[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 238 (Tuesday, December 13, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-30514]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: December 13, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Federal Highway Administration
23 CFR Part 1205
[NHTSA Docket No. 93-20; Notice 2]
RIN 2127-AE89
Highway Safety Programs; Determination of Effectiveness
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Department of Transportation
(DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: Section 2002(a) of the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) required that the Secretary of
Transportation either designate six key areas as priority highway
safety programs or submit a report to Congress describing the reasons
for not establishing these programs as priorities. Four of the six
program areas had already been designated as priority programs by the
Secretary. This final rule adds Speed Control, but not School Bus
Safety, to the list of priority programs.
EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made by this final rule are effective
January 12, 1995.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: In NHTSA: Ms. Marlene Markison, Office
of Regional Operations, NRO-01, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590, telephone:
(202) 366-2121; or Ms. Heidi L. Coleman, Office of Chief Counsel,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, telephone: (202) 366-
1834. In FHWA: Ms. Julie Cirillo, HHS-10, Federal Highway
Administration, telephone: (202) 366-2170.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The State and Community Highway Safety Grant Program (section 402
program) was established under the Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23
U.S.C. 402. The Act required the establishment of Uniform Standards for
State Highway Safety Programs to assist the States and local
communities in organizing their highway safety programs. Eighteen such
standards were established and have been administered at the Federal
level by FHWA and NHTSA. NHTSA is responsible for developing and
implementing highway safety programs relating to the vehicle and
driver; FHWA has similar responsibilities in program areas involving
the roadway. The FHWA is also responsible for implementing programs
relating to commercial motor vehicle safety. These programs include
measures related to speed control.
Until 1976, the 402 program was principally directed towards
achieving State and local compliance with the 18 Highway Safety Program
Standards, which were considered mandatory requirements with financial
sanctions for non-compliance. Under the Highway Safety Act of 1976,
Congress provided for a more flexible implementation of the program so
the Secretary would not have to require State compliance with every
uniform standard or with each element of every uniform standard. As a
result, the standards became more like guidelines for use by the
States, and management of the program shifted from enforcing standards
to one of problem identification and countermeasure development and
evaluation, using the standards as a framework for the State programs.
In 1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. 97-35, revising the section 402 program. The Act directed
the agencies to conduct rulemaking to determine those State and local
highway safety programs most effective in reducing accidents, injuries,
and fatalities.
On April 1, 1982, NHTSA and FHWA issued a joint final rule (47 FR
15116) identifying six National Priority program areas which the
agencies then considered to be the most effective highway safety
programs. The six program areas included one FHWA program area, Safety
Construction and Operational Improvements, and the following NHTSA
Program Areas: Occupant Protection, Alcohol Countermeasures, Police
Traffic Services, Emergency Medical Services, and Traffic Records.
The April 1982 final rule provided that these National Priority
program areas would be eligible for Federal funding using an expedited
procedure under the 402 program. 23 CFR 1205.4. It also established a
mechanism by which other, nonpriority programs identified by a State
may be eligible for Federal funding. 23 CFR 1205.5(a) and (b).
Periodic Review and Determination of Priority Programs
On April 2, 1987, the enactment of the Surface Transportation and
Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-17) revised
23 U.S.C. 402. The changes provided for a periodic review of the
effectiveness of the various programs eligible for funding under
section 402 in reducing crashes, injuries and fatalities. The periodic
review procedure was enacted to ensure the continued relevance of the
section 402 program to changing circumstances and traffic safety needs
and to ensure that Federal funds continue to be used for the most
effective programs.
The legislation also provided that the standards promulgated under
section 402 and codified in 23 CFR Part 1204 be changed to guidelines.
The purpose of this amendment was to conform the language of section
402 and Part 1204 to the current implementation of the programs.
Pursuant to these amendments, NHTSA and FHWA conducted a rulemaking
action to review those programs most effective in reducing crashes,
injuries and fatalities. In a final rule issued on April 6, 1988 (53 FR
1255), the agencies determined that the National Priority program areas
should continue to include the one FHWA program area, Roadway Safety
(formerly, Safety Construction and Operational Improvements), and the
five NHTSA program areas that had been identified in 1982. In addition,
the agencies determined that a sixth NHTSA area, Motorcycle Safety,
should be added.
On May 3, 1991, NHTSA and FHWA published a joint NPRM (56 FR 20387)
proposing to add Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety as one of the National
Priority program areas. The public comments supported that proposal and
the area of Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety was added to the list of
National Priority program areas eligible for the expedited funding
process on October 4, 1991 (56 FR 50250).
As a result of these rulemaking actions, the National Priority
program areas included the following:
1. Alcohol and Other Drug Countermeasures
2. Police Traffic Services
3. Occupant Protection
4. Traffic Records
5. Emergency Medical Services
6. Motorcycle Safety
7. Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety
8. Roadway Safety
ISTEA Requirements
On December 18, 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation
Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) was signed into law. Section 2002(a) of
ISTEA required that the Secretary of Transportation either designate
six key areas as priority highway safety programs or submit a report to
Congress describing the reasons for not establishing these programs as
priorities. The six program areas listed in ISTEA included programs:
(1) To reduce injuries and deaths resulting from motor vehicles
being driven in excess of posted speed limits (Speed Control), (2)
to encourage the proper use of occupant protection devices
(including the use of safety belts and child restraint systems) by
occupants of motor vehicles and to increase public awareness of the
benefit of motor vehicles equipped with air bags (Use of Occupant
Protection Devices), (3) to reduce deaths and injuries resulting
from persons driving motor vehicles while impaired by alcohol or a
controlled substance (Driving While Impaired), (4) to reduce deaths
and injuries resulting from accidents involving motor vehicles and
motorcycles (Motorcycle Safety), (5) to reduce injuries and deaths
resulting from accidents involving school buses (School Bus Safety)
and (6) to improve law enforcement services in motor vehicle
accident prevention, traffic supervision, and post-accident
procedures (Police Traffic Services).
The Secretary had already designated four of these six program
areas as priority programs, but not Speed Control or School Bus Safety.
Accordingly, on January 14, 1994, NHTSA and FHWA published a notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register requesting
comments from the public on whether to expand the list of National
Priority program areas.
The agencies explained that they apply three criteria to determine
whether a program area should be identified as a National Priority
program under 23 CFR Part 1205:
Whether the problem is of national concern (including the
relative magnitude of the problem);
Whether effective countermeasures have been developed in
this area which address this concern; and
Whether State programs in the area appear to be among the
most effective in reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities as
compared to other traffic safety program areas.
The NPRM proposed to expand the list of National Priority program
areas to include Speed Control, and requested comments on the agencies'
preliminary determination that School Bus Safety should not be added as
a National Priority program area at this time.
Comments Received
The agencies received 34 comments to the docket in response to the
NPRM, including comments from 22 State agencies (with responsibility
for transportation/highway safety, law enforcement and education); a
local PTA Council; a county health department; a private bus operator;
and nine national organizations. The national organizations represent
highway safety interests (National Association of Governors' Highway
Safety Representatives, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety,
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety and the Center for Auto Safety);
law enforcement organizations (International Association of Chiefs of
Police and National Sheriffs' Association); and pupil transportation
interests (National Association for Pupil Transportation, National
Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services and
National School Transportation Association).
Based on our review of the comments received and other available
information, NHTSA and FHWA have decided to adopt the proposal
published in the NPRM. For the reasons set forth below, the agencies
have decided to add Speed Control to the list of National Priority
program areas, and not to add School Bus Safety to the list at this
time.
Speed Control
Is Speeding a Problem of National Concern?
NHTSA and FHWA tentatively concluded in the NPRM that speeding is a
problem of national concern, based on a number of considerations.
The agencies explained in the NPRM that speeding is defined as not
only exceeding the posted speed limit, but also driving too fast for
conditions. While the agencies recognized that reliable data on travel
speeds are relatively limited and often difficult to compare, NHTSA and
FHWA tentatively concluded in the NPRM, based on the most reliable data
available, that the travel speeds of motorists have increased in recent
years.
The NPRM explained that NHTSA studies suggest that most drivers
recognize that speeding is a violation of the law, but few regard the
violation as a serious offense. This led the agency to conclude that
the public does not view speeding per se as an immediate safety risk.
However, as NHTSA and FHWA pointed out in the NPRM, speeding is one
of the most prevalent reported factors associated with crashes, and
studies identify correlations between speeding and other factors often
associated with crashes, including alcohol involvement, young drivers,
male drivers, motorcyclists and nighttime driving.
The agencies reported in the NPRM that speeding is cited as a
contributing factor in approximately 11 percent of all police-reported
crashes and in approximately 34 percent of all fatal crashes (NHTSA,
Fatal Accident Reporting System, 1991). The agencies estimated that in
1991, 13,909 fatalities and 77,000 moderate to critical injuries
occurred in speed-related crashes, resulting in an economic cost for
all speed-related crashes (including all injury levels) of over $19
billion.
As explained in the NPRM, excessive speed contributes to motor
vehicle crashes in a number of ways. Drivers have less time to react
when travelling at higher speeds since speed increases the distance a
vehicle travels during the time it takes for a driver to react to a
perceived danger; speed increases the total stopping distance necessary
to halt a vehicle; and speed reduces a driver's ability to steer safely
around curves on highways or objects in the roadway.
Speed variance, the difference in speed among vehicles in the
traffic stream, also contributes to motor vehicle crashes. As speed
variance increases, vehicles come close to each other more frequently,
which leads to more frequent lane changes and passing maneuvers as the
faster drivers seek to avoid slower-moving vehicles. Research studies
have shown that motor vehicle crashes are more likely where speed
variance is greater, and data have shown that a speed variance of 20
mph from the average speed can result in a crash risk 11 times greater
than those travelling at the average speed.
Finally, increased speeds result in reduced margins for error and
increased severity for those vehicles involved in crashes. As the speed
of a car increases from 20 mph to 80 mph, a factor of four, the energy
of the impact delivered in a collision with a fixed object goes up by a
factor of sixteen, increasing dramatically the chance of death or
serious injury.
Citing a recent FHWA study entitled Assessment of Current Speed
Zoning Criteria, the NPRM indicated that: (1) On average, seven out of
ten motorists exceeded posted limits; (2) average speeds ran
approximately two to six mph above posted limits; and (3) prevailing
85th percentile speeds ran approximately eight to twelve mph above
posted limits.
One commenter, the West Virginia Division of Highways, questioned
the agencies' tentative conclusion that speeding is a problem of
national concern. The State asserted that the agencies' comparison
between the 85th percentile speed and the speed limit indicates a
problem with speed zones (which, according to West Virginia, are set
through public pressure rather than by engineering principles), not
with speeding. West Virginia further suggested that, as drivers have
gained additional experience driving faster than 55 (following the
speed limit's being raised to 65 on certain rural Interstates), ``it is
to be anticipated that speeds would gradually increase.''
The agencies accept West Virginia's explanation that, as drivers
gain additional experience driving faster, their speeds tend to
increase. We disagree, however, that this supports a conclusion that
the difference between the 85th percentile speed and the speed limit
indicates a problem with speed zones, not with speeding. In fact, if
West Virginia's explanation is correct, the agencies believe that, if
speed limits were increased to match the 85th percentile, speeds are
likely to gradually increase even further, as drivers adjust to the
higher speed limits.
All other comments received in response to the NPRM supported the
agencies' conclusion that speeding is a problem of national concern.
New Mexico, for example, reported that it continues to suffer among the
highest rates of motor vehicle deaths in the nation, and some 25% of
their crash fatalities involve excessive speed. Michigan reported that
in 1991 excessive speed accounted for 43% of the total crashes, 44% of
fatal crashes, 52% of injury crashes and 41% of property damage crashes
in that State.
Alaska commented that traveling at unsafe speeds is the leading
cause of the State's motor vehicle crashes and is a contributing factor
in 27% of its fatal crashes. North Carolina stated that in 1992 speed
was noted as a contributing factor in 32% of all crashes and 39.8% of
fatal crashes.
The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) provided data
supporting the agencies' conclusion that travel speeds are increasing.
In addition, IIHS stated that fatalities have increased along with
travel speeds. According to IIHS:
In the 40 States that increased their speed limits to 65 mph on
rural interstates during 1987 and 1988, deaths on these roads were
17 percent higher in 1992, compared with the average number of
deaths on the same roads during 1982-86. In contrast, deaths on
rural interstates where the 55 mph limit was retained were 28
percent lower in 1992 compared with 1982-86. In the 40 States that
raised their rural interstate speed limit, the urban interstate
limit speed remained unchanged and on those highways, deaths in 1992
were 8 percent lower than in 1982-86 (IIHS, 1993b).
The agencies continue to conclude that speeding is a problem of
national concern.
Have Effective Speed Control Countermeasures Been Developed?
The agencies identified, in the NPRM, a number of speed control
countermeasures that they consider to be effective. They indicated that
NHTSA has identified and evaluated, and is currently demonstrating in
the law enforcement community a number of new law enforcement
technologies to further advance speed control efforts, including radar,
VASCAR, laser speed measuring devices, aerial speed measurement, photo
radar and electronic signing.
The NPRM stated that NHTSA studies show that one of the best
methods for obtaining compliance with speed limits is to combine an
aggressive enforcement campaign with a vigorous public information and
education effort. It also cited other effective countermeasures, such
as saturation patrols and multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional
enforcement efforts.
In the areas of highway design and traffic control, the agencies
explained that freeway design, culminating in the Interstate System,
has eliminated at-grade intersections and provided for free flow
traffic, which has resulted in a significant reduction in speed
variance and the promotion of uniform operating speed.
Other effective countermeasures were also mentioned. For example,
the NPRM indicated that variable message speed signs have been
developed to control speed for varying conditions and that real time
regulatory variable speed limits are now being tested in the State of
Washington. The NPRM indicated that these efforts can be further
enhanced through the development of comprehensive speed control
programs.
The commenters cited many of the same countermeasures and
technologies in their responses to the NPRM, and indicated they
considered them to be effective. IIHS, for example, indicated it
believes VASCAR and laser technologies can be effective at increasing
the proportion of speeders cited for violations since they are not
detectable by radar detectors. IIHS recommended also the use of radar
detector detectors (RDDs) as an effective countermeasure for
identifying individuals who are likely to be ``professional speeders.''
No commenters suggested that no effective speed control
countermeasures have been developed, and the agencies continue to
conclude that effective countermeasures have been developed.
Do State Speed Control Programs Appear To Be Among the Most Effective
in Reducing Crashes, Injuries, and Fatalities?
NHTSA and FHWA stated in the NPRM that state programs that have
been conducted to date demonstrate that speed control countermeasures
are extremely effective in reducing deaths and injuries, and cited a
number of examples. (For details, interested persons should read the
NPRM.)
The California Office of Traffic Safety (OTS) interpreted this
statement to mean that the agencies were placing more importance on
State, rather than local, programs. NHTSA and FHWA did not intend to
give this impression. In fact, the agencies recognize that many
countermeasures in the Speed Control area can be carried out most
effectively at the local level. The agencies' reference to ``State
programs'' was intended to cover programs conducted at either the State
or local level within a State. California OTS went on to indicate that
many countermeasures have been employed successfully throughout the
State to address the speeding problem.
The Department of California Highway Patrol (CHP) stated that
effective countermeasures exist only for localized speed control. CHP
claimed that the success of these programs is almost always localized
and/or temporary. The agencies agree that localized enforcement efforts
alone generally result in only localized, short-term impacts. However,
it has long been established that enforcement efforts, when combined
with a vigorous public information and education campaign, have much
more long-lasting effects. (See, ``Evaluation of the New York State
Police 55 MPH Speed Enforcement Project,'' August 1969, by the
Institute for Traffic Safety Management and Research.)
Commenters, such as IIHS and Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety,
supported this view. Advocates further commented, ``A national effort
[which provides a greater level of public information and awareness
regarding the safety dangers associated with speeding] will establish
the safety context for state and local speed control efforts under the
402 Program and provide those efforts with added credibility.''
West Virginia questioned the validity of the examples cited in the
NPRM. The State argued that ``the reductions in speed [experienced in
South Carolina and St. Louis] were minuscule'' and ``the sample [used
in California] was very small.'' West Virginia continued, ``the Notice
states a belief that the programs were effective but it gives no
measures of statistical significance or indications of necessary
seasonal adjustments or other information to back up this conclusion.''
The agencies disagree with West Virginia's comments. The success of
the South Carolina study, for example, was not measured by reductions
in speed, but rather using other factors. As stated in the NPRM, there
were 12,472 fewer crashes (a 10% decrease), 2,331 fewer injuries (a 7%
decrease) and 106 fewer fatalities in 1991 in South Carolina as
compared to 1989 (an 11% decrease). The vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in
South Carolina increased from 32,780 million to 34,456 million (a 5%
increase) during this period of time. The agencies believe the State's
rural initiative contributed to these reductions and that these
reductions are significant.
The agencies agree that the reduction in average speed (from 62 mph
to 61 mph) experienced in the first year of the St. Louis enforcement
operation (Operation Gateway) was not a significant reduction. However,
the NPRM stated that the St. Louis program was continuing and was
expected to result in further speed decreases, and further results have
in fact been achieved. The Missouri Division of Highway Safety did not
report the reduction in average speed as part of the second phase of
Operation Gateway. The State did report, however, that, prior to the
kickoff of the operation, the average speed of vehicles stopped for
speeding on I-270 was 78.3 mph, and the average speed of vehicles
stopped during the Operation Gateway kickoff was 74.3 mph. This
represents a 5% reduction in speed. The agencies believe this reduction
is significant.
With regard to the California study, the sample used may have
appeared small, as compared with the general motor vehicle population,
but the study's focus was on commercial motor vehicles, and the study
used as its sample a census of all crashes where the commercial motor
vehicle was at fault. As the agencies explained in the NPRM, speed
control efforts targeted commercial motor vehicles, and the data
revealed that the number of crashes where commercial motor vehicles
were at fault decreased by 3.5% (from 810 in 1986 to 782 in 1987). The
number of crashes caused by commercial motor vehicles which resulted in
injuries also declined, by 11.2% (from 259 in 1986 to 230 in 1987).
Seasonal adjustments were not made for the studies referenced in
the NPRM because they were not considered to be necessary. Seasonal
adjustments are not considered to be necessary, for example, for
studies in which data is to be collected during a brief period of time
involving no seasonal changes or for studies in which data is to be
collected during comparable time periods. Data was collected for the
South Carolina study during the same four months in 1990 and 1991. Data
was collected for the St. Louis effort during a brief period of time
before and during the kickoff of Operation Gateway, so seasonal changes
were not a factor in that study.
Most of the commenters agreed with the conclusion in the NPRM that
Speed Control Programs appear to be among the most effective in
reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities, and they provided examples
demonstrating the effectiveness of speed control countermeasures.
IIHS indicated that, in South Carolina, police issued 41 tickets
per 1,000 vehicles using lasers, as compared with 33 per 1,000 using
conventional radar.
New York State reported that it experienced the lowest fatality
rate on record in 1992 (1.65 deaths per hundred million vehicle miles
traveled), ``due in large part to the Division's strict [comprehensive
speed] enforcement program.'' According to New York, the fatality rate
of 1.65 was 29 percent lower than 2.33 in 1987 (when the State started
its program) and equates to 520 fewer lives lost on the highways of
that State. The program included a saturation strategy that not only
led to the apprehension of specific motorists, but also established a
visible presence and generated publicity which raised the perception of
risk among all motorists within the State.
Based on available information and the comments received in
response to the NPRM, the agencies continue to conclude that Speed
Control Programs are among the most effective in reducing crashes,
injuries, and fatalities.
Other Comments Received About Speed Control
The State of Illinois agreed that Speed Control should be
designated a priority program, but commented that there should be no
earmarking of funds for Speed Control (or any other program) and
monetary sanctions should not be imposed on States for failing to meet
compliance levels. Congress enacted the National Maximum Speed Limit
law, which established monetary sanctions for noncompliance and has,
from time to time, imposed earmarking or set-aside requirements in
appropriations legislation. NHTSA and FHWA are bound to implement these
congressional requirements. However, the designation of Speed Control
as a priority program under section 402 in this final rule will not
create any additional earmarking requirements or monetary sanctions.
Most comments strongly supported the designation of Speed Control
as a National Priority program area, particularly at this time. New
Mexico, for example, expressed its view that:
Speed control is ready to mature as a significant injury
prevention tool, following the cycle of public attitude change,
institutional preparation, and coordinated operational programming
that has worked well in * * * other areas. * * * [S]tate programs in
the coming * * * years for speed control could be among the most
productive injury control measures available to the safety world.
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety stated:
Speeding and excessive highway speeds have reached epidemic
proportions and must be treated as a national public health problem.
* * * It is incumbent on the agencies to develop a high profile
national program against speeding that provides a greater level of
public information and awareness regarding the safety dangers
associated with speeding.
NAGHSR concurred with the designation of Speed Control as a
National Priority, but expressed concern about the ``proliferation of
402 priorities'' and the ``possible overlap and duplication'' between
the Speed Control and Police Traffic Services (PTS) programs. NAGHSR
suggested that the agencies consider instead combining these two
programs in a way that emphasizes the importance of speed compliance
activities.
Three other commenters also recommended that Speed Control be
included under PTS, but for different reasons. California OTS expressed
concern that a separate Speed Control program area could ``result in
the redirection of efforts into `speed only' projects and dilute the
accomplishments made in highlighting speed as a major problem in all
traffic safety ventures.'' CHP stated that Speed Control already
receives considerable attention, and argued that including Speed
Control under PTS would allow individual States to better balance their
overall approach to traffic safety. West Virginia expressed its opinion
that ``public acceptance is likely to be higher if the Speed Control
function is part of a well-reasoned and balanced enforcement program
rather than as a stand-alone effort which can be interpreted as a
revenue enhancement measure.''
The agencies agree with the commenters that Speed Control programs
should continue to be included as part of broader traffic safety
programs. However, the designation of Speed Control as a priority
program does not require that States establish ``stand-alone'' efforts.
States have the ability and, in fact, are encouraged by the agencies to
continue to include Speed Control messages in their other traffic
safety programs. It is the agencies' hope that the program's
designation as a National Priority program area will result in the
inclusion of Speed Control messages in more traffic safety programs
than before.
NHTSA and FHWA have considered the comments cited above, and
decided not to include Speed Control as part of PTS. The agencies
recognize that there will be some overlap between the areas of Speed
Control and PTS, since law enforcement activity is an important
component in any Speed Control program. (There is a similar level of
overlap between the areas of PTS and other priority programs, such as
Alcohol Countermeasures and Occupant Protection, to the extent that
police agencies enforce laws designed to address these issues.)
However, the agencies believe it is important to list the Speed
Control program (as well as Alcohol Countermeasures and Occupant
Protection) separately, to reflect non-law enforcement activities that
are equally important components of these programs. In the area of
Speed Control, these components include, for example, the development
and enactment of speed-related laws, the use of new technologies,
public information and education activities, and the reexamination of
speed zoning criteria to ensure that posted speed limits are
appropriate for conditions.
Speed Control Determination
The agencies conclude that speeding does represent a significant
traffic safety problem throughout the country, and that numerous
countermeasures have been developed that have proven to be most
effective in addressing this problem. Accordingly, NHTSA and FHWA have
decided to designate Speed Control as a separate National Priority
program area. Speed Control will be administered jointly by both
agencies.
School Bus Safety
Is School Bus Safety a Problem of National Concern?
NHTSA and FHWA explained in the NPRM that the safety of children in
school buses has been a primary concern of parents and school systems
ever since buses began to be used to transport children and that this
concern has helped develop school buses into the safest form of
transportation in the country. The NPRM reported that, according to the
National Safety Council's ``Accident Facts'' (1991), during the 1989-90
school year, an estimated 380,000 buses were used to transport 22
million pupils approximately 3.8 billion miles (21 million miles per
school day) and that occupant fatality rates per hundred million
passenger miles in 1989 were 1.12 for passenger cars and 0.04 for
school buses.
The agencies recognized in the NPRM that school bus crashes, as
compared with automobile crashes, have a much different effect on the
population as a whole. When a child is fatally injured in a school bus
crash, there is a greater sense of loss and a greater sense of tragedy.
For this reason, school bus fatalities and crashes often receive a high
degree of public attention and draw an immediate and passionate
response from the community.
However, the number of fatalities in school bus crashes is small,
particularly when considering exposure and when compared to the number
of fatalities related to other priority programs. In 1991, passenger
cars were involved in 86.4 percent of all traffic crashes and 67.9
percent of all fatal crashes; whereas school buses were involved in
only 0.4 percent of all traffic crashes and in 0.3 percent of all fatal
crashes. These data demonstrate that the safety problem related to
school buses is not great when compared to that of other types of
vehicles.
Based on these findings, NHTSA and FHWA tentatively concluded in
the NPRM that School Bus Safety is not a problem that merits
designation as a National Priority program area.
Two commenters argued that any number of school bus fatalities
above zero is too high a fatality rate and, therefore, justifies
designating School Bus Safety as a Priority program. According to the
California Department of Education, ``school bus safety must be a
priority issue for both the State and Federal Government for as long as
our accident statistics show one `1' pupil passenger or one `1' pupil
pedestrian fatality. Zero `0', tolerance of pupil passenger and
pedestrian fatalities must be our goal.'' Similarly, the Center for
Auto Safety argued that ``the only way DOT could reject school bus
safety as a Priority Program would be to find that such a designation
would not reduce injuries and deaths in school buses at all.''
The agencies disagree, and while other commenters sought to have
the agencies designate School Bus Safety as a priority program area,
they did not suggest that School Bus Safety represents a significant
national problem. In fact, the Superintendent of Public Instruction for
Washington State said, ``We cannot disagree with [the statistics] you
have published [and w]e can not provide any additional statistics that
disagree with what you have already stated regarding Pupil
Transportation as the safest means of travel in the highway safety
system.''
Most commenters fully agreed with the agencies' conclusion that
School Bus Safety does not represent a serious problem when compared to
safety in other types of vehicles. The Oregon Department of
Transportation, for example, stated ``Oregon has had one serious school
bus accident in the last seventeen years. And, even though safety of
our children is a major concern, I do not believe school busses should
be a NHTSA priority. * * * School busses are probably the safest place
for students to be. We do not need to concentrate extraordinary effort
on school bus safety.'' The North Carolina Department of Transportation
commented, ``In North Carolina, as in the rest of the nation, school
buses remain the safest mode of transportation. * * * While the safety
of our children is still paramount, it will be extremely difficult for
any further school bus safety initiatives to be cost effective.''
New Mexico provided data which supported the agencies' conclusion.
The State's comments indicated, ``95 percent of school children in
serious crashes during school hours were in conventional passenger
vehicles--passenger cars, pickups, and vans.'' Only one percent of New
Mexico's school children in serious crashes during school hours were in
buses. The remaining 4 percent were pedestrians, on motorcycles, on
pedalcycles, and others, at one percent each. New Mexico's comments
continued, ``It is fair to say that non-use of safety belts in private
vehicles is the largest part of New Mexico's schoolchild safety
problem. * * * Indeed, the only deaths involving school buses in the
past decade have occurred outside the bus, or while entering or
leaving.''
Based on the comments received and the information available to the
agencies, NHTSA and FHWA continue to find that School Bus Safety does
not represent a serious problem that warrants its designation as a
National Priority program area.
Have Effective School Bus Safety Measures Been Developed?
NHTSA and FHWA explained in the NPRM that, although statistics
demonstrate that school buses already provide a remarkably safe form of
transportation, steps have been taken to further improve School Bus
Safety. These steps included providing set-aside funds in 1990 and 1991
to assist States in implementing ``effective'' and ``most effective''
school bus safety measures and publishing a number of rulemaking
actions, such as a final rule requiring new school buses to be equipped
with a stop signal arm, a final rule revising the minimum requirements
for school bus emergency exits and improving access to school bus
emergency doors and a final rule requiring that school buses enable
drivers to see either directly or through mirrors certain specified
areas in front of and along both sides of the vehicle. For a full
discussion of these and other actions, interested individuals are
encouraged to read the NPRM (59 FR 2341-42).
NHTSA has taken a number of additional steps that were not listed
in the NPRM to improve School Bus Safety. For example, to improve the
lateral stability and control of medium and heavy vehicles (including
school buses) during braking, NHTSA issued an NPRM proposing to require
that these vehicles be equipped with an antilock brake system (58 F.R.
50738). NHTSA also published a School Bus Safety Report and an annual
publication entitled ``Traffic Safety Facts 1993--School Buses.''
In addition, the National Safety Council (NSC) has agreed to
undertake a comprehensive marketing campaign on a school bus/pedestrian
safety educational program, developed recently by NHTSA for children in
grades K-6. This program is currently being modified into a product
that will be more marketable. NSC anticipates reaching over seven
million people in its initial marketing effort.
NHTSA has also taken steps to improve communications with the Pupil
Transportation community. The Department issued a press release
concerning school bus safety in August 1994, just prior to the
beginning of the new school year and, on August 18, 1994, NHTSA
conducted a National Meeting on Transporting Pre-Kindergarten Children
on School Buses. The meeting brought together, for the first time,
school bus manufacturers, child safety seat manufacturers, pupil
transportation officials, child safety seat trainers, injury control
professionals and Federal officials to discuss this emerging
transportation issue.
NHTSA and FHWA will continue to engage in appropriate activities
that improve the safety of school buses.
Do State School Bus Safety Measures Appear To Be Among the Most
Effective in Reducing Crashes, Injuries, and Fatalities?
As stated previously, school buses already provide the safest form
of transportation in our country. Since the number of fatalities that
are school bus-related is already so small, it is difficult to quantify
the benefits of the actions that have been taken. The agencies believe,
however, that these actions (described above), are the ones most likely
to reduce or eliminate fatal and serious injuries.
Other Comments Received About School Bus Safety
Fourteen commenters supported the agencies' tentative conclusion
not to designate School Bus Safety as a National Priority program area.
These commenters included three national highway safety organizations,
ten State highway safety/transportation agencies and one State highway
patrol. Twelve commenters urged the agencies to reconsider their
tentative conclusion. These commenters included one national highway
safety organization, one national police organization, three national
pupil transportation organizations, five State departments of
education, one local PTA council and one private bus operator.
Several commenters supported the designation of School Bus Safety
as a National Priority program area based on specific safety concerns
they face. Three commenters, for example, expressed concern over recent
increases in the number of incidents involving misbehavior and violence
on school buses, and one commenter expressed concern about crashes
involving buses and heavy trucks. While these problems may be of
concern in particular communities, the comments did not reveal and our
data do not indicate that these are problems of great magnitude
throughout the nation.
The section 402 program provides States with a mechanism for
funding programs that address State or local concerns, by providing
justification that includes information on the identified problem and
the activities or projects that are planned. Accordingly, these States
and communities have the ability, if they so choose and can provide the
justification, to develop programs to address the problems identified
in their comments. Moreover, the existence of these local problems does
not support a decision to designate School Bus Safety as a National
Priority program area for the entire nation.
A number of commenters supported the agencies' view. The
Massachusetts Governor's Highway Safety Bureau, for example, stated,
``School bus safety deserves a place within the 402 program, however
each state should identify the need for funding, within the framework
of the existing 402 guidelines.'' The Michigan Department of State
Police commented, ``[school bus safety] is an important element of any
state's highway safety program but should be based upon the identified
need in a particular state.'' The Arizona Governor's Office of Highway
Safety reported that it was able to support a school bus driver/
instructor training and certification program using section 402 dollars
using the current funding procedures. Arizona commented, ``There was no
program priority for school bus safety at that time, and we were still
able to address the issue by utilizing the current U.S. Department of
Transportation 402 program management procedures already in place.''
The comments of the National Association of Governors' Highway
Safety Representatives (NAGHSR) were most comprehensive, and
represented the views expressed by many of the other commenters. NAGHSR
stated:
We * * * concur that school bus safety should not be designated
a National Program Priority. NAGHSR is very supportive of the need
for protecting the safety of school children. However, state crash
statistics indicate that the problem is not of sufficient magnitude
to warrant a priority designation. Furthermore, we are concerned
that the designation of school bus safety will divert scarce 402
resources away from critical highway safety areas such as impaired
driving, occupant protection, and speed control. States currently
have the flexibility to spend 402 funds on school bus safety if the
needs exist and can be documented. This flexibility is sufficient to
address whatever school bus safety needs may exist.
Many commenters that urged the agencies to designate School Bus
Safety as a National Priority program area did so not based on a
perceived current safety problem or concern, but rather based on a need
for continued funding to maintain their positive safety record. As
explained previously, however, this is not a valid criterion for
designating a program to be a National Priority area.
The agencies are not attempting, as suggested by the National
School Transportation Association, to ``[p]enaliz[e] the industry for
doing a good job.'' In fact, we applaud the industry for its dedication
and continued excellent record of service and safety. Rather, we are
simply making our best efforts to ensure that scarce 402 resources are
used where they can have the greatest positive effect.
Most of the commenters agreed with this approach. The North
Carolina Department of Transportation, for example, stated, ``By not
including school bus safety as a priority program NHTSA and FHWA will
allow limited resources to be utilized where they can be most
effective.'' New Mexico commented that it supports the agencies'
decision to ``leav[e] school bus safety in its current status as an
important area of state efforts to protect children, but without
elevating it to a higher status as a national priority program area.''
The agencies understand the concern of many of the commenters who
are fearful that funds currently available may be discontinued. The
agencies do not intend for the decision not to include School Bus
Safety as a National Priority program to create an implication that
resources currently devoted to School Bus Safety should be reduced or
redirected.
A number of commenters noted that many more school children die or
are injured as pedestrians or bicyclists than as school bus occupants.
The National School Transportation Association stated, ``Outside the
bus, in the loading/unloading zone area, has been and is still the
problem area.'' According to NHTSA's ``Traffic Safety Facts 1993--
School Buses,'' of the people who lost their lives in school bus-
related crashes from 1983 through 1993, 59 percent were occupants of
other vehicles involved in the crash, 30 percent were non-occupants
(pedestrians, bicyclists, etc.) and only 11 percent were occupants of
school buses.
Some of these commenters were hopeful that problems related to the
loading and unloading of school children can be addressed through the
Pedestrian Safety program area, which was designated a National
Priority area in 1991. Within this context, some commenters requested
additional emphasis and attention from the agencies with regard to
pedestrian safety issues, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction
in Washington State cautioned that ``the emphasis of [pedestrian safety
programs] usually has little to do with school bus stops.''
NHTSA has already taken steps to address this concern, which is
shared by the agencies. In September 1992, NHTSA started a research and
development effort relating to elementary school-age pedestrians who
are school bus riders. Under this effort, which was completed in the
spring of 1994, the agency reviewed existing training materials and
national crash data relating to school bus pedestrian safety for
elementary school-age children; developed a school bus/pedestrian
safety educational program for children in grades K-6, which includes
teacher's guides, a poster and a video for grades K-3, videos and
brochures for parents and bus drivers, and promotional materials;
selected a school district to assess the program's effectiveness in
reducing crash-related behaviors; implemented and evaluated the program
in that district and modified the program, as warranted. A report
regarding this effort is expected to be published in the spring of
1995.
As stated earlier, the National Safety Council (NSC) has agreed to
undertake a comprehensive marketing campaign on the school bus/
pedestrian safety educational program. This program is currently being
modified into a product that will be more marketable. NSC anticipates
reaching over seven million people in its initial marketing effort.
The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) objected to the agencies' decision
by arguing that Congress ``mandated'' in ISTEA that School Bus Safety
must be a priority program. CAS asserted that, since Congress was aware
when it enacted ISTEA that there were lower fatality rates for school
buses, ``The only way for DOT to overturn the Congressional mandate in
ISTEA that school bus safety shall be a Priority Program is for DOT to
find that a Priority Program cannot reduce deaths and injuries in
school bus accidents.'' According to CAS, ``DOT cannot substitute its
judgment for that of Congress which has determined that saving even a
few lives from school bus accidents is as important a priority as
saving thousands of lives lost due to excess speeds.''
The agencies strongly disagree with CAS' comments. We have no
reason to believe, and CAS cites no basis for its assertions, that
Congress mandated that School Bus Safety must be designated a priority
program if the program has the potential to save just a single life or
that Congress believes that the thousands of lives lost due to excess
speeds (many of whom are children) are somehow less important than the
few children whose lives are lost in school buses.
In fact, the legislative history shows quite the contrary. The
House version of ISTEA identified eight required and seven optional
highway safety programs. Speeding was identified in the House
legislation as a required program; school bus safety was identified as
an optional program. (The Senate version of ISTEA had no comparable
provision.) The final ISTEA legislation, which was developed in
conference, listed just six program areas and eliminated the separate
categories. However, it specifically provided the agencies with the
option of choosing not to designate one or more of these six programs
as National Priorities by reporting to Congress the reasons for not
establishing the programs as priority areas. (CAS acknowledged this
option in its comments.) Moreover, there is no suggestion anywhere in
the legislative history that School Bus Safety (or any of the highway
safety programs, for that matter) should meet criteria other than those
normally applied by the agencies when they determine what programs
should be designated as National Priority areas.
CAS also questioned the agencies' reliance on data from FARS,
``Accident Facts'' and the National Safety Council. CAS argued that the
agencies should not rely on these data because they under-report school
crashes, deaths and injuries. Another commenter, Advocates for Highway
and Auto Safety, also pointed out that school bus crashes, injuries and
fatalities may be under-reported, and suggested that the agencies
investigate this issue. This commenter, however, fully supported the
agencies' preliminary conclusions.
The agencies acknowledge that there may be some under-reporting of
school bus crashes, deaths and injuries, and we are taking steps to
improve these data. Currently, pursuant to section 2002(a) of ISTEA,
the Department is in the process of developing minimum reporting
criteria for States regarding deaths and injuries resulting from school
bus crashes, as well as deaths and injuries involving other
circumstances. While it may be possible to improve the data, it is
clear from the data currently available (including those contained in
comments received in response to the NPRM) that the numbers of school
bus crashes, injuries and fatalities are extremely low.
School Bus Safety Determination
The safety of children in school buses is an important concern,
since any crash, particularly one resulting in fatalities or serious
injury to children, is so tragic.
However, the number of crashes, injuries and fatalities involving
school buses is small, particularly when considering exposure and when
compared to the number of crashes, injuries and fatalities related to
other priority programs.
The agencies believe significant attention has been devoted to
School Bus Safety and steps have been taken to improve the already
excellent safety record of this mode of transportation.
Furthermore, the states already have the ability under the Section
402 program to address school bus and other highway safety programs,
and are proficient in allocating existing resources as they deem
necessary to achieve maximum safety benefits. In addition, the States
are able to address the majority of school bus-related fatalities,
which occur while children are boarding or exiting, not riding the bus,
under the Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety program, which is a designated
National Priority area.
For these reasons, and based on a review of the comments and other
information currently available, the agencies conclude that there is
not sufficient justification for designating School Bus Safety as a
National Priority program area.
Therefore, the agencies have not included School Bus Safety as a
National Priority program at this time. The agencies wish to stress
that this decision should not be construed to imply that the current
resources focused upon School Bus Safety should be reduced or
redirected. NHTSA and FHWA believe that all existing efforts in this
area should be continued to maintain the impressive safety record
associated with school bus transportation.
Other Comments
One commenter, a local health department in Reno, Nevada, urged the
agencies to reinstate Emergency Medical Services (EMS) as a priority
program under section 402. As mentioned earlier in this notice, EMS was
designated as a priority program on April 1, 1982. It has not been
removed from the list of priorities. In fact, every program that has
been designated by the agencies as a priority program remains on the
list.
As explained above, ISTEA required that the Secretary of
Transportation either designate six program areas as priority highway
safety programs or submit a report to Congress describing the reasons
for not establishing these programs as priorities. Four of the programs
that NHTSA and FHWA had previously designated as priority areas
(Traffic Records, Emergency Medical Services, Pedestrian and Bicycle
Safety and Roadway Safety) were not listed in ISTEA. ISTEA continued to
provide the agencies with authority, however, to include additional
programs or maintain existing programs on the list of priority areas.
Accordingly, these four programs continue to be included on the list of
National Priority program areas.
The National Sheriffs' Association recommended that the following
be considered priority programs: (1) Speed Control; (2) Occupant
Protection/Child Safety Protection; (3) DWI/DUI Detection and
Standardized Field Sobriety Programs for law enforcement officers/
deputies; (4) Conspicuity Markings at Railway/Railroad/Mass Transit
Crossings and (5) Drug Evaluation, Classification, Drug Recognition
Expert (DRE), and the Drug Recognition Technician (DRT) Programs for
law enforcement officers/deputies.
As explained above, this final rule designates Speed Control as a
National Priority program area. Occupant Protection has been a National
Priority area since 1982. It includes activities designed to protect
occupants who are children. Alcohol and Other Drug Countermeasures has
also been a National Priority since 1982. States and communities may
conduct DWI/DUI Detection, Standardized Field Sobriety, Drug Evaluation
and Classification (DEC), Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), and Drug
Recognition Technician (DRT) Programs for law enforcement officers/
deputies under this program area. The agencies do not see a need to
emphasize these programs as separate priorities. Finally, States and
communities can conduct certain activities to improve the conspicuity
of markings at railway, railroad and mass transit crossings under
Roadway Safety, a FHWA National Priority program. In addition, there
are other sources of Federal assistance available from FHWA to improve
safety in this area. FHWA does not believe there is reason to designate
these activities as a separate priority program.
Economic and Other Effects
The agencies have considered the impacts associated with this
action, and determined that it is not significant within the meaning of
Executive Order 12866 and the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures.
The rulemaking does not affect the level of funding available in the
highway safety program or otherwise have a significant economic impact.
Accordingly, this rulemaking document was not reviewed under E.O.
12866.
Small Entity Impact
In compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the agencies
have evaluated the effects of this action on small entities. Based on
the evaluation, we certify that this rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. States are
the recipients of any funds awarded under the section 402 program.
Accordingly, the preparation of a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is
unnecessary.
Environmental Impacts
The agencies have also analyzed this action for the purpose of the
National Environmental Policy Act. The agencies have determined that
this action will not have any effect on the human environment.
Federalism Assessment
This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 and it has been determined
that it has no federalism implication that warrants the preparation of
a federalism assessment.
Paperwork Reduction Act
The requirement relating to this regulation, that each State must
submit a highway safety plan to receive section 402 grant funds, is
considered to be an information collection requirement, as that term is
defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 5 CFR part
1320. Accordingly, these requirements have been submitted to and
approved by OMB, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
Sec. 3501 et seq.). These requirements have been approved through 11/
30/95; OMB No. 2127-0501. This final rule establishes no new
information collection requirement, as that term is defined by the OMB
in 5 CFR part 1320.
List of Subjects in 23 CFR Part 1205
Grant programs, Highway safety.
In consideration of the foregoing, the agencies amend 23 CFR Part
1205 as follows:
PART 1205--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for Part 1205 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 23 U.S.C. 402; delegations of authority at 49 CFR
1.48 and 1.50.
2. In Sec. 1205.3, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 1205.3 Identification of National Priority Program Areas.
* * * * *
(c) Under statutory provisions jointly administered by NHTSA and
FHWA, the following highway safety program areas, jointly administered
by NHTSA and FHWA, have been identified as encompassing a major highway
safety problem which is of national concern, and for which effective
countermeasures have been identified. Programs developed in such areas
are eligible for Federal funding, pursuant to guidelines issued by
NHTSA and FHWA and the review procedures set forth in Sec. 1205.4:
(1) Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety
(2) Speed Control
Issued on: December 7, 1994.
Rodney E. Slater,
Administrator, Federal Highway Administration.
Ricardo Martinez,
Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
[FR Doc. 94-30514 Filed 12-12-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P
