[Federal Register Volume 64, Number 243 (Monday, December 20, 1999)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71242-71261]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 99-32824]
[[Page 71241]]
_______________________________________________________________________
Part V
Department of Labor
_______________________________________________________________________
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
_______________________________________________________________________
Dixie Divers, Inc.; Grant of Permanent Variance; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 243 / Monday, December 20, 1999 /
Notices
[[Page 71242]]
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
[V-97-1]
Dixie Divers, Inc.; Grant of Permanent Variance
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Department of
Labor.
ACTION: Grant of permanent variance.
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SUMMARY: This notice announces the grant of a permanent variance to
Dixie Divers, Inc. (Dixie). The permanent variance is from the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements for
decompression chambers during mixed-gas diving operations, including
paragraphs (b)(2) and (c)(3)(iii) of 29 CFR 1910.423 and paragraph
(b)(1) of 29 CFR 1910.426.
The permanent variance covers recreational diving instructors and
diving guides employed by Dixie. Using both classroom instruction and
practice dives, recreational diving instructors train novice divers
individually or in small groups in recreational diving knowledge and
skills, including conventional diving procedures and the safe operation
of diving equipment. Dixie's recreational diving instructors accompany
students during practice dives, which vary in depth from a few feet of
sea water (fsw) to 130 fsw, and last between 30 minutes and one hour.
Diving guides (who may also serve as recreational diving instructors)
lead small groups of trained sports divers to local undersea locations
for recreational purposes; the guides select the diving locations and
provide the sports divers with information regarding the dive site,
including hazardous conditions and safe diving practices. While leading
divers to a dive site, the guides dive to a maximum depth of 130 fsw
for periods of 30 minutes to one hour.
The permanent variance specifies the conditions under which Dixie's
recreational diving instructors and diving guides may conduct their
underwater training and guiding tasks using open-circuit, semi-closed-
circuit, or closed-circuit self-contained underwater breathing
apparatus (SCUBA) supplied with a breathing gas consisting of a high
percentage of oxygen (O2) mixed with nitrogen, and without a
decompression chamber near the dive site. These conditions address: The
requirements for SCUBA equipment, including carbon-dioxide canisters,
counterlungs, moisture traps, moisture sensors, carbon-dioxide and
O2 sensors, and information modules; depth limits for diving
operations; use of nationally-recognized no-decompression limits and
O2-exposure limits; the O2 and nitrogen
composition of the breathing-gas mixture; procedures and equipment for
producing and analyzing breathing-gas mixtures; emergency-egress
procedures and systems; management of diving-related medical
emergencies; procedures for maintaining diving logs; use of
decompression tables and dive-decompression computers; and training
requirements for recreational diving instructors and diving guides.
DATES: The effective date of the permanent variance is December 20,
1999.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Office of Information and Consumer
Affairs, Room N3647, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20210, Telephone: (202) 693-1999.
Additional information also is available from the following
Regional and Area Offices:
Regional Office:
U.S. Department of Labor--OSHA, 61 Forsyth St., SW., Atlanta, GA 30303,
Telephone: (404) 562-2300
Area Offices:
U.S. Department of Labor--OSHA, 5807 Breckenridge Parkway, Suite A,
Tampa, FL 33610, Telephone: (813) 626-1177
U.S. Department of Labor--OSHA, 8040 Peters Road, Building H-100,
Jacaranda Executive Court, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33324, Telephone: (954)
424-0242
U.S. Department of Labor--OSHA, Ribault Building, suite 227, 1851
Executive Center Drive, Jacksonville, FL 32207, Telephone: (904) 232-
2895
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Table of Contents
The following Table of Contents identifies the major sections under
``Supplementary Information.'' To understand fully the information
presented in the following sections, we recommend reviewing the 40
conditions of the permanent variance listed below under section VI.
I. Table of Contents
II. Background
III. Application for a Permanent Variance
IV. Comments to the Proposed Variance
Part 1. Comments to proposed section I (Background).
Part 2. Comments to proposed section II (Proposed Alternative).
Part 3. Comments to proposed section III (Rationale for the
Proposed Alternative).
Part 4. Comments to proposed section VI (Issues).
Part 5. General comments to the proposed variance.
Part 6. Our revisions to the proposed variance.
V. Decision
VI. Order
VII. References
VIII. Authority and Signature
II. Background
Dixie Divers, Inc. (Dixie) applied for a permanent variance from
paragraphs (b)(2) and (c)(3)(iii) of 29 CFR 1910.423 and paragraph
(b)(1) of 29 CFR 1910.426 under Section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 655) and 29 CFR 1905.11. These
paragraphs address the availability and use of decompression chambers
during mixed-gas diving operations.
Dixie operates six diving schools, either directly or as
franchises. The schools employ 18 skilled and experienced recreational
diving instructors to train novice divers in recreational diving
knowledge and skills. The same 18 employees also serve as diving guides
and lead groups of sport divers to local diving sites for recreational
purposes. (We also refer to recreational diving instructors and diving
guides jointly as ``employees'' or, more generally, as ``divers.'')
As recreational diving instructors, the employees train
recreational diving students in conventional diving procedures and the
safe operation of diving equipment. The diving students may use an
open-circuit, semi-closed-circuit, or closed-circuit self-contained
underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA) during these training dives.
1 SCUBAs supply divers with compressed air or a breathing
gas consisting of a high percentage of oxygen mixed with nitrogen or
another inert gas. 2
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\1\ The acronym for ``self-contained underwater breathing
apparatus'' is ``SCUBA.'' The term ``SCUBA'' refers to open-circuit
diving equipment alone, or to open-circuit, semi-closed-circuit, and
closed-circuit diving equipment combined. The term ``rebreather''
refers to semi-closed-circuit or closed-circuit diving equipment
alone or combined; this diving equipment recycles part or all of the
exhaled breathing gas into the system that delivers the breathing
gas to the diver.
\2\ The abbreviation ``O2'' means ``oxygen,'' while
the phrase ``nitrox breathing-gas mixture'' or the term ``nitrox''
refers to a breathing-gas mixture composed of nitrogen and
O2 in varying proportions.
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Dixie's training program for diving students involves both
classroom instruction and practice dives in which the employees
accompany diving students to maximum depths of 130 feet of sea water
(fsw). These dives last between 30 minutes and one hour. During these
dives, the recreational diving instructors provide underwater
[[Page 71243]]
instruction in, and allow the diving students to practice using, diving
procedures and equipment. A recreational diving instructor may make as
many as three to four training dives a day while training diving
students either individually or in small groups.
As diving guides, the employees lead small groups of trained sports
divers to local undersea diving locations for recreational purposes.
The diving guide selects the diving location prior to departure, and
provides the sports divers with information regarding the dive site,
including hazardous conditions and safe diving practices. The divers in
the recreational diving groups use open-circuit, semi-closed-circuit,
or closed-circuit SCUBAs that supply compressed air or a nitrox
breathing-gas mixture during the dive. During these diving excursions,
diving guides dive to a maximum depth of 130 fsw for periods of 30
minutes to one hour. A diving guide may make as many as five
recreational diving excursions a day.
The places of employment affected by this permanent variance are:
Dixie Divers of Boca Raton, 8241 Glades Road, Boca Raton, FL 33434
Dixie Divers of Boynton Beach, 340 North Congress, Boynton Beach, FL
33426
Dixie Divers of Deerfield, 1645 Southeast 3rd Court, Deerfield Beach,
FL 33441
Dixie Divers of Key Largo, 103400 Overseas Highway, Key Largo, FL 33037
Dixie Divers of Palm Bay, 4651 Babcock Street, Northeast, Palm Bay, FL
32905
Dixie Divers of Panama City, 109B West 23rd Street, Panama City, FL
32405
III. Application for a Permanent Variance
In its application for a permanent variance (referred to as
``variance application,'' ``proposed variance,'' or ``proposal''),
Dixie proposed an alternative to the decompression-chamber requirements
of paragraphs (b)(2) and (c)(3)(iii) of 29 CFR 1910.423 and paragraph
(b)(1) of 29 CFR 1910.426. Paragraph (b)(2) of 29 CFR 1910.423 requires
that ``[f]or any dive outside the no-decompression limits, deeper than
100 fsw or using mixed gas as a breathing mixture, the employer shall
instruct the diver to remain awake and in the vicinity of the
decompression chamber which is at the dive location for at least one
hour after the dive (including decompression or treatment as
appropriate).'' Paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of 29 CFR 1910.423 requires that
the decompression chamber be ``[l]ocated within 5 minutes of the dive
location,'' while paragraph (b)(1) of 29 CFR 1910.426 permits mixed-gas
diving only when a ``decompression chamber is ready for use at the dive
location.'' The purpose of having a decompression chamber available and
ready for use at the dive site is to treat two conditions: (1)
Decompression sickness (DCS), which may occur from breathing air or
mixed gases at diving depths and durations that require decompression;
and (2) arterial-gas embolism (AGE), which may result from
overpressurizing the lungs, usually while ascending rapidly to the
surface during a dive.
In the variance application, Dixie proposed to implement
alternative procedures that meet or exceed the level of employee
protection afforded by OSHA's decompression-chamber requirements. As an
alternative to a decompression chamber, Dixie proposed to have its
employees use open-circuit, semi-closed-circuit, or closed-circuit
SCUBA supplied with breathing-gas mixtures that contain a fraction of
O2 ranging from 22 to 40 percent (22-40%) by volume, with
the remaining breathing-gas mixture consisting of nitrogen. In
addition, the partial pressure of O2 in the nitrox
breathing-gas mixture would never exceed 1.40 atmospheres absolute
(ATA) 3 for any SCUBA. Dixie would use one of the following
procedures to produce nitrox breathing-gas mixtures: Mixing pure
nitrogen with pure O2; removing O2 from air for
mixing with pure nitrogen; adding pure O2 to air; or de-
nitrogenating air (e.g., removing nitrogen from air using filter-
membrane systems 4). According to the proposal, Dixie would:
Analyze the O2 fraction in the breathing-gas mixtures for
accuracy; institute quality-assurance procedures for the analytic
processes; and use breathing-gas mixing systems rated for O2
service whenever the highest O2 fraction used in the mixing
process exceeds 40 percent (40%). Dixie also proposed to restrict
diving operations under the variance to depths of 130 fsw or less, and
to use the nationally-recognized no-decompression limits and
O2-exposure limits developed by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Diving Science and Technology
(DSAT).
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\3\ ATA, as used here, is the partial pressure of a constituent
gas in the total pressure of a breathing gas. If the percentage of
the constituent gas in the breathing gas remains constant throughout
a dive, its partial pressure or ATA, increases in proportion to
increases in diving depth.
\4\ Filter-membrane systems produce nitrox breathing-gas
mixtures in two steps: First, they route air through filters to
remove hydrocarbons and other contaminants, then they pass the
decontaminated air through membranes that transfer O2
across the membrane fibers at higher rates than nitrogen (hence,
``de-nitrogenating air''). As the rate of air flow across the
membrane fibers increases, the resulting ratio of O2 to
nitrogen also increases. Under the permanent variance, a filter-
membrane system will reduce the hazards associated with producing
high-O2 breathing-gas mixtures because the proportion of
O2 in the system will never exceed 40 percent (40%).
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By increasing the O2 partial pressure and decreasing the
nitrogen partial pressure of the breathing-gas mixture compared to air,
and by restricting dives to no-decompression limits and depths of 130
fsw or less, Dixie asserted that both the rate and the severity of DCS
would be no greater for its employees than for divers who operate
according to paragraph (a)(2)(i) of 29 CFR 1910.401. In addition, Dixie
contended that using nationally-recognized O2-exposure
procedures would reduce the risk of O2 toxicity among its
divers to the rate expected among divers who use hyperbaric air.
Dixie proposed a number of other requirements to ensure that its
employees remain within safe diving parameters, thereby avoiding DCS
and AGE. These requirements included limiting the maximum carbon
dioxide (CO2) level in the inhaled nitrox breathing-gas
mixture to 0.01 ATA. Dixie would control excessive CO2
levels as follows: By using pre-packed sorbent materials to absorb
CO2 from the exhaled breathing gas prior to rebreathing; by
installing sensors for detecting high CO2 levels or
conditions that could result in high CO2 levels (such as
moisture sensors to detect flooding in the breathing loop); and by
using counterlungs to serve as low-breathing-resistance reservoirs for
the breathing gas. In addition, Dixie proposed that its divers use an
information module that provides them with critical dive information
(e.g., gas pressures, water-temperature); the required information
would vary with the type of SCUBA. For rebreathers, visual or auditory
warning devices would alert the diver to significant equipment problems
(e.g., solenoid failure, low battery levels) or deviations from
established diving parameters (e.g., diverging from the planned
O2 levels). Closed-circuit rebreathers would need to operate
using a gas-controller package, a manually-operated gas-supply bypass
valve, and separate O2 and diluent-gas cylinders.
Dixie proposed a number of other conditions to safeguard its
divers. For emergencies involving SCUBA malfunctions that could
endanger diver health and safety (e.g., high CO2 levels),
the proposed variance required that Dixie have a reliable ``bail-out
system'' available. The bail-out system would need to provide a
separate supply of
[[Page 71244]]
breathing gas to the second stage of the SCUBA regulator; when
rebreathers are used, the bail-out system could deliver a diluent
supply of breathing gas to the second stage of the regulator. Other
protective conditions, which refined or emphasized existing
requirements currently specified in OSHA's Commercial Diving Operations
Standard (CDO Standard), included the following: Maintaining
decompression tables and diving logs at the dive site; assuring the
availability of personnel, facilities, and equipment to treat DCS and
AGE; and providing quality control of diver training.
In summary, Dixie stated that the occurrence and severity of DCS
would be minimal when its divers breathe nitrox gas mixtures, while the
risk of AGE would be negligible when they use the equipment and
procedural safeguards specified in the variance application.
Consequently, divers who use SCUBAs according to the proposed variance
would experience a level of DCS and AGE that is equal to, or lower
than, the level experienced by recreational diving instructors who dive
under the conditions specified by the exemption to the CDO Standard at
29 CFR 1910.401(a)(2)(i). These conditions allow for the use of
compressed air supplied to open-circuit SCUBAs under no-decompression
diving limits. Dixie asserted, therefore, that it should not have to
maintain a decompression chamber at the dive location for its
recreational diving instructors and diving guides when it complies with
the conditions specified in the variance application.
In a Federal Register notice published on October 31, 1997, we
provided the public with a copy of Dixie's variance application (62 FR
58995). This notice invited interested parties, including affected
employers and employees, to submit written comments, data, views, and
arguments regarding the variance application. In addition, the notice
informed affected employers and employees of their right to request a
hearing on the variance application. At the request of several parties,
we extended the comment period for this notice until March 2, 1998 in a
Federal Register announcement dated January 6, 1998 (63 FR 579).
IV. Comments on the Proposed Variance
We received 123 comments in response to the two Federal Register
notices. Of this total, two comments (Exs. 2-98 and 2-115) were
duplications, and one comment (Ex. 2-112) consisted solely of a request
to extend the comment period. (Exs. 6-1 to 6-17 also were requests to
extend the comment period.) Two additional comments (Exs. 2-118 and 2-
119) requested a hearing on the proposal. We denied these hearing
requests because neither of the two requestors employed recreational
diving instructors, the subject of this variance application. OSHA
received 103 comments that were general, non-specific endorsements of
the variance application; the vast majority of these comments varied
only slightly in content. The remaining 15 commenters submitted
detailed comments regarding the conditions and issues specified in the
variance application.
We have organized our discussion of the substantive comments to the
variance application into six parts. Comments concerning proposed
section I (Background) are in Part 1, while Part 2 consists of comments
made about the conditions specified in proposed section II (Proposed
Alternative). Part 3 discusses comments made regarding proposed section
III (Rationale for the Proposed Alternative), and Part 4 presents
comments to the issues raised in proposed section VI (Issues). No
commenters addressed sections IV and V of the variance application,
titled ``References'' and ``Additional Information'' respectively. Part
5 consists of general and miscellaneous comments. Throughout each of
these five parts, we explain the actions we are taking with regard to
individual comments or groups of comments. The last part, Part 6,
describes refinements to the proposed variance that we have made in
developing the permanent variance; these refinements are based upon our
interpretation of the proposed conditions and our overall review of the
record.
We and other parties submitted additional exhibits (Exs. 4, 4A, 5,
and 7 through 13) to the docket (see Table I). These exhibits, which
contain scientific and technical information, provided additional
information we used in replying to comments and discussing revisions to
the proposal. The principal topics covered by the exhibits are:
O2 toxicity; nitrogen narcosis; decompression procedures;
the operation and use of SCUBAs; and treatment of diving-related
medical emergencies. Table I below provides specific reference
information on these exhibits.
Table I.--Reference Information on Exhibits 4, 4A, and 5 Through 16
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ex.
No. Reference information
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4 D. J. Kenyon and R. W. Hamilton. ``Managing Oxygen Exposure when
Preparing Decompression Tables.'' In: N. Bitterman and R.
Lincoln (eds.), Proceedings of the XVth Meeting of the European
Undersea Biomedical Society, pages 72-77. European Undersea
Biomedical Society, September 1989.
R. W. Hamilton. ``IV. Oxygen Physiology, Toxicity, and
Tolerance.'' In: R. W. Hamilton (author), Special Mix Diving:
Part One, pages 25-38. Hamilton Research and Life Support
Technologies, March 2, 1994.
4A R. W. Hamilton, R. E. Rogers, M. R. Powell, and R. D. Vann. The
DSAT Recreational Dive Planner: Development and Validation of No-
Stop Decompression Procedures for Recreational Diving. Diving
Science and Technology, Inc., and Hamilton Research, Ltd.,
February 28, 1994.
5 D. Richardson (ed.-in-chief). Proceedings of Rebreather Forum
2.0. Diving Science and Technology, Inc., 1996.
7 R. W. Hamilton. ``Tolerating Exposure to High Oxygen Levels:
Repex and Other Methods.'' Marine Technology Society Journal,
volume 23, number 4, pages 19-25, December 1989.
8 R. J. Kiessling and C. H. Maag. ``Performance Impairment as a
Function of Nitrogen Narcosis.'' Journal of Applied Psychology,
volume 46, number 2, pages 91-95, 1962.
9 A. D. Baddeley. ``Influence of Depth on the Manual Dexterity of
Free Divers: A Comparison Between Open Sea and Pressure Chamber
Testing.'' Journal of Applied Psychology, volume 50, number 1,
pages 81-85, 1966.
10 A. D. Baddeley, J. W. De Figueredo, J. W. Hawkswell Curtis, and
A. N. Williams. ``Nitrogen Narcosis and Performance Under
Water.'' Ergonomics, volume 11, number 2, pages 157-164, 1968.
11 W. B. Wright. ``Use of the University of Pennsylvania, Institute
for Environmental Medicine Procedure for Calculation of
Cumulative Pulmonary Oxygen Toxicity.'' U.S. Navy Experimental
Diving Unit, Report 2-72, 1972.
12 R. J. Biersner. ``Request for Your Recommendation Regarding
Acceptable Delay in Recompression Treatment of Diving-Related
Medical Emergencies.'' Memorandum to Dr. Edward D. Thalmann,
August 28, 1998.
[[Page 71245]]
13 E. D. Thalmann. Letter to R. J. Biersner Responding to the
Memorandum in Ex. 12, October 5, 1998.
14 J. R. Clarke. CO2 Canister Test Parameters and Procedure at NEDU.
Attachment to U.S. Navy Experimental Diving Unit E-mail
Memorandum, November 22, 1999.
15 J. R. Clarke. ``Statistically Based CO2 Canister Duration Limits
for Closed-Circuit Underwater Breathing Apparatus.'' U.S. Navy
Experimental Diving Unit, Report 2-99, 1999.
16 P. B. Bennett. ``Nitrox?'' Alert Diver, March/April, 1998.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Part 1. Comments to proposed section I (Background).
(a) The skills and experience of, and the diving operations
performed by, the applicant's divers (62 FR 58996, second column)
received two comments. Both comments were primarily concerned about
Dixie's recreational diving instructors and diving guides engaging in
diving activity beyond the scope of the proposed variance. The
Association of Diving Contractors, Inc. (Ex. 2-99) contended that
recreational diving instructors and diving guides ``[engage] in
services of a commercial nature,'' and implied that the conditions of
the variance application would allow them to extend their commercial
diving activities beyond the scope of the proposed variance.
The second commenter (Ex. 2-105) did not object to the proposed
variance for no-decompression dives to depths of 130 fsw or less if
they are ``of an instructional, training, or scientific nature and [do]
not involve any form of salvage or underwater construction or related
working tasks.'' This commenter stated that the recreational diving
must ``not encompass working dives (i.e.[,] salvage, construction).
This is a very [important] distinction as the commercial diving
industry cannot bear the financial burden imposed by the insurance
companies who would lump professional recreational instructors in with
professional commercial divers.''
In reply to these commenters, we note that the permanent variance
will not cover recreational diving instructors and diving guides when
they engage in activities that do not involve recreational diving
instruction and diving guide activities. They must comply with our CDO
Standard as appropriate, including the decompression-chamber
requirements, while engaged in these other activities. To ensure that
Dixie understands under what conditions the permanent variance applies,
we are specifying in Condition (1) (see below at section VI, titled
``Order'') that the permanent variance covers only recreational diving
instructors and diving guides who are employees of Dixie Divers, Inc.,
and then only while they are performing as diving guides and
recreational diving instructors.
(b) The background information noted that the applicant's employees
``may make as many as three or four training dives a day while training
diving students'' and that ``[a] guide may make as many as five * * *
excursions a day'' (62 FR 58996, second column). This background
information elicited one comment. This commenter (Ex. 2-109) stated
that ``[b]oth NAUI [National Association of Underwater Instructors] and
PADI [Professional Association of Diving Instructors], the two largest
certifying agencies in the U.S., limit instructors teaching entry-level
classes to no more than two dives per day with a single class.'' The
commenter also noted that ``Dixie could hire more instructors, which
would lessen their time in the water, decreasing [their] nitrogen
exposure, lessening their susceptibility to DCS, thus obviating the
need for the variance.''
The basis for the NAUI and PADI limitations is unclear (e.g., do
these limits address diver safety or training effectiveness).
Nevertheless, we believe that adopting the no-decompression procedures
for repetitive diving published in the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual and by
DSAT (Ex. 4A) as a condition of the permanent variance will protect
Dixie's recreational diving instructors and diving guides at least as
well as recreational diving instructors who use compressed air supplied
to open-circuit SCUBAs under no-decompression diving limits specified
in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of 29 CFR 1910.401.
(c) The statement in this section that ``[e]mployees who use high-
oxygen breathing-gas mixtures will be able to make more or longer
repetitive-training [or] excursion dives than they would using
compressed-air open-circuit SCUBA'' (62 FR 58995, third column)
received one comment. This commenter (Ex. 2-109) disagreed with this
statement, claiming that nitrox breathing-gas mixtures may not reduce
susceptibility to DCS and that ``[w]e know of no studies or evidence to
show that diving to limits on the nitrox tables while breathing nitrox
produces a lower incidence of DCS than diving to limits on air tables
while breathing air.''
We agree that the mathematical probability of DCS is similar for
dives that result in equivalent levels of nitrogen saturation (e.g.,
dives made to a specific depth using air, and longer-duration dives
made to the same depth using nitrox breathing-gas mixtures).
Accordingly, for dives made using nitrox breathing-gas mixtures, the
risk of DCS is lower only when these dives are at the same depths and
for the same durations as the air dives. Note, however, that Condition
J of the proposed variance limits the risk of DCS by requiring that
divers remain within the no-decompression limits of NOAA's
decompression tables, or other tables or formulas that Dixie
demonstrates are equally effective in preventing DCS.
(d) We stated in the ``Background'' section of the proposed
variance that ``[a]s a result [of using nitrox breathing-gas mixtures],
the mathematical probability of developing decompression sickness (DCS)
is reduced compared to divers who use compressed air under the same
diving conditions (i.e., depth, bottom time, and descent and ascent
rates)'' (62 FR 58997, first column). This statement elicited two
comments. The first commenter (Ex. 2-98) stated that high-O2
nitrox breathing-gas mixtures will result in a reduced risk of DCS when
used at the same depths and for the same durations as air, but only if
the divers use the depth and duration limits specified for air
decompression and do not extend the duration of the dive. The reduction
in risk occurs because the nitrogen partial pressure in the nitrox
breathing-gas mixture is less than the partial pressure of nitrogen in
air at the specified depth. The second commenter (Ex. 2-109) asserted
that Dixie has economic incentives to extend the duration of dives.
We believe these commenters are correct that extending the duration
of dives using high-O2 nitrox breathing-gas mixtures would
increase the risk of DCS. However, we conclude that the
[[Page 71246]]
resulting risk would be comparable to using the equivalent partial
pressure of nitrogen in air for that extended period. The basis for
this conclusion is the equivalent-air-depth (EAD) formula published by
NOAA, which is the nation's lead Federal agency for developing mixed-
gas decompression schedules used in scientific and technical diving
operations. According to NOAA, EAD ``is the depth at which air will
have the same nitrogen partial pressure as the [oxygen-]enriched mix
has at the depth of the dive'' (1991 NOAA Diving Manual, page 15-7).
NOAA applies its EAD formula in determining what equivalent air
decompression limits to use with nitrox breathing-gas mixtures, and
assumes that equivalent nitrogen partial pressures and dive durations
will result in similar DCS risk. However, to provide Dixie's divers
with an added margin of safety against DCS, the permanent variance
requires that the partial pressure of nitrogen in the high-
O2 nitrox breathing-gas mixture used for a specific dive
duration must never exceed the no-decompression limits for the
equivalent partial pressure of nitrogen in air for that same duration
published in the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual.
Part 2. Comments to proposed section II (Proposed Alternative).
(a) Conditions A.1 and A.2 of the proposal, which specified
requirements for CO2 scrubbers, CO2 sensors,
moisture traps, moisture sensors, and over-pressure valves, received a
number of comments. Several commenters (Exs. 2-98, 2-99, 2-105, and 2-
117) pointed out a typographical error in the stated CO2
level in Condition A.1. The correct level is 0.01 ATA, not 0.1 ATA, and
we have corrected it in the permanent variance.
Condition A.1 in the proposed variance (Condition (4) in the
permanent variance) stated that rebreathers must use commercially-
available, pre-packed, disposable scrubber cartridges or an equally
effective alternative. Three commenters (Exs. 2-101, 2-105, and 2-114)
took exception to the requirement that CO2 scrubbers must
use sorbent cartridges that are commercially available, pre-packed, and
disposable. They contended that such cartridges are not available for
some rebreathers and, when available, are expensive. They also argued
that rebreather manufacturers do not require pre-packed, disposable
cartridges because many divers manually fill and pack most rebreather
canisters. One commenter (Ex. 2-105) stated that ``no scientific
evidence [shows that] a disposable[,] pre-packaged canister would
perform safer or with greater efficiency than one packed by the user.''
Another commenter (Ex. 2-117), however, stated that ``[u]se [of
disposable scrubber cartridges] in rebreathers reduces return to
service time and reduces human error during servicing,'' and that
[several manufacturers] have canisters that simplify replacement of
sorbent material, while [at least one manufacturer] uses a disposable
cartridge.''
In reply to these commenters, we note that Condition A.1 in the
proposed variance allowed Dixie to use an alternative to pre-packed
CO2-sorbent materials, including manually-filled cartridges;
Condition (4)(b) in the permanent variance will also permit this
alternative, if it is acceptable to the rebreather manufacturer.
However, Dixie bears the burden of demonstrating to us that its
manually-filled cartridges are at least as effective as pre-packed
sorbent materials in removing CO2 from the breathing loop;
Dixie likely would get this information from the rebreather
manufacturer.
Proposed Condition A.2 required the use of CO2 sensors.
One commenter (Ex. 2-25) endorsed this proposed requirement for closed-
circuit rebreathers, but claimed these sensors were unnecessary for
semi-closed-circuit rebreathers because these rebreathers ``are
regularly venting gas from the system which is replaced with high
oxygen content gas * * * to prevent the buildup of carbon dioxide.'' We
believe that CO2 sensors are necessary for semi-closed-
circuit rebreathers because divers can ``overbreathe'' these
rebreathers. Overbreathing occurs when the diver's breathing rate is
faster than the rate at which fresh breathing gas enters the inhalation
bag; consequently, overbreathing causes the diver to rebreathe exhaled
gas containing elevated levels of CO2. The information in
Ex. 5 (pages P-19 through P-22) supports this conclusion. Therefore,
CO2 sensors enable divers to detect increased CO2
before it reaches hazardous levels.
The commenter in Ex. 2-98 endorsed the use of CO2
sensors, but claimed that this technology is ``currently unavailable
even in the current U.S. Navy rebreathers.'' Two other commenters (Exs.
2-105 and 2-114) also asserted that continuously-functioning
CO2 sensors are not available commercially. However, another
commenter (Ex. 2-117) contradicted these assertions; this commenter
stated that CO2 sensors are available in several
rebreathers.
Four commenters (Exs. 2-99, 2-106, 2-113, and 2-114) claimed that
few, if any, rebreathers on the market met proposed Conditions A.1 and
A.2. One of these commenters (Ex. 2-106) stated, ``[M]any of the
specifications for rebreathers represent the manufacturer-specific
features of an intended unit that was never brought forward as a
production model. We also manufacture diving rebreathers and protest
any regulation that would arbitrarily bias compliance to one model.''
Four other commenters contended that the proposed variance favors or
enhances the competitive position of one or more rebreather
manufacturers (Exs. 2-99, 2-101, 2-105, and 2-114); no commenter,
however, indicated which manufacturer(s) would benefit. One commenter
(Ex. 2-114) stated that ``[implementing the proposed variance] would
put every dive store and instructor who teaches rebreather diving in
the U.S. out of business,'' and claimed that ``this [proposed] variance
would in essence be a restraint of trade.''
The information provided in Ex. 2-117 demonstrates that the
required components are commercially available and used in several
existing rebreathers. Other evidence in the record (Ex. 5, page 6-4)
also shows that effective CO2 sensors are commercially
available for closed-circuit rebreathers. We find that each proposed
condition is necessary for diver safety, and that Dixie can either
purchase rebreathers, or retrofit its existing rebreathers, to meet
these conditions. In addition, we observe that no commenter found that
any required component was unsafe.
While the proposed variance did not require any CO2
alarms, the commenter in Ex. 2-98 recommended that CO2
sensors activate two alarms: The first alarm when the inhaled
CO2 partial pressure is at 0.005 ATA (3.8 mmHg), to warn
divers that they are approaching the upper CO2 limit; and
the second alarm when inhaled CO2 reaches the partial
pressure limit of 0.01 ATA (7.6 mmHg), to alert the diver to terminate
the dive immediately. We agree with much of this comment, but we
believe that once the alarm is activated at a CO2 partial
pressure of 0.005 ATA, it must continue to provide a visual or auditory
warning to the diver to take corrective action or terminate the dive
before reaching the maximum CO2 limit of 0.01 ATA. The use
of an activation level is similar to the action-level requirement found
in many of OSHA's standards for toxic substances. Therefore, the
permanent variance requires Dixie to
[[Page 71247]]
integrate the CO2 sensors with an alarm (either visual or
auditory) that operates continuously at and above a CO2
partial pressure of 0.005 ATA.
The proposed variance did not specify calibration requirements for
CO2 sensors. Nevertheless, the commenter in Ex. 2-98 stated
that any CO2 sensor adopted for use in rebreathers must be
``tested both in the laboratory and in manned diving trials,'' and that
the ``[d]ata from these trials must support [the] accuracy, reliability
and ruggedness'' of CO2 sensors. While this commenter did
not specify a protocol or criteria for testing these factors, we agree
that, at a minimum, Dixie must determine the accuracy of CO2
sensors before its divers use them. Such a determination is necessary
to enable Dixie to eliminate sensors that are unreliable or that cannot
function under rugged diving conditions. Therefore, in developing
provisions for calibrating and maintaining the accuracy of
CO2 sensors (see Condition (9) in the permanent variance),
we have adopted the requirements that Dixie specified for O2
sensors in Condition A.4 of the variance application, with one major
revision: Instead of using an accuracy of 1 percent (1%) by volume,
Condition (9)(c) of the permanent variance requires that CO2
sensors be accurate ``to within 10 percent (10%) of a CO2
concentration of 0.005 ATA or less,'' based on the comments in Ex. 2-
98. Using a test or standard gas containing a CO2
concentration of 0.005 ATA or less will ensure that the sensors can
accurately detect CO2 levels that can be harmful to Dixie's
divers. Additionally, in view of the harmful effects that can result
from high levels of CO2, we consider a maximum error rate of
no more than 10 percent (10%) of a CO2 partial pressure of
0.005 ATA to be within acceptable limits.
The commenter in Ex. 2-98 also argued that, as an alternative to
CO2 sensors, ``the breathing apparatus manufacturer [must]
produce data from manned trials that substantiate [the] operational
CO2 canister-duration limits over the entire depth, water
temperature, and exercise range for which the breathing apparatus is
designed. Furthermore, the manufacturer must clearly state what these
limits are.'' While the proposed variance did not mention such an
alternative, we agree with the general approach recommended by this
commenter. However, we believe that valid and reliable data for
determining CO2-sorbent replacement schedules can be
obtained from carefully controlled and executed testing protocols that
use breathing machines instead of divers to evaluate the canisters.
Therefore, Condition (10)(a)(i) of the permanent variance permits Dixie
to use a schedule for replacing the CO2-sorbent material in
canisters if the rebreather manufacturer developed the replacement
schedule using the canister-testing protocol specified in Appendix A of
this notice. We adapted this protocol from the canister-testing
parameters and procedure provided by the U.S. Navy Experimental Diving
Unit (NEDU) (Ex. 14); NEDU is the lead federal agency for testing
CO2-sorbent replacement schedules, and the diving industry
recognizes the NEDU canister-testing protocol as the industry standard.
Additionally, the employer can use a CO2-sorbent replacement
schedule developed by a rebreather manufacturer only if the
manufacturer analyzed the protocol results using the statistical
procedures specified by NEDU (Ex. 14 and 15).
The canister-testing protocol developed by NEDU addresses the three
factors recommended by the commenter in Ex. 2-98: Depth, exercise level
(ventilation rate), and water temperature. Depth is the maximum depth
at which a diver would use the CO2-sorbent material, which
for the permanent variance is 130 fsw. We selected three combinations
of ventilation rates and CO2-injection rates from the NEDU
protocol to simulate three diverse levels of exercise (light, moderate,
and heavy). The four water temperatures used in the NEDU protocol are
40, 50, 70, and 90 degrees F (4.4, 10.0, 21.1, and 32.2 degrees C,
respectively); these temperatures represent the wide range of water
temperatures that Dixie's recreational diving instructors are likely to
encounter. We revised the NEDU protocol slightly by: Limiting the
maximum depth to 130 fsw; requiring an O2 fraction of 0.28
in a nitrox breathing gas (this fraction being the maximum
O2 concentration permitted at this depth by the permanent
variance); providing tolerance limits for water temperatures; and
defining canister duration as the time taken to reach 0.005 ATA of
CO2 (the CO2 level specified in the permanent
variance at which divers are to eliminate excessive CO2 in
the breathing gas or terminate the dive). In addition, our protocol
uses only mandatory language, and expressly prohibits the use of
replacement schedules based on extrapolation of the protocol results.
OSHA prohibits extrapolation of the protocol results because the
statistical-analysis procedures developed by NEDU (Ex. 15) do not
provide a method for estimating the duration of CO2-sorbent
materials beyond the results obtained during the canister-testing
trials. OSHA believes this approach significantly improves the validity
and reliability of the replacement schedules derived from these
results. After thoroughly reviewing the NEDU canister-testing protocol
and adapting it the conditions of the permanent variance, we believe
that CO2-sorbent replacement schedules based on the
requirements of Appendix A of the permanent variance will enable Dixie
to replace CO2-sorbent materials in a timely manner, thereby
ensuring the health and safety of its divers.
While we are confident that CO2-sorbent replacement
schedules developed according to Condition (10) of the permanent
variance will protect divers under ordinary diving conditions, we
believe that these schedules do not address a condition that can
seriously compromise canister effectiveness: Moisture in the canister,
which usually results from canister flooding. Based on our review of
the record, we find that moisture traps and moisture sensors can
effectively control this condition. In this regard, proposed Condition
A.2 required the use of moisture traps and moisture sensors. Several
commenters (Exs. 2-101, 2-105, and 2-117) claimed that existing
rebreathers already use moisture traps. The commenter in Ex. 2-101
stated, without explanation, that ``making them a requirement would be
restrictive.'' This commenter also asserted that moisture sensors are
unnecessary because CO2 sensors perform the same function.
(The commenter did not specify the term ``function,'' but we assume
that it refers to the capability to indicate canister flooding.) A
second commenter (Ex. 2-105) noted that moisture sensors would be an
important safety feature, but asserted that they were not available
commercially. However, another commenter (Ex. 2-117) claimed that
moisture sensors are available from several companies. One commenter
(Ex. 2-105) noted that excessive moisture can impair electrical systems
in rebreathers, and asked us to specify where to place the moisture
sensors to prevent these problems.
Moisture traps are necessary to keep water out of the canisters
because water leakage into canisters can substantially reduce the
CO2-absorbing properties of the sorbent material. Moisture
sensors, in turn, detect excessive water or flooding inside the
canister that can compromise the CO2-sorbent material.
Moisture sensors, therefore, warn the diver of hazardous water leakage
into the canister. The commenters in Exs. 2-101, 2-105, and 2-117 noted
that
[[Page 71248]]
moisture traps are available commercially and that existing rebreathers
routinely use them. The information in Ex. 2-117 also indicates that
moisture sensors are commercially available. While we believe that
rebreather manufacturers should place moisture sensors on the
inhalation side of the breathing loop, we leave the design and location
of moisture sensors and moisture traps to their technical expertise.
Dixie must ensure that its divers use these components consistent with
the rebreather manufacturer's instructions, and that the moisture
sensors alert the diver of moisture in the breathing loop in sufficient
time to terminate the dive and return safely to the surface. We have
incorporated these conditions into the permanent variance.
In the proposed variance, Condition A.2 specified that rebreathers
contain over-pressure valves. Regarding over-pressure valves, one
commenter (Ex. 2-101) asked us to define the term ``over-pressure
valve,'' while two commenters (Exs. 2-105 and 2-117) asserted that
existing rebreathers already have over-pressure valves. One of these
commenters (Ex. 2-105) noted that over-pressure valves are ``important
protection to reduce the risk of [AGE] and associated pressure[-
]induced injuries and [rebreather] damage.''
An over-pressure valve is a valve on the counterlung that releases
breathing gas from the counterlung when the pressure reaches a set
level; we have incorporated this meaning into the permanent variance.
Rebreathers routinely are designed with over-pressure valves. These
valves perform a critical safety function by helping to regulate
breathing-gas volume and pressure.
Condition A.2 of the proposed variance also specified that Dixie
use redundant (i.e., at least two) CO2 sensors and redundant
moisture sensors; it also required that these sensors function
continuously. One commenter (Ex. 2-101) agreed with the proposed
requirement for a continuously-functioning CO2 sensor, but
did not believe that additional CO2 sensors were necessary.
This commenter noted that both CO2 and moisture sensors will
alert the diver whenever the breathing loop, most likely the
CO2-sorbent material, is no longer capable of removing
exhaled CO2. We agree with this commenter that
CO2 and moisture sensors serve much the same purpose--to
inform the diver of conditions (for example, reduced efficiency of the
CO2-sorbent material) that may cause CO2 to
accumulate in the breathing loop. By measuring the amount of
CO2 in the inhaled breathing gas (after the gas passes
through the sorbent material in the canister to remove CO2)
CO2 sensors can detect an elevated CO2 level that
may indicate depletion of the CO2-sorbent material because
of canister flooding. An elevated CO2 level, in turn, warns
the diver to take corrective action, including terminating the
dive.5 As noted previously, moisture sensors detect
excessive water or flooding inside the canister that can reduce the
sorbent material's capacity to remove CO2 from the inhaled
breathing gas. The independent functions performed by these sensors
(i.e., a CO2 sensor measures CO2 in the breathing
gas, while a moisture sensor detects excessive moisture in the
canister) indicates that a malfunction in one sensor is unlikely to
result in a malfunction in the other sensor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In addition, a CO2 sensor alerts the diver to
increased CO2 levels in the inhaled breathing gas that
may result from other conditions, including depleted sorbent
material (saturated with CO2) and channeling or
overbreathing (exhaled air bypassing the sorbent material).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several other conditions make sensor redundancy unnecessary. First,
the symptoms of excessive CO2 do not develop as rapidly as
the symptoms of O2 toxicity; 6 consequently, a
properly trained and experienced diver will be able to recognize a
number of effects associated with excessive CO2 and take
appropriate action, including terminating the dive. These effects
include: Reduced buoyancy (from the increased weight caused by canister
flooding); shortness of breath (from CO2 displacing
O2 in the diver's lungs); an increase in breathing
resistance during inhalation (caused by difficulty moving the breathing
gas through wet CO2-sorbent material); and a large number of
bubbles vented through the rebreather's exhaust valve (venting related
to the increased exhaust pressure caused by exhaling against wet
CO2-sorbent material). Secondly, the permanent variance
(Conditions (7) and (8)) requires that both the moisture sensor and
CO2 sensor function continuously, ensuring early detection
of a CO2-related problem by the diver. Lastly, Condition
(30) of the permanent variance requires that the divers use an open-
circuit emergency-egress system (a ``bail-out'' system); this system
will provide the divers with the capability to shift to a known, safe,
and immediately-available breathing gas, and to terminate the dive
safely whenever a CO2-related problem occurs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The rapid onset of symptoms resulting from O2
toxicity provides a major rationale for requiring redundant
O2 sensors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on this record, we find that: Carbon-dioxide sensors and
moisture sensors provide independent means of detecting a
CO2-related problem; symptoms related to excessive levels of
CO2 develop more slowly than the symptoms of excessive
O2; a properly trained and experienced diver will recognize
the effects of excessive CO2 in sufficient time to take
correct action; the requirement that CO2 sensors and
moisture sensors be continuously functioning assures real-time
detection of CO2-related problems; and the required bail-out
system provides the diver with a safe means to terminate a dive
following detection of a CO2-related problem. This record
demonstrates that the proposed requirements for redundant
CO2 sensors and redundant moisture sensors are unnecessary;
we believe that the only basis for requiring redundant sensors is if
the rebreather manufacturer includes them in the equipment design or
specifications. Therefore, we have revised the conditions accordingly
in the permanent variance.
(b) Proposed Condition A.3, which required the use of flexible
breathing bags (also known as ``counterlungs'') with rebreathers,
elicited the following comment (Ex. 2-105):
Not all rebreathers use breathing bags. However, they all employ
some type of counter lung providing a compliant volume. Certain
types of rebreathers utilize a large diaphragm or bellows assembly.
There would be no purpose in mandating a particular counterlung
configuration. The only regulation that could be mandated might be a
minimum volumetric displacement.
We consider breathing bags to be a type of counterlung. Even though
the proposed variance used the terms ``breathing bags'' and
``counterlungs'' interchangeably, we agree with the commenter that the
permanent variance should not specify a particular counterlung
configuration. We have revised the condition accordingly in the
permanent variance. In addition, while we agree with the need to
specify a minimum volumetric displacement, we believe that the
rebreather manufacturer should determine this value. In this regard,
Dixie must ensure that its divers use the counterlung according to the
rebreather manufacturer's instructions, and the counterlung must
displace enough volume to sustain the diver's respiration rate during
any diving condition. We have incorporated these conditions into the
permanent variance.
(c) Proposed Condition A.4 addressed ``bail-out systems,'' which
are supplemental breathing-gas systems used by divers for emergency
ascent to the surface if the SCUBA malfunctions. The proposed condition
specified that bail-out systems must integrate the
[[Page 71249]]
second stage of the SCUBA regulator with either a separate supply of
emergency breathing gas or, for semi-closed-circuit and closed-circuit
rebreathers, a diluent supply of emergency breathing gas. Two
commenters (Exs. 2-100 and 2-105) responded to the proposed condition.
The first commenter (Ex. 2-100) recommended that the system contain at
least 35 cubic feet of emergency breathing gas. This volume was based
on maximum consumption rates related to a number of variables,
including water temperature, diver's thermal protection, speed of
current, lung volume, and psychological stress. The second commenter
(Ex. 2-105) stated that ``[a] bail-out system is a necessity for all
rebreather use.''
We agree that the bail-out system must enable the diver to
terminate the dive safely under ``worst-case'' conditions. We believe,
however, that the rebreather manufacturer is in the best position to
determine what capacity of breathing gas is needed for safe operation
of the bail-out system. In this regard, Dixie must ensure that its
divers use the bail-out system according to the rebreather
manufacturer's instructions. Dixie must also ensure that the bail-out
system supplies sufficient emergency breathing gas to enable a diver to
terminate the dive and return safely to the surface; the rebreather
manufacturer can make this determination after Dixie provides the
critical diving parameters (e.g., depth of dive and breathing rate). We
have revised this condition accordingly in the permanent variance.
(d) Proposed Condition A.5 specified requirements for information
modules, which provide divers with information about the dive,
including gas pressures, dive times, and descent and ascent rates. One
commenter (Ex. 2-114) stated that the information module is a dive
computer, that no rebreathers are available commercially that integrate
dive computers with breathing systems, and that no dive computer
``includes displays that directly warn of rebreather solenoid failure
and excessive descent rates.'' In response, although we believe that it
would be advantageous if dive computers included such information and
warning displays, neither the proposed nor the permanent variance
require it. The permanent variance requires Dixie to equip its divers
with sensor and display systems that provide information on time,
depth, ascent, and descent to divers who use closed-circuit
rebreathers, and time, ascent, and descent information to divers who
use semi-closed-circuit rebreathers. Both types of rebreathers must
also have alarms or visual displays that warn the diver about excessive
ascent and descent rates, as well as depth levels that are shallower
than the ceiling-stop depth. The permanent variance does not require
that a dive computer provide this capability.
(e) Proposed Condition B required that closed-circuit rebreathers
must use the following sensors: (1) Sensors that measure supply
pressures for O2 and diluent gas; (2) depth sensors; (3)
continuously-functioning and redundant temperature-compensated
O2 sensors; and (4) continuously-functioning gas-loop and
ambient water-temperature sensors. One commenter (Ex. 2-114) asserted
that no existing rebreathers have continuously-functioning sensors for
assessing gas-loop and ambient water temperatures. A second commenter
(Ex. 2-117) contradicted this assertion, claiming that ``transducers
and thermocouples are readily available from numerous companies'' for
sensing pressure, depth, and ambient water temperature.
We believe that temperature sensors are necessary for diver safety.
Water-temperature sensors alert divers to the possibility of
hypothermia. In addition, gas-loop temperature sensors and water-
temperature sensors allow divers to estimate the duration of their
CO2-sorbent material. Efficiency of the CO2-
sorbent material deteriorates with decreasing temperatures (1991 NOAA
Diving Manual, page 16-9). Thus, if divers are able to estimate the
duration of their CO2-sorbent material, they can judge how
long they can dive even if their CO2 sensors malfunction.
Even if no existing rebreather incorporates temperature sensors as
stated by the commenter in Ex. 2-114, Dixie's proposal to use such
sensors will provide its divers with additional protection from
temperature-related diving hazards; therefore, we have included this
condition in the permanent variance.
(f) For open-circuit SCUBA, proposed Condition C specified that the
concentration of O2 must not exceed 40 percent (40%) of the
breathing gas by volume, or, for any SCUBA, an O2 partial
pressure of 1.40 ATA. Three commenters (Exs. 2-104, 2-106, and 2-113)
recommended that we increase the partial pressure of O2 in
the breathing-gas mixture from 1.4 to 1.6 ATA; these commenters
asserted that recreational divers use the 1.6 ATA level regularly and
safely, and that this use conforms to prevailing rebreather practices.
In reply to these commenters, we believe that the research data
cited in the proposed variance support our conclusion that a maximum
O2 level of 1.40 ATA prevents O2 toxicity. The
commenters provided no data or studies to support a maximum
O2 exposure of 1.6 ATA, nor could we find any relevant data
or study to support this recommendation for SCUBA diving. Evidence in
the record (see Exs. 4, 4A, 5 (pages 3-5 through 3-15, P-15, and P-37
through P-43), and 7) also demonstrates that breathing 1.6 ATA of
O2 for extended periods increases the risk of O2
toxicity compared to breathing 1.4 ATA of O2. The increased
risk of O2 toxicity means that little tolerance exists for
errors in O2 control and delivery equipment (e.g.,
O2 sensors, solenoids) and in calculating O2
exposures.
One commenter (Ex. 2-106) noted that we should consider both
partial pressure and the duration of a dive when determining
O2 exposure limits. Another commenter (Ex. 2-109) maintained
that when they use high-oxygen breathing-gas mixtures, Dixie's
recreational diving instructors and diving guides can dive for longer
periods than when they use air as the breathing gas. Long dive
durations extend a diver's exposure to elevated levels of oxygen,
thereby increasing the diver's risk of developing O2
toxicity, as well as DCS. Regarding the first comment (Ex. 2-106), we
note that the O2 exposure limits specified in the proposed
variance address both duration and level of O2 exposure.
Similarly, in response to the second commenter (Ex. 2-109) we believe
that Conditions C and E in the proposed variance address the concern
about O2 toxicity expressed in Ex. 2-109; these proposed
conditions cited research studies attesting to the safety of breathing
O2 at a partial pressure of 1.40 ATA.
(g) Condition D in the proposal limited the diving depth to ``no
deeper than 130 fsw, or to a maximum oxygen partial pressure delivered
to the diver of 1.40 ATA, whichever is most restrictive.'' The proposed
condition elicited two comments. The first commenter (Ex. 2-99) stated
that the Association of Diving Contractors, a trade association for the
commercial-diving industry, requires decompression chambers at the dive
site for dives deeper than 80 fsw or for dives outside the no-
decompression limits because ``there is still a possibility of a rapid
ascent to the surface and hence, a [risk of AGE] brought on by
eliminated or accelerated decompression [during] the ascent.'' The
second commenter (Ex. 2-113) considered a maximum diving depth of 160
or 170 fsw to be safe.
The proposal reduced the risk of DCS resulting from ``eliminated or
accelerated decompression'' to minimal
[[Page 71250]]
levels by requiring Dixie to ensure that its divers use nationally-
recognized no-decompression diving limits. The proposal lowered the
risk of AGE by including a number of procedural and equipment
requirements (e.g., specified O2 levels in the breathing-gas
mixture and installation of O2 and CO2 sensors)
that would minimize the need to make rapid (emergency) ascents to the
surface during a dive; such ascents can cause AGE by overpressurizing
the lungs. We believe that these proposed requirements would protect
recreational diving instructors from the risks associated with DCS and
AGE as well as, or better than, the provisions of 29 CFR
1910.401(a)(2)(i) (the exemption in OSHA's CDO Standard for
recreational diving instructors who use open-circuit, air-supplied
SCUBA).
We are not extending the depth limit to 160 or 170 fsw because we
believe that doing so would place the diver at increased risk of
nitrogen narcosis (as well as DCS). This increased risk would occur
because the partial pressure of nitrogen in the breathing gas would be
higher at 160-170 fsw than at 130 fsw. Previous research (Exs. 8, 9,
and 10) demonstrates that hyperbaric air has significant narcotic
effects even at 100 fsw or about 4.00 ATA (which is equivalent to a
nitrogen partial pressure of 3.16 ATA). Using 28 percent (28%)
O2 at 130 fsw (equivalent to about 1.40 ATA O2),
the partial pressure of nitrogen would be 3.56 ATA, which is only
slightly above the narcotic threshold specified by the previous
research.
(h) Proposed Condition E established O2-exposure limits
for the breathing-gas mixtures, requiring that divers ``not exceed the
24-hour single-exposure time limits specified by the 1991 NOAA Diving
Manual or other oxygen-exposure limits, such as the Diving Science and
Technology (DSAT) Oxygen Exposure Table, that provide a level of
oxygen-toxicity protection at least equivalent to the level of
protection afforded by the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual.'' The proposed
condition received two comments. One commenter (Ex. 2-98) agreed with
using the NOAA O2-exposure limits and a maximum
O2 partial pressure of 1.4 ATA, stating that these limits
``should not make the probability of oxygen toxicity * * *
significantly different than when breathing air.'' At O2
partial pressures above 1.3 ATA, this commenter recommended using the
exposure durations specified in Table 15-1 of NOAA's 1991 Diving
Manual. According to this commenter, using the NOAA table ``would make
the probability of CNS O2 toxicity [extremely low].'' The
second commenter (Ex. 2-100) asserted that a commercial subsidiary of
the Professional Association of Diving Instructors developed the DSAT
O2-exposure limits. The commenter contended that this
subsidiary is not a recognized research authority and is ``motivated by
profit and not necessarily the public benefit.'' According to this
commenter:
NOAA is a highly regarded and recognized source of diving
research and operational protocol. If oxygen exposure limits are not
to exceed the 24-hour single exposure time limits specified in the
1991 NOAA Diving Manual[,] then citing additional sources of oxygen
exposure limits[] that[,] by default, can only be the same or more
conservative, is unnecessary and likely confusing.
The comments in Ex. 2-98 support the maximum O2-exposure
limit of 1.40 ATA specified in proposed Condition E. We agree with the
commenter that CNS toxicity is the principal basis for specifying
O2 exposure limits; accordingly, we discussed the need to
prevent O2-induced CNS toxicity in detail in the proposed
variance (62 FR 58999-59000).
Regarding the comments in Ex. 2-100, we find that the
O2-toxicity protection afforded to divers by the DSAT tables
under the diving conditions specified in the variance application is at
least equivalent to the level of safety that they get from the
O2-exposure limits specified in the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual.
The rationale provided in the proposed variance, as well as additional
evidence submitted to the record (Exs. 4 and 7), support this
conclusion.
We have deleted the proposed general language that would have
allowed Dixie to use non-NOAA O2-exposure limits (other than
DSAT's) when these limits ``provide a level of oxygen-toxicity
protection at least equivalent to the level of protection afforded by
the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual.'' We believe this provision would
introduce unnecessary uncertainty into the permanent variance when two
adequate sources of O2 limits are already available for
Dixie's use. Accordingly, we have revised this provision so that only
the O2-exposure limits identified in the proposal are
acceptable for the permanent variance; these limits are from the 1991
NOAA Diving Manual, and the Enriched Air Operations and Resources Guide
published in 1995 by the Professional Association of Diving Instructors
(commonly referred to as the ``1995 DSAT Oxygen Exposure Table''). If
other O2-exposure limits become available in the future,
Dixie may request us to amend the permanent variance if it provides
evidence that demonstrates their safety.
(i) Proposed Condition F, which required that ``[n]itrogen shall be
the only inert gas used to obtain the breathing-gas mixture,'' elicited
two comments. One commenter (Ex. 2-103) asserted that recreational
diving instructors and diving guides ``use gas blends to increase
safety,'' implying that we should allow divers to use additional inert
gases in the breathing-gas mixture. The second commenter (Ex. 2-113)
also noted that tri-mix breathing gases (usually consisting of
O2, N2, and He) have been used safely by many
divers.
Dixie proposed to use nitrogen as the only inert gas in the
breathing-gas mixture under the specified conditions encountered by its
divers (i.e., no-decompression dives to depths that do not exceed 130
fsw). We need not consider the use of other inert gases as part of
Dixie's permanent variance because Dixie did not seek our approval for
the use of these gases. In any case, we believe that other inert gases
(e.g., helium) have limited, if any, application under the conditions
of this variance.
(j) Proposed Conditions G, H, and I specified, respectively, the
requirements for: Mixing and analyzing nitrox breathing-gas mixtures;
compressors used to produce the nitrox breathing-gas mixtures; and
SCUBAs exposed to high-pressure (pressures exceeding 300 psi) nitrox
breathing-gas mixtures. These proposed conditions received four
comments. The first commenter (Ex. 2-99) contended that the proposal
did not provide specifications for O2-clean systems and
measurement accuracy, and did not require the delivery of pre-mixed
breathing gas ``from a reliable and competent source with high
standards of documented quality control in place.''
The second commenter (Ex. 2-105) asked: What is the basis for the
O2-cleaning and O2-service requirements and the
300 psi limit; at what minimum O2 level would these
requirements apply; and how does OSHA define ``O2
compatible.'' The commenter agreed with the use of oil-free compressors
for mixing nitrox breathing-gas mixtures. The commenter noted, however,
that employees who use these compressors need proper training and that
``[s]pecial consideration must be given * * * to material use, material
compatibility, system design, cleaning[,] and maintenance.'' The
commenter described several hazards associated with mixing nitrox
breathing gases, including: Partial-pressure blending into cylinders
not prepared properly for O2 service; inducing
O2-enriched breathing-
[[Page 71251]]
gas mixtures into the intake of compressors not designed for this
purpose; and contamination of mixtures with hydrocarbons or oil. The
commenter also recommended that we permit the use of O2
analyzers that involve processes or mechanisms other than fuel-cells
(e.g., gas chromatography, thermal conductivity), stating that such
analyzers are accurate and ``have been in use worldwide for many
years.''
A third commenter (Ex. 2-116) made a number of recommendations to
improve the safety of mixing nitrox breathing gases, including:
Prohibit the use of oil-lubricated air compressors for mixing nitrox
breathing gases containing 22-40 percent (22-40%) O2;
require compressor and filter-system manufacturers to certify that
their equipment is safe for the gases used in the breathing mixtures;
require filter-system manufacturers to certify that the equipment used
to clean air (for mixing with pure O2) produces
O2-compatible breathing gases (i.e., breathing gases with
low hydrocarbon levels); and require Dixie to monitor hydrocarbon
contamination continuously. The commenter also submitted suggested
revisions to the proposed text based on these recommendations.
In reply to the commenters who requested information on which
standards we would use to ensure accurate mixing and decontamination
(especially hydrocarbon removal) of nitrox breathing gases, we note
that Dixie must comply with 29 CFR 1910.101 (Compressed Gases (General
Requirements)) and 29 CFR 1910.169 (Air Receivers), and applicable
provisions of 29 CFR 1910.134 (Respiratory Protection). We agree with
the comment in Ex. 2-105 that Dixie must use only properly trained
personnel to mix breathing gases, and we have revised the permanent
variance accordingly.
To reduce the risk of O2 explosions, proposed Condition
I required that SCUBA using high-O2 breathing-gas mixtures
or pure O2 at pressures exceeding 300 psi be designed for
O2 service. We derived the 300 psi limit by interpolating
between the pressure limit (125 psi) for pure O2 and the
pressure limit (500 psi) for compressed air specified in paragraph
(i)(3) of 29 CFR 1910.430. We note, however, that Sec. 1910.430(i)(1)
requires that equipment using O2 mixtures exceeding 40
percent (40%) O2 by volume be designed for O2
service; this requirement is based on the serious explosion risk
associated with these O2 mixtures. Therefore, to reduce the
risk of an O2 explosion, we have revised the permanent
variance to require that SCUBA using breathing-gas mixtures that exceed
40 percent (40%) O2 by volume at pressures over 125 psi be
designed for O2 service.
The proposed variance explained that an O2 analyzer that
uses a fuel-cell process would be acceptable. However, O2
analyzers based on other processes are also acceptable if they meet the
requirements specified in Conditions 22 and 24(a) of the permanent
variance.
We agree with the commenter in Ex. 2-116 that Dixie must only use
compressors and filters that manufacturers have certified will produce
O2-compatible breathing-gas mixtures and will withstand the
pressures involved. We believe these requirements substantially reduce
the risk of O2-related explosions that can occur while
mixing nitrox breathing gases under high pressure. Accordingly, we have
incorporated these requirements into the permanent variance. Consistent
with existing requirements in our CDO Standard, the permanent variance
also requires an O2-service rating for compressors used for
mixing high-pressure O2 whenever O2 fractions
could exceed 40 percent (40%) by volume, as specified in paragraphs
(i)(1) and (i)(2) of 29 CFR 1910.430.
A fourth commenter (Ex. 2-117) stated that O2 analyzers,
oil-less compressors, and filter-membrane systems are available
commercially, and identified several companies that manufacture this
equipment. These comments demonstrate that Dixie can readily meet the
requirements in the permanent variance to use O2 analyzers,
oil-less compressors, and filter-membrane systems when mixing nitrox
breathing gases for rebreathers.
(k) Proposed Condition J, which identified the no-decompression
limits that Dixie must use, elicited three comments. One commenter (Ex.
2-98) asserted that using high-O2 breathing-gas mixtures and
diving in accordance with the no-decompression limits for air diving
specified in the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual would reduce the risk of
developing DCS. This commenter also recommended comparing other,
``equivalent,'' no-decompression limits to the NOAA limits using a
method that ``give[s] acceptable prediction of DCS probability when
applied to data bases * * * where the dive profile is accurately known
and the outcome (DCS or no DCS) is known.'' The commenter added that
``the employer must show through adequate records that the DCS
incidence using these other procedures [is] acceptably low,'' and
asserted that ``an ongoing evaluation of safety through record keeping
is essential.''
Another commenter (Ex. 2-109) stated that the ``DSAT [no-
decompression air] tables, [which] are based on a shorter tissue half-
time, predict more rapid out-gassing and therefore allow much longer
repetitive dives than the Navy [no-decompression air] tables would
following similar bottom times and surface intervals.'' This commenter
concluded, however, that the DSAT and U.S. Navy no-decompression limits
provide similar levels of diver protection.
The third commenter (Ex. 2-99) noted that the proposal did not
consider ``omitted decompression'' that may occur while instructing and
supervising novice divers. This commenter asserted that novice divers
are ``prone to panic and thus more susceptible to an occurrence that
[may require] * * * a decompression chamber on site.''
Based on these comments, we conclude that the permanent variance
needs to contain specific recommendations for no-decompression limits.
Therefore, we have decided to remove the provision for ``equivalent''
no-decompression limits from the permanent variance. In doing so, we
have carefully reviewed the findings and recommendations of Dr. R. W.
Hamilton et al. in Ex. 4A (``DSAT Recreational Dive Planner:
Development and Validation of No-Stop Decompression Procedures for
Recreational Diving'' or ``the Planner''). Based on evidence cited in
the Planner, we find that the scientific community accepts the DSAT no-
decompression tables; in addition, the program of extensive laboratory
and field testing described in the Planner has demonstrated that the
DSAT no-decompression tables are reliable and valid. Accordingly, the
permanent variance allows Dixie to use the DSAT no-decompression tables
and the no-decompression limits in the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual. Should
other no-decompression limits become available in the future, Dixie may
request us to amend the permanent variance. The application would need
to demonstrate that the alternative no-decompression limits are at
least as protective as the limits specified in the permanent variance.
In an earlier response to the commenter in Ex. 2-109 in paragraph
(d) of Part 1, we stated that NOAA's EAD formula can accurately
estimate the DCS risk associated with nitrox breathing-gas mixtures
based on equivalent nitrogen partial pressures and dive durations used
in air diving. In addition, we disagree with this commenter's
recommendation to adopt the U.S. Navy's no-decompression
[[Page 71252]]
limits. If we were to adopt these limits, we would unnecessarily
restrict a major application of rebreathers (i.e., to use high levels
of O2 in the breathing-gas mixture to extend the diving
duration at a specific depth beyond the duration limit specified for
air).
As previously noted, the commenter in Ex. 2-99 expressed concern
about diving-related incidents among novice divers, and implied that
recreational diving instructors could be placed at risk of DCS or AGE
under these conditions. We find that the risk of DCS is negligible
under these conditions because the recreational diving instructors and
novice divers will be using the NOAA or DSAT no-decompression tables
and, therefore, will have no need to decompress. If a novice diver
panics and makes a rapid ascent to the surface, the recreational diving
instructor has been trained and has the necessary experience to follow
the novice diver to the surface in an orderly fashion, thereby avoiding
AGE.
(l) Proposed Condition K.3, which specified the entries that divers
must make in the diving log, received only one comment (Ex. 2-109).
This commenter asked who would make the entries, stating that
``frequently, other than the paying passengers * * * there is only the
boat captain and the instructor [or] guide.'' Dixie Divers consists of
several small commercial diving businesses that may have difficulty
finding an employee to make entries in the diving log. After we
published the proposed variance, Dixie asked us to revise the proposed
condition to permit non-employees to make entries in the log. In
addition, Dixie asked for a similar revision to proposed Condition L,
which required the employer to verify the availability of treatment
resources for medical emergencies, and to enter the verification in the
diving log. Recognizing that any properly-qualified individual can make
such entries, we have revised these provisions to permit Dixie to use
non-employees to perform these tasks, but only after verifying their
qualifications to do so. As the employer, Dixie will be responsible for
assuring that the entries are made, regardless of who makes them.
(m) Proposed Condition L required that Dixie confirm, on a daily
basis before commencing diving operations, the availability of
resources to treat a diving-related medical emergency, including
``transportation * * * capable of delivering [an injured diver] to the
decompression chamber within two hours of the injury.'' A commenter
(Ex. 2-109) asked, ``Does this imply that if they are told a chamber is
down or the Coast Guard can't confirm readiness, that they'll cancel
the diving for that day?'' This commenter cautioned that ``if an
accident happens after a significant amount of time has passed since
the call, [a decompression chamber] may not be available at that time
[because it's in use or undergoing maintenance].'' Based on these
comments, we have clarified the requirement in the permanent variance
by specifying that Dixie must confirm that the required treatment
resources are ``available during each day's diving operations.''
This commenter (Ex. 2-109) also argued that a decompression chamber
should be within one hour from the dive site, instead of two hours,
because of the ``relatively short distance off-shore that most Florida
diving is done,'' and any ``[t]ime delay in getting an injured diver to
a chamber can severely lessen the chances of full recovery from DCS.''
In reviewing this recommendation, we asked the Divers Alert Network
(DAN) for assistance. DAN is the nation's leading private-sector
organization providing DCS treatment recommendations to recreational
divers and diving guides.
With DAN's assistance, we identified 13 locations in Florida where
suitable decompression chambers (6.0 ATA pressure capability, dual-
lock, multiplace) are available to the public for treating diving-
related medical emergencies. These chambers are in Pensacola, Panama
City, Tallahassee, Gainesville, Jacksonville, Inverness, Orlando,
Tampa, Fort Myers, Miami, Tavernier, Marathon, and Key West. These 13
decompression-facility sites are within two hours transit time of any
diving location in Florida, including off-shore, state-controlled
waters. This transit time assumes the use of surface vehicle
transportation traveling at the maximum legal speed limit, and includes
30 minutes to make land when diving off-shore. In response to the
commenter's statement that increases in treatment delay will ``severely
lessen the chances of full recovery from DCS,'' we sought evidence with
respect to one-hour or two-hour treatment delays from Dr. Edward D.
Thalmann (Ex. 12). Dr. Thalmann is a world-renowned expert in treating
diving-related medical emergencies among recreational divers; he is
also the author of a number of scientific publications that address the
causes and treatment of diving-related medical emergencies, especially
DCS.
In his reply (Ex. 13), Dr. Thalmann compared the risk of AGE and
DCS among recreational divers who breathe air as opposed to nitrox. He
then estimated the maximum delay in decompression treatment that would
not worsen the treatment outcome. Dr. Thalmann noted that AGE is the
most life-threatening diving-related medical emergency that can occur
and that, to treat the most serious cases, a decompression chamber
should be available at the dive site. He recognized that this
recommendation went far beyond our existing requirements for some types
of recreational diving (e.g., recreational diving instruction covered
by paragraph (a)(2)(i) of 29 CFR 1910.401). In this regard, Dr.
Thalmann stated that AGE ``is a rare occurrence and can be avoided with
proper training and experience.'' Dr. Thalmann concluded that AGE ``is
essentially independent of the time at depth'' and that ``there is no
evidence * * * [to] suggest that the occurrence and outcome of [AGE]
would be any different breathing a [n]itrox mixture [other] than air.''
Regarding DCS, Dr. Thalmann asserted that research data show that
the EAD approach (see the discussion above under paragraph (d) of Part
1) is valid for computing no-decompression limits for O2
partial pressures as high as 1.5 ATA. Based on this research and his
field experience, Dr. Thalmann stated that DCS associated with
breathing a nitrox gas mixture ``should not be substantially different
in incidence and severity compared to diving on air[,] provided the
[n]itrox no-decompression times are computed from accepted air no-
decompression limits using the [NOAA's] EAD [formula].'' Dr. Thalmann
concluded that, within these constraints, ``there is no rationale for
having different requirements for recompression chamber availability
for air and [n]itrox no-decompression diving.''
In addressing treatment delay, Dr. Thalmann reviewed available
research studies, as well as data from DAN. According to Dr. Thalmann,
the DAN data ``apply to recreational diving only where the vast
majority of diving is within no-decompression limits.'' The results
show that, for both pain-only DCS and DCS with severe neurological
symptoms, a treatment delay of four hours can occur without diminishing
treatment success (i.e., complete relief of symptoms). In conclusion,
Dr. Thalmann stated, ``There is no significant body of evidence to
suggest that, so long as one is diving within accepted no-decompression
limits breathing air or [n]itrox, having access to a recompression
facility within 4 hours is inadequate.''
Dr. Thalmann's reply demonstrates several points: (1) The risk of
AGE and DCS while breathing air or a nitrox gas
[[Page 71253]]
mixture should not differ when the dive conforms to accepted no-
decompression limits computed using the EAD approach; (2) maintaining a
decompression chamber at the dive site to treat AGE is unnecessary and
impractical because AGE is a rare occurrence that proper training and
diving experience can prevent; and (3) as much as a four-hour delay in
treating DCS does not diminish treatment outcomes. Based on this
evidence, as well as a complete review of the existing record, we have
decided to keep the provision permitting a two-hour timeframe for
treating DCS, as proposed by Dixie.
As part of his reply, Dr. Thalmann also recommended that we revise
the phrase ``within two hours of the injury'' in proposed Condition L.1
to read ``[2] hours after it is recognized that symptoms of [a
decompression incident] are present.'' We acknowledge that the proposed
language was unclear, but we also believe that the recommended wording
may be confusing as well. Therefore, we have adopted new language in
the permanent variance that expresses the requirement in terms of the
maximum delay permitted in transporting the injured diver to a suitable
decompression chamber; the revised language reads, ``* * * within two
(2) hours travel time from the dive site.''
(n) Proposed Condition N specified that Dixie was responsible for
initial treatment of diving-related medical emergencies, and that it
had to ensure that ``two personnel, one of whom shall be a diver
employed by [Dixie] and both of whom are qualified in first-aid and the
administration of treatment oxygen'' were available at the dive site
for this purpose. Two commenters responded to this provision. The first
commenter (Ex. 2-100) stated that the provision appears to be ``an
attempt by Dixie Divers * * * to use the process to gain an unfair
advantage in the recreational diving market by requiring all diving
operations to contract with a `diver employed by the applicant.' '' The
second commenter (Ex. 2-109) asserted that this requirement would be
difficult to satisfy because the ``typical crew on a Florida boat is
[a] captain and instructor.'' Dixie, as a small business with few
employees, supported the second commenter's assertion, and requested
that it be permitted to use qualified non-employees to meet this
requirement.
In reply to these comments, we note that Dixie and all other
employers engaged in commercial diving operations must already provide,
as appropriate, on-site support personnel to perform a variety of tasks
(see, e.g., the requirements in paragraph (c) of 29 CFR 1910.410 and
paragraph (c)(2) of 29 CFR 1910.426). These personnel can also perform
duties as specified in proposed Condition N. We recognize, however,
that the main purpose of this provision is to ensure that properly-
qualified personnel are available, regardless of their employment
status. Therefore, we have revised this provision to permit Dixie to
use non-employees for first-aid and O2 treatment. However,
Dixie may do so only if it verifies their qualifications to perform
these tasks before it starts the day's diving operations.
(o) Proposed Condition O specified the training requirements for
Dixie's recreational diving instructors and diving guides, including
the requirement that an industry-recognized training agency certify
that the divers are capable of using the diving equipment and
breathing-gas mixtures needed for their recreational diving operations.
The National Association of Underwater Instructors (NAUI) (Ex. 2-100)
noted its affiliates offer ``a full range of training programs from
Skin Diver through Instructor Course Director, including certification
in oxygen enriched air, semi-closed circuit and closed circuit
rebreather diver.'' Nonetheless, NAUI found the proposed condition
ambiguous because it ``does not provide a definition of the diving
industry or outline any process or criteria to evaluate and recognize a
training agency that would establish the legitimacy of its training.''
We agree with NAUI's comment that this provision in the proposed
variance was confusing. Additionally, we believe that an employer is in
the best position to determine if the training that its divers obtain
is adequate to perform their jobs safely and effectively. Therefore, we
have revised the proposed provision and have made the training
requirement in the permanent variance performance-based; that is, Dixie
must ensure that its employees receive training that enables them to
perform safely and effectively while using open-circuit SCUBAs or
rebreathers supplied with nitrox breathing-gas mixtures. However, we
specified several critical tasks that the recreational diving
instructors and diving guides employed by Dixie must be trained to
perform safely and effectively, including: Recognizing the effects
associated with breathing excessive CO2 and O2;
taking appropriate action after detecting the effects of breathing
excessive CO2 and O2; and properly evaluating,
operating, and maintaining their open-circuit SCUBAs and rebreathers.
We addressed the importance of recognizing and responding properly to
the effects of excessive CO2 and O2 in our
earlier discussions of Conditions A.2 and E of the proposed variance.
Based on our review of Ex. 5 (especially pages 11-1 through 11-15), we
believe that divers must also know how to evaluate, operate, and
maintain their rebreathers under the diving conditions that they
encounter as recreational diving instructors and diving guides. We have
specified these revisions in Condition 38 of the permanent variance.
Part 3. Comments to Proposed Section III (Rationale for the Proposed
Alternative)
(a) In discussing Conditions A and B in the proposed variance, we
noted that the existing exemption for recreational diving instructors
in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of 29 CFR 1910.401 in our CDO Standard does not
refer to rebreathers. We explained that ``such equipment was not
available or in common use by recreational diving instructors when
OSHA's [CDO] Standard was promulgated in 1977'' (62 FR 58999, first
column). A commenter (Ex. 2-109) noted that this statement gave the
false impression that rebreather equipment ``is readily used by the
recreational diving community.'' Regarding the experience of the
recreational diving community with rebreathers, this commenter asserted
that ``while the argument can be made that [rebreathers have] been used
safely within the scientific and commercial diving industries, it can
also be argued that those divers are more highly trained and the
operations more closely monitored than is the norm in the recreational
diving industry.''
Our discussion of the rationale for Conditions A and B as proposed
noted that ``data related to the reliability and safety of [rebreather
equipment] are difficult to obtain because its use by recreational
divers is still uncommon''; however, we now believe that data are
available showing that recreational diving instructors and diving
guides can use rebreathers safely and reliably. We revised our opinion
after reviewing Ex. 5 (especially pages 2-2, 7-1, and 7-2), which shows
that various military organizations have a 50-year history of using
rebreathers safely, scientific and technical divers have been doing so
for over 20 years, and, currently, recreational diving instructors and
diving students safely perform rebreather diving. We believe,
therefore, that we have sufficient knowledge about rebreather
technology and diving procedures to determine that the conditions
specified in the permanent
[[Page 71254]]
variance will protect Dixie's recreational diving instructors and
diving guides at least as well as having an on-site decompression
chamber.
(b) The rationale for proposed Conditions C through E justified the
use of DSAT's Oxygen Exposure Table (62 FR 58999, second and third
columns). This rationale elicited one comment (Ex. 2-109). This
commenter stated that specifying time limits in the DSAT Oxygen
Exposure Table in terms of total dive time ``is * * * a very common
industry practice and not some great concession on Dixie's part, as the
wording of the sentence would perhaps lead you to believe.'' In this
case, we agree that the use of a common industry practice will enable
Dixie to comply with the permanent variance without additional effort,
while providing adequate diver protection.
(c) Proposed Condition K provided a rationale for using dive-
decompression computers, noting that no-decompression limits for
repetitive dives can involve ``tedious and time-consuming calculations
* * * made by hand.'' It concluded that dive-decompression computers
would ``assist divers in decreasing their exposure to excessive ascent
rates, oxygen toxicity, and DCS that could result from errors in
calculating repetitive no-decompression diving schedules manually.''
(62 FR 59000, third column.) The single commenter (Ex. 2-109) on this
point claimed that manual calculations ``[can be] taught in the first
or second lecture of most entry-level [SCUBA] classes'' and performed
in a couple of minutes. This commenter also asserted that manual
calculations may provide an additional margin of safety from DCS
because they typically determine decompression using the deepest depth
attained during a dive. By contrast, dive-decompression computers may
reduce decompression (and therefore increase the risk of DCS) by
``measur[ing the] exact depth every few seconds and recalculat[ing
decompression] based on actual depth.''
In reply, we note that Condition K as proposed allowed Dixie the
flexibility to use either manual calculations or dive-decompression
computers. Nevertheless, manual calculation is subject to human error,
and computer use can reduce such error. The permanent variance will
reduce problems associated with using dive-decompression computers to
avoid decompression by restricting the no-decompression limits to the
most recent decompression tables and formulas published by NOAA and
DSAT.
(d) The rationale for proposed Conditions O and P addressed the
requirements for diver certification, noting that ``Condition O
provides general uniformity to the diver qualification and training
process, as well as quality control over the certifying agencies.'' (62
FR 59001, third column.) A commenter (Ex. 2-109) stated that the
certification requirement imposed no burden on Dixie because it was
consistent with existing industry practice; in addition, the
requirement was unlikely to bring uniformity to diver qualifications
because ``different dive stores, certifying under the same national
standards, can still turn out divers [and] instructors of varying
proficiency levels.'' In reply, we note that we do expect these
requirements to make training programs more uniform (than is presently
the case) in the way that they train recreational diving instructors
and diving guides, and this uniformity should substantially reduce much
of the variability in diver proficiency.
Part 4. Comments to Proposed Section VI (Issues)
In the proposal, we invited the public to submit information and
specific comments and rationale on nine other issues. Only one
commenter (Ex. 2-109) did so. This commenter addressed the first issue,
which requested commenters to differentiate the underwater tasks and
types of diving performed by recreational diving instructors and diving
guides, and to relate these differences to the probability of
experiencing diving-related medical problems. The commenter stated
that, during training dives, recreational diving instructors ``will
probably do multiple ascents * * * but may be exposed to less time in
the water than a dive guide since students generally are excited and
[consume more air] than experienced divers.'' The commenter stated
that, during the ascent-training phase, recreational diving instructors
must ``make multiple, generally rapid, ascents with each of the
students, increasing the chances of a DCS hit.'' The commenter added
that recreational diving instructors are ``at a slightly greater risk
[than diving guides] of AGE from the ascents and perhaps a slightly
elevated chance of DCS due to rapid ascents,'' although ``[t]he
likelihood of the instructor getting DCS or AGE * * * is probably
extremely small.''
Regarding diving guides, the commenter asserted that it escorts
experienced divers who, typically, are less excitable than novice
divers; based on this assumption, the commenter asserted that
experienced divers would consume breathing gases at slower rates than
novice divers. The commenter concluded that slow rates of gas
consumption would extend dive durations which, combined with the deeper
dives made by diving guides compared to recreational diving
instructors, would increase the diving guides' risk of DCS. In response
to this commenter, we refer to our earlier discussion of this issue in
Part I. In this discussion, we agreed that ``using high-O2
nitrox breathing-gas mixtures would increase the risk of DCS,'' but
concluded that ``the resulting risk would be comparable to using the
equivalent partial pressure of nitrogen in air for that extended
period.''
Part 5. General Comments to the Proposed Variance
One commenter (Ex. 2-105) indicated that a number of topics needed
clarification or were ``so controversial or comprehensive in nature
that this level of detail in a policy document may not be
appropriate.'' These areas are: Validating dive-decompression
computers, including the programmable safety factors used in these
computers; updating decompression data; identifying programmable gas-
percentage options; using failure mode and effects analysis of critical
components and assemblies to develop consensus regarding the general
safety and accuracy of dive-decompression computers; determining the
relevance of, and necessity for, monitoring environmental temperatures
and the breathing-loop gases in closed-circuit rebreathers; and
recognizing standards developed by the equipment manufacturers. The
commenter stated that ``[t]o expand on just a few of [these areas]
would make this document much [too long].'' Nevertheless, the commenter
asserted, without explanation, that ``from a standpoint of technical
diving facts [the proposed variance] is grossly inaccurate and in many
cases written with twisted facts,'' and that the ``[proposed] variance
as written has the potential to expose employees (i.e.[,] dive shop
technicians, instructors) to dangerous situations.''
In large part, these areas of concern address the safety and
standardization of dive-decompression computers. Under the permanent
variance, use of dive-decompression computers is optional; however, if
Dixie uses these computers, it must also provide its divers with
specific decompression information. Regardless of computer use or
availability, Dixie must have hard-copy decompression tables at the
dive site. Thus, the permanent variance specifies the conditions that
Dixie must meet to ensure that its employees' diving activities conform
to accepted
[[Page 71255]]
no-decompression practices, whether or not Dixie uses dive-
decompression computers.
Another commenter (Ex. 2-109) stated that ``[t]o retailers * * *
nitrox is marketed as a new profit center. In an industry with flat
growth over the past few years, and where profit margins are small to
begin with, nitrox * * * can be sold to the diving consumer as a
`safer' alternative to air, thus generating more profits * * * through
the sale of classes and equipment specific to nitrox.'' Regarding
diving safety, this commenter asserted that the high level of diving
skills acquired by commercial divers made them safer than recreational
diving instructors and diving guides, and referred to statistics from
the Divers Alert Network (DAN) to support this assertion:
[T]he statistics [for 1996] show that 0.2% of the reported accidents
involved commercial divers, but 17.1% of the accidents involved
Instructors or Divemasters (dive guides). The latter are the same two
categories * * * who make up Dixie Diver's employees who would be
exempt under the variance. In 1995, the numbers were 0.5% for
commercial divers versus 15.9% for instructors[-] divemasters. In 1994,
the numbers were 0.0% for commercial divers and 21.5% for instructors[-
]divemasters.
The statistics cited by this commenter do not address the principal
conditions specified in the permanent variance (i.e., recreational
diving instructors and diving guides who make no-decompression dives
using nitrox breathing-gas mixtures). In a recent editorial in Alert
Diver (Ex. 16, page 2), DAN's director (Dr. Peter B. Bennett) addressed
the safety of nitrox dives made by recreational divers (which includes
sports divers, as well as recreational diving instructors and diving
guides). Dr. Bennett stated that ``[b]etween 1990 and 1993 DAN
collected data on 21 cases of mixed-gas diving injuries. In 1994 there
were 10, and in 1996, 16 injuries occurred. The 1996 data [are] based
on 23 nitrox or mixed-gas injuries requiring recompression treatment. *
* * The International Association of Nitrox and Technical Divers * * *
certified 17,780 U.S. nitrox divers from 1985 to 1996.'' Based on this
information, an average of less than 0.001 per cent of recreational
divers who use nitrox breathing-gas mixtures are injured each year.
Additionally, both Dr. Bennett (Ex. 16, pages 2 and 6) and other DAN
representatives (Ex. 4A, page 60) admit that valid comparisons cannot
be made between different categories of divers because adequate
baseline data (e.g., the number and types of dives made by all divers
in a category) are not available. In conclusion, we believe that the
protections afforded by the conditions specified in the permanent
variance will reduce the prevalence of diving-related injuries among
Dixie's recreational diving instructors (who also have substantial
experience in using nitrox breathing-gas mixtures) below the already
low injury rates cited in Dr. Bennett's editorial.
Part 6. Our Revisions to the Proposed Variance
(a) When divers use rebreathers, proposed Condition A.4 provided
for a supplemental supply of breathable gas during emergency egress
(referred to as the ``bail-out system''); this supply would consist of
a diluent breathing gas connected to the second stage of the regulator.
We have added a phrase to the permanent variance to address alternative
means of emergency egress when open-circuit SCUBA provides the nitrox
breathing-gas mixture. It allows Dixie to use the reserve breathing-gas
supplies specified in paragraph (c)(4) of 29 CFR 1910.424 for this
purpose. This alternative, specified in Condition (30)(b)(i) in the
permanent variance, is an existing requirement for open-circuit SCUBA.
When the bail-out system consists of a separate supply of emergency
breathing gas, Condition A.1 of the proposed variance permitted Dixie
to use air as the emergency breathing gas. The permanent variance
retains this provision.
(b) Conditions A.5.a and A.5.b in the proposed variance specified
the use of an information module that provides time, depth, ascent, and
descent data to divers who use closed-circuit rebreathers, and time,
ascent, and descent information to divers who use semi-closed-circuit
rebreathers. Proposed Condition A.5.c required both types of
rebreathers to have alarms or visual displays that warn the diver about
excessive ascent and descent rates, as well as depth levels that are
shallower than the ceiling-stop depth. While Dixie's recreational
diving instructors and diving guides could use dive-decompression
computers for this purpose, we believe that such computers are
unnecessary because the divers will be diving within no-decompression
limits, and the technical capability of dive-decompression computers
exceeds the requirements of no-decompression dives. An information
module that provides the divers with the specified dive information
will permit them to remain within no-decompression limits and to
descend and ascend the water column at the rates specified by the
diving tables. We believe, therefore, that the information module will
ensure that Dixie's divers remain as safe as they would if they used
dive-decompression computers.
(c) Proposed Condition A.5.c also requires that, for both semi-
closed-circuit and closed-circuit rebreathers, the information module
must warn the diver of low battery voltage. As noted in Ex. 5 (page P-
59), a partial or total electronic failure interferes with sensor and
control systems and may have serious safety consequences for the diver.
We believe that the diver's safety depends on properly-operating
electrical power supplies and electrical and electronic circuits.
Accordingly, we have revised the proposal by requiring that Dixie
perform the following procedure: ``Before each day's diving operations,
and more often when necessary, * * * ensure that the electrical power
supplies and electrical and electronic circuits in each rebreather are
operating as required by the rebreather manufacturer's instructions.''
Condition (12) of the permanent variance contains this revision.
(d) Proposed Conditions B.1 and G.1.c addressed O2
sensor and control requirements for closed-circuit rebreathers.
Conditions (13) through (17) in the permanent variance consolidate
these requirements in a single location.
(e) For closed-circuit rebreathers, proposed Condition G.1.c
specifies the use of O2 sensors to assess the O2
fraction in the breathing loop, while proposed Condition G.1.d requires
Dixie to determine (i.e., calibrate) sensor accuracy according to the
rebreather manufacturer's instructions. As noted in the proposal,
maintaining accurate O2 partial pressures in the breathing
loop is critical to diver health and safety. To assure safe operation
of O2 sensors, we believe that the permanent variance must
specify the frequency for assessing the accuracy of O2
sensors. Such an approach is consistent with the rebreather community's
use of regular diving-equipment assessments (see Ex.5, pages 4-1
through 4-13, and 14-2). Condition (15) of the permanent variance,
therefore, requires that ``[b]efore each day's diving operations, and
more often when necessary, [Dixie] must calibrate O2 sensors
as required by the sensor manufacturer's instructions[.]'' Removing
inaccurate O2 sensors from service and replacing them with
correctly-calibrated sensors is a logical and expected consequence of
the calibration process; we are specifying this requirement in
Conditions (15)(d) and (15)(e) of the permanent variance.
[[Page 71256]]
(f) Proposed Condition G.1.c accepted O2 sensors only if
they were electromechanical. Evidence in the record (Ex. 5, page 5-11)
indicates that O2-sensor technology is undergoing continued
development and refinement. We believe, therefore, that specifying
``electromechanical'' O2 sensors is too limiting, and we
have revised this provision to specify that Dixie must use
O2 sensors approved by the rebreather manufacturer (see
Condition (14)(b) in the permanent variance).
(g) Condition G.1.d in the proposed variance required Dixie to
maintain the accuracy of the equipment used to analyze O2 in
the breathing-gas mixture ``in accordance with the manufacturer's
instructions.'' We intended this requirement to apply to the analytic
equipment used both to calibrate O2 sensors and to determine
the O2 fraction in nitrox breathing-gas mixtures. To clarify
this intention, we have included the requirement separately in
Conditions (15)(b) and (22)(b) in the permanent variance.
(h) We have clarified the provision in proposed Condition G.2.a
that addressed the analysis of O2 in nitrox breathing-gas
mixtures obtained from commercial suppliers. This revision requires
Dixie to ensure that the supplier of the mixture analyzes the
O2 fraction in the mixture in the charged tank after
disconnecting the tank from the charging apparatus. This clarification
prevents the supplier from using the O2 sensor on the
charging apparatus for this purpose, a procedure that could result in
an incorrect determination. The revised provision is in Condition
(23)(b) of the permanent variance.
(i) Proposed Conditions K.3 and K.4 required that Dixie maintain a
diving log and decompression tables at the dive site. The diving log
documents the critical dive parameters. Divers who do not use dive-
decompression computers must use the decompression tables; the tables
also serve as a back-up resource to divers with dive-decompression
computers. We have revised the proposed conditions to ensure that Dixie
maintains a diving log and decompression tables at the dive sites for
all diving operations covered by the permanent variance, whether or not
its divers use a dive-decompression computer. The revised provision
also clarifies that the decompression tables must be hard copies and
conform to the no-decompression limits specified in Condition (28) of
the permanent variance. Condition (37) of the permanent variance
contains the revised requirements.
(j) Regarding the term ``portable oxygen,'' proposed Condition M
specified that ``the oxygen shall be available for administration to
the diver during the entire period the diver is being transported to a
decompression chamber.'' The O2 supplied for this purpose
must be pure O2, and the injured diver must receive the
O2 continuously from the time Dixie detects the diving-
related medical emergency until the diver begins treatment in a
decompression chamber. We have revised the proposal to clarify these
requirements. Therefore, Condition (33) in the permanent variance
requires Dixie to ensure that the portable O2 equipment
supplies pure O2 to the injured diver's transparent mask,
and that sufficient O2 is available to treat injured divers
until they reach a decompression chamber.
(k) In the proposed variance, one provision (Condition G.1.d)
required Dixie to maintain the accuracy of the equipment used to
analyze the O2 fraction of the breathing gas ``in accordance
with the manufacturer's instructions.'' To clarify which manufacturer
is being addressed in this provision, we revised the relevant
conditions of the permanent variance (Conditions (15)(b) and (22)(b))
to refer specifically to the manufacturer of the O2 analyzer
(who seems to us to be in the best position to specify how its
O2 analyzer should be calibrated). We have made similar
revisions to other provisions of the permanent variance, including
Condition (9) (which specifies calibration requirements for
CO2 sensors) and to Condition (15) (which specifies the
calibration requirement for O2 sensors).
The permanent variance contains a general requirement (Condition
(3)) to use rebreathers according to the manufacturer's instructions.
We repeat this requirement in several other important conditions of the
permanent variance. We have added this provision because SCUBA
manufacturers select and develop the characteristics and parameters of
SCUBA equipment, design and integrate the equipment accordingly,
procure or manufacture the equipment components, and then assemble and
test the final products. There is a wide range of SCUBA designs and
capabilities, and there are no uniform standards for the design,
function, and use of SCUBA. We believe, therefore, that the SCUBA
manufacturer is in the best position to specify the components,
configuration, and operation of its product. In addition, the
rebreather conference held recently in Redondo Beach, California,
recommended that ``[m]anufacturers must provide written procedures, pre
and post dive checklists, and a schedule for required maintenance.''
The SCUBA manufacturers who attended the conference endorsed this
recommendation (see Ex. 5, page 14-2).
V. Decision
Dixie Divers, Inc. seeks a permanent variance from the
decompression-chamber requirements of paragraphs (b)(2) and (c)(3)(iii)
of 29 CFR 1910.423 and paragraph (b)(1) of 29 CFR 1910.426. These
provisions require an employer to have a decompression chamber
available and ready for use at the dive site to treat two diving-
related medical emergencies that employees may experience--
decompression sickness (DCS) and arterial-gas embolism (AGE). Divers
may develop DCS after decompressing inadequately during dives in which
they breathe a mixed gas (e.g., nitrox). AGE results from
overpressurizing the lungs, usually during a rapid ascent to the
surface; overpressurization causes the air sacs in the lungs to rupture
and disperse bubbles into the pulmonary veins.
These decompression-chamber provisions require employers to ensure
that: Employees remain awake and in the vicinity of a decompression
chamber for at least one hour after the dive whenever they make no-
decompression dives, dive to depths deeper than 100 feet of sea water,
or use a mixed-gas breathing mixture (paragraph (b)(2) of 29 CFR
1910.423); and a decompression chamber is located within five minutes
from the dive site and is ready for use (paragraph (c)(3)(iii) of 29
CFR 1910.423 and paragraph (b)(1) of 29 CFR 1910.426).
In its variance application, Dixie stated that nitrox breathing-gas
mixtures reduce the occurrence and severity of DCS, while the equipment
and procedural safeguards specified in the variance application lower
the risk of AGE. (See section II, ``Application for a Permanent
Variance,'' of this notice for a thorough review of Dixie's variance
application.) Dixie asserted that the risk of DCS and AGE for divers
who use the SCUBA equipment and diving procedures proposed in the
variance application would be equal to, or less than, that experienced
by divers exempted from our CDO Standard. This exemption, specified in
paragraph (a)(2)(i) of 29 CFR 1910.401, applies to recreational diving
instructors who use compressed air supplied to open-circuit SCUBAs
under no-decompression diving limits. Dixie concluded, therefore, that
we should not require it to maintain a decompression chamber at the
dive site if it complies with the
[[Page 71257]]
conditions proposed in the variance application.
After reviewing the variance application, comments made to the
record about the application, and other technical and scientific
information submitted to the record, we have revised the proposed
variance to require Dixie to use specific procedures and equipment
safeguards for its divers when they engage in recreational diving
instruction and perform services as diving guides. Therefore, under
Sec. 6(d) of the OSH Act, and based on the record discussed above, we
find that when Dixie complies with the conditions of the following
order, its divers will be exposed to working conditions that are at
least as safe and healthful as they would be if Dixie complied with
paragraphs (b)(2) and (c)(3)(iii) of 29 CFR 1910.423 and paragraph
(b)(1) of 29 CFR 1910.426.
VI. Order
We issue this order authorizing Dixie Divers, Inc. to comply with
the following conditions instead of complying with paragraphs (b)(2)
and (c)(3)(iii) of 29 CFR 1910.423 and paragraph (b)(1) of 29 CFR
1910.426:
Application of the Permanent Variance
(1) This permanent variance applies only to the recreational diving
instructors and diving guides (``divers'') employed by Dixie Divers,
Inc. (designated as ``you'' or ``your'') when your:
(a) Recreational diving instructors train diving students in the
use of recreational diving procedures and the safe operation of diving
equipment, including open-circuit, semi-closed-circuit, or closed-
circuit self-contained underwater breathing apparatus (SCUBA) during
these training dives;
(b) Diving guides lead small groups of trained sports divers who
use open-circuit, semi-closed-circuit, or closed-circuit SCUBAs to
local undersea diving locations for recreational purposes; and
(c) Divers use a nitrox breathing-gas mixture consisting of a high
percentage of oxygen (O2) (i.e., over 22 percent (22%) by
volume) mixed with nitrogen and supplied by an open-circuit, semi-
closed-circuit, or closed-circuit SCUBA.
(2) This permanent variance does not apply when your divers engage
in diving activities other than recreational diving instruction or
diving guide duties.
Equipment Requirements for Rebreathers
(3) You must ensure that your divers use rebreathers (i.e., semi-
closed-circuit and closed-circuit SCUBAs) in accordance with the
rebreather manufacturer's instructions.
(4) Regarding CO2-sorbent materials in canisters:
(a) You must ensure that each rebreather uses a manufactured (i.e.,
commercially pre-packed), disposable scrubber cartridge containing a
CO2-sorbent material that:
(i) Is approved by the rebreather manufacturer;
(ii) Removes CO2 from your divers' exhaled gas; and
(iii) Maintains the CO2 level in the breathable gas
(i.e., the gas that your divers are inhaling directly from the
regulator) below a partial pressure of 0.01 atmospheres absolute (ATA);
or
(b) You may use an alternative scrubber method if:
(i) The rebreather manufacturer permits such use;
(ii) You use the alternative method according to the rebreather
manufacturer's instructions; and
(iii) You demonstrate that the alternative method meets the
requirements specified above in Condition (4)(a) of this order.
(5) You must ensure that each rebreather has a counterlung that
supplies a volume of breathing gas to your divers that is sufficient to
sustain their respiration rate and contains an over-pressure valve.
(6) You must ensure that each rebreather uses a moisture trap in
the breathing loop, and that the moisture trap and its location in the
breathing loop are approved by the rebreather manufacturer.
(7) You must ensure that each rebreather has a continuously-
functioning moisture sensor that connects to a visual (e.g., digital,
graphic, or analog) or auditory (e.g., voice, pure tone) alarm that
warns your divers of moisture in the breathing loop in sufficient time
to terminate the dive and return safely to the surface.
(8) You must ensure that each rebreather contains a continuously-
functioning CO2 sensor in the breathing loop, and that the
CO2 sensor and its location in the breathing loop are
approved by the rebreather manufacturer. You must also integrate the
CO2 sensor used in a rebreather with an alarm that:
(a) Operates in a visual (e.g., digital, graphic, or analog) or
auditory (e.g., voice, pure tone) mode;
(b) Is readily detectable by your divers under the diving
conditions in which they operate; and
(c) Remains continuously activated when the inhaled
CO2 level reaches and exceeds 0.005 ATA.
(9) Before each day's diving operations, and more often when
necessary, you must calibrate the CO2 sensor according to
the sensor manufacturer's instructions. In doing so, you must:
(a) Ensure that the equipment and procedures used to perform this
calibration are accurate to within 10 percent (10%) of a CO2
concentration of 0.005 ATA or less;
(b) Maintain this accuracy as required by the sensor manufacturer's
instructions;
(c) Ensure that the calibration of the CO2 sensor
demonstrates an accuracy to within 10 percent (10%) of a CO2
concentration of 0.005 ATA or less;
(d) Replace the CO2 sensor when it fails to meet the
accuracy requirements specified above in Condition (9)(c) of this
order; and
(e) Ensure that the replacement CO2 sensor meets the
accuracy requirements specified above in Condition (9)(c) of this order
before you place a rebreather in operation.
(10) As an alternative to using a continuously-functioning
CO2 sensor, you may use schedules for replacing
CO2-sorbent material provided by the rebreather
manufacturer. You may use these CO2-sorbent replacement
schedules only if:
(a) The rebreather manufacturer has:
(i) Developed the replacement schedules according to the canister-
testing protocol provided below in Appendix A of this order;
(ii) Analyzed the canister-testing results using the statistical
procedures described in U.S. Navy Experimental Diving Unit Report 2-99
(see section VII (``References'') below); and
(iii) Specified the replacement schedule in terms of the lower
prediction line (or limit) of the 95% prediction interval. In this
regard, the rebreather manufacturer may derive replacement schedules by
interpolating among, but not by extrapolating beyond, the depth, water
temperatures, and exercise levels used during canister testing; and
(b) You replace the CO2-sorbent material in the canister
as required by Condition (4) of this order.
(11) You must ensure that each rebreather has an information module
that provides:
(a) Visual (e.g., digital, graphic, or analog) or auditory (e.g.,
voice, pure tone) displays that will effectively warn your divers of
solenoid failure (when the rebreather uses solenoids) and other
electrical weaknesses or failures (e.g., low battery voltage);
(b) For semi-closed circuit rebreathers, visual displays for the
partial pressure of CO2, or deviations
[[Page 71258]]
above and below a preset CO2 partial pressure of 0.005 ATA;
and
(c) For closed-circuit rebreathers:
(i) Visual displays for the partial pressures of O2 and
CO2, or deviations above and below a preset CO2
partial pressure of 0.005 ATA and a preset O2 partial
pressure of 1.40 ATA; and
(ii) A visual display for the gas temperature in the breathing
loop.
(12) Before each day's diving operations, and more often when
necessary, you must ensure that the electrical power supplies and
electrical and electronic circuits in each rebreather are operating as
required by the rebreather manufacturer's instructions.
Special Requirements for Closed-Circuit Rebreathers
(13) You must ensure that closed-circuit rebreathers use supply-
pressure sensors for the O2 and diluent (i.e., air or
nitrogen) gases and continuously-functioning sensors for detecting
temperature in the inhalation side of the gas-loop and the ambient
water.
(14) You must ensure that:
(a) At least two O2 sensors are located in the
inhalation side of the breathing loop;
(b) The O2 sensors are continuously-functioning,
temperature-compensated, and approved by the rebreather manufacturer.
(15) Before each day's diving operations, and more often when
necessary, you must calibrate O2 sensors as required by the
sensor manufacturer's instructions. In doing so, you must:
(a) Ensure that the equipment and procedures used to perform the
calibration are accurate to within 1 percent (1%) of the O2
fraction by volume;
(b) Maintain this accuracy as required by the manufacturer of the
calibration equipment;
(c) Ensure that the sensors are accurate to within 1 percent (1%)
of the O2 fraction by volume;
(d) Replace O2 sensors when they fail to meet the
accuracy requirements specified above in Condition (15)(c) of this
order; and
(e) Ensure that the replacement CO2 sensors meet the
accuracy requirements specified above in Condition (15)(c) of this
order before you place a rebreather in operation.
(16) You must ensure that closed-circuit rebreathers have:
(a) A gas-controller package with electrically-operated solenoid
O2-supply valves;
(b) A pressure-activated regulator with a second-stage diluent-gas
addition valve;
(c) A manually-operated gas-supply bypass valve to add
O2 or diluent gas to the breathing loop; and
(d) Separate O2 and diluent-gas cylinders to supply the
breathing-gas mixture.
O2 Concentration in the Breathing Gas
(17) You must ensure that the fraction of O2 in the
nitrox breathing-gas mixture:
(a) Is greater than the fraction of O2 in compressed air
(i.e., exceeds 22 percent (22%) O2 by volume);
(b) For open-circuit SCUBA, never exceeds a maximum fraction of
breathable O2 of 40 percent (40%) by volume or a maximum
O2 partial pressure of 1.40 ATA, whichever exposes your
divers to less O2; and
(c) For rebreathers, never exceeds a maximum O2 partial
pressure of 1.40 ATA.
Depth and O2 Partial Pressure Limits
(18) Regardless of the diving equipment your divers use, you must
ensure that they dive no deeper than 130 feet of sea water (fsw) or to
a maximum O2 partial pressure of 1.40 ATA, whichever exposes
them to less O2.
(19) Regarding O2 exposure, you must:
(a) Ensure that the exposure of your divers to partial pressures of
O2 between 0.60 and 1.40 ATA does not exceed the 24-hour
single-exposure time limits specified either by the 1991 National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Diving Manual (the ``1991 NOAA
Diving Manual'') or by the report entitled Enriched Air Operations and
Resources Guide, published in 1995 by the Professional Association of
Diving Instructors (known commonly as the ``1995 DSAT Oxygen Exposure
Table'') (see section VII (``References'') below); and
(b) Determine your diver's O2-exposure duration using
the diver's maximum O2 exposure (partial pressure of
O2) during the dive and the total dive time (i.e., from the
time the diver leaves the surface until the diver returns to the
surface).
Mixing and Analyzing the Breathing Gas
(20) You must ensure that only properly trained personnel mix
nitrox breathing gases, and that nitrogen is the only inert gas used in
the breathing-gas mixture.
(21) When mixing nitrox breathing gases, you must mix the
appropriate breathing gas before you deliver the mixture to the
breathing-gas cylinders, using the continuous-flow or partial-pressure
mixing techniques specified in the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual, or using a
filter-membrane system.
(22) Before the start of each day's diving operations, you must
determine the O2 fraction of the breathing-gas mixture using
an O2 analyzer. In doing so, you must:
(a) Ensure that the O2 analyzer is accurate to within 1
percent (1%) of the O2 fraction by volume; and
(b) Maintain this accuracy as required by the manufacturer of the
analyzer.
(23) When the breathing gas is a commercially-supplied nitrox
breathing-gas mixture, you must ensure that the supplier:
(a) Determines the O2 fraction in the breathing-gas
mixture using an analytic method that is accurate to within 1 percent
(1%) of the O2 fraction by volume;
(b) Makes this determination when the mixture is in the charged
tank and after disconnecting the charged tank from the charging
apparatus;
(c) Documents the O2 fraction in the mixture; and
(d) Provides you with a written certification of the O2
analysis.
(24) For commercially-supplied nitrox breathing-gas mixtures, you
must ensure that the O2 is Grade A (also known as
``aviator's oxygen'') or Grade B (referred to as ``industrial-medical
oxygen''), and meets the specifications, including the purity
requirements, found in the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual. In doing so, you
must:
(a) Ensure that the analytic method used to make this determination
is accurate to within 1 percent (1%) of the O2 fraction by
volume; and
(b) Obtain a written certificate to this effect from the supplier.
(25) Before producing nitrox breathing-gas mixtures using a
compressor in which the gas pressure in any system component exceeds
125 pounds per square inch (psi), you must:
(a) Have the compressor manufacturer certify in writing that the
compressor is suitable for mixing high-pressure air with the highest
O2 fraction used in the nitrox breathing-gas mixture;
(b) Ensure that the compressor is oil-less or oil-free and rated
for O2 service unless you comply with the requirements of
Condition (26) of this order; and
(c) Ensure that the compressor meets the requirements specified in
paragraphs (i)(1) and (i)(2) of 29 CFR 1910.430 whenever the highest
O2 fraction used in the mixing process exceeds 40 percent
(40%).
(26) Before producing nitrox breathing-gas mixtures using an oil-
lubricated compressor to mix high-pressure air with O2,
regardless of the
[[Page 71259]]
gas pressure in any system component you must:
(a) Have the compressor manufacturer certify in writing that the
compressor is suitable for mixing the high-pressure air with the
highest O2 fraction used in the nitrox breathing-gas
mixture;
(b) Filter the high-pressure air to produce O2-
compatible air;
(c) Have the filter-system manufacturer certify in writing that the
filter system used for this purpose is suitable for producing
O2-compatible air;
(d) Continuously monitor the air downstream from the filter for
hydrocarbon contamination; and
(e) Use only uncontaminated air (i.e., air containing no
hydrocarbon particulates) for the nitrox breathing-gas mixture.
(27) You must ensure that diving equipment using nitrox breathing-
gas mixtures or pure O2 under high pressure (i.e., exceeding
125 psi) conforms to the O2-service requirements specified
in paragraphs (i)(1) and (i)(2) of 29 CFR 1910.430.
Use No-Decompression Limits
(28) For diving conducted while using nitrox breathing-gas
mixtures, you must ensure that each of your divers remains within the
no-decompression limits specified for single and repetitive air diving
and published in the 1991 NOAA Diving Manual or the report entitled
Development and Validation of No-Stop Decompression Procedures for
Recreational Diving: The DSAT Recreational Dive Planner, published in
1994 by Hamilton Research Ltd. (known commonly as the ``1994 DSAT No-
Decompression Tables'') (see section VII (``References'') below).
(29) You may permit your divers to use a dive-decompression
computer designed to regulate decompression if the dive-decompression
computer uses the no-decompression limits specified above in Condition
(28) of this order and provides output that reliably represents those
limits.
Emergency Egress
(30) Regardless of the diving equipment your divers use (i.e.,
open-circuit SCUBA or rebreathers), you must ensure that the diving
equipment consists of:
(a) An open-circuit emergency-egress system (a ``bail-out'' system)
in which:
(i) The second stage of the regulator connects to a separate supply
of emergency breathing gas; and
(ii) The emergency breathing gas consists of air or the same nitrox
breathing-gas mixture used during the dive; or
(b) One of the following alternative bail-out systems:
(i) For open-circuit SCUBAs, the emergency-egress systems specified
in paragraph (c)(4) of 29 CFR 1910.424; or
(ii) For semi-closed-circuit and closed-circuit rebreathers, a
system configured so that the second stage of the regulator connects to
a diluent supply of emergency breathing gas.
(31) You must ensure that the bail-out system performs reliably and
provides sufficient emergency breathing gas to enable your diver to
terminate the dive and return safely to the surface.
Diving-Related Medical Emergencies
(32) Before each day's diving operations, you must ensure that:
(a) A hospital, qualified health-care professionals, and the
nearest Coast Guard Coordination Center (or an equivalent rescue
service operated by a state, county, or municipal agency) are available
for diving-related medical emergencies;
(b) These treatment resources are available when you notify them of
the diving-related medical emergency;
(c) A list of telephone or call numbers for these health-care
professionals and facilities is readily available at the dive site; and
(d) Transportation to a suitable decompression chamber is readily
available when no decompression chamber is at the dive site, and that
this transportation can deliver your injured diver to the decompression
chamber within two (2) hours travel time from the dive site.
(33) You must ensure that portable O2 equipment is
available at the dive site to treat your injured divers. In doing so,
you must ensure that:
(a) This equipment delivers pure O2 to a transparent
mask that covers the injured diver's nose and mouth; and
(b) Sufficient O2 is available for administration to the
injured diver from the time you recognize the symptoms of a diving-
related medical emergency until the injured diver reaches a
decompression chamber for treatment.
(34) Before each day's diving operations, you must:
(a) Ensure that at least two individuals, either employees or non-
employees, qualified in first-aid and administering O2
treatment are available at the dive site to treat diving-related
medical emergencies; and
(b) Verify their qualifications for this task.
Diving Logs and Decompression Tables
(35) You must maintain a diving log at the dive site and ensure
that:
(a) Before starting each day's diving operations, the individual
who verifies the availability of the treatment resources required above
under Condition (32) of this order makes a signed entry to this effect
in the diving log; and
(b) The diving log contains the following information for each
dive:
(i) The time when the diver left the surface, left the bottom, and
returned to the surface;
(ii) The maximum depth of the dive; and
(iii) If a diver uses a dive-decompression computer, the name of
the manufacturer and the model and serial numbers.
(36) Before starting each day's diving operations, you must:
(a) Designate an employee or a non-employee to make the entries in
the diving log; and
(b) Verify that the designee understands the:
(i) Diving and medical terminology required to make proper entries;
and
(ii) Procedures for making entries in the diving log.
(37) You must ensure that a hard-copy of the decompression tables
used for the dives (as specified above in Condition (28) of this order)
is readily available at the dive site, whether or not your divers use
dive-decompression computers.
Diver Training
(38) You must ensure that your divers receive training that enables
them to perform their work safely and effectively while using open-
circuit SCUBAs or rebreathers supplied with nitrox breathing-gas
mixtures. Accordingly, your divers must be able to perform critical
tasks safely and effectively, including, but not limited to:
(a) Recognizing the effects of breathing excessive CO2
and O2;
(b) Taking appropriate action after detecting the effects of
breathing excessive CO2 and O2; and
(c) Properly evaluating, operating, and maintaining their diving
equipment under the diving conditions they encounter.
The Order: Notification and Duration
(39) You must notify the divers affected by this order using the
same means that you used to inform them of the variance application.
(40) This order remains effective until modified or revoked under
section 6(d) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
Appendix A (Mandatory).--Testing Protocol for Determining the
CO2 Limits of Rebreather Canisters
If the employer replaces CO2-sorbent material using a
schedule provided by
[[Page 71260]]
the rebreather manufacturer (hereafter, manufacturer), then the
employer must ensure that the manufacturer developed the schedule
according to the protocol specified below in this appendix. The
employer must also: Use only the CO2-sorbent material
specified by the manufacturer (and that is consistent with the
requirements of Condition 10(b)(ii) of this order); ensure that the
manufacturer analyzes the canister-duration results using the
statistical analysis specified in U.S. Navy Experimental Diving Unit
(NEDU) Report 2-99 (see Section VII (``References'') of the permanent
variance); and ensure that the manufacturer specifies the replacement
schedule in terms of the lower prediction line (or limit) of the 95%
prediction interval.
1. The manufacturer must use the following procedures to ensure
that the CO2-sorbent material meets the specifications of
the material's manufacturer: NATO CO2 absorbent-activity
test; RoTap shaker and nested sieves to determine granule-size
distribution; NEDU-derived Schlegel test to assess friability; and
NEDU's MeshFit software to evaluate mesh size conformance to
specifications.
These procedures involve a quality-control assessment of the
CO2-sorbent material. Canister durations are suspect if
these procedures indicate that the CO2-sorbent material used
in canister testing either exceeds or falls below the specifications
provided by the material's manufacturer. Therefore, for the purposes of
this canister-testing protocol, rebreather manufacturers must use only
CO2-sorbent materials that meet the specifications provided
by the material's manufacturer.
2. While operating the rebreather at a maximum depth of 130 feet of
sea water (fsw), the manufacturer must use a breathing machine to
continuously ventilate the rebreather with breathing gas that is at
100% humidity and warmed to a temperature of 98.6 degrees F (37 degrees
C) in the heating-humidification chamber. The breathing gas must be a
nitrox mixture, with the oxygen (O2) fraction maintained at
0.28 (equivalent to 1.4 ATA of O2 at 130 fsw, the maximum
O2 concentration permitted at this depth by the permanent
variance); the manufacturer must measure the O2
concentration of the inhalation breathing gas delivered to the
mouthpiece.
3. The manufacturer must test canisters using the following three
ventilation rates (with required breathing-machine tidal volumes and
frequencies, and CO2-injection rates, provided for each
ventilation rate):
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Breathing
Ventilation rates Breathing-machine machine CO2-injection
(liters/min., tidal volumes frequencies rates (liters/
ATPS \1\) (liters) (breaths per min., STPD \2\)
min.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
22.5 l.5 15 0.90
40.0 2.0 20 1.35
62.5 2.5 25 2.25
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ATPS means ambient temperature and pressure, saturated with water.
\2\ STPD means standard temperature and pressure, dry; the standard
temperature is 0 degrees C.
The manufacturer must perform the CO2 injection at a
constant (steady) and continuous rate during each testing trial. An
employer cannot use a rebreather at a work rate higher than the work
rates simulated in this testing protocol unless the manufacturer adds
the appropriate combinations of ventilation-CO2-injection
rates to the protocol.
4. The manufacturer must determine canister duration using a
minimum of four (4) water temperatures, including 40, 50, 70, and 90
degrees F (4.4, 10.0, 21.1, and 32.2 degrees C, respectively). An
employer cannot use a rebreather at a water temperature that is lower
than the minimum, or higher than the maximum, water temperature used in
this testing protocol unless the manufacturer adds a lower or higher
temperature to the protocol.
5. The manufacturer must monitor the breathing-gas temperature at
the rebreather mouthpiece (at the ``chrome T'' connector) and ensure
that this temperature conforms to the temperature of a diver's exhaled
breath at the water temperature and ventilation rate used during the
testing trial. (NEDU can provide the manufacturer with information on
the temperature of a diver's exhaled breath at various water
temperatures and ventilation rates, as well as techniques and
procedures used to maintain these temperatures during the testing
trials.)
6. Testing must consist of at least eight (8) testing trials for
each combination of temperature and ventilation-CO2-
injection rates. (For example, eight testing trials at 40 degrees F
using a ventilation rate of 22.5 lpm at a CO2-injection rate
of 0.90 liters/min.) While water temperature may vary slightly
( 2.0 degrees F or 1.0 degree C) between each of the eight
testing trials, the manufacturer must maintain strict control of water
temperature ( 1.0 degree F or 0.5 degree C) within each
testing trial. The rebreather manufacturer must use the average
temperature for each set of eight testing trials in the statistical
analysis of the resulting data.
7. The testing-trial result is the time taken for the inhaled
breathing gas to reach 0.005 ATA of CO2. Using the canister-
duration results from these testing trials, the rebreather manufacturer
must: Analyze the canister-duration results using the repeated-measures
statistics described in NEDU Report 2-99 (see Section VII
(``References'') of the permanent variance); and specify the
replacement schedule for CO2-sorbent materials in terms of
the lower prediction line (or limit) of the 95% confidence interval.
VII. References
This order cites the following references:
(1) National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1991). NOAA
Diving Manual: Diving for Science and Technology. U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
(2) Diving Science and Technology (1995). Analysis of Proposed
Oxygen Exposure Limits for DSAT Oxygen Exposure Table Against
Existing Database of Manned Oxygen Test Dives. Enriched Air
Operations and Resource Guide. International PADI, Inc., Rancho
Santa Margarita, California.
(3) R. W. Hamilton, R. E. Rogers, M. R. Powell, and R. D. Vann
(1994). Development and Validation of No-Stop Decompression
Procedures for Recreational Diving: The DSAT Recreational Dive
Planner. Hamilton Research, Ltd., Tarrytown, New York.
(4) J. R. Clarke. ``Statistically Based CO2 Canister
Duration Limits for Closed-Circuit
[[Page 71261]]
Underwater Breathing Apparatus.'' U.S. Navy Experimental Diving
Unit, Report 2-99, 1999.
Copies of these references are available from the Docket Office,
Room N-2625, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S.
Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, DC
20210; telephone (202) 693-2350 or fax (202) 693-1648.
VIII. Authority and Signature
The authority for this order is section 6(d) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 USC 655), Secretary of Labor's Order
No. 6-96 (62 FR 111), and 29 CFR part 1905.
Signed at Washington, DC, this 9th day of December 1999.
Charles N. Jeffress,
Assistant Secretary of Labor.
[FR Doc. 99-32824 Filed 12-17-99; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P
