[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 120 (Thursday, June 22, 1995)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 32430-32442]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-15285]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 72
RIN 3150-AE17
Emergency Planning Licensing Requirements for Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage
Facilities (MRS)
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is amending its
regulations, in accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,
for the emergency planning licensing requirements for Independent Spent
Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored Retrievable Storage
Facilities (MRS). The amendments are necessary to ensure that local
authorities will be notified in the event of an accident so that they
may take appropriate action. The regulation will provide a level of
preparedness at these facilities that is consistent with NRC's defense-
in-depth philosophy.
EFFECTIVE DATE: September 20, 1995.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of
Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301-415-6534).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On May 27, 1986 (51 FR 19106), following Commission approval, the
proposed revision to 10 CFR part 72 relating to licensing requirements
for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facilities (ISFSI) and Monitored
Retrievable Storage Facilities (MRS), including requirements for
emergency planning, was published in the Federal Register for comment.
On November 30, 1988 (53 FR 31651), the Commission published the
final rule outlining the licensing requirements for ISFSI and MRS but
reserved the emergency planning licensing requirements for a later
date.
On May 24, 1993 (58 FR 29795), the Commission published for public
comment the proposed emergency planning licensing requirements for
ISFSI and MRS. This final rule codifies the emergency planning
licensing requirements.
Discussion
On April 7, 1989 (54 FR 14051), the Commission published in the
Federal Register the final regulations relating to Emergency
Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees
(10 CFR parts 30, 40, and 70).
These regulations require certain NRC fuel cycle and other
radioactive materials licensees that engage in activities that may have
the potential for a significant accidental release of NRC licensed
materials to establish and maintain approved emergency plans for
responding to such accidents.
Although applicable to those licensed under different parts of the
Commission's regulations, the requirements for emergency plans in parts
30, 40, and 70 contain similar provisions because they are designed to
protect the public against similar radiological hazards. The proposed
revision of 10 CFR part 72 as published for comment on May 24, 1993 (58
FR 29795), would also require applicants for an ISFSI and MRS license
to submit an emergency plan. Although the texts of the Fuel Cycle final
emergency planning requirements and the parallel provisions of the
proposed Emergency Preparedness licensing requirements for ISFSI and
MRS are not identical, these provisions have the same purpose and use
the same approach. In both cases, the proposed regulations require
onsite emergency planning with provisions for offsite emergency
response in terms of coordination and communication with offsite
authorities and the public. It is therefore appropriate that in both
cases these requirements should be expressed in the same manner.
The Commission has determined that the emergency planning licensing
requirements for 10 CFR part 72 licensees should be similar to those
requirements already codified in Sec. 70.22 for part 70 licensees.
Nonetheless, the Commission wishes to establish unique provisions in
the emergency planning requirements for MRS facilities (and certain
more complex ISFSIs) versus typical ISFSI facilities. The Commission
anticipates a potential need for enhanced emergency planning
requirements appropriate to the entire range of operations which may be
conducted at an MRS facility (or ISFSI that may be repackaging or
handling spent fuel). The Commission acknowledges that, to date,
accidents that have been postulated and analyzed for either an ISFSI or
MRS would result in similar offsite doses. The analysis of potential
onsite and offsite consequences of accidental releases associated with
the operation of an ISFSI is contained in NUREG-1140. This evaluation
shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public offsite due to an
accidental release of radioactive materials would not exceed 1 rem
effective dose equivalent, which is within the EPA Protective Action
Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble uranium (due to chemical
toxicity).
Thus, the consequences of worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI
located on a reactor site would be inconsequential when compared to
those involving the reactor itself. Therefore, current reactor
emergency plans cover all at- or near-reactor ISFSI's. An ISFSI that is
to be licensed for a stand-alone operation will need an emergency plan
established in accordance with the requirements in this rulemaking.
NUREG-1140 concluded that the postulated worst-case accident involving
an ISFSI has insignificant consequences to the public health and
safety. Therefore, the final requirements to be imposed on most ISFSI
licensees reflect this fact, and do not mandate formal offsite
components to their onsite emergency plans.
Similarly, the Commission has conducted an analysis of potential
onsite and offsite consequences of accidental release associated with
the operation of an MRS. The analysis is contained in NUREG-1092. This
evaluation shows that the maximum dose to a member of the public
offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials would
likely not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent which is within the
EPA Protective Action Guides or an intake of 2 milligrams of soluble
uranium (due to chemical toxicity).
In the final NRC Generic Environmental Impact Statement on the
handling and storage of light water reactor fuel,1 it is stated
that
[[Page 32431]] \1\ NUREG-0575 Vol. 1 sec. 4.2.2 Safety and
Accident Considerations.
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* * * To be a potential radiological hazard to the general
public, radioactive materials must be released from a facility and
dispersed offsite. For this to happen:
The radioactive material must be in a dispersible form
There must be a mechanism available for the release of
such materials from the facility, and
There must be a mechanism available for offsite
dispersion of such released material.
Although the inventory of radioactive material contained in 1000
MTHM of aged spent fuel may be on the order of a billion curies or
more, very little is available in a dispersible form; there is no
mechanism available for the release of radioactive materials in
significant quantities from facility; and the only mechanism
available for offsite dispersion is atmosphere dispersion * * *.
Furthermore, NRC has conducted Safety Evaluations on many different
storage systems. Those studies included evaluations of the effects of
corrosion, handling accidents such as cask drops and tipovers,
explosions, fires, floods, earthquakes, and severe weather conditions.
As documented in each of those Safety Evaluation Reports (SER), NRC was
not able to identify any design basis accident that would result in the
failure of a confinement boundary. However, to provide a conservative
bounding analysis of the threat to the public health and safety, the
failure of the confinement barrier was postulated. As discussed in each
of the SERs and again in the response to Issue 48 the consequences of
this postulated failure do not result in an increased risk to the
public health and safety.
In the environmental assessment for 10 CFR Part 72,2 the
accident judged the most severe was the failure of a packaged fuel
element. In this analysis, the accident involves the failure of a
storage system containing 1.7 MTHM. The postulated individual doses are
presented in Table 1.3
\2\ NUREG-1092 Environmental Assessment for Part 72 ``Licensing
Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive
Waste.''
\3\ NUREG-1092 Table 2.2.4-2
[[Page 32432]]
Table 1.--Total Dose to an Individual as a Result of a Fuel Canister Failure Accident at a Surface Storage
Installation (mrem)
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Pathway Skin Total Body Thyroid Lung
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Air Submersion.......................... 1.0 x 10-\1\ 1.1 x 10-\3\ 1.1 x 10-\3\ 1.1 x 10-\3\
Inhalation.............................. 1.2 x 10-\5\ 1.1 x 10-\2\ 7.3 x 10-\5\
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Total............................. 1.0 x 10-\1\ 1.1 x 10-\3\ 1.2 x 10-\2\ 1.1 x 10-\3\
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Note: The maximum individual is defined as a permanent resident at a location 1600 meters southeast of the stack
with a time-integrated atmospheric dispersion coefficient (E/Q of 1.5 x 10-4 sec/m\3\). The accident involves
failure of a fuel canister containing approximately 1.7 MTHM.
Since the time these calculations were performed, the storage
canisters have increased in capacity, and today the capacity of the
largest approved design is approximately 9 MTHM. However, because dose
varies directly with inventory, when the totals are increased by a
factor of ten, they are still a very small fraction of the 300 mrem/yr
4 an individual receives from natural background radiation, and is
below the EPA protective action guides.
\4\ NRCP Report No. 94.
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Nonetheless, the Commission believes it appropriate to require
enhanced offsite emergency planning at an MRS (as well as any ISFSI
that conducts similar operations) because of the broader scope of
activities which could be performed at such a facility.
In addition to the handling and repackaging for storage of large
numbers of individual fuel bundles, which involves the receipt,
inspection, and transfer of several thousand transport casks, MRS
operations may also encompass the consolidation of the stored fuel into
casks for subsequent geological disposal after interim storage. At this
time, a final MRS design has not been selected. The MRS may be a large
industrial facility equipped to handle the loading, unloading, and
decontaminating of a large number of spent fuel shipping containers
arriving by both truck and rail. It could also include facilities to
disassemble the fuel bundles and consolidate that fuel into special
storage/transport containers, and facilities to handle solidified high-
level waste. These facilities would require the equipment necessary to
process low- and high-level waste that would be associated with the
above operations. It is also possible, however, for an MRS facility to
serve primarily as a warehouse operation, limited solely to accepting,
sorting and later transhipping a large number of multi-purpose canister
(MPC) systems of the type being considered by DOE.
The Multi-Purpose-Canister (MPC) being considered by the DOE would
be used to store and transport spent fuel. The MPC system provides a
sealed canister into which spent fuel would be loaded. After loading,
the MPC is evacuated, backfilled with an inert gas, and then
permanently sealed. At this point the MPC concept offers several
options: the sealed canister could be placed into a storage overpack at
the reactor site, or it could be placed in a transportation overpack
for movement to an ISFSI or MRS. After arriving at the ISFSI or MRS the
MPC would most likely be placed in the storage configuration awaiting
transport to the geological repository. When the repository is ready to
accept fuel, several options would exist. The canisters could be placed
into the transport overpack for movement to the geological repository.
Once there, the canister could be transferred directly into the
disposal overpack for emplacement into the repository. An option to
repackage the spent fuel into disposal canisters allowing the optimum
configuration required at the repository remains possible. This could
take place at either the repository or MRS. Because the canister may
only be opened once during its entire storage life and individual fuel
elements only handled under a controlled environment, the MPC concept
appears to reduce the overall risk to public health and safety.
Given the uncertainties in the design and operation of an MRS, the
Commission believes it prudent to plan and provide for an enhanced
level of emergency planning to include some offsite preparedness should
operation of a MRS (or any ISFSI conducting similar operations) present
accident risks that exceed those analyzed in NUREGs 1140 and 1092.
Because the level of risk to the public health and safety from such an
MRS (or ISFSI) may exceed that from a typical ISFSI, the relevant
emergency planning requirements should be enhanced to include an
offsite component. To achieve this goal, the final enhanced emergency
plan requirements are modeled after 10 CFR 50.47(d). The intent of 10
CFR 50.47(d) was to mandate a minimum level of offsite response
capability during initial reactor licensing and low power operations.
This same level of response capability is considered appropriate to MRS
(and any comparable ISFSI) operations. Because much of the language
needed to achieve this level of offsite protection has already been
codified in 10 CFR Part 50, similar language is included within the
final emergency planning requirements for an MRS (and ISFSI) (10 CFR
72.32(b)(15)(i-vi)).
The Commission notes that, for both types of facilities, this
rulemaking is not required in order to provide adequate safety and may
not be justified based solely on a comparison of the anticipated costs
of implementing these regulations to the increase in public health and
safety. Rather, the Commission believes that it is justified in terms
of safety enhancement such as the intangible benefit of being able to
assure the public that local authorities will be notified in the event
of an accident so that they may take appropriate actions. The NRC feels
that such preparedness is prudent and consistent with the NRC's
philosophy of defense-in-depth.
Public Comments
The NRC received a total of 25 comment letters. Five were from
utilities, two were from organizations representing utilities, eight
were from State and/or local emergency management agencies, three were
from the Mescalero Indian Tribe, five were from environmental/
intervener groups, one was from a private citizen, and one was from the
Department of Energy.
One of the letters that opposed the proposed regulation came from a
member of the Mescalero Indian Tribe and included the signatures of 40
other tribal members who agreed with opposition to the proposed rule
change. Opposition also came from the private citizen, all of the
intervener/environmental groups, and a local governmental official.
Letters that were generally in agreement with the proposed rule
change were submitted by the Mescalero Tribal MRS Program Manager, the
Department of Energy, all of the utilities, all of the State
governmental [[Page 32433]] agencies, and from the industry groups
(though the industry group letters expressed a preference for deferring
the MRS portion of the regulation (10 CFR 72.32(b)) because the
industry groups considered it premature).
The comment letters that were received provided many thought-
provoking and constructive comments. The Commission's evaluation of and
response to these comments is presented in the following section.
Issue 1. The frequency for conducting offsite communication checks
(quarterly) and onsite exercises (annually) for MRS should not be more
conservative than for ISFSI communications checks (semiannually) and
onsite exercises (biennially). The increase in frequency is not
justified by experience or analysis.
Response. The Commission agrees that the onsite exercise
requirements should be biennial rather than annual. Nonetheless, the
quarterly communication checks will remain unchanged due to the obvious
importance of reliable communications capabilities.
Issue 2. The proposed rule, 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15) states that the
review shall include certain ``arrangements'' and ``other
organizations.'' Those items are not listed as specific elements to be
included in the plan. It is inferred that they do not need to be
addressed other than in the information regarding offsite interface
activities required by paragraphs (a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(9), (a)(10),
(a)(12), and (a)(14). As written, the paragraph imposes a review
requirement upon the NRC and is merely informational to the applicant.
Response. The Commission agrees and has rewritten
Secs. 72.32(a)(15) and 72.32(b)(15) in the final regulations.
Issue 3. The discussion section and the proposed rule regarding the
frequency of communications checks should be consistent. The discussion
section indicates quarterly checks (page 29796, Section xii) and the
proposed rule in 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i) indicates semiannual checks.
Semiannual checks are appropriate.
Response. The Commission disagrees. The discussion section referred
to relates to a Final Rulemaking for Fuel Cycle and Material licensees
published on April 7, 1989 (54 FR 14051). The requirement for quarterly
communication checks is identical to that requirement for an MRS (and
comparable ISFSI). The semiannual communication checks are for a
typical, storage only ISFSI. There is no inconsistency.
Issue 4. At a site where the affected ISFSI site could be
contiguous to a Part 50 licensed site, the 10 CFR 50.47 emergency plans
should apply automatically. This would preclude the unnecessary
expenditure of limited utility, State, local and Federal resources;
avoid duplication in emergency preparedness; and minimize confusion
offsite. In order to limit confusion, change the existing proposed
first sentence of 10 CFR 72.32(a) to read: ``For an ISFSI that is
located on (or immediately adjacent to) the site of a nuclear power
reactor * * *''
Response. The Commission agrees and has incorporated this concept
into the final regulation by referencing the exclusion area as defined
in 10 CFR part 100.
Issue 5. The following areas of the proposed rule introduce
inconsistencies that require clarification: Paragraphs (a)(1) through
(a)(13) of 10 CFR 72.32 list specific information to be included in the
emergency plan. Paragraph (a)(16) also appears to list specific
information to be included. However, it is unclear whether paragraphs
(a)(14) and (a)(15) are intended to be specific information included in
the emergency plan or review and comment requirements related to the
submittal of the emergency plan which do not have to be included as
specific information in the plan. The discussion contained in the
supplementary information section of the Federal Register notice
implies that these paragraphs are review and comment requirements only.
``* * * the proposed requirements to be imposed on ISFSI licensee * * *
do not mandate formal offsite components to their onsite emergency
plans.'' (58 FR 29797, May 24, 1993.)
Response. The Commission agrees and has clarified paragraphs
(a)(14) and (a)(15).
Issue 6. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15), Offsite Arrangement: The wording ``*
* * arrangements to accommodate State local staff at the licensee's
near-site emergency facility have been made, * * *,'' should be deleted
from Sec. 72.32(a)(15). The nature of potential emergency events at
ISFSIs do not require personnel from State and local governments to
respond in a staff capacity, and do not require near-site emergency
facilities to be available. The proposed rule already requires that the
emergency facilities at the site, and the emergency response staff for
the facility, be adequate for emergency planning purposes.
Response. The Commission agrees and has incorporated this comment
in the final regulation.
Issue 7. 10 CFR 72.32(b)(14), Offsite Review: The request for the
offsite response organization to comment as to whether an offsite
component to emergency preparedness at an MRS is reasonable,
appropriate, or premature at this time. We believe that it is, in fact,
premature at this time. The analyses that have already been done
undoubtedly contain a considerable amount of conservatism. It is far
easier to add requirements later, should they be found to be
recommended, than to remove them when they are confirmed to be
excessive later.
Response. See Commission Response to Issue 18.
Issue 8. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(13), Hazardous Chemicals: The
certification deals with hazardous materials at the facility. The last
phrase of the statement does not clearly convey this message. To
clarify, the commenters suggest replacing the phase, ``if applicable to
the applicant's activities at the proposed place of use of special
nuclear material,'' with ``with respect to hazardous materials at the
facility.''
Response. The Commission agrees and has clarified the final rule
accordingly.
Issue 9. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(14), Offsite Review: The proposed rule
should only require the 60-day comment period for offsite response
organizations prior to the initial plan submittal to the NRC.
Subsequent plan changes should not have this 60-day time restriction
built into the submittal process unless the plan changes involve
offsite response organizations.
Response. The Commission agrees and has changed the final rule
accordingly.
Issue 10. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)ii, Offsite Participation:
``Participation of offsite response organizations in biennial
exercises, although recommended, is not required,'' sends a message to
State and local agencies that they may need extensive planning to
accommodate the facility. There is nothing unique to a potential
release from an ISFSI that is not enveloped by the utility and
associated State and local emergency plans to support an operating
plant or one with a possession only license. State and local agencies
should be provided a copy of the facility's plan and be asked to take
part in ``table-top'' exercises to help them understand their role.
Response. The Commission disagrees, because offsite response
organizations should also become familiar with the facility.
Issue 11. 10 CFR 73.32(a)(12)(i), Exercises: The listed drills are
capitalized, creating the impression that they are specific types of
drills, such as those described in NUREG-0654, for the conduct of
similar type drills for [[Page 32434]] operating power reactors.
Furthermore, ISFSIs, in view of the relatively passive nature of the
facility and the potential consequence of a release as compared to
operating power reactors, do not warrant this frequency. Drills should
be held biennially.
Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 12. Additionally,
the frequency of these drills have been changed from semiannual to
annual.
Issue 12. It is recommended that the existing wording, ``* * *
Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire Drills should be
conducted semiannually * * *,'' be reworded in a manner similar to 10
CFR 50.47(b)(14) as follows: ``Periodic drills shall be conducted to
develop and maintain key skills.''
Response. The Commission disagrees because it believes that it is
beneficial to specify the types of drills necessary.
Issue 13. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i), Exercises: Semiannual fire drills
may not be appropriate for an ISFSI because there are no flammable
materials associated with the facility.
Response. The frequency of these drills has been changed and will
be required annually.
Issue 14. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8), Notification and Coordination: The
means to promptly notify offsite response organizations should be
limited to using commercial telephones. Ring-down systems should not be
necessary to meet this requirement.
Response. Ring-down systems are not mentioned in the proposed or
final regulations.
Issue 15. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(6), Assessment of Releases: Extensive
dose assessment methodology is not necessary to implement the emergency
plans.
Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final
regulation does not require ``Extensive'' dose assessment.
Issue 16. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8), Notification and Coordination: The
Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) provides for the automated
transmission of a limited data set of selected onsite parameters (e.g.,
system pressure, temperature, radiation monitoring). The activation of
the ERDS does not apply to nuclear power facilities that are shut down
permanently or indefinitely. The activation of ERDS should not apply to
ISFSI incidents even located at operating plant sites.
Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final
regulation does not require the use of ERDS.
Issue 17. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3), Classification Requirements: The
implementation guidance for the rule should provide for the simplest
and easiest understood classification, notification, and reporting
system for non-emergency events. NUREG-1140 ``A Regulatory Analysis on
Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material
Licenses,'' August 1991 Section 2.27 (Spent Fuel Storage) supports the
discussion that EPA's protective action guides would not be exceeded
during an accident. Therefore, both classifications for a site and
general emergency should not be considered. Redundant classifications,
notifications and reports for non-emergency events, such as
Notifications of Unusual Events (NOUEs), 1-hour non-emergency event
reports, and four-hour non-emergency event reports used for operating
reactors, should not apply to ISFSIs and MRSs. These conclusions are
based on the magnitude, duration, and energy involved in an incident
involving spent fuel storage facilities. These analyses have been
docketed as part of submittals to the NRC to license individual ISFSIs.
For actual ISFSI and MRS emergencies, the emergency classification,
``Alert,'' should be sufficient. A ``NOUE'' classification for ISFSI
and MRS emergency planning should not be necessary.
Response. The proposed rule did not suggest requiring and the final
regulation does not require the use of notification of unusual events
``NOUE'' or ``general'' emergency classification.
Issue 18. EEI/WASTE supports adoption of proposed Sec. 72.32(a)
that would establish emergency planning requirements for ISFSI. EEI/
WASTE recommends that NRC defer proposed Sec. 72.32(b) that would
establish emergency planning requirements for MRSs. Because no final
design for MRS facilities has been selected, there is no rational basis
to determine the level of radiological hazards for which emergency
planning requirements are designed. It is therefore premature for the
NRC to establish emergency planning requirements for MRS facilities.
Response. The Commission disagrees. The proposed emergency planning
licensing requirements for an MRS as published in the Federal Register
on May 24, 1993 (58 FR 29795), have provided to the public some insight
as to what the Commission now feels would be appropriate and reasonable
emergency planning licensing requirements for an MRS. One comment
stated that, ``We have concluded that minimum requirements, such as
those currently proposed by the NRC rulemaking process, should serve as
guidance for the starting point from which Emergency Planning and
Licensing Requirements can be fully developed.'' Also, the Department
of Energy stated that it ``* * * intends to work closely with the host
community to develop a comprehensive emergency response plan with
offsite components that will not only encompass the requirements
contained in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(15), but likely will exceed them.''
Issue 19. The proposed rule does not require MRS operators to
notify local residents of any increased exposure, nor does it require
MRS operators to develop a plan for evacuation. This rule is an unfair
burden on local emergency responders with little or no training for
these type of emergencies. There is specialized training and equipment
for radiation accidents and exposure; therefore, the proposed rules
should provide for the training and obtaining equipment for the local
responders.
Response. The Commission disagrees. The emergency planning
regulations specifically require in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(8), ``Notification
and coordination. A commitment to and a brief description of the means
to promptly notify offsite response organizations * * *'' In 10 CFR
72.32(b)(9), (10), and (12), the licensee is required to provide:
Information to be communicated: A brief description of the types
of information on facility status; radioactive releases; and
recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite
response organizations and to the NRC. ``Training. A brief
description of the training the licensee will provide workers on how
to respond to an emergency and any special instructions and
orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire, police, medical
and other emergency personnel.'' * * * The licensee shall invite
offsite response organizations to participate in the annual
exercises.
Additionally, in 10 CFR 72.32(b)(15) and (b)(16) the licensee is
required to identify:
(ii) Provisions that exist for prompt communications among
principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who
would be responding onsite.
(iii) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the
emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.
(iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and
monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological
emergency condition are available.
(v) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated
and injured onsite individuals.
(vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made
available to those off site who may be called to assist in an
emergency on site. [[Page 32435]]
(16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.
Issue 20. Although it is true that emergency plans for ISFSI and
MRS need not be equivalent to emergency plans for reactors due to the
relatively passive natures of the ISFSI and MRS, offsite emergency
planning should not be eliminated for either type of facility. The
proposed rule indicates that the maximum offsite dose due to an
accidental release of radioactive material from either type of facility
would probably not exceed 1 rem. However, 1 rem is within the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guides of 1-5
rem whole body, and it is the lower limit of these guides which is to
be used as the basis for taking protective actions in emergency
response. The commenter would also question whether worst-case
scenarios have been considered in the evaluation of potential offsite
doses. Worst-case scenarios would include acts of radiological
sabotage, such as terrorist attacks employing explosives. Offsite
emergency planning is a prudent measure to take against such
uncertainties. Offsite plans may not be needed for a 10-mile radius, as
is the case for power reactors, but they should not be eliminated for
ISFSI and MRS. Reducing the radius of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)
(perhaps to 1-5 miles, as appropriate) is the proper response to the
reduced hazard posed by the ISFSI and MRS. A reduced zone will provide
the basis and flexibility for an enhanced offsite response in those
events where this is necessary.
Response. Emergency planning requirements for power reactors, fuel
cycle facilities, ISFSIs and MRSs are all based on a spectrum of
accidents, including worst-case severe accidents. Emergency planning
focuses on the detection of accidents and the mitigation of their
consequences. Emergency planning does not focus on the initiating
events. Therefore, based on the potential inventory of radioactive
material, potential driving forces for distributing that amount of
radioactive material, and the probability of the initiation of these
events, the Commission concludes that the offsite consequences of
potential accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant establishing
Emergency Planning Zones.
Issue 21. In the interest of protecting public health and safety,
appropriate offsite agencies should be notified immediately of any
classifiable accident at an ISFSI or MRS. Section 72.32(a)8 should
specify that the agency(ies) with responsibility to respond to
accidents receive the notifications. In Illinois, IDNS should be
notified of all such accidents. Consequently, we request that any
licensee submitting a plan for approval under 10 CFR part 72 for an
ISFSI or MRS in Illinois specifically provide in its emergency plan for
timely notifications to IDNS. The notifications are important to ensure
that emergency response actions are not unduly or unnecessarily
delayed.
Response. The Commission agrees. This comment focuses on the
rationale that was used in proposing the following requirements:
A commitment to, and a brief description of, the means to
promptly notify offsite response organizations and request offsite
assistance, including medical and ``The licensee shall allow the
offsite response organizations expected to respond in case of an
accident 60 days to comment on the initial submittal of the
license's emergency plan before submitting it to NRC.'' * * * The
licensee shall provide any comments received within the 60 days to
the NRC with the emergency plan.
Issue 22. The requirements for exercises are appropriate for the
facilities involved. We do believe, however, that offsite participation
in these exercises should be an integral, not perfunctory, part of the
exercise process. Invitations to participate should be both timely and
informative, maximizing the opportunity for productive interaction
between licensee and offsite personnel. The rule should require that
licensees document timely invitations to offsite agencies to
participate in annual or biennial exercises, and offsite participation
actually resulting from these invitations.
Response. The Commission does not believe that it is necessary for
the rule to require licensees to document timely invitations for
offsite participation in exercises. NRC expects licensees will do so on
their own initiative. Experience has shown that cooperative
interactions between licensee and offsite authorities generally are
quite productive.
Issue 23. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(ii) and (b)(12)(ii):
Participation of offsite response organizations in exercises should be
required.
Response. The Commission believes that this requirement would be
unnecessary in that experience shows almost all offsite authorities
that are invited to participate in exercises do participate without
being required to do so.
Issue 24. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(i): For the ISFSI,
communications checks with offsite response organizations should be
conducted quarterly, not semiannually, and onsite exercises conducted
annually, not biennially.
Response. The Commission disagrees due to the very low probability
of offsite consequences resulting from potential accidents at these
facilities in conjunction with the low probability of a significant
accident occurring.
Issue 25. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3) and (b)(3): These provisions
limit the accident classification levels to an alert for the ISFSI and
a site area emergency for the MRS. For both facilities, the accident
classification system should include the general emergency. This might
be necessary in cases of radiological sabotage.
Response. The Commission disagrees. An essential element of a
General Emergency is that ``A release can be reasonably expected to
exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels off site for
more than the immediate site area.'' As previously discussed, NRC
studies have concluded that the maximum offsite dose would be less than
1 rem which is within the EPA Protective Action Guides.
Issue 26. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8) and (b)(8): Time limits ought
to be established for notifying offsite response organizations and the
NRC. An appropriate time limit is 15 minutes.
Response. The Commission has established a reasonable time limit
for notification which has proven to be adequate in the past. ``The
licensee shall also commit to notify the NRC operations center
immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response
organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares
an emergency.''
Issue 27. Proposed 10 CFR 72.32(a)(15) and (b)(15)(i): The phrase,
``and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite
response have been identified'' should be modified to include the
requirement that arrangements should be made (such as letters of
agreement) with any organizations so identified.
Response. The Commission believes that offsite response
organizations will respond in the event of an actual emergency in order
to protect the health and safety of the public. Therefore, the
Commission does not believe that this requirement would be necessary.
Issue 28. On page 29797 of the proposed rule, first column, the
statement is made: ``As a result of the above evaluation, the
Commission is proposing that the emergency planning licensing
requirements for part 72 licensees be similar to those requirements
already codified in 10 CFR 70.22 for other part 70 licensees.'' Should
this statement also include 10 [[Page 32436]] CFR 70.24 (Criticality
Accident requirements)? Because the racking arrangement of spent fuel
storage is changing in a manner that places spent fuel assemblies
closer than in the past because of storage space needs, criticality
accidents possibilities might increase, especially in the dry cell
storage.
Response. The Commission disagrees. Criticality is only a concern
during a wet loading and unloading evolution. Additionally, such
activities would not be expected to occur under a 10 CFR part 72 ISFSI
license and, therefore, there is no basis to change 10 CFR part 72
criticality requirements.
Issue 29. Because 10 CFR part 72 contains no language that
parallels 10 CFR 50.54(x), we recommend that something similar to it be
considered as part of this rulemaking. During the operating life of an
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility or Monitored Retrievable
Storage Facility, it is possible that an unanticipated situation may
arise where the most correct action would be one that is not allowed by
the license or technical specifications. The writers of 10 CFR part 50
foresaw this eventuality and allowed a licensee to:
Take reasonable action that departs from license condition or a
technical specification in an emergency when this action is
immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and no
action consistent with license conditions and technical
specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent protection is
immediately apparent.
Although we never expect to invoke this option, prudence dictates
that we should thoughtfully plan and develop procedures that allow for
the possibility of low probability events where deviating from a
technical specification or any other license condition is the most
correct action. Adding this provision to the part 72 rule gives us a
legal basis to include it in our procedures. As a licensee under both
10 CFR parts 50 and 72, we feel that similar language has been useful
under 10 CFR part 50 for developing procedures, and that it would be
equally useful under 10 CFR part 72.
Response. The Commission agrees. The final rule reflects this
comment.
Issue 30. In Sec. 72.32(a)(12)(ii), the proposed rule states that
the licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having
direct implementation responsibility for the plan. We disagree with
this provision since it excludes our emergency planning (EP) staff from
the critique. The individuals who develop the plans are EP experts.
These are exactly the individuals that should critique the exercises.
As the rule is written, we would have to maintain an EP expert on staff
whose only EP job function would be to critique exercises. At all other
times, this individual would have to remain at arms length from the EP
program. A better use of resources would be to allow individuals from
the EP staff to be a part of the team that critiques exercises.
Response. The Commission agrees and has modified the final
regulation to state ``the licensee shall critique each exercise using
individuals not having direct implementation responsibility for
conducting the exercise.''
Issue 31. In Sec. 72.32(a)(14), NRC has proposed that an applicant
for an ISFSI submit the proposed emergency plan to offsite response
organizations (which are expected to respond in case of an onsite
accident) 60 days in advance of submittal to NRC. Comments would then
be forwarded to the NRC upon submittal of the ISFSI application. This
requirement should be deleted as the current licensing process for
review and approval of an ISFSI license affords all parties a
sufficient amount of time to review and comment on the licensee's
entire application to include the emergency plan. Furthermore,
licensees have gained sufficient experience from the operating nuclear
power plant environment to recognize the benefits of working with the
offsite authorities in order to ensure adequacy of an emergency plan
and its implementation. A requirement to instruct applications to do as
much is unnecessary.
Response. The Commission disagrees. The Commission believes that
requiring participation by offsite organizations in the development of
the emergency plan significantly helps establish coordination and
working relationships between the principals.
Issue 32. In Sec. 72.32(a)(15), NRC proposed to require that the
licensee of an ISFSI provide for a ``near-site emergency facility'' for
State and local staff. This requirement should be deleted as it implies
that an offsite emergency response facility is needed, when in fact
NRC's own studies in NUREG-1140 demonstrate that the consequences of an
accident at an ISFSI are insignificant in terms of the public health
and safety. Furthermore, NRC has generally affirmed this conclusion
through its evaluation of Defueled Emergency Plans for nuclear power
plants which are permanently defueled but continue to store spent fuel
on site (Possession Only License). The emergency plans for these
facilities are appropriately focused on the onsite aspects of emergency
response, while maintaining the ability to notify offsite authorities
such as the fire, police, and medical personnel who play a role in
addressing onsite emergency response. No licensee-provided ``near-
site'' facility is needed for such offsite authorities to implement
their onsite emergency planning responsibilities.
Response. The Commission agrees. This change is incorporated in the
final regulation.
Issue 33. Mitigation of consequences (Sec. 72.32(a)(5)): The NRC
proposes that the licensee describe those actions which would be taken
to mitigate the consequences of each type of accident. This requirement
should be revised to require that the licensee describe the response
actions for each classification of emergency.
Response. The regulation already requires, ``Information to be
communicated. A brief description of the types of information on
facility status; radioactive releases; and recommended protective
actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite response organizations
and to the NRC.''
Issue 34. Responsibilities (Sec. 72.32(a)(7)): The term ``offsite
response organizations'' should be revised to ``offsite authorities''
in recognition of the findings of NUREG-1140, i.e., the consequences of
accidental releases associated with the operation of an ISFSI would not
exceed the EPA Protective Action Guidelines. The term ``offsite
response organizations'' connotes a need for formal offsite components
to the onsite emergency plan and thus, an offsite emergency response
plan. This interpretation would be inconsistent with the conclusions of
NUREG-1140 which postulated the worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI
and found that the consequences were insignificant in terms of public
health and safety. To preclude misinterpretation, the term ``offsite
authorities'' should be used.
Response. The Commission disagrees that the term ``offsite response
organizations'' connotes the need for ``formal offsite components'' to
the onsite emergency plan. The term simply refers to those offsite
organizations that may be needed to respond to an emergency (medical,
fire department, police, etc.)
Issue 35. Information to be communicated (Sec. 72.32(a)(9)): As
concluded by the NRC in NUREG-1140, the consequences of the postulated
worst-case accident involving an ISFSI are insignificant in terms of
public health and safety. Therefore, because no offsite protective
actions are needed, this requirement should be revised to require that
the licensee communicate [[Page 32437]] only onsite facility status to
offsite authorities.
Response. The Commission disagrees with the suggestion to delete
the requirement that licensees notify offsite organizations of
recommended protective actions. The Commission acknowledges that the
consequences of a postulated worst-case accident involving an ISFSI are
insignificant in terms of public health and safety. Nonetheless, the
Commission also recognizes the need for offsite organizations to be
informed by licensees so that, in the event of an accident, protective
actions may or may not need to be taken.
Issue 36. Notification and coordination (Sec. 72.32(a)(8)): As
recommended for Sec. 72.32(a)(7), the term ``offsite response
organizations'' should be revised to ``offsite authorities.''
Response. See Commission Response to Issue 34.
Issue 37. Types of accident (Sec. 72.32(a)(2): The NRC has proposed
that the licensee identify the ``types of accidents'' that could occur
at an ISFSI installation ``for which protective actions may be
needed.'' This requirement should be deleted because the analysis of
potential accidents and their consequences, as documented in NUREG-
1140, demonstrates that there are no accidents for which protective
actions for the public may be needed. Furthermore, even if there were
such accidents, the emergency plan is not the appropriate document for
a description of the types of accidents that could occur. As is
similarly done for operating reactors, any discussion on types of
accidents is contained in the ISFSI Safety Analysis Report that
supports the license application. Therefore, the licensee should be
required only to identify the classification of accidents in 10 CFR
72.32(a)(3) and, in general, response to those classifications, as is
similarly required for operating plants.
Response. The Commission agrees to delete the words ``* * * for
which protective action may be needed.'' Nonetheless, the Commission
believes that licensees should identify the types of accidents in the
emergency plan in the same manner as part 30, 40, and 70 licensees have
done since 1989.
Issue 38. At a minimum, NRC should revise the term ``protective
actions'' to ``protective measures.'' The term ``protective actions,''
as used by operating reactors, connotes the need for an offsite
emergency response plan. In the case of an ISFSI, there is no need for
an offsite emergency response plan because the consequences of
potential accidents which can occur will not exceed the EPA Protective
Action Guidelines. Furthermore, the term ``protective measures'' is now
commonly used by Possession Only License holders to distinguish between
onsite and offsite needs. Therefore, to preclude misinterpretation, we
recommend that the term ``protective measures'' be used.
Response. The Commission disagrees. There is nothing in the
emergency planning licensing regulations for ISFSI that requires,
implies, specifies or connotes the need for a formal offsite emergency
response plan.
Issue 39. Changing the proposed 10 CFR part 72 to require local
involvement in the creation of the emergency response plan and require
funding of local emergency planning and preparedness activities
directly attributable to the additional and above ordinary risk of
Spent Fuel Storage Facilities and Monitored Retrievable Storage
Facilities is appropriate, given the above ordinary risk such
facilities present to the local government units in their vicinity.
Response. In view of the requirements in this rule, regarding the
potential involvement by local governments, a licensee may have an
incentive based on its own self-interest to assist in providing
manpower, items of equipment, or other resources that the local
governments may need but are themselves unable to provide. The
Commission believes that the question of whether the NRC should or
could require a licensee to contribute to the expenses incurred by
local governments in assisting in emergency planning and preparedness
is beyond the scope of the rule.
Issue 40. Provisions should be included in the proposed rule to
exempt Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) with very
limited radionuclide inventories from the emergency planning
requirements. This is best accomplished by establishing certain
threshold values for the radiological consequences of potential
accidents below which exemption can be granted.
Response. The Commission does not agree. An ISFSI is licensed to
store specific inventories of radionuclides. The requirements focus on
the emergency planning licensing requirements of an ISFSI, not the
amount of fuel that may or may not be stored in an individual ISFSI
during a specific time period.
Issue 41. 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12)(ii) specifies that the licensee
critique each exercise using individuals not having direct
responsibility for the plan. This regulation, while well intentioned,
is burdensome, costly, and does not allow the personnel with emergency
preparedness knowledge to identify and correct potential weaknesses.
This statement seems to satisfy the requirements for independent
review, not exercise performance (i.e., similar to Sec. 50.54(t)).
Response. See Commission Response to Issue 30.
Issue 42. 10 CFR 72.32(a) does not define the term, ``site of a
nuclear power reactor.'' Does the term mean the owner controlled area,
the site boundary, or protected area? Based on the definition of the
term, the regulations could require some licensees that build ISFSI
near their nuclear power plants but not on the site to have two
emergency plans established. Consideration should be given to
clarifying terms in order to avoid this problem especially since
nuclear power plant emergency plans are substantially more extensive
than ISFSI emergency plans.
Response. The Commission agrees. The final regulations states ``not
located within the exclusion areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 100 of a
nuclear power reactor.''
Issue 43. The 10 CFR Part 70 emergency planning requirements
(Sec. 70.22), which served as the model for the proposed rule, includes
a provision for relief based on potential radioactive consequences. It
contains the option of demonstrating that the consequences of an
accidental release are below certain levels and thereby eliminated the
need for emergency preparedness. We recommend that a parallel provision
be included in the proposed rule for the ISFSI. This would enable ISFSI
with minimal radioactive sources to avoid the substantial costs
associated with emergency preparedness which would far outweigh the
negligible benefit to the safety of the public.
Response. See Commission Response to Issue 40.
Issue 44. Unfortunately, the public is not very reassured by the
idea that the only offsite emergency planning that the discussion on
the MRS cites is that the operators of the facility should have current
phone numbers of offsite emergency services. Nor is the public very
reassured that the NRC asserts that the maximum off-site exposure from
an MRS would be 1 rem. If this were true, there is a legitimate concern
about being subjected to radiation equivalent to 50 additional chest x-
rays--presumably without any notification or disclosure, let alone
opportunity to avoid such irradiation. However, it does not seem
credible that one could gather together the highest concentration of
radioactivity on the planet and assert that there will be virtually no
risk of exposure. This overlooks, at the very least, the potential for
malicious attack on the facility from the air, such as the United
States has engaged in wiping out ``strategic targets'' in other
countries.
Response. A more accurate characterization of the offsite emergency
planning component for an MRS is as follows: ``(7) Responsibilities. A
brief description of the responsibilities of licensee personnel should
an accident occur, including identification of personnel responsible
for promptly notifying offsite response organizations and the NRC;''
and ``(9) Information to be communicated. A brief description of the
types of information on facility status; radioactive release; and
recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite
response organizations and to the NRC.'' and ``(10) * * * special
instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire,
police, medical and other emergency personnel;'' and ``(12) * * * The
licensee shall invite offsite response organizations to participate in
the annual exercises.''
Additionally, the offsite emergency planning component for an MRS
includes:
(i) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite
assistance on site have been made.
(ii) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal
response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who would be
responding onsite.
(iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and
monitoring actual potential consequence of a radiological emergency
condition are available.
(vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made
available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an
emergency onsite.
(16) Arrangements made to provide information to the public.
Also, see the Commission's response to Issue 46.
Issue 45. The discussion of MRS emergency planning indicates the
dependence upon offsite emergency responders. The fact that individuals
would be called upon to respond to radiological crises without any
special training, without protective gear and equipment is deeply
disturbing to local community officials with whom we have reviewed this
proposal. The full liability for dealing with emergency situations
should reside with the operators of such a facility and those who are
specially trained and understand that they are at risk, and are
compensated on that basis. Dependence upon untrained local responders
in a true emergency would amount to human sacrifice, and is not
acceptable.
Response. The regulations allow for extensive coordination,
communication, and training of offsite response organizations. (See
Commission Response to Issue 19.)
Issue 46. Although the MRS will represent the largest concentration
of irradiated fuel, to date, in one location, the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission has recently proposed a rule that would waive any
offsite emergency planning or evacuation, in direct contradiction to
the promises of safety to prospective host communities.
Response. In the final NRC Generic Environmental Impact Statement
on the handling and storage of light water reactor fuel,5 it is
stated that [[Page 32438]]
\5\ NUREG-0575 Vol. 1 sec. 4.2.2 Safety and Accident
Considerations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * To be a potential radiological hazard to the general
public, radioactive materials must be released from a facility and
dispersed offsite. For this to happen:
The radioactive material must be in a dispersible form
There must be a mechanism available for the release of
such materials from the facility, and
There must be a mechanism available for offsite
dispersion of such released material.
Although the inventory of radioactive material contained in 1000
MTHM of aged spent fuel may be on the order of a billion curies or
more, very little is available in a dispersible form; there is no
mechanism available for the release of radioactive materials in
significant quantities from facility; and the only mechanism available
for offsite dispersion is atmosphere dispersion * * *.
Furthermore, NRC has conducted Safety Evaluations on many different
storage systems. Those studies included evaluations of the effects of
corrosion, handling accidents such as cask drops and tipovers,
explosions, fires, floods, earthquakes, and severe weather conditions.
As documented in each of those Safety Evaluation Reports (SER), NRC was
not able to identify any design basis accident that would result in the
failure of a confinement boundary. However, to provide a conservative
bounding analysis of the threat to the public health and safety, the
failure of the confinement barrier was postulated. As discussed in each
of the SERs and again in the response to Issue 48 the consequences of
this postulated failure do not result in an increased risk to the
public health and safety.
In the environmental assessment for 10 CFR part 72,6 the
accident judged the most severe was the failure of a packaged fuel
element. In this analysis, the accident involves the failure of a
storage system containing 1.7 MTHM. The postulated individual doses are
presented in Table 1.7
\6\ NUREG-1092 Environmental Assessment for part 72 ``Licensing
Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel and High-Level Radioactive
Waste.''
\7\ NUREG-1092 Table 2.2.4-2
Table 1.--Total Dose to an Individual as a Result of a Fuel Canister Failure Accident at a Surface Storage
Installation (mrem)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pathway Skin Total body Thyroid Lung
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Submersion.......................... 1.0 x 10-1 1.1 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-3 1.1 x 10-3
Inhalation.............................. ................ 1.2 x 10-5 1.1 x 10-2 7.3 x 10-5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Total............................. 1.0 x 10-1 1.1 x 10-3 1.2 x 10-2 1.1 x 10-3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The maximum individual is defined as a permanent resident at a location 1600 meters southeast of the stack
with a time-integrated atmospheric dispersion coefficient (E/Q of 1.5 x 10-4 sec/m3). The accident involves
failure of a fuel canister containing approximately 1.7 MTHM.
Since the time these calculations were performed, the storage
canisters have increased in capacity, and today the capacity of the
largest approved design is approximately 9 MTHM. However, because dose
varies directly with inventory, when the totals are increased by a
factor of ten, they are still a very small fraction of the 300 mrem/yr
8 an individual receives from natural background radiation, and is
below the EPA protective action guides.
\8\ NRCP Report No. 94.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also see the Commission's response to Issues 19 and 48.
Issue 47. It is premature for the Commission to make a rule with
regard to emergency planning for an MRS. We also agree with others who
point out [[Page 32439]] that the MRS is a significantly different
facility than an ISFSI--for two reasons. The first is the difference in
the amount of irradiated fuel that would be present at the site: it is
four orders of magnitude greater at an MRS than a single reactor site's
load. The second is the fact that the MRS, according to the most common
model described, would be a repackaging center for the waste. This
industrial scale handling of high-level waste and irradiated fuel
raises many safety and release concerns.
Response. See the Commission's response to Issues 18 and 48.
Issue 48. The commenter believes that the massive concentration of
irradiated fuel at the reactor sites should have been the occasion for
revisiting the emergency planning for each nuclear power plant. The
irradiated fuel inventory on site far exceeds the amount of radioactive
material contained within the reactor core at any one time. The fact
that irradiated fuel has been forced to accumulate at reactor sites is
no reason to now dismiss that greater radiological hazard that it poses
to the populace and the environment. A rulemaking on the ISFSI in our
view should include; ``at reactor site facilities'' and examine the
current emergency planning with regard to the potential for much
greater releases in the event of sabotage or natural disaster.
Response. For there to be a significant environmental impact
resulting from an accident involving the dry storage of spent nuclear
fuel, a significant amount of the radioactive material contained within
a cask must escape its packaging and enter the biosphere. There are two
primary factors that protect the public health and safety from this
event. The first is the design requirements for the cask that are
imposed by regulation. The regulatory requirements, as codified in the
10 CFR part 72, have sufficient safety margins so that, during normal
storage cask handling operations, off-normal events, adverse
environmental conditions, and severe natural phenomena, the casks will
not release a significant part of its inventory to the biosphere.
Furthermore, the cask must be designed to provide confinement safety
functions during the unlikely but credible design basis events, as
required in Sec. 72.122(b). In addition, Sec. 72.122(h)(i) requires
that the fuel clad be protected against degradation that leads to gross
rupture, and Sec. 72.122(1) requires that the fuel be retrievable.
During the design evaluation process, these provisions received careful
consideration. These general design criteria place an upper bound on
the energy a cask can absorb before the fuel is damaged. No credible
dynamic events have been identified that could impart such significant
amounts of energy to a storage cask after that cask is placed at the
ISFSI.
Additionally, there is a second factor which does not rely upon the
cask itself but considers the age of the spent fuel and the lack of
dispersal mechanisms. There exists no significant dispersal mechanism
for the radioactive material contained within a storage cask. In the
case of an operating nuclear power plant, the dispersal mechanism for
radioactive material in the spent fuel is either derived from the heat
produced during the fission process or the decay heat which exists in
the short period immediately following shutdown. During these times,
the potential exists for an accident that could cause the fuel cladding
to fail. However, emergency systems exist at every power plant to
protect against just such an occurrence. On the other hand, spent fuel
stored in an ISFSI is required to be cooled for at least 1 year. Based
on the design limitations, the majority of spent fuel is cooled greater
than 5 years. At this age, spent fuel has a heat generation rate that
is too low to cause significant particulate dispersal in the unlikely
event of a cask confinement boundary failure. Therefore, the
consequences of worst-case accidents involving an ISFSI located on a
reactor site would be significantly less than those accidents involving
the reactor. Therefore, current reactor emergency plans adequately
provide for the protection of the public from the ISFSI located at or
near reactor sites.
Issue 49. An ISFSI not at a reactor warrants site-specific
emergency planning that includes evacuation of surrounding population
at least as stringent as nuclear reactor licensing. For example,
specific provisions should be included requiring: (1) Coordination of
the on-site plan with the off-site local and state emergency management
agencies; (2) training of the potential off-site responders; and (3)
public information/education for local populations.
Response. The Commission does not agree that as a general matter
emergency plans for an ISFSI must include evacuation planning.
Nonetheless the Commission agrees that the specific provisions
mentioned in the comment should be and are specifically included in the
proposed and final emergency planning licensing requirements for ISFSI
and MRS. See 10 CFR 72.32(a) (10), (12), (14), and (16) and 10 CFR
72.32(b) (10), (12), (14), (15), and (16).
Issue 50. There is no mention of financing the affected
jurisdictions to provide the requisite resources to support the
planning, operations, response, exercises, recovery and equipment
requirements defined as necessary in the plan for off-site agency
response.
Response. See the Commission's response to Issue 39.
Issue 51. The NRC should defer as premature the proposed
Sec. 72.32(b), which would establish emergency planning requirements
for MRS's, until a final MRS design has been selected. Until it is
decided whether such facilities would be equivalent, in the
Commission's words, to ``a large industrial facility'' or merely to ``a
warehouse operation,'' there is no rational basis to determine the
appropriate level of emergency planning requirements.
Response. See Commission Response to Issue 18.
Issue 52. NRC should prepare a full environmental impact statement
before issuing any emergency response guidelines. The potential for
environmental damage from accidents during the transportation, storage
and repackaging of spent fuel rods cannot even be calculated until DOE
determines whether to develop a universal cask or a dual purpose cask
for transportation/storage/disposal of spent fuel rods. Until this very
preliminary decision is made, there is no way of determining what level
of activity (or the dangers from that activity) will actually take
place at an MRS facility. NRC's response to this uncertainty, ``to
mandate a minimum level of offsite response capability'' does not
address potential and very real risks to the public.
Response. The Commission disagrees. The Commission stated the
following in the preamble to the proposed rule:
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, the Commission's regulations in
subpart A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not
be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment; and therefore, an environmental impact statement
is not required. The rule would not affect the probability or the
size of accidental radioactive releases. It might in some cases
reduce the doses people near the facility site could receive. The
environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on
which this determination is based are available for inspection at
the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW. (Lower Level),
Washington, DC. The environmental assessment and finding of no
significant impact are contained in Section 4.3 of NUREG-1140, ``A
Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and
[[Page 32440]] Other Radioactive Material Licensees.'' 9 Single
copies are available upon written request from NRC Distribution
Section, Office of Administration, USNRC, Washington, DC 20555.
\9\ Copies of NUREGs may be purchased from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Mail Stop SSOP,
Washington, DC 20402-9328. Copies are also available from the
National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road,
Springfield, VA 22161. A copy is also available for inspection and
copying for a fee in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street,
NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Issue 53. An MRS facility poses far greater potential risk to the
public than even a nuclear power plant simply by virtue of the quantity
of spent fuel rods to be stored. For example, a nuclear power plant
stores no more than 1 metric ton of spent fuel while the MRS facility
is authorized to store from 10,000 to 15,000 metric tons of spent fuel.
Therefore, licensing procedures and requirements for an MRS facility
must be more strict than even those required for a nuclear power plant.
Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 48.
Issue 54. The NRC must require off-site evacuation planning for MRS
facilities. NRC estimates that ``the maximum dose to a member of the
public offsite due to an accidental release of radioactive materials
would likely not exceed 1 rem effective dose equivalent'' cannot be
defended because of the uncertainties. Without an EIS, NRC must at a
minimum assume that an MRS facility poses an equal danger to the public
as a nuclear reactor does. CCNS therefore recommends that NRC minimally
require a 10-mile radius evacuation plan for MRS facilities.
Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 48.
Issue 55. The NRC's requirement to ``notify offsite response
organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical
assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers''
is completely unrealistic. The current applicants for MRS facilities
are all Indian Nations whose reservations are located in rural areas
with no emergency response training, equipment or expertise for
handling nuclear emergencies. At a minimum, NRC's proposed rule must
require training and equipment for both emergency response personnel as
well as hospital facilities.
Response. See the Commission's Response to Issue 19.
Additionally, the Commission received 21 suggested editorial
changes to the wording of the proposed regulations. Those changes that
improved or clarified the proposed regulations were incorporated into
the final regulations. Those suggested changes in wording that departed
from the Commission's original intent were not incorporated into the
final regulations.
Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
The Commission has determined under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended, the Commission's regulations in subpart
A of 10 CFR part 51, that this rule is not a major Federal action
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and
therefore, an environmental impact statement is not required. The rule
does not affect the probability or the size of accidental radioactive
releases. It might in some cases reduce the doses people near the
facility site could receive. The environmental assessment and finding
of no significant impact on which this determination is based are
available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L
Street, NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. The environmental assessment
and finding of no significant impact are contained in 4.3 of NUREG-
1140, ``A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle
and Other Radioactive Material Licensees.''
Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
This final rule amends information collection requirements that are
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Action 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et
seq.). These requirements were approved by the Office of Management and
Budget approval number 3150-0132.
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is
estimated to average 625 hours per response, including the time for
reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the
collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate
or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for further reducing reporting burden to the Information
and Records Management Branch, T-6F33, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0132), Office
of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.
Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis on this final
regulation. The analysis examines the accident scenarios considered by
the Commission as well as the costs and benefits of actions considered.
The analysis is available by contacting Michael T. Jamgochian, Office
of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301-415-6534).
Regulatory Flexibility Certification
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C.
6059b), the Commission certifies that this rule does not have a
significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small
entities.
The final rule requires the development and implementation of
emergency plans by licensees who are authorized to possess significant
amounts of radioactive material. These companies do not fall within the
definition of a small business found in the Small Business Act, 15
U.S.C. 632, or within the small business size standards set forth in 13
CFR part 121. The final rule will affect three (3) licensees. Two
licensees hold 10 CFR part 50 licenses and are required to comply with
the provisions respecting emergency plans set out in part 50. Thus, the
final rule does not impose a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities, as defined in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980.
Backfit Analysis
The NRC has determined that the backfit rule, 10 CFR 50.109 and 10
CFR 72.62, do not apply to this rule change because these amendments do
not involve any provisions which would impose backfits as defined in
Sec. 50.109(a)(1) or in 10 CFR 72.62. The final rule does not change or
impose additional requirements on any ISFSI currently licensed under 10
CFR part 72. For existing ISFSIs at reactor sites, the final rule
continues the current option to comply with 10 CFR 50.47. For G.E.
Morris, the only ISFSI licensed under 10 CFR part 72 for operation away
from a reactor site, the licensee currently is required to have
emergency response capabilities that will comply with this rule.
Therefore, inasmuch as the rule imposes no requirements on any part 50
facility and imposes no new or different requirements on any part 72
facility after a license has been issued, a backfit analysis is,
therefore, not required for this final rule.
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 72
Manpower training programs, Nuclear materials, Occupational safety
and health, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security
measures, Spent fuel.
[[Page 32441]] For the reasons set out in the preamble, and under
the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C 552, and 553, the
NRC is adopting the following amendments to 10 CFR part 72:
PART 72--LICENSING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT STORAGE OF
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
1. The authority citation for part 72 is revised to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 57, 62, 63, 65, 69, 81, 161, 182, 183,
184, 186, 187, 189, 68 Stat. 929, 930, 932, 933, 934, 935, 948, 953,
954, 955, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2071, 2073, 2077, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2099, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233,
2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274, Pub. L. 86-373, 73 Stat.
688, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2021); sec. 201, as amended, 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1242, as amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846);
Pub. L. 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 295 as amended by Pub. L. 102-486,
sec 7902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.W. 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L. 91-190,
83 Stat. (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 141, Pub.
L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2229, 2230, 2232, 2241, sec. 148, Pub. L. 100-
203, 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10151, 10152, 10153, 10155,
10157, 10161, 10168).
Section 72.44(g) also issued under secs. 142(b) and 148(c), (d),
Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-232, 1330-236 (42 U.S.C. 10162(b),
10168(c), (d). Section 72.46 also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat.
935 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub. L. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42
U.S.C. 10154). Section 72.96(d) also issued under sec. 145(g), Pub.
L. 100-203; 101 Stat. 1330-235 (42 U.S.C. 10165(g)). Subpart J also
issued under secs. 2(2), 2(15), 2(19), 117(a), 141(h), Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2202, 2203, 2204, 2222, 2244 (42 U.S.C. 10101,
10137(a), 10161(h). Subparts K and L are also issued under sec. 133,
96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10153) and 218(a), 96 Stat. 2252 (42 U.S.C.
10198).
2. Section 72.32 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 72.32 Emergency Plan.
(a) Each application for an ISFSI that is licensed under this part
which is: Not located on the site of a nuclear power reactor, or not
located within the exclusion area as defined in 10 CFR part 100 of a
nuclear power reactor, or located on the site of a nuclear power
reactor which does not have an operating license, or located on the
site of a nuclear power reactor that is not authorized to operate must
be accompanied by an Emergency Plan that includes the following
information:
(1) Facility description. A brief description of the licensee's
facility and area near the site.
(2) Types of accidents. An identification of each type of
radioactive materials accident.
(3) Classification of accidents. A classification system for
classifying accidents as ``alerts.''
(4) Detection of accidents. Identification of the means of
detecting an accident condition.
(5) Mitigation of consequences. A brief description of the means of
mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those
provided to protect workers onsite, and a description of the program
for maintaining the equipment.
(6) Assessment of releases. A brief description of the methods and
equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.
(7) Responsibilities. A brief description of the responsibilities
of licensee personnel should an accident occur, including
identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite
response organizations and the NRC; also responsibilities for
developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.
(8) Notification and coordination. A commitment to and a brief
description of the means to promptly notify offsite response
organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical
assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers
when appropriate. A control point must be established. The notification
and coordination must be planned so that unavailability of some
personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent
the notification and coordination. The licensee shall also commit to
notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the
appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour
after the licensee declares an emergency.10
\10\ These reporting requirements do not supersede or release
licensees of complying with the requirements under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L.
99-499 or other State or Federal reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(9) Information to be communicated. A brief description of the
types of information on facility status; radioactive releases; and
recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite
response organizations and to the NRC.
(10) Training. A brief description of the training the licensee
will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special
instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire,
police, medical and other emergency personnel.
(11) Safe condition. A brief description of the means of restoring
the facility to a safe condition after an accident.
(12) Exercises. (i) Provisions for conducting semiannual
communications checks with offsite response organizations and biennial
onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies.
Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire drills shall be
conducted annually. Semiannual communications checks with offsite
response organizations must include the check and update of all
necessary telephone numbers. The licensee shall invite offsite response
organizations to participate in the biennial exercise.
(ii) Participation of offsite response organizations in biennial
exercises, although recommended, is not required. Exercises must use
scenarios not known to most exercise participants. The licensee shall
critique each exercise using individuals not having direct
implementation responsibility for conducting the exercise. Critiques of
exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan, emergency
procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and overall
effectiveness of the response. Deficiencies found by the critiques must
be corrected.
(13) Hazardous chemicals. A certification that the applicant has
met its responsibilities under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L. 99-499, with respect to
hazardous materials at the facility.
(14) Comments on Plan. The licensee shall allow the offsite
response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60
days to comment on the initial submittal of the licensee's emergency
plan before submitting it to NRC. Subsequent plan changes need not have
the offsite comment period unless the plan changes affect the offsite
response organizations. The licensee shall provide any comments
received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.
(15) Offsite assistance. The applicant's emergency plans shall
include a brief description of the arrangements made for requesting and
effectively using offsite assistance on site and provisions that exist
for using other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite
response.
(16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.
(b) Each application for an MRS that is licensed under this part
and each application for an ISFSI that is licensed [[Page 32442]] under
this part and that may process and/or repackage spent fuel, must be
accompanied by an Emergency Plan that includes the following
information:
(1) Facility description. A brief description of the licensee
facility and area near the site.
(2) Types of accidents. An identification of each type of
radioactive materials accident.
(3) Classification of accidents. A classification system for
classifying accidents as ``alerts'' or ``site area emergencies.''
(4) Detection of accidents. Identification of the means of
detecting an accident condition.
(5) Mitigation of consequences. A brief description of the means of
mitigating the consequences of each type of accident, including those
provided to protect workers on site, and a description of the program
for maintaining the equipment.
(6) Assessment of releases. A brief description of the methods and
equipment to assess releases of radioactive materials.
(7) Responsibilities. A brief description of the responsibilities
of licensee personnel should an accident occur, including
identification of personnel responsible for promptly notifying offsite
response organizations and the NRC; also responsibilities for
developing, maintaining, and updating the plan.
(8) Notification and coordination. A commitment to and a brief
description of the means to promptly notify offsite response
organizations and request offsite assistance, including medical
assistance for the treatment of contaminated injured onsite workers
when appropriate. A control point must be established. The notification
and coordination must be planned so that unavailability of some
personnel, parts of the facility, and some equipment will not prevent
the notification and coordination. The licensee shall also commit to
notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the
appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour
after the licensee declares an emergency.11
\11\ These reporting requirements do not supersede or release
licensees of complying with the requirements under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L.
99-499 or other State or Federal reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(9) Information to be communicated. A brief description of the
types of information on facility status; radioactive releases; and
recommended protective actions, if necessary, to be given to offsite
response organizations and to the NRC.
(10) Training. A brief description of the training the licensee
will provide workers on how to respond to an emergency and any special
instructions and orientation tours the licensee would offer to fire,
police, medical and other emergency personnel.
(11) Safe condition. A brief description of the means of restoring
the facility to a safe condition after an accident.
(12) Exercises. (i) Provisions for conducting quarterly
communications checks with offsite response organizations and biennial
onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies.
Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire Drills shall be held
semiannually. Quarterly communications checks with offsite response
organizations must include the check and update of all necessary
telephone numbers. The licensee shall invite offsite response
organizations to participate in the biennial exercises.
(ii) Participation of offsite response organizations in the
biennial exercises, although recommended, is not required. Exercises
must use scenarios not known to most exercise participants. The
licensee shall critique each exercise using individuals not having
direct implementation responsibility for conducting the exercise.
Critiques of exercises must evaluate the appropriateness of the plan,
emergency procedures, facilities, equipment, training of personnel, and
overall effectiveness of the response. Deficiencies found by the
critiques must be corrected.
(13) Hazardous chemicals. A certification that the applicant has
met its responsibilities under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Title III, Pub. L. 99-499, with respect to
hazardous materials at the facility.
(14) Comments on Plan. The licensee shall allow the offsite
response organizations expected to respond in case of an accident 60
days to comment on the initial submittal of the licensee's emergency
plan before submitting it to NRC. Subsequent plan changes need not have
the offsite comment period unless the plan changes affect the offsite
response organizations. The licensee shall provide any comments
received within the 60 days to the NRC with the emergency plan.
(15) Offsite assistance. The applicant's emergency plans shall
include the following:
(i) A brief description of the arrangements made for requesting and
effectively using offsite assistance on site and provisions that exist
for using other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite
response.
(ii) Provisions that exist for prompt communications among
principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who
would be responding onsite.
(iii) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the
emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.
(iv) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and
monitoring actual or potential consequences of a radiological emergency
condition are available.
(v) Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated and
injured onsite individuals.
(vi) Radiological Emergency Response Training has been made
available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an emergency
onsite.
(16) Arrangements made for providing information to the public.
(c) For an ISFSI that is:
(1) located on the site, or
(2) located within the exclusion area as defined in 10 CFR part
100, of a nuclear power reactor licensed for operation by the
Commission, the emergency plan required by 10 CFR 50.47 shall be deemed
to satisfy the requirements of this section.
(d) A licensee with a license issued under this part may take
reasonable action that departs from a license condition or a technical
specification (contained in a license issued under this part) in an
emergency when this action is immediately needed to protect the public
health and safety and no action consistent with license conditions and
technical specifications that can provide adequate or equivalent
protection is immediately apparent.
Dated at Rockville, MD, this 16th day of June 1995.
For the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Andrew L. Bates,
Acting Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 95-15285 Filed 6-21-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
