the commercial market at low cost.
The proposed operational measures would affect several small
businesses within the maritime industry until 2015, a period of about
19 years. Through the design of this proposal's measures as described
in the preceding paragraphs, the Coast Guard believes that the
flexibility in this proposed rulemaking balances the requirements on
tank barges and tankships and provides equitable treatment of U.S. and
foreign flag vessels.
Therefore, the Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that
this proposal, if adopted, will not have a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities. If, however, you think that
your business or organization qualifies as a small entity and that this
proposal will have a significant economic impact on your business or
organization, please submit a comment (see ADDRESSES) explaining why
you think it qualifies and in what way and to what degree this proposal
will economically affect it.
Unfunded Mandate
Under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (Pub. L. 104-4), the Coast
Guard must consider whether this proposal, if adopted, will result in
an annual expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, or $100 million (adjusted annually
for inflation). That Act also requires (in Section 205) that the Coast
Guard identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory
alternatives and from those alternatives select the least costly, most
cost-effective, or least burdensome alternative that achieves the
objective of the rule.
The cost analysis completed for this SNPRM estimates first year
compliance costs to be 183.8 million. Annual costs of the proposal
would trend downward, leveling out at $5.8 million during 2012-2014,
the final years that the proposal would be in effect. The only time
this proposal would result in estimated costs of $100 million or more
to either State, local, or tribal governments in the aggregate, or to
the private sector would be in its first year of implementation. State,
local, and tribal governments, which altogether own less than a dozen
tank vessels, would account for less than 2 percent of the estimated
first-year costs. Therefore, the private sector would be most impacted
by first-year costs. The preliminary cost-benefit analysis done for
this SNPRM addresses expected cost-effectiveness for each proposed
measure. For those measures that were estimated to be the most costly,
alternative requirements, extended implementation periods, or
provisions for a COTP to determine appropriate implementation on a
case-by-case basis were proposed in this SNPRM.
If you think that your business or organization falls under the
provisions of the Act and this proposal will have an annual impact on
your business or organization that meets the parameters, please submit
a comment (see ADDRESSES) explaining why you think it qualifies and in
what way and to what degree this proposal will economically affect it.
Collection of Information
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews each proposed rule that
contains a collection-of-information requirement to determine whether
the practical value of the information is worth the burden imposed by
its collection. Collection-of-information requirements include
reporting, recordkeeping, notification, and other, similar
requirements.
This proposal contains collection-of-information requirements in
the following sections: Secs. 157.415, 157.420, 157.425, 157.430,
157.435, 157.445, 157.450, and 157.455. The following particulars
apply:
Dot No: 2115.
Administration: U.S. Coast Guard.
Title: Operational Measures to Reduce Oil Spills From Existing Tank
Vessels Without Double Hulls.
Need for Information: Without adequate operational measures on tank
vessels, the potential for spills as a result of human error is greatly
increased. This proposal requires the mariner to record, post, keep
documentation or provide notification that is necessary for the safe
operation of the vessel including: (1) Documentation for company
management and the Coast Guard to ensure personnel are trained and
systems are being surveyed both frequently and thoroughly; (2)
information to ensure the crew is informed of rest hour requirements;
(3) certain vessel specific maneuvering characteristics so that
personnel navigating the vessel have a quick reference to critical
information; (4) documentation of a vessel's command and control status
to ensure a pilot receives accurate information prior to maneuvering
evolutions. These requirements are consistent with good commercial
practice and the dictates of good seamanship for safe navigation and
maintenance of vital equipment. Additionally, a vessel owners, master,
or operator would be required to notify the COTP if the vessel did not
have certain maneuvering capabilities so that safe port entry
provisions can be made.
Proposed Use of Information: The primary use of this information
would be for Coast Guard inspectors to determine if a vessel is in
compliance or, in the case of a casualty, whether
[[Page 55927]]
failure to meet these proposed regulations contributed to the casualty.
The Coast Guard has no specific plan to collect this data for
statistical analysis.
Frequency of Response: Owners, masters, or operators of tank
vessels subject to this proposed regulation would be required to
record, post, keep documentation, or provide notification of the
following: (1) Under Sec. 157.415(d), annual completion of bridge
resource management training for each officer of the navigational
watch; (2) under Sec. 157.420(d), completion of annual training by
letter or vessel log entry, by each crew member assigned to a
navigational or engineering watch; (3) under Sec. 157.425(b), permanent
posting of the minimum rest hour requirement in crew lounge areas and
work spaces; (4) under Sec. 157.430 (a) and (b), completion of an
enhanced survey during each drydock examination (this information must
also be provided to the Coast Guard upon its request); (5) under
Sec. 157.435, by vessel log entry or similar means on board the vessel,
completion of each required vital systems survey; (6) under
Sec. 157.445(b), notification of a maneuvering capability that is less
than the IMO criteria; (7) under Sec. 157.445(c), permanent posting of
test results for maneuvering performance capability; (8) under
Sec. 157.450, permanent posting of standardized IMO maneuvering
information in the wheelhouse, completion of a pilot card before
entering the port or place of destination and prior to departing port,
and maintenance of an onboard maneuvering booklet; (9) under
Sec. 157.455(a)(3), by vessel log entry or similar means on board the
vessel, calculations of under-keel clearance before entering the port
or place of destination and prior to departing port.
Burden Estimate: 76,913 hours.
Respondents: 1404.
Average Burden Hours per Respondent: 55.
The Coast Guard has submitted the requirements to OMB for review
under section 3504(h) of the Paperwork Reduction Act. Persons
submitting comments on the requirements should submit their comments
both the OMB and to the Coast Guard as indicated under ADDRESSES.
Federalism
The Coast Guard has analyzed this proposal under the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 and has determined that
this proposal does not have sufficient federalism implications to
warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
Environment
The Coast Guard considered the environmental impact of this
proposal and concluded that preparation of an Environmental Impact
Statement is not necessary. An Environmental Assessment and a draft
Finding of No Significant Impact are available in the docket for
inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES. The additional
training, survey, and operational considerations required by this rule
would enhance navigation safety and thereby reduce the likelihood of an
oil spill or other environmental damage.
List of Subjects
33 CFR Part 157
Cargo vessels, Oil pollution, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
46 CFR Part 31
Cargo vessels, Marine safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
46 CFR Part 35
Cargo vessels, Marine safety, Navigation (water), Occupational
safety and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Seaman.
For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Coast Guard proposes
to amend 33 CFR part 157, 46 CFR part 31, and 46 CFR part 35 as
follows:
PART 157--RULES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
RELATING TO TANK VESSELS CARRYING OIL IN BULK
1. The authority citation for part 157 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1903; 46 U.S.C. 3703, 3703a (note); 49 CFR
1.46. Subpart G also is issued under section 4115(b), Pub. L. 101-
380, 104 Stat. 520.
2. In Sec. 157.01, paragraph (a)(2) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 157.01 Applicability.
(a) * * *
(2) Any other vessel that enters or operates in the navigable
waters of the United States, or that operates, conducts lightering
under 46 U.S.C. 3715, or receives cargo from or transfers cargo to a
deepwater port under 33 U.S.C. 1501 et seq., in the United States
Exclusive Economic Zone, as defined in 33 U.S.C. 2701(8).
* * * * *
3. Section 157.02 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.02 Incorporation by reference.
(a) Certain material is incorporated by reference into this part
with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. To enforce any edition other than that
specified in paragraph (b) of this section, the Coast Guard must
publish notice of change in the Federal Register; and the material must
be available to the public. All approved material is available for
inspection at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol
Street NW., suite 700, Washington, DC, and at the U.S. Coast Guard,
Merchant Vessel Inspection and Documentation Division (G-MVI), 2100
Second Street SW., Washington, DC 20593-0001, and is available from the
sources indicated in paragraph (b) of this section.
(b) The material approved for incorporation by reference in this
part and the sections affected are as follows:
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
4 Albert Embankment, London SE1 7SR, England.
IMO Assembly Resolution A.601(15), Provision and Display of
Manoeuvring Information on Board Ships, Annex sections 1, 2.3,
and 3 with appendices...........................................157.440
IMO Assembly Resolution A.744(18), Guidelines on the Enhanced
Programme of Inspections During Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil
Tankers, Annex B sections 1.1.3-1.1.4, 1.2-1.3, 2.1, 2.3-2.6, 3-
8, and Annexes 1-10 with appendices.............................157.430
IMO Assembly Resolution A.751(18), Interim Standards for Ship
Manoeuvrability, Annex sections 1.2.2, 2.2-2.4, 3-5 with
Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644...............................157.440
Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
6th Floor, Portland House, Stag Place, London SWIE 5BH, England.
International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, Second
Edition, Chapters 6, 7, and 9...................................157.430
4. In Sec. 157.03, paragraphs (pp) through (tt) are added to read
as follows:
Sec. 157.03 Definitions.
* * * * *
(pp) Departing port means departing from an anchorage or facility
for a transit beyond the navigable waters of the United States as
established in 33 CFR 2.05-25(b) or, for a vessel on the Great Lakes, a
transit beyond the breakwater of harbor entrance.
(qq) Fleeting or assist towing vessel means any commercial vessel
engaged in towing astern, alongside, or pushing ahead, used solely
within a limited
[[Page 55928]]
geographic area, such as a particular barge fleeting area or commercial
facility, and used solely for restricted service, such as making up or
breaking up larger tows.
(rr) Officer in charge of a navigational watch means any officer
employed or engaged to be responsible for navigating or maneuvering the
vessel and for maintaining a continuous vigilant watch during his or
her periods of duty and following guidance set out by the master,
international or national regulations, and company policies.
(ss) Primary towing vessel means any vessel engaged in towing
astern, alongside, or pushing ahead and includes the tug in an
integrated tug barge. It does not include fleeting or assist towing
vessels.
(tt) Rest hour means an off-duty period of 1 hour during which no
tasks are assigned to the crew member and the crew member is not
scheduled to perform any duty. A rest hour may include response to
drills or emergencies.
SUBPART G--STRUCTURAL AND OPERATIONAL MEASURES FOR CERTAIN TANK
VESSELS WITHOUT DOUBLE HULLS
5. Section 157.400 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 157.400 Applicability.
This subpart applies to each tank vessel of 5,000 gross tons or
more that--
(a) Carries oil in bulk as cargo or cargo residue;
(b) Enters or operates in the navigable waters of the United States
or that operates, conducts lightering under 46 U.S.C. 3715, or receives
cargo from or transfers cargo to a deepwater port under 33 U.S.C. 1501
et seq., in the United States Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), as defined
in 33 U.S.C. 2701(8); and
(c) Is not currently equipped with a double hull meeting
Sec. 157.10d of this part, or an equivalent to the requirements of
Sec. 157.10d, but required to be equipped with a double hull at a date
set forth in 46 U.S.C. 3703a(b)(3) and (c)(3).
6. In Sec. 157.410, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 157.410 Emergency lightering requirements for tank vessels.
* * * * *
(c) Reducers, bolts, and gaskets must meet the requirements of 46
CFR subpart 56.25. Cast iron and malleable iron shall not be used for
valves or fittings in lines carrying flammable or combustible fluids
which are directly connected to, or in the proximity of, equipment or
other lines having open flames, or any parts operating at temperatures
above 260 deg.C (500 deg.F).
7. Section 157.415 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.415 Bridge resource management training.
(a) After [12 months after the effective date of the final rule.],
a tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall not assign a person to
duties as an officer in charge of a navigational watch unless that
person has satisfactorily completed a course that includes the
following:
(1) Instruction in the following areas:
(i) Communications: effective management of the flow of
information, including but not limited to, the exchange of information
between the master and the pilot, the master and the crew members, and
the officer in charge of a navigational watch and crew members.
(ii) Voyage planning: the planning of both ocean and pilotage water
transits to account for navigational hazards, weather, vessel traffic,
operational restrictions, facility and port requirements, and
compliance with local and international regulations.
(iii) Error trapping: identifying and verifying elements in a
sequence of events that could lead to an accident.
(iv) Situational awareness: accurate perception of any factors and
conditions that affect a vessel over time.
(v) Pilot and bridge team integration: the effective flow of
knowledge between the vessel's crew and the pilot to incorporate
knowledge of the local port area and ensure cooperation in the
development of the vessel's navigation plan.
(vi) Watch team training: method for training watchstanding
personnel to efficiently and effectively stand a watch.
(vii) Emergency situation procedures: development and use of
procedures, including communications between crew and shoreside
personnel and use of onboard safety equipment, for successful emergency
response.
(2) Practical demonstration of the following skills:
(i) Ability to recognize potential hazards to navigation,
incorporate these considerations into a voyage plan, and communicate
these hazards to subordinates, senior watchstanding personnel, and a
pilot during a voyage.
(ii) Ability to recognize subordinate limitations and take
appropriate action to ensure the subordinates are attentive and provide
accurate feedback on their assigned tasks during a voyage.
(iii) Ability to recognize and initiate communications with other
vessels, subordinates, and senior watchstanding personnel to prevent
miscommunication or an inappropriate action.
(iv) Ability to work with and, at the same time, monitor a pilot to
ensure consistency with vessel operating characteristics and the voyage
passage plan.
(v) Ability to use all available bridge equipment to perform their
assigned duties, and to display knowledge of the appropriate action(s)
to take in the event of an equipment malfunction.
(b) Tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall not assign a
person to duties as an officer in charge of a navigational watch unless
that person has demonstrated knowledge of company and vessel standard
operating procedures including allowed variations, watch augmentation
provisions, relationship of the officer in charge of a navigational
watch to the master or pilot when both are on the bridge, and emergency
navigation procedures.
(c) The training identified in paragraph (a) of this section must
be completed at least once every 5 years.
(d) Satisfactory completion of a commercial or company course
approved by the Coast Guard or, for an individual holding a foreign
license, the appropriate flag administration, that contains elements
comparable to those required in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this
section meets the initial training requirement if completed after [36
months prior to the effective date of the final rule.].
(e) Course completion must be documented by a certificate, license
endorsement, or a letter confirming that each officer in charge of a
navigational watch has satisfactorily completed the training
requirements. Copies of each officer's certificate, endorsement, or
letter confirming their completion must be retained on board the vessel
or otherwise be made readily available to the Coast Guard for
examination upon request.
(f) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that those
individuals assigned to duties on the primary towing vessel that are
similar to the duties of the officer in charge of a navigational watch
also complete bridge resource management training as specified in
paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section.
8. Section 157.420 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.420 Vessel specific watch training.
(a) The owner, master, or operator of a tank vessel shall not
assign duties to an individual assigned lookout, helmsman, or
engineering watch duties unless that person has successfully
[[Page 55929]]
completed a course that includes academic instruction in the following
areas, as applicable to the individual's job responsibilities:
(1) Communications: effective flow of information between
personnel, including the importance of feedback and timeliness.
(2) Error trapping: identifying and verifying elements in a
sequence of events that could lead to an accident.
(3) Equipment: employing correct use and monitoring requirements of
the equipment necessary to perform assigned duties, including the
appropriate action(s) to take in the event of an equipment malfunction.
(4) Watch team integration: the effective flow of information among
the vessel's crew to ensure the person in charge of vessel navigation
is kept aware of events pertaining to equipment operation and personnel
effectiveness.
(b) Each individual must complete initial training that meets the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this section prior to assignment of
watchkeeping duties.
(c) Each individual must complete annual training that meets the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this section.
(d) Completion of training must be documented by a certificate,
vessel log entry, or a letter confirming that each individual has
satisfactorily completed the training requirements. Copies of the
certificate or letter confirming completion must be retained on board
the vessel or otherwise made readily available to the Coast Guard for
examination upon request.
(e) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that those
individuals assigned to duties on the primary towing vessel that are
similar to lookout, helmsman, or engineering watch duties also complete
vessel specific watch training as specified in paragraphs (a) through
(d) of this section.
9. Section 157.425 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.425 Minimum rest hour requirement.
(a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure each person
is provided a minimum of 6 continuous rest hours within the 12 hours
prior to departing port or prior to cargo transfer operations before
assuming the following duties:
(1) Officer in charge of a navigational watch, lookout, helmsman,
engineer officer in charge of a manned engine room on a tankship,
member of an engineering watch on a tankship, and the operator or
master of the vessel, if scheduled as a member of the duty rotation for
officer in charge of a navigational watch.
(2) Person in charge of cargo transfer operations.
(b) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that the
individuals on the primary towing vessel having duties similar to those
listed in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section are provided a
minimum of 6 continuous rest hours within the 12 hours before assuming
his or her duties prior to departing port or prior to cargo transfer
operations.
(c) If a crew member's rest hours have been interrupted by drills
or emergencies, the operator or master shall assess the crew member's
fitness for duty before assigning him or her to any of the duties
described in this section.
(d) Minimum rest hour requirements must be posted on tank vessels
in crew lounge areas and work spaces.
10. Section 157.430 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.430 Enhanced survey requirements.
(a) Enhanced survey. The tank vessel owner, master, or operator
shall ensure an enhanced survey is conducted during each regularly
scheduled drydock examination required under 46 CFR part 31 or at a
frequency specified by the vessel's flag administration. Survey scope
and recordkeeping requirements must comply with the standards of IMO
Resolution A.744(18), Annex B sections 1.1.3-1.1.4, 1.2-1.3, 2.1, 2.3-
2.6, 3-8, and Annexes 1-10 with appendices.
(b) Alternate enhanced survey. For a tankship of less than 20,000
deadweight tons (dwt) carrying crude oil, a tankship of less than
30,000 dwt carrying product, or a tank barge, one of the following may
be substituted for the enhanced survey requirements in paragraph (a) of
this section:
(1) An enhanced survey performed by a recognized classification
society.
(2) An enhanced survey performed by the company with oversight by
the Coast Guard or the vessel's flag administration, a recognized
classification society, or an independent auditing authority approved
by the Coast Guard if--
(i) The frequency of survey is no less than that required by 46 CFR
part 31 or as specified by the vessel's flag administration;
(ii) Program plans establishing comparable standards with the
requirements in paragraph (a) of this section are approved by the
Commandant (G-MVI) and contain the following information:
(A) The scope of the inspection program.
(B) Permanent recordkeeping requirements.
(C) An implementation plan outlining a continuous survey program
and identifying by job title those individuals whom the company will
assign to conduct the surveys.
(D) Confirmation from the administration, a recognized
classification society, or an independent auditing authority approved
by the Coast Guard that the oversight implementation plan is feasible.
(c) A copy of the most recent survey must be retained onboard the
vessel or, upon request by the Coast Guard, made available within 24
hours for examination.
11. Section 157.435 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.435 Vital systems surveys.
(a) A tank vessel owner, master, or operator shall survey the
following systems:
(1) Cargo systems. The survey must include the examination and
testing of the items listed in Chapters 6, 7, and 9 of the
International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, if
applicable, prior to cargo transfer operations.
(2) Mooring systems. The survey must include a visual examination
of the emergency towline, the anchor releasing mechanism, and mooring
lines prior to departing port.
(b) Surveys must be conducted by company management personnel,
company designated individuals, or vessel senior officers knowledgeable
about the equipment operating parameters and having the authority,
capability, and responsibility to initiate corrective action when the
equipment is not functioning properly.
(c) The material condition of each system identified in paragraph
(a) of this section must be recorded in the vessel's Oil Record Book,
Part I or Part II, as applicable, the vessel's log, or other onboard
documentation.
12. Section 157.440 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.440 Autopilot alarm or indicator.
(a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that each
installed autopilot unit without automatic manual override has an
audible and visual alarm, which is distinct from other required bridge
alarms, that will activate if the helm is manually moved while the
autopilot is engaged.
(b) A tank barge owner or operator shall ensure that each autopilot
unit without automatic manual override installed on the primary towing
vessel has a means to clearly indicate the autopilot status and warns
personnel of
[[Page 55930]]
the requirement to disengage the autopilot if positive rudder control
is needed.
13. Section 157.445 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.445 Maneuvering performance capability.
(a) A tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that
maneuvering tests in accordance with IMO Resolution A.751(18), sections
1.2.2, 2.3-2.4, and 3-5 (with Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644) have
been conducted by [12 months after the effective date of the final
rule]. Satisfactory completion of maneuvering performance tests must be
shown by--
(1) For a foreign flag tankship, a letter from the flag
administration or a recognized classification society stating the
requirements in paragraph (a) of this section have been met; or
(2) For a U.S. flag tankship, test results from the vessel owner
confirming the completion of sea trial maneuvers or a letter from a
recognized classification society stating the requirements in paragraph
(a) of this section have been met.
(b) If a vessel undergoes a major conversion or alteration
affecting the control systems, control surfaces, propulsion system, or
other areas which may be expected to alter maneuvering performance, the
tankship owner, master, or operator shall ensure that maneuvering tests
are conducted as required by paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) If a vessel does not meet the performance standards of IMO
Resolution A.751(18), the owner, master, or operator must inform the
Captain of the Port (COTP) by message, letter, or radio contact, at
least 24 hours before entering the port of place of destination. Upon
notification, the COTP will determine if additional operational
restrictions for port entry should be imposed on the vessel. These may
include, but are not limited to--
(1) Requiring a tug escort or augmentation of existing escorts;
(2) Restricting transit times;
(3) Restricting vessel speed;
(4) Requiring the vessel to follow a specified route and make
specified reports;
(5) Barring entry into port; or
(6) Imposing other measure(s) appropriate for local conditions.
(d) Performance test results, recorded in the format of Appendix 6
of the Explanatory Notes in MSC/Circ.644, must be prominently displayed
in the wheelhouse.
14. Section 157.450 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.450 Maneuvering and vessel status information.
A tankship owner, master or operator shall comply with IMO
Resolution A.601(15), Annex sections 1, 2.3, and 3 with appendices.
15. Section 157.455 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.455 Minimum under-keel clearance.
(a) For a tank vessel that is not fitted with a double bottom that
covers the entire cargo tank length, a vessel owner, master, or
operator shall meet the following requirements prior to entering the
port or place of destination and prior to departing port:
(1) The tank vessel's deepest navigational draft must be calculated
including the following factors--
(i) The mean draft;
(ii) The trim and list characteristics; and
(iii) The intended transit speed and the corresponding squat
characteristics, if known.
(2) The anticipated controlling depth must be calculated including
the following factors--
(i) Tide and current conditions;
(ii) Present sea state conditions;
(iii) Past weather impact on water depth;
(iv) The depth at the facility or anchorage; and
(v) The depth of the transit area found in the publication and
chart materials required to be on board the vessel by 33 CFR part 164.
(3) The anticipated under-keel clearance must be calculated by
subtracting the tank vessel's deepest navigational draft from the
anticipated controlling depth. The vessel's calculated deepest
navigational draft, anticipated controlling depth, and the calculated
anticipated under-keel clearance must be recorded in the vessel's log
or in other onboard documentation.
(4) The vessel shall not proceed without the approval of the local
COTP if the anticipated under-keel clearance is less than .5 meter (2
feet).
(b) For a tank barge that is not fitted with a double bottom that
covers the entire cargo tank length, the tank barge owner or operator
shall ensure that the primary towing vessel owner, master, or operator
meets the requirements specified in paragraphs (a) (1) through (4) of
this section.
16. Section 157.460 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 157.460 Additional operational requirements for tank barges.
(a) Emergency steering capability. The owner or operator of each
tank barge shall ensure that by [12 months after effective date of the
final rule] the primary towing vessel has--
(1) A steering gear system with a main power unit, an alternative
power unit, and two remote steering gear control systems, except that
separate steering wheels or steering levers are not required. The
steering gear control systems shall be arranged so that if the system
in operation fails, the other system can be brought into immediate
operation from a position on the navigating bridge; or
(2) Twin screw propulsion with separate control systems for each
propeller.
(b) Fendering system. An owner or operator of a tank barge shall
ensure the primary towing vessel and any fleeting or assist towing
vessels have a fendering system that is of substantial size and
composition to prevent metal to metal contact between the towing vessel
and the barge during maneuvering operations.
PART 31--INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION
17. The authority citation for part 31 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1321(j); 46 U.S.C. 2103, 3306, 3703; 49
U.S.C. App. 1804; E.O. 12234, 45 FR 58801, 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p.
277; E.O. 11735, 38 FR 21243, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp., p. 793; 49 CFR
1.46; Section 31.10-21a also issued under the authority of Sec.
4109, Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 515.
18. In Sec. 31.10-21, Table (a) is revised to read as follows:
[[Page 55931]]
Table 31.10.--21 (a) Salt Water Service Vessels Examination Intervals in Years
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ship and Double
Double Double single hull
Ship and hull barge hull barge Single hull Wood hull hull barge barge Single hull Double
single with with barge with ship and grade D grade D asphalt hull
hull internal external independent barge and E and E barge\6\\9\ asphalt
barge\9\ framing\1\ framing\2\ tanks\3\\9\ cargoes cargoes barge\7\
only\4\\9\ only\5\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drydock....................................... 2.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 2.5 2.5 5.0 2.5 5.0
Internal structural........................... 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 5.0 5.0 2.5 10.0 2.5
Cargo tank internal........................... \8\2.5 \8\5.0 \8\10.0 \8\10.0 \8\2.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 15.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the internal tank surface.
\2\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the external tank surface accessible for
examination from voids, double bottoms, and other similar spaces.
\3\Applicable to single hull tank barges with independent cargo tanks where the cargo tanks are not a contiguous part of the hull structure and which
has adequate clearance between the tanks and between the tanks and the vessel's hull to provide access for examination of all tank surfaces and the
hull structure.
\4\Applicable to single hull tankships and tank barges certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.
\5\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.
\6\Applicable to single hull tank barges certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.
\7\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.
\8\Or as specified in part 38 or 151 as applicable.
\9\Enhanced survey requirements apply as specified in 33 CFR part 157.
19. In Sec. 31.10-21, Table (b) is revised to read as follows:
Table 31.10.--21(b) Fresh Water Service Vessels Examination Intervals in Years
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ship and
single Double
Ship and Double Double Single hull hull hull Single Double
single hull barge hull barge barge with Wood hull barge barge hull hull
hull with with independent ship and grade D grade D asphalt asphalt
barge\9\ internal external tanks3,9 barge and E an E barge6,9 barge\7\
framing\1\ framing\2\ cargoes cargoes
only4,9 only\5\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drydock.......................................... 5.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 2.5 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0
Internal structural.............................. 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0
Cargo tank internal.............................. \8\5.0 \8\5.0 \8\10.0 \8\10.0 \8\2.5 5.0 10.0 10.0 15.0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes:
\1\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the internal tank surface.
\2\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends, and bottoms) when the structural framing is on the external tank surface accessible for
examination from voids, double bottoms, and other similar spaces.
\3\Applicable to single hull tank barges with independent cargo tanks where the cargo tanks are not a contiguous part of the hull structure and which
has adequate clearance between the tanks and between the tanks and the vessel's hull to provide access for examination of all tank surfaces and the
hull structure.
\4\Applicable to single hull tank ships and tank barges certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.
\5\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of grade D and E cargoes only.
\6\Applicable to single hull tank barges certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.
\7\Applicable to double hull tank barges (double sides, ends and bottoms) certificated for the carriage of asphalt only.
\8\Or as specified in part 38 or 151 as applicable.
\9\Enhanced survey requirements apply as specified in 33 CFR part 157.
PART 35--OPERATIONS
20. The Authority citation for part 35 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 33 U.S.C. 1321(j); 46 U.S.C. 3306, 3703, 6101; 49
U.S.C. App. 1804; E.O. 11735, 38 FR 21243, 3 CFR, 1971-1975 Comp.,
p. 793; E.O. 12234, 45 FR 58801, 3 CFR, 1980 Comp., p. 277; 49 CFR
1.46.
21. In Sec. 35.01-40, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 35.01-40 Prevention of oil pollution-TB/ALL.
* * * * *
(c) 33 CFR parts 151, 155, 156, 157 and 164.
Dated: October 27, 1995.
A.E. Henn,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Acting Commandant.
[FR Doc. 95-27185 Filed 10-31-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-14-M
